Islam in Iran

History of Islam in Iran

Islamic conquest of Persia Islamization of Iran Islamic golden age Revolution of 1979 Islamic republic of Iran

Notable scholars

Salman the Persian • Shaikh Saduq Shaikh Kulainy • Hakim al-Nishaburi Tabari • Shaykh Tusi Ghazali • Fakhr al-Din al-Razi Avicenna • Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī Rumi • Abdul-Qadir Gilani Suhrawardi • Mulla Sadra Allameh Tabatabaei Ruhollah Khomeini

Sects

Twelvers • Zaidis Nizaris • Alavids • Sunnis Sufism

Islamic Cities/Regions

Mashhad • Qom • Ray

Culture

Nizamiyya • Hawza • Shu'ubiyya Commemoration of Ashura

Architecture

Mosques in Iran • Imam Reza shrine Ziaratgah • Naqsh-i Jahan Square Iranian architecture

Organizations

Bonyad • Astan Quds Razavi • Imam Khomeini Relief Committee • Bonyad-e Mostazafen va Janbazan •Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan This box: view talk edit

Bonyads are charitable trusts in Iran that play a significant role in Iran's non-petroleum economy, controlling an estimated 20% of Iran's GDP.^[1] Exempt from taxes, they have been called "bloated",^[2] and "a major weakness of Iran’s economy",^[3] and criticized for reaping "huge subsidies from government", while siphoning off production to the lucrative black market and providing limited and inadequate charity to the poor.^[2]

Background[link]

Monarchy[link]

Founded as royal foundations by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the original bonyads were criticized for providing a "smokescreen of charity" to patronage, economic control, for-profit wheeling and dealing done with the goal of "keep[ing] the Shah in Power."^[4] Resembling more a secretive conglomerate than a charitable trust, these bonyads invested heavily in property development, such as the Kish Island resort; but the developments' housing and retail was oriented to the middle and upper classes, rather than the poor and needy.^[5]

Islamic Republic[link]

After the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Bonyads were nationalized and renamed with the declared intention of redistributing income to the poor and families of martyrs, i.e. those killed in the service of the country. The assets of many Iranians whose ideas or social positions ran contrary to the new Islamic government were also confiscated and given to the Bonyads without any consequence.

Today, there are over 100 Bonyads,^[6] and they are criticized for many of the same reasons as their predecessors. They form tax-exempt, government subsidized, consortiums receiving religious donations and answerable directly (and only) to the Supreme Leader of Iran. The Bonyads are involved in everything from vast soybean and cotton fields to hotels to soft drinks to auto-manufacturing to shipping lines. The most prominent, the Bonyad-e Mostazafen va Janbazan, (Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled), for example, "controls 20% of the country's production of textiles, 40% of soft drinks, two-thirds of all glass products and a dominant share also in tiles, chemicals, tires, foodstuffs."^[7] Some economists argue that its chair, and not the Minister of Finance or president of the Central bank, is considered the most powerful economic post in Iran.^[8] In addition to the very large national Bonyads, "almost every Iranian town has its own bonyad", affiliated with local mullahs.^[9]

Estimates of how many people the bonyads employ ranges from in excess of 400,000^[10] to "as many as 5 million".^[3]

Criticism[link]

Bonyads are criticized as enormously wasteful: overstaffed,^[11] corrupt, and generally unprofitable. In 1999 Mohammad Forouzandeh, a former defense minister, reported that 80% of Iran's Bonyad companies were losing money.^[11]

Bonyad companies also compete with Iran's unprotected private sector, whose firms complain of the difficulty of competing with bonyad firms whose political connections provide government permits and subsidies which eliminate worries over the need to make a profit in many market sectors. These Bonyads, by their very presence, hamper healthy economic competition, efficient use of capital and other resources, and growth.^[6]

Unification of Iran's social security system[link]

As charity organizations they are supposed to provide social services to the poor and the needy; however, "since there are over 100 of these organisations operating independently, the government doesn't know what, why, how and to whom this help and assistance is given." Bonyads do not fall under Iran’s General Accounting Law and, consequently, are not subject to financial audits.^[12] Unaccountable to the Central Bank governor, the bonyads "jealously guard their books from prying eyes."^[13] Lack of proper oversight and control of these foundations has also hampered the government's efforts in creating a comprehensive, central and unified social security system in the country, undertaken since 2003.^[6][14] Iran has 12 million people living below the poverty line, six million of whom are not supported by any foundation or organization.^[15]

Rather than charitable organizations, the bonyads have been described as "patronage-oriented holding companies that ensure the channeling of revenues to groups and milieus supporting the regime," but don't help the poor as a class.^[16] Another complaint describes them as having kept to their charitable mission for the first decade of the Islamic Republic, but having "increasingly forsaken their social welfare functions for straightforward commercial activities" since the death of Imam Khomeini.^[9] Local city and town bonyad have been accused of sometimes using extortionate tehniques to draw the traditional Shia Islamic 20% khums donations from local business owners.^[9]

Seized assets[link]

In certain well known instances, such as the confiscation of the properties and assets of the Boroumand family of Esfahan, the Islamic Revolutionary Court judge responsible for unjustly ordering the seizure and confiscation of that family's belongings was identified as a criminal, who was subsequently executed by the Islamic regime on charges of "corruption on earth", yet his confiscation ruling was let to stand.^{[citation needed]}

In the rare instances where courts have ordered the Bonyad Mostazafan to return the properties of individuals whose belongings were unjustly seized, the Bonyad Mostazafan has refused to do so, instead offering to remunerate those individuals at the prices prevalent at the time at which those assets were seized in 1979, effectively denying the legitimate owners over 30 years of lost income and compensating them at only a tiny fraction of the true value of their belongings.^{[citation needed]}

List of major bonyads[link]

• Bonyad-e Mostazafen va Janbazan (Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled), one of the largest welfare organization, A semi-public foundation originally founded in 1979 with the assets of the last Shah’s family; it operates a wide variety of charitable activities. With a reported $10 billion in assets (2003).^[17]
• Astan Quds Razavi (Imam Reza shrine Foundation), with $15 billion in assets (2003).^[17]
• Bonyad Shahid va Isaar-Garaan (Foundation of the Martyrs and the Affairs of Self-Sacrificers),
• Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan (Foundation of Martyrs and Veteran Affairs), one of the biggest with over 100 companies. Provides welfare assistance to families of the Martyrs of the Iran-Iraq war.
• Pilgrimage Foundation,
• Housing Foundation,
• Foundation for War Refugees,
• Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, provides sickness, maternity, and work injury benefits to some workers in the private sector.

See also[link]

	Iran portal
	Cooperatives portal

• Smuggling in Iran
• Economy of Iran
• Privatization in Iran
• List of Iranian companies
• Iranian labor law
• International rankings of Iran
• Banking in Iran
• Health care in Iran
• Agriculture in Iran
• Mining in Iran
• Tourism in Iran
• Transport in Iran
• Energy in Iran
• Taxation in Iran

Further reading[link]

• Annual Review by the Central Bank of Iran, including statistics about social security in Iran.
• "A mess." The Economist, July 19, 2001.
• "Stunted and Distorted." The Economist, January 16, 2003.
• "Still fading, still defiant." The Economist, December 9, 2004.
• "Inside Iran's Holy Money Machine." Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2007. Details about the Imam Reza shrine, the largest active bonyad in Iran.
• "Bonyad-e Mostazafen va Janbazan, (Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled)" globalsecurity.org
• World Bank Statistics Human development, social and economic indicators for Iran
• Iran's Ministry of Welfare and Social Security policies still based on charity
• Iran Para-governmental Organizations (bonyads) By Ali A. Saeidi (Source: The Middle East Institute)
• Poverty and Inequality since the Revolution By Djavad Salehi-Isfahani (Source: The Middle East Institute)
• Iran’s Bonyads: Economic Strengths and Weaknesses. Katzman, Kenneth (2006)

External links[link]

• Imam Khomeiny Relief Foundation
• Bonyad Shahid va Isaar-Garaan (Foundation of the Martyrs and the Affairs of Self-Sacrificers)
• Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan (Foundation of Martyrs and Veteran Affairs)
• Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan (Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled)
• Bonyad Panzdah Khordad (Foundation of the 15 Khordad)
• Astan Quds Razavi (Imam Reza Shrine Foundation)

References[link]

This biographical article needs additional citations for verification. Please help by adding reliable sources. Contentious material about living persons that is unsourced or poorly sourced must be removed immediately, especially if potentially libelous or harmful. (April 2007)

Maryam Rajavi
President-elect of the Iranian Resistance
Incumbent
Assumed office 10 August 1993
Preceded by	Masoud Rajavi
Personal details
Born	1953 Tehran, Iran
Political party	National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)
Religion	Twelver Shia Islam

Maryam Rajavi (born Maryam Azodanlu in 1953 in Tehran, Iran) is the wife of Massoud Rajavi, a founder of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). She's the "president-elect" of the National Council of Resistance of Iran.,^[1] a coalition of exiled groups opposed to the Islamic Republic regime. In 1985, she became co-leader of the PMOI along with Massoud Rajavi, and together they made women a main portion of the group's fighting force.

Maryam Rajavi was born in 1953 to a middle class family in Tehran. She has a degree in metallurgical engineering. She speaks English, French and Persian. Mrs. Rajavi became acquainted with the anti-Shah movement in 1970.

In 1982 Maryam Rajavi left Iran for Paris, where the headquarters of the National Council of Resistance was located. In 1993 Rajavi was elected President-Elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an umbrella coalition of which the PMOI is the primary member organization.^[2] As President-Elect, Rajavi has continued to place women in nearly all of the leadership roles within her resistance movement, and believes that women should have equal opportunity with men to participate in social and political activities.^[3]

Views[link]

Maryam Rajavi's Vision for Future Iran[link]

On democracy[link]

" Freedom is the most precious value. It is the very essence of progress... For us, freedom is an ideal and a conviction. It is the spirit that guides our Resistance. Freedom is the raison d'être of our movement, it is the reason for its growth and development..." " ...The reason Khomeini so interferes in all the minute details of the people's lives and leaves them no room to breathe is because the world of this demon and his heirs is comprised of vengeance, obsession, and hatred.... In contrast, we must go among our people with a spirit of compassion and openness. Let them be free. Let them step forward to vote and elect freely. Let a spirit of mutual understanding, forgiveness, love of construction, and national unity take the place of spite and vengeance. Let the scars left by Khomeini on the body of this nation be healed."

On women's emancipation[link]

" Iranian women must free themselves. Freedom does not come free and no one will ever deliver it to us in a silver platter. We must build relationships that are unimpeded by gender-based distinctions and discrimination. The path to liberation begins the moment you believe that no one can prevent the liberation of a woman who has chosen to be free of all fetters we all know too well... " Parallel to the liberation of women, men are also liberated and become even more responsible. This is because men who reject gender-based distinctions and discrimination and recognize women's freedom of choice, first of all liberate themselves." {mospagebreak}

On mullahs & Islam[link]

" These demegogues commit their crimes in the name of Islam, a despicable and horrendous act, and itself one of their most heinous crimes. As a Muslim woman, let me proclaim that the peddlers of religion who rule Iran in the name of Islam, but shed blood, suppress the people and advocate export of fundamentalism and terrorism, are themselves the worst enemy of Islam and Muslims. The day will come when they will be forced to let go of the name of Islam."

On mullahs' misogyny[link]

" Allow me as a woman to tell the wicked and misogynist mullahs: With all of your reactionary and medieval savagery, misogyny and oppression, you have done all you could do to Iranian women, but I warn you to beware of the day when this tremendous historic force is set free... " You will see how you and your backwardness will be uprooted by these free women. You mullahs have chosen, with your unspeakable crimes against women, and you cannot avoid being swept away from Iran's history by these same liberated women." {mospagebreak}

On her future mandate[link]

" I have devoted my life to bring hope for a better future to the people of Iran... And to also prove to the world that Islam as a social and democratic religion is not belligerent and can be productive for women. This is the mandate that gives me inner satisfaction and a sense of true freedom... After the overthrow of the mullahs, we should, more than anything else, try to cure the sense of revenge and hatred amongst our people. We should create unity and expand the spirit of tolerance and patience in the society. It is our mandate to revive the identity and value of Iranian people."

On arts[link]

" Whereas Khomeini espouses the culture of sorrow, despair, and disappointment..., the Iranian Resistance advocates the culture of love, jubilation, affection, life and happiness. So, it is the task of the Resistance at this juncture and in future Iran to prepare the ground for artists to flourish their ingenuity in an open, free and healthy environment. We hope that our genuine culture and art can take the spirit of life and hope, light and brightness, prosperity and abundance throughout the country and deep into heart of every Iranian, fueling the flames of hope for a better life and a brighter future."

Current situation of Iran and Resistance In an internattion conference held in Brussels on January 25, 2011, Maryam Rajavi made a speech outlining the most important viewpoints of the Iranian Resistance.Maryam Rajavi's speech in Brussels

The Raid of June 17, 2003[link]

On June 17, 2003, over 1,300 French anti-terrorist police, in a coordinated effort, raided the homes of Iranian dissidents and the offices of the National Council of Resistance of Iran in Auvers-sur-Oise. Some 165 activists, including Rajavi, were arrested. The French government charged that the Iranian opposition was bringing its base of operations to France, though the NCRI said that the raid was conducted as part of France's appeasement policy towards Iran. Supporters of the NCRI launched protests and hunger strikes, and sought the support of prominent persons. On July 3, 2003, French courts ruled that the government did not have a case to hold Maryam Rajavi or any of the 165 people arrested in prison and all were released.^[4]

Several PMOI members had set themselves on fire in protest of the raid; two died from their burns.^[5] The PMOI won its legal battle against the EU when the European Court of Justice First Instance ruled in its favour on 12 December 2006. A British court, the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC), also ruled in favour of the PMOI on 30 November 2007. [4]. On May 7, 2008, the UK Court of Appeal verified the POAC ruling, and ordered the government to remove the PMOI from its terror list.[5] On 23 January 2008, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution on the terrorist list based on a report by Swiss Liberal Senator Dick Marty ( Paragraphs 54 to 58) which insisted on the removal of PMOI from blacklists. A week later, on 31 January 2008, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on Iran which took note of these two verdicts in EU and UK courts. On 7 May 2008, the UK Court of Appeal rejected an appeal by Jacqui Smith, the Home Secretary, against a decision by the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission to remove the PMOI from the list of groups banned under the Terrorism Act 2000. Lord Phillips, the Lord Chief Justice, said there was no evidence that the People's Mojahedin Organisation of Iran was currently involved in terrorism.

References[link]

External links[link]

• Maryam Rajavi's Website
• National Council of Resistance of Iran website
• Official website of the PMOI
• National Council of Resistance of Iran - Foreign Affairs Committee
• http://www.iran-e-azad.org/english/president.html
• Mujahedin-e Khalq training camp
• John Stanton. Iran Policy Committee (IPC): Pentagon mouthpiece, Israeli ally, MEK supporter, Online Journal, May 21, 2005.
• U.S. Congress's support for Mujahedin-e Khalq, OpenDemocracy, July 15, 2005.

This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (April 2010)

Ahmad Kasravi
Ahmad Kasravi (Oil Painting on Canvas by Shapour Suren-Pahlav)
Birth name	Ahmad Kasravī-ye Tabrīzī
Born	(1890-09-29)29 September 1890 Tabriz, Iran
Died	March 11, 1946(1946-03-11) (aged 55) Tehran, Iran
Nationality	Iranian
Field	Ancient Languages, history, Politics, religion, and Philosophy.
Works	The Constitutional History of Iran; The 18 Year History of Azarbaijan; The Forgotten Kings (all in Persian)

Ahmad Kasravi (29 September 1890 - March 11, 1946; Azerbaijani: احمد کسروی - Əhməd Kəsrəvi, Persian: احمد کسروی‎), was a notable Iranian linguist, historian, and reformer.

Born in Hokmabad (Hohmavar), Tabriz, Iran, Kasravi was an Iranian Azeri^[1] Initially, Kasravi enrolled in a seminary. Later, he joined the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. He experienced a sort of conversion to Western learning when he learned that the comet of 1910 had been identified as a reappearance of Halley's comet. He abandoned his clerical training after this event and enrolled in the American Memorial School of Tabriz. Thenceforward he became, in Roy Mottahedeh's words, "a true anti-cleric."

Ahmad Kasravi came from a traditional clerical family. While still a seminary student in Tabriz, his home town, he came into contact with militants of the constitutionalist movement. The 1905 constitutionalist movement in Iran had driven a wedge between the cleric. Some rallied to its support and legitimized it while others argued that an Islamic form of government can only be based on the Shari'a. The clerical opponents of the movement accused its proponents of seeking to impose the will of the people over that of God. From the early age of sixteen, Kasravi became a pro-constitutionalist.

Kasravi's experience with every day private and social conduct of Muslims confronted him with a major epistemological problem. He witnessed certain acts and practices prevalent among the Shi'a for which he could not find sources or evidence in Islamic jurisprudence that he considered sound, and which he could not rationally explain. He also observed that those same Muslims refrained from certain acts which he believed were incumbent upon any pious believer. He identified a rupture between what he considered as the essence of the faith, the observation of which would have secured the welfare of the believers, and the outward signs or the form of the faith, which he believed to have developed into a superstitious series of futile rites and rituals. Cut off from worldly affairs, which according to Kasravi were the concern of religion, the Shi'a were, he concluded, still grappling with the problems and circumstances of 1,300 years ago. Shi'i Muslims, he observed were neither concerned with the national integrity and prosperity of their country, nor with colonialism and the reasons for the subjugation of the Eastern countries to European powers.

In Kasravi's mind, pursuing the essence of the faith resulted in social benefit. The deep preoccupation of the Shi'a with religious formalities, however, deprived them of the means to improve their socioeconomic condition. He maintained that excess zeal in practising what he considered to be 'impurities', which had crept into the faith, was the cause of the people's state of deprivation and underdevelopment. According to Kasravi, Islam was the guiding torch of the people in the pursuit of welfare, yet at the hands of the Shi'a it had become the source of their deception and misfortune.

Although Kasravi had written an important book called Shari'at Ahmadi on the osul and foru' of Islam and Shi'ism, he gradually began to question not only the role and legitimacy of the clergy, but even the basis of Shi'ism. He distinguished two different types of Islam: the Islam of the pious Prophet and the Islam of all the various sects that had emerged from the spread of the religion. According to Kasravi, the two were opposed to one another. Existing Islam was an institution run by the clerics, beneficial to no one and the source of great misfortune. The object of religion, he argued, was to secure the welfare of the people by finding solutions to their daily problems such as poverty, unemployment, and ill health. These he believed, were the acts which would please God.

According to Kasravi, the clergy did not perform their expected role. Instead of functioning as the enlightened shepherd who would lead his flock to spiritual and material felicity, they misled the people, perpetrated ignorance, deprivation and superstition. Kasravi reproached the clergy on several counts. He derided their role in deepening the animosity between Shi'i and Sunni Muslims. He attacked the custom of building shrines for the Imams and characterized their worship as idolatry. He accused the clergy of deceiving the people by encouraging them to go on pilgrimages as a means of attaining salvation or as a guarantee for the realization of a miracle. Kasravi argued that a reward could be expected only for a useful act. The lavish expenditure on pilgrimage, he maintained, was best spent on feeding and clothing the hungry and the poor. He mocked the concept of mediation (shafa'at), according to which on Judgment Day the Imams would request the salvation of a sinner from God and obtain it if only he were to mourn the Imams, visit their shrines and petition them with prayers (tavasol). Kasravi revolted against what he called the cult of personality of Shi'i Imams which had led to the Shi'i custom of 'people worshipping'. Thus Kasravi claimed that the faith had to be cleansed from all its impurities and called for a return to its original essence. Many of Kasravi's above-mentioned criticisms of Shi'i rituals and practices as well as his view on the role of the traditional clergy, later found its echo in modernist Islamic circles and especially in the works of Ali Shariati.

Kasravi, who at first seemed to be a reformer of Shi'ism, later hardened his position and became anti-Shi'i. In his book Shi'igari, 'The practice of Shi'ism', he bases his refutations of Shi'i beliefs on the Qur'an, the practice of the Prophet and Imam Ali. Throughout the book he remains highly respectful and reverential towards Imam Ali, Imam Hossein and their original followers. According to Kasravi, two factors were instrumental in institutionalizing the deviations and aberrations of the Shi'i faith: Imam Ja'far Sadeq, the sixth Shi'i Imam and the founder of Shi'i feqh (jurisprudence) and the Safavid dynasty. Whereas Imam Hossein revolted against Mo'awiya to regain his right to caliphate, Kasravi argues that Imam Ja'far Sadeq claimed himself to be the rightful and God-ordained imam, yet instead of struggling for his right, he chose the safety of his home. Proclaiming power without wishing to challenge the existing political power necessarily bred certain problems. According to Kasravi, the Shi'i practice of dissimulation of one's real beliefs (taqiyeh) when survival is at stake, was in fact a means of deception which legitimized falsehood. The safavid rulers who wished to prove their Shi'i zeal went to extremes to uphold established Shi'i rituals and rites. With the active collaboration of the clergy, they accentuated those aspects which Kasravi believed to be impurities. They institutionalized the custom of insulting Abu Bakr, Omar, and Osman, thereby deepening the hatred between Shi'a and Sunnis. It was also during their time that Islam became synonymous with observing certain formal rituals such as attending and weeping at mourning sessions (rowzeh-khani), going on pilgrimages and petitioning the imams with prayers. Later, Shari'ati too identified Safavid Shi'ism as a 'polytheistic' religion. Kasravi's attack on the practices of certain Islamic jurists (faqaha) and the Safavids, under whose rule Shi'ism became Iran's official religion and the Shi'i clergy obtained power and prestige, was a challenge to the dominant perception of Islamic practices. Kasravi, however, was very careful not to question or negate any of the three fundamental basis for Islam, namely monotheism, prophethood and resurrection.

From the Shi'i community's point of view, Kasravi crossed the Rubicon when he attacked the authenticity of certain essential pillars of Twelver Shi'i thought and insulted certain highly revered Shi'i infallibles. He rejected the commonly held belief that the first three caliphs had usurped the position of Imam Ali. He challenged the concept of imamate, or the right of Imam Ali and his male lineage to the religious and temporal leadership of the Islamic community. Kasravi rejected the infallibility of the Twelve Imams, ridiculed the existence of the Twelfth Imam and consequently the central Shi'i notion of his occultation and his promised return on earth. In his writings, Kasravi demeaned several of the imams and Fatemeh, the daughter of the Prophet and Ali's wife. Kasravi repudiated the axiomatic theoretical basis of Shi'ism. His criticism was no longer directed at one or another member of the clergy, certain practices or rituals, but the content, object and raison d'etre of the Shi'i faith. His discourse had become anti-Shi'a. Having had a traditional clerical education, Kasravi must have anticipated the traditional response of the clerical community to his discourse.

Kasravi's criticism of the mechanical, superstitious, ahistorical and dogmatic nature of Shi'ism, as it was practised in his day, left an undeniable mark on the Muslims who sought to modernize their religion. Kasravi's tumultuous life and his fate also indicated the extent and limitations of an open attack on certain rituals and practices, the clergy, and ultimately certain fundamentals of the faith.

The controversy around Kasavi's arguments and his assassination could not have escaped the thirteen year old, inquisitive Ali Shari'ati. It could be justifiably argued that both Mohammad Taqi (Ali Shariati's father) and Ali Shari'ati were sensitive to and influenced by Kasravi's criticisms and denunciation of Shi'i excesses and the clerical institution. During his stay in Paris, Ali Shari'ati sent home a list of books he needed in preparation for a lecture on 'New Islamic Currents in Iran'. Among the works requested were those of Bazargan, Motahhari, Tabataba'i, Sa'idi, Shari'at-e Sanglaji, and Kasravi. On this list, only Kasravi's name was underlined.

It was in Tbilisi where he first became acquainted with a wide spectrum of political ideas and movements, and he soon was employed by the government of Iran in various cultural posts.

A prolific writer, Kasravi was very critical of both the Shi'a clergy and of the policies of the central government. His outspoken ways would lead him to have many supporters and critics starting from the Reza Shah period. While Abdolhossein Teymourtash was a strong supporter of his works, Mohammad Ali Foroughi is said to have taken strong exception to his literary theories and banned him from contributing to the Farhangestan or to continue publishing. Moreover, he had liberal views on religion, was a strong supporter of democracy, and expressed them in satirical pamphlets like What Is the Religion of the Hajis with Warehouses? that infuriated many readers. His views earned him many powerful enemies such as Ayatollah Khomeini.

His detailed account of the Constitutional Revolution still stands out as one of the most important sources on the events, even though Kasravi was a teenager at the time of the revolution and cannot claim the full authority of a contemporary witness that his writing at times suggests.

Kasravi is known for his solid and controversial research work on the ancient Azari language. He showed that the ancient Azari language was an offshoot of Pahlavi language. Due to this discovery, he was granted membership of the London Royal Asiatic Society and American Academy.^[2]

Arguing that the ancient Azari language had been closely related to Persian language and the influx of Turkic words began only with the Seljuq invasion, Ahmad Kasravi believed that the true national language of Iranian Azerbaijan was Persian and therefore advocated the linguistic assimilation of Persian in Azarbaijan.^[3] In 1927-8 Ahmad Kasravi led the way in establishing the ancestry of the Safavids dynasty with the publication of three influential articles, and disputed the validity of the 'official' Safavid family tree contained in the Safvat al-Safa, and argued convincingly that the ancestors of Shaykh Safi al-Din, who founded the Safavid Order (tariqa), were indigenous inhabitants of Iran. Today, the consensus among Safavid historians is that the Safavid family hailed from Persian Kurdistan.[1]

On March 11, 1946, while being tried on charges of "slander against Islam," Kasravi and one of his assistants were knifed and killed in open court in Tehran by followers of Navvab Safavi, a Shi'a extremist cleric who had founded a terrorist organization called the Fadayan-e Islam (literally Devotees of Islam). The same group had failed in assassinating Kasravi earlier in April 1945 in Tehran. Ayatollah Borujerdi and Ayatollah Sadr^[who?] issued fatwas for killing Ahmad Kasravi.^[4]

Some of his more famous books are:

• The 18 Year History of Azarbaijan (Persian: تاریخ هجده‌سالهٔ آذربایجان‎)
• The Constitutional History of Iran (Persian: تاریخ مشروطهٔ ایران‎)
• The Forgotten Kings (Persian: شهرياران گمنام‎)
• The 500 Year History of Khuzestan (Persian: تاریخ پانصد سالهٔ خوزستان‎)
• A Brief History of The Lion and Sun (Persian: تاریخچهٔ شیر وخورشید‎)
• Sheikh Safi and His Progeny (Persian: شیخ صفی و تبارش‎)
• Azari or the Ancient Language of Azerbaijan (Persian: آذری یا زبان باستان آذربایجان‎)
• varjavand bonyad (Persian: ورجاوند بنیاد‎)
• Shi'aism (Persian: شيعيگرى‎)
• Bahaism (Persian: بهاييگرى‎)
• Sufism (Persian: صوفيگرى‎)

Books by Ahmad Kasravi[link]

• Ahmad Kasravi, Tārikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran (تاریخ مشروطهٔ ایران) (History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution), in Persian, 951 p. (Negāh Publications, Tehran, 2003), ISBN 964-351-138-3. Note: This book is also available in two volumes, published by Amir Kabir Publications in 1984. Amir Kabir's 1961 edition is in one volume, 934 pages.
• Ahmad Kasravi, History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution: Tārikh-e Mashrute-ye Iran, Volume I, translated into English by Evan Siegel, 347 p. (Mazda Publications, Costa Mesa, California, 2006). ISBN 1-56859-197-7

See also[link]

• Intellectual Movements in Iran

Notes[link]

References[link]

• Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran, 416 p. (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1985), Ch. 3. ISBN 0-671-55197-3
• Ali Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian' 7-10p. (I.B Tauris Publishers, New York, 2000), The Political and Religious Setting. ISBN 978-1-86064-552-5

External links[link]

• Website dedicated to Ahmad Kasravi: Ahmad Kasravi 1891 - 1946
• Ahmad Kasravi (BBC Persian)
• Ahmad Kasravi biography
• Why is Safavid history important
• Criticism at Kasravi by Khosro Naghed
• Books from Ahmad Kasravi in Kavehsara.com

v t e Personalities involved in the Persian Constitutional Revolution Qajar dynasty Tobacco Protest Persian Constitutional Revolution Kings Naser al-Din Shah Qajar Mozaffar ad-Din Shah Qajar Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar Ahmad Shah Qajar Princes Kamran Mirza Nayeb es-Saltaneh Abdol Majid Mirza Mass'oud Mirza Zell-e Soltan Malek Mansur Mirza Shao es-Saltaneh Governmental Persons Mirza Nasrullah Khan Hassan Pirnia Abdol-Hossein Mirza Farmanfarma Ali Asghar Khan Mohammad Vali Khan Tonekaboni Mostowfi ol-Mamalek Ali-Qoli Khan Bakhtiari Sheikh Khaz'al Colonel Pessian Yeprem Khan Morteza Gholi Khan Hedayat Mehdi Qoli Hedayat Political Intellectuals Mirza Abdul'Rahim Talibov Tabrizi Mirza Malkam Khan Sayyid Hossein Ardabili Hassan Taqizadeh Ahmad Kasravi Haji-Mirza Hassan Roshdieh Hajj Sayyah Iranian Clerics Mohammad-Kazem Khorasani Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani Mirza Sayyed Mohammad Tabatabai Hassan Modarres Sheikh Fazlollah Noori Seqat-ol-Eslam Tabrizi Mohammad Khiabani Mirza Abutaleb Zanjani Iranian Writer and poets Iraj Mirza Ali-Akbar Dehkhoda Mirzadeh Eshghi Mirza Alakbar Sabir Aref Qazvini Mohammad-Taqi Bahar Mohammad Farrokhi Yazdi Mirza Fatali Akhundov Jahangir-Khan Sur-e-Esrafil Commons Saad ad-Daula Sattar Khan Bāqer Khān Haydar Khan e Amo-oghli Yeprem Khan Mirza Reza Kermani Jamshid Bahman Jamshidian Foreigners William Morgan Shuster Howard Baskerville Edward Granville Browne Vladimir Liakhov Women Zahra Khanom Tadj es-Saltaneh Bibi Khanoom Astarabadi Sediqeh Dowlatabadi