Operation Storm (
Croatian: Operacija
Oluja) was the last major battle of the
Croatian War of Independence and a major decisive factor in the outcome of the
Bosnian War. It was a decisive victory for the
Croatian Army (HV), which attacked across a 630-kilometre (390 mi) front against the
Republic of Serbian Krajina (
RSK), and a strategic victory for the
Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH). The HV was supported by the Croatian special police advancing from the
Velebit Mountain, and the ARBiH located in the
Bihać pocket, in the Army of the Republic of
Serb Krajina's (ARSK) rear. The battle, launched to restore Croatian control of 10,400 square kilometres (4,
000 square miles) of territory, representing 18.4% of the territory it claimed, and
Bosnian control of
Western Bosnia, was the largest
European land battle since the
Second World War. Operation Storm commenced at dawn on 4
August 1995 and was declared complete on the evening of 7 August, despite significant mopping-up operations against pockets of resistance lasting until 14 August.
Operation Storm was a strategic victory in the Bosnian War, effectively ending the siege of
Bihać and placing the HV,
Croatian Defence Council (
HVO) and the ARBiH in a position to change the military balance of power in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the subsequent
Operation Mistral 2. The operation built on HV and HVO advances made during
Operation Summer '95, when strategic positions allowing the rapid capture of the RSK capital
Knin were gained, and on the continued arming and training of the HV since the beginning of the Croatian War of Independence, when the RSK was created during the
Serb Log revolution and
Yugoslav People's Army (
JNA) intervention. The operation itself followed an unsuccessful
United Nations (
UN) peacekeeping mission and diplomatic efforts to settle the conflict.
The HV's (and ARBiH's strategic) success was a result of a series of improvements to the armies themselves, and crucial breakthroughs made in the ARSK positions that were subsequently exploited by the HV and the ARBiH. The attack was not immediately successful at all points, but seizing key positions led to the collapse of the ARSK command structure and overall defensive capability. The HV capture of
Bosansko Grahovo just before Operation Storm, and the special police's advance to
Gračac, made it nearly impossible to defend Knin. In
Lika, two guard brigades quickly cut the ARSK-held area (which lacked tactical depth and mobile reserve forces), isolating pockets of resistance, positioning a mobile force for a decisive northward thrust into the
Karlovac Corps area of responsibility (
AOR), and pushing ARSK towards
Banovina. The defeat of the ARSK at Glina and
Petrinja, after a tough defence, defeated the ARSK
Banija Corps as well, as its reserve was pinned down by the ARBiH. The RSK relied on the
Republika Srpska and the Yugoslav militaries as its strategic reserve, but they did not intervene in the battle.
The HV and the special police suffered 174–211 killed or missing, while the ARSK had 560 soldiers killed. Four
UN peacekeepers were also killed. The HV captured 4,000 prisoners of war. The number of Serb civilian deaths is disputed—
Croatia claims that
214 were killed, while
Serbian sources cite 1,
192 civilians killed or missing. During and after the offensive,
150,000–
200,000
Serbs—or nearly the entire Serb population of the area formerly held by the ARSK—fled and a variety of crimes were committed against the remaining civilians there.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (
ICTY) later tried three Croatian generals charged with war crimes and partaking in a joint criminal enterprise designed to force the Serb population out of Croatia, although all three were ultimately acquitted and the tribunal refuted charges of a criminal enterprise. In
2010,
Serbia sued Croatia before the
International Court of Justice (
ICJ), claiming that the offensive was an example of genocide. In
2015, the court ruled that it was not genocidal, though it affirmed that the Serb population fled as a direct result of the offensive and that serious crimes against civilians had been committed by Croatian forces.
As of November 2012, the Croatian judiciary has convicted 2,380 persons for various crimes committed during Operation Storm.
- published: 17 Mar 2016
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