The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organization that was created on July 22, 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference and came into existence on December 27, 1945 when 29 countries signed the Articles of Agreement^[1]. It originally had 45 members. The IMF's stated goal was to stabilize exchange rates and assist the reconstruction of the world’s international payment system post World War II. Countries contribute money to a pool through a quota system from which countries with payment imbalances can borrow funds on a temporary basis. Through this activity and others such as surveillance of its members' economies and policies, the IMF works to improve the economies of its member countries.^[2] The IMF describes itself as “an organization of 188 countries (as of April 2012), working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty.” The organization's stated objectives are to promote international economic cooperation, international trade, employment, and exchange rate stability, including by making financial resources available to member countries to meet balance of payments needs.^[3] Its headquarters are in Washington, D.C.

History[link]

IMF "Headquarters 1" in Washington, D.C.

The International Monetary Fund was originally created as part of the Bretton Woods system exchange agreement in 1944.^[4] During the Great Depression, countries sharply raised barriers to foreign trade in an attempt to improve their failing economies. This led to the devaluation of national currencies and a decline in world trade.^[5] This breakdown in international monetary cooperation created a need for oversight. The representatives of 45 governments met in the Mount Washington Hotel in the area of Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in the United States, and agreed on a framework for international economic cooperation to establish post-World War II. The participating countries were concerned with the rebuilding of Europe and the global economic system after the war.

There were two views on the role the IMF should assume as a global economic institution at the Bretton Woods Conference. British economist John Maynard Keynes imagined that the IMF would be a cooperative fund upon which member states could draw to maintain economic activity and employment through periodic crises. This view suggested an IMF that helped governments and to act as the US government had during the New Deal in response to World War II. American delegate Harry Dexter White foresaw an IMF that functioned more like a bank, making sure that borrowing states could repay their debts on time.^[6] Most of White’s plan was incorporated into the final acts adopted at Bretton Woods.

The IMF was formally organized on December 27, 1945, when the first 29 countries signed its Articles of Agreement. The International Monetary Fund was one of the key organizations of the international economic system; its design allowed the system to balance the rebuilding of international capitalism with the maximization of national economic sovereignty and human welfare, also known as embedded liberalism.^[7]

In 1947, France became the first country to borrow from the IMF.^[5] The IMF’s influence in the global economy steadily increased as it accumulated more members. The number of IMF member countries has more than quadrupled from the 44 states involved in its establishment, reflecting in particular the attainment of political independence by many African countries and more recently the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union because most countries in the Soviet Sphere of influence did not join the IMF.^[5]

The Bretton Woods system prevailed until 1971, when the U.S. government suspended the convertibility of the dollar (and dollar reserves held by other governments) into gold. This is known as the Nixon Shock.^[5] As of January 2012, the largest borrowers from the fund in order are Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Romania and Ukraine.^[8]

Member countries[link]

  IMF member states

  IMF member states not accepting the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4^[9]

The members of the IMF are 188 members of the UN and the Republic of Kosovo^[a].^[10][11] All members of the IMF are also International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) members and vice versa.^{[citation needed]}

Former members are Cuba (which left in 1964)^[12] and the Republic of China, which was ejected from the UN in 1980 after losing the support of then U.S. President Jimmy Carter and was replaced by the People's Republic of China.^[13]

Apart from Cuba, the other states that do not belong to the IMF are North Korea, Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein, Nauru, Cook Islands, Niue, Vatican City, and the states with limited recognition (other than Kosovo).

Qualifications[link]

Any country may apply to be a part of the IMF. Post-IMF formation, in the early postwar period, rules for IMF membership were left relatively loose. Members needed to make periodic membership payments towards their quota, to refrain from currency restrictions unless granted IMF permission, to abide by the Code of Conduct in the IMF Articles of Agreement, and to provide national economic information. However, stricter rules were imposed on governments that applied to the IMF for funding.^[14]

The countries that joined the IMF between 1945 and 1971 agreed to keep their exchange rates secured at rates that could be adjusted only to correct a "fundamental disequilibrium" in the balance of payments, and only with the IMF's agreement.^[15]

Some members have a very difficult relationship with the IMF and even when they are still members they do not allow themselves to be monitored. Argentina for example refuses to participate in an Article IV Consultation with the IMF.^[16]

Benefits[link]

Member countries of the IMF have access to information on the economic policies of all member countries, the opportunity to influence other members’ economic policies, technical assistance in banking, fiscal affairs, and exchange matters, financial support in times of payment difficulties, and increased opportunities for trade and investment^[17]

Leadership[link]

Board of Governors[link]

The Board of Governors consists of one governor and one alternate governor for each member country. Each member country appoints its two governors. The Board normally meets once a year and is responsible for electing or appointing executive directors to the Executive Board. While the Board of Governors is officially responsible for approving quota increases, special drawing right allocations, the admittance of new members, compulsory withdrawal of members, and amendments to the Articles of Agreement and By-Laws, in practice it has delegated most of its powers to the IMF's Executive Board. ^[18]

The Board of Governors is advised by the International Monetary and Financial Committee and the Development Committee. The International Monetary and Financial Committee has 24 members and monitors developments in global liquidity and the transfer of resources to developing countries.^[19] The Development Committee has 25 members and advises on critical development issues and on financial resources required to promote economic development in developing countries. They also advise on trade and global environmental issues.^[19]

Executive Board[link]

24 Executive Directors make up Executive Board. The Executive Directors represent all 188 member-countries. Countries with large economies have their own Executive Directo, but most countries are grouped in constituencies representing four or more countries.^[18]

Following the 2008 Amendment on Voice and Participation, eight countries each appoint an Executive Director: the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China, the Russian Federation, and Saudi Arabia.^[20] The remaining 16 Directors represent constituencies consisting of 4 to 22 countries. The Executive Director representing the largest constituency of 22 countries accounts for 1.55% of the vote.

Managing Director[link]

The IMF is led by a Managing Director, who is head of the staff and serves as Chairman of the Executive Board. The Managing Director is assisted by a First Deputy Managing Director and three other Deputy Managing Directors.^[18]Historically the IMF’s managing director has been European and the president of the World Bank has been from the United States. However, this standard is increasingly being questioned and competition for these two posts may soon open up to include other qualified candidates from any part of the world.^[21][22] In 2011 the world's largest developing countries, the BRIC nations, issued a statement declaring that the tradition of appointing a European as managing director undermined the legitimacy of the IMF and called for the appointment to be merit-based.^[22][23]The head of the IMF's European department is António Borges of Portugal, former deputy governor of the Bank of Portugal. He was elected in October 2010.^[24]

Dates	Name	Nationality
May 6, 1946 – May 5, 1951	Camille Gutt	Belgium
August 3, 1951 – October 3, 1956	Ivar Rooth	Sweden
November 21, 1956 – May 5, 1963	Per Jacobsson	Sweden
September 1, 1963 – August 31, 1973	Pierre-Paul Schweitzer	France
September 1, 1973 – June 16, 1978	Johannes Witteveen	Netherlands
June 17, 1978 – January 15, 1987	Jacques de Larosière	France
January 16, 1987 – February 14, 2000	Michel Camdessus	France
May 1, 2000 – March 4, 2004	Horst Köhler	Germany
June 7, 2004 – October 31, 2007	Rodrigo Rato	Spain
November 1, 2007 – May 18, 2011	Dominique Strauss-Kahn	France
July 5, 2011 –	Christine Lagarde	France

On June 28, 2011, Christine Lagarde was named Managing Director of the IMF, replacing Dominique Strauss-Kahn.

Previous Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn was arrested in connection with charges of sexually assaulting a New York room attendant. Strauss-Kahn subsequently resigned his position on May 18.^[25] On June 28, 2011 Christine Lagarde was confirmed as Managing Director of the IMF for a five-year term starting on July 5, 2011.^[26][27]

Voting power[link]

Voting power in the IMF is based on a quota system. Each member has a number of “basic votes" (each member's number of basic votes equals 5.502% of the total votes),^[28] plus one additional vote for each Special Drawing Right (SDR) of 100,000 of a member country’s quota.^[29] The Special Drawing Right is the unit of account of the IMF and represents a claim to currency. It is based on a basket of key international currencies. The basic votes generate a slight bias in favor of small countries, but the additional votes determined by SDR outweigh this bias.^[30]

Effects of the quota system[link]

The IMF’s quota system was created to raise funds for loans.^[31] Each IMF member country is assigned a quota, or contribution, that reflects the country’s relative size in the global economy. Each member’s quota also determines its relative voting power. Thus, financial contributions from member governments are linked to voting power in the organization.^[29]This system follows the logic of a shareholder-controlled organization: wealthy countries have more say in the making and revision of rules.^[32] Since decision making at the IMF reflects each member’s relative economic position in the world, wealthier countries that provide more money to the fund have more influence in the IMF than poorer members that contribute less.; nontheless, the IMF focuses on redistribution.^[29]

Developing countries[link]

Quotas are normally reviewed every five years and can be increased when deemed necessary by the Board of Governors. Currently, reforming the representation of developing countries within the IMF has been suggested. ^[29] These countries’ economies represent a large portion of the global economic system but this is not reflected in the IMF's decision making process through the nature of the quota system. Joseph Stiglitz argues "There is a need to provide more effective voice and representation for developing countries, which now represent a much larger portion of world economic activity since 1944, when the IMF was created." ^[33] In 2008, a number of quota reforms were passed including shifting 6% of quota shares to dynamic emerging markets and developing countries^[34].

United States influence[link]

A second criticism is that the United States’ transition to neoliberalism and global capitalism also lead a change in the identity and functions of international institutions like the IMF. Because of the high involvement and voting power of the United States, the global economic ideology could effectively be transformed to match the US's. This is consistent with the IMF’s function change during the 1970s after the Nixon Shock ending the Bretton Woods system. Another criticism is that allies of the United States are able to receive bigger loans with fewer conditions^[4].

Overcoming borrower/creditor divide[link]

The IMF’s membership is divided along income lines: certain countries provide the financial resources while others use these resources. Both developed country “creditors” and developing country “borrowers” are members of the IMF. The developed countries provide the financial resources but rarely enter into IMF loan agreements; they are the creditors. Conversely, the developing countries use the lending services but contribute little to the pool of money available to lend because their quotas are smaller; they are the borrowers. Thus, tension is created around governance issues because these two groups, creditors and borrowers, have fundamentally different interests in terms of the conditions of these loans.^[35]. The criticism is that the system of voting power distribution through a quota system institutionalizes borrower subordination and creditor dominance. The resulting division of the Fund's membership into borrowers and non-borrowers has increased the controversy around conditionality because the borrowering members are interested in making loan access easier while the creditor members want to maintain reassurance the loans will be repaid^[36].

Functions[link]

The IMF works to foster global growth and economic stability. It provides policy advice and financing to members in economic difficulties and also works with developing nations to help them achieve macroeconomic stability and reduce poverty^[37]. The rationale for this is that private international capital markets function imperfectly and many countries have limited access to financial markets. Such market imperfections, together with balance of payments financing, provide the justiciation for official financing, without which many countires could only correct large external payment imbalances through measures with adverse effects on both national and international economic prosperity^[38]. The IMF can provide other sources of financing to countries in need that would not be available in the absence of an economic stabilization program supported by the Fund.

Upon initial IMF formation, its two primary functions were: to oversee the fixed exchange rate arrangements between countries^[39], thus helping national governments manage their exchange rates and allowing these governments to prioritize economic growth^[40], and to provide short-term capital to aid balance-of-payments ^[39]. This assistance was meant to prevent the spread of international economic crises. The Fund was also intended to help mend the pieces of the international economy post the Great Depression and World War II^[41] .

The IMF’s role was fundamentally altered after the floating exchange rates post 1971. It shifted to examining the economic policies of countries with IMF loan agreements to determine if a shortage of capital was due to economic fluctuations or economic policy. The IMF also researched what types of government policy would ensure economic recovery^[42]. The new challenge is to promote and implement policy that reduces the frequency of crises among the emerging market countries, especially the middle-income countries that are open to massive capital outflows^[43]. Rather than maintaining a position of oversight of only exchange rates, their function became one of “surveillance” of the overall macroeconomic performance of its member countries. Their role became a lot more active because the IMF now manages economic policy instead of just exchange rates.

In addition, the IMF negotiates conditions on lending and loans under their policy of conditionality^[39] , which was established in the 1950s^[41]. Low-income countries can borrow on concessional terms, which means there is a period of time with no interest rates, through the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the Standby Credit Facility (SCF) and the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF). Nonconcessional loans, which include interest rates, are provided mainly through Stand-By Arrangements (SBA), the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), and the Extended Fund Facility. The IMF provides emergency assistance via the newly introduced Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) to all its members facing urgent balance of payments needs^[44].

Surveillance of the global economy[link]

The IMF is mandated to oversee the international monetary and financial system^[45] and monitor the economic and financial policies of its 188 member countries. This activity is known as surveillance and facilitates international cooperation^[46] . Since the demise of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s, surveillance has evolved largely by way of changes in procedures rather than through the adoption of new obligations^[45] . The responsibilities of the Fund changed from those of guardian to those of overseer of members’ policies.

The Fund typically analyzes the appropriateness of each member country’s economic and financial policies for achieving orderly economic growth, and assesses the consequences of these policies for other countries and for the global economy<refname="IMF Surveillance: A Case Study on IMF Governance" /> .

IMF Data Dissemination Systems participants:

  IMF member using SDDS

  IMF member using GDDS

  IMF member, not using any of the DDSystems

  non-IMF entity using SDDS

  non-IMF entity using GDDS

  no interaction with the IMF

In 1995 the International Monetary Fund began work on data dissemination standards with the view of guiding IMF member countries to disseminate their economic and financial data to the public. The International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) endorsed the guidelines for the dissemination standards and they were split into two tiers: The General Data Dissemination System (GDDS) and the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS).

The International Monetary Fund executive board approved the SDDS and GDDS in 1996 and 1997 respectively, and subsequent amendments were published in a revised Guide to the General Data Dissemination System. The system is aimed primarily at statisticians and aims to improve many aspects of statistical systems in a country. It is also part of the World Bank Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers.

The primary objective of the GDDS is to encourage IMF member countries to build a framework to improve data quality and increase statistical capacity building. Upon building a framework, a country can evaluate statistical needs, set priorities in improving the timeliness, transparency, reliability and accessibility of financial and economic data. Some countries initially used the GDDS, but later upgraded to SDDS.

Some entities that are not themselves IMF members also contribute statistical data to the systems:

•  Palestinian National Authority – GDDS
•  Hong Kong – SDDS
•  Macau - GDDS^[47]
•  European Union institutions:
  • the European Central Bank for the Eurozone – SDDS
  • Eurostat for the whole EU – SDDS, thus providing data from  Cyprus (not using any DDSystem on its own) and  Malta (using only GDDS on its own)

Conditionality of loans[link]

IMF conditionality is a set of policies or “conditions” that the IMF requires in exchange for financial resources^[39]. The IMF does not require collateral from countries for loans but rather requires the government seeking assistance to correct its macroeconomic imbalances in the form of policy reform. If the conditions are not met, the funds are withheld^[39]. Conditionality is perhaps the most controversial aspect of IMF policies^[48] . The concept of conditionality was introduced in an Executive Board decision in 1952 and later incorporated in the Articles of Agreement.

Conditionality is associated with economic theory as well as an enforcement mechanism for repayment. Stemming primarily from the work of Jacques Polak in the Fund’s research department, the theoretical underpinning of conditionality was the “monetary approach to the balance of payments."^[41]

Benefits[link]

These loan conditions ensure that the borrowing country will be able to repay the Fund and that the country won’t attempt to solve their balance of payment problems in a way that would negatively impact the international economy^{[49] [50]} . The incentive problem of moral hazard, which is the actions of economic agents maximizing their own utility to the detriment of others when they do not bear the full consequences of their actions, is mitigated through conditions rather than providing collateral; countries in need of IMF loans do not generally possess internationally valuable collateral anyway<refname="IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs" />. Conditionality also reassures the IMF that the funds lent to them will be used for the purposes defined by the Articles of Agreement and provides safeguards that country will be able to rectify its macroeconomic and structural imbalances^[50]. In the judgment of the Fund, the adoption by the member of certain corrective measures or policies will allow it to repay the Fund, thereby ensuring that the same resources will be available to support other members^[48].

Some critics assume that Fund lending imposes a burden on creditor countries. However, countries receive market-related interest rates on most of their quota subscription, plus any of their own-currency subscriptions that are loaned out by the Fund, plus all of the reserve assets that they provide the Fund. Also, as of 2005 borrowing countries have had a very good track record of repaying credit extended under the Fund's regular lending facilities with the full interest over the duration of the borrowing ^[38].

Criticisms[link]

The IMF has the obstacle of being unfamiliar with local economic conditions, cultures, and environments in the countries they are requiring policy reform^[39]. The Fund knows very little about what public spending on programs like public health and education actually means, especially in African countries; they have no feel for the impact that their proposed national budget will have on people. The economic advice the IMF gives might not always take into consideration the difference between what spending means on paper and how its felt by citizens^[51]. For example, Jeffrey Sach's work shows that "the Fund’s usual prescription is 'budgetary belt tightening to countries who are much too poor to own belts'^[51]." The IMF’s role as a generalist institution specializing in macroeconomic issues needs reform. Conditionality has also been criticized because a country can pledge collateral of “acceptable assets” in order to obtain waivers on certain conditions^[50]. However, that assumes that all countries have the capability and choice to provide acceptable collateral.

One view is that conditionality undermines domestic political institutions ^[52] . The recipient governments are sacrificing policy autonomy in exchange for funds, which can lead to public resentment of the local leadership for accepting and enforcing the IMF conditions. Political instability can result from more leadership turnover as political leaders are replaced in electoral backlashes.^[39]. IMF conditions are often criticized for their bias against economic growth and reduce government services, thus increasing unemployment^[41] . Another criticism is that IMF programs are only designed to address poor governance, excessive government spending, excessive government intervention in markets, and too much state ownership<refname="The End of Poverty" />. This assumes that this narrow range of issues represents the only possible problems; everything is standardized and differing contexts are ignored^[51]. A country may also be compelled to accept conditions it would not normally accept had they not been in a financial crisis in need of assistance^[48].

It is claimed that conditionalities retard social stability and hence inhibit the stated goals of the IMF, while Structural Adjustment Programs lead to an increase in poverty in recipient countries.^[53] The IMF sometimes advocates “austerity programmes,” cutting public spending and increasing taxes even when the economy is weak, in order to bring budgets closer to a balance, thus reducing budget deficits. Countries are often advised to lower their corporate tax rate. In Globalization and Its Discontents, Joseph E. Stiglitz, former chief economist and senior vice president at the World Bank, criticizes these policies.^[54] He argues that by converting to a more monetarist approach, the purpose of the fund is no longer valid, as it was designed to provide funds for countries to carry out Keynesian reflations, and that the IMF “was not participating in a conspiracy, but it was reflecting the interests and ideology of the Western financial community.”^[55]

Reform[link]

The IMF is only one of many international organizations and it is a generalist institution for macroeconomic issues only; its core areas of concern in developing countries are very narrow. One proposed reform is a movement towards close partnership with other specialist agencies in order to better productivity. The IMF has little to no communication with other international organizations such as UN specialist agencies like UNICEF, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)^[51]. Jeffrey Sachs argues in The End of Poverty: “international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have the brightest economists and the lead in advising poor countries on how to break out of poverty, but the problem is development economics”^[51]. Development economics needs the reform, not the IMF. He also notes that IMF loan conditions need to be partnered with other reforms such as trade reform in developed nations, debt cancellation, and increased financial assistance for investments in basic infrastructure in order to be effective^[51]. IMF loan conditions cannot stand alone and produce change; they need to be partnered with other reforms.

Use[link]

A recent study reveals that the average overall use of IMF credit per decade increased, in real terms, by 21% between the 1970s and 1980s, and increased again by just over 22% percent from the 1980s to the 1991–2005 period. Another study has suggested that since 1950 the continent of Africa alone has received $300 billion from the IMF, the World Bank and affiliate institutions^[56]

A study done by Bumba Mukherjee found that developing democratic countries benefit more from IMF programs than developing autocratic countries because policy-making, and the process of deciding where loaned money is used, is more transparent within a democracy^[56]. One study done by Randall Stone found that although earlier studies found little impact of IMF programs on balance of payments, more recent studies using more sophisticated methods and larger samples “usually found IMF programs improved the balance of payments.”^[4]

IMF and globalization[link]

Globalization encompasses three institutions: global financial markets and transnational companies, national governments linked to each other in economic and military alliances led by the US, and rising “global governments” such as World Trade Organization (WTO), IMF, and World Bank ^[57]. Charles Derber argues in his book People Before Profit, "These interacting institutions create a new global power system where sovereignty is globalized, taking power and constitutional authority away from nations and giving it to global markets and international bodies."^[57] Titus Alexander argues that this system institutionalises global inequality between western countries and the Majority World in a form of global apartheid, in which the IMF is a key pillar. ^[58]

The establishment of globalized economic institutions has been both a symptom of and a stimulus for globalization. The development of the World Bank, the IMF. regional development banks such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and, more recently, multilateral trade institutions such as the WTO indicates the trend away from the dominance of the state as the exclusive unit of analysis in international affairs. Globalization has thus been transformative in terms of a reconceptualizing of state sovereignty. ^[59] .

Following U.S. President Bill Clinton's administration’s aggressive financial deregulation campaign in the 1990s, globalization leaders overturned long-standing restrictions by governments that limited foreign ownership of their banks, deregulated currency exchange, and eliminated restrictions on how quickly money could be withdrawn by foreign investors^[57]

Criticism[link]

Overseas Development Institute (ODI) research undertaken in 1980 pointed to five main criticisms of the IMF which support the analysis that it is a pillar of global apartheid. ^[60]. Firstly, developed countries were seen to have a more dominant role and control over less developed countries (LDCs) primarily due to the Western bias towards a capitalist form of the world economy with professional staff being Western trained and believing in the efficacy of market-oriented policies.

Secondly, the Fund worked on the incorrect assumption that all payments disequilibria were caused domestically. The Group of 24 (G-24), on behalf of LDC members, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) complained that the Fund did not distinguish sufficiently between disequilibria with predominantly external as opposed to internal causes. This criticism was voiced in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis. Then LDCs found themselves with payments deficits due to adverse changes in their terms of trade, with the Fund prescribing stabilisation programmes similar to those suggested for deficits caused by government over-spending. Faced with long-term, externally generated disequilibria, the Group of 24 argued that LDCs should be allowed more time to adjust their economies and that the policies needed to achieve such adjustment are different from demand-management programmes devised primarily with internally generated disequilibria in mind.

The third criticism was that the effects of Fund policies were anti-developmental. The deflationary effects of IMF programmes quickly led to losses of output and employment in economies where incomes were low and unemployment was high. Moreover, it was sometimes claimed that the burden of the deflationary effects was borne disproportionately by the poor.

Fourthly is the accusation that harsh policy conditions were self-defeating where a vicious circle developed when members refused loans due to harsh conditionality, making their economy worse and eventually taking loans as a drastic medicine.

Lastly is the point that the Fund's policies lack a clear economic rationale. Its policy foundations were theoretical and unclear due to differing opinions and departmental rivalries whilst dealing with countries with widely varying economic circumstances.

ODI conclusions were that the Fund’s very nature of promoting market-oriented economic approach attracted unavoidable criticism, as LDC governments were likely to object when in a tight corner. Yet, on the other hand, the Fund could provide a ‘scapegoat service’ where governments could take loans as a last resort, whilst blaming international bankers for any economic downfall. The ODI conceded that the fund was to some extent insensitive to political aspirations of LDCs, while its policy conditions were inflexible.^[61]

Argentina, which had been considered by the IMF to be a model country in its compliance to policy proposals by the Bretton Woods institutions, experienced a catastrophic economic crisis in 2001,^[62] which some believe to have been caused by IMF-induced budget restrictions—which undercut the government’s ability to sustain national infrastructure even in crucial areas such as health, education, and security—and privatization of strategically vital national resources.^[63] Others attribute the crisis to Argentina’s misdesigned fiscal federalism, which caused subnational spending to increase rapidly.^[64] The crisis added to widespread hatred of this institution in Argentina and other South American countries, with many blaming the IMF for the region’s economic problems.^[65] The current—as of early 2006—trend toward moderate left-wing governments in the region and a growing concern with the development of a regional economic policy largely independent of big business pressures has been ascribed to this crisis.

In an interview, the former Romanian Prime Minister Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu claimed that "Since 2005, IMF is constantly making mistakes when it appreciates the country's economic performances."^[66]

Support of military dictatorships[link]

The role of the Bretton Woods institutions has been controversial since the late Cold War period, due to claims that the IMF policy makers supported military dictatorships friendly to American and European corporations and other anti-communist regimes. Critics also claim that the IMF is generally apathetic or hostile to their views of human rights, and labor rights. The controversy has helped spark the Anti-globalization movement.

Arguments in favor of the IMF say that economic stability is a precursor to democracy; however, critics highlight various examples in which democratized countries fell after receiving IMF loans.^[67]

Impact on access to food[link]

A number of civil society organizations^[68] have criticized the IMF’s policies for their impact on people’s access to food, particularly in developing countries. In October 2008, former U.S. president Bill Clinton presented a speech to the United Nations World Food Day, which criticized the World Bank and IMF for their policies on food and agriculture:

We need the World Bank, the IMF, all the big foundations, and all the governments to admit that, for 30 years, we all blew it, including me when I was president. We were wrong to believe that food was like some other product in international trade, and we all have to go back to a more responsible and sustainable form of agriculture.

—Former U.S. president Bill Clinton, Speech at United Nations World Food Day, October 16, 2008^[69]

Impact on public health[link]

In 2008 a study by analysts from Cambridge and Yale universities published on the open-access Public Library of Science concluded that strict conditions on the international loans by the IMF resulted in thousands of deaths in Eastern Europe by tuberculosis as public health care had to be weakened. In the 21 countries to which the IMF had given loans, tuberculosis deaths rose by 16.6%.^[70]

In 2009, a book by Rick Rowden titled The Deadly Ideas of Neoliberalism: How the IMF has Undermined Public Health and the Fight Against AIDS, claimed that the IMF’s monetarist approach towards prioritizing price stability (low inflation) and fiscal restraint (low budget deficits) was unnecessarily restrictive and has prevented developing countries from being able to scale up long-term public investment as a percent of GDP in the underlying public health infrastructure. The book claimed the consequences have been chronically underfunded public health systems, leading to dilapidated health infrastructure, inadequate numbers of health personnel, and demoralizing working conditions that have fueled the “push factors” driving the brain drain of nurses migrating from poor countries to rich ones, all of which has undermined public health systems and the fight against HIV/AIDS in developing countries.^[71]

Impact on environment[link]

IMF policies have been repeatedly criticized for making it difficult for indebted countries to avoid ecosystem-damaging projects that generate cash flow, in particular oil, coal, and forest-destroying lumber and agriculture projects. Ecuador for example had to defy IMF advice repeatedly in order to pursue the protection of its rain forests, though paradoxically this need was cited in IMF argument to support that country. The IMF acknowledged this paradox in a March 2010 staff position report ^[72] which proposed the IMF Green Fund, a mechanism to issue special drawing rights directly to pay for climate harm prevention and potentially other ecological protection as pursued generally by other environmental finance.

While the response to these moves was generally positive^[73] possibly because ecological protection and energy and infrastructure transformation are more politically neutral than pressures to change social policy. Some experts voiced concern that the IMF was not representative, and that the IMF proposals to generate only US$200 billion a year by 2020 with the SDRs as seed funds, did not go far enough to undo the general incentive to pursue destructive projects inherent in the world commodity trading and banking systems—criticisms often leveled at the World Trade Organization and large global banking institutions.

In the context of the May 2010 European banking crisis, some observers also noted that Spain and California, two troubled economies within Europe and the United States respectively, and also Germany, the primary and politically most fragile supporter of a euro currency bailout would benefit from IMF recognition of their leadership in green technology, and directly from Green Fund–generated demand for their exports, which might also improve their credit standing with international bankers.^{[citation needed]}

Criticism from free-market advocates[link]

Typically the IMF and its supporters advocate a monetarist approach. As such, adherents of supply-side economics generally find themselves in open disagreement with the IMF.^[who?] The IMF frequently advocates currency devaluation, criticized by proponents of supply-side economics as inflationary.

Currency devaluation is recommended by the IMF to the governments of poor nations with struggling economies. Some economists claim these IMF policies are destructive to economic prosperity.^[74]

In the media[link]

Life and Debt, a documentary film, deals with the IMF's policies' influence on Jamaica and its economy from a critical point of view. Debtocracy, a 2011 independent Greek documentary film, also criticizes the IMF and its tactics for providing financial help to indebted nations.

See also[link]

• African Monetary Fund
• Bank for International Settlements
• Group of Thirty
• World Bank
• Loan
• Conditionality
• Globalization
• Washington Consensus
• Structural Adjustment Program
• International Financial Institution

Notes and references[link]

Notes:

References:

20. http://www.clarin.com/politica/gobierno/FMI-advirtio-sancion-Argentina-mostrar_0_349165280.html

Further reading[link]

• Bordo, M. D. "The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical Overview", in A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System, edited by M. D. Bordo and B. Eichengreen. London:1993;
• Boughton, J. M. Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund 1979-1989, Washington DC, 2001.
• James, H. "International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods", Oxford, 1996.
• Joicey, N. and Pickford, S. "The International Monetary Fund and Global Economic Cooperation" in Nicholas Bayne and Stephen Woolcock, "The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-Making and Negotiation in International Relations", (Ashgate Publishing, 2011).
• Keynes, J. M. "The Collected Writings, Vol.XXVI. Activies 1941-1946: Shaping the Post-War World: Bretton Woods and Reparations", Cambridge, 1980.
• Moschella, M. Governing Risk: The IMF and Global Financial Crises (Palgrave Macmillan; 2010).
• Skidelsky, R. "John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Britain", London, 2000.
• Truman, E. Strengthening IMF Surveillance: A Comprehensive Proposal, Policy Brief 10-29, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2010.
• Woods, N. "The Globalizers:The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers", Ithaca, 2006

External links[link]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: International Monetary Fund

• Official website
• IFIWatchNet (Web resource for analysis and commentary critical of the IMF and similar institutions)
• IMF-Supported Macroeconomic Policies and the World Recession: A Look at Forty-One Borrowing Countries, from the Center for Economic and Policy Research, October 2009
• Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944
• IMF and Ukraine found a compromise

Evo Morales
President of Bolivia
Incumbent
Assumed office January 22, 2006
Vice President	Álvaro García Linera
Preceded by	Eduardo Rodríguez
Personal details
Born	(1959-10-26) 26 October 1959 (age 52) Isallawi, Bolivia
Political party	Movement for Socialism

Juan Evo Morales Ayma (born October 26, 1959), popularly known as Evo (Spanish pronunciation: [ˈeβo]), is a Bolivian politician and activist, serving as the 80th President of Bolivia, a position that he has held since 2006. He is also the leader of both the Movement for Socialism party (MAS) and the cocalero trade union. Politically a socialist, his presidency has seen a focus on implementing leftist policies in the country, introducing a new constitution, land reforms, nationalising various key industries, opposing United States and corporate involvement in the country's politics, and poverty reduction measures.^[1]

Born into a working class Aymara family in Isallawi, Orinoca Canton, Evo grew up aiding his parents as a subsistence farmer. After studying for a degree, Morales undertook national service until 1978, when he returned to the family profession of farming, moving with them to Chapare Province. He eventually settled into growing coca, the plant from which cocaine is made. His activism led him into the political arena, and he eventually became the leader of the MAS, through which he got involved in social protests like the gas conflict and the Cochabamba protests of 2000. The MAS claimed that its aims were giving more power to the country's indigenous and poor communities by means of land reforms and redistribution of gas wealth, and gradually increased its electoral support.

Morales was first elected President of Bolivia on December 18, 2005, with 53.7% of the popular vote. Two and a half years later he substantially increased this majority; in a recall referendum on August 14, 2008, more than two thirds of voters voted to keep him in office.^[2][3] Morales won presidential elections again in December 2009 with 63% and continued to his second term of presidency.^[4]

A critic of the United States' foreign policy and the involvement of drug cartels in Latin America, he has been a firm ally of the socialist government of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and the Communist government of Fidel Castro in Cuba.

Early life and activism[link]

Childhood and education: 1959-1977[link]

A traditional Aymara ceremony (left); Poopó Lake was the dominant geographical feature around Evo's home village of Isallawi (right).[5]

Morales was born in Isallawi village, a rural community of around thirty houses scattered over an area of 4 square kilometres in Orinoca Canton, a part of the Oruro Department in western Bolivia, on 26 October 1959.^[5] He was one of seven children born to Dionisio Morales Choque and Maria Mamani; however, only Morales and two of his siblings, Esther and Hugo, survived past childhood.^[5][6][7] Indeed, his mother suffered a postpartum haemorrhage after giving birth to him, almost dying due to the absence of any doctors or midwives in the village.^[5] Ethnically a mestizo and thereby being of American Indian heritage, much of his ancestry came from the indigenous Aymara people, and in keeping with Aymara custom, his father buried the placenta produced after his birth in a place specially chosen for the occasion.^[5] He grew up speaking the Aymara language, although later commentators would remark that by the time he had become president he was no longer an entirely fluent speaker, something some critics would use against him.^[8][9]

Morales' family were farmers and from an early age he took part in his parents' work, aiding in planting and harvesting crops and guarding their herd of llamas and sheep, always taking a homemade soccer ball with him to amuse himself.^[5][6] His home was an adobe house with a dirt floor and straw roof, in keeping with Aymara cultural style.^[9] As a toddler, he briefly attended the preparatory school in Orinoca, although aged five he began schooling at the primary school in his home village, which consisted of a single room in which children of all ages were taught.^[10][11] Aged six, he travelled with his sister and father to northern Argentina for six months where his father worked harvesting sugar cane, and Evo himself sold ice cream as well as briefly attending school, but speaking only Aymara he had difficulty understanding the lessons, which were taught in Spanish, and he was forced to leave.^[10][12] As a child, he would also regularly travel by foot to Arani province in Cochabamba with his father and their llamas, a journey lasting up to two weeks, in order to exchange their salt and potatoes for maize and coca.^[9][13] A big fan of soccer, aged 13 he organised a community soccer team, 'The Fraternity', with himself as team captain. Within two years, he had been elected to the position of training coach for the whole region, gaining early experience with leadership.^[12][14]

After finishing primary education, Morales attended the Agrarian Humanistic Technical Institute of Orinoca (ITAHO), completing all but the final year.^[15] That year, his parents then sent him to study for a degree in Oruro, where although he did very poorly academically, he finished all of his courses and exams by 1977, meanwhile earning money on the side as a brick-maker, day labourer, baker and a trumpet player for the Royal Imperial Band, the latter of which allowed him to travel across Bolivia.^{[15][16][17][18]} However, at the end of his higher education he failed to collect his degree certificate, probably because of the expense that this would have entailed; in Bolivia, obtaining a "certificate for completed studies" was "a very costly and time-consuming affair."^[15] Although he had an interest in going on to study journalism at university, he didn't have the grades to pursue it as a profession.^[15][19]

Military service and El Chapare: 1978-1981[link]

At the time, the Bolivian government instituted mandatory conscription into the army, and so Morales had to serve in the armed forces between 1977 and 1978. He had initially signed up at the Centre for Instruction of Special Troops (CITE) in Cochabamba, but was instead sent into the 4th Ingavi Cavalry Regiment and stationed at the army headquarters in Bolivia's administrative capital La Paz to undertake his military service.^[15][19][20] These two years saw "one of Bolivia's politically most unstable periods", with five presidents and two military coups, led by General Juan Pereda and General David Padilla respectively.^[15] It was under the regime of the latter that Morales was stationed as a guard at the Palacio Quemado, or Presidential Palace.^[21]

The Palacio Quemado in La Paz, where Morales was a guard during part of his military service. Many years later it would be the building from which he governed the country.

At the end of his military service, Evo returned to his family, who had decided to move from Isallawi, where they had lived for four generations, and set up a new home in the Tropics of Cochabamba, located in the eastern Bolivian lowlands; this was brought about after the Orinoca communities had been hit by the El Niño storm cycle in 1980, which decimated the region's agriculture.^[18][19] In doing so, the Morales family were following in an Andean tradition that had been practiced since at least the time of the Inca Empire, that of moving between the different climatic zones in order to diversify their livelihoods; according to Andean tradition, the family ayllu, being a discontinuous territory, would move with them, but retain links to Isallawi.^[22] Setting up a new home in the town of Villa 14 de Septiembre, El Chapare with the help of a loan from Evo's maternal uncle, the Morales family cleared a plot of land in the semi-tropical forest, and proceeded to grow such crops as rice, oranges, grapefruit, papaya, bananas and later on also coca.^[23][24] The arrival of the Morales family was a part of a much wider migration to the region, with many Bolivians hoping to set up farms where they could earn a living growing coca, the plant from which cocaine is made, and was experiencing a steady rise in price and which could be cultivated up to four times a year; in 1981 El Chapare's population was 40,000 but by 1988 it had risen to 215,000.^[25]

In his new home, Evo got to know the local community by joining their soccer team, before going on to found his own team, named New Horizon, who proved victorious at the August 2nd Central Tournament.^[25] The El Chapare region would remain special to Evo for many years to come, for during his presidency he would often talk about it in public speeches and would return there whenever possible, frequenting one of three "locally renowned" fish restaurants for one of his favourite dishes, surubí.^[23]

[edit] Entering the cocalero union: 1981-1983

It was in El Chapare that Evo joined a cocalero union made up of coca producers, first getting involved in political activism. in 1980, the General Luis García Meza came to power.

A Bolivian man holding a coca leaf; coca has been a staple crop in Bolivia and other parts of Andean South America for centuries, where it is chewed as a stimulant and has become an integral part of rural culture. In the 20th century however it was adopted as a key ingredient in the production of cocaine, a narcotic which has been declared illegal across much of the world, leading the U.S. government to try and prevent the plant's cultivation throughout South America.

Further political instability rocked the nation when Luis García Meza was forced to resign, and in 1982 the left wing Democratic and Popular Union (Unidad Democrática y Popular - UDP) took power in representative democratic elections, with Hernán Siles Zuazo becoming president. However, with the Bolivian economy in crisis, the UDP implemented a series of neoliberal capitalist reforms to the economy, cutting back the state sector and opening the country up to foreign investment, privatizing companies. The reforms brought hyperinflation under control. The U.S. government then ordered further intervention in Bolivia as a part of the War on Drugs to destroy the illegal narcotics trade; as U.S. President George H.W. Bush proclaimed, "The fastest and cheapest way to eliminate narcotic trafficking is at its source... We need to do away with the plantations where they grow". Because coca was the key ingredient in the production of cocaine, the U.S. sent their own armed forces into El Chapare in order to aid the Bolivian authorities in halting its production.^[26]

In 1983, Evo's father Dionisio died, and so he temporarily retreated from his work with the cocalero syndicate to focus on organising his father's affairs.^[27] However, the Bolivian government angered Evo, who returned to campaigning on behalf of the coca drug cartels, that he liked to call "coca farmers" to disguise the fact that he was supporting the cocaine trade. He refused the $2,500 compensation offered by the government for each acre of coca that he eradicated; the campesinos was a very profitable means of subsistence. For them, the lucrative trade in cocaine had them rich, and they resented the government for cutting off the cash flow. They tried to paint it as issue of national sovereignty, and they did their best to villainize the U.S., equating them helping the Bolivian government to crack down on the drug trade with invading imperalists proclaiming "Long live coca! Death to the Yankees!" ("Causachun coca! Wañuchun yanquis!").^[28] From 1982 to 1983, Evo served as the General Secretary of his local San Francisco syndicate, before serving as Secretary of Records from 1984 to 1985, and then General Secretary of the August 2nd Headquarters in 1985.^[28]

[edit] General Secretary of the Cocalero Union: 1985-1994

By 1985, Morales was elected general secretary in a union of farmers growing coca for the drug cartels and by 1988 was elected executive secretary of the Tropics Federation.^[29] He retains this position to this day, even while serving as President of Bolivia. Around this time the Bolivian government, encouraged by the US, began a program to eradicate most coca production. By 1996 Morales was made president of the Coordinating Committee of the Six Federations of the Tropics of Cochabamba.^[29] Morales was among those opposing the government's position on coca and lobbied in favor the drug cartels. This opposition often resulted in him being jailed. Morales was a talented leader, taking coca production, and drug production as a symbol of Andean culture. He said that coca or cocaine was in danger of extinction and the evil imperialists led of course by the U.S., were oppressing them, by fighting the drug trade. Furthermore, he presented the coca growers working for the drug cartels as victims of a wealthy, urban social elite, who had bowed to U.S. pressure. Morales soon led a 600 km march from Cochabamba to the Bolivian capital La Paz.

Early political activity[link]

The ASP, IPSP and MAS: 1995-1999[link]

Members of the sindicato social movement first began suggesting that they move into the political arena in 1986. This suggestion brought much disagreement, with many fearing that a move into politics would lead the social movement to be co-opted for personal gain by politicians, who were widely mistrusted by the activists.^[30] Evo Morales began supporting the formation of a political wing in 1989, although a consensus in favor of its formation only emerged in 1993.^[31] On March 27, 1995, at the seventh congress of the Unique Confederation of Rural Laborers of Bolivia (Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia - CSUTCB), such a "political instrument" - a term intentionally employed over "political party" - was finally founded, named the Assembly for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (Asamblea por la Sobernía de los Pueblos - ASP).^[31][32] The ASP soon held its first congress, at which the CSUTCB participated along with three other Bolivian unions, the FNMB, CSCB and CIDOB, representing miners, peasants and indigenous peoples respectively.^[31]

Nonetheless, the National Electoral Court (Corte Nacional Electoral - CNE) prevented Morales or any of his fellow activists running for political office under the ASP banner by refusing to recognize it, citing minor procedural infringements.^[31] The coca activists circumvented this problem by instead running under the banner of the United Left (IU), a coalition of leftist parties that had been founded in 1988 and which was headed by the Communist Party of Bolivia (Partido Comunista Boliviano - PCB).^[31][32] They went on to win landslide victories in those areas which were local strongholds of the movement, producing 11 mayors and 49 municipal councilors.^[31] In the subsequent national elections of 1997, the IU/ASP gained four seats in Congress, obtaining 3.7% of the national vote, with this rising to 17.5% in the department of Cochabamba.^[33] Morales was among the four activists elected to Congress, representing the provinces of Chapare and Carrasco, and carrying 70% of the votes in his electoral district.^[32]

MAS-IPSP partisans celebrate the 16th anniversary of the IPSP party's founding in Sacaba, Cochabamba.

Rising electoral success was accompanied by factional in-fighting, with a leadership contest emerging in the ASP between the incumbent Alejo Véliz and Evo Morales, who had the electoral backing of the social movement's bases.^[33] Morales and his supporters subsequently split from Véliz and the ASP and formed their own party, the Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos - IPSP).^[33][34] The movement's bases soon defected en masse to the IPSP, leaving the ASP to crumble and Véliz to join the centre-right New Republican Force (Nueva Fuerza Republicana - NFR), for which Morales denounced him as a traitor.^[35]

Morales came to an agreement with David Añez Pedraza, the leader of a defunct yet still registered party named the Movement for Socialism (MAS); under this agreement, Morales and the Six Federaciónes could take over the party name, with Pendraza stipulating the condition that they must maintain its own acronym, name and colors. Thus the defunct right wing MAS became the flourishing left wing vehicle for the coca activist movement known as the Movement for Socialism – Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples.^[32][35] The MAS is described as "an indigenous-based political party that calls for the nationalization of industry, legalization of the coca leaf … and fairer distribution of national resources."^[36]

Morales and the MAS went on to contest the local elections of December 5, 1999.

Expulsion from Congress[link]

While Morales was a Member of Congress, the governments of Hugo Banzer and Jorge Quiroga broadened the eradication campaign through Plan Dignidad. The cocaine producing region of Chapare which Morales represented was beset with hundreds of police and military officers who were seen by Morales as "committing an innumerable amount of abuses and assassinations which violated the most basic human rights and liberties."^[32] Morales denounced the militarization and said that the government was committing a massacre in the Chapare, he declared that the peasants had a right to resist militarily against the troops who were said to be shooting at protesters.^[32] Then three police officers were slain when they attempted to close a coca market.^[20] In light of Morales' comments about armed resistance on January 24, 2002 a 104-member majority of Congress voted to have him expelled. The Congressional Ethics Commission declared that Morales had committed "serious inadequacies in the execution of his duties."^[32] With his popularity rising for standing up to an unpopular government, on March 5, 2002, he submitted an objection to the Constitutional Tribunal saying his rights had been violated. He said his right to defend himself, to the presumption of innocence, and to parliamentary immunity had all been unjustly ignored.^[32]