This article's citation style may be unclear. The references used may be made clearer with a different or consistent style of citation, footnoting, or external linking. (September 2009)

Chinese law is one of the oldest legal traditions in the world. In the 20th and 21st century, law in China has been a complex mix of traditional Chinese approaches and Western influences.

For most of the history of China, its legal system has been based on the Confucian philosophy of social control through moral education, as well as the Legalist emphasis on codified law and criminal sanction. Following the Revolution of 1911, the Republic of China adopted a largely Western-style legal code^{[citation needed]} in the civil law tradition (specifically German-influenced). The establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 brought with it a more Soviet-influenced system of socialist law. However, earlier traditions from Chinese history have retained their influence, even to the present.

Law in the People's Republic of China is currently undergoing gradual reform, as many elements inside and outside the country emphasize the need to strengthen the rule of law in China, and international trade and globalization spur transformations in various areas of Chinese domestic law.

Chinese legal tradition[link]

The word for law in classical Chinese was fǎ (法) . The Chinese character for fǎ denotes a meaning of "fair", "straight" and "just", derived from its water radical. It also carries the sense of "standard, measurement, and model".^[1] Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris held that the concept of fǎ had an association with yì (義: "social rightness").^[2] Yan Fu, in his Chinese translation of Montesquieu's De l'esprit des lois published in 1913, warned his readers about the difference between the Chinese fǎ and Western law: "The word 'law' in Western languages has four different interpretations i "rites", "decorum"), fǎ (法: "human laws") and zhì (制: "control").^[3]

A term which preceded fǎ was xíng (刑), which originally probably referred to decapitation. Xíng later evolved to be a general term for laws that related to criminal punishment. The early history Shang Shu recorded the earliest forms of the "five penalties": tattooing, disfigurement, castration, mutilation, and death. Once written law came into existence, the meaning of xíng was extended to include not only punishments but also any state prohibitions whose violation would result in punishments. In modern times, xíng may be understood in the sense of penal law or criminal law. An example of the classical use of xíng is xíng bù (刑部: "Department of Punishment") for the legal or justice department in imperial China.

The two major Chinese philosophical schools discussed below, Confucianism and Legalism, strongly influenced the idea of law in China. Briefly, under Confucianism, the state should lead the people with virtue and thus create a sense of shame which will prevent bad conduct. Under Legalism, law is to be publicly promulgated standards of conduct backed by state coercion. The tension between these two systems is that Confucianism relies on tradition to make the leader the head of household of all China while Legalism makes standard law that even the emperor should be bound by. The common factor is that both endorse to different degrees a paternalistic conception of the state, which knows better than its citizens and makes laws to protect them. This concept persisted throughout the imperial period, into the republican period, and can still be seen acting today.

Unlike many other major civilizations where written law was held in honor and often attributed to divine origin, law in early China was viewed in purely secular terms and its initial appearance was greeted with hostility by Confucian thinkers as indicative of a serious moral decline, a violation of human morality, and even a disturbance of the total cosmic order.^[4] Historically, the people's awareness and acceptance of ethical norms was shaped far more by the pervasive influence of custom and usage of property and by inculcating moral precepts than by any formally enacted system of law. Early emperors however embraced the Legalist ideal as a way of exerting control over their large and growing territory and population. This process was integrated with traditional Chinese beliefs in the cosmic order, holding that correct behavior was behavior consonant with the appropriate responses set by fǎ. Xíng states the potential costs to the individual of exceeding them and imposes penalties for these actions.^[5]

The imperial period was characterized mainly by the concept of law as serving the state, a means of exerting control over the citizenry. In the late Qing dynasty there were efforts to reform the law codes mainly by importing German codes with slight modifications. This effort continued and was amplified in the republican period resulting in the Provisional Constitution of 1912 which included the idea of equality under the law, rights for women, and broader rights for citizens vis-à-vis the government. The onset of the communist period at first rolled back the development of individual rights with the primary concept of law returning to that of a tool of the state. After the Cultural Revolution devastated the ranks of intellectuals and legal professionals, it took until 1982 for the idea of individual rights to reemerge as a significant influence on Chinese law.

The current constitution, created in 1982, states in Article V that no organization or individual is above the law and in Article III makes the People’s Congresses and state administration responsible to the people, paving the way for later efforts to allow enforcement of individual rights. Passage of the Administrative Litigation Law of 1987 created legal recourse for individuals from arbitrary government action, an avenue previously unavailable. Despite the deep-seated norm against legal proceedings, litigation in the Chinese courts has increased dramatically, especially in recent years. The continuing weakness of courts resulting from their dependence on the local government for financial support and enforcement undermines the effectiveness of these remedies but this has also begun to change with China’s initiatives to increase legal training and the professionalism of the judiciary. One avenue of individual appeal from government action which continues to be important is the custom of xinfang or petitions by citizens to the individuals officials for change. The continuing wide use of xinfang reflects the fact that many officials are still able to avoid legal sanctions and the underlying avoidance of the legal system, as well as the personal ability of officials to personally intervene to change unjust results. Recently xinfang has been institutionalized to some extent with the central government mandating that every level of administration establish a xinfang office to handle petitions and report them up to high levels. This solution by exertion of personal power clearly goes against the idea of rule of law, and worse, some scholars have noted that xinfang today functions more as an informational collection system for the government than an effective review mechanism.

Confucianism and Legalism[link]

Confucianism and Legalism are two major Classical legal theories or philosophies developed during the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period, a time that saw the most impressive proliferation of new ideas and philosophies in Chinese history. While both theories call for governmental hierarchy, they differ drastically in their views of human potential and the preferred means to achieve political order. Nevertheless, both theories have influenced and continue to influence the development of cultural, social, and legal norms in China.

The basic premise of Confucianism is the idea that human beings are fundamentally good. With this optimistic view on human potential, Confucius advocates for ruling through li – traditional customs, mores, and norms – which allow people to have a sense of shame and become humane people with good character, rather than through government regulations and penal law. The idea is that people will internalize the acceptable norms and only take proper actions. This will not only lead to a harmonious social order, but it will also provide the additional benefit of improving an individual’s inner character and the overall quality of the society. In contrast, codified laws require external compliance, and people may abide by the laws without fully understanding the reason for compliance. As such, a social order achieved through formal laws does not come with the additional benefit of better citizenry. It is worth noting, however, that even Confucius did not advocate for the elimination of formal laws. Rather, according to Confucius, laws should be used minimally and reserved only for those that insist on pursuing one’s self-interests without taking into account the well being of the society.

As Confucius rejects the general use of formal laws to achieve social order, what lies vital to Confucius’ theory is the willing participation by citizens of the society to search for commonly accepted, cooperative solutions. In addition to willing participation of citizens, there must also be grounds or bases upon which commonly acceptable solutions can be arrived at - the concept known as li. Li is commonly understood as a set of culturally and socially valued norms that provide guidance to proper behaviors that will ultimately lead to a harmonious society. These norms are not fixed or unchangeable over time but rather a reflection of what is accepted at a particular time in a particular context. When conflicts arise, the li have to be applied and interpreted to produce a just result and restore the harmony of the society. However, in the absence of any procedural safeguard afforded by codified laws, interpretation of li is subject to abuse.

Recognizing that people in a society hold diverse interests, Confucius charges the ruler with the responsibility to unify these interests and maintain social order. This is not done by dictatorship but by setting an example. Therefore, a ruler needs not to force his people to behave properly. Instead, the ruler needs only to make himself respectful, and the people will be induced and enlightened by his superior virtues to follow his example – an ideal known as wuwei. Nevertheless, the ruler must know and understand the li to be able to create solutions to conflict and problems the society faces. As the people are to follow the moral standards and example set by the ruler, to a large extent, the quality of the ruler determines the quality of the political order.

In contrast to Confucius’ li-based theory, the Legalism advocates the utilization of codified laws and harsh punishment to achieve social order. This is due to the legalists’ belief that all human beings are born evil and self-interested. Therefore, if left unrestrained, people would engage in selfish behavior which will undoubtedly lead to social unrest. To cure this defect and force people to behave morally, the only way, believed the legalists, is to publicly promulgate clearly written laws and impose harsh punishments.

Realizing that the abilities of rulers are often limited and that reliance on the ruler’s ability and judgment often leads to adverse results, the legalists designed a system in which the law is run by the state, not the ruler. This ensures that the laws will be applied impartially without the interference of personal bias of the ruler or ones who are responsible for applying the laws. It also makes it irrelevant whether the ruler has superior abilities. This non-action promoted by the legalists is their understanding of the concept of wuwei, which is different from the Confucians’ understanding of the same concept. Notwithstanding such an understanding, the ruler, like in Confucianism, has the ultimate authority to decide what the law should be. Therefore, like Confucianism, Legalism is subject to abuse as well. In fact, the Qin emperor implemented strict laws and extremely harsh punishments without taking into account mitigating circumstances even for insignificant crimes. For example, books were burned and people holding different ideals were buried alive. While the Qin emperor successfully instilled fear and respect for law into the minds of his people, the harshness of the law led to his quick demise after only 14 years of reigning over China.

In summary, although both Confucianism and Legalism were developed in a period of turmoil and both were aimed at the re-unification of the country, the two theories went opposite directions with one advocating for and one against the use of formal laws to achieve social order. What the two theories have in common is their concession of the ultimate authority to the ruler, who remained above and beyond the li or law. It is true that neither theory is ideal in achieving a social order. Nevertheless, both theories have had a significant impact on the cultural and legal development in China, and their influence remains visible today.

The significant influence of the Legalist tradition in Chinese law has historically been overlooked. Although the Confucian ideology provided the fundamentals for the substance of traditional law, the Legalist school constructed the important framework of the traditional legal system. The Han dynasty retained the basic legal system established under the Qin but modified some of the harsher aspects in line with the Confucian philosophy of social control.

The Han dynasty formally recognized four sources of law: lü (律: "codified laws"), ling (令: "the emperor's order"), ke (科: "statutes inherited from previous dynasties") and bi (比: "precedents"), among which ling has the highest binding power over the other three. Most legal professionals were not lawyers but generalists trained in philosophy and literature. The local, classically trained, Confucian gentry played a crucial role as arbiters and handled all but the most serious local disputes.

Eventually, the incorporation of the essentials of Confucianist li into legal codes occurred with this Confucian conception dominating ancient Chinese law. Ch'ü concludes that the gradual process of Confucianisation of law was the most significant development in the legal system of China prior to 20th century modernization.^[6] The line between ruling by moral influence and ruling by punishment was not always clearly delineated. For example, li could be enforced by moral influence and legal means. The metamorphosis of li into law depended on its widespread and unvaried acceptance by society.

Although the codification of law was largely completed by the Tang Code of CE 624, throughout the centuries the Confucian foundations of the Tang Code were retained, and indeed with some aspects of it strengthened by the later dynasties.

The Confucian notion that morality and self-discipline was more important than legal codes caused many historians, such as Max Weber, until the mid-20th century to conclude that law was not an important part of Imperial Chinese society. This notion, however, has come under extreme criticism and is no longer the conventional wisdom among Sinologists, who have concluded that Imperial China had an elaborate system of both criminal and civil law which was comparable to anything found in Europe.

During the Qing dynasty, criminal justice was based on extremely detailed Great Qing Legal Code. One element of the traditional Chinese criminal justice system is the notion that criminal law has a moral purpose, one of which is to get the convicted to repent and see the error of his ways. In the traditional Chinese legal system, a person could not be convicted of a crime unless he has confessed. This often led to the use of torture, in order to extract the necessary confession. These elements still influence modern Chinese views toward law. All capital offenses were reported to the capital and required the personal approval of the emperor.

There was no civil code separate from the criminal code, which led to the now discredited belief that traditional Chinese law had no civil law. More recent studies have demonstrated that most of the magistrates' legal work was in civil disputes, and that there was an elaborate system of civil law which used the criminal code to establish torts.

Modernization[link]

The introduction and translation of Western legal texts into Chinese is believed to have been started under the auspices of Lin Zexu in 1839. More systematic introduction of Western law together with other Western sciences started with the establishment of Tongwen Guan in 1862. The major efforts in translation of Western law that continued until the 1920s prepared the building blocks for modern Chinese legal language and Chinese law.^[7] Legal translation was very important from 1896 to 1936 during which period the Chinese absorbed and codified their version of Western laws. These efforts were assisted by the medium of the Japanese legal language and law developed in Japan during the Meiji period which involved in large part Japanese translation of European Continental laws.

In the late Qing dynasty there was a concerted effort to establish legal codes based on European models. Because of the German victory in the Franco-Prussian War and because Japan was used as the model for political and legal reform, the law codes which were adopted were modeled closely after that of Germany.

Attitudes toward the traditional Chinese legal system changed markedly in the late-20th century. Most Chinese and Westerners of the early 20th century regarded the traditional Chinese legal system as backward and barbaric. However, extensive research into China's traditional legal system has caused attitudes to become more favorable in the late-20th and early 21st centuries. Researchers of the early and mid-20th century tended to compare the traditional Chinese legal system to then contemporary systems, finding the former to be backward. However, more recent research compared the 18th century Chinese legal system to European systems of the 18th century, resulting in a far more positive view of traditional Chinese law.

The Department of Punishment was changed to fa bu (法部: "Department of Law") in the early 1900s legal reforms.

Republic of China[link]

Law in the Republic of China (Taiwan) is mainly a civil law system. The legal structure is codified into the Six Codes: the Constitution, the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedures, the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedures and in Administrative laws.

People's Republic of China[link]

After the Communist victory in 1949, the People's Republic of China quickly abolished the ROC's legal codes and attempted to create a system of socialist law copied from the Soviet Union. With the Sino-Soviet split and the Cultural Revolution, all legal work was suspected of being counter-revolutionary, and the legal system completely collapsed.

Over the past century, there have been numerous constitutions in China.^[8] The first attempts towards implementing a constitution in China were made during the final decade of the Qing Dynasty. Several constitutions were subsequently promulgated by various controlling groups between that time and the establishment of the PRC. The PRC had a provisional constitution from its inception until the enactment of its first constitution in 1954. This initial constitution was based on the constitution of the Soviet Union. It was shortly ignored, however, and became without legal force. Although it provided that the National People’s Congress (NPC) would be elected every four years as the highest state power, these guidelines were not adhered to. The second constitution of the PRC was modeled on the ideology of the Cultural Revolution and promulgated in 1975. This constitution subjected the NPC to the Communist Party and removed previous constitutional protections such as equality under the law and private property succession rights. It was also immediately disregarded through breaches of its provisions and in-adherence to guidelines regarding the NPC. The third constitution of the PRC was adopted in 1978. Although this version moved away from the ideologies of the Cultural Revolution, it did retain some remnants of it. It also retained Communist Party control over the state structure. However, reformists subsequently gained power, which lead to the breakdown of this constitution as focus shifted to economic construction and modernization.

With the start of the Deng Xiaoping reforms, the need for reconstructing a legal system to restrain abuses of official authority and revolutionary excesses was seen. In 1982, the National People's Congress adopted a new state constitution that emphasized the rule of law under which even party leaders are theoretically held accountable. This reconstruction was done in piece-meal fashion. Typically, temporary or local regulations would be established and after a few years of experimentation, conflicting regulations and laws would be standardized.

The current Constitution of the PRC was enacted in 1982 and reflects the model of the first PRC constitution.^[9] The Constitution provides that leadership is through the working class, which in turn is led by the Communist Party. This Constitution also contains more extensive rights than any of the previous constitutions. The rights include equality before the law, political rights, religious freedom, personal freedom, social and economic rights, cultural and educational rights, and familial rights. These rights, however, are connected to social duties. The duties include safeguarding the unity, security, honor, and interests of the country, observing law and social ethics, paying taxes, and serving in the military. Neither the rights nor duties provided for in the Constitution are exhaustive.

The Constitution provides that the NPC is the supreme organ of state power over a structure of other people’s congresses at various levels.^[10] The NPC has power to amend the Constitution by a two-thirds majority, promulgate legislation, elect and remove highest-level officials, determine the budget, and control economic and social development planning. The NPC also includes a Standing Committee that functions much as the NPC does when the NPC is not in session. Although the Standing Committee has had some powers since 1955, its law-making powers were initially provided for in the 1982 Constitution. The NPC sits at the highest level in the hierarchy of governmental structure in the PRC. This national level is followed in descending order by the provincial level (including autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the national level), the prefectural level, the county level, and the townships and towns level. Government members at the lower two levels are directly elected, and those at the higher levels are elected by the lower levels. In addition to the NPC, the provincial people’s congresses possesses legislative power and can pass laws so long as they do not contravene the Constitution or higher legislation or administrative regulations.

The Constitution states its own supremacy.^[11] However, it has been theorized that the supremacy of the Communist Party means that the Constitution and law are not supreme, and that this perspective is the result of the Marxist view of law as simply a superstructure combined with a lack of recognition of rule of law in philosophical or historical tradition. Although the Constitution provides for legislative, executive, judicial, and pro-curatorial powers, they are all still subject to Communist Party leadership. Often, important political decisions are made through actions which are not regulated by the Constitution. Additionally, courts may not rely on the Constitution in deciding cases, and they may not review legislation for Constitutionality. Nonetheless the Constitution does provide the linguistic framework for conducting government affairs and describing them in the media.

Since 1979, when the drive to establish a functioning legal system began, more than 300 laws and regulations, most of them in the economic area, have been promulgated. The use of mediation committees, informed groups of citizens who resolve about 90% of the PRC's civil disputes and some minor criminal cases at no cost to the parties, is one innovative device. There are more than 800,000 such committees in both rural and urban areas.

In drafting the new laws, the PRC has declined to copy any other legal system wholesale, and the general pattern has been to issue laws for a specific topic or location. Often laws are drafted on a trial basis, with the law being redrafted after several years. This process of creating a legal infrastructure piecemeal has led to many situations where the laws are missing, confusing, or contradictory, and has led to judicial decisions having more precedental value than in most civil law jurisdiction. In formulating laws, the PRC has been influenced by a number of sources including traditional Chinese views toward the role of law, the PRC's socialist background, the German-based law of the Republic of China on Taiwan, and the English-based common law used in Hong Kong.

Legal reform became a government priority in the 1990s. The Chinese government has promoted a reform it often calls "legalisation" (法制化). Legalisation, among other things, has provided the regime with a gloss of legitimacy and has enhanced predictability. There have been major efforts in the rationalization and strengthening of the legal structure and institution building in terms of developing and improving the professionalism of the legislature, judiciary and legal profession. As market reforms have deepened and social inequality has widened, legal forums - ranging from mediation and arbitration commissions to courts - have come to play an increasingly prominent role.

The 1994 Administrative Procedural Law allows citizens to sue officials for abuse of authority or malfeasance. In addition, the criminal law and the criminal procedures laws were amended to introduce significant reforms. The criminal law amendments abolished the crime of "counter- revolutionary" activity. However political dissidents are sometimes charged on the grounds of subverting state security or publishing state secrets. Criminal procedures reforms also encouraged establishment of a more transparent, adversarial trial process. Minor crimes such as prostitution and drug use are sometimes dealt with under re-education through labor laws. The PRC constitution and laws provide for fundamental human rights, including due process, but some have argued that they are often ignored in practice. (See Human rights in the People's Republic of China.)

The basic principles of Chinese legislative drafting include generality and flexibility. Sometimes excessive generality and omissions in Chinese law, coupled with the wide discretionary powers conferred on local authorities to implement laws, undermines the predictability and certainty of law. Furthermore, as Chinese law is intended to be educative, the language of the law is that of the ordinary language comprehensible to the average citizen, although many laws are drafted in broad and indeterminate language.

As a result of a pending trade war with the United States of America over violations of intellectual property rights of American corporations in the early 1990s, the People's Republic of China's trademark law has been modified and now offers significant protections to foreign trademark owners.^[12]

After the transfers of sovereignty, Hong Kong and Macau continue to practice English Common Law and Portuguese legal systems respectively, with their own courts of final appeal. In other words, Hong Kong and Macau are outside of the legal jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China, except on constitutional issues.

Due to the growing sophistication of Chinese laws, the expansion of the rule of law, as well as an influx of foreign law firms, China has also begun to develop a legal services market. Foreign lawyers have accompanied foreign capital and their clients to China which has had an immense influence on the promulgation of new Chinese laws based on international norms, especially in regards to intellectual property and corporate and securities law.^[12]

On July 1, 1992, in order to meet growing demand, the Chinese government opened the legal services market to foreign law firms allowing them to establish offices in China when the Ministry of Justice and the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAOIC) issued the Provisional Regulation of Establishment of Offices by Foreign Law Firms regulation.^[13] As a result, many foreign law firms, including the United States' Baker & McKenzie and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, along with several British firms, incorporated consulting firms in their home countries or Hong Kong and then set up subsidiaries in Beijing or Shanghai to provide legal services.

However, there still many regulatory barriers to entry to protect the domestic legal industry. Issues relating to Chinese law must be referred to Chinese law firms and foreign lawyers are also prohibited from interpreting or practicing Chinese law nor representing their clients in court. However, in reality many foreign law firms interpret laws and manage litigation by directing the local firms they must have cooperative relationships with. In this regards China's restrictive legal market can be directly tied to a phobia of people asserting their legal rights in the face of rampant corruption. Information received from the State Council Legislative Office suggests that China may be allowing foreigners to sit the Chinese Lawyers Examination, or have a mutual recognition treaty with other countries to allow foreign lawyers to conduct non-litigation Chinese legal work.

While the trend in China’s legal landscape is to continue to open up the legal market, China’s laws and regulations have helped develop a number of domestic Chinese firms to specializing to meet demand of a booming economy. According to Asia Law and Business magazine China Awards, the top China firms were King & Wood PRC Lawyers, Commerce & Finance Law Offices, Fangda Partners, Haiwen & Partners, Jun He Law Offices and Lehman, Lee & Xu.^[14]

Legal rights[link]

Classical Chinese does not have a semantic equivalent to the concept of "rights". The idea of rights was introduced to China from the West. Its translation as quanli (权利) was coined by William Alexander Parsons Martin in 1864, in his translation of Henry Wheaton's Elements of International Law.

Rule of law[link]

One of the most commonly used phrases in contemporary China, by legal scholars and politicians alike, is fǎzhì (法治). Fǎzhì can be translated into English as "rule by law". While fǎzhì supposed to be "rule of law", there is a widely misconceiving that mixed "rule by law" with fǎzhì.^[15] The related concepts of yi fa zhi guo (以法治国: "governing the nation in accordance with law") and jianshe shehui zhuyi fazhi guojia (建设社会主义法制国家: "building a socialist rule of law state") have been part of the Chinese Communist Party's official policy since the mid-1990s. In 1999, the NPC adopted an amendment to the Chinese Constitution, incorporating both concepts in Article 5.

The existence of the rule of law in China has been widely debated.^[16] There are differing theories of the rule of law. One theory is the "thin", or formal, theory of rule of law, and the other is the "thick" theory.

The "thin" theory of rule of law is described by Randall Peerenboom as at the basest level incorporating a legal system that imposes meaningful restraints on the state and individuals in ruling power, that the law is supreme, and that all citizens are equal before the law (Peerenboom, 2). According to Lon Fuller’s account of thin theory, rule of law exists in a society when the laws of that society are “general, public, prospective, clear, consistent, capable of being followed, stable, and enforced” (Peerenboom, 3). The thin theory has also been explained by Joseph Raz as emphasizing the formal or instrumental aspects of a legal system regardless of whether it is part of a particular political structure, i.e. a democratic or non-democratic society.[14] Thick theory rule of law espouses all the elements of thin theory in addition imposes a political, social, and economic concept into the rule of law. The rule of law is regarded by some as presupposing political or economic structures of liberal democracy, human rights and other ideal socio-legal order.[11] Some scholars believe that given China's socialist and non-democratic political system and practice, it is at best regarded as a country of rule by law with law used by the state as an instrument for social control.[12] However, others rely on the formal or thin theory of rule of law to interpret fazhi as a legal reality in China.[13] Additionally, some believe that China may still fall short of the thin theory of rule of law.

Of particular relevance to the second principle set out above, was the enactment of the Administrative Permission Law of the PRC (APL) on 27 August 2003, effective from July 2004. The APL for the first time requires all laws and regulations that subject any civil act to approval requirements to be published.^[17]

The APL also provides that only those laws adopted by the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee, administrative regulations promulgated by the State Council, and local regulations adopted by the local people’s congresses may impose administrative approval requirements. Individual ministries or agencies (central or local) do not have such powers except in specified circumstances. This is consistent with the hierarchy of laws and regulations provided under the Legislative Law of the PRC. The enactment of the APL represents an encouraging step forward.^[17]

Despite the newly elevated role of courts in Chinese society, there still remains some consensus about defects in China’s legal system in regards to progressing towards the rule of law. Scholars point to the following defects as slowing movement toward rule of law. These include:

• First, the National People’s Congress is ineffective at executing its constitutional duty to legislate and supervise the government.^[18]

• Second, the Chinese Constitution is not treated as the supreme law, nor is it enforced.^[19]

• Third, the judiciary is not independent from political pressure. On the other hand, direct intervention in particular cases by the CCP has lessened in recent years, as has the direct influence of the CCP on the legislative process.^[20]

• Fourth, there is a high level of corruption among public officials. Personal favors, bribery, and taking of public monies are all too common at all levels of government.^[21]

• Finally, the legal profession is inadequate for lack of qualified attorneys and judges.^[22] This failure is being remedied by legislation aimed at instituting higher educational standards for judges, opening more courts and law schools throughout China.^[23]

Notes[link]

References[link]

• Deborah Cao, Chinese Law: A Language Perspective (Hants, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2004).
• Albert Hung-Yee Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People's Republic of China (1992).
• Neil J. Diamant et al. (ed.), Engaging the Law in China: State, Society, and Possibilities for Justice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).
• Phillip C. C. Huang, Code, Custom and Legal Practice in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
• Xin Ren, Tradition of the Law and Law of the Tradition (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1997).
• Scott Andy, China Briefing Business Guide: Mergers and Acquisition Law in China (Kowloon,Hong Kong: Asia Briefing Media, 2007).

External links[link]

• Chinese Legislative Information Network System full text search of English translations of hundreds of PRC laws and regulations
• Ancient Chinese Theories of control (management study)
• Chinese Legislative Information in English
• Judicial independence should come first China Daily/Beijing Review 2005-11-15 (article on Peking University legal scholar He Weifang)

Bo Xilai 薄熙来
CPC Chongqing Committee Secretary
In office November 2007 – March 2012
Deputy (Mayor)	Wang Hongju (2007–2009) Huang Qifan (2009–)
Preceded by	Wang Yang
Succeeded by	Zhang Dejiang
Minister of Commerce of the PRC
In office February 2004 – December 2007
Premier	Wen Jiabao
Preceded by	Lü Fuyuan
Succeeded by	Chen Deming
Personal details
Born	(1949-07-03) 3 July 1949 (age 62) Beijing, Republic Of China
Political party	Communist Party of China
Spouse(s)	Li Danyu (divorced) Gu Kailai
Relations	Bo Yibo (father)
Children	Li Wangzhi Bo Guagua
Alma mater	Peking University Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Bo Xilai (born 3 July 1949) is a Chinese politician. He came to prominence through his tenures as the mayor of the coastal economic hub of Dalian and then governor of Liaoning province. From 2004 to November 2007, he served as Minister of Commerce. Between 2007 and 2012 he served as a member of the Politburo and head of the Communist Party's Chongqing branch.

The son of Bo Yibo, one of the Eight Elders of the Communist Party of China, Bo Xilai is identified as one of the "princelings" of Chinese politics. He cultivated a casual and charismatic image in the media that marked a departure from the normally staid nature of Chinese politics.

In Chongqing, Bo became known for heavy-handed populism. He initiated a campaign against organized crime, increased spending on welfare programs, maintained consistent double-digit percentage GDP growth, and campaigned to revive Cultural Revolution-era "red culture." Bo's promotion of egalitarian values and the achievements of his "Chongqing model" made him the champion of the Chinese New Left, composed of both Maoists and social democrats disillusioned with the country's market-based economic reforms and increasing economic inequality.^[1] However, the perceived lawlessness of Bo's anti-corruption campaigns, coupled with concerns about his outsized personality, made him a controversial figure.

Bo was considered a likely candidate for promotion to the elite Politburo Standing Committee in CPC 18th National Congress in 2012. His political fortunes came to an abrupt end following the Wang Lijun incident, in which his top lieutenant and police chief sought asylum at the American consulate in Chengdu and revealed details of Bo's alleged involvement in a homicide plot. In the fallout, Bo was removed as Chongqing party chief in March 2012 and suspended from the politburo the following month. Bo's dismissal was notable for exposing disunity within Communist Party ranks shortly before a leadership transition.

Early life[link]

Bo Xilai was the fourth child of prominent Communist Party leader Bo Yibo, who served as Minister of Finance in the early years of the People's Republic of China but who fell from favor in 1965 for supporting more open trade relations with the West^{[citation needed]}. When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, Bo Yibo was labeled a "rightist" and a "counterrevolutionary" and purged from his posts.^[2] He spent the ensuing twelve years in prison, where he was reportedly tortured. His wife, Hu Ming, was abducted by Red Guard in Guangzhou, and was either beaten to death or committed suicide.^[3]

Bo Xilai was 17 years old when the Cultural Revolution began, and at the time attended the prestigious No. 4 High School in Beijing — one of the best in the country.^[3][4] In the early years of the Cultural Revolution, Bo is reported to have been an active member of the liandong Red Guard organization^[4][5] and may have at one point denounced his father.^[6]

As the political winds of the Cultural Revolution shifted, Bo and his siblings were either imprisoned or sent to the countryside, and Bo Xilai was locked up for five years.^[7] After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the members of the Gang of Four were officially blamed for the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and Bo's family was released. Bo Yibo was politically rehabilitated, and in 1979 became vice premier.^[2]

After his release, Bo Xilai worked at the Hardware Repair Factory for the Beijing Second Light Industry Bureau.^[8] He was admitted to the Peking University by public examination in 1977. Unlike many of his contemporaries in the Chinese leadership who studied engineering, Bo majored in world history.^[9] In his sophomore year, Bo enlisted in a Master's program in international journalism at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,^[4] graduating with a Master's degree in 1982.^[10] He joined the Communist Party in October 1980.^[10]

Early political career[link]

During the 1980s, the Bo family regained its political influence. Bo Yibo served successively as vice premier and vice-chairman of the Central Advisory Commission. The elder Bo came to be known as one of the “eight elders” (sometimes referred to as the “eight immortals”) of the Communist Party and was instrumental in the implementation of market reforms in the 1980s. Although he favored more liberal economic policies, the elder Bo was politically conservative, and endorsed the use of military force against demonstrators during the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests.^[2] After the 1989 crackdown, Bo Yibo helped ensure the ascent of Jiang Zemin to succeed Deng Xiaoping as the leader of the Party and helped Jiang consolidate power in the 1990s.^[9] Bo Yibo remained a prominent figure in the party until his death in 2007^[2] and was influential in shaping his son's career.^[11]

After graduating from university, Bo was assigned to Zhongnanhai^[9] – the headquarters of the Communist Party – where he worked with the research office of the CPC Central Committee Secretariat and CPC Central Committee General Office.^[4] He soon requested a transfer to the provinces, and in 1984 was appointed deputy party secretary of Jin County, near Dalian in the northeastern province of Liaoning.^[9][10] In an interview with People’s Daily, Bo said that his family name created career obstacles. "For quite a long time people had reservations about me," he said.^[11] Bo subsequently became deputy secretary and then secretary of the party committee of the Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone and secretary of the Jinzhou party committee.^[10]

Rising again in rank within the party, he became a member of the Standing Committee of the Dalian Municipal CPC Committee, the city's top decision-making body, and became the Vice-mayor of Dalian in 1990.^[10] In 1993, Bo became deputy Party secretary and mayor of Dalian.^[9]

Liaoning[link]

Mayor of Dalian[link]

Dalian saw significant development under Bo's leadership.

Bo became acting mayor of Dalian in 1992 and formally assumed the post in 1993. He remained mayor until 2000. Bo served as Dalian's deputy party secretary from 1995.^[10] Bo was promoted to party chief in 1999 and served in that position until 2000.

Bo's tenure in Dalian was marked by the city's phenomenal transformation from a drab port city to a modern metropolis, a 'showcase' of China's rapid economic growth.^[12] In the early 1990s, Bo took some credit for the construction of the Shenyang-Dalian Expressway, China's first controlled-access freeway, winning accolades for the rapid expansion of infrastructure and for environmental work.^[13] Since Bo's time in office, Dalian became known as one of the cleanest cities in China, having won the UN Habitat Scroll of Honour Award in 1999. In addition, Bo was an advocate for free enterprise and small businesses, and successfully courted foreign investment from South Korea, Japan, and Western countries.^[12] In contrast to his colleagues, he held press conferences at Chinese New Year, and developed a reputation among foreign investors for 'getting things done'.^[13]

Bo spent seventeen years in the city of Dalian, a lengthy term in comparison to colleagues of the same rank, who are often transferred to different locales throughout their careers. Despite the accompanying economic growth and rise in living standards, Bo's tenure in Dalian has sometimes been criticized as having been too focused on aesthetic development projects such as expansive boulevards, monuments, and large public parks.^[13] To make way for his large-scale projects, Bo's administration moved large numbers of local residents from downtown areas into new homes in the city's outskirts. Dalian's greenery was dubbed "Xilai Grass".^[14] He also reputedly had a remote control in the Mayor's office for the fountains on the city's main square.^[15] In addition, he spearheaded the construction of a huabiao in the city.^[16] In 2000, Bo was frontrunner for the post of Mayor of Shenzhen, based on his success in making Dalian the "Hong Kong of the North". However it was suggested that Bo was too independent and outspoken for the post. The post went to Yu Youjun instead.^[17]

15th Party Congress[link]

During the 15th Party Congress in 1997, Bo Xilai’s family launched an unsuccessful campaign to secure his promotion to become a member of the Central Committee of the CCP. Although nepotism was generally frowned upon in China, Bo Yibo’s ambitions for his son were well-known.^[14] Bo Yibo advanced the idea that revolutionary elders should 'nominate' their children to become high officials, and Bo Xilai was selected as his family’s 'representative' over his older brother Bo Xicheng,^[14] ostensibly because of Xilai’s superior academic credentials, which included attendance at the elite Peking University and a master’s degree.

In order to secure Bo Xilai’s selection for promotion during the 15th Party Congress, the family launched a nationwide campaign to publicize his son’s "achievements" as mayor of Dalian.^[14] They commissioned author Chen Zufeng to pen a report portraying Bo as a man who is "as statesman-like as Henry Kissinger, as environmentally conscious as Al Gore, and almost as beloved by the public as Princess Diana."^[14] Despite the publicity campaign, Bo Xilai failed even to gain a seat in the Liaoning provincial delegation to the Party Congress. Ultimately, Bo Yibo helped him gain a seat with the Shanxi delegation, but the younger Bo was unable to secure a promotion.^[14]

In addition, Bo placed second-last in the confirmation vote for membership in the 15th Central Committee. As he placed in the bottom 5% of candidates, Bo was denied entry into the elite council, suffering a major political embarrassment.^[4] Bo's failure to get elected was attributed to a general opposition to nepotism within the Party.^[14] Moreover, during his tenure in Dalian, Bo caused resentment for the amount of 'special favours' that he procured for the coastal city at the expense of the rest of the province.^[14] His perceived partisan interests locked Bo's kin in a factional struggle against Li Tieying, one of China's central leadership figures, who may have created obstacles to his promotion.^[14]

Provincial Governor[link]

In 2001, a corruption scandal involving former Liaoning governor Zhang Guoguang provided an opportunity for Bo's advancement.^[13] Prior to the 15th Party Congress, Bo Yibo and Bo Xilai assisted then-President Jiang Zemin in preparing to force political rival Qiao Shi into retirement. The Bo family also supported Jiang's lacklustre "Three Stresses" (San Jiang) campaign in 1997.^[9] Such unwavering support for Jiang was said to have worked in Bo Xilai's favour when the vacancy for Governor of Liaoning opened. Bo became acting Governor in 2001 after the dismissal and arrest of Zhang Guoguang,^[9] and was officially confirmed as Governor in 2003.^[10] In his position as governor, which he held until 2004, Bo gained membership to the Central Committee of the Communist Party.^[4]

During his tenure in Liaoning, Bo played a critical role in the promotion of the Northeast Area Revitalization Plan. Adopted in 2003 by party authorities, the policy aimed to strengthen economic development in the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. Bo Xilai was particularly enthusiastic about the policy, stating his desire to see the northeast become "China's fourth economic engine" (the others being the Pearl River Delta, Yangtze River Delta, and the Bohai Economic Region).^[4]

The northeast region was at one time known as the "cradle of industrialization" of China. In 1980, industrial output for Liaoning province alone was twice that of the southern Guangdong province. However, the northeast was left behind amidst market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, while regions like Guangdong prospered. Its economy—still largely tied to state-owned enterprises—stagnated relative to other regions, with high unemployment rates.^[4] The revitalisation plan aimed to address this by reviving the region’s traditional industries, strengthening trade ties with and encouraging investment from South Korea and Japan, and experimenting with free trade zones in select cities.^[18] In 2004, official media reported that foreign direct investment in Liaoning had nearly doubled since the launch in 2003 of the northeastern rejuvenation strategy.^[19]

Although Bo established a reputation as a comparatively clean politician during his tenures in Dalian and as governor of Liaoning,^[20] he was not immune to corruption allegations. In particular, Bo was the subject of critical investigative reports by Liaoning journalist Jiang Weiping,^[21] the whistleblower in the Mu and Ma corruption case in Liaoning – a scandal that Bo benefited from politically. While Bo was not directly involved in the scandal, Jiang accused Bo of providing political cover for his friends and relatives.^[21] Jiang was initially sentenced to eight years in prison on trumped-up charges, for which Bo was criticized, but was released after five years under international pressure.^[13][22] Yang Rong, the former chief executive of Brilliance China Automotive who fled to the United States after getting embroiled in a dispute against state property authorities, accused Bo of interfering in his judicial proceedings in Beijing.^[13] In addition, Bo openly clashed with Wen Shizhen, then-party secretary in Liaoning who was technically Bo's superior.^[4][13] Wen reportedly criticized Bo for "developing China's cities like Europe and its countryside like Africa," and even held a party to celebrate Bo's departure from Liaoning in 2004.^[23]

Falun Gong practitioners and their supporters have accused Bo of leading an especially severe crackdown on the group during his tenure in Liaoning.^[24][25] They have filed lawsuits against Bo in over ten countries, alleging torture and crimes against humanity.^[26][27] In 2007 Bo was found liable for the torture of a Falun Gong practitioner in an uncontested civil suit in Australia.^[28]

16th Party Congress[link]

At the 16th Party Congress in 2002, Bo's age, regional tenures, and patronage links fit the profile for a potential candidate to be groomed for the "5th generation of leaders" that would assume power in 2012. His chief competitors were seen as Xi Jinping, then party chief in the coastal province of Zhejiang, and Li Keqiang, a populist Tuanpai candidate who was the Governor of the central province of Henan.^[9] As with the 15th Party Congress five years earlier, the elder Bo lobbied for his son's promotion.^[9] The Bo family enjoyed the patronage of Jiang Zemin. However, Bo Xilai's unequivocal support for Jiang strengthened the reluctance of his political opponents to support his nomination. Ultimately, although Bo remained a top contender for higher promotion, Xi and Li remained the main candidates to succeed Hu Jintao as Paramount leader.^[9]

Minister of Commerce[link]

Commerce Minister Bo meets his American counterpart, Carlos Gutierrez, during a visit to the United States in 2007

When Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as General Secretary in late 2002, Bo's career as a local official ended with his appointment to Minister of Commerce in Wen Jiabao's cabinet to replace Lü Fuyuan, who retired for health reasons. Bo concurrently served as a member of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Bo's stint as Minister of Commerce significantly raised his international profile and generated media attention both in China and abroad. Described as good-looking, articulate and open-minded in his approach to problems,^[29] Bo's rise from a municipal official to the central government generated great media fanfare and elevated his status to something of a 'political star.' Bo's political persona was considered a departure from the generally serious and conservative leadership in Beijing. With his youthful vigour, populism, and purported popularity with female reporters, Bo's political rise had been compared to that of John F. Kennedy.^[30]

Bo presided over a continued rise in foreign investment in China as Minister of Commerce. His daily schedule was dominated by receiving foreign guests and dignitaries. By the time that he became Minister, he spoke relatively fluent and colloquial English. During a meeting with American officials, Bo reputedly told a struggling interpreter to stop translating because the Chinese officials could understand English and it was wasting time. In May 2004 Bo was one of the few ministers hand-picked to accompany Premier Wen Jiabao on a five-country trip to Europe.^[30] The trade policy of the United States toward China also sparked significant controversy. Bo maintained a conciliatory but assertive attitude as he attended talks in Washington.^[30] On his trips to the United States, he conducted substantive discussions with his American counterparts and signed agreements on intellectual property, the services sector, agricultural products, food safety, and consumer protection.^[30]

Bo also oversaw the restructuring of the Ministry, formed from the amalgamation of the National Economics and Commerce Bureau and the Department of International Trade. Bo sought to balance the amount of attention given to foreign investors and domestic commercial institutions. He began tackling the imbalance from the retail sector, whose success up to that point was largely dependent on foreign companies.^[30] He drew up plans to protect Chinese industries' competitive position within a domestic market that was quickly being crowded out by foreign competition.^[31]

17th Party Congress[link]

At the 17th Party Congress in October 2007, Bo gained a seat on the 25-member Politburo, effectively China's ruling council. He was then tipped to leave the Ministry of Commerce and take over as party chief in the southwestern megalopolis of Chongqing. Bo’s predecessor, political rival Wang Yang, was reassigned as party chief of Guangdong province.

At the time, Chongqing was reeling from problems such as air and water pollution, unemployment, poor public health, and complications from the Three Gorges Dam.^[6] According to analysts, Hu wanted to transfer his ally Wang Yang out of Chongqing before these problems intensified.^[6] Bo was initially reluctant to go to Chongqing and was reportedly unhappy with his new assignment. He had hoped to become vice-premier instead,^[32] but Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice-premier Wu Yi argued against Bo's promotion to vice-premiership. In particular, Wu was critical of Bo’s penchant for self-promotion,^[23] and Wen cited international lawsuits against Bo by Falun Gong adherents as a barrier to his holding higher office.^[6]

Bo took up the Chongqing post on 30 November, a month following the conclusion of the Congress, even though Wang Yang had vacated the position on 13 November.^[32] Whilst some saw this transfer as a 'banishment' from the central government to the hinterlands to keep Bo's perceived arrogance and high-profile antics out of Beijing's view,^[6] others considered it a promotion since being the party chief in one of the four direct-controlled municipalities came with an ex officio seat on the Politburo.^[32][33]

Chongqing[link]

The Chongqing model[link]

Although Bo was initially unhappy about his re-assignment in Chongqing, he soon resolved to use his new position as a staging ground for a return to higher national office.^[34] Bo made no secret of his desire to enter the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) during the 18th Party Congress in autumn 2012,^[35] all but two of the PSC members—including President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao—were expected to retire.^[29] The transition would be an opportunity for Bo to join the highest echelon of national leadership, likely as a replacement for ally Zhou Yongkang, secretary of the Central Political and Legislative Committee, serving as the head of the party's security apparatus.^[35][36]

In Chongqing, Bo pioneered a new style of governance dubbed the "Chongqing Model” — a set of social and economic policies intended to address diverse challenges facing modern China following economic reforms.^[37][38]

The Chonqging model was characterized in part by increased state control and the promotion of a neo-leftist ideology. Along with his police chief Wang Lijun, Bo launched a sweeping campaign against organized crime, and increased the security and police presence in the city. Critics noted these policies were accompanied by the erosion of the rule of law, and allegations surfaced of political and personal rivals being victimized amidst Bo’s anti-corruption drive. As a means of addressing declining public morality, Bo launched a “red culture” movement to promote Maoist-era socialist ethics. On the economic front, he actively courted foreign investment—much as he had done in Liaoning province. The Chongqing model was also characterized by massive public works programs, subsidized housing for the poor, and social policies intended to make it easier for rural citizens to move to the city, thus reaping the benefits of urban status.^[37] Some have compared Bo's governing style to Russian president Vladimir Putin.^[39]

The Chongqing model provided an 'alternate' comprehensive roadmap for development that diverged from the policies favored by the reformist faction dominated by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao.^[37] Bo’s leadership in Chongqing dramatically raised his profile, both nationally and internationally. In 2010, he was named as one of the 'World's 100 Most Influential People in 2010' by Time.^[40] Observers noted that, in China's non-electoral political system, Bo's high-profile presence and bold political maneuvers effectively amounted to a public campaign for the top leadership.^[41] However, he drew the ire of some of the country’s leaders; President Hu and Premier Wen were reluctant to acknowledge Bo publicly, ostensibly due to a discomfort over his leadership style.^[41]

Organized crime[link]

Bo's tenure in Chongqing was dominated by a protracted war against organized crime and corruption known as dahei ("striking black"). Between 2009 and 2011, an estimated 5,700 people were arrested in the sweeping campaign that ensnared not only criminals, but also businessmen, members of the police force, judges, government officials, and political adversaries.^[42][43] The campaign was overseen by Wang Lijun, whom Bo had worked with previously in Liaoning province.^[29]

Wen Qiang, one of the most prominent figures implicated in the trials, had been a prominent municipal official since the days of party chiefs He Guoqiang and Wang Yang. China observer Willy Lam suggested that the such a large-scale crackdown was given 'go-ahead' from central authorities and general secretary, president Hu Jintao, and Bo was careful to not look as though Chongqing was trying to 'set an example' for the rest of the country so he could benefit from the success politically.^[44]

The dahei campaign earned Bo national recognition and widespread popularity in Chongqing—all the more because of the city’s historical reputation as a center for criminal activity.^[35] In contrast to often colorless and orthodox politicians, Bo gained the reputation as a party boss that "got things done."^[45] The apparent success of the campaign gave Bo a 'rock star status', and resulted in calls for a nation-wide campaign modeled on Chongqing. Through the campaign, Bo gained the support of a number of powerful members of the Politburo Standing Committee, including Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping and Zhou Yongkang, all of whom visited Chongqing or praised Bo's achievements sometime between 2010 and 2011.^[38]

However, Bo's campaign was criticized for running roughshod over judicial due process and eroding the rule of law.^[42] Individuals targeted in the campaign were arbitrarily detained by the authorities, with an estimated 1,000 being sent to forced labor.^[46] Lawyers for the accused were intimidated and harassed, and in at least one case, sentenced to 18 months in prison.^[45] Allegations also surfaced over the use of torture to extract confessions.^[45] Moreover, assets seized during the campaign were allegedly redirected to help pay for Bo’s popular social housing programs.^[47] The Wall Street Journal reported that the $11 billion went into government coffers through the campaign.^[42] Li Jun, a fugitive businessman, asserted that he became a target of Bo anti-corruption drive as a result of a land dispute with the government. When he refused government demands to give up the land, he claims that he was abducted and tortured, and that the $700 million worth of assets in his business were seized.^[48][49]

Red culture movement[link]

During his time in Chongqing, Bo initiated a series of Maoist-style campaigns to revive 'red culture' and improve public morale. The initiative included the promotion of Maoist quotes, 'red' songs, revolutionary television programing and operas, and initiatives to encourage students to work in the countryside, akin to the way students were required to do during the Down to the Countryside Movement of the Cultural Revolution.^[50] As part of the movement, Bo and the city's Media Department initiated a "Red Songs campaign" that demanded every district, government department, commercial enterprise, educational institution, state radio and TV station begin singing 'red songs' praising the achievements of the Communist Party of China. Bo pledged to reinvigorate the city with the Marxist ideals reminiscent of the Mao era.^{[51][52][53][54]}

Prior to the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China celebrations, for instance, Bo sent out 'red text messages' to the city's 13 million cellphone users.^[55] According to Xinhua, Bo's text messages are usually quotes from Mao's Little Red Book, and include phrases such as "I like how Chairman Mao puts it: The world is ours, we will all have to work together,"^[56] and "responsibility and seriousness can conquer the world, and the Chinese Communist Party members represent these qualities."^[35] Bo and his team of municipal administrators also raised new Mao statues in Chongqing, while providing 'social security apartments' to the city's less well-off.^[57] Some scholars have characterized this as an example of the revival of Maoism in the Chinese Communist ethos.^[57]

Reactions to the red culture movement were divided. Bo’s revival of Mao-era culture and accompanying social welfare programs were popular within much of the middle to lower income strata of Chongqing society, and made Bo a star with both conventional Marxists and neo-leftists. Bo won praise for returning the city to what some called China's 'true socialist heritage' by de-emphasizing material wealth, and evoked nostalgia to the social equality that existed during Mao's time.^[58] Some retirees said they wanted to pass on "revolutionary spirit" to their children, while others participated as a means to praise the Communist Party for the country’s economic progress.^[59]

The campaign also had many detractors. Some intellectuals and reformers criticized the campaign for being regressive, akin to "being drowned in a red sea", and bringing back painful memories from the Cultural Revolution.^[58][60] Several mid-level officials in the city committed suicide due to overwhelming pressure to organize events for the red songs campaign.^[60] Bo’s critics derisively referred to him as "little Mao".^[61]

Social policies[link]

A cornerstone of Bo’s Chongqing model involved a series of egalitarian social policies aimed to lessen the gap between rich and poor, and ease the rural-urban divide. Bo promoted the notion of pursuing “red GDP”—an economic model embodying communist egalitarianism—and suggested that, if economic development were analogous to 'baking a cake', then the primary task should be to divide the cake fairly rather than building a larger cake.^[62]

To that end, the city reportedly spent $15.8 billion on public apartment complexes for use by recent college graduates, migrant workers and low-income residents.^[38] In 2007, the cities of Chongqing and Chengdu were selected to run pilot projects intended to mitigate the rural-urban divide and ease integration of rural residents into the cities. Under China’s hukou registration system, citizens are classified as either rural or urban—a distinction that determines nor only where they may live, but also affects educational opportunities, taxation, property rights, and so on. Of Chongqing’s 32 million residents, only 27% held urban hukous as of 2007.^[63] The 2007 project made it easier for rural residents to obtain urban status, a policy intended not only to help balance inequality, but also to enable the government to develop underused rural land. Under Bo’s leadership, Chongqing established “land exchanges” where rural villages could earn credits for maximizing farmland.^[64]

Bo's approach to social policy was demonstrated during the November 2008 taxi strikes, which saw over 8,000 taxi drivers take to the streets for two days in protests over high fees, unregulated competition and rising fuel charges. Similar protests in China are frequently suppressed—sometimes forcefully—with official media sometimes blaming labor unrest on criminal instigation.^[65] Bo's government instead held a televised roundtable dialogues with the protesters and citizens, and agreed to allow the formation of a trade union. His handling of situation earned him praise as a comparatively restrained and progressive leader.^[66][67]

Economic policies[link]

Another major component of Bo’s Chongqing model concerned the city’s economic policies. Just as he had done in Liaoning province, Bo ambitiously pursued foreign investment in the city, lowering corporate income tax rates (15% compared to the 25% national average), and sought to stimulate rapid urbanization and industrialization.^[63] He also carried on with policies initiated by his predecessors which focused on domestic consumption, rather than export-led growth.

During his tenure, Chongqing reported annual GDP growth far exceeding the national average. In 2008, for instance, nationwide GDP growth was reported at 8%, while Chongqing reported 14.3%; the same year, foreign trade rose by 28%, and bank loans were up 29%.^[63]

Bo model of economic growth won national and international praise for seamlessly combining foreign investment and state-led growth. However, Bo's critics called the model of “red GDP” – subsidized infrastructure, housing and public works projects – unsustainable and a drain on the city's budget. Some civil servants complained that they were not getting salaries on time.^[60] Chongqing received a disproportionately high share (some $34 billion) of stimulus money from the Beijing in 2008. Political rivals such as Bo’s predecessor Wang Yang also suggested that economic figures in Chongqing were “rigged”—artificially inflated through unnecessary construction and public works projects.^[68]

Leadership style[link]

Although many of Bo’s campaigns earned popular support, especially from the city’s poor, his leadership style has been described as “propagandistic,” “ruthless,” and “arrogant” by subordinates and city officials, academics, journalists, and other professionals.^[23][60] Michael Wines of the New York Times wrote that although Bo was possessed of “prodigious charisma and deep intelligence,” these qualities were offset by a “studied indifference to the wrecked lives that littered his path to power…Mr. Bo’s ruthlessness stood out, even in a system where the absence of formal rules ensures that only the strongest advance.”^[23] Bo placed onerous demands on government officials in the city, requiring them to be available to work all day and all night, seven days a week.^[60] He reportedly called subordinates to late-night meetings, publicly criticized and humiliated those with whom he disagreed, and even hit underlings who failed to meet his demands.^[23] According to a psychologist quoted in the Daily Telegraph, since Bo Xilai assumed power, "depression, burn out and suicides have all risen among officials…Officials now make up the largest share of patients in counselling in the city.”^[60]

In late 2009, a popular investigative television show on China Central Television aired a critical story on Bo’s anti-crime drive, expressing concern over the apparent disregard for the legal process. In response, Bo utilized his connections to have the show’s host temporarily banned from the airwaves, and its producer moved to another program.^[23] Others who opposed Bo’s initiatives were also met with retribution. Li Zhuang, a defense lawyer from Beijing, was sentenced to two and a half years in prison (lated reduced to 18 months) in 2009 for attempting to defend one of the high-profile targets of Bo’s crackdown.^[23][69] Cheng Li, a scholar at the Brookings Institution, remarked that “Nobody really trusts [Bo]: a lot of people are scared of him, including several princelings who are supposed to be his power base.”^[23]

Alleged eavesdropping operations[link]

As part of Bo’s efforts to fight crime and maintain social and political stability in Chongqing, he initiated a major electronic surveillance operation. Wang Lijun, Bo’s police chief, served as the architect of the state-funded project, which was described in official media as a “comprehensive package bugging system covering telecommunications to the Internet.”^[70] The system involved wiretaps, eavesdropping, and monitoring of internet communications, and was designed with the help of cybersecurity expert Fang Binxing, known for his pivotal role in the construction of China’s Great Firewall.^[70]

According the New York Times, the eavesdropping operations did not only target local criminals, but also the communications of top Chinese leaders, including general secretary, president Hu Jintao.^[71] One source connected to the Chinese leadership said that Bo tried to monitor nearly all central leaders who had visited Chongqing.^[70] In August 2011, a phone call between President Hu Jintao and anti-corruption official Ma Wen was found to be wiretapped under Bo’s orders. The revelation about the eavesdropping operation resulted in intense scrutiny from Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and contributed in Bo’s downfall in 2012.^[70]

Death of Neil Heywood[link]

On 14 November 2011, British citizen Neil Heywood was found dead in his Chongqing hotel room. At the time, local authorities declared he had died from alcohol over-consumption, though his family noted that he was not a heavy drinker. The official cause of death was not scrutinized until several months later, when revelations emerged that Heywood’s death was a homicide, and Bo Xilai was implicated.

Heywood served as an intermediary linking western companies to powerful Chinese politicians.^[72] He was a long-time associate of the Bo family: he reportedly shared a close personal relationship with Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai, and had helped the couple’s son earn admission to the Harrow School in England.^[73] Heywood also allegedly served as a middleman for the family, helping them clandestinely move large sums of money overseas.^[74]

In October 2011, Heywood reportedly had a business dispute with Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai, when he demanded a higher commission for his services. The dispute escalated, with Heywood ultimately threatening to reveal the family’s business dealings and overseas assets, estimated to total in excess of $136 million.^[75][76] Heywood was then allegedly poisoned by Gu and an assistant.^[77]

Downfall[link]

Wang Lijun incident[link]

In early 2012, the party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection bolstered its presence within Chongqing as the city's leaders came under investigation. Much of the attention focused on Bo's police chief, Wang Lijun, who may have been under investigation for his role in a corruption case in Liaoning province. Growing scrutiny over the city's wiretapping operation against senior leaders also likely fell mainly on Wang.^[70] Although details are scarce, several sources have suggested that Wang's resentment against Bo grew amidst the investigations—resentment that was compounded when Wang realized that he and his wife had also been targets of wiretapping under Bo's orders.^[70]

Moreover, Wang was privy to details of Neil Heywood's death, and had reportedly attempted to voice his concerns to Bo about alleged poisoning. Around 16 January, Wang is believed to have confronted Bo over evidence that implicated Bo's wife in the murder. Although Bo initially agreed to allow an inquiry, he then changed course and sought to obstruct investigations.^[78] Wang was abruptly demoted on 2 February to the far less prestigious position of Vice-mayor overseeing education, science, and environmental affairs.^[79] Bo placed Wang under surveillance, and several of his close associates were reportedly taken into custody. Some reports allege that Bo may have been plotting to have Wang assassinated.^[80]

On 6 February 2012, apparently fearing for his life, Wang traveled to the U.S. consulate in the nearby city of Chengdu, bringing evidence implicating Bo and his family in the Neil Heywood murder. According to reports, Wang sought and was denied asylum in the United States.^[81] He remained in the consulate for approximately 24 hours before leaving "of his own volition" and being taken into the custody of state security officials dispatched from Beijing.^[82][83][84] Local media in Chongqing announced that he was on a mental health-related sick leave.^[85]

A day after Wang's leave, several overseas Chinese-language news websites posted an open letter allegedly penned by Wang, which sharply criticized Bo as a "hypocrite" and "the greatest gangster in China" and accused Bo of corruption.^[86] Without knowing what incriminating material Wang may have held against Bo, even Bo's supporters in China's top leadership were reluctant to vouch for him.^[87] Bo responded in an unusually open press conference during the 2012 National People's Congress, acknowledging "negligent supervision" of his subordinates, saying he may have "relied upon the wrong person".^[88]

Removal from posts[link]

On 15 March, Bo was dismissed as Chongqing party chief and its related municipal posts, while temporarily retaining a seat on the Politburo. Due to the potentially destructive effects Bo's dismissal would have on party unity, party elders were consulted on the matter.^[89] The decision was reportedly made at a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee on 7 March, during which security tsar Zhou Yongkang cast a lone dissenting vote.^[89] On 14 March, Bo was reprimanded by Premier Wen Jiabao during the Premier's annual press conference.^[90][91] Wen called the achievements of Chongqing "significant," but the result of "multiple administrations," i.e., not just Bo himself. Wen also made numerous allusions to the damage wrought by the Cultural Revolution, an indirect rebuke of Bo's efforts to revive "red culture".^[32][91] Addressing high-level political changes by a Premier to an open public forum was unprecedented. Political observers believe that Wen's remarks and Bo's downfall represented a consensus within the central leadership that Bo not only needed to shoulder the responsibility for the Wang Lijun scandal, but also marked a significant victory for liberal reformers.^[92][93]

On 10 April, Bo was suspended from the party's Central Committee and its Politburo, pending investigation for "serious disciplinary violations." Bo's wife, Gu Kailai, was now a prime suspect in the inquiry into the death of British businessman Neil Heywood.^[94] The announcements, carrying criminal implications, likely marked the end of Bo's political career.^[95][96]

Aftermath[link]

Bo's downfall elicited strong reactions among the Chinese public and with commentators across the political spectrum.^[97] Leftist websites such as Utopia, Red China, and Maoflag were full of angry commentary over Bo's dismissal. These websites were shut down for a period of "maintenance" shortly after.^[97][98] Leftist commentators voiced support for Bo: Kong Qingdong called Bo's dismissal 'a plot by enemies of the state'; Sima Nan said associating Bo with the Cultural Revolution was a 'smear campaign';^[99] Sima's pro-Bo microblogs were censored.^[98] Large numbers of sympathetic posts for Bo appeared in microblogs from Chongqing, and Dalian, where Bo was once mayor.^[97][100] The Global Times also wrote a sympathetic editorial. Liberal media reacted positively, criticizing Bo's style of 'personality-based rule' as dangerous and regressive.^[101] Right-leaning commentators said Bo's downfall signified a 'correct orientation' to China's future development.^[101] Southern Media Group editor Yan Lieshan remarked that Bo correctly identified China's problems but prescribed the wrong solution.^[101] Businesspeople whose assets were seized by Bo's administration in Chongqing also reacted positively.^[97]

Bo's dismissal caused political shockwaves unseen since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989,^[95][102] and exposing internal conflicts within Communist Party. In the weeks following 15 March, party authorities deliberated on Bo's case.^[103] In the absence of official reports of the proceedings, microblogs churned out a flood of speculation, including rumours of a coup.^[104] In response, the authorities instructed newspapers and websites to strictly report only official releases, and arrested six people accused of 'rumourmongering'.^[103]

Aware of its potentially divisive impact, authorities carefully controlled media coverage of Bo's removal from office. State media reported 'pledges of loyalty' to the party's decision to disgrace Bo, including statements from the new Chongqing party authorities, Beijing municipal organs, and grassroots party members rallying to the party line. The party's mouthpiece People's Daily issued a front-page editorial calling for unity behind the "correct decision".^[103][96] The military held 'political education' sessions on short notice, stressing unity and loyalty to the Party under the leadership of Hu Jintao.^[105] Bo's downfall also affected his ally Zhou Yongkang, who had reportedly relinquished his operational control over Chinese security institutions and lost the right to influence who would succeed him at the 18th Party Congress.^[106]

Political alignment and affiliations[link]

In the course of his career, Bo Xilai was the beneficiary of considerable patronage from former Communist Party leader Jiang Zemin.^[107] He is thus associated with Jiang’s faction,^[68] sometimes referred to as the “elitists,” that is generally known to favor a model that emphasizes free trade, economic development in the coastal regions, and export-led growth. It is a coalition composed largely of “princelings” (the children of high-ranking former party leaders), business people, leaders of coastal cities, and members of the erstwhile "Shanghai clique."^[108] By contrast, the “populist” coalition of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao advocates more balanced economic development and improvements to China’s social safety net.^[68] The populist faction is generally associated with the "left," and comprised rural leaders, socialist intellectuals, and several leaders who rose to prominence through their connections with the Communist Youth League.^[108]

Although Bo is identified with the elitist bloc for his time in Liaoning and as Minister of Commerce, during his tenure in the interior city of Chongqing, he adopted a number of populist policies more typically associated with the left. Namely, he implemented social housing programs, gave residency status (and therefore the associated social welfare benefits) to rural migrant workers, and emphasized a need for a more balanced distribution of wealth.^[109] Although Bo relentlessly pursued technology, capital, and business opportunities, he also spearheaded a large number of government programs to help the working class and disadvantaged groups.^[38] Bo’s campaigns against corruption also allegedly seized the assets of private entrepreneurs, in turn funneling these funds into state projects and welfare programs, effectively re-asserting state control over wealth.^[47] He also sought to promote “red culture,” and mandated the revival of Mao-era slogans and songs, evoking a time of an egalitarian society.

Bo's policies in Chongqing ultimately made him a prominent figure among neo-Maoists and leftists,^[47] and a representative of the conservative wing of the Communist Party. Although Bo did not favor the discontinuation of market economics or a return to Mao-era policies, he was seen to advocate a strong role for the state in peoples' lives.^[110] Bo’s anti-corruption campaign, in particular, earned him a reputation for heavy-handedness and authoritarian methods in crime and punishment.^[111][112] Bo’s policies put him in opposition to the more liberal and reform-oriented faction, particularly Premier Wen Jiabao and Guangdong party chief Wang Yang, who favored the strengthening of rule of law and a continuation of political reform.^[47][110] To observers, Bo and Wang's verbal warfare over the future direction of development marked an increasing polarization of Chinese politics into leftist and reformer camps.^[113]

Family[link]

Bo's first wife was Li Danyu, the daughter of former Beijing Party First Secretary Li Xuefeng. Their son, Li Wangzhi, graduated from Columbia University in 2001.^[114][115] Li Danyu insisted that her son change his surname to Li following her divorce from Bo Xilai.^[114] Li Wangzhi is reportedly low-key and modest, and has a master's degree in media studies. He worked at Citibank and a law firm in Beijing.^[114]

Bo married his second wife, Gu Kailai, in 1986. Gu was a prominent lawyer and founder of the Kailai lawfirm in Beijing.^[116] Gu’s father, Gu Jingsheng, was a Communist revolutionary. Her mother, Fan Chengxiu, is a descendant of the renowned Song Dynasty Prime Minister and Poet Fan Zhongyan.^[116]

Bo Xilai drew criticism from others in the party for his high-profile courting of media attention and using his family pedigree to further the interests of his wife and her law firm.^[9] Bo denied that his wife had profited from his position, saying that his wife had retired her legal practice while the couple lived in Dalian in the 1990s. Bo said that Gu "now basically just stays at home, doing some housework for me."^[117] Jiang Weiping claimed that Gu served as Bo's "gatekeeper" when Bo was the mayor of Dalian, regularly accepting gifts and bribes from property developers seeking access to him, and from Party officials seeking government appointments.^[118] There was speculation that Bo Xilai may have attempted to interfere with a corruption investigation into his wife.^[119] Following his dismissal, his wife was reported to have been implicated in the death of British businessman and family friend Neil Heywood.^[120]

Bo and Gu have one son, Guagua. He attended Harrow School, and was later admitted to Balliol College, Oxford, where in 2006 he started studying for a degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Guagua then went on to study at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.^[121][122] Bo Guagua's high-profile and privileged lifestyle has provided tabloid fodder for Chinese-language media.^[117][121] Asked how he could afford his son's tuition fees on his estimated annual salary of $22,000,^[121] Bo replied that his son received "full scholarships" from the respective institutions.^[117] Maclean's reported that Bo's family associate, Neil Haywood, pulled strings to have Guagua accepted into Harrow shortly after becoming involved with Bo.^[118]

Bo Xiyong, Bo Xilai's eldest brother, is a vice-chairman and executive director of Hong Kong-listed China Everbright International, but does so under a pseudonym. Although the name used, according to company filings, is 'Li Xueming', the company declined to confirm if they are one and the same.^[123]

See also[link]

• Politics of Liaoning
• Politics of Chongqing

References[link]