| Japanese invasions of Korea |
The Japanese landing on Busan |
| Date |
1592–1598 |
| Location |
Korean Peninsula |
| Result |
Korean-Chinese victory; Withdrawal of Japanese armies |
|
| Belligerents |
Korea: Joseon Dynasty
China: Ming Dynasty |
Japan: Azuchi-Momoyama period |
| Commanders and leaders |
Korea
Yi Sun-sin†,
Yi Eok-gi†,
Won Gyun†,
Sin Rip†,
Kim Si-min†,
Song Sang-hyeon†,
Go Gyeong-myeong†,
Kim Cheon-il†,
Jo Heon†,
Gwon Yul,
Yu Seong-ryong,
Kim Myeong-won,
Yi Il,
Gwak Jae-u,
Jeong Ki-ryong,
Kim Deok-nyeong,
Yu Jeong,
Seosan,
Jeong Mun-bu,
Kim Chung-seon.
China
Song Yingchang,
Yang Hao,
Li Rusong,
Xing Jie,
Listed above: Inspectors-general/field commanders
Yang Shaoxun,
Ma Gui (pr.),
Liu Ting,
Deng Zilong†,
Wu Weizhong,
Chen Lin
Qian Shizheng et al.
|
Japan
Toyotomi Hideyoshi,
Ukita Hideie,
Katō Kiyomasa,
Fukushima Masanori,
Konishi Yukinaga,
Kuroda Nagamasa,
Mōri Terumoto,
Kobayakawa Takakage,
Mōri Katsunobu,
Toyotomi Hidekatsu,
Listed above: Legion chiefs
Chōsokabe Motochika,
Shimazu Yoshihiro,
Tachibana Muneshige,
Kobayakawa Hidekane,
Kuki Yoshitaka,
Tōdō Takatora,
So Yoshitoshi,
Wakizaka Yasuharu,
Katō Yoshiaki,
Kurushima Michiyuki†,
Kurushima Michifusa† et al.
|
| Strength |
Korea
172,000 Korean Army,[1]
(at the beginning)
at least 22,600 Korean volunteers and insurgents
China
1st. (1592–1593)
43,000+[2]
2nd. (1597–1598)
~75,000[3]
Total:221,500[4]
|
Japan
1st. (1592–1593)
~ 158,000 [5]
2nd. (1597–1598)
~ 141,500[6]
|
| Casualties and losses |
Joseon: 300,000+ killed
civilian + military total 260,000-1,000,000[7][8] |
140,000+ killed |
|
Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598)
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| Japanese name |
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The two Japanese invasions of Korea took place from 1592 to 1598. Toyotomi Hideyoshi led the newly unified Japan into the first invasion (1592–1593) with the professed goal of conquering the Joseon Dynasty Korea, the Jurchens, and eventually Ming Dynasty China,[9] and the European Merchants (Nanban,南蛮[10][11]). The second invasion (1594–1596) was aimed as a retaliatory offensive against Joseon Dynasty Korea and Ming Dynasty China as its ally.[9] The invasions are also known as Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, the Seven Year War (in reference to its span), the Imjin Waeran (Hangul: 임진왜란, Hanja: 壬辰倭亂 - lit. Japanese Invasion of the Imjin Year), in reference to the "Imjin (壬辰)" year of the sexagenary cycle in Korean,[12] and Bunroku Keichō no eki (Japanese: 文禄・慶長の役).
The first invasion (1592–1593) is literally called the "Japanese (倭 |wae|) Disturbance (亂 |ran|) of Imjin" (1592 being an imjin year in the sexagenary cycle) in Korean. In Chinese, the wars are referred to as the "Wanli Korean Campaign", after then reigning Chinese emperor, or the "Renchen War to Defend the Nation" (壬辰衛國戰爭), where renchen (壬辰) is the Chinese reading of imjin. Meanwhile, the war is called Bunroku no eki in Japanese (Bunroku referring to the Japanese era under the Emperor Go-Yōzei, spanning the period from 1592 to 1596). The second invasion (1597–1598) is called the "Second War of Jeong-yu" and "Keichō no eki", respectively. In Japanese, the war was also called "Kara iri" (唐入り, literally "entry to China") in Edo period (17–19C) because Japan's ultimate purpose was the conquest of Ming China although the armies of Toyotomi Hideyoshi were confined to the Korean Peninsula for the duration of the war.
Initially, the Japanese forces saw overwhelming success on land and repeated defeat at sea due to the skill of the Korean Admiral Yi Sun-Sin. The Japanese forces came to suffer heavily as their communication and supply lines were disrupted. The Korean navy starved the Japanese forces by successfully intercepting the Japanese supply fleets on the western waters of the peninsula, to which most major rivers of the Korean peninsula flow. The Ming dynasty in China under the Wanli Emperor brought about a military and diplomatic intervention to the conflict, which China understood as a challenge to its tributary system.[13] The war stalled for five years during which the three countries tried to negotiate a peaceful compromise. The first phase of the invasion was during the period of 1592 until 1596, with a brief interlude for, what would be failed peace negotiations between 1596 and 1597; however, Japan invaded Korea a second time in 1597. The war concluded with the naval battle at Noryang. All of the Japanese forces in Korea had retreated by the 12th lunar month of 1598 and returned to Japan after the devastating defeat dealt by the Korean Navy.
Korea suffered the loss of a large portion of its population and faced gigantic financial difficulties as a result of the war taking place almost entirely on its soil and nowhere else.
In addition to the human losses, Korea suffered tremendous cultural, economic, and infrastructural damage, including a large reduction in the amount of arable land,[12] the destruction and confiscation of significant artworks, artifacts, and historical documents, and the abductions of artisans and technicians. During this time, the main Korean royal palaces Gyeongbokgung, Changdeokgung, and Changgyeonggung were burned down, the palace Deoksugung was used as a temporary palace.[14] The heavy financial burden placed on China by this war, as well as two other wars in the south, adversely affected its military capabilities and partly contributed to the fall of the Ming Dynasty and the rise of the Qing Dynasty.[15] However, the sinocentric tributary system that Ming had defended was restored by Qing, and the trade relations between Korea and Japan continued.[16]
In 1392, the Korean General Yi Seong-gye led a successful coup to take political power from King U of the Goryeo Dynasty by using military force. His followers forced Yi to take the crown, thus founding Joseon.[17] In search of a justification for its rule given the lack of a royal bloodline, the new regime received recognition from China and integration into its tributary system[1] within the context of the Mandate of Heaven.[18] Under Ashikaga Yoshimitsu's reign during the late 15th century, Japan, too, gained a seat in the tributary system (lost by 1547, see hai jin).[19][20] Within this tributary system, China assumed the role of a big brother, Korea the middle brother, and Japan the younger brother.[21]
Unlike the situation over one thousand years earlier when Chinese dynasties had an antagonistic relationship with the largest of the Korean polities (Goguryeo), Ming China had close trading and diplomatic relations with the Joseon Dynasty, which also enjoyed continuous trade relations with Japan.[22]
The two dynasties, Ming and Joseon (also called Choson), shared much in common: both emerged during the fourteenth century at the fall of Mongolian rule, embraced Confucian ideals in society, and faced similar external threats (the Jurchen raiders and the Wokou pirates).[23] Internally, both China and Korea were troubled with fights among competing political factions, which would significantly influence decisions made by the Koreans prior to the war, and those made during the war by the Chinese.[24][25] Dependence on each other for trade and also having common enemies resulted in Korea and Ming China having a friendly relationship.
The Wanli Emperor succeeded to the Ming dynasty in the year 1572 at the age of 9; for the first 10 years of his reign the Ming was largely run by his teacher and guardian, Zhang Juzheng; who pushed through a series of reforms that revitalized the declining dynasty and made major breakthroughs several of the key issues that had plagued the Ming, including its financial problems. Zhang also made strong progress against the Mongols of the north, and promoted military generals based on their merits, such as Li Chengliang and Qi Jiguang.
Although after Zhang Juzheng's passing in 1582, the Ming court slowly began to reverse some of his reforms and the Wanli Emperor himself increasingly became disillusioned and uninterested with daily politics, the Ming was in effect still at a relatively revitalized stage during the 1590s.
The Ming saw a string of conflicts during this period. Aside from their endless struggle against the Mongolians, they were also dealing with a military rebellion in Ningxia just before the war broke out, along with a border war with the Burmese Taungoo dynasty that coincided with the Imjin war, their conflicts with the Woko pirates a couple decades earlier also gave them significant experience against the Japanese style of warfare. Japan was by this time ending an period of internal conflict and the process of unification had been taken forward by Toyotomi. Japan launched the first attack to the Korean Peninsula, with the pretext that Korea refused to let pass Japanese soldiers trough their land to get to China. This could have effectively been true since, on one hand Japan was eager, for social and economic reasons, to take land into the continent and expand, also by that time China and Korea were allies.
By the last decade of the 16th century, Hideyoshi as daimyō had unified all of Japan in a brief period of peace. Since Hideyoshi came to hold power in the absence of a legitimate Minamoto lineage necessary for the Imperial Shogun commission, he sought for military power to legitimize his rule and to decrease his dependence on the Imperial family.[26] It is said that Hideyoshi planned an invasion of China to fulfill the dreams of his late lord Oda Nobunaga,[27] and to mitigate the possible threat of civil disorder or rebellion posed by the large number of samurai and soldiers in unified Japan.[28] But it is quite possible that Hideyoshi might have set a more realistic goal of subjugating the smaller neighbouring states (i.e. Ryukyus, Luzon, Taiwan, and Korea), and treating the larger or more distant countries as trading partners, as [26] all throughout the invasion of Korea, Hideyoshi sought for legal tally trade with China[26] Hideyoshi's need for military supremacy as a justification for his rule which lacked Shogunal background could, on an international level, translate into a Japanocentric order with Japan's neighbouring countries below Japan.[26] Historian Kenneth M. Swope mentions a rumor circulating at the time that Hideyoshi could have been Chinese who then fled to Japan from the law, and therefore sought revenge against China.[29] Also, another theory states that Hideyoshi needed the war to make sure no rebellion would arise in Japan against him and to debilitate some competing daimyōs by making them fight a war, away from Japanese territory.[2]. This would be consistent with the fact that Hideyoshi was not a Shogun nor had any bonds with the royal bloodline.
The defeat of the Odawara-based Hōjō clan in 1590[30] finally brought about the second unification of Japan,[31] and Hideyoshi began preparing for the next war. Beginning in March 1591, the Kyūshū daimyō and their labor forces constructed a castle at Nagoya (in modern-day Karatsu) as the center for the mobilization of the invasion forces.[32]
Hideyoshi planned for a possible war with Korea long before completing the unification of Japan, and made preparations on many fronts. As early 1578, Hideyoshi, then battling under Nobunaga against Mōri Terumoto for control of the Chūgoku region of Japan, informed Terumoto of Nobunaga's plan to conquer China.[33] In 1592 Hideyoshi sent a letter to the Philippines demanding tribute from the governor general and stating that Japan had already received tribute from Korea (which was a misunderstanding, as explained below) and the Ryukyus.[34]
As for the military preparations, the construction of as many as 2,000 ships may have begun as early as 1586.[35] To estimate the strength of the Korean military, Hideyoshi sent an assault force of 26 ships to the southern coast of Korea in 1587.[36] On the diplomatic front, Hideyoshi began to establish friendly relations with China long before completing the unification of Japan and helped to police the trade routes against the wakō.[37]
In 1587, Hideyoshi sent his first envoy Yutani Yasuhiro,[38][39][40] to Korea, which was during the rule of King Seonjo[41] to re-establish diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan (broken since the Japanese pirate raid in 1555),[42] which Hideyoshi hoped to use as a foundation to induce the Korean court to join Japan in a war against China.[43] Yasuhiro, with his warrior background and an attitude disdainful of the Korean officials and their customs, failed to receive the promise of future ambassadorial missions from Korea.[44]
Around May 1589, Hideyoshi's second embassy, consisting of Sō Yoshitoshi (or Yoshitomo),[45][46] Yanagawa Shigenobu[47][48] and Buddhist monk Genso[49] reached Korea and secured the promise of a Korean embassy to Japan in exchange for the Korean rebels which had taken refuge in Japan.[44]
In fact, in 1587 Hideyoshi had ordered the adopted father of Yoshitoshi and the daimyō of Tsushima, Sō Yoshishige,[39][50] to offer Joseon the ultimatum of submitting to Japan and participating in the conquest of China, or engage war with Japan. However, as Tsushima enjoyed a special trading position as the single checkpoint to Korea for all Japanese ships and had permission from Korea to trade with as many as 50 of its own vessels,[51] the Sō family delayed the talks for nearly two years.[45] Even when Hideyoshi renewed his order, Sō Yoshitoshi reduced the visit to the Korean court to a campaign to better relations between the two countries. Near the end of the ambassadorial mission, Yoshitoshi presented King Seonjo a brace of peafowl and matchlock guns - the first advanced fire-arms to come to Korea.[52] Yu Seong-ryong, a high-ranking scholar official, suggested that the military put the arquebus into production and use, but the Korean court failed to cooperate.[53] This lack of interest and underestimation of the power of the arquebus eventually led to the decimation of the Korean army early in the war.
On April 1590, the Korean ambassadors including Hwang Yun-gil, Kim Saung-il and others[54] left for Kyoto, where they waited for two months while Hideyoshi was finishing his campaign against the Odawara and the Hōjō clans.[55] Upon his return, they exchanged ceremonial gifts and delivered King Seonjo's letter to Hideyoshi.[55] Hideyoshi assumed that the Koreans had come to pay a tributary homage to Japan, but the Koreans still refused. For this reason the ambassadors were not given the formal treatment that was due diplomatic matters representatives; at last, the Korean ambassadors asked for Hideyoshi to write a reply to the Korean king, for which they waited 20 days at the port of Sakai.[56] The letter, redrafted as requested by the ambassadors on the ground since it was too discourteous, invited Korea to submit to Japan and join the war against China.[52] Upon the ambassadors' return, the Korean court held serious discussions concerning Japan's invitation;[57] while Hwang Yun-gil reported to the Korean court conflicting estimates of Japanese military strength and intentions and pressed that a war was coming, Kim Saung-il claimed that Hideyoshi's saying was nothing but a bluff. Moreover, most of the estimates considered the Japanese to be incompetent. Some, including King Seonjo, argued that Ming should be informed about the dealings with Japan, as failure to do so could make Ming suspect Korea's allegiance, but the Korean court finally concluded to wait further until the appropriate course of action became definite.[58]
Hideyoshi initiated his diplomacy moves with Korea. The Joseon Court approached Japan as a country inferior to Korea accordingly within the Chinese tributary system, and it evaluated Hideyoshi's invasions to be no better than the common wakō, Japanese pirate raids.[59] The Korean court handed to Shigenobu[47] and Genso, Hideyoshi's third embassy, King Seonjo's letter rebuking Hideyoshi for challenging the Chinese tributary system; Hideyoshi replied with a disrespectful letter, but, since it was not presented in person as expected by custom, the Korean Court ignored it.[60] After the denial of his second request, Hideyoshi launched his armies against Korea in 1592.
China had several reasons to involve itself in the Korea-Japanese war. Primarily China had to held its responsibility to its tributary states as was Korea at the time. If China had not gotten involved it would have seem like they were vulnerable and it could have given too much confidence to the Japanese to try and declare an open war directly to China. The other possible consequence of not getting involved and not stand up for Korea, would have been other tributary states bringing up an opposition and, by doing so the entire tributary system would have fallen apart. Of course there was also the obvious fact that this Japanese attack was a serious threat, as stated above Hideyoshi had made several declarations of his intentions to enter in China and conquest it, as he also stated of his goal to even reach India.
Hwacha were developed by Koreans and could shoot up to 200 arrows at one time.
Many of the castles in Korea were strong mountain fortresses like this one. Other stone fortresses, however, were of poor quality and structure.
The two major security threats to Korea and China at the time were the Jurchens, who raided along the northern borders, and the wakō (Japanese pirates), who pillaged the coastal villages and trade ships.[61][62]
In response to the threats, the Koreans developed a powerful navy, constructed a thorough defense line of fortresses along the Tumen River, and took control of the island of Tsushima.[63] This defensive stance within an environment of relative peace pushed the Koreans to depend on a heavy artillery of fortresses and warships. With the transmission of gunpowder and firearms technology from China during the Goryeo Dynasty, Korea improved upon the original Chinese designs of firearms and developed advanced cannon which were used with great efficiency at sea. Even though China was the main source of new military technologies in Asia, Korea excelled in both cannon manufacturing and shipbuilding in this age.[64]
Japan, on the other hand, had been in a state of civil war for over a century, which had the result of turning Japan into a very warlike society. When traders from Portugal arrived in Japan and introduced Arquebuses and Muskets, the Japanese warlords were quick to adapt to this innovative weapon, giving them a large advantage over the Korean armies. The Korean cannons were highly effective against Japanese naval vessels, as a few effective hits would sink the ship along with its crew. On land, however, the charging Japanese infantry were very difficult targets for the Korean cannons, and the small arms carried by Japanese soldiers had greater advantage. This strategic difference in weapons development and implementation contributed to the in-war Japanese dominance on land, and the Korean dominance at sea.
As Japan had been at war since the mid-15th century, Hideyoshi had half a million battle-hardened soldiers at his disposal[65] to form a remarquable professional army in Asia for the invasion of Korea.[66] While Japan's chaotic state had left the Koreans with a very low estimate of Japan as a military threat,[66] a new sense of unity among the different political factions in Japan, the "Sword hunt" in 1588, (the confiscation of all weapons from the peasants) indicated otherwise.[67] Along with the hunt came "The Separation Edict" in 1591, which effectively put an end to all Japanese wakō piracy by prohibiting the daimyōs to support the pirates within their fiefs.[67] Ironically enough, the Koreans believed that Hideyoshi's invasion would be just an extension of the previous pirate raids that had been repelled before.[68] As for the military situation in Joseon, the Korean scholar official Yu Seong-ryong observed, "not one in a hundred [Korean generals] knew the methods of drilling soldiers":[69] rise in ranks depended far more on social connections than military knowledge.[70] Korean soldiers were disorganized, ill-trained and ill-equipped,[70] and they were used mostly in construction projects such as building castle walls.[71]
Japanese arquebuses of the Edo era. These types of
firearms were used by Japanese soldiers during Hideyoshi's invasions.
There were several defects with the organization of the Joseon-era Korean military defence system.[72] An example was a defence policy that stated local officers could not individually respond to a foreign invasion outside of their jurisdiction until a higher ranking general, appointed by the king's court, arrived with a newly mobilized army.[72] This arrangement was highly inefficient since the nearby forces would remain stationary until the mobile border commander arrived on the scene and took control.[72] Secondly, as the appointed general often came from an outside region, he was likely to be unfamiliar with the natural environment, the available technology and manpower of the invaded region.[72] Finally, as a main army was never maintained, new and ill-trained recruits conscripted during war constituted a significant part of the army.[72] The Korean court managed to carry out some reforms, but they remain problematic. For example, the military training center established in 1589 in the Gyeongsang province recruited mostly either too young or too old soldiers (as able men targeted by the policy had higher priorities such as farming and other economic activities), augmented by some adventure-seeking aristocrats and slaves buying their freedom.[72]
The dominant form of the Korean fortresses was the "Sanseong", or the mountain fortress,[73] which consisted of a stone wall that continued around a mountain in a serpentine fashion.[66] These walls were poorly designed with little use of towers and cross-fire positions (usually seen in European fortifications) and were mostly low in height.[66] It was a wartime policy for everyone to evacuate to one of these nearby fortresses and for those who failed to do so to be assumed to be collaborators with the enemy; however, the policy never held any great effect because the fortresses were out of reach for most refugees.[66]
Hideyoshi mobilized his army at the Nagoya Castle on Kyūshū (present-day Karatsu), newly built for the sole purpose of housing the invasion forces and the reserves.[74] The first invasion consisted of nine divisions totaling 158,800 men, of which the last two of 21,500 were stationed as reserves in Tsushima and Iki respectively.[75]
On the other hand, Joseon maintained only a few military units with no field army, and its defense depended heavily on the mobilization of the citizen soldiers in case of emergency.[71] During the first invasion, Joseon deployed a total of 84,500 regular troops throughout, assisted by 22,000 non-regular volunteers.[76] Aid from the Chinese during the war could not have made up for the difference in numbers since they never maintained more than 60,000 troops in Korea at any point of the war,[77] while the Japanese used a total of 500,000 troops throughout the entire war.[65]
Joseon cannons such as this one were extensively used in the Joseon navy.
Since its introduction by the Portuguese traders on the island of Tanegashima in 1543,[78] the arquebus had become widely used in Japan.[79] While both Korea and China had also been introduced to firearms similar to the Portuguese arquebus, most were older models. The Korean soldiers' small firearms was a handgun with simple mechanism either with gunstock or wooden shaft attached. When the Japanese diplomats presented the Korean court arquebuses as gifts, the Korean scholar-official Yu Seong-ryong advocated the use of the new weapon but the Korean court failed to realize its potency.[55] In contrast, the Japanese often deployed the arquebus in combination with archery in war.[80]
Korean archers used advanced composite bows, which was made of different materials laminated together along with an inward curve to increase power. These composite bows had a maximum range of 500 yards, in comparison to the 350 yards of most standard Japanese bows.[81]
The Chinese used a variety of weapons, including long bows,[81] swords,[82][83] firearms, early kind of land mines and early hand grenades.[84]
An illustration of an ampulliform Chinese fire-lance with a gunpowder charge shooting a blast of flame with lead pellets as coviative projectiles. The weapon was called the 'phalanx-charging fire-gourd'
Chinese also demonstrated massive use of rocket-propelled arrows, notably during the Siege of Pyongyang in January 1593. During siege actions, Chinese deployed rattan shields and iron pavises (large shields), reputed to be musket-proof.
The Japanese defeated successive Korean armies with a combination of muskets, spears and swords. While muskets used by the Japanese were superior to Korean bows in terms of penetration, the former lacked the range, accuracy, and fire rate of the latter. Numerous battle accounts from the Annal of Joseon dynasty and various essays, diaries of Korean officials and commanders show that musket alone could not ensure victory. By employing both musket and arme blanche ("cold steel", swords, lances, spears, and the like), the Japanese were able to achieve success during the early phase of war. Indeed, the ferocious charge of Japanese troops with spears and swords were often more decisive than with muskets. This is because the Koreans, who fare fairly well in ranged combat by employing small firearms and bows, were poorly trained in close combat, and lacked battlefield experience and discipline. Thus Korean soldiers were unable to hold their line against charging Japanese soldiers. The following words from a Korean military official named Shi-eon Lee to the Korean king clearly shows such weakness:
- The King asked him (Shi-eon Lee),
"You have already told me about the low accuracy of Japanese muskets. Why, then, are Korean armies having great problem with defeating them?"
He then answered, "The Korean soldiers cower before the enemy and flee for their lives even before they have engaged the enemy. As for the commanders, they seldom leave their positions because they fear that they might be executed for deserting. However, there is a limit to executing deserting soldiers since there are so many of them. Truly, the Japanese aren't good musketeers, but they advance so rapidly that they appear right in front of the Koreans in the time Koreans can shoot only two arrows. It is said that Koreans are good archers, but they seldom hit the targets when the enemy is too far away, and are too scared to shoot when the enemy is near because they fear Japanese swords. Archery often becomes useless because Koreans, fearing the Japanese arme blanche, can barely shoot. The Japanese are reputed to be good swordsmen, but it is possible for Koreans to draw swords and hold their ground. However, the Koreans seldom do this and merely run for their lives."[85]
As for field artillery, it seems the Koreans seldom employed them, with cannons mainly used in siege action and in defending castles. However, there are a few cases of Koreans employing artillery in the field. At the battle of Haengju, the Korean army employed "Earth" class cannon (Jija-chongtong) behind field fortification. In addition, a irregular Korean units with government-supplied weapons used explosive shots fired from mortars at the open terrain in Ban-am, Gyeongsang district. This is recorded in "The Diary of a Militia" (향병일기; Hyangbyeong-ilgi), which is stored in the database of www.history.go.kr. The Chinese seem to have been more active in employing field artillery than the Koreans. One of the notable Chinese field gun was "Great General Cannon". This was a large breech-loading cannon with two-wheeled cart, shooting an iron ball weighing about 10 kilograms. The Japanese, on the other hand, employed virtually no artillery neither in siege or field warfare. (Nevertheless, when Admiral Yi bombarded Japanese base in Busan, the Japanese employed looted Korean cannon against the Korean Navy, using Korean captives.)
The Koreans actively deployed their cavalry divisions in action, however they often suffered significant disadvantages. Terrain was often mountainous, lacking both the flat plains suitable for cavalry charges, the land was prone to ditches, and it lacked grass essential in feeding their horses. In addition, Japanese use of the arquebus at long range and in concentrated volleys negated effective cavalry tactics.[83] Korean cavalrymen's primary weapons were bows, with swords and lances holding only subsidiary positions. Most of cavalry action for the Koreans took place in the Battle of Chungju at the beginning of the war where they were outnumbered and wiped out by Japanese infantry.[86] Although the Japanese divisions also fielded cavalry (they, however, dismounted when engaged in action, acting more like mounted infantry) and occasionally specialized firearms were used on horseback, though most cavalrymen preferred the conventional yari (spear),[87] their use was reduced by increasing logistical difficulties and the increasing use of firearms by the Koreans and Chinese.[88]
An old painting of a panokseon.
In contrast to the Japanese advantages on land, Korea possessed a large advantage at sea. Advanced artillery and shipbuilding technology, along with an experienced naval history against Japanese pirates, allowed the Korean navy to field highly advanced and formidable watercraft. By the time of the Japanese invasion, Korea employed the panokseon, a powerful galley-type ship armed with cannon that outranged most Japanese vessels.
As virtually all Japanese ships in the first phase of the war lacked cannon artillery,[64] Korean ships outranged and bombarded Japanese ships with impunity outside the range of the Japanese muskets, arrows, and catapults.[64] When the Japanese attempted to outfit cannon to their ships,[89] their lightweight ship design prohibited using more than a few per vessel and usually lacked the firepower or range of their Korean counterparts[90]
In addition to a lack of effective naval armament, most Japanese ships were modified merchant vessels more suited for transportation of troops and equipment than fielding artillery weapons.[64][91] Most Japanese ships were also constructed with a deep keel and a single sail, that while provided speed limited movement to favourable winds and manouevrability was considerably disadvantaged by Korea's narrow coastal waters. Korean ships in contrast fielded multiple sails and crews providing oar power, and were constructed with a flat keel that enabled sharp turns. Additionally Japanese ships were constructed with iron nails while the Korean panokseons used wooden pegs. In water, nails corroded and loosened while wooden pegs expand and strengthened the joints.
Admiral Yi's leadership and strategic thinking was also a large factor in Korea's naval dominance, using a superior naval force to disrupt the Japanese logistical network and hence limit the Japanese forces ability to operate inland.
In order to bolster his fleet, Hideyoshi attempted unsuccessfully to hire two Portuguese galleons to join the invasion.[92]
| First wave of the Japanese invasion[93] |
| 1st div. |
Konishi Yukinaga |
7,000 |
|
|
Sō Yoshitoshi |
5,000 |
|
Matsuura Shigenobu |
3,000 |
|
Arima Harunobu |
2,000 |
|
Ōmura Yoshiaki (ja) |
1,000 |
|
Gotō Sumiharu |
700 |
18,700 |
| 2nd div. |
Katō Kiyomasa |
10,000 |
|
|
Nabeshima Naoshige |
12,000 |
|
Sagara Yorifusa (ja) |
800 |
22,800 |
| 3rd div. |
Kuroda Nagamasa |
5,000 |
|
Ōtomo Yoshimasa |
6,000 |
11,000 |
| 4th div. |
Shimazu Yoshihiro |
10,000 |
|
|
Mōri Yoshimasa (ja) |
2,000 |
|
Takahashi Mototane (ja), Akizuki Tanenaga, Itō Suketaka (ja), Shimazu Tadatoyo[94] |
2,000 |
14,000 |
| 5th div. |
Fukushima Masanori |
4,800 |
|
Toda Katsutaka |
3,900 |
|
Chōsokabe Motochika |
3,000 |
|
Ikoma Chikamasa |
5,500 |
|
Ikushima (Kurushima Michifusa)? |
700 |
|
Hachisuka Iemasa (ja) |
7,200 |
25,000 (sic) |
| 6th div. |
Kobayakawa Takakage |
10,000 |
|
Kobayakawa Hidekane, Tachibana Muneshige, Tachibana Naotsugu (ja), Tsukushi Hirokado, Ankokuji Ekei |
5,700 |
15,700 |
| 7th div. |
Mōri Terumoto |
30,000 |
30,000 |
| Subtotal |
|
|
137,200 |
| Reservers (8th div.) |
Ukita Hideie (Tsushima Island) |
10,000 |
| (9th div.) |
Toyotomi Hidekatsu (ja) and Hosokawa Tadaoki (ja) (Iki Island) |
11,500 |
21,500 |
| Subtotal |
|
|
158,700 |
| Stationed force at Nagoya |
Ieyasu, Uesugi, Gamō, and others |
75,000 |
| Subtotal |
|
|
233,700 |
| Naval force exclusion |
|
-9,000 |
|
| Total (rounded) |
|
|
225,000 |
On May 23, 1592, the First Division of the Japanese invasion army consisting of 7,000 men led by Konishi Yukinaga[95] left Tsushima in the morning, and arrived at the port city of Busan in the evening.[96] Korean naval intelligence had detected the Japanese fleet, but Won Gyun, the Right Naval Commander of Gyeongsang, misidentified the fleet as trading vessels on a mission.[97] A later report of the arrival of an additional 100 Japanese vessels raised his suspicions, but the general did nothing about it.[97] Sō Yoshitoshi landed alone on the Busan shore to ask the Koreans for a safe passage to China for the last time; the Koreans refused, and Sō Yoshitoshi laid siege to the city while Konishi Yukinaga attacked the nearby fort of Dadaejin the next morning.[96] Japanese accounts claim that the battles dealt the Koreans complete annihilation (one claims 8,500 deaths, and another, 30,000 heads), while a Korean account claims that the Japanese themselves took significant losses before sacking the city.[98]
"Dongnaebu Sunjeoldo", a Korean painting from 1760 depicting the Battle of Dongnae.
On the morning of May 25, 1592, the First Division arrived at Dongnae eupseong.[98] The resulting fight lasted twelve hours, killed 3,000, and resulted in Japanese victory.[99] A popular legend describes the governor in charge of the fortress, Song Sang-hyeon. When Konishi Yukinaga again demanded before the battle that the Koreans allow the Japanese to travel through the peninsula, the governor was said to have replied, "It is easy for me to die, but difficult to let you pass."[99] Even when the Japanese troops neared his commanding post during the battle, Song remained seated with cool dignity.[99] Finally, when a Japanese soldier cut off Song's right arm holding his staff of command, Song picked up the staff with his left arm, which was then cut off; again Song picked it up, this time with his mouth, but was killed by a third blow.[99] The Japanese, impressed by Song's defiance, treated his body with proper burial ceremony.[99]
Katō Kiyomasa's Second Division landed in Busan on May 27, and Kuroda Nagamasa's Third Division, west of Nakdong, on May 28.[100] The Second Division took the abandoned city of Tongdo on May 28, and captured Kyongju on May 30.[100] The Third Division, upon landing, captured the nearby Kimhae castle by keeping the defenders under pressure with gunfire while building ramps up to the walls with bundles of crops.[101] By June 3, the Third Division captured Unsan, Changnyong, Hyonpung, and Songju.[101] Meanwhile, Konishi Yukinaga's First Division passed the Yangsan mountain fortress (captured on the night of the Battle of Dongnae, when its defenders fled when the Japanese scouting parties fired their arquebuses), and captured the Miryang castle on the afternoon of May 26.[102] The First Division secured the Cheongdo fortress in the next few days, and destroyed the city of Daegu.[102] By June 3, the First Division crossed the Nakdong River, and stopped at the Sonsan mountain.[102]
Upon receiving the news of the Japanese attacks, the Joseon government appointed General Yi Il as the mobile border commander, as was the established policy.[103] General Yi headed to Myongyong near the beginning of the strategically important Choryong pass to gather troops, but he had to travel further south to meet the troops assembled at the city of Daegu.[102] There, General Yi moved all troops back to Sangju, except for the survivors of the Battle of Dongnae who were to be stationed as a rearguard at the Choryong pass.[102]
On April 25,[104] General Yi deployed a force of less than 1,000 men on two small hills to face the approaching First Division.[105] Assuming that a rising smoke was from the burning of buildings by a nearby Japanese force, General Yi sent an officer to scout on horseback; however, as he neared a bridge, the officer was ambushed by Japanese musket fire from below the bridge, and was beheaded.[105] The Korean troops, watching him fall, were greatly demoralized.[105] Soon the Japanese began the battle with their arquebuses; the Koreans replied with their arrows, which fell short of their targets.[105] The Japanese forces, having been divided into three, attacked the Korean lines from both the front and the two flanks; the battle ended with General Yi Il's retreat and 700 Korean casualties.[105]
General Yi Il then planned to use the Choryong pass, the only path through the western end of the Sobaek mountain range, to check the Japanese advance.[105] However, another commander, Sin Rip, appointed by the Joseon government had arrived in the area with a cavalry division, and moved 8,000 combined troops to the Chungju fortress, located above the Choryong pass.[106] General Sin Rip then wanted to fight a battle on an open field, which he felt ideal for the deployment of his cavalry unit, and placed his units on the open fields of Tangeumdae.[106] As the general feared that, since the cavalry consisted mostly of new recruits, his troops would flee in battle easily,[107] he felt the need to trap his forces in the triangular area formed by the convergence of the Talcheon and Han rivers in the shape of a "Y".[106] However, the field was dotted with flooded rice paddies, and was not suitable for cavalry action.[106]
On June 5, 1592 the First Division of 18,000 men[107] led by Konishi Yukinaga left Sangju, and reached an abandoned fortress at Mungyong by night.[108] The next day, the First Division arrived at Tangumdae in the early afternoon, where they faced the Korean cavalry unit at the Battle of Chungju. Konishi divided his forces into three, and attacked with arquebuses from both flanks and the front.[108] The Korean arrows fell short of the Japanese troops, which were outside their range, and General Sin led two charges that failed against the Japanese lines. General Sin then killed himself in the river, and the Koreans that tried to escape by the river either drowned, or were decapitated by the pursuing Japanese.[108]
The Second Division led by Katō Kiyomasa arrived at Chungju, with the Third Division not far behind.[109] There, Katō expressed his anger against Konishi for not waiting at Busan as planned, and attempting to take all of the glory for himself; then Nabeshima Naoshige proposed a compromise of dividing the Japanese troops into two separate groups to follow two different routes to Hanseong (the capital and present-day Seoul), and allowing Katō Kiyomasa to choose the route that the Second Division would take to reach Seoul.[109] The two divisions began the race to capture Hanseong on June 8, and Katō took the shorter route across the Han River while Konishi went further upstream where smaller waters posed a lesser barrier.[109] Konishi arrived at Hanseong first on June 10 while the Second Division was halted at the river with no boats with which to cross.[109] The First Division found the castle undefended with its gates tightly locked, as King Seonjo had fled the day before.[110] The Japanese broke into a small floodgate, located in the castle wall, and opened the capital city's gate from within.[110] Katō's Second Division arrived at the capital the next day (having taken the same route as the First Division), and the Third and Fourth Divisions the day after.[110] Meanwhile, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Divisions had landed on Busan, with the Ninth Division kept in reserve on the island of Iki.[110]
Parts of Hanseong had already been looted and torched, including bureaus holding the slave records and the weapons, and they were already abandoned by its inhabitants.[110] General Kim Myong-won, in charge of the defenses along the Han River, had retreated.[111] The King's subjects stole the animals in the royal stables and fled before him, leaving the King to rely on farm animals.[111] In every village, the King's party was met by inhabitants, lined up by the road, grieving that their King was abandoning them, and neglecting their duty of paying homage.[111] Parts of the southern shore of the Imjin River was burnt to deprive the Japanese troops of materials with which to make their crossing, and General Kim Myong-won deployed 12,000 troops at five points along the river.[111]
While the First Division rested in Hanseong, the Second Division began heading north, only to be delayed by the Imjin River for two weeks.[111] The Japanese sent a familiar message to the Koreans on the other shore requesting them to open way to China, but the Koreans rejected this.[111] Then the Japanese commanders withdrew their main forces to the safety of the Paju fortress; the Koreans saw this as a retreat, and launched an attack at dawn against the remaining Japanese troops on the southern shore of the Imjin River.[111] The main Japanese body retaliated against the isolated Korean troops, and acquired their boats; at this, the Korean General Kim Myong-won retreated with his forces to the Kaesong fortress.[112]
With the Kaesong castle having been sacked shortly after General Kim Myong-won retreated to Pyeongyang,[112] the Japanese troops divided their objectives thus: the First Division would pursue the Korean king in Pyongan Province in the north (where Pyongyang is located); the Second Division would attack Hamgyong Province in the northeastern part of Korea; the Sixth Division would attack Jeolla Province at the southwestern tip of the peninsula; the Fourth Division would secure Gangwon Province in the mid-eastern part of the peninsula; and the Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Divisions would stabilize the following provinces respectively: Hwanghae Province (below Pyongan Province), Chungcheong Province (below Gyeonggi Province); Gyeongsang Province (in the southeast where the Japanese first had landed); and Gyeonggi Province (where the capital city is located).[113]
The First Division under Konishi Yukinaga proceeded northward, and sacked Pyongsan, Sohung, Pungsan, Hwangju, and Chunghwa on the way.[114] At Chunghwa, the Third Division under Kuroda Nagamasa joined the First, and continued to the city of Pyeongyang located behind the Taedong River.[114] 10,000 Korean troops guarded the city against 30,000 Japanese [115] under various commanders including the Generals Yi Il and Kim Myong-won, and their defense preparations had assured that no boats were available for Japanese use.[114]
On the night of July 22, 1592, the Koreans silently crossed the river and launched a successful surprise attack against the Japanese encampment.[114] However, this stirred up the rest of the Japanese army, which attacked the rear of the Korean positions and destroyed the reinforcements crossing the river.[116] Then the rest of the Korean troops retreated back to Pyeongyang, and the Japanese troops gave up their pursuit of the Koreans to observe the way the Koreans crossed the river.[116]
The next day, using what they had learned from observing the retreating Korean troops, the Japanese began sending troops to the other shore over the shallow points in the river, in a systematic manner, and at this the Koreans abandoned the city overnight.[117] On July 24, the First and Third Divisions entered the deserted city of Pyeongyang.[117]
The Fourth Division under the command of Mōri Yoshinari set out eastward from the capital city of Hanseong in July, and captured the fortresses down the eastern coast from Anbyon to Samcheok.[117] The division then turned inward to capture Jeongseon, Yeongwol, and Pyeongchang, and settled down at the provincial capital of Wonju.[117] There Mōri Yoshinari established a civil administration, systematized social ranks according to the Japanese model, and conducted land surveys.[117] Shimazu Yoshihiro, one of the generals in the Fourth Division, arrived at Gangwon late, due to the Umekita Rebellion, and finished the campaign by securing Chunchon.[118]
Katō Kiyomasa leading the Second Division of more than 20,000 men, crossed the peninsula to Anbyon with a ten day march, and swept north along the eastern coast.[118] Among the castles captured was Hamhung, the provincial capital of the Hamgyong Province, and here a part of the Second Division was allocated for defense and civil administration.[119]
The rest of the division of 10,000 men[115] continued north, and fought a battle on August 23 against the southern and northern Hamgyong armies under the commands of Yi Yong at Songjin (present-day Kimchaek).[119] A Korean cavalry division took advantage of the open field at Songjin, and pushed the Japanese forces into a grain storehouse.[119] There the Japanese barricaded themselves with bales of rice, and successfully repelled a formation charge from the Korean forces with their arquebuses.[119] While the Koreans planned to renew the battle in the morning, Katō Kiyomasa ambushed them at night; the Second Division completely surrounded the Korean forces with the exception of an opening leading to a swamp.[119] Here, those that fled were trapped and slaughtered.[119]
Koreans who fled gave alarms to the other garrisons, allowing the Japanese troops easily to capture Kilchu, Myongchon, and Kyongsong.[119] The Second Division then turned inland through Puryong toward Hoeryong where two Korean princes had taken refuge.[119] On August 30, 1592, the Second Division entered into Hoeryong where Katō Kiyomasa received the Korean princess and the provincial governor Yu Yong-rip, these having already been captured by the local inhabitants.[119] Shortly afterward, a Korean Warrior band handed over the head of an anonymous Korean general, and the General Han Kuk-ham tied up in ropes.[119]
Katō Kiyomasa then decided to attack a nearby Jurchen castle across the Tumen River in Manchuria to test his troops against the "barbarians", as the Koreans called the Jurchens ("Orangkae" in Korean and "Orangai" in Japanese – the Japanese derived both the word and the concept of the Jurchens as barbarians from the Koreans).[120] The Koreans with 3,000 men at Hamgyong joined in (with Kato's army of 8,000), as the Jurchens periodically raided them across the border.[120] Soon the combined force sacked the castle, and camped near the border; after the Koreans left for home, the Japanese troops suffered a retaliatory assault from the Jurchens.[120] Despite having the advantage, Katō Kiyomasa retreated with his forces to avoid heavy losses.[120] Because of this invasion, rising Jurchen leader Nurhachi offered military assistance to Joseon and Ming in the war. However, the offer was refused by both countries, particularly Joseon, citing that it would be disgraceful to accept assistance from the "Barbarians" to the north.
The Second Division continued east, capturing the fortresses of Jongseong, Onsong, Kyongwon, and Kyonghung, and finally arrived at Sosupo on the estuary of the Tumen River.[120] There the Japanese rested on the beach, and watched a nearby volcanic island rising on the horizon that they mistook as Mount Fuji.[120] After the tour, the Japanese continued their previous efforts to bureaucratize and administrate the province, and allowed several garrisons to be handled by the Koreans themselves.[121]
Having secured Pyeongyang, the Japanese planned to cross the Yalu River into Jurchen territory, and use the waters west of the Korean peninsula to supply the invasion.[122] However, Yi Sun-sin, who held the post of the Left Naval Commander (equivalent of "Admiral" in English) of the Jeolla Province (which covers the western waters of Korea), successfully destroyed the Japanese ships transporting troops and supplies.[122] Thus the Japanese, now lacking enough arms and troops to carry on the invasion of the Jurchens, changed the objective of the war to the occupation of Korea.[122]
When the Japanese troops landed at the port of Busan, Bak (also spelled Park) Hong, the Left Naval Commander of the Gyeongsang Province, destroyed his entire fleet, his base, and all armaments and provisions, and fled.[97] Won Gyun, the Right Naval Commander, also destroyed and abandoned his own base, and fled to Konyang with only four ships.[97] Therefore, there was no Korean naval activity around the Gyeongsang Province, and the surviving two, out of the four total navies, were active only on the other (west) side of the peninsula.[97] Admiral Won later sent a message to Admiral Yi that he had fled to Konyang after being overwhelmed by the Japanese in a fight.[123] A messenger was sent by Admiral Yi to the nearby island of Namhae to give Yi's order for war preparations, only to find it pillaged and abandoned by its own inhabitants.[123] As soldiers began to flee secretly, Admiral Yi ordered "to arrest the escapees" and had two of the fugitives brought back, beheaded them and had their heads exposed.[123]
Admiral Yi's battles greatly affected the war and put significant strain on Japanese supply routes.[124]
Main article:
Battle of OkpoAdmiral Yi relied on a network of local fishermen and scouting boats to receive intelligence of the enemy movements.[124] On the dawn of June 13, 1592, Admiral Yi and Admiral Yi Eok-gi set sail with 24 Panokseons, 15 small warships, and 46 boats (i.e. fishing boats), and arrived at the waters of the Gyeongsang Province by sunset.[124] Next day, the Jeolla fleet sailed to the arranged location where Admiral Won was supposed to meet them, and met the admiral on June 15. The augmented flotilla of 91 ships[125] then began circumnavigating the Geoje Island, bound for the Gadeok Island, but scouting vessels detected 50 Japanese vessels at the Okpo harbor.[124] Upon sighting the approaching Korean fleet, some of the Japanese who had been busying themselves with plundering got back to their ships, and began to flee.[124] At this, the Korean fleet encircled the Japanese ships and finished them with artillery bombardments.[126] The Koreans spotted five more Japanese vessels that night, and managed to destroy four.[126] The next day, the Koreans approached 13 Japanese ships at Jeokjinpo as reported by the intelligence.[126] In the same manner as the previous success at Okpo, the Korean fleet destroyed 11 Japanese ships – completing the Battle of Okpo without a loss of a single ship.[126]
About three weeks after the Battle of Okpo,[130] Admirals Yi and Won sailed with a total of 26 ships (23 under Admiral Yi) toward the Bay of Sacheon upon receiving an intelligence report of the Japanese presence.[131] Admiral Yi had left behind his fishing vessels that used to make up most of his fleet in favor of his newly completed Turtle ship.[130]
The turtle ship was a vessel of a Panokseon design with the removal of the elevated command post, the modification of the gunwales into curved walls, and the addition of a roof covered in iron spikes (and hexagonal iron plates, which is disputed[127][128][129]).[132] Its walls contained a total of 36 cannon ports, and also openings, above the cannon, through which the ship's crew members could look out and fire their personal arms.[131] This design also prevented the outsiders from boarding the ship and aiming at the personnel inside.[132] The ship was the fastest and most maneuverable existing warship in the East Asian theater, as it was powered by two sails and 80 oarsmen taking turns to handle the ship's 16 oars.[91] No more than six Turtle Ships served throughout the entire war, and their primary role was to cut deep into the enemy lines, cause havoc with its cannon, and destroy the enemy flag ship.[91]
On July 8, 1592, the fleet arrived at the Bay of Sacheon, where the outgoing tide prevented the Korean fleet from entering.[130] Therefore, Admiral Yi ordered the fleet to feign withdrawal, which the Japanese commander observed from his tent on a rock.[132] Then the Japanese hurriedly embarked their 12 ships and pursued the Korean fleet.[130] The Korean navy counterattacked, with the Turtle Ship in the front, and successfully destroyed all 12 ships.[130] Admiral Yi was shot by a bullet in his left shoulder, but survived.[130]
On July 10, 1592, the Korean fleet again found and destroyed 21 Japanese ships, which were anchored at Dangpo while the Japanese raided a coastal town.[133]
Admiral Yi Eok-gi with his fleet joined Admirals Yi Sun-sin and Won Gyun, and participated in a search for enemy vessels in the Gyonsang waters.[133] On July 13, the generals received intelligence that a group of Japanese ships including those that escaped from the Battle of Dangpo was resting in the Bay of Danghangpo.[133] Having traveled through a narrow gulf, the Koreans sighted a total of 26 enemy vessels in the bay.[133] The turtle ship was used to penetrate the enemy formation and rammed the flagship, while the rest of the Korean fleet held back.[134] Then Admiral Yi ordered a fake retreat, as the Japanese could escape to land while in the bay.[134] When the Japanese pursued the Koreans far enough, the Korean fleet turned and surrounded the Japanese fleet, with the Turtle Ship again ramming against the enemy flag ship. The Japanese were unable to counter the Korean cannon.[134] Only 1 Japanese ship managed to escape from this route, and that too was caught and destroyed by a Korean ship the next morning.[134]
On July 15, the Korean fleet was sailing east to return to the island of Gadok, and successfully intercepted and destroyed seven Japanese ships coming out from the Yulpo harbor.[134]
In response to the Korean navy's success, Toyotomi Hideyoshi recalled three admirals from land-based activities: Wakizaka Yasuharu, Kato Yoshiaki, and Kuki Yoshitaka.[134] They were the only ones with naval responsibilities in the entirety of the Japanese invasion forces.[134] However, the admirals arrived in Busan nine days before Hideyoshi's order was actually issued, and assembled a squadron to counter the Korean navy.[134] Eventually Admiral Wakizaka completed his preparations, and his eagerness to win military honor pushed him to launch an attack against the Koreans without waiting for the other admirals to finish.[134]
The combined Korean navy of 70 ships[135] under the commands of Admirals Yi Sun-sin and Yi Ok-gi was carrying out a search-and-destroy operation because the Japanese troops on land were advancing into the Jeolla Province.[134] The Jeolla Province was the only Korean territory to be untouched by a major military action, and served as home for the three admirals and the only active Korean naval force.[134] The admirals considered it best to destroy naval support for the Japanese to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy ground troops.[134]
On August 13, 1592, the Korean fleet sailing from the Miruk Island at Dangpo received local intelligence that a large Japanese fleet was nearby.[134] The following morning, the Korean fleet spotted the Japanese fleet of 82 vessels anchored in the straits of Gyeonnaeryang.[134] Because of the narrowness of the strait and the hazard posed by the underwater rocks, Admiral Yi sent six ships to lure out 63 Japanese vessels into the wider sea,[135] and the Japanese fleet followed.[134] There the Japanese fleet was surrounded by the Korean fleet in a semicircular formation called "crane wing" by Admiral Yi.[134] With at least three turtle ships (two of which were newly-completed) spearheading the clash against the Japanese fleet, the Korean vessels fired volleys of cannonballs into the Japanese formation.[134] Then the Korean ships engaged in a free-for-all battle with the Japanese ships, maintaining enough distance to prevent the Japanese from boarding; Admiral Yi permitted melee combats only against severely damaged Japanese ships.[134] The battle ended in a Korean victory, with Japanese losses of 59 ships – 47 destroyed and 12 captured.[136] Several Korean prisoners of war were rescued by the Korean soldiers throughout the fight. Admiral Wakisaka escaped due to the speed of his flag ship.[136] When the news of the defeat at the Battle of Hansando reached Toyotomi Hideyoshi, he ordered that the Japanese invasion forces cease all naval operations.[134]
On August 16, 1592, Yi Sun-sin led their fleet to the harbor of Angolpo where 42 Japanese vessels were docked.[134] When Admiral Yi tried to fake a retreat, the Japanese ships did not follow; in response, Admiral Yi ordered the Korean ships to take turns bombarding the Japanese vessels.[134] In fear that the Japanese troops would take revenge for their losses against the local inhabitants, Admiral Yi ordered the Korean ships to cease fire against the few remaining enemy vessels.[134]
Main article:
Righteous armyFrom the beginning of the war, the Koreans organized militias called the "Righteous Army" (의병) to resist the Japanese invasion.[137] These fighting bands were raised throughout the country, and participated in battles, guerilla raids, sieges, and the transportation and construction of wartime necessities.[138]
There were three main types of Korean militias during the war: first, the surviving and leaderless Korean regular soldiers; second, the "Righteous Armies" consisting of patriotic yangbans (aristocrats) and commoners; and third, the Buddhist monks.[138]
During the first invasion, the Jeolla Province remained the only untouched area on the Korean peninsula.[138] In addition to the successful patrols of the sea by Admiral Yi, volunteer activism pressured the Japanese troops to avoid the province for other priorities.[138]
Gwak Jae-u was a famous leader in the Korean militia movement, and it is widely accepted that he was the first to form a resistance group against the Japanese invaders.[139] He was a land-owner in the town of Uiryong situated by the Nam River in the Gyeongsang Province. As the Korean regulars abandoned the town[138] and an attack seemed imminent, Gwak organized fifty townsmen; however the Third Division went from Changwon straight toward Songju.[139] When Gwak used abandoned government stores to supply his army, the Gyeongsang Province Governor Kim Su branded Gwak's group as rebels, and ordered that it be disbanded.[139] When the general asked for help from other landowners, and sent a direct appeal to the King, the governor sent troops against Gwak, in spite of having enough troubles already with the Japanese.[139] However, an official from the capital city then arrived to raise troops in the province, and, since the official lived nearby and actually knew him, he saved Gwak from troubles with the governor.[139]
Gwak Jae-u deployed his troops in guerilla warfare under the cover of the tall reeds on the union of the Nakdong and the Nam Rivers.[139] This strategy prevented easy access for the Japanese troops to the Jeolla Province where Admiral Yi and his fleet were stationed.[139]
The Sixth Division under the command of Kobayakawa Takakage was in charge of conquering the Jeolla Province.[139] The Sixth Division marched to Songju through the established Japanese route (i.e. the Third Division, above), and cut left to Geumsan in Chungcheong, which Kobayakawa secured as his starting base for his invasion of the province.[139]
Ankokuji Ekei, a former Buddhist monk made into a general due to his role in the negotiations between Mōri Terumoto and Toyotomi Hideyoshi, led the units of the Sixth Division charged with the invasion of the Jeolla Province. The units began their march to Uiryong at Changwon, and arrived at the Nam River.[139] Ankokuji's scouts planted meters measuring the river's depths so that the entire squadron could cross the river; over the night, the Korean militiamen moved the meters into the deeper parts of the river.[139] As the Japanese troops began to cross, Gwak's militia ambushed them, and caused heavy losses for the Japanese.[139] In the end, to advance into the Jeolla Province, Ankokuji's men had to try going north around the insecure grounds and within the security of the Japanese-garrisoned fortresses.[139] At Kaenyong, Ankokuji's target was changed to Gochang, to be taken with the aid of Kobayakawa Takakage.[139] However, the entire Jeolla campaign was then abandoned when Kim Myeon and his guerillas successfully ambushed Ankokuji's troops by firing arrows from hidden positions within the mountains.[139]
When the Japanese troops were advancing to Hanseong (present-day Seoul), Yi Kwang, the governor of the Jeolla Province, attempted to check the Japanese progress by launching his army toward the capital city.[140] Upon hearing the news that the capital had already been sacked, the governor withdrew his army.[140] However, as the army grew in size to 50,000 men with the accumulation of several volunteer forces, Yi Kwang and the irregular commanders reconsidered their aim to reclaim Hanseong, and led the combined forces north to Suwon, 26 miles (42 km) south of Hanseong.[140][141] On June 4, an advance guard of 1,900 men attempted to take the nearby fortress at Yong-in, but the 600 Japanese defenders under Admiral Wakizaka Yasuharu avoided engagement with the Koreans until June 5, when the main Japanese troops came to relieve the fortress.[140][142] The Japanese troops counterattacked successfully against the Jeolla coalition, forcing the Koreans to abandon arms and retreat.[140]
Around the time of General Kwak's mobilization of his volunteer army in the Gyeongsang Province, Go Gyeong-myeong in Jeolla Province formed a volunteer force of 6,000 men.[140] Go then tried to combine his forces with another militia in the Chungchong Province, but upon crossing the provincial border he heard that Kobayakawa Takakage of the Sixth Division had launched an attack on Jeonju (the capital of Jeolla Province) from the mountain fortress at Geumsan. Go returned to his own territory.[140] Having joined forces with General Gwak Yong, Go then led his soldiers to Geumsan.[140] There, on July 10, the volunteer forces fought with a Japanese army retreating to Geumsan after a defeat at the Battle of Ichi two days earlier on July 8[143]
Jinju (진주) was a strategic stronghold that defended Kyonhsang Province. The Japanese commanders knew that control of Jinju would mean easy access to the ricebelts of Jeolla Province. Therefore, a large army under Hosokawa Tadaoki approached Jinju. Jinju was defended by Kim Si-min (김시민), one of the better generals in Korea, commanding a Korean garrison of 3,000 men. Kim had recently acquired about 200 new arquebuses that were equal in strength to the Japanese guns. With the help of arquebuses, cannon, and mortars, Kim and the Koreans were able to drive back the Japanese from Jeolla Province. Hosokawa lost over 30,000 men. The battle at Jinju is considered one of the greatest victories of Korea because it prevented the Japanese from entering Jeolla.
The Koreans could not hope to expel the Japanese from their land by themselves. Despite the various logistical and organizational difficulties suffered by the Japanese, had to rely on an external factor, the intervention of Ming China, to foil the first Japanese invasion.[144]
Korean Court historian Yu Song-nyong stated that the Korean naval victory spoiled the entire strategy of the invaders by "cutting off one of the arms" with which Japan tried to envelop Korea, isolating Konishi Yukinaga's army at P'yongyang and securing Chinese waters from the feared Japanese attack, such that "the Celestial Army could come by land to the assistance" of Korea.[144]
Ming Dynasty Wanli Emperor
萬曆神宗皇帝
Viewing the crisis in Choson, the Ming Dynasty Wanli emperor and his court was initially filled with confusion and skepticism on how their tributary could have been overran so quickly.[145] This, combined with the fact that they were still dealing with a military rebellion in Ningxia, resulted in a slow response.
The Korean Court was at first hesitant to call for help from the Ming Dynasty [146] The local governor at Liaodong eventually acted upon King Seonjo's request for aid by sending a small force of 5,000 soldiers led by Zu Chengxun. This cavalry force advanced almost unhindered and even entered Pyongyang, where they were badly defeated by the Japanese troops in the streets. One of their main generals, Shi Ru, was killed in this engagement. During the later half of 1592, the Ming also sent investigation teams into Korea to clarify the situation.[147] The Ming became fully aware of the situation and made the decision for a full reinforcement by September 1592.
By then it had become clear that this was a situation much more serious than something that could be handled by local forces. Thus the Ming Emperor mobilized and dispatched a larger force in January 1593 under the general Li Rusong and Imperial Superintendent Song Yingchang, the former being one of the sons of Ming dynasty's Liaodong military magistrate Li Chengliang and the latter being a bureaucratic officer (Ming military law stipulated that any military officer would have an accompanying bureaucrat appointed by the Imperial Court acting as the general's superior). The army had a prescribed strength of 100,000, though actual strength was much lower. According to the collection of letters left by Song Yingchang, the actual strength of the Ming army that crossed into Korea in late 1592 was 36,000 - eventually reinforced to over 38,000 by early February -[148] composed mostly of garrisons from the north, including 3,000+ men who were trained by officers with experience against Japan-based pirates a couple decades prior under Qi Jiguang and other generals.
Ming Army's matchlocks, an early muzzle-loaded firearm used in the 15th to 17th centuries,.
On January 5, 1593, the Ming expeditionary army arrived outside Pyongyang accompanied by a group of Korean soldiers. By King Seonjo's decree, Ming general Li Rusong was appointed the supreme commander of armies in Korea. After initial attempts to negotiate with the Japanese defenders under Konishi Yukinaga broke down,[149] the two sides began skirmishing on the outskirts over the next couple of days, with the allied forces attempting to dislodge a Japanese garrison on the hills north of the city while the Japanese attempted a night raid on the Ming camp.[149]
On the morning of the 8th, Li ordered an all-out assault on 3 sides of the city; Japanese defenders were forced off the walls fairly quickly, and retreated to the citadel they built on the eastern portions of the city. The allies were unwilling to commit to a direct assault on the heavily defended fortification during the day, instead they left an opening for the Japanese to rally while making preparations for a fire assault on their position at night. Japanese forces sallied out of the undefended eastern walls and made a run for Seoul, and they were hit with additional ambushes on the way back south and took heavy casualties.[150][151][152]
Soon after retaking Pyongyang, the allied forces also succeeded in retaking the major city of Kaesong on 19 January [153] and met only minor resistance from the Japanese defenders.
Overconfident with his recent success and possibly misled by false reports,[154] Li Rusong advanced towards the capital city of Seoul on January 21 of 1592. His personally-led small force of elite cavalry numbered somewhere around 3,000, along with a small force of Koreans and advance scouts. On January 26, the force ran into an unexpected confrontation at Byeokjegwan by a large Japanese formation of about 30,000.
Initially, the scouting party of the group under Cha Da Sho and a Korean general confronted a small band of Japanese numbering no more than 600 men. The party overran them successfully but soon ran into a much larger host under Tachibana Muneshige, and retreated to a nearby hill to defend themselves.
Upon hearing of his scouting party's plight, Li decided to rush forward with the rest of his small host. He met up with his scouting party around noon, but by that time even more Japanese forces were converging on the area.
The Ming forces gradually retreated north while fighting off several waves of attacks. Li Rusong and many other generals personally fought in the brawl, and they sustained heavy casualties before they met up with the rest of their army toward the later portion of the day. At this point, the Japanese gave up further attacks and both sides pulled back. Because the Ming suffered heavy casualties among their elite retinues, Li became reluctant to move aggressively for the remainder of the war.[155]
The Japanese invasion into Jeolla province was broken down and pushed back by General Gwon Yul at the hills of Ichiryeong, where outnumbered Koreans fought overwhelming Japanese troops and gained victory. Gwon Yul quickly advanced northwards, re-taking Suwon and then swung south toward Haengju where he would wait for the Chinese reinforcements. After he got the message that the Ming army under Li Rusong was pushed back at Byeokje, Gwon Yul decided to fortify Haengju.
Bolstered by the victory at Battle of Byeokjegwan, Katō and his army of 30,000 men advanced to the south of Hanseong to attack Haengju Fortress, an impressive mountain fortress that overlooked the surrounding area. An army of a few thousand led by Gwon Yul was garrisoned at the fortress waiting for the Japanese. Katō believed his overwhelming army would destroy the Koreans and therefore ordered the Japanese soldiers to simply advance upon the steep slopes of Haengju with little planning. Gwon Yul answered the Japanese with fierce fire from the fortification using Hwachas, rocks, handguns, and bows. After nine massive assaults and 10,000 casualties, Katō burned his dead and finally pulled his troops back.
The Battle of Haengju was an important victory for the Koreans, as it greatly improved the morale of the Korean army. The battle is celebrated today as one of the three most decisive Korean victories; Battle of Haengju, Siege of Jinju (1592), and Battle of Hansando.
Today, the site of Haengju fortress has a memorial built to honor Gwon Yul.
After the Battle of Byeokjegwan, the Ming army took a cautious approach and moved on Seoul again later in February after the Korean milita's valiant defense in the Battle of Haengju.
The two sides remained at stalemate between the Kaesong to Seoul line for the next couple of months, both sides were unable and unwilling to commit to further offensives, the Japanese were still unable to gain sufficient supplies to move north, and the defeat at PyongYang had caused part of the Japanese leadership such as Konishi Yukinaga and Ishida Mitsunari to seriously consider negotiating with the Ming dynasty forces, this got them into a heated debate with other hawkish generals such as Kato Kiyomasa, these conflicts would eventually have further implications in the events of Japan following the war. (see Battle of Sekigahara)
The Allied forces on the other hand, was also facing their own set of problems, soon after arriving in Korea the Ming officials began to note the inadequate logistical supply from the Korean court, the records by one such general ( Qian ShiZheng) noted that even after the siege of Pyongyang the Ming forces were already stalled for nearly a week due to the lack of supplies before moving on to Kaesong,[156] as the time went on the situation only become more serious. When the weather warmed the road condition in Korea also became terrible, as numerous letters from Song Yingchang and other Ming officers attest, which made resupplying from China itself also a tedious process.[157]
The Korean countryside was already devastated from the invasion when the Ming forces arrived, and in the heart of winter it was extremely difficult for the Koreans to muster sufficient supplies, even though the court had assigned the majority of the men on hand to tackle the situation, but their desire to reclaim their country along with the militarily inexperienced nature of many of their administrators resulted in them continuing requesting the Ming forces to advance despite the situation. These events created an increasing level of distrust between the two sides.
The Ming forces also had some internal conflicts, as the forces with Southern China origins were often at odds with Li Rusong and his northmens, Qian ShiZheng in his records noted that the Northmen often did not follow orders and stole their gains in battles. While Li also appeared to have favored his compatriots more than the forces from southern China.
Though by mid April 1593, faced with ever greater logistical pressure from blockade of Admiral Yi and the Righteous army's raid, in addition to the Ming forces special operation that managed to burn down a very significant portion of the Japanese grain storage [158] the Japanese decided break off into talks and pull out of Seoul.
There are two things that encourage the Japanese to leave, first, a Chinese commando penetrated Seoul and burned storehouses at Yongsan, destroying most of what was left of the Japanese troops depleted stock of food. Secondly, Shen Wei Ching made another appearance to conduct negotiations, and threatended the Japanese with an attack by 400,000 Chinese. The Japanese, aware of their weak situation, Konishi and Kato agreed the Japanese would withdraw to the Pusan area while the Chinese would withdraw back to China; a Ming embassy was be sent to Japan to discuss peace terms.[159]
Hideyoshi proposed to China the division of Korea: the north as a self-governing Chinese satellite, and the south would remain in Japanese hands. The peace talks were mostly carried out by Konishi Yukinaga, who did most of the fighting against the Chinese. The offer was taken into consideration until Hideyoshi also demanded one of the Chinese princesses to be sent as his concubine. Then the offer was promptly rejected.
By May 18, 1593, all the Japanese soldiers had retreated to the area around Busan and many began to make their way back to Japan. In the summer of 1593, a Chinese delegation visited Japan and stayed at the court of Hideyoshi for more than a month. The Ming government withdrew most of its expeditionary force, but kept 16,000 men on the Korean peninsula to guard the truce.
An envoy from Hideyoshi reached Beijing in 1594. Most of the Japanese army had left Korea by the autumn of 1596; a small garrison nevertheless remained in Busan. Satisfied with the Japanese overtures, the imperial court in Beijing dispatched an embassy to allow Hideyoshi to have the title of "King of Japan" under the condition of complete withdrawal of Japanese forces from Korea.
Later, Hideyoshi abrogated a negotiation one-sidedly. Peace negotiations soon broke down and the war entered its second phase when Hideyoshi sent another invasion force. Early in 1597, both sides resumed hostilities.
During the period between the First and Second invasions, the Korean government had a chance to examine the reasons why they had been easily overrun by the Japanese. Yu Seong-ryong, the Prime Minister, spoke out about the Korean disadvantages.
Yu pointed out that Korean castle defenses were extremely weak, a fact which he had already pointed out before the war. He noted how Korean castles had incomplete fortifications and walls that were too easy to scale. He also wanted cannons set up in the walls. Yu proposed building strong towers with gun turrets for cannons. Besides castles, Yu wanted to form a line of defenses in Korea. In this kind of defense, the enemy would have to scale many walls in order to reach Seoul.
Yu also pointed out how efficient the Japanese army was, since it took them only one month to reach Seoul, and how well organized they were. Yu noted how the Japanese moved their units in complex maneuvers, often weakening the enemy with arquebuses, then attacking with melee weapons.
King Seonjo and the Korean court finally began to reform the military. In September 1593, the Military Training Agency was established. The agency carefully divided the army into units and companies. Within the companies were squads of archers, arquebusers, swordsmen, and spear infantry. The agency set up divisional units in each region of Korea and garrisoned battalions at castles. The agency, which originally had less than 80 members, soon grew to about 10,000.
One of the most important changes was that both upper class citizens and slaves were subject to the draft. All males had to enter military service be trained and familiarized with weapons.
It was also around this time that the military scholar Han Gyo (한교) wrote the martial arts manual Muyejebo based on the book Ji Xiao Xin Shu written by the famous Chinese general Qi Jiguang.
| Japanese second invasion wave[93] |
| Army of the Right |
|
Mori Hidemoto |
30,000 |
|
Katō Kiyomasa |
10,000 |
|
Kuroda Nagamasa |
5,000 |
|
Nabeshima Naoshige |
12,000 |
|
Ikeda Hideuji |
2,800 |
|
Chosokabe Motochika |
3,000 |
|
Nakagawa Hidenari |
2,500 |
|
| Subtotal |
|
65,300 |
|
|
| Army of the Left |
|
Ukita Hideie |
10,000 |
|
Konishi Yukinaga |
7,000 |
|
Sō Yoshitoshi |
1,000 |
|
Matsuura Shigenobu |
3,000 |
|
Arima Harunobu |
2,000 |
|
Omura Yoshiaki |
1,000 |
|
Goto Sumiharu |
700 |
|
Hachisuka Iemasa |
7,200 |
|
Mōri Yoshinari |
2,000 |
|
Ikoma Kazumasa |
2,700 |
|
Shimazu Yoshihiro |
10,000 |
|
Shimazu Tadatsune |
800 |
|
Akizuki Tanenaga |
300 |
|
Takahashi Mototane |
600 |
|
Ito Suketaka |
500 |
|
Sagara Yorifusa |
800 |
|
| Subtotal |
|
49,600 |
|
|
| Naval Command |
|
Todo Takatora |
2,800 |
|
Katō Yoshiaki |
2,400 |
|
Wakizaka Yasuharu |
1,200 |
|
Kurushima Michifusa |
600 |
|
Mitaira Saemon |
200 |
| Subtotal |
|
7,200 |
| Total |
|
122,100 |
Hideyoshi was dissatisfied with the first campaign and decided to attack Korea again. One of the main differences between the first and second invasions was that conquering China was no longer a goal for the Japanese. Failing to gain a foothold during Katō Kiyomasa's Chinese campaign and the full retreat of the Japanese during the first invasion affected Japanese morale.
Soon after the Chinese ambassadors returned safely to China in 1597, Hideyoshi sent 200 ships with approximately 141,100 men[160] under the overall command of Kobayakawa Hideaki.[67] Japan's second force arrived unopposed on the southern coast of Gyeongsang Province in 1596. However, the Japanese found that Korea was both better equipped and ready to deal with an invasion this time.[161] In addition, upon hearing this news in China, the imperial court in Beijing appointed Yang Hao (楊鎬) as the supreme commander of an initial mobilization of 55,000 troops[160] from various (and sometimes remote) provinces across China, such as Sichuan, Zhejiang, Huguang, Fujian, and Guangdong.[162] A naval force of 21,000 was included in the effort.[163] Rei Huang, a Chinese historian, estimated that the combined strength of the Chinese army and navy at the height of the second campaign was around 75,000.[164] Korean forces totaled 30,000 with General Gwon Yul's army in Gong Mountain (공산; 公山) in Daegu, General Gwon Eung's (권응) troops in Gyeongju, Gwak Jae-u's soldiers in Changnyeong (창녕), Yi Bok-nam's (이복남) army in Naju, and Yi Si-yun's troops in Chungpungnyeong.[160]
Initially the Japanese found little success, being confined mainly to Gyeongsang Province and only managing numerous short-range attacks as they found that the Korean defenders were much better prepared this time around.[161] Aside from a brief period in the early Autumn of 97, Japan would mainly be on the defensive and locked in at Gyeongsang province.[161] The Japanese planned to attack Jeolla Province in the southwestern part of the peninsula and eventually occupy Jeonju, the provincial capital. Korean success in the Siege of Jinju in 1592 had saved this area from further devastation during the first invasion. Two Japanese armies, under Mōri Hidemoto and Ukita Hideie, began the assault in Busan and marched towards Jeonju, taking Sacheon and Changpyong along the way.
A naval battle. Close combat was very rare during Admiral Yi's operations.
The Korean navy played a crucial part in the second invasion, as in the first. The Japanese advances were halted due to the lack of reinforcements and supplies as the naval victories of the Korean navy prevented the Japanese from accessing the south-western side of the Korean peninsula.[165] Also, during the second invasion, China sent a large number of Chinese ships to aid the Koreans. This made the Korean navy an even bigger threat to the Japanese, since they had to fight a larger enemy fleet.
Initially, Korea was setback in the naval arena when Won Gyun took Admiral Yi's place as commander.
Because Admiral Yi, the commander of the Korean navy, was also experienced in land warfare, the Japanese plotted to demote him by making use of the laws that governed the Korean military. A Japanese double agent working for the Koreans falsely reported that Japanese General Katō Kiyomasa would be coming on a certain date with a great Japanese fleet in another attack on Korean shores, and insisted that Admiral Yi be sent to lay an ambush.[166]
Knowing that the area had sunken rocks detrimental to the ships, Admiral Yi refused, and he was demoted and jailed by King Seonjo for refusing orders. On top of this, Admiral Won Gyun accused Admiral Yi of drinking and idling. Won Gyun was quickly put in Admiral Yi's place.
After Won Gyun replaced Admiral Yi, Won Gyun gathered the entire Korean fleet, which now had more than 100 ships carefully accumulated by Admiral Yi, outside of Yosu to search for the Japanese. Without any previous preparations or planning, Won Gyun had his fleet sail towards Busan.
After one day, Won Gyun was informed of a large Japanese fleet near Busan. He decided to attack immediately, although captains complained of their exhausted soldiers.
At the Battle of Chilcheollyang, Won Gyun was completely outmaneuvered by the Japanese in a surprise attack. His ships were overwhelmed by arquebus fire and the Japanese traditional boarding attacks. However, before the battle, Bae Soel, an officer, ran away with 13 Panokseons, the entire fighting force of the Korean navy for many months.
The Battle of Chilcheollyang was Japan's only naval victory during the entire war. Won Gyun was killed by a Japanese garrison after he struggled ashore on an island.
After the disaster at Battle of Chilcheollyang, the allied defenses in the south began to break down, the Japanese forces stormed into Jeolla province, the garrison of Namwon became their next key target.
Namwon was located 30 miles southeast of Jeonju. Correctly predicting a Japanese attack, a coalition force of 6,000 soldiers (including 3,000 Chinese troops under Yang Yuan and civilian volunteers) were readied to fight the approaching Japanese forces.[167] The Japanese laid siege to the walls of the fortress with ladders and siege towers.[168] The two sides exchanged volleys of arquebuses and bows. Eventually the Japanese forces scaled the walls and sacked the fortress. According to Japanese commander Okochi Hidemoto, author of the Chosen Ki, the Siege of Namwon resulted in 3,726 casualties[169] on the Korean and Chinese forces' side.[170] The entire Jeolla Province fell under Japanese control, but as the battle raged on, the Japanese found themselves hemmed in on all sides in a retreat and again positioned in a defensive perimeter only around Gyeongsang Province.[161]
Among the defenders, the Korean forces and its leaders were almost entirely killed, while Yang Yuan managed to sally out after the walls were breached with a handful of men back to Seoul, though eventually he was executed by the Ming court on the grounds of this defeat.
Hwangseoksan Fortress consisted of extensive walls that circumscribed the Hwangseok mountain and garrisoned thousands of soldiers led by the general Jo Jong-do and Gwak Jun. When Katō Kiyomasa laid siege to the mountain with a large army, the Koreans lost morale and retreated with 350 casualties. Even with this incident the Japanese were still unable to break free from Gyeongsang Province and were reduced to hold a defensive position only, with constant attacks from the Chinese and Korean forces.[161]
Upon the breakout of the new round of fighting, the Ming emperor was furious about the entire debâcle of the peace talk and turned his wrath on many of its chief supporters; namely, the minister of military department Shi Xin, who was deposed and jailed (he died a couple of years later in prison) while the chief negotiator, Shen Wei-Jin, was executed. Xin Jie was named the new minister of military and Yang Hao as the new chief superintendent (Jin Lue) of Korea; Xin Jie himself was also stationed in Korea for the remainder of the war. The Ming quickly pulled in many units from its border with Korea in the hope of turning the tide on the Japanese onslaught.
After the Japanese initial success on land, they were ready to aim for Seoul by late August – early September 1597. However, their attempt to attack Seoul was foiled by a Ming defense around Jiksan (modern day Cheonan).
Forces under Kuroda Nagamasa formed the vanguard of the right army and marched toward Seoul, which deeply disturbed the court at Seoul. Several of the Ming generals stationed in Korea offered for the court to pull back with them until they could gather more reinforcements, but the Ming administrators overruled their generals and ordered them to make a stand. Thus the chief commander of the Ming forces at the time Ma Gui sent out general Jie Sheng (解生) and three other generals with an elite cavalry force to try to confront the Japanese forces.
According to Korean records, the Ming forces ran into the vanguard forces under Kuroda around the area of Jiksan. On the first day, they beat back a smaller scouting party. On the second day, the two forces clashed in earnest, with the Japanese forces being beaten back as a result. Soon afterwards, a larger Japanese force showed up and the Ming forces also retreated; however, the Japanese force did not advance much further from Jiksan, and pulled back afterwards. This battle greatly relieved the court and was the beginning of the turnaround on land.[171]
After the debacle in Chilcheollyang, King Seonjo immediately reinstated Admiral Yi. Admiral Yi quickly returned to Yeosu only to find the majority of his navy destroyed. Yi re-organized the navy, now reduced to 12 ships and 200 men from the previous battle.[172] Nonetheless, Admiral Yi's strategies did not waver, and on September 16, 1597, in the Myeongnyang Strait, he fought against a large Japanese fleet of 133 warships and 200 logistical ships with only 12 warships of his own.[173] The Battle of Myeongnyang resulted in a Korean victory, with Admiral Yi retaking control of the Korean shores, and the Japanese being forced to return to Busan,[174] under the orders of Mōri Hidemoto. The Battle of Myeongnyang is considered Admiral Yi's greatest battle because of the disparity of numbers.
Main article:
Siege of Ulsan
Korean and Chinese soldiers assault the Japanese-built fortress at Ulsan.
By late 1597, the Joseon and Ming allied forces achieved victory in Jiksan and pushed the Japanese further south. After the news of the loss at Myeongnyang, Katō Kiyomasa and his retreating army decided to destroy Gyeongju, the former capital of Unified Silla.
Eventually, Japanese forces sacked the city and many artifacts and temples were destroyed, most prominently, the Bulguksa, a Buddhist temple. However, Joseon and Ming allied forces repulsed the Japanese forces, who retreated south to Ulsan,[175] a harbor that had been an important Japanese trading post a century before, and which Katō had chosen as a strategic stronghold.
Yet Admiral Yi's control of the areas over the Korea Strait permitted no supply ships to reach the western side of the Korean peninsula, into which many extensive tributaries merge. Without provisions and reinforcements, the Japanese forces had to remain in the coastal fortresses known as wajō that they still controlled. To gain advantage of the situation, the Chinese and Korean coalition forces attacked Ulsan. This siege was the first major offensive from the Chinese and Korean forces in the second phase of the war.
The effort of the Japanese garrison (about 7,000 men) of Ulsan was largely dedicated to its fortification in preparation for the expected attack. Katō Kiyomasa assigned command and defense of the base to Katō Yasumasa, Kuki Hirotaka, Asano Nagayoshi, and others before proceeding to Sosaengpo.[176] The Chinese Ming and Korean army first assault on January 29, 1598, caught the Japanese army unawares and still encamped, for the large part, outside Ulsan's unfinished walls.[177]
A total of around 36,000 troops with the help of singijeons and hwachas nearly succeeded in sacking the fortress, but reinforcements under the overall command of Mōri Hidemoto came across the river to aid the besieged fortress[178] and prolonged the hostilities. Although the Japanese garrison was desperately short of supplies, the Ming commander Ma Gui judged the situation to be going against the allied forces; as more and more Japanese forces began to arrive around the area, the allied forces were quickly becoming outnumbered.[179]
Late at night on 1/03[clarification needed] 1598, Ma Gui decided to order a general retreat of the allied forces, but soon confusion began to erupt in the allied forces further complicated by heavy rainfall and Japanese attacks, the chief superintendent Yang Hao also panicked and left hastily for Seoul ahead of the army.[180][181][182]
Soon the general retreat order began to fall apart into a chaotic rout; the Japanese forces also took advantage of the situation and attacked some of the allied forces.[183]
The disaster was a heavy setback for the allied forces, who would not move on the Japanese position again for more than eight months.
After the debacle at Ulsan, the two side remained in stalemate for the next several months. Xin Jie decided that they would require further reinforcements to launch a final large offensive to permanently end the Japanese presence on the Korean peninsula.
Reinforcements from China began to pour in through most of mid 1598, with Chen Lin and Deng Zilong and their navy arriving in May. By September 1598, the Ming presence in Korea had swelled to 75,000 overall, by far the largest at any point in the war.
Xin Jie divided his forces into four groups, with Ma Gui heading the offensive against Ulsan yet again, Li Rumei heading the offensive against Sacheon, Chen Lin would command the navy and along with Liu Ting and Yi Sun-Sin with a coordinated land-sea effort against Suncheon.
Just before they set out however, news came that Li Rusong was killed by Mongolian tribesmen back in Liao Dong, Xin Jie decided to remove his emotionally weakened brother Li Rumei in favor of Dong Yi Yuan.
In June 1598, after Commander Konishi Yukinaga's warning of the dire situations in the campaign, 70,000 troops were withdrawn and 60,000 troops were left behind — mostly Satsuma soldiers under the Shimazu clan commanders Shimazu Yoshihiro and his son Tadatsune.[184] Kato Kiyomasa remained in command of the defenses of Ulsan while Konishi himself commanded the defenses at Suncheon.
Only in Sacheon was the battle more decisive before the Japanese abandoned the war in November. In Suncheon, failed coordination among the different generals caused the allies several good chances, while in Ulsan, some back and forth fighting resulted in further stalemate.
The Chinese believed that Sacheon was crucial in their program to retake the lost castles and ordered an attack. Although the Chinese were ascendant initially, the tide of battle turned when Japanese reinforcements attacked the rear of the Chinese army and the Japanese soldiers inside the fortress counter-attacked through the gates.[185] The Chinese Ming forces retreated with 30,000 losses.[186]
According to the Chinese and Korean sources, forces led by Dong Yi Yuan were making strong headway in the siege until a sudden gunpowder accident caused most of their camp to go up in flame, and the Japanese forces were able to take advantage of the situation to rout the already devastated forces.[187]
On September 18, 1598, Hideyoshi ordered the withdrawal of forces from Korea on his deathbed.[188] The Council of Five Elders kept Hideyoshi's death a secret to preserve morale and sent the decree to withdraw to the Japanese commanders in late October.
The Battle of Noryang Point was the final naval battle in the war. The Korean navy under Admiral Yi had recovered from its losses and was aided by the Chinese navy under Chen Lin. Intelligence reports revealed that 500 Japanese ships were anchored in the narrow straits of Noryang in order to withdraw the remaining Japanese troops.[189] Noting the narrow geography of the area, Admirals Yi and Chen Lin led a surprise attack against the Japanese fleet at 2:00 am on December 16, 1598, using cannon and fire arrows.
By dawn, nearly half of the Japanese battle ships were destroyed; as the Japanese began to withdraw, Admiral Yi ordered the final charge to destroy the remaining ships. As Yi's flagship sped forward, he was shot on the left side of his chest under the arm. This was the third time he was shot throughout the war. Yi told his captains to keep his death secret and to continue the battle so that the morale of the soldiers would not drop. Admiral Yi died in minutes. Only three nearby captains, including his nephew, saw his death.
The battle ended with an allied victory and a Japanese loss of about 400 warships out of the original 500 (It is said through various Joseon archives that only 50 ships out of Shimazu's original Armada returned to Pusan). Only after the battle did the soldiers learn of Yi's death, and it is said that Chen Lin was so shocked when he heard the news of his death, he fell down many times on his way and lamented that Yi died in his stead.[190]
As Tsushima suffered greatly from its loss of trade with Korea as a result of the invasions, Yoshitoshi of the Sō family, then dominant in Tsushima, sent four peace negotiation missions to Korea in 1599: the first three were captured and sent to Beijing by Chinese troops, but the fourth one in 1601 successfully obtained from Seoul the condition of returning the Korean captives for peace.[191] However, the major incentive for Korea toward normalization of relations with Japan was the withdrawal of the Chinese soldiers off their territory, which could result into normalization, since the Chinese themselves were causing as much havoc as the Japanese had.[191] Yoshitoshi then released several Korean prisoners and, between the years 1603 and 1604, helped the two Korean envoys in repatriating a further 3,000 by organizing a negotiation at Kyoto with Tokugawa Ieyasu, then the Shogun of Japan.[191]
In continuation of the diplomatic talks toward peaceful relations, Korea in 1606 demanded the Shogun to write a formal letter requesting peace, and to extradite the Japanese soldiers who had defiled the royal tombs near Seoul.[191] Unable to fulfill the request, Yoshitoshi sent a forged letter and a group of criminals instead; despite the clear fraud, the great need to dispel the Chinese soldiers pushed the Koreans to send an embassy in 1608.[191] The end result of the visit was a return of hundreds of Koreans and the restoration of the diplomatic relations between the two countries.[192]
Yeosu today. Admiral Yi's headquarters were located here.
The Japanese invasions were Asia's first regional wars involving massive armies equipped with modern weapons.[193] The regular deployment of Japanese armies sizing up to 200,000, Chinese armies at 80,000,[77] and the regular Korean participation in the hundreds of thousands.
The invasions also stood as a challenge to the existing Chinese world order on two levels:[194] the military, in which the war reaffirmed Ming China's status as the supreme military power in East Asia, and the political, in which the war affirmed Chinese willingness to aid in the protection of its tributary/suzerain states.[195]
Japan achieved technological transfer from Korea, such as new methods of pottery/silk making/iron forging, ceramics, etc. at the cost of thousands of lives and large sums of national wealth.[196] After Hideyoshi's son's death, Toyotomi Hideyori became head of the Toyotomi clan. In fact these two invasions weakened the clan's power and prestige and in a matter of months, Japan was split again. Tokugawa Ieyasu later won the decisive Battle of Sekigahara and established himself as Shogun in 1603.[197]
China had to bear the financial burden from defending Korea, while fighting several other conflicts in the same decade, the war also indirectly weakened their position in Manchuria, which gave the fledgling Manchu chieftain Nurhachi significant room to expand. (Nurhachi's expansions would culminate in the rise of the Qing Dynasty).[15]
As for Korea, which suffered the most damage out of the three,[15] this conflict was more devastating than any other event in its history (even the Korean War).[16] Reduction of arable land to sixty-six percent of the prewar total [14] greatly hurt Korea's mainly agricultural economy;[196] famine, disease, and rebellions ran rampant in Korea.[15] Significant losses of historical archives, cultural and scientific artifacts (such as the water clock Ja-gyuk-roo[198]), and skilled artisans marked the nadir of Korean science in its decline.[199]
The total military and civilian casualties, as estimated by the late 19th century historian, Geo H. Jones, is 1 million,[8] and the total combat casualty ranges around 250,000.[200] A total of 185,738 Korean and 29,014 Chinese casualties occurred, and 50,000 to 60,000 captives were taken by the Japanese throughout the war.[201] Among those captured, a total of 7,500 were returned to Korea through diplomatic means.[202] A large portion of the captives were sold to European traders — mainly Portuguese, who then resold them in Southeast Asia.[203]
The captives brought to Japan, including scholars, craftsmen, medicine makers, and gold smelters, provided to Japan many cultural and technological gains.[201] It is not surprising that Japanese pottery and art developed a significant similarity to their Korean counterparts.[124]
Japanese typography began with Korean fonts and technicians along with the adoption of the western techniques.[204] The first production of porcelain (Arita) in Japan began in 1616 at the town of Imari when a Korean potter called Yi Sam-pyong discovered kaolin-rich clay.[205] As Korean pottery was highly prized in Japan, many Japanese lords established pottery-producing kilns with the captured Korean potters in Kyūshū and other parts of Japan,[205] and these communities were forced to maintain their Korean traditions and to keep away from the rest of the society.[206]
According to Stephen Turnbull, a historian specialized in Japanese history, Japanese troops committed crimes against civilians in battles and killed indiscriminately, including farm animals.[98] Outside of the main battles, Japanese raided Korean habitations to "kill, rape and steal in a… cruel manner…"[207] Japanese soldiers treated their own peasants no better than the captured Koreans and worked many to death by starvation and flogging.[208] The Japanese collected enough ears and noses[209] (cutting ears off of enemy bodies for making casualty counts was an accepted practice) to build a large mound near Hideyoshi's Great Buddha, called the Mimizuka, or "the Mound of Ears".[210]
Turnbull, a western historian specializing in the samurais of Japan wrote in his book that Chinese were no better than the Japanese in the amount of destruction they caused and the degree of the crimes they committed.[191] They even attacked Korean forces,[205] and they did not distinguish between Korean civilians and the Japanese.[211] The military competition resulted between the Chinese generals and the Koreans, and supposedly led to the indiscriminate killing of Korean civilians in Namhae by the Chinese soldiers, whom the Chinese General Chen Lin labelled as Japanese collaborators in order to gain a larger head count.[211] Indeed the Chinese / Korean sources of the time confirm several incidents of the Ming troops, such as one in 1593 when the forces under Wu Weizhong apparently attacked a group of Korean civilians whom they thought were trying to rob their supplies, Wu was nearly dismissed for the incident but still went to take part in most of the war. The Ming court also launched an investigation on the rumor that many of the people killed in the Siege of Pyongyang were, in fact, Korean civilians, but the court eventually decided that commander Li Rusong was innocent.
Korean bandits and highwaymen took advantage of the chaos during the war to form raiding parties and rob other Koreans.[212] The inhabitants of Hamgyong Province (in the northern part of the Korean peninsula) surrendered their fortresses, turning in their generals and governing officials to the Japanese invaders, as they felt oppressed by the Joseon government.[119] Many Korean generals and government officials deserted their posts whenever danger seemed imminent.[102]
The war left significant legacies in all three countries. Korea gained several national heroes, such as Admiral Yi.[16] In Chinese academia, historians list the war as one of the Wanli Emperor's "Three Great Punitive Campaigns".[16] Contemporary Chinese historians often use the campaigns as an example of the friendship the two nations shared.
Contemporary Japanese leaders justified or explain the war with a previous incursion into Korea led by the mythical Empress Jingu in 400 AD, claiming that they were being blessed by the god of war, Hachiman, whom Empress Jingu carried in her womb during her invasion.[192] This temporary and partial occupation of Korea fixed a Japanese argument that Korea had always been part of Japan,[213] and the Japanese leaders of the late 19th and the early 20th centuries used the war to justify their occupation of Korea.[214] However, the ancient Japanese presence in southern Korean peninsula is denied by many historians and, in light of archaeological evidence and the general state of affairs in the region at the time, is regarded to be most probably mythological.
Hideyoshi's former castle at Osaka was restored as a museum in the 1930s to commemorate Japan's military history.[215] In the context of Japanese imperialism, the invasions are seen as the first Japanese attempt to become a global power.[16] In China (as well as Korea),[193] the war inspired nationalistic resistance against the Japanese imperialism during the 20th century.[16]
Today, anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea can be traced back to the Japanese invasions in 1592.
Despite the great interest in the war in East Asia,[215] the Japanese invasions of Korea are not widely known in the west.[216] Historian Stephen Turnbull attributes this ignorance to titles such as Hideyoshi's Invasions of Korea (merely an extended part of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's biography) and the Japanese invasions of Korea (simply a larger repeat of the Japanese wakō pirate raids) absent the distinction as a "war".[62] Some textbooks treat the war with a few lines, and to date not a single complete academic study on the subject exists in English.[217] Historian Kenneth M. Swope lists a near exception: Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korean War 1592–98 by Stephen Turnbull, but criticizes the work for undercoverage of the Korean and Chinese perspective, and for its pro-Japanese bias.[217]
- Note: All websites are listed here independently from the References section.
- ^ Pak Shomei (eds.):Tyosen to Nihon no Kankei-Shi,Akashi Shoten,Tokyo,2000,P.192.(朴鐘鳴監修『朝鮮と日本の関係史』明石書店)
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 140.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 217.
- ^ Joseon Dynasty's record:朝鮮史料『燃黎室記述』
- ^ ＋75000Army standed by at Nagoya Castle,Kyusyu.
- ^ Hotoshi Nakano:Bunroku,Keityo no eki,Yoshikawakobunkan,2008.(中野等『文禄・慶長の役』吉川弘文館)
- ^
Ming: ~30,000+ killed or wounded Twentieth Century Atlas-Historical Body Count
- ^ a b Jones, Geo H., Vol. 23 No. 5, pp. 254
- ^ a b Swope, Kenneth (2006). "Beyond Turtleboats: Siege Accounts from Hideyoshi's Second Invasion of Korea, 1597-1598" (PDF). Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies 6 (2): 177–206. http://sjeas.skku.edu/upload/200701/177-206.PDF
- ^ Hideyoshi's letter for Toyotomi Hidetsugu,1592-5-18. See Saga Prefectural Nagoya Castle Museum (eds.);Hideyoshi and Bunroku Keichō no eki(『秀吉と文禄・慶長の役』 佐賀県立名護屋城博物館),2007,pp.42-43. 佐賀県立名護屋城博物館
- ^ Nanban differs from chinese Nanman. Chinese Nanman means aboriginal tribes who lived in southwestern China. In Japan of 16th century,it means Spanish and Portuguese merchants. See Japanese Wikipedia of Nanban.
- ^ a b "Today in Korean History". Yonhap News Agency of Korea. 2006-11-28. http://find.galegroup.com/itx/infomark.do?&contentSet=IAC-Documents&type=retrieve&tabID=T004&prodId=ITOF&docId=A155053120&source=gale&srcprod=ITOF&userGroupName=tel_middleten&version=1.0. Retrieved 2007-03-24.
- ^ Swope. 2002. pp. 761
- ^ a b "Early Joseon Period". History. Office of the Prime Minister. http://www.opm.go.kr/warp/webapp/content/view?meta_id=english&id=62. Retrieved 2007-03-30.
- ^ a b c d Strauss, Barry. pp. 21
- ^ a b c d e f Swope. 2002. pp. 758-9
- ^ Jang, Pyun-soon. pp. 123-132
- ^ Rockstein, Edward D., Ph.D. pp. 7
- ^ Rockstein, Edward D., Ph.D. pp. 10-11
- ^ Villiers pp. 71
- ^ Alagappa, Muthiah pp. 117
- ^ Sansom, George. pp. 142, 167-180.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 11.
- ^ Swope. 2002. pp. 771
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 13.
- ^ a b c d Arano pp. 206.
- ^ Hooker, Richard ((C) 1996, last updated 1999). "Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–1598)". Washington State University. http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/TOKJAPAN/TOYOTOMI.HTM. Retrieved 2007-05-12.
- ^ Coyner, Tom (2006-07-11). "Why Are Koreans So Against Japanese?: A Brief History Lesson Helps Foreign Investors Do Business". The Korea Times. http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/biz/200607/kt2006071120020911910.htm
- ^ Swope. 2002. pp. 760
- ^ "Azuchi-Momoyama Period (1573–1603)". japan-guide.com. http://www.japan-guide.com/e/e2123.html. Retrieved 2007-05-12.
- ^ Stanley, Thomas A.; R.T.A. Irving ((C) 1996, revised 14 September 2001). "Toyotomi Hideyoshi". Nakasendo Highway: A Journey to the Heart of Japan. University of Hong Kong. Archived from the original on 2007-04-26. http://web.archive.org/web/20070426142209/http://www.hku.hk/history/nakasendo/. Retrieved 2007-05-12.
- ^ Rockstein, Edward D., Ph.D. pp. 37
- ^ Rockstein, Edward D., Ph.D. pp. 23
- ^ Rockstein, Edward D., Ph.D. pp. 24
- ^ Rockstein, Edward D., Ph.D. pp. 38
- ^ Swope. 2005. pp. 21.
- ^ "Toyotomi Hideyoshi - Japanese general who united Japan". Japan101.com. 2003–2005. http://www.japan-101.com/history/toyotomi_hideyoshi.htm. Retrieved 2007-05-12.
- ^ 柚谷康広
- ^ a b Kang, Etsuko Hae-jin (1997). Diplomacy and ideology in Japanese-Korean relations: from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 88. ISBN 0-312-17370-9. http://books.google.com/?id=4f0jnNzdRb4C&pg=PA88&dq=%22So+yoshishige%22+%22Yutani+Yasuhiro%22#v=onepage&q=%22So%20yoshishige%22%20%22Yutani%20Yasuhiro%22.
- ^ The Book of Corrections: Reflections on the National Crisis during the Japanese Invasion of Korea, 1592–1598. By Sôngnyong Yu. Translated by Choi Byonghyon. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 2002. xi, 249 pp. James B. Lewis. The Journal of Asian Studies, Volume 63, Issue 02, May 2004, pp 524-526. doi:10.1017/S0021911804001378, Published online by Cambridge University Press February 26, 2007.
- ^ "선조[宣祖]". Daum 백과사전(Britannica). Daum.net. Daum.net
- ^ Caraway, Bill. "Ch 12 - Japanese invasions: More Worlds to Conquer". KOREA IN THE EYE OF THE TIGER. Korea History Project. http://www.koreanhistoryproject.org/Ket/C12/E1202.htm. Retrieved 2007-07-04.
- ^ Jones, Geo H., Vol. 23 No. 5, pp. 240
- ^ a b Jones, Geo H., Vol. 23 No. 5, pp. 240-1
- ^ a b Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 34.
- ^ 宗義智
- ^ a b Hulbert, Homer B. (1999). History of Korea. 1. Routledge. p. 427. ISBN 0-7007-0700-X. http://books.google.com/?id=rdMBZb6nSOIC&pg=PA427&dq=tsuginobu#v=onepage&q=tsuginobu.
- ^ 柳川調信
- ^ 玄蘇
- ^ 宗義調
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 28.
- ^ a b Jones, Geo H., Vol. 23 No. 5, pp. 242
- ^ "구국(救國)의 영재상, 서애 유성룡". 경북혁신인물. Gyeong-sang-buk-do Province. http://innovation.gb.go.kr/room/rev_people/mnu7_1185779926649.swf. Retrieved 2007-10-07.
- ^ Jang, Pyun-soon. pp. 112
- ^ a b c Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 36.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 36-37.
- ^ Jones, Geo H., Vol. 23 No. 5, pp. 242-3
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 38.
- ^ Swope. 2002. pp. 760-1
- ^ Jones, Geo H., Vol. 23 No. 5, pp. 243
- ^ Rockstein, Edward D., Ph.D. pp. 26
- ^ a b Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 9.
- ^ Rockstein, Edward D., Ph.D. pp. 14
- ^ a b c d Swope. 2005. pp. 32.
- ^ a b Strauss, Barry. pp. 3
- ^ a b c d e Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 22.
- ^ a b c Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 187.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 26.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 15.
- ^ a b Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 16.
- ^ a b Caraway, Bill. "Ch 12 - Japanese invasions: More Worlds to Conquer". KOREA IN THE EYE OF THE TIGER. Korea History Project. http://koreanhistoryproject.org/Ket/C12/E1202.htm. Retrieved 2007-07-04.
- ^ a b c d e f Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 17-18.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 20.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 40.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 42.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 109.
- ^ a b Swope. 2006. pp. 186.
- ^ Hawley, Samuel. pp. 3–7.
- ^ Hawley, Samuel. pp. 6.
- ^ Swope. 2005. pp. 30.
- ^ a b Swope. 2005. pp. 29.
- ^ Swope. 2005. pp. 37.
- ^ a b Swope. 2005. pp. 38.
- ^ Swope. 2005. pp. 26.
- ^ - Seonjo Sillok Book 188, Year 38, 7th of June - (上曰: "倭賊不能射, 而人莫敢敵, 何?" 時言曰: "我國人見賊, 則先潰以走爲能事。 將則雖不忠, 畏有軍律, 不敢先走。 軍之走者, 不可勝誅, 惟其不可勝誅, 是以走耳。 倭賊雖不能射, 兩矢之間, 忽焉到前, 我國之人雖曰善射, 遠則不中, 近則倭劍可畏。 發矢之後, 恐其短兵來接, 未得發矢, 射亦不足恃矣。 倭雖善用劍, 我國人若持劍而進, 則可以敵矣。 我國人則不能如此, 皆以走爲善策": Both Korean translated text and original Chinese text can be read in this site: sillok.history.go.kr)
- ^ Swope. 2005. pp. 28.
- ^ Swope. 2005. pp. 24.
- ^ Caraway, Bill. "Ch 12 - Japanese invasions: Song of the Great Peace". KOREA IN THE EYE OF THE TIGER. Korea History Project. http://koreanhistoryproject.org/Ket/C12/E1201.htm. Retrieved 2007-07-04.
- ^ Brown, Delmer M., pp. 252
- ^ Strauss, Barry. pp. 9
- ^ a b c Strauss, Barry. pp. 10
- ^ Brown, Delmer M., pp. 243
- ^ a b Sansom, Sir George Bailey (1961). A History of Japan, 1334-1615. Stanford University Press. p. 353. ISBN 0-8047-0525-9. http://books.google.com/books?id=0syC6L77dpAC&pg=PA353#v=onepage&q&f=false.
- ^ based on the archives of Shimazu clan
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 47.
- ^ a b Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 48.
- ^ a b c d e Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 83-4.
- ^ a b c Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 50-1.
- ^ a b c d e Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 52.
- ^ a b Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 55-6.
- ^ a b Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 56-7.
- ^ a b c d e f Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 53-4.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 53.
- ^ "상주전투". 문화원영 백과사전. Daum.
- ^ a b c d e f Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 57-8.
- ^ a b c d Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 59-60.
- ^ a b "한니발의 背水陣, 김정일의 배수진: 부하의 '마음을 '얻지 '못한 '배수진은 '死地가 '된다" (in Korean). 독립신문. 2006-10-18. http://www.independent.co.kr/news_01/n_view.html?id=16165&kind=menu_code&keys=5&search=&listpage=n_list.html. Retrieved 2007-07-25.
- ^ a b c Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 61-2.
- ^ a b c d Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 63-4.
- ^ a b c d e Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 65-6.
- ^ a b c d e f g Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 67-8.
- ^ a b Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 69-70.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 71.
- ^ a b c d Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 72-3.
- ^ a b Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 240.
- ^ a b Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 73-4.
- ^ a b c d e Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 74-5.
- ^ a b Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 75-6.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 77-8.
- ^ a b c d e f Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 79-80.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 81-82.
- ^ a b c Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 82.
- ^ a b c Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 85-6.
- ^ a b c d e f Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 90-1.
- ^ Strauss, Barry. pp. 11
- ^ a b c d Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 90-2.
- ^ a b Hawley, Samuel: The Imjin War. Japan's Sixteenth-Century Invasion of Korea and Attempt to Conquer China, The Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, Seoul 2005, ISBN 89-954424-2-5, p.195f.
- ^ a b Turnbull, Stephen: Samurai Invasion. Japan's Korean War 1592-98 (London, 2002), Cassell & Co ISBN 0-304-35948-3, p.244
- ^ a b Roh, Young-koo: "Yi Sun-shin, an Admiral Who Became a Myth", The Review of Korean Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2004), p.13
- ^ a b c d e f Strauss, Barry. pp. 12
- ^ a b Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 93.
- ^ a b c Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 94-5.
- ^ a b c d Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 96-7.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 98-107.
- ^ a b Strauss, Barry. pp. 13
- ^ a b Strauss, Barry. pp. 14
- ^ "의병 (義兵)". Encyclopedia. Yahoo Korea!. http://kr.dic.yahoo.com/search/enc/result.html?p=%C0%C7%BA%B4&pk=16989000&subtype=&type=enc&field=id. Retrieved 2007-10-07.
- ^ a b c d e Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 1-8-9.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 110-5.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 116-123.
- ^ "Suwon". Encyclopædia Britannica. http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9070532/Suwon. Retrieved 2007-09-01.
- ^ "용인전투". Encyclopædia Britannica. Daum. http://enc.daum.net/dic100/contents.do?query1=b16a3034a. Retrieved 2007-09-01.
- ^ "이치전투 (조선 역사) [梨峙戰鬪]". Daum 백과사전(Britannica). Daum.net. http://enc.daum.net/dic100/contents.do?query1=b18a0543a.
- ^ a b Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 4, p279
- ^ [Annals of Seonjo entry on 5/29 1592]時變起倉卒, 訛言傳播。 僚左〔僚佐〕煽言: "朝鮮與日本連結, 詭言被兵。 國王與本國猛士, 避入北道, 以他人爲假王, 托言被兵, 實爲日本嚮導。" 流言聞於上國。 朝廷疑信相半,
- ^ [Annals of Seonjo entry on 5/29 1592]時或欲請兵天朝, 大臣以爲: "遼、廣之人, 性甚頑暴, 若天兵渡江, 蹂躪我國, 則浿江以西未陷諸郡, 盡爲赤地。" 兩議爭論, 日久不決
- ^ [Annals of Seonjo entry on 5/29 1592]兵部尙書石星密諭遼東, 遣崔世臣、林世祿等。 以採審賊情爲名, 實欲馳至平壤, 請與國王相會, 審其眞僞而歸。
- ^ letter by Song YingChang in an official report back to the court on February 16, 1593 states 已到兵丁三萬八千五百三十七人員, a total of 38537 men have arrived
- ^ a b The History of Ming chapter 238
- ^ The History of Ming chapter 238.
- ^ description within the annals of Seonjo
- ^ Song YingChang's letters on March the 1st 1593 describing the battle in full to the Ming court
- ^ The history of Ming Chapter 238 十九日，如柏遂複開城
- ^ The history of Ming Chapter 238 官軍既連勝，有輕敵心 二十七日再進師。朝鮮人以賊棄王京告。如松信之，將輕騎趨碧蹄館。
- ^ History of the Ming chapter 238 將輕騎趨碧蹄館。距王京三十裏，猝遇倭，圍數重。如松督部下鏖戰。一金甲倭搏如松急，指揮李有聲殊死救，被殺。如柏、寧等奮前夾擊，如梅射金甲倭墜馬，楊元兵亦至，斫重圍入，倭乃退，官軍喪失甚多。會天久雨，騎入稻畦中不得逞。倭背嶽山，面漢水，聯營城中，廣樹飛樓，箭砲不絕，官軍乃退駐開城。
- ^ Statements in "The records of the Eastern Expedition" by Qian ShiZheng
- ^ various letter by Song Yingchang, including the letter to Li Rusong on February 10, 1593 stating "今糧草未敷泥濘難進"
- ^ The history of Ming chapter 238 聞倭將平秀嘉據龍山倉，積粟數十萬，密令大受率死士從間焚之。倭遂乏食。
- ^ Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 4, Early Modern Japan, p281
- ^ a b c 브리태니커백과사전. 정유재란 (丁酉再亂)
- ^ a b c d e Korean History Project - Where the Past is Always Present. Song of the Great Peace
- ^ Hawley, The Imjin War, op. cit, p. 450.
- ^ Huang, Ray, "The Lung-ch'ing and Wan-li Reigns, 1567–1620." in The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 7, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part I, edited by Denis Twitchett and John Farbank. Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 572.
- ^ Huang, Ray, "The Lung-ch'ing and Wan-li Reigns, 1567–1620." in The Cambridge History of Chani. Vol. 7, The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part I, edited by Denis Twitchett and John Farbank. Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 572.
- ^ Lee, Ki-Baik, A New History of Korea, Translated by Edward W. Wagner and Edward J. Shultz, Ilchorak/Harvard University Press, 1984, p. 214, ISBN 0-674-61575-1.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 182–183.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 191.
- ^ 脇坂紀, 太田 藤四郎 and 塙 保己一, editors, 続群書類従 [Zoku Gunsho Ruiju Series], 1933, p. 448.
- ^ This refers to a record of the number of noses collected, as samurai were paid according to how many noses they collected, both from the living and the dead, in contrast to the more traditional practice of collecting heads.
- ^ Hidemoto, Okochi, 朝鮮記 [Chosen Ki], 太田 藤四郎 and 塙 保己一, editors, 続群書類従 [Zoku Gunsho Ruiju Series], 1933
- ^ 九月，經理楊鎬，使副總兵解生等，大拜賊兵於稷山. 先是,賊自陷南原, 乘勝長驅, 進逼京畿. 經理楊鎬在平壤聞之, 馳入京城, 朝提督責不戰之狀. 於提督定記, 密選騎士之精勇者, 使解生牛伯英楊登山頗貴領之, 迎擊於稷山, 諸軍及我人皆末知也. 解生等伏兵於稷山之素沙坪, 乘賊未及城列, 縱突騎擊之, 賊披靡而走, 死者甚多. 又遣游擊擺賽, 將兩千騎繼之, 與四將合勢, 游擊又破之. 是日, 經理提督請上出視江上, 上不得已而行, 人心洶懼, 士庶接荷擔而立, 內殿壁兵西幸, 及捷報致，京中乃稍定。 From the Annals of King Seonjo
- ^ 桑 田忠親 [Kuwata, Tadachika], ed., 旧参謀本部編纂, [Kyu Sanbo Honbu], 朝鮮の役 [Chousen no Eki] (日本の戦史 [Nihon no Senshi] Vol. 5), 1965, p. 192.
- ^ Nanjung Ilgi. War Diary of Admiral Yi Sun-sin. Translated by Ha Tae Hung, edited by Sohn Pow-key. Yonsei University Press, Seoul, Korea, 1977, p. 312, ISBN 89-7141-018-3.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 202,
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 203.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, pp. 204–205.
- ^ 文禄\u12539 ・慶長役における被虜人の研究, 東京大学出版, 1976, p. 128, ASIN 4130260235.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 215.
- ^ Annals of Seonjo record on 1/14 1598 解副揔【生。】接伴使戶曹參議宋諄啓曰: "蔚山之賊, 被圍日久, 援船多來泊, 又於賊窟迤西遠山, 山上盛張旗幟, 以助聲勢。
- ^ History of the Ming chapter 259 明年正月二日，行長救兵驟至。鎬大懼，狼狽先奔，諸軍繼之。賊前襲擊，死者無算。副將吳惟忠、遊擊茅國器斷後，賊乃還，輜重多喪失。
- ^ History of the Ming chapter 238 明年正月二日，行長來援，九將兵俱潰。賊張旗幟江上，鎬大懼，倉皇撤師
- ^ Annals of Seonjo record on 1/14 1598 正月初三日夜間, 喧說船賊下陸, 而唐軍卒然解圍, 一時移陣。
- ^ Annals of Seonjo record on 1/14 1598 初四日朝, 諸軍馬鳥驚魚駭, 達夜崩潰, 俱棄器械, 狼藉原陸。 臣失副摠所在, 追至安東, 亦不相逢, 姑留待候副摠之行, 而以天將接伴之臣, 奉使無狀, 至於相失, 措躬無地, 席藁待罪耳
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 219.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 220–221.
- ^ Turnbull, Stephen. 2002, p. 222.
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