Race and ethnicity in the United States Census, as defined by the Federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the United States Census Bureau, are self-identification data items in which residents choose the race or races with which they most closely identify, and indicate whether or not they are of Hispanic or Latino origin (ethnicity).

The racial categories represent a social-political construct for the race or races that respondents consider themselves to be and "generally reflect a social definition of race recognized in this country." The race categories include both racial and national-origin groups.

Race and ethnicity are considered separate and distinct identities, with Hispanic or Latino origin asked as a separate question. Thus, in addition to their race or races, all respondents are categorized by membership in one of two ethnicities, which are "Hispanic or Latino" and "Not Hispanic or Latino".

In 1997, OMB issued a Federal Register Notice regarding revisions to the standards for the classification of federal data on race and ethnicity. OMB developed race and ethnic standards in order to provide "consistent data on race and ethnicity throughout the Federal Government. The development of the data standards stem in large measure from new responsibilities to enforce civil rights laws." Among the changes, OMB issued the instruction to "mark one or more races" after noting evidence of increasing numbers of interracial children and wanting to capture the diversity in a measurable way, and after having received requests by people who wanted to be able to acknowledge their or their children's full ancestry rather than identifying with only one group. Prior to this decision, the Census and other government data collections asked people to report only one race.

How data on race and ethnicity are used

The OMB states that “many federal programs are put into effect based on the race data obtained from the decennial census (i.e., promoting equal employment opportunities; assessing racial disparities in health and environmental risks). Race data are also critical for the basic research behind many policy decisions. States require these data to meet legislative redistricting requirements. The data are needed to monitor compliance with the Voting Rights Act by local jurisdictions."

"Data on ethnic groups are important for putting into effect a number of federal statutes (i.e., enforcing bilingual election rules under the Voting Rights Act; monitoring and enforcing equal employment opportunities under the Civil Rights Act). Data on Ethnic Groups are also needed by local governments to run programs and meet legislative requirements (i.e., identifying segments of the population who may not be receiving medical services under the Public Health Act; evaluating whether financial institutions are meeting the credit needs of minority populations under the Community Reinvestment Act).”

Brief overview of race and ethnicity in the U.S. Census' history

Census 1790

In 1790, first official year of the U.S. Census, the following questions were asked, four of which had racial implications:

Number of free White males aged under 16 years

Number of free White males aged 16 years and upward

Number of free White females

Number of other free persons

Number of slaves

In 1800 and 1810, the age question regarding free white males was more detailed.

Census 1820

The 1820 census built on the questions asked in 1810 by asking age questions about the slaves who were owned. Also the term “colored” enters the census rhetoric. In addition, a question stating “Number of foreigners not naturalized” was included.

Census 1830

For the 1830 census, a new question which stated “The number of White persons who were foreigners not naturalized” was included, as well as combining the number and age question of both slaves and free colored individuals.

Census 1850

The 1850 census saw a dramatic shift in the way information about residents was collected. For the first time, free persons were listed individually instead of by head of household. There were two questionnaires: one for free inhabitants and one for slaves. The question on the free inhabitants schedule about color was a column that was to be left blank if a person was White, marked "B" if a person was Black, and marked "M" if a person was Mulatto. Slaves were listed by owner, and classified by gender and age, not individually, and the question about color was a column that was to be marked with a "B" if the slave was Black and an "M" if Mulatto.

Census 1870

For the 1870 census, the color/racial question was expanded to include “C” for Chinese, which was a category that included all east Asians, as well as “I” for American Indians.

Census 1890

For 1890, the Census Office changed the design of the population questionnaire. Residents were still listed individually, but a new questionnaire sheet was used for each family. Additionally, this was the first year that the census distinguished between different East Asian races, such as Japanese and Chinese, due to increased immigration. This census also marked the beginning of the term “race” in the questionnaires. Enumerators were instructed to write "White," "Black," "Mulatto," "Quadroon," "Octoroon," "Chinese," "Japanese," or "Indian."

Census 1900

For 1900, the “Color or Race” question was slightly modified, removing the term “Mulatto”. Also, there was an inclusion of an “Indian Population Schedule” in which “enumerators were instructed to use a special expanded questionnaire for American Indians living on reservations or in family groups off of reservations.” This expanded version included the question “Fraction of person's lineage that is white.”

Census 1910

The 1910 census was similar to that of 1900, but it included a re-insertion of “Mulatto” and a question about the respondent's "mother tongue.” “Ot” was also added to signify "other races", with space for a race to be written in. This decade's version of the Indian Population Schedule featured questions asking the individual’s proportion of white, black, or American Indian lineage.

Census 1920

The 1920 census questionnaire was similar to 1910, but excluded a separate schedule for American Indians. “Hin”, “Kor”, and “Fil” were also added to the “Color or Race” question, signifying Hindu (South Asia Indian), Korean, and Filipino, respectively.

Census 1930

The biggest change in this year’s census was in racial classification. Enumerators were instructed to no longer use the "Mulatto" classification. Instead, they were given special instructions for reporting the race of interracial persons. A person with both White and Black ancestry (termed "blood") was to be recorded as "Negro," no matter the fraction of that lineage (the "one-drop rule"). A person of mixed Black and American Indian ancestry was also to be recorded as "Neg" (for "Negro") unless he was considered to be "predominantly" American Indian and accepted as such within the community. A person with both White and American Indian ancestry was to be recorded as an Indian, unless his American Indian ancestry was small, and he was accepted as White within the community. In all situations in which a person had White and some other racial ancestry, he was to be reported as that other race. Persons who had minority interracial ancestry were to be reported as the race of their father.

For the first and only time, "Mexican" was listed as a race. Enumerators were instructed that all persons born in Mexico, or whose parents were born in Mexico, should be listed as Mexicans, and not under any other racial category. But, in prior censuses and in 1940, enumerators were instructed to list Mexican Americans as white.

The Supplemental American Indian questionnaire was back, but in abbreviated form. It featured a question asking if the person was of full or mixed American Indian ancestry.

Census 1940 (Population)

The 1940 census was the first to include separate population and housing questionnaires. The race category of "Mexican" was eliminated in 1940, and the population of Mexican descent was counted with the White population.

Census 1950 (Population)

The 1950 Census questionnaire removed the word “color” from the racial question, and also removed Hindu and Korean from the race choices.

Census 1960 (Population)

The 1960 Census re-added the word “color” to the racial question, and changed “Indian” to “American Indian”, as well as added Hawaiian, Part-Hawaiian, Aleut, and Eskimo. The Other (print out race) option was removed.

Census 1970 (Population)

This year’s census included “Negro or Black”, re-added Korean and the Other race option. There was a questionnaire that was asked of only a sample of respondents. These questions were as follows:

a. Where was this person born?

b. Is this person's origin or descent...

Mexican

Puerto Rican

Cuban

Central or South American

Other Spanish

None of These

14. What country was the person's father born in?

15. What country was the person's mother born in?

16.

a. For persons born in a foreign country- Is the person naturalized?

b. When did the person come to the United States to stay?

17. What language, other than English, was spoken in the person's home as a child?

Spanish

French

German

Other

None, only English

Census 1980 (Population)

This year added several options to the race question, including Vietnamese, Indian (East) Guamanian, Samoan, and re-added Aleut. Again, the term “color” was removed from the racial question, and the following questions were asked of a sample of respondents:

11. In what state or foreign country was the person born?

12. If this person was born in a foreign country...

a. Is this person a naturalized citizen of the United States?

b. When did this person come the United States to stay?

13.

a. Does this person speak a language other than English at home?

b. If yes, what is this language?

c. If yes, how well does this person speak English?

14. What is this person's ancestry?

Census 1990 (Population)

The racial categories in this year are as they appear in the 2000 and 2010 Census. The following questions were asked of a sample of respondents for the 1990 Census:

8. In what U.S. State or foreign country was this person born?

9. Is this person a citizen of the United States?

10. If this person was not born in the United States, when did this person come to the United States to stay?

The 1990 Census was not designed to capture multiple racial responses, and when individuals marked the Other race option and provided a multiple write in, the response was assigned according to the race written first. “For example, a write in of "Black-White" was assigned a code of Black, a write in of "White-Black" was assigned a code of White.”

Census 2000 (Population)

Race was asked differently in the Census 2000 in several other ways than previously. Most significantly, respondents were given the option of selecting one or more race categories to indicate racial identities. Data show that nearly seven million Americans identified as members of two or more races. Because of these changes, the Census 2000 data on race are not directly comparable with data from the 1990 census or earlier censuses. Use of caution is therefore recommended when interpreting changes in the racial composition of the US population over time.

The 23rd federal census, 2010 asks one ethnic and one race question (questions 1-4 not reproduced here, questions 5 and 6 paraphrased):

8. Is the person of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin?

*No, not of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin

*Yes, Mexican, Mexican Am., Chicano

*Yes, Puerto Rican

*Yes, Cuban

*Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin — Print origin, for example, Argentinean, Colombian, Dominican, Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, Spaniard, and so on.

9. What is the person's race?

*White

*Black, African Am., or Negro

*American Indian or Alaska Native — Print name of enrolled or principal tribe.

*Asian Indian

*Chinese

*Filipino

*Other Asian — Print race, for example, Hmong, Laotian, Thai, Pakistani, Cambodian, and so on.

*Japanese

*Korean

*Vietnamese

*Native Hawaiian

*Guamanian or Chamorro

*Samoan

*Other Pacific Islander — Print race, for example, Fijian, Tongan, and so on.

*Some other race — Print race.

This census acknowledged that "race categories include both racial and national-origin groups."

The following definitions apply to the 2000 census only.

"White. A person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa. It includes people who indicate their race as "White" or report entries such as Irish, German, Italian, Lebanese, Near Easterner, Arab, or Polish."

"Black or African American. A person having origins in any of the Black racial groups of Africa. It includes people who indicate their race as 'Black, African Am., or Negro,' or provide written entries such as African American, Afro American, Kenyan, Nigerian, or Haitian."

"American Indian and Alaska Native. A person having origins in any of the original peoples of North and South America (including Central America) and who maintain tribal affiliation or community attachment."

"Asian. A person having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent including, for example, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam. It includes 'Asian Indian,' 'Chinese', 'Filipino', 'Korean', 'Japanese', 'Vietnamese', and 'Other Asian'."

"Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander. A person having origins in any of the original peoples of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, or other Pacific Islands. It includes people who indicate their race as 'Native Hawaiian', 'Guamanian or Chamorro', 'Samoan', and 'Other Pacific Islander'."

"Some other race. Includes all other responses not included in the 'White', 'Black or African American', 'American Indian and Alaska Native', 'Asian' and 'Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander' race categories described above. Respondents providing write-in entries such as multiracial, mixed, interracial, We-Sort, or a Hispanic/Latino group (for example, Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Cuban) in the "Some other race" category are included here."

"Two or more races. People may have chosen to provide two or more races either by checking two or more race response check boxes, by providing multiple write-in responses, or by some combination of check boxes and write-in responses."

The Federal government of the United States has mandated that "in data collection and presentation, federal agencies are required to use a minimum of two ethnicities: 'Hispanic or Latino' and 'Not Hispanic or Latino'." The Census Bureau defines "Hispanic or Latino" as "a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American or other Spanish culture or origin regardless of race." For discussion of the meaning and scope of the Hispanic or Latino ethnicity, see the Hispanic and Latino Americans and Racial and ethnic demographics of the United States articles.

Use of the word ''ethnicity'' for Hispanics only is considerably more restricted than its conventional meaning, which covers other distinctions, some of which are covered by the "race" and "ancestry" questions. The distinct questions accommodate the possibility of Hispanic and Latino Americans' also declaring various racial identities (see also White Hispanic and Latino Americans, Asian Latinos, and Black Hispanic and Latino Americans).

In the 2000 Census, 12.5% of the US population reported "Hispanic or Latino" ethnicity and 87.5% reported "Not-Hispanic or Latino" ethnicity.

Relation between ethnicity and race in census results

The Census Bureau warns that data on race in 2000 Census are not directly comparable to those collected in previous censuses. Many US residents consider race and ethnicity to be the same concept.

100 93.7 47.9 2.0 1.2 0.3 0.1 42.2 6.3 5.3 1.0

!Race !!Hispanic orLatino!!% ofH/L!!% ofUS!!Not Hispanicor Latino!!% of NotH/L!!% ofUS
!Any races	35,305,818	|	12.5	246,116,088	100	87.5
!One race:	33,081,736	|	11.8	241,513,942	98.1	85.8
!White	16,907,852	|	6.0	194,552,774	79.1	69.1
!Black orAfrican A.	710,353	|	0.3	33,947,837	13.8	12.1
!A. Indian/Alaska Nat.	407,073	|	0.1	2,068,883	0.8	0.7
!Asian	119,829	|	<0.1	10,123,169	4.1	3.6
!Hawaiian N.& Pacific Is.	45,326	|	<0.1	353,509	0.1	0.1
!Some other	14,891,303	|	5.3	467,770	0.2	0.2
!2+ races:	2,224,082	|	0.8	4,602,146	1.9	1.6
!Some other+ W/B/N/A	1,859,538	|	0.7	1,302,875	0.5	0.5
!2+ W/B/N/A	364,544	|	0.1	3,299,271	1.3	1.2

In the 2000 Census, respondents were tallied in each of the race groups they reported. Consequently, the total of each racial category exceeds the total population because some people reported more than one race.

The Census Bureau implemented a Census Quality Survey, gathering data from approximately 50,000 households in order to assess the reporting of race and Hispanic origin in the 2000 Census with the purpose creating a way to make comparisons between the 2000 Census with previous Census racial data.

The AAA also stated,

The recommendations of the AAA were not adopted by the Census Bureau for the 2000 Census or the 2010 Census.

2010 Census

The 2010 US Census includes changes designed to more clearly distinguish Hispanic ethnicity as not being a race. That includes adding the sentence: "For this census, Hispanic origins are not races." Additionally, the Hispanic terms are modified from "Hispanic or Latino" to "Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin".

Although used in the Census and the American Community Survey, "Some other race" is not an official race, and the Bureau considered eliminating it prior to the 2000 Census. As the 2010 census form does not contain the question titled "Ancestry" found in recent censuses, there are campaigns to get non-Hispanic West Indian Americans, Arab Americans and Iranian Americans to indicate their ethnic or national background through the race question, specifically the "Some other race" category.

The Interagency Committee has suggested that the concept of marking multiple boxes be extended to the Hispanic origin question, thereby freeing individuals from having to choose between their parents' ethnic heritages. In other words, a respondent could chose both "Hispanic or Latino" and "Not Hispanic or Latino".

Other agencies

In 2001, the National Institutes of Health adopted the new language to comply with the revisions to Directive 15, as did the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of the United States Department of Labor in 2007. See Race and ethnicity (EEO).

See also

Criticism of the term Latino

Language (United States Census)

Race (classification of humans)

Race in the United States

Race and ethnicity in the United States

United States Census, 2000

References

Category:Demographics of the United States Category:Race in the United States

de:Race (United States Census) es:Raza (censo de los Estados Unidos) fr:Race (recensement des États-Unis) gl:Raza (censo dos Estados Unidos) id:Ras dan etnisitas di Sensus Amerika Serikat ru:Расовый состав США

Conflict	Pacific War
Partof	World War II
Date	7 December 1941 – 2 September 1945
Place	East Asia, South Asia, the Western Pacific Ocean, its islands and neighboring countries, and part of the Indian Ocean for a short time.
Result	Decisive Allied victoryEnd of World War II. Fall of the Empire of Japan. Continuation of Chinese Civil War. Substantial weakening of European colonial powers, gradual decolonization of Asia (including the Indonesian National Revolution and the First Indochina War)
Territory	American occupation of Japan. Removal of all Japanese troops occupying parts of the Republic of China. Retrocession of Taiwan to China. Liberation of Korea and Manchuria from Japanese rule, division of Korea. Secession of all Japanese-held islands in the Central Pacific Ocean, such as the Marianas Islands, the Marshall Islands, the Caroline Islands, and the Palau Islands to the United Nations. Removal of all Japanese troops from the Australian-governed Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, the Admiralty Islands, and the Bismarck Archipelago. Seizure of Sakhalin and of the Kuril Islands by the Soviet Union.
Combatant1	Major Allied combatants Commonwealth of the Philippines British Malaya Dutch East Indies
Combatant2	Major Axis combatants Second Philippine Republic Arzi Hukumat-e-Azad Hind
Commander1	Chester W. Nimitz Douglas MacArthur George C. Marshall Ernest J. King Henry H. Arnold Alexander "Archie" Vandergrift Chiang Kai-shek Chen Cheng He Yingqin Sun Liren Archibald Wavell Louis Mountbatten Thomas Blamey Aleksandr Vasilevsky Hein ter Poorten
Commander2	Kotohito Kan'in Hajime Sugiyama Hideki Tojo Isoroku Yamamoto Yoshijirō Umezu Osami Nagano Shigetarō Shimada Koshirō Oikawa Plaek Pibulsonggram Zhang Jinghui Subhas Chandra Bose
Casualties1	≈4,000,000 military deaths (1937-45) 354,523 United States casualties (106,207 killed, 248,316 wounded and missing), 52,000 British casualties including 12,000 deaths in captivity, 86,838 British Indian casualties (this casualty figure is for all theatres of World War Two that Indian troops fought in), 17,501 Australian casualties, 57,000 casualties from the Philippine Commonwealth, around 9,400 Dutch casualties including 8,500 who died in captivity (likely not including colonial forces), 578 New Zealander casualties, 63,225 Soviet casualties (20,797 killed and missing, 42,428 wounded and sick), 5000 French military casualties in Indochina, 300 Mongolian casualties and 5 Mexican deaths Malaria was the most important health hazard encountered by U.S. troops in the South Pacific during World War II, where about 500,000 men were infected. |groupnb}}

≈17,000,000 civilian deaths (1937-45), two million Indochinese civilians, around 1.5 million British Indian civilian deaths, 1/2 to one million Filipino civilian and hundreds of thousands of Burmese, Malayan, Pacific etc. civilian deaths.|group=nb}} |casualties2=≈2,000,000 Japanese military deaths (1937-45) 22,000 Burmese casualties, 5,600 Thai casualties, and 2,615 Indian casualties.|group=nb}} ~960,000+ civilian casualties, 378,000 Korean and 300 Thai civilian deaths.|group=nb}} }}

The Pacific War, also sometimes called the Asia-Pacific War refers broadly to the parts of World War II that took place in the Pacific Ocean, its islands, and in East Asia, then called the Far East. The term ''Pacific War'' is used to encompass the Pacific Ocean theatre, the South West Pacific theatre, the South-East Asian theatre and the Second Sino-Japanese War, also including the 1945 Soviet-Japanese conflict.

It is generally considered that the Pacific War began on 7/8 December 1941 with the Japanese invasion of Thailand for the invasion of British Malaya, and the attack on Pearl Harbor in the United States' Territory of Hawaii by the Empire of Japan. Some authors consider the conflict in Asia can be dated as far as 7 July 1937, beginning with the Second Sino-Japanese War between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China, or possibly 19 September 1931, beginning with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. However, it is more widely accepted that the Pacific War itself started in early December 1941, with the Sino-Japanese War then becoming part of it as a theater of the greater World War II.

The Pacific War saw the Allied powers against the Empire of Japan, the latter briefly aided by Thailand and to lesser extent by its Axis allies Germany and Italy. The war culminated in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and other large aerial bombing attacks by the United States Army Air Forces, accompanied by the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on 8 August 1945, resulting in the surrender of Japan and the end of fighting during World War II on 15 August 1945. The formal and official surrender of Japan occurred aboard the battleship in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945.

Etymology

In Allied countries during the war, it was not usually distinguished from World War II in general, or it was known simply as the War against Japan. In the United States, the term Pacific Theater was widely used, although technically this did not cover the South West Pacific Theatre (under the command of General Douglas MacArthur), the China-Burma-India Theater, or the usually the Southeast Asian Theater. However, note that the aircraft carrier task forces of the U.S. Pacific Fleet did carry out large air raids on Vietnam – at Haiphong, Camranh Bay, and Saigon in early 1945.

Japan used the name , as chosen by a cabinet decision on 10 December 1941, to refer to both the war with the Western Allies and the ongoing war in China. This name was released to the public on 12 December, with an explanation that it involved Asian nations achieving their independence from the Western powers through armed forces of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Japanese officials integrated what they called the into the Greater East Asia War.

During the American military occupation of Japan (1945–52), these Japanese terms were prohibited in official documents, although their informal usage continued, and the war became officially known as . This latter term has later come into limited use in Occidental countries. In Japan, the is also used, referring to the period from the Mukden Incident of 1931 through 1945.

Participants

The Axis states which assisted Japan included the authoritarian government of Thailand, which quickly formed a temporary alliance with the Japanese in 1941, since Japanese forces were invading the southern peninsula of Thailand, anyway. Also the Phayap Army sent troops to invade and occupy northeastern Burma. This was former Thai territory that had much earlier been forcibly taken away by the British Army. Also involved were the Japanese puppet states of Manchukuo (consisting of most of Manchuria and part of Inner Mongolia), and the Wang Jingwei (which controlled the coastal regions of China).

The official policy of the U.S. Government is that Thailand was not an ally of the Axis, and that the United States was not at war with Thailand. The policy of the U.S. Government ever since 1945 has been to treat Thailand not as a former enemy, but rather, Thailand had been forced into certain actions by Japanese blackmail, and then Thailand was occupied by Japanese troops. Thailand has been treated by the United States just the same as other Axis-occupied countries such as Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Greece, Korea, Norway, Poland, and the Netherlands.

Japan enlisted many soldiers from its colonies of Korea and Formosa (Taiwan). To a small extent, some Vichy French, Indian National Army, and Burmese National Army forces were active in the area of the Pacific War. To an even smaller extent, German and Italian naval forces (mainly armed merchantmen and naval submarines) also operated in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

The major Allied participants were the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom (including the armed forces of British India, the Fiji Islands, Samoa, etc.), Australia, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the Netherlands (as the possessor of the Dutch East Indies and the western part of New Guinea), New Zealand, and Canada, all of whom were members of the Pacific War Council. Mexico, Free France and many other countries also took part, especially forces from other British colonies and also Latin America.

The Soviet Union fought two short, undeclared border conflicts with Japan in 1938 and 1939, then remained neutral until August 1945, when it joined the Allies and invaded the territory of Manchukuo, Republic of China, Inner Mongolia, the Japanese protectorate of Korea and Japanese-claimed islands such as Sakhalin coordinated notably between the Red Banner Pacific Fleet and the US Navy's Task Force 38.

Theaters

Between 1942 and 1945, there were four main areas of conflict in the Pacific War: China, the Central Pacific, South East Asia and the South West Pacific. U.S. sources refer to two theaters within the Pacific War: the Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO) and the China Burma India Theater (CBI). However these were not operational commands.

In the PTO, the Allies divided operational control of their forces between two supreme commands, known as Pacific Ocean Areas and Southwest Pacific Area. In 1945, for a brief period just before the Japanese surrender, the Soviet Union and its Mongolian ally engaged Japanese forces in Manchuria and northeast China.

Conflict between China and Japan

Second Sino-Japanese War

By 1937 Japan controlled Manchuria and was ready to move deeper into China. The opportunity came at the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (7 July 1937), which provoked a war between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan. Though the Nationalist and Communist Chinese occasionally cooperated in military campaigns against Japan, the two forces saved their efforts to later fight each other. World opinion--especially in the United States--condemned Japan. especially after American warships came under attack, as in the Panay incident.

In 1939 Japanese forces tried to push into the Soviet Far East from Manchuria. They were soundly defeated in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol by a mixed Soviet and Mongolian force led by Georgy Zhukov. This stopped Japanese expansion to the north, and Japan and the Soviet Union kept an uneasy peace until 1945.

In September 1940 Japan decided to cut China's only land line to the outside world by seizing Indochina, which was controlled at the time by Vichy France. Japanese forces broke the terms of their agreement with the Vichy administration and fighting broke out, ending in a Japanese victory. On 27 September Japan signed a military alliance with Germany and Italy, becoming one of the three Axis Powers. In practice, there was little coordination between Japan and Germany until 1944, by which time the U.S. was deciphering their secret diplomatic correspondence.

By 1941 the conflict had become a stalemate. Although Japan had occupied much of northern and central China, the Kuomintang had retreated to the interior with a provisional capital set up at Chungking while the Chinese communists remained in control of base areas in Shaanxi. In addition, Japanese control of northern and central China was somewhat tenuous, in that Japan was usually able to control railroads and the major cities ("points and lines"), but did not have a major military or administrative presence in the vast Chinese countryside. The Japanese found its aggression against the retreating and regrouping Chinese army was stalled by the mountainous terrain in southwestern China while the Communists organised widespread guerrilla and saboteur activities in northern and eastern China behind the Japanese front line.

Japan sponsored several puppet governments, one of which was headed by Wang Jingwei. However, its policies of brutality toward the Chinese population, of not yielding any real power to the governments, and of supporting several rival governments failed to make any of them a popular alternative to Chiang's government. Japan was also unwilling to negotiate directly with Chiang, nor was it willing to attempt to create splits in the Chinese united front.

Japanese strategic bombing efforts mostly targeted large Chinese cities such as Shanghai, Wuhan and Chonging, with around 5,000 raids from February 1938 to August 1943 in the later case. According to Jennifer M. Lind, "Japanese strategic bombing campaigns devastated Chinese cities, killing more than 260,000 noncombatants."

Tensions between Japan and the Western powers

In an effort to discourage Japanese militarism, Western powers including Australia, the United States, Britain, and the Dutch government in exile, which controlled the petroleum-rich Dutch East Indies, stopped selling iron ore, steel and oil to Japan, denying it the raw materials needed to continue its activities in China and French Indochina. In Japan, the government and nationalists viewed these embargos as acts of aggression; imported oil made up about 80% of domestic consumption, without which Japan's economy, let alone its military, would grind to a halt. The Japanese media, influenced by military propagandists, began to refer to the embargoes as the "ABCD ("American-British-Chinese-Dutch") encirclement" or "ABCD line".

Faced with a choice between economic collapse and withdrawal from its recent conquests (with its attendant loss of face), the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters began planning for a war with the western powers in April or May 1941.

The key objective was for the Southern Expeditionary Army Group to seize economic resources under the control of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, most notably those in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, known as the "Southern Plan". It was also decided—because of the close relationship between the UK and United States, and the (mistaken) belief the US would inevitably become involved—Japan would also require an "eastern plan".

The eastern plan required

initial attacks on the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, with carrier-based aircraft of the Combined Fleet, and

following this attack with

* seizure of the Philippines, and

* cutting the U.S. lines of communication by seizing Guam and Wake.

The southern plans called for:

attacking Malaya and Hong Kong, and

following with attacks against

* the Bismarck Archipelago,

* Java, and

* Sumatra.

isolating Australia and New Zealand

Following completion of these objectives, the strategy would turn defensive, primarily holding their newly acquired territory while hoping for a negotiated peace.

By November these plans were essentially complete, and were modified only slightly over the next month. Japanese military planners' expectation of success rested on the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union being unable to effectively respond to a Japanese attack because of the threat posed to each by Germany; the Soviet Union was even seen as unlikely to commence hostilities.

There is no evidence the Japanese planned to defeat the United States; the alternative would be negotiating for peace after their initial victories. In fact, the Imperial GHQ noted, should acceptable negotiations be reached with the Americans, the attacks were to be canceled—even if the order to attack had already been given.

They also planned, should the U.S. transfer its Pacific Fleet to the Philippines, to intercept and attack this fleet ''en route'' with the Combined Fleet, in keeping with all Japanese Navy prewar planning and doctrine.

Should the United States or Britain attack first, the plans further stipulated the military were to hold their positions and wait for orders from GHQ. The planners noted attacking the Philippines and Malaya still had possibilities of success, even in the worst case of a combined preemptive attack including Soviet forces.

German and Italian involvement

Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy both had limited involvement in the Pacific War. The German Navy (''Kriegsmarine'') and the Italian Royal Navy (''Regia Marina'') operated submarines and raiding ships in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Italians had access to "concession territory" naval bases in China, having been one of the Allies of World War I, while the Germans did not. After Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent declarations of war, both navies had access to Japanese naval facilities.

Japan attacks the Western Powers

On 7 December 1941 Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in the Attack on Pearl Harbor as well as Guam and Wake Island. The same day (8 December on the other side of the International Date Line), Japanese forces attacked the British crown colony of Hong Kong, (resulting in its occupation), invaded the U.S.-controlled Commonwealth of the Philippines, invaded Thailand from bases in French Indochina, and invaded Malaya through Thai territory.

Attack on Pearl Harbor

In the early hours of 7 December (Western Hemisphere time), Japan launched a major carrier-based air strike on Pearl Harbor, which knocked eight American battleships out of action. The Japanese had gambled the United States, when faced with such a sudden and massive defeat, would agree to a negotiated settlement and allow Japan free rein in Asia. This gamble did not pay off. American losses were less serious than initially thought: the American aircraft carriers, far more important than battleships, were at sea, and vital naval infrastructure (fuel oil tanks, shipyard facilities, and power station), submarine base, and signals intelligence units were unscathed. Japan's fallback strategy, relying on a war of attrition to make the U.S. come to terms, was beyond the IJN's capabilities.

When the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred, the U.S. was not officially at war anywhere in the world. The 800,000-member America First Committee vehemently opposed any American intervention in the European conflict, even as America sold military aid to Britain and the Soviet Union through the Lend-Lease program. Opposition to war in the U.S. vanished after the attack. On 8 December, the Netherlands declared war on Japan, followed by Australia the next day. Four days after Pearl Harbor, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy declared war on the United States, drawing the country into a two-theater war. This is widely agreed to be a grand strategic blunder, as it abrogated the benefit Germany gained by Japan's distraction of the U.S. (predicted months before in a memo by Commander Arthur McCollum) and the reduction in aid to Britain, which both Congress and Hitler had managed to avoid during over a year of mutual provocation, which would otherwise have resulted.

Japanese offensives, 1941–42

British, Australian and Dutch forces, already drained of personnel and matériel by two years of war with Germany, and heavily committed in the Middle East, North Africa and elsewhere, were unable to provide much more than token resistance to the battle-hardened Japanese. The Allies suffered many disastrous defeats in the first six months of the war. Two major British warships, and were sunk by a Japanese air attack off Malaya on 10 December 1941.

Thailand, with its territory already serving as a springboard for the Malayan campaign, surrendered within 24 hours of the Japanese invasion. The government of Thailand formally allied itself with Japan on 21 December.

Hong Kong was attacked on 8 December and fell on 25 December 1941, with Canadian forces and the Royal Hong Kong Volunteers playing an important part in the defense. U.S. bases on Guam and Wake Island were lost at around the same time.

Following the 1 January 1942 ''Declaration by United Nations'' (the first official use of the term United Nations), the Allied governments appointed the British General Sir Archibald Wavell to the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDACOM), a supreme command for Allied forces in South East Asia. This gave Wavell nominal control of a huge force, albeit thinly-spread over an area from Burma to the Philippines to northern Australia. Other areas, including India, Hawaii and the rest of Australia remained under separate local commands. On 15 January Wavell moved to Bandung in Java to assume control of ABDA Command (ABDACOM).

In January, Japan invaded Burma, the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and captured Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Rabaul. After being driven out of Malaya, Allied forces in Singapore attempted to resist the Japanese during the Battle of Singapore but surrendered to the Japanese on 15 February 1942; about 130,000 Indian, British, Australian and Dutch personnel became prisoners of war. The pace of conquest was rapid: Bali and Timor also fell in February. The rapid collapse of Allied resistance had left the "ABDA area" split in two. Wavell resigned from ABDACOM on 25 February, handing control of the ABDA Area to local commanders and returning to the post of Commander-in-Chief, India.

Meanwhile, Japanese aircraft had all but eliminated Allied air power in South-East Asia and were making attacks on northern Australia, beginning with a psychologically devastating (but militarily insignificant) attack on the city of Darwin on 19 February, which killed at least 243 people.

At the Battle of the Java Sea in late February and early March, the Japanese Navy inflicted a resounding defeat on the main ABDA naval force, under Admiral Karel Doorman. The Dutch East Indies campaign subsequently ended with the surrender of Allied forces on Java and Sumatra.

In March and April, a raid into the Indian Ocean by a powerful Imperial Japanese Navy aircraft carrier force resulted in a wave of major air raids against Ceylon and the sinking of a British aircraft carrier, , as well as other Allied ships and driving the British fleet out of the Indian Ocean. This paved the way for a Japanese assault on Burma and India.

The British, under intense pressure, made a fighting retreat from Rangoon to the Indo-Burmese border. This cut the Burma Road which was the western Allies' supply line to the Chinese Nationalists. Cooperation between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists had waned from its zenith at the Battle of Wuhan, and the relationship between the two had gone sour as both attempted to expand their area of operations in occupied territories. Most of the Nationalist guerrilla areas were eventually overtaken by the Communists. On the other hand, some Nationalist units were deployed to blockade the Communists and not the Japanese. Furthermore, many of the forces of the Chinese Nationalists were warlords allied to Chiang Kai-Shek, but not directly under his command. "Of the 1,200,000 troops under Chiang's control, only 650,000 were directly controlled by his generals, and another 550,000 controlled by warlords who claimed loyalty to his government; the strongest force was the Szechuan army of 320,000 men. The defeat of this army would do much to end Chiang's power." The Japanese exploited this lack of unity to press ahead in their offensives.

Filipino and U.S. forces resisted in the Philippines until 8 May 1942, when more than 80,000 soldiers were ordered to surrender. By this time, General Douglas MacArthur, who had been appointed Supreme Allied Commander South West Pacific, had retreated to the safer confines of Australia. The U.S. Navy, under Admiral Chester Nimitz, had responsibility for the rest of the Pacific Ocean. This divided command had unfortunate consequences for the commerce war, and consequently, the war itself.

Threat to Australia

In late 1941, as Japan struck at Pearl Harbor, most of Australia’s best forces were committed to the fight against Hitler in the Mediterranean Theatre. Australia was ill-prepared for an attack, lacking armaments, modern fighter aircraft, heavy bombers, and aircraft carriers. While still calling for reinforcements from Churchill, the Australian Prime Minister John Curtin called for American support with an historic announcement on 27 December 1941:

Australia had been shocked by the speedy collapse of British Malaya and Fall of Singapore in which around 15,000 Australian soldiers became prisoners of war. Curtin predicted that the "battle for Australia" would now follow. The Japanese established a major base in the Australian Territory of New Guinea in early 1942. On 19 February, Darwin suffered a devastating air raid, the first time the Australian mainland had been attacked. Over the following 19 months, Australia was attacked from the air almost 100 times.

Two battle-hardened Australian divisions were steaming from the Mid-East for Singapore. Churchill wanted them diverted to Burma, but Curtin insisted on a return to Australia. In early 1942 elements of the Imperial Japanese Navy proposed an invasion of Australia. The Japanese Army opposed the plan and it was rejected in favour of a policy of isolating Australia from the United States via blockade by advancing through the South Pacific. The Japanese decided upon a seaborne invasion of Port Moresby, capital of the Australian Territory of Papua which would put Northern Australia within bomber range of Japanese aircraft.

U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt ordered his commander in the Philippines, General Douglas MacArthur, to formulate a Pacific defence plan with Australia in March 1942. Curtin agreed to place Australian forces under the command of MacArthur, who became "Supreme Commander of the South West Pacific". MacArthur moved his headquarters to Melbourne in March 1942 and American troops began massing in Australia. Axis naval activity in Australian waters reached Sydney in late May 1942, when Japanese midget submarines launched a daring raid on Sydney Harbour. On 8 June 1942, two Japanese submarines briefly shelled Sydney's eastern suburbs and the city of Newcastle.

Allies re-group

|Franklin D. Roosevelt, 28 April 1942}}

In early 1942, the governments of smaller powers began to push for an inter-governmental Asia-Pacific war council, based in Washington, D.C.. A council was established in London, with a subsidiary body in Washington. However the smaller powers continued to push for a U.S.-based body. The Pacific War Council was formed in Washington, on 1 April 1942, with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his key advisor Harry Hopkins, and representatives from Britain, China, Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Canada. Representatives from India and the Philippines were later added. The council never had any direct operational control, and any decisions it made were referred to the U.S.-UK Combined Chiefs of Staff, which was also in Washington.

Allied resistance, at first symbolic, gradually began to stiffen. Australian and Dutch forces led civilians in a prolonged guerilla campaign in Portuguese Timor. The Doolittle Raid did minimal damage but was a huge morale booster for the Allies, especially the United States, and it caused repercussions throughout the Japanese military because they were sworn to protect the Japanese emperor and homeland, but did not shoot down a single bomber. The greatest effect of the raid, however, was that it caused the Japanese to launch the ultimately catastrophic assault on Midway.

Coral Sea and Midway: the turning point

By mid-1942, the Japanese Combined Fleet found itself holding a vast area, even though it lacked the aircraft carriers, aircraft, and aircrew to defend it, and the freighters, tankers, and destroyers necessary to sustain it. Moreover, Fleet doctrine was inadequate to execute the proposed "barrier" defence. Instead, they decided on additional attacks in both the south and central Pacific. While Yamamoto had used the element of surprise at Pearl Harbor, Allied codebreakers now turned the tables. They discovered an attack against Port Moresby, New Guinea, was imminent with intent to invade and conquer all of New Guinea. If Port Moresby fell, it would give Japan control of the seas to the immediate north of Australia. Nimitz rushed the carrier , under Admiral Fletcher, to join and an American-Australian task force, with orders to contest the Japanese advance. The resulting Battle of the Coral Sea, fought 4–8 May 1942, was the first naval battle in which ships involved never sighted each other and aircraft were solely used to attack opposing forces. Although ''Lexington'' was sunk and ''Yorktown'' seriously damaged, the Japanese lost the aircraft carrier , suffered extensive damage to and heavy losses to the air wing of (both missed the operation against Midway the following month), and saw the Moresby invasion force turn back. Even though Allied losses were heavier than Japanese, the Japanese attack on Port Moresby was thwarted and their invasion forces turned back, yielding a strategic victory for the Allies. Moreover, Japan lacked the capacity to replace losses in ships, planes and trained pilots. Destruction of U.S. carriers was Yamamoto's main objective, and he planned an operation to lure them to battle. After Coral Sea, he had four fleet carriers operational—, , and —and believed Nimitz had a maximum of two— and . was out of action, undergoing repair after a torpedo attack, while ''Yorktown'' sailed after three days' work to repair her flight deck and make essential repairs, with civilian work crews still aboard.

A large Japanese force was sent north to attack the Aleutian Islands, off Alaska. The next stage of Yamamoto's plan called for the capture of Midway Atoll, which would give him an opportunity to destroy Nimitz's remaining carriers; afterward, it would be turned into a major airbase, giving Japan control of the central Pacific. In May, Allied codebreakers discovered his intentions. Nagumo was again in tactical command but was focused on the invasion of Midway; Yamamoto's complex plan had no provision for intervention by Nimitz before the Japanese expected him. Planned surveillance of the U.S. fleet by long range seaplane did not happen (as a result of an abortive identical operation in March), so U.S. carriers were able to proceed to a flanking position on the approaching Japanese fleet without being detected. Nagumo had 272 planes operating from his four carriers, the U.S. 348 (of which 115 were land-based).

As anticipated by U.S. commanders, the Japanese fleet arrived off Midway on 4 June and was spotted by PBY patrol aircraft. Nagumo executed a first strike against Midway, while Fletcher launched his aircraft, bound for Nagumo's carriers. At 09:20 the first U.S carrier aircraft arrived, TBD Devastator torpedo bombers from ''Hornet'', but their attacks were poorly coordinated and ineffectual; they failed to score a single hit, and Zero fighters shot down all 15. At 09:35, 15 TBDs from ''Enterprise'' skimmed in over the water; 14 were shot down by Zeroes. Fletcher's attacks had been disorganized, yet succeeded in distracting Nagumo's defensive fighters. When U.S. dive bombers arrived, the Zeros could not offer any protection. In addition, Nagumo's four carriers had drifted out of formation, reducing the concentration of their anti-aircraft fire. His most-criticized error was twice changing his arming orders: he first held aircraft for shipping attack as a hedge against discovery of U.S. carriers, changed this based on reports an additional strike was needed against Midway, then again after sighting ''Yorktown'', wasting time and leaving his hangar decks crowded with refueling and rearming aircraft, and ordnance stowed outside the magazines. Yamamoto's dispositions, which left Nagumo with inadequate reconnaissance to detect (and therefore attack) Fletcher before he launched, are often ignored. When SBD Dauntlesses from ''Enterprise'' and ''Yorktown'' appeared at an altitude of , the Zeroes at sea level were unable to respond before the bombers pushed over. They scored a small number of significant hits; ''Sōryū'', ''Kaga'', and ''Akagi'' all caught fire. ''Hiryū'' survived this wave of attacks and launched an attack against the American carriers which caused severe damage to ''Yorktown'' (which was later finished off by a Japanese submarine). A second attack from the U.S. carriers a few hours later found and destroyed ''Hiryū''. Yamamoto had four additional small carriers, assigned to his scattered surface forces, all too slow to keep up with the ''Kido Butai'' and therefore never in action. Yamamoto's enormous superiority in gun power was irrelevant as the U.S. had air superiority at Midway and could refuse a surface gunfight (which, by remarkable good fortune, Spruance moved to avoid, based on a faulty submarine report); Yamamoto's flawed dispositions had made closing to engage after dark on 4 June impossible. Midway was a decisive victory for the U.S. Navy and the high point in Japanese aspirations in the Pacific.

New Guinea and the Solomons

Japanese land forces continued to advance in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. From July 1942, a few Australian reserve battalions, many of them very young and untrained, fought a stubborn rearguard action in New Guinea, against a Japanese advance along the Kokoda Track, towards Port Moresby, over the rugged Owen Stanley Ranges. The militia, worn out and severely depleted by casualties, were relieved in late August by regular troops from the Second Australian Imperial Force, returning from action in the Mediterranean theater. In early September 1942 Japanese marines attacked a strategic Royal Australian Air Force base at Milne Bay, near the eastern tip of New Guinea. They were beaten back by the Australian Army, which inflicted the first outright defeat on Japanese land forces since 1939.

Guadalcanal

At the same time as major battles raged in New Guinea, Allied forces identified a Japanese airfield under construction at Guadalcanal. In August 16,000 Allied infantry—primarily US Marines—made an amphibious landing to capture the airfield.

Japanese and Allied forces occupied various parts of the island. Over the following six months, both sides fed resources into an escalating battle of attrition on the island, at sea, and in the sky. Most of the Japanese aircraft in the South Pacific were drafted into the Japanese defence of Guadalcanal, facing Allied air forces based at Henderson Field. Japanese ground forces launched attacks on US positions around Henderson Field, suffering high casualties. These offensives were resupplied by Japanese convoys known to the Allies as the "Tokyo Express", which often faced night battles with the Allied navies, and expended destroyers IJN could ill-afford to lose. Later fleet battles involving heavier ships and even daytime carrier battles resulted in a stretch of water near Guadalcanal becoming known as "Ironbottom Sound", from the severe losses to both sides. However, only the US Navy could quickly replace and repair its losses. The Allies were victorious on Guadalcanal in February 1943.

Allied advances in New Guinea and the Solomons

By late 1942, the Japanese were also retreating along the Kokoda Track in the highlands of New Guinea. Australian and U.S. counteroffensives culminated in the capture of the key Japanese beachhead in eastern New Guinea, the Buna-Gona area, in early 1943.

In June 1943, the Allies launched Operation Cartwheel, which defined their offensive strategy in the South Pacific. The operation was aimed at isolating the major Japanese forward base, at Rabaul, and cutting its supply and communication lines. This prepared the way for Nimitz's island-hopping campaign towards Japan.

Stalemate in China and South-East Asia

In the aftermath of the Japanese conquest of Burma, there was widespread disorder in eastern India, and a disastrous famine in Bengal, which ultimately caused up to 3 million deaths. In spite of these, and inadequate lines of communication, British and Indian forces attempted limited counter-attacks in Burma in early 1943. An offensive in Arakan failed, while a long distance raid mounted by the Chindits under Brigadier Orde Wingate suffered heavy losses, but was publicized to bolster Allied morale. It also provoked the Japanese to mount major offensives themselves the following year.

In August 1943 the Allies formed a new South East Asia Command (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for Burma and India from the British India Command, under Wavell. In October 1943 Winston Churchill appointed Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as its Supreme Commander. The British and Indian Fourteenth Army was formed to face the Japanese in Burma. Under Lieutenant General William Slim, its training, morale and health greatly improved. The American General Joseph Stilwell, who also was deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded U.S. forces in the China Burma India Theater, directed aid to China and prepared to construct the Ledo Road to link India and China by land.

On 22 November 1943 U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and ROC Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, met in Cairo, Egypt, to discuss a strategy to defeat Japan. The meeting was also known as Cairo Conference and concluded with the Cairo Declaration.

Allied offensives, 1943–44

Midway proved to be the last great naval battle for two years. The United States used the ensuing period to turn its vast industrial potential into actual ships, planes, and trained aircrew. At the same time, Japan, lacking an adequate industrial base or technological strategy, a good aircrew training program, or adequate naval resources and commerce defense, fell further and further behind. In strategic terms the Allies began a long movement across the Pacific, seizing one island base after another. Not every Japanese stronghold had to be captured; some, like Truk, Rabaul, and Formosa, were neutralized by air attack and bypassed. The goal was to get close to Japan itself, then launch massive strategic air attacks, improve the submarine blockade, and finally (only if necessary) execute an invasion.

In November 1943 U.S. Marines sustained high casualties when they overwhelmed the 4,500-strong garrison at Tarawa. This helped the Allies to improve the techniques of amphibious landings, learning from their mistakes and implementing changes such as thorough pre-emptive bombings and bombardment, more careful planning regarding tides and landing craft schedules, and better overall coordination.

The U.S. Navy did not seek out the Japanese fleet for a decisive battle, as Mahanian doctrine would suggest (and as Japan hoped); the Allied advance could only be stopped by a Japanese naval attack, which oil shortages (induced by submarine attack) made impossible.

Submarine warfare

US submarines, as well as some British and Dutch vessels, operating from bases at Cavite, in the Philippines (1941–42) Fremantle and Brisbane in Australia; Pearl Harbor; Trincomalee, Ceylon; Midway; and later Guam, played a major role in defeating Japan. This was the case even though submarines made up a small proportion of the Allied navies—less than two percent in the case of the US Navy. Submarines strangled Japan by sinking its merchant fleet, intercepting many troop transports, and cutting off nearly all the oil imports essential to weapons production and military operations. By early 1945 the oil tanks were dry. The Japanese military claimed its defenses sank 468 Allied subs. Only 42 US submarines were sunk in the Pacific, with 10 others going down in accidents or as the result of friendly fire.

US submarines accounted for 56% of the Japanese merchantmen sunk; most of the rest were destroyed by mines or aircraft. US submariners also claimed 28% of Japanese warships destroyed. Furthermore, they played important reconnaissance roles, as at the battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf (and, coincidentally, at Midway), when they gave accurate and timely warning of the approach of the Japanese fleet. Submarines also rescued hundreds of downed fliers.

The Allied submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within hours of Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt ordered a new doctrine into effect: unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. This meant sinking any warship, commercial vessel, or passenger ship in Axis controlled waters, without warning and without help to survivors. Allied submarine bases were well-protected by surface fleets and aircraft.

While Japan had a large number of submarines, they did not make a significant impact on the war. In 1942, the Japanese fleet subs performed well, knocking out or damaging many Allied warships. However, Imperial Japanese Navy (and pre-war US) doctrine stipulated naval campaigns are won only by fleet battles, not ''guerre de course'' (commerce raiding). So, while the US had an unusually long supply line between its west coast and frontline areas, and was vulnerable to submarine attack, Japan's submarines were instead primarily used for long range reconnaissance and only occasionally attacked US supply lines. The Japanese submarine offensive against Australia in 1942 and 1943 also achieved little. As the war turned against Japan, IJN submarines were increasingly used to resupply strongholds which had been cut off, such as Truk and Rabaul. In addition, Japan honored its neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union and ignored US freighters shipping millions of tons of war supplies from San Francisco to Vladivostok much to the consternation of its German ally.

The US Navy, by contrast, relied on commerce raiding from the outset. However, the problem of Allied forces surrounded in the Philippines, during the early part of 1942, led to diversion of boats to "guerrilla submarine" missions. As well, basing in Australia placed boats under Japanese aerial threat while ''en route'' to patrol areas, inhibiting effectiveness, and Nimitz relied on submarines for close surveillance of enemy bases. Furthermore, the standard issue Mark 14 torpedo and its Mark VI exploder were both defective, problems not corrected until September 1943. Worst of all, before the war, an uninformed US Customs officer had seized a copy of the Japanese merchant marine code (called the "''maru'' code" in the USN), not knowing the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) had broken it. The Japanese government promptly changed it, and the new code was not broken again until 1943.

Thus, it was not until 1944 the US Navy began to use its 150 submarines to maximum effect: effective shipboard radar was installed, commanders lacking in aggression were replaced, and faults in torpedoes were fixed. Japanese commerce protection was "shiftless beyond description," and convoys were poorly organised and defended compared to Allied ones, a product of flawed IJN doctrine and training — errors concealed by American faults as much as Japanese overconfidence. The number of U.S. submarines patrols (and sinkings) rose steeply: 350 patrols (180 ships sunk) in 1942, 350 (335) in 1943, and 520 (603) in 1944. By 1945, sinkings had decreased because so few targets dared to move on the high seas. In all, Allied submarines destroyed 1,200 merchant ships for about five million tons of shipping. Most were small cargo carriers, but 124 were tankers bringing desperately needed oil from the East Indies. Another 320 were passenger ships and troop transports. At critical stages of the Guadalcanal, Saipan, and Leyte campaigns, thousands of Japanese troops were killed or diverted before they arrived where they were needed. Over 200 warships were sunk, ranging from many auxiliaries and destroyers to one battleship and no fewer than eight carriers. Underwater warfare was especially dangerous; of the 16,000 Americans who went out on patrol, 3,500 (22%) never returned, the highest casualty rate of any American force in World War II. The Japanese losses, 130 submarines in all, were even higher.

A single German submarine, ''U-862'', operated in the Pacific Ocean during the war, patrolling off the Australian east coast and New Zealand in December 1944 and January 1945. It sank one ship in the Pacific before it was recalled to Batavia.

Japanese Naval and Merchant Marine losses 1941-1945 can be found here at. US Submarine claims of sunk/damaged ships 1941-1945 can be found at. The Joint Army Navy Assessment Committee has assessed US Submarine credits.

Japanese counteroffensives in China, 1944

In mid-1944, Japan launched a massive invasion across China, under the code name Operation Ichi-Go. These attacks, the biggest in several years, gained much ground for Japan before they were stopped in Guangxi.

Japanese offensive in India 1944

After the Allied setbacks in 1943, the South East Asia command was preparing to launch offensives into Burma on several fronts. In the first months of 1944, the Chinese and American troops of the Northern Combat Area Command, commanded by the American Joseph Stilwell, began extending the Ledo Road from India into northern Burma, while the XV Corps began an advance along the coast in the Arakan province. In February, the Japanese mounted a local counter-attack in the Arakan. After early success, this counter-attack was defeated when the Indian divisions of XV Corps stood firm, and relied on aircraft to drop supplies to isolated forward units until they could be relieved by reserve divisions.

The Japanese response to the Allied attacks was to launch an offensive of their own into India, across the mountainous and densely-forested frontier. This attack, codenamed Operation U-Go, was advocated by Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi, the recently promoted commander of the Japanese Fifteenth Army, and was permitted to proceed by Imperial General Headquarters, despite misgivings at several intervening headquarters. The offensive was launched in mid-March. Although several units of the British Fourteenth Army were forced to fight their way out of encirclement, by early April they had concentrated around Imphal in Manipur state. A Japanese division which had advanced to Kohima in Nagaland cut the main road to Imphal, but failed to capture the whole of the defences at Kohima. During April, the Japanese attacks against Imphal failed, while fresh Allied formations drove the Japanese from the positions they had captured at Kohima.

As many Japanese had feared, their supply arrangements were inadequate to maintain their forces. Once Mutaguchi's hopes for an early victory were thwarted, his troops, particularly those at Kohima, starved. During May, while Mutaguchi continued to order attacks, the Allies were advancing southwards from Kohima and northwards from Imphal. The two Allied attacks met on 22 June, breaking the Japanese siege of Imphal. The Japanese finally broke off the operation on 3 July. They had lost over 50,000 troops, mainly to starvation and disease. It was the worst defeat suffered by the Japanese Army to that date.

Although the advance in the Arakan had been halted to release troops and aircraft for the Battle of Imphal, the Americans and Chinese had continued to advance in northern Burma, aided by the Chindits operating against the Japanese lines of communication. By the time campaigning ceased during the monsoon rains, the Americans had secured a vital airfield at Myitkyina, which eased the problems of the air resupply to China over The Hump.

Beginning of the end in the Pacific, 1944

Saipan and Philippine Sea

On 15 June 1944, 535 ships began landing 128,000 U.S. Army and Marine personnel on the island of Saipan. The Allied objective was the creation of airfields within B-29 range of Tokyo. The ability to plan and execute such a complex operation in the space of 90 days was indicative of Allied logistical superiority.

It was imperative for Japanese commanders to hold Saipan. The only way to do this was to destroy the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which had 15 fleet carriers and 956 planes, 7 battleships, 28 submarines, and 69 destroyers, as well as several light and heavy cruisers. Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa attacked with nine-tenths of Japan's fighting fleet, which included nine carriers with 473 planes, 5 battleships, several cruisers, and 28 destroyers. Ozawa's pilots were outnumbered 2:1 and their aircraft were becoming or were already obsolete. The Japanese had considerable antiaircraft defenses but lacked proximity fuzes or good radar. With the odds against him, Ozawa devised an appropriate strategy. His planes had greater range because they were not weighed down with protective armor; they could attack at about 480 km (300 mi), and could search a radius of 900 km (560 mi). U.S. Navy Hellcat fighters could only attack within and only search within a radius. Ozawa planned to use this advantage by positioning his fleet out. The Japanese planes would hit the U.S. carriers, land at Guam to refuel, then hit the enemy again when returning to their carriers. Ozawa also counted on about 500 land-based planes at Guam and other islands.

Admiral Raymond A. Spruance was in overall command of Fifth Fleet. The Japanese plan would have failed if the much larger U.S. fleet had closed on Ozawa and attacked aggressively; Ozawa correctly inferred Spruance would not attack. U.S. Admiral Marc Mitscher, in tactical command of Task Force 58, with its 15 carriers, was aggressive but Spruance vetoed Mitscher's plan to hunt down Ozawa because Spruance's orders made protecting the landings on Saipan his first priority.

The forces converged in the largest sea battle of World War II up to that point. Over the previous month American destroyers had destroyed 17 of 25 submarines out of Ozawa's screening force. Repeated U.S. raids destroyed the Japanese land-based planes. Ozawa's main attack lacked coordination, with the Japanese planes arriving at their targets in a staggered sequence. Following a directive from Nimitz, the U.S. carriers all had combat information centers, which interpreted the flow of radar data and radioed interception orders to the Hellcats. The result was later dubbed the ''Great Marianas Turkey Shoot''. The few attackers to reach the U.S. fleet encountered massive AA fire with proximity fuzes. Only one American warship was slightly damaged.

On the second day, U.S. reconnaissance planes located Ozawa's fleet, away, and submarines sank two Japanese carriers. Mitscher launched 230 torpedo planes and dive bombers. He then discovered the enemy was actually another further off, out of aircraft range (based on a roundtrip flight). Mitscher decided this chance to destroy the Japanese fleet was worth the risk of aircraft losses due to running out of fuel on the return flight. Overall, the U.S. lost 130 planes and 76 aircrew; however, Japan lost 450 planes, three carriers, and 445 aircrew. The Imperial Japanese Navy's carrier force was effectively destroyed.

Leyte Gulf 1944

The Battle of Leyte Gulf was arguably the largest naval battle in history. It was a series of four distinct engagements fought off the Philippine island of Leyte from 23 to 26 October 1944. Leyte Gulf featured the largest battleships ever built, was the last time in history that battleships engaged each other, and was also notable as the first time that kamikaze aircraft were used. Allied victory in the Philippine Sea established Allied air and sea superiority in the western Pacific. Nimitz favored blockading the Philippines and landing on Formosa. This would give the Allies control of the sea routes to Japan from southern Asia, cutting off substantial Japanese garrisons. MacArthur favoured an invasion of the Philippines, which also lay across the supply lines to Japan. Roosevelt adjudicated in favor of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Japanese Combined Fleet Chief Toyoda Soemu prepared four plans to cover all Allied offensive scenarios. On 12 October Nimitz launched a carrier raid against Formosa to make sure that planes based there could not intervene in the landings on Leyte. Soemu put Plan ''Sho-2'' into effect, launching a series of air attacks against the U.S. carriers. However the Japanese lost 600 planes in three days, leaving them without air cover.

''Sho-1'' called for V. Adm. Jisaburo Ozawa's force to use an apparently vulnerable carrier force to lure the U.S. 3rd Fleet away from Leyte and remove air cover from the Allied landing forces, which would then be attacked from the west by three Japanese forces: V. Adm. Takeo Kurita's force would enter Leyte Gulf and attack the landing forces; R. Adm. Shoji Nishimura's force and V. Adm. Kiyohide Shima's force would act as mobile strike forces. The plan was likely to result in the destruction of one or more of the Japanese forces, but Toyoda justified it by saying that there would be no sense in saving the fleet and losing the Philippines.

Kurita's "Center Force" consisted of five battleships, 12 cruisers and 13 destroyers. It included the two largest battleships ever built: and . As they passed Palawan Island after midnight on 23 October the force was spotted, and U.S. submarines sank two cruisers. On 24 October, as Kurita's force entered the Sibuyan Sea, and USS ''Cabot '' launched 260 planes, which scored hits on several ships. A second wave of planes scored many direct hits on ''Musashi''. A third wave, from and hit ''Musashi'' with 11 bombs and eight torpedoes. Kurita retreated but in the evening turned around to head for San Bernardino Strait. ''Musashi'' sank at about 19:30.

Meanwhile, V. Adm. Onishi Takijiro had directed his First Air Fleet, 80 land-based planes, against U.S. carriers, whose planes were attacking airfields on Luzon. The carrier was hit by an armour-piercing bomb and suffered a major explosion which killed 108 crew (out of 1,569) and 80 on a cruiser which was fire-fighting alongside. ''Princeton'' sank, and the cruiser was forced to retire.

Nishimura's force consisted of two battleships, one cruiser and four destroyers. Because they were observing radio silence, Nishimura was unable to synchronise with Shima and Kurita. Nishimura and Shima had failed to even coordinate their plans before the attacks — they were long-time rivals and neither wished to have anything to do with the other. When he entered the narrow Surigao Strait at about 02:00, Shima was 22 miles (40 km) behind him, and Kurita was still in the Sibuyan Sea, several hours from the beaches at Leyte. As they passed Panaon Island, Nishimura's force ran into a trap set for them by the U.S.-Australian 7th Fleet Support Force. R. Adm. Jesse Oldendorf had six battleships, four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, 29 destroyers and 39 PT boats. To pass the strait and reach the landings, Nishimura had to run the gauntlet. At about 03:00 the Japanese battleship and three destroyers were hit by torpedoes and ''Fuso'' broke in two. At 03:50 the U.S. battleships opened fire. Radar fire control meant they could hit targets from a much greater distance than the Japanese. The battleship , a cruiser and a destroyer were crippled by 16-inch (406 mm) shells; ''Yamashiro'' sank at 04:19. Only one of Nishimura's force of seven ships survived the engagement. At 04:25 Shima's force of two cruisers and eight destroyers reached the battle. Seeing ''Fuso'' and believing her to be the wrecks of two battleships, Shima ordered a retreat.

Ozawa's "Northern Force" had four aircraft carriers, two obsolete battleships partly converted to carriers, three cruisers and nine destroyers. The carriers had only 108 planes. The force was not spotted by the Allies until 16:40 on 24 October. At 20:00 Soemu ordered all remaining Japanese forces to attack. Halsey saw an opportunity to destroy the remnants of the Japanese carrier force. The U.S. Third Fleet was formidable — nine large carriers, eight light carriers, six battleships, 17 cruisers, 63 destroyers and 1,000 planes — and completely outgunned Ozawa's force. Halsey's ships set out in pursuit of Ozawa just after midnight. U.S. commanders ignored reports that Kurita had turned back towards San Bernardino Strait. They had taken the bait set by Ozawa. On the morning of 25 October Ozawa launched 75 planes. Most were shot down by U.S. fighter patrols. By 08:00 U.S. fighters had destroyed the screen of Japanese fighters and were hitting ships. By evening, they had sunk the carriers , , and , and a destroyer. The fourth carrier, and a cruiser were disabled and later sank.

Kurita passed through San Bernardino Strait at 03:00 on 25 October and headed along the coast of Samar. The only thing standing in his path were three groups (Taffy 1, 2 and 3) of the Seventh Fleet, commanded by Admiral Thomas Kinkaid. Each group had six escort carriers, with a total of more than 500 planes, and seven or eight destroyers or destroyer escorts (DE). Kinkaid still believed that Lee's force was guarding the north, so the Japanese had the element of surprise when they attacked Taffy 3 at 06:45. Kurita mistook the Taffy carriers for large fleet carriers and thought he had the whole Third Fleet in his sights. Since escort carriers stood little chance against a battleship, Adm. Clifton Sprague directed the carriers of Taffy 3 to turn and flee eastward, hoping that bad visibility would reduce the accuracy of Japanese gunfire, and used his destroyers to divert the Japanese battleships. The destroyers made harassing torpedo attacks against the Japanese. For ten minutes ''Yamato'' was caught up in evasive action. Two U.S. destroyers and a DE were sunk, but they had bought enough time for the Taffy groups to launch planes. Taffy 3 turned and fled south, with shells scoring hits on some of its carriers and sinking one of them. The superior speed of the Japanese force allowed it to draw closer and fire on the other two Taffy groups. However, at 09:20 Kurita suddenly turned and retreated north. Signals had disabused him of the notion that he was attacking the Third Fleet, and the longer Kurita continued to engage, the greater the risk of major air strikes. Destroyer attacks had broken the Japanese formations, shattering tactical control, and two of Kurita's heavy cruisers had been sunk. The Japanese retreated through the San Bernardino Strait, under continuous air attack. The Battle of Leyte Gulf was over.

The battle secured the beachheads of the U.S. Sixth Army on Leyte against attack from the sea, broke the back of Japanese naval power and opened the way for an advance to the Ryukyu Islands in 1945. The only significant Japanese naval operation afterwards was the disastrous Operation Ten-Go, in April 1945. Kurita's force had begun the battle with five battleships; when he returned to Japan, only ''Yamato'' was combat-worthy. Nishimura's sunken ''Yamashiro'' was the last battleship in history to engage another in combat.

Philippines, 1944–45

On 20 October 1944 the U.S. Sixth Army, supported by naval and air bombardment, landed on the favorable eastern shore of Leyte, north of Mindanao. The U.S. Sixth Army continued its advance from the east, as the Japanese rushed reinforcements to the Ormoc Bay area on the western side of the island. While the Sixth Army was reinforced successfully, the U.S. Fifth Air Force was able to devastate the Japanese attempts to resupply. In torrential rains and over difficult terrain, the advance continued across Leyte and the neighboring island of Samar to the north. On 7 December U.S. Army units landed at Ormoc Bay and, after a major land and air battle, cut off the Japanese ability to reinforce and supply Leyte. Although fierce fighting continued on Leyte for months, the U.S. Army was in control.

On 15 December 1944 landings against minimal resistance were made on the southern beaches of the island of Mindoro, a key location in the planned Lingayen Gulf operations, in support of major landings scheduled on Luzon. On 9 January 1945, on the south shore of Lingayen Gulf on the western coast of Luzon, General Krueger's Sixth Army landed his first units. Almost 175,000 men followed across the twenty-mile (32 km) beachhead within a few days. With heavy air support, Army units pushed inland, taking Clark Field, northwest of Manila, in the last week of January.

Two more major landings followed, one to cut off the Bataan Peninsula, and another, that included a parachute drop, south of Manila. Pincers closed on the city and, on 3 February 1945, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division pushed into the northern outskirts of Manila and the 8th Cavalry passed through the northern suburbs and into the city itself.

As the advance on Manila continued from the north and the south, the Bataan Peninsula was rapidly secured. On 16 February paratroopers and amphibious units assaulted the island fortress of Corregidor, and resistance ended there on 27 February.

In all, ten U.S. divisions and five independent regiments battled on Luzon, making it the largest campaign of the Pacific war, involving more troops than the United States had used in North Africa, Italy, or southern France. Of the 250,000 Japanese troops defending Luzon, 80 percent died.

Palawan Island, between Borneo and Mindoro, the fifth largest and western-most Philippine Island, was invaded on 28 February with landings of the Eighth Army at Puerto Princesa. The Japanese put up little direct defence of Palawan, but cleaning up pockets of Japanese resistance lasted until late April, as the Japanese used their common tactic of withdrawing into the mountain jungles, dispersed as small units. Throughout the Philippines, U.S. forces were aided by Filipino guerrillas to find and dispatch the holdouts.

The U.S. Eighth Army then moved on to its first landing on Mindanao (17 April), the last of the major Philippine Islands to be taken. Mindanao was followed by invasion and occupation of Panay, Cebu, Negros and several islands in the Sulu Archipelago. These islands provided bases for the U.S. Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces to attack targets throughout the Philippines and the South China Sea.

==Final stages==

Allied offensives in Burma, 1944–45

In late 1944 and early 1945, the Allied South East Asia Command launched offensives into Burma, intending to recover most of the country, including Rangoon, the capital, before the onset of the monsoon in May.

The Indian XV Corps advanced along the coast in Arakan province, at last capturing Akyab Island after failures in the two previous years. They then landed troops behind the retreating Japanese, inflicting heavy casualties, and captured Ramree Island and Cheduba Island off the coast, establishing airfields on them which were used to support the offensive into Central Burma.

The Northern Combat Area Command resumed its advance in northern Burma, and in late January 1945, they linked up with Chinese armies attacking westwards from Yunnan province. The Ledo Road was completed, linking India and China, but too late in the war to have any significant effect.

The Japanese Burma Area Army attempted to forestall the main Allied attack on the central part of the front by withdrawing their troops behind the Irrawaddy River. Lieutenant General Heitarō Kimura, the new Japanese commander in Burma, hoped that the Allies' lines of communications would be overstretched trying to cross this obstacle. However, the advancing British Fourteenth Army under Lieutenant General William Slim switched its axis of advance to outflank the main Japanese armies.

During February, Fourteenth Army secured bridgeheads across the Irrawaddy on a broad front. On 1 March, units of IV Corps captured the supply centre of Meiktila, throwing the Japanese into disarray. While the Japanese attempted to recapture Meiktila, XXXIII Corps captured Mandalay. The Japanese armies were heavily defeated, and with the capture of Mandalay, the Burmese population and the Burma National Army which the Japanese had raised, turned against the Japanese.

During April, Fourteenth Army advanced south towards Rangoon, the capital and principal port of Burma, but was delayed by Japanese rearguards north of Rangoon at the end of the month. Slim feared that the Japanese would defend Rangoon house-to-house during the monsoon, placing his army in a disastrous supply situation, and in March he had asked that a plan to capture Rangoon by an amphibious force, Operation Dracula, which had been abandoned earlier, be reinstated. ''Dracula'' was launched on 1 May, but Rangoon was found to have been abandoned. The troops which occupied Rangoon linked up with Fourteenth Army five days later, securing the Allies' lines of communication.

The Japanese forces which had been bypassed by the Allied advances attempted to break out across the Sittang River during June and July to rejoin the Burma Area Army which had regrouped in Tenasserim in southern Burma. They suffered 10,000 casualties, half their strength. Overall, the Japanese lost some 150,000 men in Burma. Only 1,700 prisoners were taken.

The Allies were preparing to make amphibious landings in Malaya when word of the Japanese surrender arrived.

Liberation of Borneo

The Borneo Campaign of 1945 was the last major campaign in the South West Pacific Area. In a series of amphibious assaults between 1 May and 21 July, the Australian I Corps, under General Leslie Morshead, attacked Japanese forces occupying the island. Allied naval and air forces, centred on the U.S. 7th Fleet under Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, the Australian First Tactical Air Force and the U.S. Thirteenth Air Force also played important roles in the campaign.

The campaign opened with a landing on the small island of Tarakan on 1 May. This was followed on 1 June by simultaneous assaults in the north west, on the island of Labuan and the coast of Brunei. A week later the Australians attacked Japanese positions in North Borneo. The attention of the Allies then switched back to the central east coast, with the last major amphibious assault of World War II, at Balikpapan on 1 July.

Although the campaign was criticised in Australia at the time, and in subsequent years, as pointless or a "waste" of the lives of soldiers, it did achieve a number of objectives, such as increasing the isolation of significant Japanese forces occupying the main part of the Dutch East Indies, capturing major oil supplies and freeing Allied prisoners of war, who were being held in deteriorating conditions. At one of the very worst sites, around Sandakan in Borneo, only six of some 2,500 British and Australian prisoners survived.

Landings in the Japanese home islands

Hard-fought battles on the Japanese home islands of Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and others resulted in horrific casualties on both sides but finally produced a Japanese defeat. Of the 117,000 Japanese troops defending Okinawa, 94 percent died. Faced with the loss of most of their experienced pilots, the Japanese increased their use of kamikaze tactics in an attempt to create unacceptably high casualties for the Allies. The U.S. Navy proposed to force a Japanese surrender through a total naval blockade and air raids.

Towards the end of the war as the role of strategic bombing became more important, a new command for the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific was created to oversee all U.S. strategic bombing in the hemisphere, under United States Army Air Forces General Curtis LeMay. Japanese industrial production plunged as nearly half of the built-up areas of 64 cities were destroyed by B-29 firebombing raids. On 9–10 March 1945 alone, about 100,000 people were killed in a fire storm caused by an attack on Tokyo. In addition, LeMay also oversaw Operation Starvation, in which the inland waterways of Japan were extensively mined by air, which disrupted the small amount of remaining Japanese coastal sea traffic.

Soviet invasion and the Atomic bomb

On 3 February 1945 the Soviet Union agreed with Roosevelt to enter the Pacific conflict. It promised to act 90 days after the war ended in Europe and did so exactly on schedule on 9 August by invading Manchuria. A battle-hardened, one million-strong Soviet force, transferred from Europe, attacked Japanese forces in Manchuria and quickly defeated the Japanese ''Kantōgun'' (Kwantung Army group).

On 6 August 1945, the B-29 ''Enola Gay'' dropped an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, in the first nuclear attack in history. On 9 August another was dropped on Nagasaki. This was the last nuclear attack. More than 240,000 people died as a direct result of these two bombings. The necessity of the atomic bombings has long been debated, with detractors claiming that a naval blockade and bombing campaign had already made invasion, hence the atomic bomb, unnecessary. However, other scholars have argued that the bombings did obviate invasion, including a planned Soviet invasion of Hokkaidō, or a prolonged blockade and bombing campaign, any of which may have exacted even higher casualties among Japanese civilians.

Surrender

The effects of the "Twin Shocks"—the Soviet entry and the atomic bombing—were profound. On 10 August the "sacred decision" was made by Japanese Cabinet to accept the Potsdam terms on one condition: the "prerogative of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler". At noon on 15 August, after the American government's intentionally ambiguous reply, stating that the "authority" of the emperor "shall be subject to" the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers", the Emperor broadcast to the nation and to the world at large the rescript of surrender, ending the Second World War.

"Should We continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization." -Emperor Hirohito.

In Japan, 14 August is considered to be the day that the Pacific War ended. However, as Imperial Japan actually surrendered on 15 August, this day became known in the English-speaking countries as "V-J Day" (Victory in Japan). The formal Instrument of Surrender was signed on 2 September 1945, on the battleship , in Tokyo Bay. The surrender was accepted by General Douglas MacArthur as "Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, with representatives of several Allied nations, from a Japanese delegation led by Mamoru Shigemitsu and Yoshijiro Umezu.

Following this period, MacArthur went to Tokyo to oversee the postwar development of the country. This period in Japanese history is known as the occupation.

War crimes

Japanese soldiers killed millions of civilians and prisoners of war from surrounding nations. At least 20 million Chinese died during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). Unit 731 was one example of wartime atrocities committed on a civilian population during World War II, where experiments were performed on thousands of Chinese civilians and Allied prisoners of war. In military campaigns, the Japanese army used biological weapons on Chinese, killing around 400,000 Chinese civilians. The Rape of Nanking is another example of atrocity committed by Japanese soldiers on a civilian population.

According to the findings of the Tokyo tribunal, the death rate of Western prisoners was 27.1%, seven times that of POWs under the Germans and Italians. The most notorious use of forced labour was in the construction of the Burma–Thailand Death Railway. A widely publicised example of institutionalised sexual slavery are "comfort women", a euphemism for the 200,000 women who served in the Japanese army's camps during World War II. Some 35 Dutch comfort women brought a successful case before the Batavia Military Tribunal in 1948. To this day, Japan still denies these war crimes as Prime Minister Shinzō Abe claimed "The fact is, there is no evidence to prove there was coercion."

The Three Alls Policy (''Sankō Sakusen'') was a Japanese scorched earth policy adopted in China, the three alls being: ''"Kill All, Burn All and Loot All"''. Initiated in 1940 by Ryūkichi Tanaka, the ''Sankō Sakusen'' was implemented in full scale in 1942 in north China by Yasuji Okamura. According to historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta, the scorched earth campaign was responsible for the deaths of "more than 2.7 million" Chinese civilians.

Pacific War campaigns

(Flags indicate the country, or countries, taking the offensive.)

Second Sino-Japanese war

Before 1941 and inclusion in the Pacific War : 1937-07-07 – 1937-07-09 Marco Polo Bridge Incident 1937-08-13 – 1937-11-26 Battle of Shanghai 1937-09-01 – 1937-11-09 Battle of Taiyuan 1937-12-09 – 1938-01-31 Battle of Nanjing 1938-03-24 – 1938-05-01 Battle of Xuzhou 1938-06-11 – 1938-10-27 Battle of Wuhan 1939-03-17 – 1939-05-09 Battle of Nanchang 1939-04-20 - 1939-05-24 Battle of Suixian-Zaoyang 1939-09-13 - 1939-10-08 Battle of Changsha (1939) 1939-11-15 - 1940-11-30 Battle of South Guangxi 1940-05-01 - 1940-06-18 Battle of Zaoyang-Yichang 1941-01-30 - 1941-03-01 Battle of South Henan 1941-03-14 - 1941-04-09 Battle of Shanggao 1941-05-07 – 1941-05-27 Battle of South Shanxi 1941-09-06 - 1941-10-08 Battle of Changsha (1941) After inclusion in the Pacific War : 1941-02-24 - 1942-01-15 Battle of Changsha (1942) 1942-05-14 - 1942-09-07 Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign 1943-05-12 - 1943-06-03 Battle of West Hubei 1943-11-02 - 1943-12-20 Battle of Changde 1944-04-17 - 1944-12-10 Operation Ichi-Go 1945-04-09 - 1945-06-07 Battle of West Hunan

Franco-Thai War

October 1940 – 9 May 1941

Soviet-Japanese Border Wars

1938-07-29 – 1938-08-11 Battle of Lake Khasan

1939-05-11 – 1939-09-16 Battle of Khalkhin Gol

Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia and Pacific

1940-09-22 Invasion of French Indochina 1941-12-07 (12-08 Asian Time) Attack on Pearl Harbor 1941-12-08 Japanese Invasion of Thailand 1941-12-08 Battle of Guam (1941)

1941-12-07 Japan declares war on the United States and the United Kingdom; 1941-12-08 The United States and the United Kingdom declare war on Japan

1941-12-08 – 1941-12-25 Battle of Hong Kong 1941-12-08 – 1942-01-31 Malayan Campaign 1941-12-10 Sinking of and 1941-12-11 – 1941-12-24 Battle of Wake Island 1941-12-16 – 1942-04-01 Battle of Borneo (1941–42) 1941-12-22 – 1942-05-06 Battle of the Philippines

1942-01-01 – 1945-10-25 Transport of POWs via hell ships

1942-01-11 – 1942-01-12 Battle of Tarakan 1942-01-23 Battle of Rabaul (1942) 1942-01-24 Battle of Balikpapan (1942)

1942-01-25 Thailand declares war on the Allies

1942-01-30 – 1942-02-03 Battle of Ambon 1942-01-30 – 1942-02-15 Battle of Singapore 1942-02-04 Battle of Makassar Strait 1942-02-14 – 1942-02-15 Battle of Palembang 1942-02-19 Air raids on Darwin, Australia 1942-02-19 – 1942-02-20 Battle of Badung Strait 1942-02-19 – 1943-02-10 Battle of Timor (1942-43) 1942-02-27 – 1942-03-01 Battle of the Java Sea 1942-03-01 Battle of Sunda Strait 1942-03-01 – 1942-03-09 Battle of Java 1942-03-31 Battle of Christmas Island 1942-03-31 – 1942-04-10 Indian Ocean raid

1942-04-09 Bataan Death March begins

1942-04-18 Doolittle Raid 1942-05-03 Japanese invasion of Tulagi 1942-05-04 – 1942-05-08 Battle of the Coral Sea 1942-05-31 – 1942-06-08 Attacks on Sydney Harbour area, Australia 1942-06-04 – 1942-06-06 Battle of Midway

Allied offensives

! colspan=3

South East Asian campaigns: 1941-12-08 – 1945-08-15 Burma Campaign: 1941-12-16 – 1945-08-15 1945-05-15 – 1945-05-16 Battle of the Malacca Strait

New Guinea campaign 1942-01-23 – Battle of Rabaul

1942-03-07 – Operation Mo (Japanese invasion of mainland New Guinea)

1942-05-04 – 1942-05-08 Battle of the Coral Sea 1942-07-01 – 1943-01-31 Kokoda Track Campaign 1942-08-25 – 1942-09-05 Battle of Milne Bay 1942-11-19 – 1943-01-23 Battle of Buna-Gona 1943-01-28 – 1943-01-30 Battle of Wau 1943-03-02 – 1943-03-04 Battle of the Bismarck Sea 1943-06-29 – 1943-09-16 Battle of Lae 1943-06-30 – 1944-03-25 Operation Cartwheel 1943-09-19 – 1944-04-24 Finisterre Range campaign 1943-09-22 – 1944-01-15 Huon Peninsula campaign 1943-11-01 – 1943-11-11 Attack on Rabaul 1943-12-15 – 1945-08-15 New Britain campaign 1944-02-29 – 1944-03-25 Admiralty Islands campaign 1944-04-22 – 1945-08-15 Western New Guinea campaign

Madagascar Campaign 1942-05-05 – 1942-11-06 Battle of Madagascar

Aleutian Islands Campaign 1942-06-06 – 1943-08-15 Battle of the Aleutian Islands 1942-06-07 – 1943-08-15 Battle of Kiska 1943-03-26 – Battle of the Komandorski Islands

Guadalcanal Campaign 1942-08-07 – 1943-02-09 Battle of Guadalcanal 1942-08-09 Battle of Savo Island 1942-08-24 – 1942-08-25 Battle of the Eastern Solomons 1942-10-11 – 1942-10-12 Battle of Cape Esperance

1942-10-25 – 1942-10-27 Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands

1942-11-13 – 1942-11-15 Naval Battle of Guadalcanal 1942-11-30 Battle of Tassafaronga

Solomon Islands campaign 1943-01-29 – 1943-01-30 Battle of Rennell Island 1943-03-06 Battle of Blackett Strait 1943-06-10 – 1943-08-25 New Georgia Campaign

1943-07-06 Battle of Kula Gulf

1943-07-12 – 1943-07-13 Battle of Kolombangara 1943-08-06 – 1943-08-07 Battle of Vella Gulf 1943-08-17 – 1943-08-18 Battle off Horaniu 1943-08-15 – 1943-10-09 Land Battle of Vella Lavella 1943-10-06 Naval Battle of Vella Lavella 1943-11-01 – 1945-08-21 Battle of Bougainville 1943-11-01 – 1943-11-02 Battle of Empress Augusta Bay 1943-11-26 Battle of Cape St. George

Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign 1943-11-20 – 1943-11-23 Battle of Tarawa 1943-11-20 – 1943-11-24 Battle of Makin 1944-01-31 – 1944-02-07 Battle of Kwajalein 1944-02-16 – 1944-02-17 Attack on Truk 1944-02-16 – 1944-02-23 Battle of Eniwetok

Bombing of South East Asia, 1944-45 Operation Cockpit 1944-04-19 Operation Transom 1944-05-17 Bombing of Bangkok 1944-05-20 Operation Matterhorn 1944-06-05 – May 1945 Operation Meridian 1945-01-24 – 1945-01-29

Mariana and Palau Islands campaign 1944-06-15 – 1944-07-09 Battle of Saipan 1944-06-19 – 1944-06-20 Battle of the Philippine Sea 1944-07-21 – 1944-08-10 Battle of Guam 1944-07-24 – 1944-08-01 Battle of Tinian 1944-09-15 – 1944-11-25 Battle of Peleliu 1944-09-17 – 1944-09-30 Battle of Angaur

Philippines campaign 1944-10-20 – 1944-12-10 Battle of Leyte 1944-10-24 – 1944-10-25 Battle of Leyte Gulf 1944-11-11 – 1944-12-21 Battle of Ormoc Bay 1944-12-15 – 1945-07-04 Battle of Luzon 1945-01-09 Invasion of Lingayen Gulf 1945-01-31 – 1945-02-08 Recapture of Bataan 1945-02-03 – 1945-03-03 Battle of Manila 1945-03-18 – 1945-07-30 Battle of the Visayas 1945-03-10 – 1945-08-15 Battle of Mindanao

Volcano and Ryukyu Islands campaign 1945-02-16 – 1945-03-26 Battle of Iwo Jima 1945-04-01 – 1945-06-21 Battle of Okinawa 1945-04-07 Operation Ten-Go

Borneo campaign 1945-05-01 – 1945-05-25 Battle of Tarakan 1945-06-10 – 1945-06-15 Battle of Brunei 1945-06-10 – 1945-06-22 Battle of Labuan 1945-06-17 – 1945-08-15 Battle of North Borneo 1945-07-07 – 1945-07-21 Battle of Balikpapan

Japan campaign 1945-07-22 Battle of Tokyo Bay 1945-08-06 – 1945-08-09 Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Soviet invasion of Manchuria 1945-08-08 – 1945-09-02 Soviet invasion of Manchuria

Command areas

The command structures of the Pacific War varied, reflecting the different roles of various belligerent nations, and often involving different geographic scopes. These included the following:

Purely American commands:

* Pacific Ocean Theater

* South West Pacific Theater

* South-East Asian Theater

Other Allied commands:

* American-British-Dutch-Australian Command

* Far East Command (Soviet Union), the Soviet command during the war against Japan in 1945

Japanese commands:

* Japanese Combined Fleet, the Japanese command which oversaw naval operations

* Southern Expeditionary Army Group, the Japanese army command in the South West Pacific and South East Asia

See also

Battle between HMAS Sydney and German auxiliary cruiser Kormoran

European Theatre of World War II

Japanese holdout

Operation Downfall

Pacific Theater of Operations

Pacific War Museum

Timeline WW II — Pacific Theater

Footnotes

Citations

References

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Clay Blair, Jr. ''Silent Victory''. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975 (submarine war).

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Thomas Buell, ''The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond Spruance''. 1974.

John Costello, ''The Pacific War''. 1982.

Wesley Craven, and James Cate, eds. ''The Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol. 1, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942''. University of Chicago Press, 1958. Official history; Vol. 4, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944''. 1950; Vol. 5, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki''. 1953.

Dunnigan, James F., and Albert A. Nofi. ''The Pacific War Encyclopedia.'' Facts on File, 1998. 2 vols. 772p.

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Gordon, David M. "The China-Japan War, 1931-1945" ''Journal of Military History'' (January 2006) v 70#1, pp 137–82. Historiographical overview of major books

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Dudley McCarthy, ''Australia in the War of 1939–45, Army. Vol. 5, South-West Pacific Area—First Year: Kokoda to Wau''. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1959.

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Masatake Okumiya, and Mitso Fuchida. ''Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan''. Naval Institute Press, 1955.

E. B. Potter, and Chester W. Nimitz. ''Triumph in the Pacific''. Prentice Hall, 1963. Naval battles

E. B. Potter, ''Bull Halsey'' Naval Institute Press, 1985.

E. B. Potter, ''Nimitz''. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1976.

John D. Potter, ''Yamamoto'' 1967.

Gordon W. Prange, Donald Goldstein, and Katherine Dillon. ''At Dawn We Slept''. Penguin, 1982. Pearl Harbor

——, ''et al.'' ''Miracle at Midway''. Penguin, 1982.

——, ''et al.'' ''Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History''.

Henry Shaw, and Douglas Kane. ''History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II. Vol. 2, Isolation of Rabaul''. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1963

Henry Shaw, Bernard Nalty, and Edwin Turnbladh. ''History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II. Vol. 3, Central Pacific Drive.'' Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953.

E.B. Sledge, ''With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa.'' Presidio, 1981. Memoir.

J. Douglas Smith, and Richard Jensen. ''World War II on the Web: A Guide to the Very Best Sites''. (2002)

Ronald Spector, ''Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan'' Free Press, 1985.

John Toland, ''The Rising Sun''. 2 vols. Random House, 1970. Japan's war.

Ian W. Toll. ''Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941-1942'' (2011)

H. P. Willmott. ''Empires in the Balance''. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1982.

H. P. Willmott. ''The Barrier and the Javelin''. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1983.

Gerhard L. Weinberg, ''A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II,'' Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-44317-2. (2005).

William Y'Blood, ''Red Sun Setting: The Battle of the Philippine Sea''. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1980.

External links

Film Footage of the Pacific War

La politique de la sphère de coprospérité de la grande Asie orientale au Japon

Animated History of the Pacific War

Canada at the Pacific War — Canadians in Asia & the Pacific

The Pacific War Series – at The War Times Journal

Morinoske: Japanese Pilot testimonials - and more

Imperial Japanese Navy Page

The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II

Category:Military history of Oceania

ar:حرب المحيط الهادي bs:Rat na Pacifiku bg:Тихоокеанска война ca:Guerra del Pacífic cs:Válka v Tichomoří da:Stillehavskrigen de:Pazifikkrieg es:Guerra del Pacífico (1937-1945) eu:Pazifikoko Gerra fr:Guerre en Asie et dans le Pacifique ko:태평양 전쟁 hr:Rat na Pacifiku id:Perang Pasifik it:Guerra del Pacifico (seconda guerra mondiale) he:המערכה באסיה ובאוקיינוס השקט jv:Perang Pasifik lb:Pazifikkrich lt:Antrasis pasaulinis karas Ramiajame vandenyne ms:Perang Pasifik nl:Azië in de Tweede Wereldoorlog ja:太平洋戦争 no:Stillehavskrigen pl:Wojna na Pacyfiku pt:Guerra do Pacífico ro:Războiul din Pacific (al Doilea Război Mondial) ru:Тихоокеанский театр военных действий Второй мировой войны sk:Vojna v Pacifiku sl:Vojna za Tihi ocean sh:Rat na Pacifiku fi:Tyynenmeren sota toisessa maailmansodassa sv:Stillahavskriget tl:Digmaang Pasipiko ta:பசிபிக் போர் th:สงครามแปซิฟิก tr:Pasifik Cephesi (II. Dünya Savaşı) uk:Війна на Тихому океані vi:Chiến tranh Thái Bình Dương zh:太平洋战争

Name	Isoroku Yamamoto
Birth date	4 April 1884
Death date	April 18, 1943
Birth place	Nagaoka, Niigata, Japan
Death place	Buin, Papua New Guinea
Allegiance	Empire of Japan
Branch
Serviceyears	1901–1943
Rank	Naval Marshal General Commander-in-Chief
Commands	, , Naval Air Command, Navy Ministry, Naval Air Command, 1st Fleet, Combined Fleet, 1st Battleship Division
Unit	Combined Fleet among others
Battles	Russo-Japanese War World War II (Battle of Midway)
Awards	Grand Cordon of the Supreme Order of the Chrysanthemum (2nd class) (posthumously) Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun Paulownia Blossoms (1st class)Grand Cordon of the Order of the Sacred Treasure (1st class)Order of the Golden Kite (1st class) Order of the Golden Kite (2nd class) Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords
Enteredservice	}}

was a Japanese Naval Marshal General and the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet during World War II, a graduate of the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy and a student of Harvard University (1919–1921).

Yamamoto held several important posts in the Imperial Japanese Navy, and undertook many of its changes and reorganizations, especially its development of naval aviation. He was the commander-in-chief during the decisive early years of the Pacific War and so was responsible for major battles such as Pearl Harbor and Midway. He died during an inspection tour of forward positions in the Solomon Islands when his aircraft (a Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" bomber) was shot down during an ambush by American P-38 Lightning fighter planes. His death was a major blow to Japanese military morale during World War II.

Family background

Yamamoto was born as in Nagaoka, Niigata. His father was , an intermediate ''samurai'' of the Nagaoka Domain. "Isoroku" is an old Japanese term meaning "56"; the name referred to his father's age at Isoroku's birth.

In 1916, Isoroku was adopted into the Yamamoto family (another family of former Nagaoka samurai) and took the Yamamoto name. It was a common practice for Japanese families lacking sons to adopt suitable young men in this fashion to carry on the family name. In 1918 Isoroku married Reiko Mihashi, with whom he had two sons and two daughters.

Early career

After graduating from the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy in 1904, Yamamoto served on the cruiser during the Russo-Japanese War. He was wounded at the Battle of Tsushima, losing two fingers (the index and middle fingers) on his left hand. He returned to the Naval Staff College in 1914, emerging as a Naval Major (Lieutenant Commander) in 1916.

1920s and 1930s

Yamamoto was part of the Japanese Navy establishment, who were rivals of the more aggressive Army establishment, especially the officers of the Kwantung army. As such he promoted a policy of a strong fleet to project force through gunboat diplomacy, rather than a fleet used primarily for transport of invasion land forces, as some of his political opponents in the army wanted. This stance led him to oppose the invasion of China. He also opposed war against the United States partly because of his studies at Harvard University (1919–1921) and his two postings as a naval attaché in Washington, D.C.. He learned to speak fluent English as a result.

He was promoted to Naval Colonel (Captain) in 1923. On 13 April 1924 at the rank of captain, he was part of the Japanese delegation visiting the U.S. Naval War College. Later that year, he changed his specialty from gunnery to naval aviation. His first command was the cruiser in 1928, followed by the aircraft carrier .

He participated in the second London Naval Conference of 1930 as a Naval Major-General (Rear Admiral) and the 1934 London Naval Conference as a Naval Lieutenant-General (Vice Admiral), as the government felt that a career military specialist needed to accompany the diplomats to the arms limitations talks. Yamamoto was a strong proponent of naval aviation, and served as head of the Aeronautics Department before accepting a post as commander of the First Carrier Division. Yamamoto personally opposed the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the subsequent land war with China (1937), and the 1940 Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. As Deputy Navy Minister, he apologized to United States Ambassador Joseph C. Grew for the bombing of the gunboat in December 1937. These issues made him a target of assassination by pro-war militarists.

Throughout 1938, many young army and naval officers began to speak publicly against Yamamoto and certain other Japanese admirals such as Mitsumasa Yonai and Shigeyoshi Inoue for their strong opposition towards a Tripartite pact with Nazi Germany for reportedly being against "Japan's natural interests." Yamamoto himself received a steady stream of hate mail and death threats from Japanese nationalists but his reaction to the prospect of death by assassination was passive and accepting. The Admiral wrote:

The Japanese army, annoyed at Yamamoto's unflinching opposition to a Rome-Berlin-Tokyo treaty, dispatched military police to "guard" Yamamoto; this was an attempt by the Army to keep an eye on him. He was later reassigned from the Navy Ministry to sea as the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on (30 August 1939). This was done as one of the last acts of the then-acting Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, under Baron Hiranuma's short-lived administration partly to make it harder for assassins to target Yamamoto; Yonai was certain that if Yamamoto remained ashore, he would be killed before the year (1939) ended.

1940–1941

Yamamoto was promoted to Naval General (Admiral) on 15 November 1940. This in spite of the fact that when Hideki Tōjō was appointed Prime Minister on 18 October 1941, many political observers thought that Yamamoto's career was essentially over. Tōjō had been Yamamoto's old opponent from the time when the latter served as Japan's deputy navy minister and Tōjō was the prime mover behind Japan's takeover of Manchuria. It was believed that Yamamoto would be appointed to command the Yokosuka Naval Base, "a nice safe demotion with a big house and no power at all." After the new Japanese cabinet was announced, however, Yamamoto found himself left alone in his position despite his open conflicts with Tōjō and other members of the army's oligarchy who favored war with the European powers and America. Two of the main reasons for Yamamoto's political survival were his immense popularity within the fleet, where he commanded the respect of his men and officers, and his close relations with the imperial family. He also had the acceptance by Japan's naval hierarchy: Consequently, Yamamoto stayed in his post. With Tōjō now in charge of Japan's highest political office, it became clear the army would lead the navy into a war about which Yamamoto had serious reservations. He wrote to an ultranationalist:

This quote was spread by the militarists, minus the last sentence, where it was interpreted in America as a boast that Japan would conquer the entire continental United States. The omitted sentence showed Yamamoto's counsel of caution towards a war that could cost Japan dearly. Nevertheless, Yamamoto accepted the reality of impending war and planned for a quick victory by destroying the US fleet at Pearl Harbor while simultaneously thrusting into the oil and rubber resource rich areas of Southeast Asia, especially the Dutch East Indies, Borneo and Malaya. In naval matters, Yamamoto opposed the building of the super-battleships and as an unwise investment of resources.

Yamamoto was responsible for a number of innovations in Japanese naval aviation. Although remembered for his association with aircraft carriers due to Pearl Harbor and Midway, Yamamoto did more to influence the development of land-based naval aviation, particularly the Mitsubishi G3M and G4M medium bombers. His demand for great range and the ability to carry a torpedo was intended to conform to Japanese conceptions of attriting the American fleet as it advanced across the Pacific in war. The planes did achieve long range, but long-range fighter escorts were not available. These planes were lightly constructed and when fully fueled, they were especially vulnerable to enemy fire. This earned the G4M the sardonic nickname "the Flying Cigarette Lighter." Yamamoto would eventually die in one of these aircraft.

The range of the G3M and G4M contributed to a demand for great range in a fighter aircraft. This partly drove the requirements for the A6M Zero which was as noteworthy for its range as for its maneuverability. Both qualities were again purchased at the expense of light construction and flammability that later contributed to the A6M's high casualty rates as the war progressed.

As Japan moved toward war during 1940, Yamamoto gradually moved toward strategic as well as tactical innovation, again with mixed results. Prompted by talented young officers such as Minoru Genda, Yamamoto approved the reorganization of Japanese carrier forces into the First Air Fleet, a consolidated striking force that gathered Japan's six largest carriers into one unit. This innovation gave great striking capacity, but also concentrated the vulnerable carriers into a compact target; both boon and bane would be realized in war. Yamamoto also oversaw the organization of a similar large land-based organization in the 11th Air Fleet, which would later use the G3M and G4M to neutralize American air forces in the Philippines and sink the British Force "Z".

In January 1941, Yamamoto went even further and proposed a radical revision of Japanese naval strategy. For two decades, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain Alfred T. Mahan, the Naval General Staff had planned in terms of Japanese light surface forces, submarines and land-based air units whittling down the American Fleet as it advanced across the Pacific until the Japanese Navy engaged it in a climactic "Decisive Battle" in the northern Philippine Sea (between the Ryukyu Islands and the Marianas Islands), with battleships meeting in the traditional exchange between battle lines.

Correctly pointing out this plan had never worked even in Japanese war games, and painfully aware of American strategic advantages in military productive capacity, Yamamoto proposed instead to seek a decision with the Americans by first reducing their forces with a preemptive strike, and following it with a "Decisive Battle" sought offensively, rather than defensively. Yamamoto hoped, but probably did not believe, if the Americans could be dealt such terrific blows early in the war, they might be willing to negotiate an end to the conflict. As it turned out, however, the note officially breaking diplomatic relations with the United States was delivered late, and he correctly perceived the Americans would be resolved upon revenge and unwilling to negotiate. Yamamoto's thoughts on this matter were later dramatically encapsulated in the apocryphal "sleeping giant" quote uttered in the movie ''Tora! Tora! Tora!''.

The Naval General Staff proved reluctant to go along and Yamamoto was eventually driven to capitalize on his popularity in the fleet by threatening to resign to get his way. Admiral Osami Nagano and the Naval General Staff eventually caved in to this pressure, but only insofar as approving the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The First Air Fleet commenced preparations for the Pearl Harbor Raid, solving a number of technical problems along the way, including how to launch torpedoes in the shallow water of Pearl Harbor and how to craft armor-piercing bombs by machining down battleship gun projectiles.

Attack on Pearl Harbor

As Yamamoto had planned, the First Air Fleet of six carriers commenced hostilities against the Americans on 7 December 1941, launching 353 aircraft against Pearl Harbor in two waves. The attack was a complete success according to the parameters of the mission which sought to sink at least four American battleships and prevent the U.S. Fleet from interfering in Japan's southward advance for at least six months. American aircraft carriers were also considered a choice target, but were not in port at the time of the attack.

In the end, five American battleships were sunk, three damaged, and eleven other cruisers, destroyers and auxiliaries were sunk or seriously damaged. The Japanese lost only 29 aircraft, while 74 were damaged from anti-aircraft fire from the ground. The damaged aircraft were disproportionately dive and torpedo bombers, seriously impacting available firepower to exploit the first two waves' success, so the commander of the First Air Fleet, Naval Lieutenant-General Chuichi Nagumo, withdrew. Yamamoto later lamented Nagumo's failure to seize the initiative to seek out and destroy the American carriers, absent from the harbor, or further bombard various strategically important facilities on Oahu. Nagumo had absolutely no idea where the American carriers might be, and remaining on station while his forces cast about looking for them ran the risk his own force might be found first and attacked while his aircraft were absent searching. Further, his aircraft also lacked appropriate ordnance for attacking the machine tools and drydocks of the shipyard, or even the revetted fuel tanks, whose destruction could have been more serious losses than the fighting ships themselves. In any case, insufficient daylight remained after recovering the aircraft from the first two waves for the carriers to launch and recover a third before dark, and Nagumo's escorting destroyers lacked the fuel capacity for him to loiter long. Much has been made of Yamamoto's hindsight, but (in keeping with Japanese military tradition not to criticize the commander on the spot) he did not punish Nagumo in any way for his withdrawal, which was according to plan.

On the political level, the attack was a disaster for Japan, rousing American passions for revenge due to it being a "sneak attack". The shock of the attack coming in an unexpected place, with such devastating results and without the expected "fair play" of a declaration of war galvanized the American public's determination to avenge the attack. When asked by Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe in mid-1941 concerning the outcome of a possible war with the United States, Yamamoto made a well-known and prophetic statement: If ordered to fight, "I shall run wild considerably for the first six months or a year but I have utterly no confidence for the second and third years." His prediction would be vindicated as Japan easily conquered territories and islands for the first 6 months of the war until it suffered a shattering defeat at the Battle of Midway on June 4–7, 1942, which tilted the balance of power in the Pacific towards the U.S.

As a strategic blow intended to prevent American interference in the Netherlands East Indies for six months, the attack was a success, but unbeknownst to Yamamoto, it was a pointless one. The U.S. Navy had abandoned any intention of attempting to charge across the Pacific towards the Philippines at the outset of war in 1935 (in keeping with the evolution of War Plan Orange). In 1937, the U.S. Navy had further determined even fully manning the fleet to wartime levels could not be accomplished in less than six months, and myriad other logistic assets needed to execute a trans-Pacific movement simply did not exist and would require two years to construct after the onset of war. In 1940, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark had penned "Plan Dog", which emphasized a defensive war in the Pacific while the U.S. concentrated on defeating Nazi Germany first, and consigned Admiral Husband Kimmel's Pacific Fleet to merely keeping the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) out of the eastern Pacific and away from the shipping lanes to Australia. Moreover, it is in question whether the U.S. would have gone to war at all had Japan only attacked British and Dutch possessions in the Far East.

December 1941 to May 1942

With the American Fleet largely neutralized at Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto's Combined Fleet turned to the task of executing the larger Japanese war plan devised by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy General Staff. The First Air Fleet proceeded to make a circuit of the Pacific, striking American, Australian, Dutch and British installations from Wake Island to Australia to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) in the Indian Ocean. The 11th Air Fleet caught the American 5th Air Force on the ground in the Philippines hours after Pearl Harbor, and then proceeded to sink the British Force "Z" (battleship and battlecruiser ) underway at sea.

Under Yamamoto's able subordinates, Naval Lieutenant-Generals Jisaburō Ozawa, Nobutake Kondō and Ibō Takahashi, the Japanese swept the inadequate remaining American, British, Dutch and Australian naval assets from the Netherlands East Indies in a series of amphibious landings and surface naval battles that culminated in the Battle of the Java Sea on 27 February 1942. With the occupation of the Netherlands East Indies, and the reduction of the remaining American positions in the Philippines to forlorn hopes on the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor island, the Japanese had secured their oil- and rubber-rich "Southern Resources Area".

By late March, having achieved their initial aims with surprising speed and little loss (albeit against enemies ill-prepared to resist them), the Japanese paused to consider their next moves. Yamamoto and a few Japanese military leaders and officials waited, hoping that the United States or Great Britain would negotiate a peace treaty to end the war in their favor. But when the British, as well as the Americans, expressed no interest in negotiating with Japan for any cease fire, the Japanese thoughts turned to securing and protecting their newly seized territory, and acquiring more with an eye toward additional conquest and/or attempting to force one or more of their enemies out of the war.

Competing plans were developed at this stage, including thrusts to the west against India, the south against Australia and the east against the United States. Yamamoto was involved in this debate, supporting different plans at different times with varying degrees of enthusiasm and for varying purposes, including "horse-trading" for support of his own objectives.

Plans included ideas as ambitious as invading India or Australia, or seizing Hawaii. These grandiose ventures were inevitably set aside as the army could not spare enough troops from China for the first two (which would require a minimum of 250,000 men), nor shipping to support the latter two. (Shipping was allocated separately to IJN & IJA, and jealously guarded.) Instead, the Imperial General Staff supported an army thrust into Burma in hopes of linking up with Indian Nationalists revolting against British rule, and attacks in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands designed to imperil Australia's sea line of communication with the United States. Yamamoto agitated for an offensive decisive battle in the east to finish off the American fleet, but the more conservative Naval General Staff officers were unwilling to risk it.

On April 18, in the midst of these debates, the Doolittle Raid struck Tokyo and the surrounding areas, galvanizing the threat posed by the American aircraft carriers in the minds of staff officers, and giving Yamamoto an event he could exploit to get his way as further debate over military strategy came to a quick end. The Naval General Staff agreed to Yamamoto's Midway (MI) Operation, subsequent to the first phase of the operations against Australia's link with America, and concurrent with their own plan to seize positions in the Aleutian Islands.

Yamamoto rushed planning for the Midway and Aleutians missions, while dispatching a force under Naval Major-General Takeo Takagi, including the Fifth Carrier Division (the large, new carriers and ), to support the effort to seize the islands of Tulagi and Guadalcanal for seaplane and airplane bases, and the town of Port Moresby on Papua New Guinea's south coast facing Australia.

The Port Moresby (MO) Operation proved an unwelcome setback. Although Tulagi and Guadalcanal were taken, the Port Moresby invasion fleet was compelled to turn back when Takagi clashed with an American carrier task force in the Battle of the Coral Sea in early May. Although the Japanese sank the American carrier in exchange for a smaller carrier, the Americans damaged the carrier ''Shōkaku'' so badly that she required dockyard repairs. Just as importantly, Japanese operational mishaps and American fighters and anti-aircraft fire devastated the dive bomber and torpedo plane formations of both ''Shōkaku''s and ''Zuikaku''s air groups. These losses sidelined ''Zuikaku'' while she awaited replacement aircraft and aircrews, and saw to tactical integration and training. These two ships would be sorely missed a month later at Midway.

:''References: Dull'' (1978), ''Evans & Peattie'' (1997), ''Lundstrom'' (1984), Parillo.

Battle of Midway, June 1942

Yamamoto's plan for Midway Island was an extension of his efforts to knock the U.S. Pacific Fleet out of action long enough for Japan to fortify her defensive perimeter in the Pacific island chains. Yamamoto felt it necessary to seek an early, offensive decisive battle.

This plan was long believed to have been to draw American attention—and possibly carrier forces—north from Pearl Harbor by sending his Fifth Fleet (two light carriers, five cruisers, 13 destroyers, and four transports) against the Aleutians, raiding Dutch Harbor on Unalaska Island and invading the more distant islands of Kiska and Attu. Recent scholarship using Japanese language documents has revealed it was, rather, an unrelated venture of the Naval General Staff which Yamamoto agreed to conduct concurrently with the Midway operation, in exchange for the latter's approval.

While Fifth Fleet attacked the Aleutians, First Mobile Force (4 carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, and 12 destroyers) would raid Midway and destroy its air force. Once this was neutralized, Second Fleet (1 light carrier, 2 battleships, 10 cruisers, 21 destroyers, and 11 transports) would land 5,000 troops to seize the atoll from the American Marines.

The seizure of Midway was expected to draw the American carriers west into a trap where the First Mobile Force would engage and destroy them. Afterward, First Fleet (1 light carrier, 7 battleships, 3 cruisers and 13 destroyers), in conjunction with elements of Second Fleet, would mop up remaining American surface forces and complete the destruction of the Pacific Fleet.

To guard against mischance, Yamamoto initiated two security measures. The first was an aerial reconnaissance mission (Operation K) over Pearl Harbor to ascertain if the American carriers were there. The second was a picket line of submarines to detect the movement of the American carriers toward Midway in time for First Mobile Force, First Fleet, and Second Fleet to combine against it. In the event, the first was aborted and the second delayed until after American carriers had sortied.

The plan was a compromise and hastily prepared (apparently so it could be launched in time for the anniversary of Tsushima), but appeared well thought out, well organized, and finely timed when viewed from a Japanese viewpoint. Against four carriers, two light carriers, 11 battleships, 16 cruisers and 46 destroyers likely to be in the area of the main battle the Americans could field only three carriers, eight cruisers, and 15 destroyers. The disparity appeared crushing. Only in numbers of carrier decks, available aircraft, and submarines was there near parity between the two sides. Despite various frictions developed in the execution, it appeared — barring something extraordinary — Yamamoto held all the cards.

Unfortunately for Yamamoto, something extraordinary had happened. The worst fear of any commander is for an enemy to learn his battle plan in advance, which was exactly what American cryptographers had done, thanks to breaking the Japanese naval code D (known to the U.S. as JN-25). As a result, Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Pacific Fleet commander, was able to circumvent both of Yamamoto's security measures and position his outnumbered forces in the exact position to conduct a devastating ambush. By Nimitz's calculation, his three available carrier decks, plus Midway, gave him rough parity with Nagumo's First Mobile Force.

Following a foolish nuisance raid by Japanese flying boats in May, Nimitz dispatched a minesweeper to guard the intended refueling point for Operation K near French Frigate Shoals, causing the reconnaissance mission to be aborted and leaving Yamamoto ignorant of whether Pacific Fleet carriers were still at Pearl Harbor. (It remains unclear why Yamamoto permitted the earlier attack, and why his submarines did not sortie sooner, as reconnaissance was essential to the success of MI.) He also dispatched his carriers toward Midway early, and they passed the intended picket line force of submarines ''en route'' to their station, negating Yamamoto's back-up security measure. Nimitz's carriers positioned themselves to ambush the ''Kido Butai'' (Striking Force) when it struck Midway. A token cruiser and destroyer force was sent toward the Aleutians, but otherwise Nimitz ignored them. 4 June 1942, days before Yamamoto expected them to interfere in the Midway operation, American carriers destroyed the four carriers of the ''Kido Butai'', catching the Japanese carriers at an especially vulnerable moment.

With his air power destroyed and his forces not yet concentrated for a fleet battle, Yamamoto attempted to maneuver his remaining forces, still strong on paper, to trap the American forces. He was unable to do so because his initial dispositions had placed his surface combatants too far from Midway, and because Admiral Raymond Spruance prudently withdrew to the east in a position to further defend Midway Island, believing (based on a mistaken submarine report) the Japanese still intended to invade. Not knowing several battleships, including the powerful , were on the Japanese order of battle, he did not comprehend the severe risk of a night surface battle, in which his carriers and cruisers would be at a disadvantage. However, his move to the east did avoid the possibility of such a battle taking place. Correctly perceiving he had lost and could not bring surface forces into action, Yamamoto aborted the invasion of Midway and withdrew. The defeat marked the high tide of Japanese expansion.

Yamamoto's plan for MI has been the subject of much criticism. Many commentators state it violated the principle of concentration of force, and was overly complex. Others point out similarly complex Allied operations (such as Operation MB8) that were successful, and note the extent to which the American intelligence ''coup'' derailed the operation before it began. Had Yamamoto's dispositions not denied Nagumo adequate pre-attack reconnaissance assets, both the American cryptanalytic success and the unexpected appearance of Fletcher's carriers would have been irrelevant. where he received, posthumously, the title of Marshal and was awarded the Order of the Chrysanthemum, (1st Class). He was also awarded Nazi Germany's Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords. Part of his ashes were buried in the public cemetery in Tama, Tokyo (多摩霊園), and the remainder at his ancestral burial grounds at the temple of Chuko-ji in Nagaoka City. He was succeeded as commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet by Admiral Mineichi Koga.

Personal life

While other military leaders avoided the image of being "soft", Yamamoto continued to practice calligraphy. He and his wife, Reiko, had four children: two sons and two daughters. Yamamoto was an avid gambler, enjoying ''shogi'', billiards, bridge, mah jong, poker, and other games that tested his wits and sharpened his mind. He frequently made jokes about moving to Monaco and starting his own casino. He enjoyed the company of ''geisha'', and his wife Reiko revealed to the Japanese public in 1954 that Yamamoto was closer to his favorite ''geisha'' Kawai Chiyoko than to her, which stirred some controversy. After his death, his funeral procession passed by Kawai's quarters on the way to the cemetery, perhaps with hidden purpose.

Yamamoto as a commander

Yamamoto is generally regarded as one of the most prominent leaders in the IJN for making significant changes to its organization, although he was also responsible for several critical defeats. Yamamoto is considered to be an imaginative and brave leader for formulating a plan to launch a pre-emptive attack on US forces in the Pacific Fleet. He is known as one of the very few military leaders who vocally opposed the occupation of China, the Tripartite Pact, and the war with the U.S., though in doing so he received death threats from nationalists.

Having studied at Harvard University, he was reluctant to enter into war with the United States. He was aware of their overwhelming industrial capacity compared to that of Japan, and felt that only a knockout blow would remove the US threat to Japan. He also did not trust Nazi Germany; somewhat ironically, he became the only non-German to be given the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords, which was awarded posthumously. He correctly anticipated that the aircraft carrier would play a role in any decisive battle with the United States. Furthermore, he supported increasing the striking power of the air fleets by combining as many as 6 aircraft carriers into one carrier battle group. Additionally, he often assigned capable individuals such as Minoru Genda to form his battle plans.

His forces suffered severely in certain areas, with Allied submarines dealing major blows to the Imperial Japanese Navy shipping and causing the war economy of Japan to be starved of resources, although the full weight of the blow began to be truly felt only in 1943, when American codebreakers cracked the merchant marine code again, and 1944, after technical deficiencies in the Mark 14 torpedo were finally resolved. The Imperial Japanese Navy's codes were decrypted by the United States; this proved to be a fatal development, as it resulted in the biggest direct blow to the Imperial Japanese Navy at the Battle of Midway. The battle proved to be Yamamoto's most prominent defeat—his force lost four aircraft carriers and 228 planes, and suffered significant casualties, losing 3500 men.

Decorations

The Breast Star of the Order of the Chrysanthemum

Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun Paulownia Blossoms

Grand Cordon of the Order of the Sacred Treasure

Order of the Golden Kite (1st class)

Order of the Golden Kite (2nd class)

Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords

Yamamoto's career promotions

Midshipman—14 November 1904

Ensign—31 August 1905

Sublieutenant—28 September 1907

Lieutenant—11 October 1909

Lieutenant Commander—13 December 1915

Commander—1 December 1919

Captain—1 December 1923

Rear Admiral—30 November 1929

Vice Admiral—15 November 1934

Admiral—15 November 1940

Fleet Admiral—18 April 1943 (posthumous)

Media portrayals

Several motion pictures depict the character of Isoroku Yamamoto. One of the most notable films is the 1970 movie ''Tora! Tora! Tora!'', with Japanese actor Sô Yamamura as Yamamoto. He is seen planning the Japanese attack. There is no evidence that Yamamoto said this in reality despite the film calling it a quote. (See Isoroku Yamamoto's sleeping giant quote for further discussion.)

The 1960 film ''The Gallant Hours'' depicts the battle of wits between Admiral William Halsey, Jr. and Yamamoto from the start of the Guadalcanal Campaign in August 1942 to Yamamoto's death in April 1943.

Japanese actor Toshirô Mifune (star of ''The Seven Samurai'') would play Yamamoto in three films: ''Rengo kantai shirei chôkan: Yamamoto Isoroku'' (1968), ''Gekido no showashi 'Gunbatsu' '' (1970), and ''Midway'' (1976) (where all of the Japanese scenes had English dialogue).

In Shūe Matsubayashi's 1981 film ''Rengo kantai'' (''The Imperial Navy''), Yamamoto was portrayed by Keiju Kobayashi.

The latest film depiction of Yamamoto was in 2001's ''Pearl Harbor'', a Jerry Bruckheimer-produced epic. While mostly focused on the love triangle between American characters, the film does show several scenes of the Japanese planning for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto is played by Oscar-nominated actor Mako Iwamatsu. Like ''Tora! Tora! Tora!'', this film also features the sleeping giant quote.

Alternate History

Yamamoto is seen in the Anime series ''Zipang'', in which he works to develop the uneasy partnership with the crew of the JMSDF ''Mirai'', which has been transported back sixty years through time to the year 1942. In the 1993 OVA series ''Konpeki no Kantai'' (lit. ''Deep Blue Fleet''), the original timeline proceeds until his death in April 1943. However, instead of dying in the crash, Yamamoto blacks out and suddenly wakes up as his younger self, Isoroku Takano, after the Battle of Tsushima in 1905. His memory from the original timeline intact, Yamamoto uses his knowledge of the future to help Japan become a stronger military power, and eventually launching a ''coup d'état'' against Hideki Tōjō's government. In the subsequent Pacific war, Japan's technologically advanced navy decisively defeats the United States, and grants all of the former European and American colonies in Asia full independence. Later on, Japan joins forces with the United States and Britain to defeat Nazi Germany.

In Douglas Niles' 2007 book ''MacArthur's War: A Novel of the Invasion of Japan'' (written with Michael Dobson), which focuses on General Douglas MacArthur and an alternate history of the Pacific War (following a much different outcome of the Battle of Midway), Yamamoto is portrayed sympathetically, with much of the action in the Japanese government seen through his eyes, though he could not change the major decisions of Japan in World War II.

Notes

Sources

Agawa, Hiroyuki; Bester, John (trans.). ''The Reluctant Admiral''. New York: Kodansha, 1979. ISBN 4-7700-2539-4. A definitive biography of Yamamoto in English. This book explains much of the political structure and events within Japan that lead to the war.

Davis, Donald A. ''Lightning Strike: The Secret Mission to Kill Admiral Yamamoto and Avenge Pearl Harbor''. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2005. ISBN 0-312-30906-6.

Dull, Paul S. ''A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945''. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1978. ISBN 0-87021-097-1.

Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. ''Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887–1941''. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1997. ISBN 0-87021-192-7.

Glines, Carroll V. ''Attack on Yamamoto'' (1st edition). New York: Crown, 1990. ISBN 0-517-57728-3. Glines documents both the mission to shoot down Yamamoto and the subsequent controversies with thorough research, including personal interviews with all surviving participants and researchers who examined the crash site.

Hoyt, Edwin P. ''Yamamoto: The Man Who Planned Pearl Harbor''. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990. ISBN 1-58574-428-X.

Lundstrom, John B. ''The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway''. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1984. ISBN 0-87021-189-7.

Miller, Edward S. ''War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945''. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991. ISBN 0-87021-759-3.

Peattie, Mark R. ''Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941''. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2002. ISBN 1-55750-432-6.

Prados, John. ''Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II''. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2001. ISBN 1-55750-431-8.

Prange, Gordon. ''At Dawn We Slept''. New York: Penguin Books, 1982. ISBN 0-1-006455-09

Ugaki, Matome; Chihaya, Masataka (trans.). ''Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941-45''. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991. ISBN 0-8229-5462-1. Provides a high-level view of the war from the Japanese side, from the diaries of Yamamoto's Chief of Staff, Admiral Matome Ugaki. Provides evidence of the intentions of the imperial military establishment to seize Hawaii and to operate against the British navy in the Indian Ocean. Translated by Masataka Chihaya, this edition contains extensive clarifying notes from the U.S. editors derived from U.S. military histories.

External links

Yamamoto biography From Spartacus Educational

World War II Database: Isoroku Yamamoto biography

World War II Database: Death of Yamamoto

"Isoroku Yamamoto" ''Encyclopædia Britannica''

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Japanese Navy US Naval Historical Center

Pacific Wrecks. Place where Yamamoto Type 1 bomber crash

The Great Pacific War

The Assassination of Yamamoto in 1943

Isoroku Yamamoto gravesite

CombinedFleet.com, Isoroku Yamamoto

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