Conflict | Doolittle Raid |
---|---|
Partof | World War II, Pacific War |
Caption | A B-25 taking off from for the raid |
Date | 18 April 1942 |
Place | Tokyo and other Japanese cities |
Combatant1 | |
Combatant2 | |
Commander1 | James H. Doolittle |
Commander2 | N/A |
Strength1 | 16 B-25 Mitchells, 80 airmen (52 officers, 28 enlisted) |
Strength2 | Unknown number of troops and homeland defense |
Casualties1 | 3 dead, 8 POWs (4 died in captivity: 3 executed, 1 disease)15 B-25s |
Casualties2 | About 50 dead, 400 injured |
The Doolittle Raid, on 18 April 1942, was the first air raid by the United States to strike the Japanese Home Islands (Honshu) during World War II. By demonstrating that Japan itself was vulnerable to American air attack, it provided a vital morale boost and opportunity for U.S. retaliation after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. The raid was planned and led by Lieutenant Colonel James "Jimmy" Doolittle. Doolittle would later recount in his autobiography that the raid was intended to bolster American morale and to cause the Japanese to begin doubting their leadership:
The Japanese people had been told they were invulnerable ... An attack on the Japanese homeland would cause confusion in the minds of the Japanese people and sow doubt about the reliability of their leaders.There was a second, and equally important, psychological reason for this attack ... Americans badly needed a morale boost.
Sixteen U.S. Army Air Forces B-25B Mitchell medium bombers were launched from the U.S. Navy's aircraft carrier deep in the Western Pacific Ocean. The plan called for them to bomb military targets in Japan, and to continue westward to land in China—landing a medium bomber on the Hornet was impossible. All of the aircraft involved in the bombing were lost and 11 crewmen were either killed or captured—with three of the captured men executed by the Japanese Army in China. One of the B-25s landed in the Soviet Union at Vladivostok, where it was confiscated and its crew interned for more than a year. Thirteen entire crews, and all but one crewman of a 14th, returned either to the United States or to American forces.
The raid caused negligible material damage to Japan, but it succeeded in its goal of helping American morale, and casting doubt in Japan on the ability of the Japanese military leaders. It also caused Japan to withdraw its powerful aircraft carrier force from the Indian Ocean to defend their Home Islands, and the raid contributed to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's decision to attack Midway—an attack that turned into a decisive rout of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) by the U.S. Navy near Midway Island in the Central Pacific.
Up to 250,000 Chinese civilians were massacred by the Japanese Army in eastern China in its retaliatory measures.
The concept for the attack came from Navy Captain Francis Low, Assistant Chief of Staff for Anti-submarine Warfare, who reported to Admiral Ernest J. King on 10 January 1942 that he thought that twin-engine Army bombers could be successfully launched from an aircraft carrier after observing several at a naval airfield in Norfolk, Virginia, where the runway was painted with the outline of a carrier deck for landing practice. It was subsequently planned and led by Doolittle, a famous civilian aviator and aeronautical engineer before the war.
Requirements for the aircraft for a cruising range of with a bomb load resulted in the selection of the North American B-25B Mitchell to carry out the mission. The B-26 Marauder, B-18 Bolo and B-23 Dragon were also considered, but the B-26 had questionable takeoff characteristics from a carrier deck and the B-23's wingspan was nearly 50% greater than the B-25's, reducing the number that could be taken aboard a carrier and posing risks to the ship's island. The B-18, one of the final two types considered by Doolittle, was rejected for the same reason.
The B-25 had yet to be tested in combat, but subsequent tests with B-25s indicated they could fulfill the mission's requirements. Doolittle's first report on the plan suggested that the bombers might land in Vladivostok, shortening the flight by on the basis of turning over the B-25s as Lend-Lease. However, negotiations with the Soviet Union (which had signed a neutrality pact with Japan in April 1941) for permission were fruitless. The raid was immediately approved and the 17th Bomb Group (Medium) chosen to provide the pool of crews from which volunteers would be recruited. The 17th BG had been the first group to receive B-25s, with all four of its squadrons equipped with the bomber by September 1941. The 17th not only was the first medium bomb group of the Army Air Corps, but in the spring of 1942 also had the most experienced B-25 crews. Its first assignment following the entry of the United States into the war was to the U.S. Eighth Air Force.
The 17th BG, then flying antisubmarine patrols from Pendleton, Oregon, was immediately moved cross-country to Lexington County Army Air Base at Columbia, South Carolina, ostensibly to fly similar patrols off the East Coast of the United States but in actuality to prepare for the mission against Japan. The group officially transferred effective 9 February to Columbia, where its combat crews were offered the opportunity to volunteer for an "extremely hazardous" but unspecified mission. On 17 February the group was detached from the Eighth Air Force.
Initial planning called for 20 aircraft to fly the mission, and 24 of the group's B-25B Mitchell bombers were diverted to the Mid-Continent Airlines modification center in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Modifications included:
At 07:38 on the morning of 18 April, while the task force was still about from Japan, it was sighted by the Japanese picket boat Dai-23 Nittō Maru which radioed an attack warning to Japan.No. 3 Nittō Maru was a 70-ton patrol craft captained by a chief petty officer who committed suicide rather than be captured. Five of the eleven crew survived when they were picked up by the cruiser . Although the boat was fatally damaged by gunfire from the Nashville, Doolittle and Hornet skipper Captain Marc Mitscher decided to launch the B-25s immediately—10 hours early and farther from Japan than planned. from Tokyo at launch, while Farrow, last off, was from landfall.|group=N}} After respotting to allow for engine start and runups, Doolittle's aircraft had 467 feet (142 m) of takeoff distance. Despite the fact that none of the B-25 pilots, including Doolittle, had ever taken off from a carrier before, all 16 aircraft launched safely between 08:20 and 09:19. (The 16th B-25 had been included only as a reserve, intended to fly along as an observation and photographic platform, but when surprise was compromised, Doolittle decided to use all 16 aircraft in the attack.) This was the only time that United States Army Air Forces bombers were launched from a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier on a combat mission.
The B-25s then flew towards Japan, most in groups of two to four aircraft before changing to single file at wavetop level to avoid detection. The aircraft began arriving over Japan about noon (Tokyo time; six hours after launch) and bombed 10 military and industrial targets in Tokyo, two in Yokohama and one each in Yokosuka, Nagoya, Kobe and Osaka. Although some B-25s encountered light antiaircraft fire and a few enemy fighters over Japan, no bomber was shot down. Only the B-25 of Lt. Richard O. Joyce received any battle damage, minor hits from antiaircraft fire.
15 of the 16 aircraft then proceeded southwest along the southern coast of Japan and across the East China Sea towards eastern China, where several fields in Zhejiang province were supposed to be ready to guide them in using homing beacons, then recover and refuel them for continuing on to Chongqing, the wartime Kuomintang capital. As a result of these problems, the crews realized they would probably not be able to reach their intended bases in China, leaving them the option of either bailing out over eastern China or crash landing along the Chinese coast. Doolittle subsequently recommended Birch for intelligence work with Claire Chennault's Flying Tigers.
After the war, the complete story of the two missing crews was uncovered in a war crimes trial held in Shanghai. The trial opened in February 1946 to try four Japanese officers for mistreatment of the eight captured crewmen. Two of the missing crewmen, Staff Sgt. William J. Dieter and Sgt. Donald E. Fitzmaurice, had drowned when their B-25 crashed off the coast of China. The other eight, Lieutenants Dean E. Hallmark, Robert J. Meder, Chase Nielsen, William G. Farrow, Robert L. Hite, and George Barr; and Corporals Harold A. Spatz and Jacob DeShazer were captured. In addition to being tortured and starved, these men contracted dysentery and beriberi as a result of the poor conditions under which they were confined. On 28 August 1942, pilot Hallmark, pilot Farrow and gunner Spatz were given a mock trial by the Japanese, although the airmen were never told the charges against them. On 14 October 1942, these three crewmen were advised that they were to be executed the next day. At 16:30 on 15 October 1942, the three were taken by truck to Public Cemetery Number 1 outside of Shanghai and executed by a firing squad.
The other five captured airmen remained in military confinement on a starvation diet, their health rapidly deteriorating. In April 1943, they were moved to Nanking where, on 1 December 1943, Meder died. The remaining four men (Nielsen, Hite, Barr and DeShazer) eventually began receiving slightly better treatment from their captors and were even given a copy of the Bible and a few other books. They survived until they were freed by American troops in August 1945. The four Japanese officers who were tried for war crimes against the eight Doolittle Raiders were all found guilty. Three of them were sentenced to hard labor for five years and the fourth to a nine-year sentence. DeShazer eventually became a missionary and returned to Japan in 1948, where he served in that capacity for over 30 years.
Of the group, only Hite is alive. Barr died of heart failure in 1967, Nielsen in 2007 and Jacob DeShazer died 15 March 2008.
One other Doolittle Raid crewman was lost on the mission. Corporal Leland D. Faktor (flight engineer/gunner with Gray) was killed during his bailout attempt over China, the only man on his crew to be lost.
In addition to Doolittle's award of the Medal of Honor, Corporal David J. Thatcher (a flight engineer/gunner on Lawson's crew) and 1st Lt. Thomas R. White (flight surgeon/gunner with Smith) each received the Silver Star for their efforts in helping the wounded crew members of Lt. Lawson's crew evade Japanese troops in China. All 80 Raiders received the Distinguished Flying Cross and those who were killed, wounded or injured as a result of the raid also received the Purple Heart. In addition, every Doolittle Raider received a decoration from the Chinese government.
Twenty-eight of the crewmen remained in the China Burma India theater flying missions, most for more than a year. Five were killed in action. Nineteen crew members flew combat missions from North Africa after returning to the United States, with four killed in action and four becoming prisoners of war. Nine crew members served in the European Theater of Operations, one killed in action. Altogether 12 of the survivors died in air crashes within 15 months of the raid. Two survivors were separated from the USAAF in 1944 due to the severity of their injuries.
The 17th Bomb Group, from which the Doolittle Raiders had been recruited, received replacement crews and transferred to Barksdale Army Air Field in June 1942, where it converted to B-26 Marauder medium bombers. In November 1942 it deployed overseas to North Africa, where it operated in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations with the Twelfth Air Force for the remainder of the war.
For years before Pearl Harbor, there had been mock aerial drills in every Japanese city, not a precaution against China's almost nonexistent air force but part of the process of keeping warlike emotion at a high pitch. The Japanese press was told how to convey the news. The complexion was put on as cruel act, indiscriminate bombing civilians, women and children. Despite the minimal damage inflicted, American morale soared when news of the raid was released. Stinging from the attack on Pearl Harbor and Japan's subsequent territorial gains, it was important for the American public to know that a successful military response had been undertaken.
The raid also had a strategic impact, though it was not understood at the time: It caused the Japanese to recall some fighting IJN units to the Japanese Home Islands for defense. Its main aircraft carrier task force, spearheaded by five large, fast carriers—with its best naval aircraft and aircrews—under the command of Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, had inflicted serious losses on the Royal Navy and merchant shipping during the Indian Ocean Raid, steaming as far west as Ceylon for air raids on British shipping and Royal Air Force airfields there. Following the Doolittle Raid, Nagumo's force was recalled to Japan, removing all pressure from the Royal Navy in the Indian Ocean.
The Imperial Japanese Navy also bore a special responsibility for allowing an American aircraft carrier force to approach the Japanese Home Islands in a manner similar to that of the IJN fleet to Hawaii in 1941, and likewise it escaped undamaged. The fact that rather large twin-engine land-based bombers carried out the attack served to confuse the IJN's high command about the source of the attack. This confusion and the conclusion that Japan itself was vulnerable to air attack strengthened Yamamoto's resolve to capture Midway Island, with the attempt to do so resulting in the decisive IJN loss at the Battle of Midway.
"It was hoped that the damage done would be both material and psychological. Material damage was to be the destruction of specific targets with ensuing confusion and retardation of production. The psychological results, it was hoped, would be the recalling of combat equipment from other theaters for home defense thus effecting relief in those theaters, the development of a fear complex in Japan, improved relationships with our Allies, and a favorable reaction on the American people." —General James H. Doolittle, 9 July 1942
As of January 2011, five Raiders are still alive. Only eight were able to attend the 64th anniversary reunion held in Dayton, Ohio, in April 2006. Seven attended the 65th anniversary in 2007 in San Antonio, Texas, six attended the 66th anniversary in 2008 in Dallas, Texas, and four attended the 67th anniversary in 2009 in Columbia, South Carolina. The raiders held their 68th reunion at the National Museum of the United States Air Force in Dayton, Ohio. Cole, Griffin, Hite and Thatcher were the only raiders well enough to attend.
There are also seven individuals, such as Lt. Miller and raider historian Col. Carroll V. Glines, who are considered honorary Raiders for their respective efforts for the mission.
The last B-25 to be retired from the U.S. Air Force inventory is displayed at the Air Force Armament Museum at Eglin AFB in the markings of Gen. Doolittle's aircraft.
The recently opened Pacific Aviation Museum on Ford Island, Oahu, Hawaii also features a 1942 exhibit in which the centerpiece is a restored B-25 in the markings of "The Ruptured Duck" used on the Doolittle Raid.
The San Marcos, Texas, chapter of the Commemorative Air Force has in their museum the armor plate from the pilot seat of the B-25 Doolittle flew in the raid.
Two World War II–era B-25 bombers were craned on board and over 1,500 guests (including national, local and military media) were embarked to witness the two vintage warbirds thunder down the Ranger's flight deck and take off.
The raid also inspired two other films. One was the 1943 RKO film Bombardier starring Randolph Scott and Pat O'Brien. The climax of this movie is an attack on Japan by a group of B-17s. The other film, The Purple Heart, made in 1944, starring Dana Andrews, was a fictional depiction based on a Japanese court martial of captured American airmen, from the Doolittle Raid.
The 2001 film Pearl Harbor (with Alec Baldwin playing Doolittle) presented a heavily fictionalized version of the raid. The film's portrayal of the planning of the raid, the air raid itself, and the raid's aftermath, is inaccurate, portraying the bombing as a devastatingly effective strike against an entire industrial area. Additionally, the film includes a completely fictionalized shootout between Japanese soldiers in China and American airmen, resulting in the deaths of several Americans, many Japanese, and the rescue of the surviving airmen by Chinese soldiers.
A highly fictionalized film in 1943, Destination Tokyo starring Cary Grant, tangentially involved the raid, concentrating on the fictional submarine USS Copperfin. The submarine's mission is to enter Tokyo Bay undetected and place a landing party ashore to obtain weather information vital to the upcoming Doolittle raid. The film suggests the raid did not launch until up-to-the-minute data was received. However, all the after-action reports indicated the raid launched without time for weather briefings because of the encounter with the picket ships.
Category:Airstrikes Category:Asia and the Pacific 1941-42 Category:Conflicts in 1942 Category:1942 in Japan Category:Japanese home islands campaign
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