

Annex III: Scenarios and Modelling Methods

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Coordinating Lead Authors: Celine Guivarch (France), Elmar Kriegler (Germany), Joana Portugal Pereira (Brazil).

Lead Authors: Valentina Bosetti (Italy), James Edmonds (the United States of America), Manfred Fischedick (Germany), Petr Havlik (Austria), Paulina Jaramillo (the United States of America), Volker Krey (Austria), Franck Lecocq (France), André Lucena (Brazil), Malte Meinshausen (Australia/Germany), Sebastian Mirasgedis (Greece), Brian O'Neill (the United States of America), Glen Peters (Norway/Australia), Joeri Rogelj (Belgium/United Kingdom), Steve Rose (the United States of America), Yamina Saheb (Algeria), Goran Strbac (United Kingdom), Anders Hammer Strømman (Norway), Detlef van Vuuren (the Netherlands), Nan Zhou (the United States of America).

Contributing Authors: Alaa Al Khourdajie (United Kingdom/Syria), Hossein Ameli (Germany), Cornelia Auer (Germany), Nico Bauer (Germany), Edward Byers (Austria/Ireland), Michael Craig (the United States of America), Bruno Cunha (Brazil), Stefan Frank (Austria), Jan Fuglestvedt (Norway), Mathijs Harmsen (the Netherlands), Alan Jenn (the United States of America), Jarmo Kikstra (Austria/the Netherlands), Paul Kishimoto (Canada), Robin Lamboll (United Kingdom/ the United States of America), Julien Lefèvre (France), Eric Masanet (the United States of America), David McCollum (the United States of America), Zebedee Nicholls (Australia), Aleksandra Novikova (Germany), Simon Parkinson (Canada), Pedro Rochedo (Brazil), Sasha Samadi (Germany), David Vérez (Spain/Cuba), Sonia Yeh (Sweden/ the United States of America).

Date of Draft: 28/11/2021

Table of Contents

Annex III: Scenarios and Modelling Methods	I-1
Preamble	I-4
Part I. Modelling methods	I-5
1. Overview of modelling tools.....	I-5
2. Economic frameworks and concepts used in sectoral models and integrated assessment models I-8	
3. Energy system modelling.....	I-11
3.1. Bottom-up models.....	I-11
3.2. Modelling of energy systems in context of economy	I-13
3.3. Hybrid models.....	I-13
4. Building sector models	I-14
4.1. Models purpose, scope and types.....	I-14
4.2. Representation of energy demand and GHG emissions.....	I-14
4.3. Representation of mitigation options	I-15
4.4. Representation of climate change impacts.....	I-15
4.5. Representation of sustainable development dimensions.....	I-16
4.6. Models underlying the assessment in Chapter 9.....	I-18
5. Transport models	I-22
5.1. Purpose and scope of models.....	I-22
5.2. Inventory of transportation models included in AR6.....	I-24
6. Industry sector models	I-24
6.1. Types of industry sector models	I-24
6.2. Representation of demand for industrial products	I-24
6.3. Representation of mitigation options - mitigation options, how their uptake is represented, how potentials and costs are represented	I-25
6.4. Limitations and critical analysis	I-26
7. Land use modelling.....	I-27
7.1. Modelling of land use and land use change	I-27
7.2. Demand for food, feed, fibre and agricultural trade.....	I-28
7.3. Treatment of land-based mitigation options	I-28
7.4. Treatment of environmental and socio-economic impacts of land use.....	I-29
8. Reduced complexity climate modelling.....	I-29
9. Integrated assessment modelling	I-30
9.1. Types of Integrated Assessment Models.....	I-31
9.2. Components of integrated assessment models.....	I-32

9.3. Representation of nexus issues and sustainable development impacts in IAMs.....	I-33
9.4. Policy analysis with IAMs	I-35
9.5. Limitations of IAMs.....	I-37
10. Key characteristics of models that contributed mitigation scenarios to the assessment	I-39
11. Comparison of mitigation and removal measures represented by models that contributed mitigation scenarios to the assessment.....	I-42
Part II. Scenarios	II-48
1. Overview on climate change scenarios	II-48
1.1. Purposes of climate change scenarios	II-48
1.2. Types of climate change mitigation scenarios	II-49
1.3. Scenario framework for climate change research	II-52
1.4. Key design choices and assumptions in mitigation scenarios.....	II-54
2. Use of scenarios in the assessment	II-57
2.1. Use of scenario literature and database	II-57
2.2. Treatment of scenario uncertainty.....	II-58
2.3. Feasibility of mitigation scenarios	II-58
2.4. Illustrative mitigation pathways.....	II-60
2.5. Scenario approaches to connect WG III with the WG I and WG II assessments	II-63
3. WG III AR6 scenario database	II-68
3.1. Process of scenario collection and vetting	II-68
3.2. Global pathways.....	II-70
3.3. National and regional pathways.....	II-81
3.4. Sector transition pathways	II-83
References.....	II-85

1 Preamble

2 The use of scenarios and modelling methods are pillars in IPCC WG III Assessment Reports. Past WG
3 III assessment report cycles identified knowledge gaps about the integration of modelling across scales
4 and disciplines, mainly between global integrated assessment modelling methods and bottom-up
5 modelling insights of mitigation responses. The need to improve the transparency of model assumptions
6 and enhance the communication of scenario results was also recognised.

7 This annex on *Scenarios and modelling methods* aims to address some of these gaps by detailing the
8 modelling frameworks applied in the WG III AR6 chapters and disclose scenario assumptions and its
9 key parameters. It has been explicitly included in the Scoping Meeting Report of the WG III
10 contribution to the AR6 and approved by the IPCC Panel in the 46th Session of the Panel.

11 The annex includes two parts: Part I. on *modelling methods* summarises methods and tools available to
12 evaluate sectorial, technological and behavioural mitigation responses as well as integrated assessment
13 models (IAMs) for the analysis of “whole system” transformation pathways; Part II on *scenarios* sets
14 out the portfolio of climate change scenarios and mitigation pathways assessed in the WG III AR6
15 chapters, its underneath principles and interactions with scenario assessments by WG I and WG II.

16

ACCEPTED VERSION
SUBJECT TO FINAL EDITING

Part I. Modelling methods

1. Overview of modelling tools

Modelling frameworks vary vastly amongst themselves, and several key characteristics can be used as basis for model classification (Scrieciu et al. 2013; Hardt and O'Neill 2017; Capellán-Pérez et al. 2020; Dodds et al. 2015). Broadly, literature characterises models along three dimensions: (i) level of detail and heterogeneity, (ii) mathematical algorithm concepts and (iii) and temporal and spatial system boundaries (Krey 2014).

Commonly climate mitigation models are referred to as *bottom-up* and *top-down* depending upon their degree of detail (van Vuuren et al. 2009). Generally, *bottom-up* approaches present more systematic individual technological details about a reduced number of mitigation strategies of a specific sector or sub-sector. These models tend to disregard relations between specific sectors/technologies and miss evaluating interactions with the whole system. On the other hand, *top-down* approaches present a more aggregated and global analysis, in detriment of less detailed technological heterogeneity. They tend to focus on interactions within the whole system, such as market and policy instrument interactions within the global economy systems. Studies using top-down models are more capable of representing economic structural change than adopting technology-explicit decarbonisation strategies (Kriegler et al. 2015a; van Vuuren et al. 2009). Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) typically use a top-down approach to model sectorial mitigation strategies.

Although this dichotomic classification has been while mentioned in the literature, since AR5, climate mitigation models have evolved towards a more *hybrid* approach incorporating attributes of both *bottom-up* and *top-down* approaches. This is partly due to different modelling communities having different understandings of these two approaches principles, which can be misleading.

One of the most basic aspects of a modelling tool is how it approaches the system modelled from a solution perspective. A broad interpretation of mathematical algorithm concepts classifies models as simulation and optimisation models. **Simulation models** are based on the evaluation of the dynamic behaviour of a system (Lund et al. 2017). They can be used to determine the performance of a system under alternative options of key parameters in a plausible manner. Most often, simulation models require comprehensive knowledge of each parameter, in order to choose a specific path under several alternatives. On the other hand, **optimisation models** seek to maximise or minimise a mathematical objective function under a set of constraints (Iqbal et al. 2014; Baños et al. 2011). Most often, the objective function represents the total cost or revenue of a given system or the total welfare of a given society. One major aspect of optimisation models is that the solution is achieved by simultaneously binding a set of constraints, which can be used to represent real life limitation on the system, such as: constraints on flows, resource and technology availability, labour and financial limitations, environmental aspects, and many other characteristics that the model may require (Fazlollahi et al. 2012; Cedillos Alvarado et al. 2016; Pfenninger et al. 2014). Specifically, when modelling climate mitigation responses, limiting carbon budgets is often used to represent future temperature level pathways (Gidden et al. 2019; Rogelj et al. 2016; Millar et al. 2017; Peters 2018).

Another major distinction amongst modelling tools is related to the solution methodology from a temporal perspective. They can have a perfect foresight intertemporal assumption or a recursive-dynamic assumption. Intertemporal optimisation with **perfect foresight** is an optimisation method for achieving an overall optimal solution over time. It is based on perfect information on all future states of a system and assumptions (such as technology availability and prices) and, as such, today's and future decisions are made simultaneously, resulting in a single path of optimal actions that lead to the overall optimal solution (Keppo and Strubegger 2010; Gerbaulet et al. 2019). Such modelling approach can

1 present an optimal trajectory of the set of actions and policies that would lead to the overall first-best
2 solution. However, real-life decisions are not always based on optimal solutions (Ellenbeck and
3 Lilliestam 2019) and, therefore, solutions from perfect foresight models can be challenging to be
4 implemented by policymakers (Pindyck 2013, 2017). For instance, perfect foresight implies perfect
5 knowledge of the future states of the system, such as future demand on goods and products and
6 availability of production factors and technology.

7 **Recursive-dynamic** models, also known as myopic or limited foresight models, make decisions over
8 sequential periods of time. For each time step, the solution is achieved without information of future
9 time steps. Therefore, the solution path is a series of solutions in short trajectories that, ultimately, are
10 very unlikely to achieve the overall optimal solution over the whole time period considered (Fuso Nerini
11 et al. 2017). Nonetheless, the solution represents a set of possible and plausible policies and behavioural
12 choices of the agents that could be taken in short-term cycles, without perfect information (Hanna and
13 Gross 2020; Heuberger et al. 2018). In between, some models consider **imperfect or adaptive**
14 **expectations**, where economic decisions are based on past, current and imperfectly anticipated future
15 information (Keppo and Strubegger 2010; Löffler et al. 2019; Kriegler et al. 2015a). Modelling tools
16 can also be differentiated by their level of representation of economic agents and sectors: they can have
17 a full representation of all agents of the economy and their interactions with each other (**general**
18 **equilibrium**) or focus on a more detailed representation of a subset of economic sector and agents
19 (**partial equilibrium**) (Babatunde et al. 2017; Cheng et al. 2015; Hanes and Carpenter 2017; Sanchez
20 et al. 2018; Guedes et al. 2019; Pastor et al. 2019) (Annex III, I.2).

21 The most basic aspect to differentiate models is their main objective function, which include the detail
22 at which they represent key sectors, systems and agents. This affects the decision on methodology and
23 other coverage aspects. Several models have been developed for different sectorial representation, such
24 as the energy (Annex III.I.3) buildings (Annex III.I.4), transports (Annex III.I.5), industry (Annex
25 III.I.6) and land use (Annex III.I.7).

26 Modelling exercises vary considerable in terms of key characteristics, including geographical scales,
27 time coverage, environmental variables, technologies portfolio, and socioeconomic assumptions. A
28 detailed comparison of key characteristics of global and national models used in this report is presented
29 in Annex III.I.9. Geographical coverage ranges from sub-national (Cheng et al. 2015; Feijoo et al. 2018;
30 Rajão et al. 2020), national (Vishwanathan et al. 2019; Li et al. 2019; Sugiyama et al. 2019; Schaeffer
31 et al. 2020), regional (Vrontisi et al. 2016; Hanaoka and Masui 2020) and global models (McCollum et
32 al. 2018; Gidden et al. 2018; Kriegler et al. 2018a; Rogelj et al. 2019b; Drouet et al. 2021). Even models
33 with the same geographical coverage can still be significantly different from each other, for instance,
34 due to the number of regions within the model. Models can also have spatially implicit and explicit
35 formulations, which in turn can have different spatial resolution. This distinction is especially important
36 for land use models, which account for changes in land use and agricultural practices (Annex III.7. Land
37 use modelling). The time horizon, time steps and time resolution are major aspects that differ across
38 models. Model horizon can range from short- to long-term, typically reaching from a few years to up
39 until the end of the century (Fujimori et al. 2019b; Rogelj et al. 2019a; Ringkjøb et al. 2020; Gidden et
40 al. 2019). Time resolution is particularly relevant for specific applications, such as power sector models,
41 which have detailed representation of power technologies dispatch and operation (Soria et al. 2016;
42 Abujarad et al. 2017; Guan et al. 2020).

43 Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) is an integrated technique to evaluate the sustainability of a product
44 throughout its life cycle. It quantifies the environmental burdens associated with all stages from the
45 extraction of raw materials, through the production of the product itself, its utilisation, and end-life,
46 either via reuse, recycling or final disposal (Rebitzer et al. 2004; Finnveden et al. 2009; Guinée et al.
47 2011; Curran 2013; Hellweg and Milà i Canals 2014). The environmental impacts covered include all
48 types of loads on the environment through the extraction of natural resources and emission of hazardous

1 substances. For this reason, LCA has the flexibility to evaluate an entire product system hence avoiding
2 sub-optimisation in a single process and identifying the products/processes that result in the least
3 environmental impact. Thus, it allows for the quantification of possible trade-offs between different
4 environmental impacts (e.g. eliminating air emissions by increasing non-renewable energy resources)
5 (Gibon et al. 2017; Nordelöf et al. 2014; Hawkins et al. 2013) and/or from one stage to other (e.g. reuse
6 or recycling a product to bring it back in at the raw material acquisition phase) (Hertwich and Hammitt
7 2001a,b). It gives a holistic view of complex systems and reduces the number of parameters for which
8 decisions have to be taken, while not glossing over technical and economical details. In recent years,
9 LCA has been widely used in both retrospective and prospective analysis of product chains in various
10 climate mitigation fields, namely comparing existing energy technologies with planned alternatives
11 (Portugal-Pereira et al. 2015; Cetinkaya et al. 2012), product innovation and development (Wender et
12 al. 2014; Sharp and Miller 2016; Portugal-Pereira et al. 2015), certification schemes (Prussi et al. 2021),
13 or supply chain management (Hagelaar 2001; Blass and Corbett 2018).

14
15 Two different types of LCA approaches can be distinguished: the Attributional Life Cycle Assessment
16 (ALCA) and the Consequential Life Cycle Assessment (CLCA). The Attributional Life Cycle
17 Assessment (ALCA) aims at describing the direct environmental impacts of a product. It typically uses
18 average and historical data to quantify the environmental burden during a products' life cycle, and it
19 tends to exclude market effects or other indirect effects of the production and consumption of products
20 (Baitz 2017). CLCA, on the other hand, focus on the effects of changes due to product life cycle,
21 including both consequences inside and outside the product life cycle (Earles and Halog 2011). Thus,
22 the system boundaries are generally expanded to represent direct and indirect effects of products'
23 outputs. CLCA tends to describe more complex systems than ALCA that are highly sensitive to data
24 assumptions (Plevin et al. 2014; Weidema et al. 2018; Bamber et al. 2020).

25 **Integrated Assessment Model (IAM)** are simplified representations of the complex physical and social
26 systems, focusing on the interaction between economy, society and the environment (Annex III.I.9).
27 They represent the coupled energy-economy-land-climate system to varying degrees. In a way, IAM
28 differ themselves in all the topics discussed in this section: significant variation in geographical,
29 sectorial, spatial and time resolution; rely greatly on socioeconomic assumptions; different
30 technological representation; partial or general equilibrium assumptions; differentiated between perfect
31 foresight or recursive-dynamic methodology. The difficulty in fully representing the extent of climate
32 damages in monetary terms may be the most important and challenging limitation of IAMs and it is
33 mostly directed to cost benefit IAMs. However, both categories of IAMs present important limitations
34 (Annex III.I.9).

35 Following this brief synopsis of modelling taxonomies, Section 2. Economic frameworks and concepts
36 used in sectoral models and integrated assessment models details key aspects of economic frameworks
37 and principles used to modelling climate mitigation responses and estimates its costs. Sections I.3, I.4,
38 I.5, I.6, I.7 present key aspects of sectorial modelling approaches in energy systems, buildings,
39 transports, industry, and land use, respectively. Interactions between WG I climate emulators and WG
40 III mitigation models are described in Section I.8 A review of integrated assessment model (IAM)
41 approaches, their components and limitations are present in Section I.9. Sections I.10 and I.11 present
42 comparative tables of key characteristics and measures of national and global models that contributed
43 to the WG III AR6 scenario database.

44

2. Economic frameworks and concepts used in sectoral models and integrated assessment models

Several types of ‘full economy’ frameworks are used in integrated assessment models. The **general equilibrium** framework – often referred to as Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) – represents the economic interdependencies between multiple sectors and agents, and the interaction between supply and demand on multiple markets (Robinson et al. 1999). It captures the full circularity of economic flows through income and demand relationships and feedbacks including the overall balance of payments. Most CGE approaches used are neoclassical supply-led models with market clearing based on price adjustment. Representative agents usually minimize production costs or maximize utility under given production and utility function, although optimal behaviours are not a precondition *per se*. Most CGE models also include assumptions of perfect markets with full employment of factors although market imperfections and underemployment of factors (e.g. unemployment) can be assumed (Babiker and Eckaus 2007; Guivarch et al. 2011). CGE frameworks can either be static or dynamic and represent pathways as a sequence of equilibria in the second case.

Macro-econometric frameworks represent similar sectoral interdependence with balance of payments as general equilibrium, and are sometimes considered a subset of it. They differ from standard neoclassical CGE models in the main aspect that economic behaviours are not micro-founded optimizing behaviours but represented by macroeconomic and sectoral functions estimated through econometric techniques (Barker and Scricciu 2010). In addition, they usually adopt a demand-led post-Keynesian approach where final demand and investment determine supply and not the other way around. Prices also do not instantaneously clear markets and adjust with lag.

Macro-economic growth framework are also full economy approaches derived from aggregated growth models. They are based on a single macroeconomic production function combining capital, labour and sometimes energy to produce a generic good for consumption and investment. They are used as the macroeconomic component of cost benefit IAMs (Nordhaus 1993) and some detailed-process IAMs.

The **disaggregation of economic actors and sectors and the representation of their interaction** differ across full economy frameworks. A main distinction is between models based on full Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and aggregated growth approaches. On the one hand, SAM-based frameworks – CGE and macro-econometric – follow a multi-sectoral approach distinguishing from several to a hundred of different economic sectors or production goods and represent sector specific value-added, final consumption and interindustry intermediary consumption (Robinson 1989). They also represent economic agents (firms, households, public administration, etc.) with specific behaviours and budget constraints. On the other hand, macro-economic growth frameworks are reduced to a single macro-economic agent producing, consuming and investing a single macroeconomic good without considering interindustry relationships. In some detailed process IAMs, the aggregated growth approach is combined with a detailed representation of energy supply and demand systems that surmises different economic actors and subsectors. However, the energy system is driven by an aggregated growth engine (Bauer et al. 2008).

Partial equilibrium frameworks do not cover the full economy but only represent a subset of economic sectors and markets disconnected from the rest of the economy. They basically represent market balance and adjustments for a subset of sectors under *ceteris paribus* assumptions about other markets (labour, capital, etc.), income, etc. ignoring possible feedbacks. Partial equilibrium frameworks are used in sectoral models, as well as to model several sectors and markets at the same time – e.g. energy and agriculture markets – in energy system models and some detailed process IAMs but still without covering the full economy.

1 In most models the treatment of **economic growth** follows Solow or Ramsey growth approach based
2 on the evolution through time of production factors endowment and productivity. Classically, labour
3 endowment and demography are exogenous, and capital accumulates through investment. Partial
4 equilibrium frameworks do not model economic growth but use exogenous growth assumptions derived
5 from growth models. Factors productivity evolution is assumed exogenous in most cases i.e. general
6 technical progress is assumed to be an autonomous process. A few models feature endogenous growth
7 aspects where factor productivity increases with cumulated macroeconomic investment. Models also
8 differ about the content of technical progress and alternatively consider un-biased total factor
9 productivity improvement or labour specific factor augmenting productivity. In multi-sectoral
10 macroeconomic models, economic growth comes with endogenous changes of the sectoral composition
11 of GDP known as structural change. **Structural change** results from the interplay between
12 differentiated changes of productivity between sectors and of the structure of final demand as income
13 grows (Herrendorf et al. 2014). If general technical progress is mostly assumed exogenous and
14 autonomous at an aggregated level, **innovation in relation to energy demand and technical systems**
15 follow more detailed specifications in models. Energy efficiency can be assumed an autonomous
16 process at different levels – macroeconomic, sector or technology – or energy technical change can be
17 endogenous and induced as a learning by doing process or as a result of R&D investments (learning-
18 by-searching) (Löschel 2002).

19 Multi-regional models consider interactions between regions through **trade** of energy goods, non-
20 energy goods and services – depending on model scope – and emission permits in the context of climate
21 policy. For each type of goods, trade is usually represented as a common pool where regions interact
22 with the pool through supply (exports) or demand (imports). A few models consider bilateral trade flows
23 between regions. Traded goods can be assumed as perfectly substitutable between regions of origin
24 (Heckscher-Ohlin assumption) such as is often the case for energy commodities or as imperfectly
25 substitutable (e.g. Armington goods) for non-energy goods. The representation of trade and capital
26 imbalances at the regional level and their evolution through time vary across model and imbalances are
27 either not considered (regional current accounts are balanced at each point in time), or a constraint for
28 intertemporal balance is included (an export surplus today will be balanced by an import surplus in the
29 future) or else trade imbalances follow other rules such as a convergence towards zero in the long run
30 (Foure et al. 2020).

31 **Strategic interaction** can also occur between regions especially in the presence of externalities such as
32 climate change, energy prices or technology spillovers. Intertemporal models can include several types
33 of strategic interaction: i) a cooperative Pareto optimal solution where all externalities are internalised
34 and based on the maximization of a global discounted welfare with weighted regional welfare (Negishi
35 weights), ii) a non-cooperative solution that is strategically optimal for each region (Nash equilibrium)
36 (Leimbach et al. 2017b), and iii) partially cooperative solutions (Eyckmans and Tulkens 2003; Yang
37 2008; Bréchet et al. 2011; Tulkens 2019), akin to climate clubs (Nordhaus 2015).

38 Models cover different **investment** flows depending on the economic framework used. Partial
39 equilibrium models compute energy system and/or sectoral (transport, building, industry, etc.)
40 technology specific investment flows associated with productive capacities and equipment. Full
41 economy models compute both energy system and macroeconomic investment, the second being used
42 to increase macroeconomic capital stock. Full economy multi-sectoral models compute sector specific
43 (energy and non-energy sectors) investment and capital flows with some details about the investments
44 goods involved.

45 Full economy models differ in the representation of macro-**finance**. In most CGE and macro-economic
46 growth frameworks financial mechanisms are only implicit and total financial capacity and investment
47 are constrained by savings. Consequently, investment in a given sector (e.g. low carbon energy) fully
48 crowds-out investment in other sectors. In macro-econometric frameworks, macro-finance is sometimes

1 explicit, and investments can be financed by credit on top of savings, which implies more limited
2 crowding-out of investments (Mercuré et al. 2019). Macro-financial constraints are usually not
3 accounted for in partial equilibrium models.

4 Models compare economic flows over time through **discounting**. Table I.5 summarizes key
5 characteristics of different models assessed in AR6, including the uses of discounting. In cost-benefit
6 analysis (CBA), discounting enables to compare mitigation costs and climate change damage. In the
7 context of mitigation and in cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), discounting allows comparing
8 mitigation costs over time.

9 In optimization models a social discount rate is used to compare costs and benefits over time. In the
10 case of partial equilibrium optimization models, the objective is typically to minimize total discounted
11 system cost. The social discount rate is then an exogenous parameter, which can be assumed constant
12 or changing (generally decreasing) over time (e.g. Gambhir et al. 2017 where a 5% discount rate is
13 used). In the case of intertemporal welfare optimization models, a Ramsey intertemporal optimization
14 framework is generally used, considering a representative agent who decides how to allocate her
15 consumption, and hence saving, over time subject to a resource constraint. Ramsey (1928) shows that
16 the solution must always satisfy the Ramsey Equation, which provides the determinants of the social
17 discount rate. The Ramsey Equation is given as follows:

$$18 \quad \rho = \delta + \eta g_t$$

19 where ρ is the consumption discount rate (aka social discount rate), δ is the utility discount rate (aka
20 pure time discount rate, or time preferences rate) which is a value judgement that determines the present
21 value of a change in the utility experienced in the future and hence it is an ethical parameter, g_t is the
22 growth rate of consumption per capita overtime, and η is the elasticity of marginal utility of
23 consumption, which is also a value judgement and hence an ethical parameter. The parameter η is also
24 a measure of risk aversion and a measure of society's aversion to inequality within and across
25 generations. The pure time preference rate is an exogenous parameter, but the social discount rate is
26 endogenously computed by the model itself and depends on the growth rate of consumption per capita
27 over time. Note that more complex frameworks disentangle inequality aversion from risk aversion, and
28 introduce uncertainty, leading to extensions of the social discount rate equation (see for instance Gollier
29 2013)

30 Discounting is also used for ex-post comparison of mitigation cost pathways across models and
31 scenarios. Values typically used for such ex-post comparison are 2%-5% (e.g. Admiraal et al. 2016).
32 Across this report, whenever discounting is used for ex-post comparisons, the discount rate applied is
33 stated explicitly.

34 The choice of the appropriate social discount rate (and the appropriate rate of pure time preference when
35 applicable) is highly debated (see e.g. Arrow et al. (2013), Gollier and Hammitt (2014), Polasky and
36 Dampha (2021)) and two general approaches are commonly used. Based on ethical principles, the
37 prescriptive approach states that the discount rate should reflect how costs and benefits supported by
38 different generations should be weighted. The descriptive approach identifies the social discount rate to
39 the risk free rate of return to capital as observed in the real economy, which generally yields higher
40 values.

41 In CBA the choice of discount rate is crucial for the balance of mitigation costs and avoided climate
42 damages in the long run and a lower discount rate yields more abatement effort and lower global
43 temperature increases (Stern 2006; Hänsel et al. 2020). In CEA, the choice of social discount rate
44 influences the timing of emission reductions to limit warming to a given temperature level. A lower
45 discount rate increases short-term emissions reductions, lowers temperature overshoot, favours
46 currently available mitigation options (energy efficiency, renewable energy, etc.) over future

1 deployment of net negative emission and distributes mitigation effort more evenly between generations
2 (Emmerling et al. 2019; Strefler et al. 2021b).

3 Outside social discounting for intertemporal optimization, discounting is used in simulation models to
4 compute the lifecycle costs of investment decisions (e.g. energy efficiency choices, choices between
5 different types of technologies based on their levelized costs – LCOE). In this case, the discount rate
6 can be interpreted as the cost of capital faced by investors. The cost of capital influences the merit order
7 of technologies and lower capital cost favours capital intensive technologies over technologies with
8 higher variable costs. Models can reflect regional, sectoral or technology specific cost of capital -
9 through heterogeneous discount rates for lifecycle cost estimates in simulation models (Iyer et al. 2015)
10 or as hurdle rates in energy optimization models (Ameli et al. 2021). In some cases, simulation models
11 may also produce mitigation pathways following the Hotelling principle and assuming that the carbon
12 price rises at the social discount rate (e.g. GCAM scenarios in the SSP study with carbon prices
13 increasing at 5% yearly (Guivarch and Rogelj 2017)).

14

15 **3. Energy system modelling**

16 In the literature, the energy system models are categorized based on different criteria, such as (a) energy
17 sectors covered, (b) geographical coverage, (c) time resolution, (d) methodology, and (e) programming
18 techniques. In the following sections, examples on different types of energy system models applied in
19 Chapter 6 are presented.

20 **3.1. Bottom-up models**

21 ***3.1.1. Modelling electricity system operation and planning with large scale penetration of renewables***

22 A number of advanced grid modelling approaches have been developed (Sani Hassan et al. 2018), such
23 as robust optimization (Jiang et al. 2012), interval optimization (Dvorkin et al. 2015), or stochastic
24 optimization (Meibom et al. 2011; Monforti et al. 2014) to optimally schedule the operation of the future
25 low carbon systems with high penetration of variable renewable energies (VRE). Advanced stochastic
26 models demonstrated that this would not only lead to significantly higher cost of system management
27 but may eventually limit the ability of the system to accommodate renewable generation (Badesa et al.
28 2020; Hansen et al. 2019; Perez et al. 2019; Bistline and Young 2019). Modelling tools such as
29 *European Model for Power system Investment with Renewable Energy (EMPIRE)* (Skar et al. 2016),
30 *Renewable Energy Mix for Sustainable Electricity Supply (REMIX)* (Scholz et al. 2017), *European Unit*
31 *Commitment And Dispatch model (EUCAD)* (Després 2015), *SWITCH* (Fripp 2012), *GenX* (TNO
32 2021), and *Python for Power System Analysis (PyPSA)* (Brown et al. 2018) investigated these issues.
33 SWITCH is a stochastic model, in which investments in renewable and conventional power plants is
34 optimized over a multi-year period (Fripp 2012). In GenX the operational flexibility as well as capacity
35 planning is optimized from a system-wide perspective (TNO 2021). PyPSA is an optimization model
36 for modern electricity systems, including unit commitment of generation plants, renewable sources,
37 storage, and interaction with other energy vectors (Brown et al. 2018).

38 Furthermore, advanced modelling tools have been developed for the purpose of providing estimations
39 of system wide inertial frequency response that would assist system operators in maintaining adequate
40 system inertia (Sharma et al. 2011; Teng and Strbac 2017). These innovative models also provided
41 fundamental evidence regarding the role and value of advanced technologies and control systems in
42 supporting cost effective operation of future electricity systems with very high penetration of renewable
43 generation. In particular, the importance of enhancing the control capabilities of renewable generation
44 and applying flexible technologies, such as energy storage (Hall and Bain 2008; Obi et al. 2017;
45 Arbabzadeh et al. 2019), demand side response (DSR), interconnection (Aghajani et al. 2017) and

1 transmission grid extensions (Schaber et al. 2012) for provide system stability control, is demonstrated
2 through novel system integration models (Sinsel et al. 2020; Lund et al. 2015).

3 A novel modelling framework is proposed to deliver inertia and support primary frequency control
4 through variable-speed wind turbines (Morren et al. 2006) and PVs (Waffenschmidt and Hui 2016; Liu
5 et al. 2017), including quantification of the value of this technology in future renewable generation
6 dominated power grids (Chu et al. 2020). Advanced models for controlling distributed energy storage
7 systems to provide an effective virtual inertia have been developed, demonstrating the provision of
8 virtual-synchronous-machine capabilities for storage devices with power electronic converters, which
9 can support system frequency management following disturbances (Hammad et al. 2019; Markovic et
10 al. 2019). Regarding the application of interconnection for exchange of balancing services between
11 neighbouring power grids, alternative control schemes for High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC)
12 converters have been proposed demonstrating that this would reduce the cost of balancing (Tosatto et
13 al. 2020).

14 **3.1.2. Modelling the interaction between different energy sectors**

15 Several integrated models have been developed in order to study the interaction between different
16 energy vectors and whole system approaches, such as *Integrated Energy System Simulation model*
17 (*IESM*) (NREL 2020), *Integrated Whole-Energy System (IWES)* (Strbac et al. 2018), *UK TIMES* (Daly
18 and Fais 2014), and *Calliope* (Pfenninger and Pickering 2018).

19 IESM is an approach in which the multi-system energy challenge is investigated holistically rather than
20 looking at each of the systems in isolation. IESM capabilities include co-optimization across multiple
21 energy systems, including electricity, natural gas, hydrogen, and water systems. These provide the
22 opportunity to perform hydro, thermal, and gas infrastructure investment and resource use coordination
23 for time horizons ranging from sub-hourly (markets and operations) to multi-years (planning) (NREL
24 2020).

25 IWES model incorporates detail modelling of electricity, gas, transport, hydrogen, and heat systems
26 and captures the complex interactions across those energy vectors. The IWES model also considers the
27 short-term operation and long-term investment timescales (from seconds to years) simultaneously,
28 while coordinating operation of and investment in local district and national/international level energy
29 infrastructures (Strbac et al. 2018).

30 The UK TIMES Model ('The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System') uses linear-programming to
31 produce a least-cost energy system, optimized according to a number of user constraints, over medium
32 to long-term time horizons. It portrays the UK energy system, from fuel extraction and trading to fuel
33 processing and transport, electricity generation and all final energy demands (Taylor et al. 2014; Daly
34 and Fais 2014). The model generates scenarios for the evolution of the energy system based on different
35 assumptions around the evolution of demands, future technology costs, measuring energy system costs
36 and all greenhouse gases (GHGs) associated with the scenario. UKTM is built using the TIMES model
37 generator: as a partial equilibrium energy system and technologically detailed model, is well suited to
38 investigate the economic, social, and technological trade-offs between long-term divergent energy
39 scenarios.

40 Calliope is an open source Python-based toolchain for developing energy system models, focusing on
41 flexibility, high temporal and spatial granularities. This model has the ability to execute many runs on
42 the same base model, with clear separation of model (data) and framework (code) (Pfenninger and
43 Pickering 2018).

44

1 **3.2. Modelling of energy systems in context of economy**

2 To study the impact of low carbon energy systems on the economy, numerous integrated assessment
3 modelling tools (Top-down models) are applied, such as: *General Equilibrium Model for Economy-*
4 *Energy-Environment (GEM-E3)* (Capros et al. 2013), *ENV-Linkages* (Burniaux and Chateau 2010), and
5 *Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA)* (Chen et al. 2016).

6 GEM-E3 is a recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium model that covers the interactions
7 between the economy, the energy system and the environment. It is especially designed to evaluate
8 energy, climate, and environmental policies. GEM-E3 can evaluate consistently the distributional and
9 macro-economic effects of policies for the various economic sectors and agents across the
10 countries/regions (Capros et al. 2013).

11 The modelling work based on ENV-Linkages (as a successor to the OECD GREEN) provides insights
12 to policy makers in identifying least-cost policies by taking into account environmental issues, such as
13 phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, and climate change mitigation (Burniaux and Chateau 2010).

14 In the EPPA model different processes (e.g., economic and technological), which have impacts on the
15 environment from regional to global at multiple scales is simulated. The outputs of this modeling (e.g.,
16 greenhouse gas emissions, air and water pollutants) are provided to the MIT Earth System (MESM),
17 which investigated the interaction between sub-models of physical, dynamical and chemical processes
18 in different systems (Chen et al. 2016).

19

20 **3.3. Hybrid models**

21 Hybrid models are a combination of macro-economic models (i.e., top-down) with at least one energy
22 sector model (i.e., bottom-up) that could benefit from the advantages of both mentioned approaches. In
23 this regard, linking these two models can be carried out either manually through transferring the data
24 from one model to the other (soft-linking), or automatically (hard-linking) (Prina et al. 2020). In this
25 section, some of these models are presented including *World Energy Model (WEM)* (IEA 2020a), the
26 *National Energy Modelling System (NEMS)* (Fattahi et al. 2020).

27 The WEM is a simulation model covering energy supply, energy transformation and energy demand.
28 The majority of the end-use sectors use stock models to characterize the energy infrastructure. In
29 addition, energy-related CO₂ emissions and investments related to energy developments are specified.
30 The model is focused on determining the share of alternative technologies in satisfying energy service
31 demand. This includes investment costs, operating and maintenance costs, fuel costs and in some cases
32 costs for emitting CO₂ (IEA 2020a).

33 The NEMS is an energy-economy modelling system applied for the U.S.A. through 2030. NEMS
34 projects considers the production, imports, conversion, consumption, and prices of energy, subject to
35 assumptions on macroeconomic and financial factors, world energy markets, resource availability and
36 costs, behavioural and technological choice criteria, cost and performance characteristics of energy
37 technologies, and demographics. NEMS was designed and implemented by the Energy Information
38 Administration (EIA) of the U.S. Department of Energy. NEMS is used by EIA to project the energy,
39 economic, environmental, and security impacts on the United States considering alternative energy
40 policies and assumptions related to energy markets (Fattahi et al. 2020).

41


1 4. Building sector models

2 4.1. Models purpose, scope and types

3 GHG emissions and mitigation potentials in the building sector are modelled using either a top-down,
4 a bottom-up or a hybrid approach, which combines both bottom-up and top-down (Figure I.1.).

- 5 1. The top-down models are used for assessing economic-wide responses of building policies.
6 These models are either economic or technological and have low granularity (Figure I.1.).
- 7 2. The bottom-up models are data intensive and based on microscopic data of individual end-uses
8 and the characteristics of each component of buildings. Bottom-up models can be either
9 physics-based, also known as engineering models; data-driven, also known as statistical
10 models; or a combination of both, also known as hybrid bottom-up models. Bottom-up models
11 are useful to assess the technico-economic potentials of the overall building stock by
12 extrapolating the estimated energy consumption of a representative set of individual buildings
13 (Duerinck et al. 2008; Hall and Buckley 2016; Bourdeau et al. 2019) (Figure I.1.).
- 14 3. Hybrid models used for buildings can be either optimisation or simulation models (Duerinck et
15 al. 2008; Hall and Buckley 2016; Bourdeau et al. 2019) (Figure I.1.). The latter can also be
16 agent-based models and could be combined with building performance models to allow for an
17 assessment of occupants behaviour (Sachs et al. 2019a; Papadopoulos and Azar 2016; Niamir
18 et al. 2020). Hybrid models are used for exploring the impacts of resource constraints and for
19 investigating the role of specific technological choices as well as for analysing the impact of
20 specific building policies.

21 The use of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) layers (Reinhart and Cerezo Davila 2016)
22 combined to machine learning techniques (Bourdeau et al. 2019) allows creating detailed datasets of
23 building characteristics while optimising the computing time. Thus, leading to a better representation
24 of energy demand of buildings and a more accurate assessment of GHG mitigation potential.
25



26
27 **Figure I.1. Modelling approaches of GHG emissions used in the building sector**
28

29 4.2. Representation of energy demand and GHG emissions

30 Comprehensive models represent energy demand per energy carrier and end-use for both residential
31 and non-residential buildings, for different countries or set of countries, further disaggregated across
32 urban/rural and income groups. Drivers of energy demand considered include population, the floor area

1 per capita, appliances ownership and to some extent occupants' behaviour in residential buildings. The
2 former being included in top-down, hybrid and bottom-up models while the latter is, usually included
3 in bottom-up and agent-based models (IEA 2021; Niamir et al. 2020). In non-residential buildings,
4 value-added is considered among the drivers.

5 GHG emissions from buildings are usually modelled on the basis of the estimated energy demand per
6 energy carrier and appropriate emissions factors. The purpose of most building models is to assess the
7 impact of mitigation measures on energy demand in the use phase of buildings and for a given
8 assumption on the per-capita floor area and technological improvement (Pauliuk et al. 2021b) and (IEA
9 2021). After decades of ignoring material cycles and embodied emissions (Pauliuk et al. 2017), few
10 IAMs are now including material stocks and flows (Zhong et al. 2021; Deetman et al. 2020; IEA 2021).
11 However, the top-down nature of these models and the modelling methodology of embodied emissions,
12 which are added onto the emissions estimated in the use phase, questions the policy relevance of these
13 estimates. As of today, the resource efficiency and climate change (RECC) scenario (Pauliuk and
14 Heeren 2021; Pauliuk et al. 2021b; Fishman et al. 2021; Hertwich et al. 2020) is the only global scenario
15 identified which includes measures to limit, at the first place, embodied emissions from buildings. The
16 scenario is modelled using the bottom-up ODYM-RECC model.

18 **4.3. Representation of mitigation options**

19 The assessment conducted in Chapter 9 was based on the SER (Sufficiency, Efficiency, Renewable)
20 framework with sufficiency being all the measures and daily practices which avoid, at the first place,
21 the demand for energy, materials, water, land and other natural resources over the life cycle of buildings
22 and appliances/equipment, while providing decent living standard for all within the planetary
23 boundaries. By contrast to efficiency, sufficiency measures do not consume energy in the use phase.
24 Efficiency improvement of the building envelope and appliances/equipment are the main mitigation
25 options considered in the existing models/scenarios. They are, usually, combined with market-based
26 and information instruments and to some extent with behaviour change. As of today, Grubler et al.
27 (2018), (Pauliuk et al. 2021b), Kuhnhehn et al. (2020), Millward-Hopkins et al. (2020), Kikstra et al.
28 (2021), van Vuuren et al. (2021) are the only six global models/scenarios to include sufficiency
29 measures, out of which detailed data were available only for two scenarios (Pauliuk et al. 2021b; van
30 Vuuren et al. 2021).

32 **4.4. Representation of climate change impacts**

33 In total, 931 scenarios were submitted to AR6 scenario database out of which only two scenarios
34 provided detailed data allowing for an assessment of climate change impacts based on the SER
35 framework considered in the building chapter. Additional 78 bottom-up models/scenarios were gathered
36 (Table I.1.). Mitigation potentials from these scenarios are assessed using either a decomposition
37 analysis (Chapter 9, Section 9.3.) or an aggregation of bottom-up potential estimates for different
38 countries into regional and then global figures (Chapter 9, Section 9.6.).

39 Scenarios considered in the illustrative mitigation pathways included in Chapter 3 were assessed,
40 compared to current policy scenario. The assessment was possible for only the combined direct CO₂
41 emissions for both residential and non-residential buildings due to lack of data on other gases as well
42 as on indirect and embodied emissions. The assessment shows mitigation potentials, compared to
43 current policies scenarios, at a global level ranging from 9% to 13% by 2030 and from 58% to 89% in
44 2050 (Figure I.2-b).


1 There are great discrepancies in the projected potentials by the IAMs across regions and scenarios. In
2 the deep electrification and high renewable scenario, emissions in Africa are projected to increase by
3 88% by 2030, followed by a decrease of 97% by 2050 compared to current policies scenario. Similarly,
4 in the sustainable development scenario, emissions in developing Asia are projected, compared to
5 current policies scenario, to increase by 56% by 2030, followed by a decrease of 75% by 2050. Such
6 variations in emissions over two decades in the developing world raise questions about the policy
7 relevance of these scenarios. In developed countries, emissions are projected to go down in all regions
8 across all scenarios, except in SSP2 scenario in Asia-Pacific, where emissions are projected to increase
9 by 18% by 2030 followed by a decrease of 25% by 2050, compared to current policies scenario. It is
10 worth noting that, across all scenarios, Eastern Asia is the region with the lowest estimated mitigation
11 potential compared to the current policies (Figure I.2-b).

12

13 **4.5. Representation of sustainable development dimensions**

14 Link to sustainable development goals is not always explicit in buildings models/scenarios. However,
15 some models include requirements to ensure the access to decent living standard for all Kikstra et al.
16 (2021), Millward-Hopkins et al. (2020), Grubler et al. (2018) or to specifically meet the 2030 SDG 7
17 goal (IEA 2020a, 2021).


18



*The percentages correspond to the increase or decrease in relation to the same year with the Current Policies Scenario as a baseline.

1
2
3

a) Global



* The percentages correspond to the increase or decrease in relation to the same year with the Current Policies Scenario as a baseline.

b) Regional

Figure I.2. GHG mitigation potentials in scenarios considered in the illustrative mitigation pathways considered in Chapter 3.

4
5
6
7

1

2 4.6. Models underlying the assessment in Chapter 9

3 The AR6 scenario database received 101 models, with a building component, out of which 96 were
4 IAM models and five building specific models. This is equivalent to 931 scenarios. After an initial
5 screening, quality control and further vetted to assess if they sufficiently represented historical trends
6 and climate goals, 43 models (42 IAMs and 1 building specific model) were kept for the assessment.
7 Thus, reducing the number of scenarios to assess to 554. The unvetted scenarios are still available in
8 the database. After a final screening based on the SER (Sufficiency, Efficiency, Renewable) framework,
9 only two IAMs were kept. Given the top-down nature of IAMs and their weaknesses in assessing
10 mitigation measures, especially sufficiency measures, 78 bottom-up models with technological
11 representation have been included in the assessment (Table I.1.). These additional bottom-up models
12 were not submitted to AR6 scenario database. However, scenario owners supplied Chapter 9 with the
13 underlying assumptions and data.

ACCEPTED VERSION
SUBJECT TO FINAL EDITS

Table I.1. Models underlying the assessment in Chapter 9.

Model name/Institution using the model	Model description	Geographic scope	Building type included	Energy demand	Example of publications
World Energy Model (WEM)/International Energy Agency (IEA)	A simulation model with detailed bottom-up building stock model	Global	Residential and non-residential	The building module includes a stock model with detailed technologies, end uses and energy carriers. Activity variables such as floor area and appliance ownership are projected by end-use. A cost-based approach, influenced by policy and other constraints, is used to allocate between almost 100 technologies. Energy demand projections are based on country-level historical data for both residential and non-residential buildings. The buildings module is integrated within the wider World Energy Model.	(IEA 2020a);(IEA 2021)
IMAGE 3.2 model/ Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency	A modular Integrated Assessment Model using a simulation model for energy demand	Global	Residential and non-residential buildings	Energy demand is calculated as a function of household expenditures and population growth, disaggregating across urban/rural and income groups. The model includes a building stock model (residential) with a detailed description of end-uses, energy carrier use and building technologies for both residential	(van Vuuren et al. 2021)

				and non-residential buildings. A scenario analysis assessing assumptions on lifestyle changes has also been conducted.	
Resource Efficiency and Climate Change (RECC) model. Research Institutions: Norwegian University of Science & Technology, and University of Freiburg. Funding Institutions: UNEP and International Resource Panel	Bottom-up building stock-flow model estimating material and energy flows associated with housing stock growth, driven by input parameters of population and floor area per capita	Global	Residential buildings	Energy demand is calculated by the model BuildME, a physical model using the EnergyPlus simulation engine, incorporating country/region-specific projections of envelope and equipment efficiency	(Pauliuk et al. 2021b); (Hertwich et al. 2020); (Pauliuk et al. 2021a); (Fishman et al. 2021); (Pauliuk and Heeren 2021)
A total of 77 bottom-up models out of which 67 were technology-rich and 10 sufficiency-focussed	Bottom-up technology-rich models with detailed building and other technology stock models	Three global (all sufficiency models), six regional (regions here refer to regions including several countries), two subnational, and the rest national	Residential and/or non-residential buildings	In most cases, energy demand was modelled by multiplying unit of energy consumption of technologies/product/buildings with stocks of corresponding technologies/products and/or buildings at national level. The stocks of buildings and/or technologies/products rely on very detailed stock modelling in the future relying on such statistics in the past. The potential is demonstrated replacing the business-as-usual technologies and practices with demonstrated best available or commercially feasible technologies and practices. The studies rely on all, the	(Alaidroos and Krarti 2015; Bashmakov 2017; Brugger et al. 2021; Bürger et al. 2019; Butler et al. 2020; Calise et al. 2021; Chaichaloempreecha et al. 2017; Colenbrander et al. 2019; Csoknyai et al. 2016; de la Rue du Can et al. 2019, 2018; de Melo and de Martino Jannuzzi 2015; Department of Environmental Affairs 2014; Dioha et al. 2019; Duscha et al. 2019; Energetics 2016; Gagnon, Peter, Margolis, Robert, Melius, Jennifer, Phillips, Saleb, Elmore 2016; González-Mahecha et al. 2019; Grande-Acosta and Islas-Samperio 2020; Horváth et al. 2016; Iten R., Jakob M., Catenazzi G, Reiter U., Wunderlich A. 2017; Kamal et al. 2019; Khan et al. 2017; Krarti 2019; Krarti et al. 2017; Kusumadewi and Limmeechokchai 2015, 2017; Kwag et al. 2019; Markewitz et al. 2015; Merini et al. 2020; Minami et al. 2019; Momonoki et al. 2017; Nadel 2016; Novikova et al. 2018a,b; Filippi Oberegger et al. 2020; Oluleye et al. 2018, 2016; Onyenokporo and Ochedi 2019; Ostermeyer, Y.; Camarasa, C.; Naegeli,

				<p>combination, or either of the following mitigation options: the construction of new high-performance buildings using building design, forms, and passive construction methods; the thermal efficiency improvement of building envelopes of the existing stock; the installation of advanced HVAC systems, equipment and appliances; the exchange of lights, appliances, and office equipment, including ICT, water heating, and cooking; active and passive DSM measures; as well as onsite production and use of renewable energy. Many bottom-up studies considered the measures as an integrated package due to their technological complementarity and interdependence, rather than the penetration of individual technologies applied in an incremental manner in or to these buildings.</p>	<p>C.; Saraf, S.; Jakob, M.; Hamilton, I; Catenazzi 2018; Ostermeyer et al. 2019a; Ostermeyer, Y.; Camarasa, C.; Saraf, S.; Naegeli, C.; Jakob, M.; Palacios, A, Catenazzi 2018; Ostermeyer et al. 2018, 2019b; Ploss et al. 2017; Prada-hernández et al. 2015; Radpour et al. 2017; Rosas-Flores and Rosas-Flores 2020; Roscini et al. 2020; Sandberg et al. 2021; Streicher et al. 2017; Subramanyam et al. 2017a,b; Sugiyama et al. 2020b; Tan et al. 2018; Timilsina et al. 2016; Toleikyte et al. 2018; Trottier 2016; Wakiyama and Kuramochi 2017; Wilson et al. 2017b; Xing et al. 2021; Yeh et al. 2016; Yu et al. 2018; Zhou et al. 2018; ADB 2017; Zhang et al. 2020; Mirasgedis et al. 2017)(Grubler et al. 2018)(Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020)(Levesque et al. 2019)(Bierwirth and Thomas 2019)(Roscini et al. 2020)(Cabrera Serrenho et al. 2019) (Roca-Puigròs et al. 2020)(Negawatt 2017)(Virage-Energie Nord-Pas-de-Calais. 2016)</p>
--	--	--	--	--	---

ACCEPTED VERSION
SUBJECT TO EDIT

1 5. Transport models

2 5.1. Purpose and scope of models

3 GHG emissions from transport are largely a function of **travel demand, transport mode, and**
4 **transport technology and fuel**. The purpose of transportation system models is to describe how future
5 **demand** for transport can be fulfilled through different **modes** and **technologies** under different climate
6 change mitigation targets or policies. Within a given transport mode, technologies differ by efficiency
7 and fuel use.

8 Common components of transportation energy systems models mirror these main drivers of GHG
9 emissions. Most models will also quantify how much movement occurs, or the **travel demand**
10 associated with each mode. Models commonly quantify demand through **transportation mode** (e.g.
11 active transit, passenger vehicles, trucks, boats, planes, etc.) or how movement occurs (e.g. passenger
12 travel distance *p.km* and freight distance *t.km*). Higher fidelity models provide more nuanced
13 breakdowns of demand by trips of various lengths such as short-, medium-, and long-distance trips or
14 by region (e.g. kilometres or *t.km* per region). The scope of the model often determines how much
15 information it provides on where and when movement occurs. While larger scale models typically
16 provide aggregate travel demand, higher resolution travel demand models can be integrated into
17 transportation system models and provide much more information on origin and destination of trips,
18 when and where trips occur, and the route of travel taken. This level of detail is not often characterised
19 in the output of system models but can be employed as a “base” model to determine how travel occurs
20 before aggregation (Edelenbosch et al. 2017a; Yeh et al. 2017).

21 A key distinguishing feature between different model types is how they control the above components.
22 Our review of the transport energy system models can be broadly divided into three main categories: i)
23 optimisation models, ii) simulation models, and iii) accounting and exploratory models.

24 i) Optimization models: Identify least cost pathways to meet policy targets (such as CO₂
25 emission targets of transport modes or economy-wide) given constraints (such as rate of
26 adoption of vehicle technologies or vehicle efficiency standards). For example MessageIX-
27 TransportV5 (Krey et al. 2016) and TIMES (Daly et al. 2014).

28
29 ii) Simulation models: Simulate behaviour of consumers and producers given prices, policies,
30 and other factors by using parameters calibrated to historically observed behaviours such
31 as demand price elasticity and consumer preferences. For example models by Barter et al.
32 (2015), Brooker et al. (2015) and Schäfer (2017).

33
34 iii) Accounting and exploratory models: Track the outcomes (such as resources use and
35 emissions) of key decisions (such as the adoption of advanced fuels or vehicle technologies)
36 that are based on *what-if* scenarios. The major difference between accounting models
37 versus optimisation and simulation models are that key decision variables such as new
38 technologies adoptions typically follow modeler’s assumptions as opposed to being
39 determined by mathematical formulations as in optimisation and simulation models. See
40 models in Fulton et al. (2009), IEA (2020a), Gota et al. (2019) and Khalili et al. (2019).

41
42 Due to the model types’ relative strengths and weaknesses, they are commonly applied to certain
43 problem types (Table I.2.). Models can do **forecasting**, which makes projections of how futures
44 may evolve, or **backcasting**, which makes projections of a future that meets a predefined goal such
45 as a policy target of 80% reduction in GHG emissions from a historical level by a certain year.
46 Models often are also used to explore what-if questions, to confirm the **feasibility** of certain

1 assumptions/outcomes, and to quantify the **impacts** of a change such as a policy under different
 2 conditions. Enhancing fuel efficiency standards, banning internal combustion engines, setting fuel
 3 quality standards, and the impacts of new technologies are the typical examples of problem types
 4 analysed in energy system models.

6 **Table I.2. Taxonomy of transport models by method (modelling type) and application (problem type).**

Problem Type	Optimization model	Simulation model	Accounting model	Heuristic model
Backcasting	x			x
Forecasting	x	x	x	
Exploring feasibility space		x	x	x
Impact analysis	x	x	x	

7
 8 While these four model types drive the component dynamics in different ways, they commonly include
 9 modules that include: learning and diffusion (via exogenous, e.g. autonomous learning, or endogenous
 10 learning regarding costs and efficiency: i.e. cost decreases and/or efficiency increases as a function of
 11 adoption, and increased diffusion due to lower costs) (Jochem et al. 2018), stock turnover (the
 12 performance and characteristics of vehicle fleets including survival ages, mileages, fuel economies and
 13 loads/occupancy rates are tracked for each new sales/vehicle stocks), consumer choice (theories of how
 14 people invest in new technology and utilize different mode of transport based on their individual
 15 preferences given the characteristics of mode or technology) (Daly et al. 2014; Schäfer 2017), or other
 16 feedback loops (Linton et al. 2015).

17 IAMs (Krey et al. 2016; Edelenbosch et al. 2017a) are typically global in scope and seek to solve for
 18 feasible pathways meeting a global temperature target (Annex III.I.9). This implies solving for
 19 mitigation options within and across sectors. In contrast, global/national transport energy system
 20 models (GTEM/NTEMs) typically only solve for feasible pathways within the transport sector (Yeh et
 21 al. 2017). The range of feasible pathways can be determined through optimisation, simulation,
 22 accounting and exploratory methods as we explained in Table I.2. Some GTEMs are linked to IAMs
 23 model (Krey et al. 2016; Edelenbosch et al. 2017a; Roelfsema et al. 2020). The key difference between
 24 IAMs and GTEM or NTEMs is whether the transportation systems is integrated with the rest of the
 25 energy systems specifically regarding energy and fuel productions and use, fuel prices, economic
 26 drivers such as GDP, and mitigation options given a policy goal. IAMs can endogenously determine
 27 these factors because the transport sector is just one of many sectors captured by the IAM. While this
 28 gives IAMs certain advantages, IAMs sacrifice resolution and complexity for this broader scope. For
 29 example, most IAMs lack a sophisticated travel demand model that reflects the heterogeneity of
 30 demands and consumer preferences, whereas GTEM/NTEMs can incorporate greater levels of details
 31 regarding travel demands, consumer choices, and the details of transport policies. Consequently, what
 32 GTEM/NTEMs lack in integration with other sectors they make up through more detailed analyses of
 33 travel patterns, policies, and impacts (Yeh et al. 2017).

34 Several noteworthy recent active research areas in long-term transportation energy systems modelling
 35 involves the consideration of infrastructure investment and consumer acceptance for non-fossil fuel
 36 vehicles including charging for electric vehicles (Statharas et al. 2021; Jochem et al. 2019) and
 37 refuelling stations for hydrogen vehicles (Rose and Neumann 2020); and the greater integration of the
 38 electric, transport, residential, and the industrial sectors in fuel production, storage, and utilization
 39 (Rottoli et al. 2021; Lester et al. 2020; Bellocchi et al. 2020; Olovsson et al. 2021). While
 40 national/regional transport energy models have the advantage of exploring these relationships in greater
 41 spatial, temporal, and policy details for specific country/regions (Jochem et al. 2019; Rottoli et al. 2021;
 42 Statharas et al. 2021; Lester et al. 2020; Bellocchi et al. 2020), the IAMs have the advantage of

1 examining these interactions across the entire economy at the global level (Brear et al. 2020; Rottoli et
2 al. 2021).

4 **5.2. Inventory of transportation models included in AR6**

5 The global/national transport energy system models included in the transportation chapter (Chapter 10)
6 are listed below in Table I.3.

8 **Table I.3. GTEM/NTEMs models evaluated in Chapter 10.**

Model name	Organisation	Scope	Resolution	Period	Economy-wide	Method
Mobility model (MoMo)	International Energy Agency (IEA)	Global	Country groups	2050	Soft-link	Accounting model
Global Transportation Roadmap	International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)	Global	Country groups	2050	No	Accounting model
MESSAGE-Transport V.5	International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)	Global	Country groups	2100	Yes	Optimization model
GCAM	Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)	Global	Country groups	2100	Yes	Partial equilibrium model

11 **6. Industry sector models**

12 **6.1. Types of industry sector models**

13 Industry sector modelling approaches can vary considerably from one another. As other types of
14 models, industry sector models a key characteristic related to their geographical scope. While IAMs are
15 often global in scope, many bottom-up sector models are limited to individual countries or regions. The
16 models' system boundaries also differ, with some models fully considering the use of energy for
17 feedstock purposes and other models focussing only on the use of energy for energetic purposes.
18 Differences between models also exist in regard to the differentiation between the industry sector and
19 the energy transformation sector, concerning e.g. the refineries and industrial power plants.

21 **6.2. Representation of demand for industrial products**

22 Industry sector models vary in regard to their representation of demand for industrial goods or products.
23 A more detailed representation of demand in a model allows for a more explicit discussion of different

1 types of drivers of industrial demand and therefore a more detailed representation of demand side
2 strategies such as material recycling, longer use of products or sharing of products.

3 Particularly, in bottom-up models of the industry sector, demand for industrial products is often
4 considered in more detail than in top-down models by taking more drivers into account. These drivers
5 can be inter alia population, gross value added, construction activity, transport activity, but also changes
6 in material efficiency, recycling rates and scrap rates as well as product use efficiency (e.g. through
7 longer use of products or sharing of products) (Fleiter et al. 2018; Material Economics 2019; IEA
8 2020b).

9

10 **6.3. Representation of mitigation options - mitigation options, how their uptake is** 11 **represented, how potentials and costs are represented**

12 In most top-down IAMs, some energy-intensive sectors such as iron and steel or cement are included
13 separately at least in a generalised manner, but typically few if any sector-specific technologies are
14 explicitly represented. Instead, energy efficiency improvements in the industry sector and its subsectors
15 are often either determined by exogenous assumptions or are a function of energy prices. Likewise, fuel
16 switching occurs primarily as a result of changes in relative fuel prices, which in turn are influenced by
17 CO₂ price developments. In IAMs that include specific technologies, fuel switching can be constrained
18 based on the characteristics of those technologies, while in IAMs with no technological detail more
19 generic constraints on fuel switching in the industry sector are embedded (Edelenbosch et al. 2017b).

20 In bottom-up models, individual technological mitigation options are represented in detail, especially
21 for energy-intensive sectors such as iron and steel, cement and chemicals. Typically, for each considered
22 technology not only specific energy demand but also investment and operating costs are included in
23 these models. Investment costs can change over time, either based on an exogenous assumption or on
24 an endogenized process such as a learning rate. While bottom-up models often consider technology-
25 specific learning, IAMs cover technological progress in a more general way associated to industry
26 branches. The uptake of new technologies is typically restricted in bottom-up models, for example by
27 assuming a minimum lifetime for existing stock or by assuming S-shaped diffusion curves (Fleiter et
28 al. 2018). The industrial sector models included in the industry chapter (Chapter 11) are listed in Table
29 I.4.

30

31

1

Table I.4 Models underlying specific assessments in Industry Sector (Chapter 11).

Model name and institution using the model	Model description	Geo-graphic scope	Industrial sectors included/ distinguished	Demand for industrial products	Examples of publications
Industry sector model of the ETP model	The bottom-up industry sector model is one of four soft-linked models making up the ETP model: The four models are an energy supply optimization model and three end-use sector models (transport, industry, buildings). Technologies and fuels in the industry sector model are chosen based on cost optimization.	Global	Aluminium, iron and steel, chemical and petrochemical, cement, pulp and paper and other industry.	Demand for industrial products is derived based on country-level historical data on per capita consumption. This per capita consumption is projected forward by using population projections and industry value-added projections. Demand for materials is derived by also taking the build-up of material stocks into account.	(IEA 2020b, 2021)
World Energy Model (IEA)	Simulation model consisting inter alia of technologically detailed bottom-up representations of several industry sectors.	Global	See ETP model	See ETP model	(IEA 2020a, 2021)
Material Economics modelling framework	Modelling tool consisting of several separate bottom-up models.	European Union	Steel, chemicals (plastics & ammonia), cement	Demand for industrial products is derived based on scenarios of future activity levels in key segments such as construction, mobility and food production. Separate models additionally explore opportunities for improving materials efficiency and increasing materials circulation.	(Material Economics 2019)

2

3

4 **6.4. Limitations and critical analysis**

5 Aggregated, top-down models of the industry sector, as used in most IAMs, are typically calibrated
6 based on long-term historical data, for example on the diffusion of new technologies or on new fuels.
7 These models are therefore able to implicitly consider real-life restrictions of the whole sector that
8 bottom-up models (with their focus on individual technologies) may not fully take into account. These
9 restrictions may arise from inter alia delays in the construction of infrastructure or market actors
10 possessing incomplete information about new technologies. Furthermore, as IAMs also model the

1 climate system, these models can principally take into account potential repercussions of climate change
2 impacts on the growth rate and structure of economies.

3 However, a downside of top-down models is that they are typically limited in their representation of
4 individual technologies and processes in the industry sector and particularly of technology-driven
5 structural change. This lack of technological detail limits the usefulness of these models to analyse
6 technology-specific and sector-specific mitigation measures and related policies. Top-down models
7 also tend to have a relatively aggregated representation of industrial energy demand, meaning demand-
8 side mitigations strategies such as recycling, product-service efficiency and demand reduction options
9 are difficult to assess with these models (Pauliuk et al. 2017).

10 In contrast, technology-rich bottom-up models allow detailed analysis of the potential of new
11 technologies, processes and fuels in individual industrial sectors to reduce GHG emission. Their often-
12 detailed analysis of the demand side allows demand-side mitigation strategies to be evaluated.
13 Furthermore, radical future changes in technology, climate policy or social norms can more easily be
14 reflected in bottom-up models than in top-down models which are calibrated on past observations. Both
15 types of models are typically not able to account for product substitution (e.g. steel vs. plastics) arising
16 from changing production cost differentials or changing product quality due to new production
17 processes. In principle, technology rich input-output models could fill this gap.

18

19 **7. Land use modelling**

20 Land use related IAM modelling results as presented in Chapter 7 are based on comprehensive land-
21 use models (LUMs) that are either integrated directly, or through emulators into the integrated
22 assessment framework. Given the increasing awareness of the importance of the land use sector to
23 achieve ambitious climate mitigation targets, LUMs and their integration into IAMs systems was one
24 of the key innovations to the integrated assessment over the past decade to allow for an economy wide
25 quantification of climate stabilization pathways.

26 LUMs allow to project developments in the land use sector over time and assess impacts of mitigation
27 policies on different economic (markets, trade, prices, demand, supply etc.) and environmental (land
28 use, emissions, fertiliser, irrigation water use, etc.) indicators. The following models submitted
29 scenarios to the AR6 database: AIM (Fujimori et al. 2014, 2017; Hasegawa et al. 2017), EPPA (Chen
30 et al. 2016), GCAM (Calvin et al. 2019), IMAGE (Stehfest et al. 2014), MERGE, MESSAGE-
31 GLOBIOM (Fricko et al. 2017; Havlík et al. 2014; Huppmann et al. 2019), POLES (Keramidas et al.
32 2017), REMIND-MAGPIE (Dietrich et al. 2019; Krieglner et al. 2017), WITCH (Emmerling et al. 2016).

33

34 **7.1. Modelling of land use and land use change**

35 LUMs represent different land use activities for managed land (agriculture including cropland and
36 pastures, managed forests, and dedicated energy crops) while natural lands (primary forests, natural
37 grasslands, shrubland, savannahs etc.) act as land reserve that can be converted to management
38 depending on other constraints (Popp et al. 2014a; Schmitz et al. 2014). Typically, the agricultural
39 sector has the greatest level of detail across land use sectors. LUMs include different crop- and livestock
40 production activities, some even at the spatially explicit level and differentiated by production system
41 (Havlík et al. 2014; Weindl et al. 2015). Forestry is covered with varying degree of complexity across
42 LUMs. While some models represent only afforestation/deforestation activities dynamically, others
43 have detailed representation of forest management activities and/or forest industries (Lauri et al. 2017).
44 The models endogenously determine the land allocation of different land use activities as well as land

1 use changes according to different economic principles (land rent, substitution elasticities etc.) and/or
2 considering biophysical characteristics such as land suitability (Weindl et al. 2017; Schmitz et al. 2014).

4 **7.2. Demand for food, feed, fibre and agricultural trade**

5 LUMs project demand for food, feed, other industrial or energy uses for different agriculture and
6 forestry commodities over time. While partial equilibrium models typically use reduced-form demand
7 functions with greater level of detail at the commodity level, however limited agriculture and forestry,
8 CGE models represent demand starting from utility functions from which it is possible to derive demand
9 functions, and functional forms for income and price elasticities however for a more limited set of
10 agricultural and forestry commodities but with full coverage of all economic sectors (Valin et al. 2014;
11 von Lampe et al. 2014). Over time, demand for food, feed, and other industrial uses is projected
12 conditional on population and income growth while bioenergy demand is typically informed in PE
13 models by linking with IAMs/energy systems models, and is usually endogenous in CGE/IAMs
14 (Hasegawa et al. 2020). Depending on the model, demand projections are sensitive to price changes
15 (Valin et al. 2014). International trade is often represented in LUMs using either Armington or spatial
16 equilibrium approaches (von Lampe et al. 2014).

18 **7.3. Treatment of land-based mitigation options**

19 Two broad categories of land-based mitigation options are represented in LUMs: i) reduction of GHG
20 (CO₂, CH₄ and N₂O) emissions from land use, ii) carbon sink enhancement options including biomass
21 supply for bioenergy. Each of these categories is underpinned by a portfolio of mitigation options with
22 varying degree of complexity and parameterisation across LUMs. The representation of mitigation
23 measures is influenced on the one hand, by the availability of data for its techno-economic
24 characteristics and future prospects as well as the computational challenge, e.g. in terms of spatial and
25 process detail, to represent the measure, and on the other hand, by structural differences and general
26 focus of the different LUMs, and prioritization of different mitigation options by the modelling teams.
27 While GHG emission reduction and CO₂ sequestration options such as afforestation, are typically
28 covered directly in LUMs (Hasegawa et al. 2021), carbon sequestration from biomass supplied for
29 bioenergy coupled with carbon sequestration (BECCs) is usually not accounted for in LUMs but in the
30 energy sector and hence is taken care of directly in the IAMs. Yet, LUMs provide estimates of available
31 biomass for energy production and the impacts of its production.

33 **7.3.1. Treatment of GHG emissions reduction**

34 Agricultural non-CO₂ emissions covered in LUMs include CH₄ from enteric fermentation, manure
35 management and cultivation of rice paddies, and N₂O emissions from soils (fertilizer and manure
36 application, crop residues) and manure management and are based on IPCC accounting guidelines
37 (IPCC 2019a). For each of those sources, LUMs typically represent a (sub)set of technical, structural
38 and demand side mitigation options. Technical options refer to technologies such as anaerobic digesters,
39 feed supplements or nitrogen inhibitors that are either explicitly represented (Frank et al. 2018) or
40 implicitly via the use of MACCs (Beach et al. 2015; Harmsen et al. 2019; Lucas et al. 2007). Emission
41 savings from structural changes refer to more fundamental changes in the agricultural sector for
42 example through international trade, production system changes or reallocation and substitution effects
43 (Havlík et al. 2014). Demand side options include dietary changes and reduction of food waste (Mbow
44 et al. 2019; Rosenzweig et al. 2020; Springmann et al. 2016; Ivanova et al. 2020; Ritchie et al. 2018;
45 Creutzig et al. 2018; Clark et al. 2020; Popp et al. 2010; Frank et al. 2019). For the forest sector,
46 emission reduction options are mainly targeting CO₂ from deforestation (Rochedo et al. 2018; Eriksson

1 2020; Overmars et al. 2014; Bos et al. 2020; Hasegawa et al. 2017; Doelman et al. 2020).
2 Mitigation/restoration options for wetlands to reduce emissions from drained organic soils are typically
3 not represented in LUMs (Humpenöder et al. 2020).

4 There are significant differences between UNFCCC nationally reported GHG inventories and analytical
5 global land use models. According to Grassi et al. (2017), this discrepancy results in a 3GtCO_{2e}
6 difference in estimates between country reports and global models. The difference relies on different
7 methods to classify and assess managed forests and its forest management fluxes (Houghton et al. 2012;
8 Pongratz et al. 2014; Tubiello et al. 2015; Smith et al. 2014; Grassi et al. 2017, 2021). While global
9 models account for GHG emissions from indirect human induced effects and natural effects in
10 unmanaged land, country only consider fluxes of land use and land use change in managed land. In
11 order to produce policy relevant land use model exercises, reconciling these differences is needed by
12 harmonising definitions and approaches of anthropogenic land and the treatment of indirect
13 environmental change (Grassi et al. 2017).

14

15 **7.3.2. Treatment of terrestrial carbon dioxide removal options including biomass supply for** 16 **bioenergy**

17 Terrestrial Carbon Dioxide Removal (tCDR) options are only partially included in LUMs and mostly
18 rely on afforestation and bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) (Smith et al. 2019; Fuss et al. 2014, 2018; Minx
19 et al. 2018; Butnar et al. 2020). Especially some nature-based solutions (Griscom et al. 2017) such as
20 soil carbon management (Paustian et al. 2016) which have the potential to alter the contribution of land-
21 based mitigation in terms of timing, potential and sustainability consequences are only recently
22 becoming implemented in LUMs (Frank et al. 2017; Humpenöder et al. 2020). The representation of
23 bioenergy feedstocks varies across models but typically LUMs have comprehensive representation of a
24 series of crops (starch, sugar, oil, wood/lignocellulosic feedstocks) or residues/byproducts that can be
25 used for liquid and solid bioenergy production (Hanssen et al. 2019).

26

27 **7.4. Treatment of environmental and socio-economic impacts of land use**

28 Aside reporting the implications on AFOLU GHG emissions, LUMs can provide a set of environmental
29 and socioeconomic impact indicators to assess the quantified climate stabilisation pathways in a broader
30 sustainable development agenda (Frank et al. 2021; Obersteiner et al. 2016; Soergel et al. 2021; van
31 Vuuren et al. 2019, 2015). These indicators typically span from land use area developments (Popp et
32 al. 2017; Stehfest et al. 2019), fertilizer use, irrigation water use and environmental flows (Bonsch et
33 al. 2015; Pastor et al. 2019; Chang et al. 2021; de Vos et al. 2021), and on biodiversity (Leclère et al.
34 2020; Marquardt et al. 2021), to market impacts on commodity prices and food consumption, or impact
35 on undernourishment (Fujimori et al. 2019a; Hasegawa et al. 2018; Doelman et al. 2019; Hasegawa et
36 al. 2020; Soergel et al. 2021).

37

38 **8. Reduced complexity climate modelling**

39 Climate model emulators (often referred to as reduced complexity or simple climate models) are used
40 to integrate the WG I knowledge of physical climate science in WG III assessment. Hence, emulators
41 are used to assess the climate implications of the GHG and other emissions trajectories that IAMs
42 produce (van Vuuren et al. 2008; Rogelj et al. 2018a; Clarke et al. 2014; Rogelj et al. 2011; Schaeffer
43 et al. 2015). The IAM literature typically uses one of two approaches: comprehensive emulators such
44 as MAGICC (Meinshausen et al. 2011) or Hector (Hartin et al. 2015) or minimal complexity
45 representations such as the representation used in DICE (Nordhaus 2018), PAGE (Yumashev et al.

1 2019; Kikstra et al. 2021c) and Fund (Waldhoff et al. 2014). In physical science research, a wider range
2 of different emulators are used (Nicholls et al. 2020b, 2021a).

3 A key application of emulators within IPCC WG III is the classification of emission scenarios with
4 respect to their global mean temperature outcomes (Clarke et al. 2014; Rogelj et al. 2018a). WG III
5 relies on emulators to assess the full range of carbon-cycle, and climate response uncertainty of
6 thousands of scenarios, as assessed by AR6 WG I. An exercise of such amplitude is currently infeasible
7 with more computationally demanding state-of-the-art Earth system models. Cross-chapter Box 7.1 of
8 WG I documents how emulators used in AR6 WG3 are consistent with the physical science assessment
9 of WG I (Forster et al. 2021).

10 Previous IPCC Assessment Reports relied either on the climate output from each individual IAM (IPCC
11 2000) or a more streamlined approach, where one consistent emulator setup was used to assess all
12 scenarios. For instance, in AR5 and SR1.5, MAGICC was used for scenario classification (Clarke et al.
13 2014; Rogelj et al. 2018a). In recent years, numerous other emulators have been developed and
14 increased confidence and understanding can thus be gained by combining insights from more than one
15 emulator. For example, SR1.5 used MAGICC for its scenario classification, with additional insights
16 provided by the FaIR model (Smith et al. 2018) The SR1.5 experience highlighted that the veracity of
17 emulators “is a substantial knowledge gap in the overall assessment of pathways and their temperature
18 thresholds” (Rogelj et al. 2018a). Since SR1.5, international research efforts have demonstrated
19 tractable ways to compare emulator performance (Nicholls et al. 2020b) as well as their ability to
20 accurately represent a set of uncertainty ranges in physical parameters (Nicholls et al. 2021b), such as
21 those reported by the AR6 WG I assessment (Forster et al. 2021).

22 Finally, the recently developed OpenSCM-Runner package (Nicholls et al. 2020a) provides users with
23 the ability to run multiple emulators from a single interface. OpenSCM-Runner has been built in
24 collaboration with the WG III research community and forms part of the WG III climate assessment
25 (Annex III.II.2.4.1).

26

27 **9. Integrated assessment modelling**

28 Process-based Integrated assessment models (IAMs) describe the coupled energy-land-economy-
29 climate system (Weyant 2009, 2017; Krey 2014). They typically capture all greenhouse gas (GHG)
30 emissions induced by human activities and, in many cases, other emissions of climate forcers like
31 sulphate aerosols. Process-based IAMs represent most GHG and climate pollutant emissions by
32 modelling the underlying processes in energy and land use. Those models are able to endogenously
33 describe the change in emissions due to changes in energy and land use activities, particularly in
34 response to climate action. But IAMs differ in the extent to which all emissions and the corresponding
35 sources, processes and activities are represented endogenously and, thus, can be subjected to policy
36 analysis.¹ IAMs also differ regarding the scope of representing carbon removal options and their
37 interlinkage with other vital systems such as the energy and the land-use sectors.

38 Typically, IAMs consider multi-level systems of global, regional, national and local constraints and
39 balance equations for different categories such as emissions, material and energy flows, financial flows,
40 land availability that are solved simultaneously. Intertemporal IAMs can fully incorporate not only flow
41 constraints that are satisfied in each period, but also stock constraints that are aggregated over time and
42 require to balance activities over time. Changes of activities, e.g. induced by policies to reduce
43 emissions are connected to a variety of balance equations and constraints and therefore such policies

FOOTNOTE¹ See the common IAM documentation at www.iamcdocumentation.eu.

1 lead to system wide changes that can be analysed with IAMs. Many IAMs also contain gridded
2 components to capture, e.g., land use and climate change processes where the spatial distribution
3 matters greatly for the dynamics of the system. Processes that operate on smaller spatial and temporal
4 scales than resolved by IAMs, such as temporal variability of renewables, are included by
5 parameterisation and statistical modelling approaches that capture the impact of these subscale
6 processes on the system dynamics at the macro level (Pietzcker et al. 2017).

7 Global IAMs are used to analyse global emissions scenarios extrapolating current trends under a variety
8 of assumptions and climate change action pathways under a variety of global goals. In recent years, a
9 class of national and regional IAMs have emerged that describe the coupled energy-land-economy
10 system in a given geography. They typically have higher sectorial, policy and technology resolution
11 than global models and make assumptions about boundary conditions set by global markets and
12 international policy regimes. These IAMs are used to study trends and transformation pathways for a
13 given region (Shukla and Chaturvedi 2011; Capros et al. 2014; Lucena et al. 2016).

15 **9.1. Types of Integrated Assessment Models**

16 IAMs include a variety of model types that can be distinguished into two broad classes (Weyant 2017).
17 The first class comprises *cost-benefit IAMs* that fully integrate a stylized socioeconomic model with a
18 reduced form climate model to simultaneously account for the costs of mitigation and the damages of
19 global warming using highly aggregate cost functions derived from more detailed models. In the model
20 context these functions do not explicitly represent the underlying processes, but map mitigation efforts
21 and temperature to costs. This closed-loop approach between climate and socioeconomic systems
22 enables cost-benefit analysis by balancing the cost of mitigation and the benefits of avoided climate
23 damages. This can be done in a globally cooperative setting to derive the globally optimal climate policy
24 where no region can further improve its welfare without reducing the welfare of another region (Pareto
25 optimum). Alternatively, it can be assumed that nations do not engage in emission mitigation at all or
26 mitigate in a non-cooperative way only considering the marginal benefit of their own action (Nash
27 equilibrium). Also, differing degrees of partial cooperation are possible.

28 The second class of IAMs, called *process-based IAMs*, focuses on the analysis of transformation
29 processes depending on a broad set of activities that induce emissions as side effects. They describe the
30 interlinkages between economic activity, energy use, land use, and emissions with emission reductions
31 and removals as well as broader sustainable development targets. GHGs and other climate pollutants
32 are caused by a broad range of activities that are driven by socioeconomic developments (Riahi et al.
33 2017) and also induce broader environmental consequences such as land-use change (Popp et al. 2017)
34 and air pollution (Rao et al. 2017b). With few exceptions, these models typically do not close the loop
35 with climate change and damages that affect the economy, but focus on emission scenarios and climate
36 change mitigation pathways. Due to the process based representations of emission sources and
37 alternatives it is not only possible to investigate the implications of policies on GHG emissions, but also
38 the trade-offs and synergies with social and environmental sustainability criteria (von Stechow et al.
39 2015) (Annex III.I.9.3). The analysis of different cross-sectorial synergies and trade-offs is frequently
40 termed a nexus analysis, such as the energy-water-land nexus. The analysis can also address
41 socioeconomic sustainability criteria such as energy access and human health. Process-based IAMs are
42 also used to explore the synergies and trade-offs of ‘common, but differentiated responsibilities’ by
43 analysing issues of burden sharing, equity, international cooperation, policy differentiation and transfer
44 measures (Tavoni et al. 2015; Leimbach and Giannousakis 2019; Bauer et al. 2020b; Fujimori et al.
45 2016).

1 There exists a broad range of detailed process IAMs that differ regarding the economic modelling
2 approaches (Annex III.I.2) as well as the methodology and detail of sector representation (Annex III.I.3-
3 7) and how they are interlinked with each other.

4 This leads to differences in model results regarding global aggregates as well as sectorial and regional
5 outputs. Several approaches have been used to evaluate the performance of IAMs and understand
6 differences in IAM behaviour (Wilson et al. 2017a; Schwanitz 2013), including sensitivity analysis
7 (McJeon et al. 2011; Luderer et al. 2013; Rogelj et al. 2013a; Bosetti et al. 2015; Marangoni et al. 2017;
8 Giannousakis et al. 2021), model comparisons (Kriegler et al. 2014a, 2016; Tavoni et al. 2015; Kriegler
9 et al. 2015a; Riahi et al. 2015; Clarke et al. 2009; Riahi et al. 2017; Luderer et al. 2018; Roelfsema et
10 al. 2020; van Soest et al. 2021; Riahi et al. 2021), model diagnostics (Kriegler et al. 2015a; Wilkerson
11 et al. 2015; Harmsen et al. 2021), and comparison with historical patterns (Wilson et al. 2013; van
12 Sluisveld et al. 2015; Napp et al. 2017).

13

14 **9.2. Components of integrated assessment models**

15 **9.2.1. Energy-economy component**

16 Typically, IAMs comprise a model of energy flows, emissions and the associated costs (Krey 2014).
17 The demand for exploring the Paris Agreement climate goals led to model developments to make the
18 challenges and opportunities of the associated transformation pathways more transparent. Since AR5
19 much progress has been achieved to improve the representation of mitigation options in the energy
20 supply sector (e.g. renewable energy integration (Pietzcker et al. 2017), energy trade (Bauer et al. 2017,
21 2016; Jewell et al. 2018; McCollum et al. 2016), capacity inertia, carbon removals, decarbonisation
22 bottlenecks (Luderer et al. 2018) and technological and behavioural change measures in energy demand
23 sectors such as transport (Edelenbosch et al. 2017a; van Sluisveld et al. 2016; McCollum et al. 2017).
24 An energy sector model can be run as a partial equilibrium model using exogenous demand drivers for
25 final energy and energy services. These models derive mitigation policy costs in terms of additional
26 energy sector costs and area under the MAC curve.

27 Energy models can be also embedded into a broader, long-term macroeconomic context in a general
28 equilibrium model (Messner and Schrattenholzer 2000; Bauer et al. 2008). The demands for final energy
29 and energy services are endogenously driven by an economic growth model that also endogenizes the
30 economic allocation problem of macroeconomic resources for the energy sector that crowd out with
31 alternatives. This allows impact analysis of climate policies on economic growth and structural change,
32 investment financing and crowding-out as well as income distribution and tax revenue recycling
33 (Guivarch et al. 2011). Moreover, general equilibrium models also derive mitigation costs in terms of
34 GDP losses and Consumption losses, which comprise the full macroeconomic impacts rather than only
35 the narrow energy related costs (Paltsev and Capros 2013).

36 **9.2.2. Land system component**

37 In recent years substantial efforts have been devoted to improve and integrate land-use sector models
38 in IAMs (Popp et al. 2014b, 2017). This acknowledges the importance of land-use GHG emissions of
39 the agricultural and forestry sectors as well as the role of bioenergy, afforestation and other land-based
40 mitigation measures. The integration is particularly important in light of the long-term climate goals of
41 the Paris Agreement for four reasons (IPCC 2019b). First, the GHG emissions from the land use sector
42 accounts for LUC emissions account for more than 10% of global GHG emissions (Kuramochi et al.
43 2020) and some sources of CH₄ and N₂O constitute serious mitigation bottlenecks. Second, bioenergy
44 is identified as crucial primary energy source for low-emission energy supply and carbon removal
45 (Bauer et al. 2020a; Butnar et al. 2020; Calvin et al. 2021). Third, land use-based mitigation measures
46 such as afforestation and reduced deforestation have substantial mitigation potentials. Finally, land-

1 cover changes alter the earth surface albedo, which has implications for regional and global climate.
2 Pursuing the Paris Agreement climate goals requires the inclusion of a broad set of options regarding
3 GHG emissions and removals, which will intensify the interaction between the energy, the economy
4 and the land use sector. Consequently, intersectoral policy coordination becomes more important and
5 the land-related synergies and trade-offs with sustainable development targets will intensify (Calvin et
6 al. 2014b; Humpenöder et al. 2018; Frank et al. 2017; Kreidenweis et al. 2016; van Vuuren et al. 2017a;
7 Bauer et al. 2020d). IAMs used by the IPCC in the AR6 have continuously improved the integration of
8 land-use models with energy models to explore climate mitigation scenarios under varying policy and
9 technology conditions (Rogelj et al. 2018a; Smith et al. 2019). However, feedbacks from changes in
10 climate variables are not or only to a limited degree included in the land use sector models.

11 **.9.2.3. Climate system component**

12 Reduced complexity climate models (often called simple climate models or emulators) are used for
13 communicating WG I physical climate science knowledge to the research communities associated with
14 other IPCC working groups (Annex III.I.8). They are used by IAMs to model the climate outcome of
15 the multi-gas emissions trajectories that IAMs produce (van Vuuren et al. 2011a). A main application
16 of such models is related to scenario classifications in WG III of the IPCC (Clarke et al. 2014; Rogelj
17 et al. 2018a). Since WG III assesses a large number of scenarios, it must rely on the use of these simple
18 climate models; more computationally demanding models (as used by WG I) will not be feasible to
19 apply. For consistency across the AR6 reports, it is important that these reduced-complexity models are
20 up to date with the latest assessments from IPCC WG I. This relies on calibrating these models so that
21 they match, as closely as possible, the assessments made by WG I (Annex III.II.2.4). The calibrated
22 models can then be used by WG III in various parts of its assessment.

23

24 **9.3. Representation of nexus issues and sustainable development impacts in IAMs**

25 An energy-water-land nexus approach integrates the analysis of linked resources and infrastructure
26 systems to provide a consistent platform for multi-sector decision-making (Howells et al. 2013). Many
27 of the IAMs that contributed to the assessment incorporate a nexus approach that considers
28 simultaneous constraints on land, water and energy, as well as important mutual dependencies (Calvin
29 et al. 2019; Fricko et al. 2017; Dietrich et al. 2019; Fujimori et al. 2017; van Vuuren et al. 2019).
30 Recently IAMs have also been integrated with life cycle assessment tools in assessing climate
31 mitigation policies to better understand the relevance of life cycle GHG emissions in cost-optimal
32 mitigation scenarios (Tokimatsu et al. 2020; Portugal-Pereira et al. 2016; Pehl et al. 2017; Arvesen et
33 al. 2018). This holistic perspective ensures mitigation pathways do not exacerbate challenges for other
34 sectors or environmental indicators. At the same time, pathways are leveraging potential synergies
35 along the way towards achieving multiple goals.

36 IAMs rely on biophysical models with a relatively high-degree of spatial and temporal resolution to
37 inform coarser scale economic models of the potentials and costs for land, water and energy systems
38 (Johnson et al. 2019). IAMs leverage population, GDP and urbanization projections to generate
39 consistent water, energy and crop demand projections across multiple sectors (e.g., agriculture,
40 livestock, domestic, manufacturing and electricity generation) (Mouratiadou et al., 2016). The highly-
41 distributed nature of decisions and impacts across sectors, particularly for land and water, has been
42 addressed using multi-scale frameworks that embed regional and sub-regional models within global
43 IAMs (Mosnier et al. 2014; Hejazi et al. 2015; Bijl et al. 2018; Portugal-Pereira et al. 2018). These
44 analyses have demonstrated how local constraints and policies interact with national and international
45 strategies aimed at reducing emissions.

46 Sustainable development impacts extending beyond climate outcomes have been assessed by the IAMs
47 that contributed to the assessment, particularly in the context of the targets and indicators consistent

1 with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The representation of individual SDGs is diverse
2 (Figure I.3.), and recent model development has focused mainly on improving capabilities to assess
3 climate change mitigation policy combined with indicators for economic growth, resource access, air
4 pollution and land use (van Soest et al. 2019). Synergies and trade-offs across sustainable development
5 objectives can be quantified by analysing multi-sector impacts across ensembles of IAM scenarios
6 generated from single or multiple models (McCollum et al. 2013; Mouratiadou et al. 2016). Modules
7 have also been developed for IAMs with the specific purpose of incorporating policies that address non-
8 climatic sustainability outcomes (Fujimori et al. 2018; Parkinson et al. 2019; Cameron et al. 2016).
9 Similar features have been utilized to incorporate explicit adaptation measures and targeted policies that
10 balance mitigation goals with other sustainability criteria (Bertram et al. 2018; McCollum et al. 2018).
11

ACCEPTED VERSION
SUBJECT TO FINAL EDITS




Figure I.3. The representation of SDGs by IAMs. a) Individual target coverage from a multi-model survey; and b) SDG interactions and coverage by IAM models according to a combination of expert and model surveys. The strength dimension of SDG interactions is indicated by grey shading: darker shades represent strong interactions while white represents no interactions. Orange cells indicate where there is the highest agreement between the importance of interactions and model representation, while blue coloured cells show the most important interactions without model representation. Source: van Soest et al. (2019).

9.4. Policy analysis with IAMs

A key purpose of IAMs is to provide orientation knowledge for the deliberation of future climate action strategies by policy makers, civil society and the private sector. This is done by presenting different courses of actions (climate change and climate action pathways) towards a variety of long-term climate outcomes under a broad range of assumptions about future socio-economic, institutional and technological developments. The resulting climate change and climate action pathways can be analysed in terms of their outcomes towards a set of societal goals (such as the SDGs) and the resulting trade-offs between different pathways. Key trade-offs that have been investigated in the IAM literature are between (1) no, moderate, and ambitious mitigation pathways (Riahi et al. 2017), (2) early vs. delayed mitigation action (Riahi et al. 2015; Luderer et al. 2018), (3) global action with a focus on economic efficiency equalizing marginal abatement costs across countries and sectors vs. regionally and sectorially fragmented action (Kriegler et al. 2015b; Bertram et al. 2015; Kriegler et al. 2018b; Roelfsema et al. 2020; Bauer et al. 2020b; Blanford et al. 2014a), (4) pathways with different emphasis on supply side vs. demand side mitigation measures (van Vuuren et al. 2018; Grubler et al. 2018) or

1 more broadly different sustainable development strategies (Riahi et al. 2012; van Vuuren et al. 2015;
2 Soergel et al. 2021), and (5) pathways with different preferences about technology deployment, in
3 particular with regard to CCS and carbon dioxide removals (Kriegler et al. 2014a; Krey 2014; Riahi et
4 al. 2015; Strefler et al. 2018, 2021b; Rose et al. 2020; Luderer et al. 2021). Key uncertainties that were
5 explored in the IAM literature are between (1) different socio-economic futures as, e.g., represented by
6 the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) (Riahi et al. 2017; Bauer et al. 2017; Popp et al. 2017), (2)
7 different technological developments (Bosetti et al. 2015) and (3) different resource potentials (Kriegler
8 et al. 2016).

9 Policy analysis with IAMs follows the approach that a baseline scenario is augmented by some kind of
10 policy intervention. To address the uncertainties in baseline projections, the scientific community has
11 developed the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) that provide a set of vastly different future
12 developments as reference cases (Annex III.II.1.2.2). Most scenarios used in AR6 are based on the
13 middle-of-the-road reference system (SSP2). Depending on the research interest the baseline can be
14 defined as a no-policy baseline or it can include policies that either address GHG emissions like the
15 NDCs or other pre-existing policies such as energy subsidies and taxes. There is no standard definition
16 for baseline scenarios regarding the inclusion of policies. The baseline scenario is augmented by
17 additional policies like a carbon tax aiming towards a long-term climate goal. Hence, the IAM based
18 policy analysis assumes a reference system like SSP2 within which policy scenarios are compared with
19 a baseline scenario.

20 Most policy analysis with process-based IAMs apply a mix of short-term policy evaluation and long-
21 term policy optimization. Policy evaluation applies an exogenous set of policies such as the stated NDCs
22 and evaluates the emission outcomes. Policy optimization is mostly implemented as a cost-effectiveness
23 analysis: a long-term climate stabilisation target is set to derive the optimal mitigation strategy that
24 equalizes marginal abatement cost across sectors, GHGs and countries. This optimal mitigation strategy
25 can be implemented by a broad set of well-coordinated sector specific policies or by comprehensive
26 carbon pricing policies.

27 Most commonly the baseline scenario is either a no-policy baseline or based on the NDCs applying an
28 extrapolation beyond 2030 (Roelfsema et al. 2020; Grant et al. 2020). The climate policy regimes most
29 commonly applied include a long-term target to be reached. The optimal climate strategy can be phased
30 in gradually or applied immediately after 2020. It can focus on a global carbon price equalizing marginal
31 abatement costs across countries or policy intensities can vary across countries and sectors in the near-
32 to medium-term. The climate policy regime can or cannot include effort sharing mechanisms and
33 transfers between regions. Also, it can be extended to include additional sector policies such as
34 improved forest protection or fossil fuel subsidy removal. If certain technologies or activities are related
35 to spill-overs such as technology learning carbon-pricing might be complemented by technology
36 support (Schultes et al. 2018). If carbon pricing policies are fragmented or delayed additional and early
37 sector policies can help reduce distortions and carbon leakage effects (Bauer et al. 2020b). All these
38 variations to the policy regime can lead to very different transformation pathways and policy costs,
39 which is a core result of the IAM analysis.

40 By applying sensitivity analysis IAMs can be used to assess the importance to strategically develop new
41 technologies and options for mitigation and identify sticking points in climate policy frameworks. The
42 sensitivity analysis evaluates differences in outcomes subject to changes in assumptions. For instance,
43 the assumption about the timing and costs of CCS and CDR availability can be varied (Bauer et al.
44 2020a). The differences in mitigation costs and the transformation pathway support the assessment of
45 policy prioritization by identifying and quantifying crucial levers for achieving long-term climate
46 mitigation targets such as R&D efforts and timing of policies.

47

1 9.5. Limitations of IAMs

2 The application of IAMs and its results for providing orientation knowledge on climate change response
3 strategies has been criticised based on four arguments (Keppo et al. 2021; Gambhir et al. 2019). First,
4 there are concerns that IAMs are missing important dynamics, e.g. with regard to climate damages and
5 economic co-benefits of mitigation (Stern 2016), demand side responses (Wilson et al. 2012),
6 bioenergy, land degradation and management (Creutzig et al. 2014; IPCC 2019b), carbon dioxide
7 removal (Smith et al. 2016), rapid technological progress in the renewable energy sector (Creutzig et
8 al. 2017), actor heterogeneity, and distributional impacts of climate change and climate policy. This has
9 given rise to criticism that IAMs lack credibility in set of crucial assumptions, among which stands out
10 the critique on the availability of carbon dioxide removal technologies (Bednar et al. 2019; Anderson
11 and Peters 2016).

12 These concerns spur continuous model development and improvements in scenario design (Keppo et
13 al. 2021), particularly with regard to improved representations of energy demand, renewable energy,
14 carbon dioxide removal technologies, and land management. IAMs are aiming to keep pace with the
15 development of sector-specific models, including latest advances in estimating and modelling climate
16 damages (Piontek et al. 2018). In places, where dynamic modelling approaches are lacking, scenarios
17 are being used to explore relevant futures (Grubler et al. 2018). Moreover, sector-specific model
18 comparison studies have brought together domain experts and modellers to improve model
19 representations in these areas (Pietzcker et al. 2017; Edelenbosch et al. 2017a; Harmsen et al. 2020;
20 Rose et al. 2020; Bauer et al. 2020a). Although most models are still relying on the concept of a single
21 representative household representing entire regions, efforts are under way to better represent agent
22 heterogeneity and distributional impacts of climate change and climate mitigation policies (Rao et al.
23 2017a; Peng et al. 2021).

24 Second, concerns have been raised that IAMs are non-transparent and thus make it difficult to grasp
25 context and meaning of their results (Skea et al. 2021). These concerns have facilitated a substantially
26 increase in model documentation (see the common IAM documentation at www.iamcdocumentation.eu
27 as entry point) and open-source models. Nonetheless, more communication tools and co-production of
28 knowledge formats will be needed to contextualize IAM results for users (Auer et al. 2021). When
29 projecting over a century, uncertainties are large and cannot be ignored. Efforts have been undertaken
30 (Marangoni et al. 2017; Gillingham et al. 2018; Harmsen et al. 2021; Wilson et al. 2021) to diagnose
31 key similarities and differences between models and better gauge robust findings from these models
32 and how much they depend on key assumptions (as for example long term growth of the economy, the
33 monetary implication of climate damages or the diffusion and cost of key mitigation technologies).

34 Third, there are concerns that IAMs are describing transformative change on the level of energy and
35 land use, but are largely silent about the underlying socio-cultural transitions that could imply
36 restructuring of society and institutions. Weyant (2017) notes the inability of IAMs to mimic extreme
37 and discontinuous outcomes related to these underlying drivers as one of their major limitations. This
38 is relevant when modelling extreme climate damages as well as when modelling disruptive changes.
39 Dialogues and collaborative work between IAM researchers and social scientists have explored ways
40 to bridge insights from the various communities to provide a more complete picture of high impact
41 climate change scenarios and, on the other end, deep transformation pathways (Turnheim et al. 2015;
42 Geels et al. 2016; Trutnevyte et al. 2019). The extension of IAM research to sustainable development
43 pathways is giving rise to further inter-disciplinary research on underlying transformations towards the
44 Paris climate goals and other sustainable development goals (Kriegler et al. 2018c; Sachs et al. 2019b).

45 Finally, there are concerns that IAM analysis could focus on only a subset of relevant futures and thus
46 push society in certain direction without sufficient scrutiny (Beck and Mahony 2017). IAMs aim to
47 explore a wide range of socio-economic, technology and policy assumptions (Riahi et al. 2017), but it
48 remains a constant challenge to capture all relevant perspectives (O'Neill et al. 2020). These concerns

1 can be addressed by adopting an iterative approach between researchers and societal actors in shaping
2 research questions and IAM applications (Edenhofer and Kowarsch 2015). IAM research is constantly
3 taking up concerns about research gaps and fills it with new pathway research, as e.g. occurred for low
4 energy demand and limited bioenergy with CCS scenarios (Grubler et al. 2018; van Vuuren et al. 2018).

5

ACCEPTED VERSION
SUBJECT TO FINAL EDITS

1 **10. Key characteristics of models that contributed mitigation scenarios to the assessment²**

2 **Table I.5: Comparison of modelling characteristics as stated by contributing modelling teams to the AR6 database. Attributes include regional scope, sectoral**
 3 **coverage, type of baseline or benchmark setup as a basis for mitigation policies comparison, technology diffusion, capital vintaging and "sunsetting" of technologies**
 4 **and variety of discount rates approaches.**

		Global integrated and energy models															National integrated models																				
		AIM	C3IAM 2.0	COFFEE 1.1	EPPA 6	IMAGE 3.0 & 3.2	IMACLIM	GCAM	GENESYS-MOD	GMM (Global MARKAL Model)	McKinsey 1.0	MERGE-ETL	MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 1.1	MUSE 1.0	POLES	PROMETHEUS	TIAM-ECN 1.1	REmap GRO2020	REMIND 2.1 - MAGPIE 4.2	WEM (World Energy Model)	WITCH	7see6-20_GB	AIM/Enduse-Japan	BLUES 2.0	China DREAM	CONTO-RUS 1.0	E4SMA-EU-TIMES 1.0	STEM (Swiss TIMES Energy Systems Model)	JRC-EU-TIMES	TIMES-China 2.0	TIMES-France	TIMES_PT	TIMES-Sweden 2.0				
Regional scope	Global	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	National	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	Non-global multi-region	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Sectoral coverage	Full system (covering all GHGs from all sectors)	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	Energy	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	Buildings	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Transport	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Industry	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

FOOTNOTE² The tables are limited to the integrated models that have provided the information to a survey circulated in 2021, and therefore do not have a comprehensive coverage of all models that submitted scenarios to the AR6 scenario database.

	Global integrated and energy models															National integrated models																						
	AIM	C3IAM 2.0	COFFEE 1.1	EPPA 6	IMAGE 3.0 & 3.2	IMACLIM	GCAM	GENESYS-MOD	GMM (Global MARKAL Model)	McKinsey 1.0	MERGE-ETL	MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 1.1	MUSE 1.0	POLES	PROMETHEUS	TIAM-ECN 1.1	REmap GRO2020	REMIND 2.1 - MAGPIE 4.2	WEM (World Energy Model)	WITCH	7see6-20_GB	AIM/Enduse-Japan	BLUES 2.0	China DREAM	CONTO-RUS 1.0	E4SMA-EU-TIMES 1.0	STEM (Swiss TIMES Energy Systems Model)	JRC-EU-TIMES	TIMES-China 2.0	TIMES-France	TIMES_PT	TIMES-Sweden 2.0						
Characteristics of baseline/benchmark setup	Well-functioning markets in equilibrium	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	Regulatory and/or pricing policies	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	Socioeconomic costs & benefits of climate change impacts	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	Physical impacts of climate change on key processes	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	Logit substitution	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Technology diffusion	Constant elasticity of substitution	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	Lowest marginal cost w/ expansion constraints	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	Technology choice depends on agents' preferences	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	Technologies w/o constraints or marginal cost w/ expansion constraints	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	Single capital stock with fixed lifetime and load factor, early retirement via reduction in load	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Capital vintaging and "sunsetting" of technologies	Capital vintaging with fixed lifetime and load factors, early retirement of vintages or reduction	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	Single capital stock with fixed lifetime and load factor, without early retirement	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	Mix of the above for different technologies	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	As a property of an intertemporal welfare function (social discount rate)	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Discount rates	In an objective function of an intertemporal optimization, to sum values at different times	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	To compute lifecycle costs of investment decisions or return on investments, in functions representing agents investment choices	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

1
2

1
2
3
4
5
6

Table I.6: Overview of evaluated GHG emissions as stated by contributing modelling teams to the AR6 database: carbon dioxide (CO₂) from energy, industrial processes and land use change, methane (CH₄) from fossil fuel combustion, from fugitive and process activities, and agricultural biogenic fluxes, nitrous oxide (N₂O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF₆), sulphur dioxide (SO₂), black and organic carbon, and non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC). Levels of emission factor (EF) evaluation were classified in four categories: linked to explicit technology but for average fuel, linked to the evolution of other emissions, dependent on average technology classes, and based on an average activity sector.

Type of GHG emissions evaluation	Global integrated and energy models																	National integrated models																		
	AIM	C3IAM 2.0	COFFEE 1.1	EPPA 6	IMAGE 3.0 & 3.2	IMACLIM	GCAM	GENESYS-MOD	GMM (Global MARKAL Model)	McKinsey 1.0	MERGE-ETL	MESSAGEx-GLOBIOM 1.1	MUSE 1.0	POLES	PROMETHEUS	TIAM-ECN 1.1	REmap GRO2020	REMIN 2.1 - MAGPIE 4.2	WEM (World Energy Model)	WITCH	7see6-20_GB	AIM/Enduse-Japan	BLUES 2.0	China DREAM	CONTO-RUS 1.0	E4SMA-EU-TIMES 1.0	STEM (Swiss TIMES Energy Systems Model)	JRC-EU-TIMES	TIMES-China 2.0	TIMES-France	TIMES_PT	TIMES-Sweden 2.0				
EF linked to explicit technology w/ or w/o fuel representation	a																																			
EF linked to evolution of other emissions	b																																			
Average EF for technology class	c																																			
EF for sector	d																																			
Not represented	e																																			
CO ₂ energy	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
CO ₂ industrial processes	a	d	a	a	a	b	a	e	d	a	a	a	a	a	c	a	a	d	a	a	b	a	a	a	a	a	a	c	a	e	e	e	a	a	a	
CO ₂ land-use change	a	d	a	a	a	b	a	e	e	c	d	a	e	d	e	a	d	a	e	c	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e
CH ₄ fossil (combustion)	a	a	a	a	a	b	a	e	e	c	a	a	a	a	c	a	e	a	a	a	e	e	a	a	a	a	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e
CH ₄ fossil (fugitive and process)	a	d	a	a	a	b	a	e	e	a	a	a	e	a	c	a	e	c	e	d	e	e	d	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e
CH ₄ biogenic	a	e	a	a	a	b	a	e	e	a	d	a	e	d	b	a	e	d	e	c	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e
N ₂ O	a	d	a	a	a	b	a	e	e	a	d	a	a	d	c	a	e	a	e	c	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e
HFCs	d	e	e	a	a	e	a	e	e	e	d	d	e	c	d	e	e	e	e	e	d	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e
PFCs	d	e	e	a	a	e	a	e	e	e	d	e	e	c	d	e	e	e	e	d	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e
SF ₆	d	e	e	a	a	e	a	e	e	e	d	d	e	c	d	e	e	e	e	d	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e
SO ₂	a	a	e	d	a	e	a	e	e	e	d	a	e	a	e	e	a	a	e	a	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e
Black carbon	a	d	e	d	a	e	a	e	e	e	a	e	a	e	e	e	a	e	a	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	a
Organic carbon	a	d	e	d	a	e	a	e	e	e	a	e	a	e	e	e	a	e	a	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	a
Non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC)	a	a	e	d	a	e	a	e	e	e	d	a	e	a	e	e	a	a	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	e	a

7
8

11. Comparison of mitigation and removal measures represented by models that contributed mitigation scenarios to the assessment³

Table I.7: Overview of demand- and supply-side mitigation and removal measures in the energy, transport, building, industry and AFOLU sectors, as stated by contributing modelling teams to the AR6 database. Levels of inclusion were classified in two dimensions of explicit versus implicit and endogenous or exogenous. An explicit level suggests that the measure is directly represented in the model, while an implicit level refers to measures that are estimated indirectly by a proxy. An endogenous level reflects measures that are included in the dynamics of the model framework, whereas an exogenous level refers to measures that are not part of the model dynamics.

Level of inclusion	Global integrated and energy models																	National integrated models																						
	AIM	C3IAM 2.0	COFFEE 1.1	EPPA 6	IMAGE 3.0 & 3.2	IMACLIM	GCAM	GENESYS-MOD	GMM (Global MARKAL Model)	McKinsey 1.0	MERGE-ETL	MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 1.1	MUSE 1.0	POLES	PROMETHEUS	TIAM-ECN 1.1	REmap GRO2020	REMIND 2.1 - MAGPIE 4.2	WEM (World Energy Model)	WITCH	7see6-20_GB	AIM/Enduse-Japan	BLUES 2.0	China DREAM	CONTO-RUS 1.0	E4SMA-EU-TIMES 1.0	STEM (Swiss TIMES Energy Systems Model)	JRC-EU-TIMES	TIMES-China 2.0	TIMES-France	TIMES_PT	TIMES-Sweden 2.0								
<table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td>Explicit</td> <td>Implicit</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Endogenous</td> <td>A</td> <td>C</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Exogenous</td> <td>B</td> <td>D</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Not represented</td> <td colspan="2">E</td> </tr> </table>			Explicit	Implicit	Endogenous	A	C	Exogenous	B	D	Not represented	E																												
	Explicit	Implicit																																						
Endogenous	A	C																																						
Exogenous	B	D																																						
Not represented	E																																							
Demand side measures																																								
Energy efficiency improvements in energy end uses		A	B	A	C	A	A	C	B	A	A	C	C	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	B	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A					
Electrification of transport demand		A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A				
Electrification of energy demand for buildings		A	C	A	C	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	B	A	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A				
Electrification of industrial energy demand		A	C	A	C	A	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	B	A	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A				
CCS in industrial process applications		A	A	A	A	A	E	A	E	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	B	A	A	E	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A				

FOOTNOTE³ The tables are limited to the integrated models that have provided the information to a survey circulated in 2021, and therefore do not have a comprehensive coverage of all models that submitted scenarios to the AR6 scenario database.

Level of inclusion	Global integrated and energy models																																
	AIM	C3IAM 2.0	COFFEE 1.1	EPPA 6	IMAGE 3.0 & 3.2	IMACLIM	GCAM	GENeSYS-MOD	GMM (Global MARKAL Model)	McKinsey 1.0	MERGE-ETL	MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 1.1	MUSE 1.0	POLES	PROMETHEUS	TIAM-ECN 1.1	REmap GRO2020	REMIND 2.1 - MagPIE 4.2	WEM (World Energy Model)	WITCH													
<table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td>Explicit</td> <td>Implicit</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Endogenous</td> <td>A</td> <td>C</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Exogenous</td> <td>B</td> <td>D</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Not represented</td> <td colspan="2">E</td> </tr> </table>		Explicit	Implicit	Endogenous	A	C	Exogenous	B	D	Not represented	E																						
		Explicit	Implicit																														
	Endogenous	A	C																														
Exogenous	B	D																															
Not represented	E																																
Higher share of useful energy in final energy	C	B	A	C	A	D	A	D	A	A	C	C	A	A	C	A	C	C	A	C	C												
Reduced energy and service demand in industry	C	C	A	C	A	C	C	D	C	B	C	C	D	C	C	C	B	C	B	C	C												
Reduced energy and service demand in buildings	C	C	D	C	A	D	C	D	C	B	C	C	D	A	A	C	B	C	B	C	C												
Reduced energy and service demand in transport	C	C	A	C	A	A	A	A	D	B	D	C	D	A	C	C	B	C	B	D	D												
Reduced energy and service demand in international transport	C	E	A	C	C	C	C	D	D	B	D	C	D	A	C	C	B	C	B	D	D												
Reduced material demand	C	B	B	C	C	D	E	E	E	A	E	E	E	E	E	E	B	E	B	E	E												
Urban form	E	E	B	E	C	D	E	D	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	C	E	E												
Switch from traditional biomass and modern fuels	B	A	A	B	A	E	A	C	E	B	A	D	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	D	D												
Dietary changes (e.g., reducing meat consumption)	B	E	B	A	B	B	A	E	E	A	E	A	E	E	E	E	E	B	E	E	E												
Food processing	A	E	A	C	B	B	E	E	E	E	A	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E												
Reduction of food waste	B	E	E	E	B	E	C	E	E	B	E	B	E	E	E	E	E	B	E	E	E												
Substitution of livestock-based products with plant-based products	A	E	B	A	B	D	E	E	E	B	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	B	E	E	E												
Supply side measures																																	
Decarbonisation of electricity:																																	
Solar PV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A												
Solar CSP	E	E	A	E	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A												
Hydropower	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	D												
Nuclear energy	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A												
Advanced, small modular nuclear reactor designs (SMR)	E	E	E	C	C	E	E	E	A	E	A	E	E	E	C	A	D	E	C	E	E												

National integrated models												
7see6-20_GB	AIM/Enduse-Japan	BLUES 2.0	China DREAM	CONTO-RUS 1.0	E4SMA-EU-TIMES 1.0	STEM (Swiss TIMES Energy Systems Model)	JRC-EU-TIMES	TIMES-China 2.0	TIMES-France	TIMES_PT	TIMES-Sweden 2.0	
B	A	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	
B	B	A	A	C	C	A	C	C	C	B	A	
B	B	A	B	D	C	A	C	C	C	B	B	
B	B	A	B	D	C	A	C	C	C	B	A	
B	E	A	B	E	C	E	C	C	C	E	B	
D	B	B	B	D	E	E	C	C	B	B	B	
D	B	B	B	E	E	A	E	E	E	E	D	
B	E	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	E	A	E	
E	E	B	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
D	E	A	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	D	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	B	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	
B	E	A	A	E	A	A	A	A	A	A	E	
B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	
B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	
B	E	E	E	E	A	A	E	E	E	E	E	

Level of inclusion	Global integrated and energy models																																
	AIM	C3IAM 2.0	COFFEE 1.1	EPPA 6	IMAGE 3.0 & 3.2	IMACLIM	GCAM	GENeSYS-MOD	GMM (Global MARKAL Model)	McKinsey 1.0	MERGE-ETL	MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 1.1	MUSE 1.0	POLES	PROMETHEUS	TIAM-ECN 1.1	REmap GRO2020	REMIND 2.1 - MAGPIE 4.2	WEM (World Energy Model)	WITCH													
<table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td>Explicit</td> <td>Implicit</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Endogenous</td> <td>A</td> <td>C</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Exogenous</td> <td>B</td> <td>D</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Not represented</td> <td colspan="2">E</td> </tr> </table>		Explicit	Implicit	Endogenous	A	C	Exogenous	B	D	Not represented	E																						
		Explicit	Implicit																														
	Endogenous	A	C																														
Exogenous	B	D																															
Not represented	E																																
Fuel cells (hydrogen)	E	A	A	A	A	E	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A												
CCS at coal and gas-fired power plants	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A												
Ocean energy (incl. tidal and current energy)	E	E	E	E	C	E	E	A	A	D	A	E	E	A	E	A	A	E	A	E													
High-temperature geothermal heat	A	E	A	E	C	E	A	A	A	D	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	E													
Wind (on-shore and off-shore lumped together)	A	A	E	A	A	A	E	A	E	E	A	A	E	E	A	A	A	A	A	A													
Wind (on-shore and off-shore represented individually)	E	E	A	E	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	E	A	A													
Bio-electricity, including biomass co-firing, without CCS	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A													
Bio-electricity, including biomass co-firing, with CCS	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A													
Decarbonisation of non-electric fuels:																																	
1st generation biofuels	A	E	A	A	A	A	A	E	A	C	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A													
2nd generation biofuels (grassy/woody biomass to liquids) without CCS	A	E	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	A													
2nd generation biofuels (grassy/woody biomass to liquids) with CCS	A	E	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	C	A	E	A	A	A													
Solar and geothermal heating	A	E	A	E	C	E	E	A	A	C	A	A	E	A	C	A	A	A	A	E													
Nuclear process heat	E	E	E	E	C	E	E	E	A	E	A	E	E	E	C	E	E	E	A	E													
Hydrogen from fossil fuels with CCS	E	E	A	A	A	E	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A													
Hydrogen from electrolysis	E	E	A	A	A	E	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A													
Hydrogen from biomass without CCS	E	E	A	A	A	A	A	E	A	D	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	E													
Hydrogen from biomass with CCS	E	E	A	A	A	E	A	E	A	D	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	E													
Algae biofuels without CCS	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	A	E	E	E	E	E	E	C	E													

National integrated models												
7see6-20_GB	AIM/Enduse-Japan	BLUES 2.0	China DREAM	CONTO-RUS 1.0	E4SMA-EU-TIMES 1.0	STEM (Swiss TIMES Energy Systems Model)	JRC-EU-TIMES	TIMES-China 2.0	TIMES-France	TIMES_PT	TIMES-Sweden 2.0	
B	A	A	B	E	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
B	A	A	E	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
B	A	E	E	E	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	E
B	A	E	E	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	E
B	E	E	A	A	A	A	E	E	E	E	E	E
B	A	A	E	A	A	E	A	A	A	A	A	A
B	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
B	A	A	E	E	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
B	A	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
B	E	E	E	B	A	A	A	E	E	E	E	E
B	A	A	E	E	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
B	A	A	B	E	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
B	A	A	E	E	A	A	A	E	A	A	A	A
B	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E

Level of inclusion	Global integrated and energy models																			
	AIM	C3IAM 2.0	COFFEE 1.1	EPPA 6	IMAGE 3.0 & 3.2	IMACLIM	GCAM	GENeSYS-MOD	GMM (Global MARKAL Model)	McKinsey 1.0	MERGE-ETL	MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 1.1	MUSE 1.0	POLES	PROMETHEUS	TIAM-ECN 1.1	REmap GRO2020	REMIND 2.1 - MagPIE 4.2	WEM (World Energy Model)	WITCH
Endogenous	Explicit																Implicit			
	A	C																		
Exogenous																	Explicit			
	B	D																		
Not represented																	Implicit			
	E	E															E			
Algae biofuels with CCS	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	C	E
Power-to-gas, methanisation, synthetic fuels, fed with fossil CO ₂	E	E	A	A	C	E	E	A	A	E	A	E	E	A	A	A	A	E	A	E
Power-to-gas, methanisation, syn-fuels, fed with biogenic or atmospheric CO ₂	E	E	A	E	C	E	E	A	A	E	A	E	E	A	A	A	A	E	A	E
Fuel switching and replacing fossil fuels by electricity in end-use sectors	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Other processes:																				
Substitution of halocarbons for refrigerants and insulation	E	E	E	E	A	E	C	E	E	E	E	D	E	C	C	E	E	E	E	C
Reduced gas flaring and leakage in extractive industries	C	E	A	B	C	E	C	E	E	A	E	D	E	A	E	B	E	C	A	C
Electrical transmission efficiency improvements, including smart grids	E	E	A	C	C	E	E	D	C	E	D	E	E	E	C	B	A	E	A	C
Grid integration of intermittent renewables	C	E	A	C	A	C	A	C	C	E	C	A	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	A
Electricity storage	C	D	A	A	A	E	A	A	C	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
AFOLU Measures:																				
Reduced deforestation, forest protection, avoided forest conversion	A	D	A	A	A	B	A	E	E	A	E	A	E	C	E	B	D	A	E	C
Methane reductions in rice paddies	A	E	A	C	A	C	C	E	E	A	E	A	E	C	E	B	E	C	E	C
Livestock and grazing management	A	E	A	C	A	A	C	E	E	A	E	A	E	C	E	B	E	C	E	C
Increasing agricultural productivity	A	C	A	C	A	A	A	E	E	A	E	A	A	C	E	D	D	C	E	E
Nitrogen pollution reductions	A	E	B	C	A	A	A	E	E	A	E	A	E	C	E	D	E	C	E	E
Changing agricultural practices enhancing soil carbon	E	E	E	C	A	E	E	E	E	A	E	E	A	C	E	B	E	E	E	E

National integrated models											
7see6-20_GB	AIM/Enduse-Japan	BLUES 2.0	China DREAM	CONTO-RUS 1.0	E4SMA-EU-TIMES 1.0	STEM (Swiss TIMES Energy Systems Model)	JRC-EU-TIMES	TIMES-China 2.0	TIMES-France	TIMES_PT	TIMES-Sweden 2.0
B	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
B	A	A	E	E	A	A	A	E	A	A	A
B	A	A	E	E	A	A	A	E	A	A	A
B	A	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Other processes:											
E	A	E	B	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
E	E	A	B	B	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
D	E	A	B	B	B	C	E	A	E	B	E
D	A	A	A	E	A	A	C	E	E	A	C
B	A	A	A	D	A	A	C	A	A	A	A
AFOLU Measures:											
E	E	A	E	B	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
E	A	A	B	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
E	A	A	B	D	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
E	E	A	E	D	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
E	A	B	B	B	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
E	E	A	E	D	E	E	E	E	E	E	E

Level of inclusion	Global integrated and energy models																				
	AIM	C3IAM 2.0	COFFEE 1.1	EPPA 6	IMAGE 3.0 & 3.2	IMACLIM	GCAM	GENeSYS-MOD	GMM (Global MARKAL Model)	McKinsey 1.0	MERGE-ETL	MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 1.1	MUSE 1.0	POLES	PROMETHEUS	TIAM-ECN 1.1	REmap GRO2020	REMIND 2.1 - MagPIE 4.2	WEM (World Energy Model)	WITCH	
Endogenous	Explicit		Implicit																		
	A	C																			
Exogenous	B	D																			
Not represented	E																				
Agroforestry and silviculture	E	C	A	E	D	E	E	E	E	B	E	E	E	E	E	B	E	E	E	E	E
Land-use planning	E	D	A	E	B	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Urban and peri-urban agriculture and forestry	E	E	E	E	D	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Fire management and (ecological) pest control	C	E	E	E	D	E	D	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Conservation agriculture	E	E	A	E	D	E	E	E	E	E	A	E	E	E	E	D	E	E	E	E	E
Influence on land albedo of land use change	E	E	E	E	A	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	D	E	E	E
Manure management	A	E	E	E	A	C	C	E	E	A	E	A	E	E	E	B	E	C	E	C	E
Reduce food post-harvest losses	B	D	E	E	D	E	D	E	E	E	E	B	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recovery of forestry and agricultural residues	E	E	A	E	A	B	A	E	E	E	A	E	C	E	E	D	E	E	E	E	E
Forest Management – increasing forest productivity	C	E	E	C	C	B	D	E	E	E	A	E	C	E	E	D	E	E	E	C	E
Forest Management – increasing timber/biomass extraction	C	E	E	E	C	B	D	E	E	E	A	E	C	E	E	D	E	E	E	C	E
Forest Management – remediating natural disturbances	E	E	E	E	B	B	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	C
Forest Management – conservation for carbon sequestration	E	D	E	E	B	B	D	E	E	A	E	A	E	E	E	E	D	E	E	E	C
Carbon dioxide removal:																					
Bioenergy production with carbon capture and sequestration (BECCS)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Direct air capture and storage (DACs)	E	E	A	A	A	E	E	A	A	A	A	E	E	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Mineralization of atmospheric CO ₂ through enhanced weathering of rocks	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	C	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	A	E	E	E
Afforestation / Reforestation	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	E	E	C	E	A	E	C	C	B	C	A	E	A	A

National integrated models												
7see6-20_GB	AIM/Enduse-Japan	BLUES 2.0	China DREAM	CONTO-RUS 1.0	E4SMA-EU-TIMES 1.0	STEM (Swiss TIMES Energy Systems Model)	JRC-EU-TIMES	TIMES-China 2.0	TIMES-France	TIMES_PT	TIMES-Sweden 2.0	
E	E	A	E	D	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	A	E	B	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	E	E	D	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	A	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	E	E	D	E	E	E	E	E	E	A	
E	E	E	E	D	E	E	E	E	E	E	A	
E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	A	E	B	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	

Level of inclusion	Global integrated and energy models																			
	AIM	C3IAM 2.0	COFFEE 1.1	EPPA 6	IMAGE 3.0 & 3.2	IMACLIM	GCAM	GENeSYS-MOD	GMM (Global MARKAL Model)	McKinsey 1.0	MERGE-ETL	MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 1.1	MUSE 1.0	POLES	PROMETHEUS	TIAM-ECN 1.1	REmap GRO2020	REMIND 2.1 - MAGPIE 4.2	WEM (World Energy Model)	WITCH
Endogenous	Explicit																			
	A	C																		
Exogenous	Implicit																			
	B	D																		
Not represented	E																			
Restoration of wetlands	E	E	E	E	C	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Biochar	E	E	E	E	D	E	E	E	E	E	A	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Soil carbon enhancement, enhancing carbon sequestration in biota and soils	E	E	A	C	D	D	E	E	E	E	A	A	E	C	E	E	E	C	E	E
Material substitution of fossil CO ₂ with bio-CO ₂ in industrial application	E	E	A	C	A	E	E	E	E	E	A	E	E	E	E	D	E	E	A	E
Ocean iron fertilization	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Ocean alkalinisation	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Carbon capture and usage (CCU):																				
Bioplastics, carbon fibre and other construction materials	E	E	A	A	E	E	C	E	A	D	A	E	E	E	A	E	A	E	A	E

National integrated models												
7see6-20_GB	AIM/Enduse-Japan	BLUES 2.0	China DREAM	CONTO-RUS 1.0	E4SMA-EU-TIMES 1.0	STEM (Swiss TIMES Energy Systems Model)	JRC-EU-TIMES	TIMES-China 2.0	TIMES-France	TIMES_PT	TIMES-Sweden 2.0	
E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	E	E	E	E	A	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	A	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
D	E	A	E	E	A	E	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
E	E	A	E	B	A	E	A	E	E	A	E	

1
2
3

Part II. Scenarios

1. Overview on climate change scenarios

Scenarios are descriptions of alternative future developments. They are used to explore the potential implications of possible future developments and how they might depend on alternative courses of action. They are particularly useful in the context of deep uncertainty. Scenarios are conditional on the realization of external assumptions and can be used to explore possible outcomes under a variety of assumptions.

Future climate change is a prime example for the application of scenarios. It is driven by human activities across the world and thus can be altered by human agency. It affects all regions over many centuries to come. Humankind's response to climate change touches not only on the way we use energy and land, but also on socio-economic and institutional layers of societal development. Climate change scenarios provide a central tool to analyse this wicked problem.

1.1. Purposes of climate change scenarios

Climate change scenarios are developed for a number of purposes (O'Neill et al. 2020). First, they are constructed to explore possible climate change futures covering the causal chain from (i) socio-economic developments to (ii) energy and land use to (iii) greenhouse gas emissions to (iv) changes in the atmospheric composition of greenhouse gases and short-lived climate forcers and the associated radiative forcing to (v) changes in temperature and precipitation patterns to (vi) bio-physical impacts of climate change and finally to (vii) impacts on socio-economic developments, thus closing the loop. Quantitative scenarios exploring possible climate change futures are often called climate change projections and climate change impact projections

Second, climate change scenarios are developed to explore pathways towards long-term climate goals. Goal-oriented scenarios often carry the word pathway in their name, such as climate change mitigation pathway, climate change adaptation pathway, or more generally climate change transition / transformation pathway. They are sometimes called backcasting⁴ scenarios, or short backcasts, in the literature, particularly when contrasted with forecasts (Robinson 1982). Goal-oriented / backcasting scenarios are inherently normative and intricately linked to human intervention. They can be used to compare and contrast different courses of actions. For example, they are applied in climate change mitigation analysis by comparing reference scenarios without or with only moderate climate policy intervention, sometimes called baseline scenarios, with mitigations pathways that achieve certain climate goals (Grant et al. 2020). Transformation pathways to climate goals are examples of backcasting scenarios. Among other things, they can be used to learn about the multi-dimensional trade-offs between raising or lowering ambition (Clarke et al. 2014; Schleussner et al. 2016). In addition, different transformation pathways to the same goal are often used to analyse trade-offs between different routes towards this goal (Rogelj et al. 2018a). These scenarios need to be looked at as a set to understand attainable outcomes and the trade-offs between them. With scenarios, context matters.

Third, climate change scenarios are used to integrate knowledge and analysis between the three different climate change research communities working on the climate system and its response to human interference (linked to WG I of the IPCC), climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability (linked

FOOTNOTE⁴ Backcasting is different from Hindcasting. Hindcasting refers to testing the ability of a mathematical model to reproduce past events. In contrast Backcasting begins with a desired future outcome and calculates a pathway from the present to that outcome consistent with constraints.

1 to WG II) and climate change mitigation (linked to WG III) (IPCC 2000; van Vuuren et al. 2011b;
2 O'Neill et al. 2016) (Annex III.II.1.3). This involves the adoption of common scenario frameworks that
3 allow the consistent use of, e.g., shared emissions scenarios, socio-economic development scenarios
4 and climate change projections (Moss et al. 2010; Kriegler et al. 2012; van Vuuren et al. 2012, 2014;
5 O'Neill et al. 2014). The integrative power of scenarios extends beyond the climate change research
6 community into neighbouring fields such as the social sciences and ecology (Rosa et al. 2020; Pereira
7 et al. 2020). To foster such integration, underlying scenario narratives have proven extremely useful as
8 they allow to develop and link quantitative scenario expressions in very different domains of knowledge
9 (O'Neill et al. 2020).

10 Fourth, climate change scenarios and their assessment aim to inform society (Kowarsch et al. 2017;
11 Weber et al. 2018; Auer et al. 2021). To achieve this, it is important to connect climate change scenarios
12 to broader societal development goals (Riahi et al. 2012; van Vuuren et al. 2015; Kriegler et al. 2018c;
13 Soergel et al. 2021) and relate them to social, sectoral and regional contexts (Absar and Preston 2015;
14 Frame et al. 2018; Kok et al. 2019; Aguiar et al. 2020). To this end, scenarios can be seen as tools for
15 societal discourse and decision making to coordinate perceptions about possible and desirable futures
16 between societal actors (Edenhofer and Kowarsch 2015; Beck and Mahony 2017).

17

18 **1.2. Types of climate change mitigation scenarios**

19 Different types of climate change scenarios are linked to different purposes and knowledge domains
20 and different models used to construct them (Annex III, Part I). Global reference and mitigation
21 scenarios and their associated emissions projections, which are often called emission scenarios, and
22 national, sector and service transition scenarios are key types of scenarios assessed in the Working
23 Group III report. They are briefly summarized below⁵.

24 A brief description of the common climate change scenario framework with relevance for all three IPCC
25 Working Groups is provided in Annex III.II.1.3, and a discussion how the WG I and WG II assessments
26 relate to the WG III scenario assessment is given in Annex III.II.2.4.

27 **1.2.1. Global mitigation scenarios**

28 Global mitigation scenarios are mostly derived from global integrated assessment models (Annex III.9.
29 Integrated assessment modelling) and have been developed in single model studies as well as multi-
30 model comparison studies. The research questions of these studies have evolved together with the
31 climate policy debate and the knowledge about climate change, drivers, and response measures. The
32 assessment of global mitigation pathways in the 5th Assessment Report (AR5) (Clarke et al. 2014) was
33 informed, inter alia, by a number of large-scale multi model studies comparing overshoot and not-to-
34 exceed scenarios for a range of concentration stabilization targets (Energy Modelling Forum (EMF)
35 study 22: EMF22) (Clarke et al. 2009), exploring the economics of different decarbonisation strategies
36 and robust characteristics of the energy transition in global mitigation pathways (EMF27, RECIPE)
37 (Luderer et al. 2012; Krey and Riahi 2013; Kriegler et al. 2014a), and analysing co-benefits and trade-
38 offs of mitigation strategies with energy security, energy access, and air quality objectives (Global
39 Energy Assessment: GEA) (Riahi et al. 2012; McCollum et al. 2011, 2013; Rogelj et al. 2013b; Rao et
40 al. 2013). They also investigated the importance of international cooperation for reaching ambitious
41 climate goals (EMF22, EMF27, AMPERE) (Clarke et al. 2009; Blanford et al. 2014b; Kriegler et al.
42 2015b), the implications of collective action towards the 2°C goal from 2020 onwards vs. delayed
43 mitigation action (AMPERE, LIMITS) (Riahi et al. 2015; Kriegler et al. 2014b), and the distribution of

FOOTNOTE⁵ The terms mitigation / transition / transformation scenarios and mitigation / transition / transformation pathways are used interchangeably, as they refer to goal-oriented scenarios.

1 mitigation costs and burden sharing schemes in global mitigation pathways (LIMITS) (Tavoni et al.
2 2014, 2015). Scenarios from these and other studies were collected in a scenario database supporting
3 the AR5 assessment (Krey et al. 2014). With a shelf life of 8 to 14 years, they are now outdated and no
4 longer part of this assessment.

5 Since AR5, many new studies published global mitigation pathways and associated emissions
6 projections. After the adoption of the Paris Agreement, several large-scale multi-model studies newly
7 investigated pathway limiting warming to 1.5°C (ADVANCE: Luderer et al. (2018); CD-LINKS:
8 McCollum et al. (2018a); ENGAGE: Riahi et al. (2021); SSPs: Rogelj et al. (2018b)), allowing this
9 report to conduct a robust assessment of 1.5°C pathways. Most scenario studies took the hybrid climate
10 policy architecture of the Paris Agreement with global goals, nationally determined contributions
11 (NDCs) and an increasing number of implemented national climate policies as a starting point,
12 including hybrid studies with participation of global and national modelling teams to inform the global
13 stocktake (ENGAGE: Fujimori et al. (2021); COMMIT: van Soest et al. (2021); CD-LINKS: Schaeffer
14 et al. (2020), Roelfsema et al. (2020)). Multi-model studies covered a range of scenarios from
15 extrapolating current policy trends and the implementation of NDCs, respectively, to limiting warming
16 to 1.5°-2°C with immediate global action and after passing through the NDCs in 2030, respectively.
17 These scenarios are used to investigate, among others, the end of century warming implications of
18 extrapolating current policy trends and NDCs (Perdana et al. 2020); the ability of the NDCs to keep
19 limiting warming to 1.5-2°C in reach (Luderer et al. 2018; Vrontisi et al. 2018; Roelfsema et al. 2020),
20 the scope for global accelerated action to go beyond the NDCs in 2030 (van Soest et al. 2021), and the
21 benefits of early action vs. the risk of overshoot and the use of net negative CO₂ emissions in the long-
22 term (Riahi et al. 2021; Bertram et al. 2021; Hasegawa et al. 2021). Other large-scale multi-model
23 studies looked into specific topics: the international economic implications of the NDCs in 2030
24 (EMF36) (Böhringer et al. 2021), the impact of mitigating short-lived climate forcers on warming and
25 health co-benefits in mitigation pathways (EMF30) (Harmsen et al. 2020; Smith et al. 2020b) and the
26 role and implications of large-scale bioenergy deployment in global mitigation pathways (EMF33)
27 (Rose et al. 2020; Bauer et al. 2020a).

28 A large variety of recent modelling studies, mostly based on individual models, deepened research on
29 a diverse set of questions (Annex III.3.2. Global pathways). Selected examples are the impact of peak
30 vs. end of century targets on the timing of action in mitigation pathways (Rogelj et al. 2019a; Strefler
31 et al. 2021a); demand-side driven deep mitigation pathways with sustainable development co-benefits
32 (van Vuuren et al. 2018; Grubler et al. 2018; Bertram et al. 2018); synergies and trade-offs between
33 mitigation and sustainable development goals (Fujimori et al. 2020; Soergel et al. 2021); and the
34 integration of climate impacts into mitigation pathways (Schultes et al. 2021). There have also been a
35 number of recent sectoral studies with global integrated assessment models and other global models
36 across all sectors, e.g. the energy sector (IEA 2021; IRENA 2020; Kober et al. 2020) and transport
37 sector (Rottoli et al. 2021; Fisch-Romito and Guivarch 2019; Edelenbosch et al. 2017a; Zhang et al.
38 2018; Paltsev et al. 2022; Mercure et al. 2018; Lam and Mercure 2021). Very recent work investigated
39 the impact of COVID on mitigation pathways (Kikstra et al. 2021a) and co-designed global scenarios
40 for users in the financial sector (NGFS 2021). In addition to these policy-, technology- and sector-
41 oriented studies, a few diagnostic studies developed mitigation scenarios to diagnose model behaviour
42 (Harmsen et al. 2021) and explore model harmonization (Giarola et al. 2021).

43 The scenarios from most of these and many other studies were collected in the AR6 scenario database
44 (Annex III.II.3.2) and are primarily assessed in Chapter 3 of the report. However sectoral chapters have
45 also used the scenarios, including their climate mitigation categorizations to ensure consistent cross-
46 chapter treatment. Only a small fraction of these scenarios were already available to the assessment of
47 global mitigation pathways in the Special Report on 1.5°C Warming (SR15) (Rogelj et al. 2018a) and
48 were included in the supporting SR15 database (Huppmann et al. 2018).

1 **1.2.2. National transition scenarios**

2 A large number of transition scenarios is developed on a national/regional level by national integrated
3 assessment, energy-economy or computable general equilibrium models, among others. These aim to
4 analyse the implications of current climate plans of countries and regions, as well as long-term strategies
5 until 2050 investigating different degrees of low carbon development. National/regional transition
6 scenarios are assessed in Chapter 4 of the Report.

7 Recent research has focused on several different types of national transition scenarios that focus on
8 accelerated climate mitigation pathways in the near-term to 2050. These include scenarios considered
9 by the authors as tied to meeting specific global climate goals⁶ and scenarios tied to specific policy
10 targets (e.g., carbon neutrality or 80-95% reduction from a certain baseline year). A majority of the
11 accelerated national transition modelling studies up to 2050 evaluate pathways that the authors consider
12 compatible with a 2°C global warming limit, with fewer scenarios defined as compatible with 1.5°C
13 global pathways. Regionally, national transition scenarios have centred on countries in Asia
14 (particularly in China, India, Japan), in the European Union, and in North America, with fewer and
15 more narrowly focused scenario studies in Latin America and Africa (Lepault and Lecocq 2021).

16 **1.2.3. Sector transition scenarios**

17 There are also a range of sector transition scenarios, both on the global and the country level. These
18 include scenarios for the transition of the electricity, buildings, industry, transport and AFOLU sectors
19 until 2050. Due to the accelerated electrification in mitigation pathways, sector coupling plays an
20 increasingly important role to overcome decarbonisation bottlenecks, complicating a separate sector-
21 by-sector scenario assessment. Likewise, the energy-water-land nexus limits the scope a separate
22 assessment of the energy and agricultural sectors. Nevertheless, sector transition scenarios play an
23 important role for this assessment as they can usually offer much more technology, policy and behaviour
24 detail than integrated assessment models. They are primarily assessed in the sector chapters of the
25 report. Their projections of emissions reductions in the sectors in the near- to medium-term is used to
26 check the sector dynamics of global models in Chapter 3 of the Report.

27 Recent transition scenarios considered overarching accelerated climate mitigation strategies across
28 multiple sectors, including demand reduction, energy efficiency improvement, electrification and
29 switching to low carbon fuels. The sectoral strategies considered are often specific to national resource
30 availability, political, economic, climate, and technological conditions. Many sectoral transition
31 strategies have focused on the energy supply sectors, particularly the power sector, and the role for
32 renewable and bio-based fuels in decarbonising energy supply and carbon capture and sequestration
33 (CCS). Some studies present comprehensive scenarios for both supply-side and demand-side sectors,
34 including sector-specific technologies, strategies, and policies. Nearly all demand sector scenarios have
35 emphasized the need for energy efficiency, conservation and reduction through technological changes,
36 with a limited number of models also exploring possible behavioural changes enabled by new
37 technological and societal innovations.

38 **1.2.4. Service transition scenarios**

39 A central feature of service transition pathways is a focus on the provision of adequate energy services
40 to provide decent standards of living for all as the main scenario objective. Energy services are proxies
41 for well-being, with common examples being provision of shelter (expressed as m²/capita), mobility
42 (expressed as passenger-kilometres), nutrition (expressed as kCal/capita), and thermal comfort

FOOTNOTE⁶ National emission pathways in the near- or mid-term cannot be linked to long-term mitigation goals without making additional assumptions about emissions by other countries up to the mid-term, and assumptions by all countries up to 2100 (see Chapter 4, Box 4.1).

1 (expressed as degree-days) (Creutzig et al. 2018). (Creutzig et al. 2018). Service transition pathways
2 seek to meet adequate levels of such energy services with minimal carbon emissions, using
3 combinations of demand- and supply-side options. Ideally this is done by improving the efficiency of
4 service provision systems to minimize overall final energy and resource demand, thereby reducing
5 pressure on supply-side and carbon dioxide removal technologies (Grubler et al. 2018). Specifically,
6 this includes providing convenient access to end-use services (health care, education, communication,
7 etc.), while minimizing both primary and end-use energy required. Service transition pathways provide
8 a compelling scenario narrative focused on wellbeing, resulting in technology and policy pathways that
9 give explicit priority to decent living standards. Furthermore, more efficient service provision often
10 involves combinations of behavioural, infrastructural and technological change, expanding the options
11 available to policymakers for achieving mitigation goals (van Sluisveld et al. 2016, 2018). These
12 dimensions are synergistic, in particular in that behavioural and lifestyle changes often require
13 infrastructures adequately matching lifestyles. Service transition scenarios are primarily assessed in
14 Chapter 5 of the report.

16 **1.3. Scenario framework for climate change research**

17 *1.3.1. History of scenario frameworks used by the IPCC*

18 For the first three assessment reports the IPCC directly commissioned emission scenarios, with social,
19 economic, energy and partially policy aspects as drivers of projected GHG emissions. The first set of
20 scenarios, the ‘SA90’ of the IPCC First Assessment Report (IPCC 1990), had four distinct scenarios,
21 ‘business-as-usual’ and three policy scenarios of increasing ambition. The set of ‘IS92’ scenarios used
22 in the Second Assessment Report (SAR) investigated variations of business-as-usual scenarios with
23 respect to uncertainties about the key drivers of economic growth, technology and population (Leggett
24 et al. 1992). The SRES scenarios from the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) (IPCC
25 2000) were produced by multiple modelling organizations and were used in the Third and Fourth
26 Assessment reports (TAR and AR4). Four distinct scenario families were characterized by narratives
27 and projections of key drivers like population development and economic growth (but no policy
28 measures) to examine their influence on a range of GHG and air pollutant emissions. Until the 4th
29 Assessment Report, the IPCC organized the scenario development process centrally. Since then,
30 scenarios are developed by the research community and the IPCC limited its role to catalysing and
31 assessing scenarios. To shorten development times, a parallel approach was chosen (Moss et al. 2010)
32 and representative concentration pathways (RCPs) were developed (van Vuuren et al. 2011b) to inform
33 the next generation of climate modelling for the 5th Assessment Report (AR5). RCPs explored four
34 different emissions and atmospheric composition pathways structured to result in different levels of
35 radiative forcing in 2100: 2.6, 4.5, 6.0 and 8.5 W/m². They were used as an input to the Climate Model
36 Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) (Taylor et al. 2011) and its results were assessed in AR5
37 (Collins et al. 2013).

38 *1.3.2. Current scenario framework and SSP-based emission scenarios*

39 The current scenario framework for climate change research (van Vuuren et al. 2014; O’Neill et al.
40 2014; Kriegler et al. 2014c) is based on the concept of Shared Socio-Economic Pathways (SSPs)
41 (Kriegler et al. 2012; O’Neill et al. 2014). Unlike their predecessor scenarios from the SRES (IPCC
42 2000), their underlying narratives are motivated by the purpose of using the framework for mitigation
43 and adaptation policy analysis. Hence the narratives are structured to cover the space of socio-economic
44 challenges to both adaptation and mitigation. They tell five stories of sustainability (SSP1), middle of
45 the road development (SSP2), regional rivalry (SSP3), inequality (SSP4) and fossil-fuelled
46 development (SSP5) (O’Neill et al. 2017). SSP1, SSP2, and SSP3 were structured to explore futures
47 with socio-economic challenges to adaptation and mitigation increasing from low to high with

1 increasing number of SSP. SSP4 was structured to explore a world with high socio-economic challenges
2 to adaptation but low socio-economic challenges to mitigation, while SSP5 explored a world with low
3 challenges to adaptation but high challenges to mitigation. The five narratives have been translated into
4 population and education (Kc and Lutz 2017), economic growth (Dellink et al. 2017; Crespo Cuaresma
5 2017; Leimbach et al. 2017a), and urbanization projections (Jiang and O’Neill 2017) for each of the
6 SSPs.

7 The SSP narratives and associated projections of socio-economic drivers provide the core components
8 for building SSP-based scenario families. These basic SSPs are not scenarios or goal-oriented pathways
9 themselves (despite carrying “pathway” in the name), but building blocks from which to develop full-
10 fledged scenarios. In particular, their basic elements do not make quantitative assumptions about energy
11 and land use, emissions, climate change, climate impacts and climate policy. Even though including
12 these aspects in the scenario building process may alter some of the basic elements, e.g. projections of
13 economic growth, the resulting scenario remains associated with its underlying SSP. To improve the
14 ability of SSPs to capture socio-economic environments, basic SSPs have been extended in various
15 ways, including the addition of quantitative projections on further key socio-economic dimensions like
16 inequality (Rao et al. 2019), governance (Andrijevic et al. 2019), and gender equality (Andrijevic et al.
17 2020a). Extensions also included spatially downscaled projections of, e.g., population developments
18 (Jones and O’Neill 2016). By now, the SSPs have been widely used in climate change research ranging
19 from projections of future climate change to mitigation, impact, adaptation and vulnerability analysis
20 (O’Neill et al. 2020).


21 The integrated assessment modelling community has used the SSPs to provide a set of global integrated
22 energy-land use-emissions scenarios (Riahi et al. 2017; Rogelj et al. 2018b; Bauer et al. 2017; Popp et
23 al. 2017; Rao et al. 2017b; van Vuuren et al. 2017b; Fricko et al. 2017; Fujimori et al. 2017; Calvin et
24 al. 2017; Kriegler et al. 2017) in line with the matrix architecture of the scenario framework (van Vuuren
25 et al. 2014) (Figure II.1.). It is structured along two dimensions: socio-economic assumptions varied
26 along the SSPs, and climate (forcing) outcomes varied along the Representative Concentration
27 Pathways (RCPs) (van Vuuren et al. 2011b). To distinguish resulting emission scenarios from the
28 original four RCPs (RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6.0, and RCP8.5), they are typically named SSPx-y with x
29 = 1,...,5 the SSP label and y = {1.9, **2.6**, 3.4, **4.5**, **6.0**, 7.0, **8.5**} W/m² the nominal forcing level in 2100.
30 The four forcing levels that were already covered by the original RCPs are bolded here.

31 The new SSP-based emissions and concentrations pathways provided the input for CMIP6 (Eyring et
32 al. 2015; O’Neill et al. 2016) and its climate change projections are assessed in AR6 (WG1 AR6 Cross-
33 chapter Box 1.2, WGI AR6 Chapter 4). From the original set of more than 100 SSP-based energy-land
34 use-emissions scenarios produced by six IAMs (Figure II.1.), five Tier-1 scenarios (SSP1-1.9, SSP1-
35 2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0, SSP5-8.5), and four Tier-2 scenarios (SSP4-3.4, SSP4-6.0, variants of SSP7-
36 3.0, SSP5-3.4) were selected⁷ (O’Neill et al. 2016), further processed and harmonized with historic
37 emissions and land use change estimates (Gidden et al. 2019; Hurtt et al. 2020), and then taken up by
38 CMIP6 models. WGI focuses its assessment of CMIP6 climate change projections on the five Tier-1
39 scenarios (WGI Chapter 4), but also uses the Tier 2 scenarios where they allow assessment of specific
40 aspects like air pollution. All SSP-based IAM scenarios from the original studies are included in the
41 AR6 emissions scenario database and are part of the assessment of global mitigation pathways in
42 Chapter 3.

FOOTNOTE⁷ Each SSPx-y combination was calculated by multiple IAMs. The specific scenarios developed by the marker models for the associated SSPs (SSP1: IMAGE; SSP2: MESSAGE-GLOBIOM; SSP3: AIM; SSP4: GCAM; SSP5: REMIND-MAGPIE) were selected as Tier 1/Tier 2 scenario for use in CMIP6. Tier 2 variants include SSP7-3.0 with low emissions of short lived climate forcers and SSP5-3.4 with high overshoot from following SSP5-8.5 until 2040.

1 IAMs could not identify SSP-based emissions scenarios for all combinations of SSPs and RCPs (Figure
 2 II.1.) (Riahi et al. 2017; Rogelj et al. 2018b). The highest emission scenarios leading to forcing levels
 3 similar to RCP8.5 could only be obtained in a baseline without climate policy in SSP5 (SSP5-8.5).
 4 Since by now climate policies are implemented in many countries around the world, the likelihood of
 5 future emission levels as high as in SSP5-8.5 has become small (Ho et al. 2019). Baselines without
 6 climate policies for SSP1 and SSP4 reach up to 6.0-7.0 W/m², with baselines for SSP2 and SSP3 coming
 7 in higher at around 7.0 W/m². On the lower end, no 1.5°C (RCP1.9) and likely 2°C scenarios (RCP2.6)
 8 could be identified for SSP3 due to the lack of cooperative action in this world of regional rivalry. 1.5°C
 9 scenarios (RCP1.9) could only be reached by all models under SSP1 assumptions. Models struggled to
 10 limit warming to 1.5°C under SSP4 assumptions due to limited ability to sustainably manage land, and
 11 under SSP5 assumptions due to its high dependence on ample fossil fuel resources in the baseline
 12 (Rogelj et al. 2018b).

13



14

15 **Figure II.1. The SSP/RCP matrix showing the SSPs on the horizontal axis and the forcing levels on the**
 16 **vertical axis [Adapted from Rogelj et al. (2018b) Figure 5; A = AIM, G = GCAM; I = IMAGE, M =**
 17 **MESSAGE-GLOBIOM, R = REMIND-MAGPIE, W = WITCH]. Not all SSP/RCP combinations are**
 18 **feasible (red triangles), and not all combinations were tried (grey triangles). Corresponding scenarios**
 19 **were published in Riahi et al. (2017) and Rogelj et al. (2018b) and included the AR6 scenario database.**

20

21 1.4. Key design choices and assumptions in mitigation scenarios

22 The development of a scenario involves design choices, in addition to the selection of the model. This
 23 section will focus on key choices related to design of the scenario, and the respective socioeconomic,
 24 technical, and policy assumptions. Model selection cannot be separated from these choices, but the

1 various advantages and disadvantages of models are described in Annex III, Part I (Modelling
2 Methods).

3 **Target setting:** Goal-oriented scenarios in the climate scenario literature initially focussed on
4 concentration stabilisation but have now shifted towards temperature limits and associated carbon
5 budgets. In early model intercomparisons, climate targets were often specified as a CO₂ equivalent
6 concentration level that could not be crossed, for example, 450ppm CO₂-eq or 550ppm CO₂-eq (Clarke
7 et al. 2009). These targets were either applied as not-to-exceed or overshoot targets. In the latter case,
8 concentration levels could be returned to the target level by 2100. Overshoot was particularly allowed
9 for low concentration and temperature targets as many models could not find a solution otherwise
10 (Clarke et al. 2009; Kriegler et al. 2014a; Blanford et al. 2014b; Rogelj et al. 2018b). Bioenergy with
11 Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) was an important technology that facilitated aggressive targets
12 to be met in 2100. Due to its ability to remove CO₂ from the atmosphere and produce net negative CO₂
13 emissions, it enabled overshoot of the target leading to a distinctive peak-and-decline behaviour in
14 concentration, radiative forcing, and temperature (Clarke et al. 2014; Fuss et al. 2014). The mitigation
15 scenarios based on the SSP-RCP framework also applied radiative forcing levels in 2100 (Riahi et al.
16 2017). Temperature targets were often implemented by imposing end-of-century carbon budgets, i.e.
17 cumulative emissions up until 2100. In the case of 2°C pathways, those budgets were usually chosen
18 such that the 2°C limit was not overshoot with some pre-defined probability (Luderer et al. 2018).
19 Arguably, the availability of net negative CO₂ emissions has led to high levels of carbon dioxide
20 removal (CDR) in the second half of the century, although CDR deployment is often already substantial
21 to compensate residual emissions (Rogelj et al. 2018a).

22 Recent literature has increasingly focused on alternative approaches such as peak warming or peak CO₂
23 budget constraints to implement targets (Rogelj et al. 2019b; Johansson et al. 2020; Riahi et al. 2021).
24 Nevertheless, due to the availability of net negative CO₂ emissions and the assumption of standard
25 (exponentially increasing) emissions pricing profiles from economic theory, peak and decline
26 temperature profiles still occurred in a large number of mitigation pathways in the literature even in the
27 presence of peak warming and carbon budget targets (Strefler et al. 2021b). This has led to proposals
28 to combine peak targets with additional assumptions affecting the timing of emissions reductions like a
29 constraint on net negative CO₂ emissions (Obersteiner et al. 2018; Rogelj et al. 2019a; Riahi et al. 2021)
30 and different carbon pricing profiles (Strefler et al. 2021b). These proposals are aiming at a stabilization
31 rather than a peak and decline of warming under a given warming limit. However, arguments in support
32 of peak and decline warming profiles also exist: the goal of hedging against positive feedback loops in
33 the Earth system (Lenton et al. 2019) and the aim of increasing the likelihood of staying below a
34 temperature limit towards the end of the century (Schleussner et al. 2016). It is also noteworthy that
35 peak and decline temperature pathways are connected to achieving net zero GHG emissions (with CO₂-
36 eq emissions calculated using GWP100) in the second half of the century (Rogelj et al. 2021).

37 **Efficiency considerations:** Process-based IAMs typically calculate cost-effective mitigation pathways
38 towards a given target as benchmark case (Clarke et al. 2014). In these pathways, global mitigation
39 costs are minimized by exploiting the abatement options with the least marginal costs across all sectors
40 and regions at any time, implicitly assuming a globally integrated and harmonized mitigation regime.
41 This idealized benchmark is typically compared across different climate targets or with reference
42 scenarios extrapolating current emissions trends (UNEP 2019). It naturally evolves over time as the
43 onset of cost-effective action is being set to the immediate future of respective studies. This onset was
44 pushed back from 2010-2015 in studies assessed by AR5 (Clarke et al. 2014) to the first modelling time
45 step after 2020 in studies assessed by AR6.

46 The notion of cost-effectiveness is sensitive to economic assumptions in the underlying models,
47 particularly concerning the assumptions on pre-existing market distortions (Guivarch et al. 2011; Clarke
48 et al. 2014; Krey et al. 2014) and the discount rate on future values. Those assumptions are often not

1 clearly expressed. Most models have a discount rate of 3-5%, though the range of alternatives is larger.
2 Cost-benefit IAMs have had a tradition of exploring the importance of discount rates, but process-based
3 IAMs have generally not. A lower discount rate brings mitigation forward in time and uses less net
4 negative CO₂ emissions in cases where target overshoot is allowed (Realmonte et al. 2019; Emmerling
5 et al. 2019). While most models report discount rates in documentation, there is arguably too little
6 sensitivity analysis of how the discount rate affects modelled outcomes.

7 Cost-effective pathways typically do not account for climate impacts below the temperature limit,
8 although recent updates to climate damage estimates suggest a strengthening of near-term action in
9 cost-effective mitigation pathways (Schultes et al. 2021). Recently, the research community has begun
10 to combine mitigation pathway analysis with ex-post analysis of associated climate impacts and the
11 benefits of mitigation (Drouet et al. 2021). Cost-effective pathways that tap into least cost abatement
12 options globally without considering compensation schemes to equalize the mitigation burden between
13 countries are not compatible with equity considerations. There is a large body of literature exploring
14 international burden sharing regimes to accompany globally cost-effective mitigation pathways (Tavoni
15 et al. 2015; van den Berg et al. 2020; Pan et al. 2017).

16 **Policy assumptions:** Cost-effective mitigation scenarios assume that climate policies are globally
17 uniform. There is a substantial literature contrasting these benchmark cases with pathways derived
18 under the assumption of regionally fragmented and heterogeneous mitigation policy regimes (Blanford
19 et al. 2014b; Kriegler et al. 2015b, 2018b; Roelfsema et al. 2020; van Soest et al. 2021; Bauer et al.
20 2020b). For example, the Shared Policy Assumptions (Kriegler et al. 2014c) used in the SSP-RCP
21 framework allow for some fragmentation of policy implementation, and many scenarios follow current
22 policies or emission pledges until 2030 before implementing stringent policies (Vrontisi et al. 2018;
23 Roelfsema et al. 2020; Riahi et al. 2015). Other studies assume a gradual strengthening of emissions
24 pledges and regulatory measures converging to a globally harmonized mitigation regime slowly over
25 time (Kriegler et al. 2018b; van Soest et al. 2021). With increasing announcements of mid-century
26 strategies and the rise of net zero CO₂ or GHG targets, global mitigation scenario analysis has begun to
27 build in nationally specific policy targets until mid-century (NGFS 2021).

28 Scenarios limiting warming to below 2°C phase in climate policies in all regions and sectors. Almost
29 all converge to a harmonized global mitigation regime before the end of century (with the exception of
30 Bauer et al. (2020b)). In practice, policies are often a mix of regulations, standards, or subsidies.
31 Implementing these real-world policies can give different outcomes to optimal uniform carbon pricing
32 (Mercure et al. 2019). Modelled carbon prices will generally be lower when other policies are
33 implemented (Calvin et al. 2014a; Bertram et al. 2015). As countries implement more and a diverse set
34 of policies, the need to further develop the policy assumptions in models is becoming apparent (O'Neill
35 et al. 2020; Grant et al. 2020; Keppo et al. 2021).

36 **Socio-economic drivers:** Key socio-economic drivers of emission scenarios are assumptions on
37 population and economic activity. There are other socio-economic assumptions, often included in
38 underlying narratives (O'Neill et al. 2017), that strongly affect energy demand per capita / unit of GDP
39 and dietary choices (Popp et al. 2017; Bauer et al. 2017; Grubler et al. 2018; van Vuuren et al. 2018).
40 The SSPs are often used to help harmonise socio-economic assumptions, and further explore the
41 scenario space. Many studies focus on the middle-of-the-road SSP2 as their default assumption, and
42 many use SSP variations to explore the sensitivity of their results to socio-economic drivers (Riahi et
43 al. 2017; Rogelj et al. 2017; Marangoni et al. 2017). While the SSPs help harmonisation, they are not
44 unique and do not fully explore the scenario space (O'Neill et al. 2020). A wider range of narratives
45 describing alternative worlds is also conceivable. The sustainability world (SSP1), for example, is a
46 world with strong economic growth, but sustainability worlds with low growth or even elements of
47 degrowth in developed countries could also be explored. Thus, standardisation of scenario narratives
48 and drivers has advantages, but can also risk narrowing the scenario space that is explored by the

1 literature. Consequently, many studies in the literature have adopted other socio-economic assumptions,
2 for example with regard to population and GDP (Kriegler et al. 2016; Gillingham et al. 2018) and
3 sustainable development trends (Soergel et al. 2021).

4 **Technology availability and costs:** Technology assumptions are a key component of IAMs, with some
5 models representing hundreds or thousands of technologies. Despite the importance of technology costs
6 (Creutzig et al. 2017), there has been limited comparison of technology assumptions across models
7 (Krey et al. 2019; Kriegler et al. 2015b). There is, however, a substantial literature on the sensitivity of
8 mitigation scenarios to technology assumptions, including model comparisons (Kriegler et al. 2014a;
9 Riahi et al. 2015), single model sensitivity studies (McJeon et al. 2011; Krey and Riahi 2013;
10 Giannousakis et al. 2021) and multi-model sensitivity studies (Bosetti et al. 2015). Not only are the
11 initial technology costs important, but also how these costs evolve over time either exogenously or
12 endogenously. Since IAMs have so many interacting technologies, assumptions on one technology can
13 affect the deployment of another. For example, limits on solar energy expansion rates, or integration,
14 may lead to higher levels of deployment for alternative technologies. Because of these interactions, it
15 can be difficult to determine what factors affect deployment across a range of models.

16 Within these key scenario design choices, model choice cannot be ignored. Not all models can
17 implement aspects of a scenario or implement in the same way. Alternative target implementations are
18 difficult for some model frameworks, and implementation issues also arise around technological change
19 and policy implementation. Certain scenario designs may lock out certain modelling frameworks. These
20 issues indicate the need for a diversity of scenario designs (Johansson et al. 2020) to ensure that model
21 diversity can be fully exploited.

22 It is possible for many assumptions to be harmonised, depending on the research question. The SSPs
23 were one project aimed at increasing harmonisation and comparability. It is also possible to harmonise
24 emission data, technology assumptions, and policies (Giarola et al. 2021). While harmonisation
25 facilitates greater comparability between studies, it also limits scenario and model diversity. The
26 advantages and disadvantages of harmonisation need to be discussed for each model study.

28 **2. Use of scenarios in the assessment**

29 **2.1. Use of scenario literature and database**

30 The WGIII assessment draws on the full literature on mitigation scenarios. To support the assessment,
31 as many as possible mitigation scenarios in the literature were collected in a scenario database with
32 harmonized output reporting (Annex III.II.3). The collection of mitigation pathways in a common
33 database is motivated by a number of reasons: First, to establish comparability of quantitative scenario
34 information in the literature which is often only sporadically available from tables and figures in peer-
35 reviewed publications, reports and electronic supplementary information. Moreover, this information is
36 often reported using different output variables and definitions requiring harmonization. Second, to
37 increase latitude of the assessment by establishing direct access to quantitative information underlying
38 the scenario literature. Third, to improve transparency and reproducibility of the assessment by making
39 the quantitative information underlying the scenario figures and tables shown in the report available to
40 the readers of AR6. The use of such scenario databases in AR5 of WG III (Krey et al. 2014) and SR1.5
41 (Huppmann et al. 2018) proved its value for the assessment as well as for broad use of the scenario
42 information by researchers and stakeholders. This is now being continued for AR6.

1 **2.2. Treatment of scenario uncertainty**

2 The calls for scenarios issued in preparation of this assessment report allowed to collect a large
3 ensemble of scenarios, coming from many modelling teams using various modelling frameworks in
4 many different studies. Although large ensembles of scenarios were gathered, it should be
5 acknowledged that only a portion of the full uncertainty space is investigated, and that scenarios
6 ensemble distribution of results are an “artefact” of the context of the studies the scenarios were
7 developed in. This introduces “biases” in the ensemble, e.g. (i) the topics of the scenario studies
8 collected in the database determine coverage of the scenario space, with large model-comparison studies
9 putting large weight on selected topics over lesser explored topics explored by individual models, (ii)
10 some models are more represented than others, (iii) only “optimistic” models (i.e. models finding lower
11 mitigation costs) reach the lowest mitigation targets (Tavoni and Tol 2010). Where appropriate,
12 sampling bias was recognized in the assessment, but formal methods to reduce bias were not employed
13 due to conceptual limitations.

14 Furthermore, although it has been attempted to elicit scenario likelihoods from expert knowledge
15 (Christensen et al. 2018), scenarios are difficult to associate with probabilities as they typically describe
16 a situation of deep uncertainty (Grübler and Nakicenovic 2001). This and the non-statistical nature of
17 the scenario ensemble collected in the database does not allow a probabilistic interpretation of the
18 distribution of output variables in the scenario database. Throughout the report, descriptive statistics are
19 used to describe the spread of scenario outcomes across the scenarios ensemble. The ranges of results
20 and the position of scenarios outcomes relative to some thresholds of interest are analysed. In some
21 figures, the median of the distribution of results is plotted together with the interquartile range and
22 possibly other percentiles (5th-10th-90th-95th) to facilitate the assessment of results, but these should not
23 be interpreted in terms of likelihood of outcomes.

24

25 **2.3. Feasibility of mitigation scenarios**

26 In order to develop feasibility metrics of mitigation scenarios (Chapter 3.8), the assessment relied on
27 the multidimensional feasibility framework developed in Brutschin et al. (2021), considering five
28 feasibility dimensions: (i) geophysical, (ii) technological, (iii) economic, (iv) institutional and (v) socio-
29 cultural. For each dimension, a set of indicators were developed, capturing not only the scale but also
30 the timing and the disruptiveness of transformative change (Kriegler et al. 2018b). All AR6 scenarios
31 (C1-C3 climate categories) were categorized through this framework to quantify feasibility challenges
32 by climate category, time, policy architecture and by feasibility dimension, summarized in Figure 3.43
33 (Chapter 3).

34 Scenarios were categorized into three levels of concerns: (i) low levels of concern where transformation
35 is similar to the past or identified in the literature as feasible/plausible, (ii) medium levels of concern
36 that might be challenging but within reach, given certain enablers, (iii) high levels of concern
37 representing unprecedented levels of transformation attainable only under consistent enabling
38 conditions. Indicators’ thresholds defining these three levels of concern were obtained from the
39 available literature and developed with additional empirical literature. Table II.1 summarizes the main
40 indicators used and the associated thresholds for medium and high levels of concern. Finally, we
41 aggregated feasibility concerns for each dimension and each decade employing the geometric mean, a
42 non-compensatory method which limits the degree of substitutability between indicators, and used for
43 example by the United Nations for the HDI. Alternative aggregation scores such as the counting of
44 scenarios exceeding the thresholds was also implemented.

45

1 **Table II.1. Feasibility dimensions, associated indicators and thresholds for the onset of medium and high**
 2 **concerns about feasibility (Chapter 3.8).**

		Indicators	Computation	Medium	High	Source
Geophysical		Biomass potential	Total primary energy generation from biomass in a given year	100 EJ/y	245 EJ/y	(Frank et al. 2021; Creutzig et al. 2014)
		Wind potential	Total secondary energy generation from wind in a given year	830 EJ/year	2000 EJ/year	(Deng et al. 2015; Eureka et al. 2017)
		Solar potential	Total primary energy generation from solar in a given year	1600 EJ/year	50 000 EJ/year	(Rogner et al. 2012; Moomaw et al. 2011)
Economic		GDP loss	Decadal percentage difference in GDP in mitigation vs baseline scenario	5 %	10 %	Analogy to current COVID-19 spending (Andrijevic et al. 2020b)
		Carbon price	Carbon price levels (NPV) and decadal increases	60\$	120\$ and 5×	(Brutschin et al. 2021; OECD 2021)
		Energy Investments	Ratio between investments in mitigation vs baseline in a given decade	1.2	1.5	(McCollum et al. 2018)
		Stranded coal assets	Share of prematurely retired coal power generation in a given decade	20 %	50 %	(Brutschin et al. 2021; Global Energy Monitor 2021)
Technological	Established	Wind/Solar scale-up	Decadal percentage point increase in the wind/solar share in electricity generation	10 pp	20 pp	(Brutschin et al. 2021; Wilson et al. 2020)
		Nuclear scale-up	Decadal percentage point increase in the nuclear share in electricity generation	5 pp	10 pp	(Brutschin et al. 2021; Markard et al. 2020; Wilson et al. 2020)
	New Technologies	BECCS scale-up	Amount of CO ₂ captured in a given year	3 GtCO ₂ /y	7 GtCO ₂ /y	(Warszawski et al. 2021)
		Fossil CCS scale-up	Amount of CO ₂ captured in a given year	3.8 GtCO ₂ /y	8.8 GtCO ₂ /y	(Budinis et al. 2018)
		Biofuels in transport scale-up	Decadal percentage point increase in the share of	5 pp	10 pp	(Nogueira et al. 2020)

Socio-cultural	Electricity in transport scale-up	biofuels in the final energy demand of the transport sector Decadal percentage point increase in the share of electricity in the final energy demand of the transport sector	10 pp	15 pp	(Muratori et al. 2021)
	Total/transport/industry/residential energy demand decline	Decadal percentage decrease in demand	10 %	20 %	(Grubler et al. 2018)
	Decline of livestock share in food demand	Decadal percentage decrease in the livestock share in total food demand	0.5 pp	1 pp	(Grubler et al. 2018; Bajželj et al. 2014)
	Forest cover increase	Decadal percentage increase in forest cover	2 %	5 %	(Brutschin et al. 2021)
	Pasture cover decrease	Decadal percentage decrease in pasture cover	5 %	10 %	(Brutschin et al. 2021)
Institutional	Governance level and decarbonization rate	Governance levels and per capita CO ₂ emission reductions over a decade	>0.6 and <20%	<0.6 and >20%	(Brutschin et al. 2021; Andrijevic et al. 2019)

1

2

3 2.4. Illustrative mitigation pathways

4 In the IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C Warming (SR1.5), illustrative pathways (IPs) were used in
5 addition to descriptions of the key characteristics of the full set of scenarios in the database to assess
6 and communicate the results from the scenario literature. While the latter express the spread in scenario
7 outcomes highlighting uncertain vs. robust outcomes, IPs can be used to contrast different stories of
8 mitigating climate change (Rogelj et al. 2018a).

9 Following the example of the SR1.5, IPs have also been selected for the AR6 of WGIII. In contrast to
10 SR1.5, the selection needed to cover a larger range of climate outcomes while keeping the number of
11 IPs limited. The selection focused on a range of critical themes that emerged from the AR6 assessment:
12 1) the level of ambitious of climate policy, 2) the different mitigation strategies, 3) timing of mitigation
13 actions and 4) the combination of climate policy with sustainable development policies. The IPs consist
14 of narratives (Table II.2) as well as possible quantifications. The IPs are illustrative and denote
15 implications of different societal choices for the development of future emissions and associated
16 transformations of main GHG emitting sectors. For Chapter 3, for each of the IPs a quantitative scenario
17 was selected from the AR6 scenario database to have particular characteristics and from diverse
18 modelling frameworks (Table II.3).

19 In total two reference pathways with warming above 2°C and five Illustrative Mitigation Pathways
20 (IMPs) limiting warming in the 1.5-2°C range were selected. The first reference pathway follows
21 current policies as formulated around 2018 (Current Policies, Cur-Pol) through to 2030 and then
22 continues to follow a similar mitigation effort to 2100. The associated quantitative scenario (NGFS

1 2021) selected by Chapter 3 leads to about 3-4 degree C warming at the end of the century. The second
2 reference pathway follows emission pledges to 2030 (NDCs) and then continues with moderate climate
3 action over time (Moderate Action, Mod-Act).

4 The five IMPs are deep mitigation pathways with warming in the 1.5-2°C range. The first IMP pursues
5 gradual strengthening beyond NDC ambition levels until 2030 and then acts to likely limit warming to
6 2°C warming (Climate Category C3) (IMP-GS) (van Soest et al. 2021) (Chapter 3.5.3). Three others
7 follow different mitigation strategies focusing on low energy demand (IMP-LD) (Grubler et al. 2018),
8 renewable electricity (IMP-Ren) (Luderer et al. 2021) and large-scale deployment of carbon dioxide
9 removal measures resulting in net negative CO₂ emissions in the second half of the century (IMP-Neg).
10 The fifth IMP explicitly pursues a broad sustainable development agenda and follows SSP1 socio-
11 economic assumptions (IMP-SP) (Soergel et al. 2021). IMP-LD, IMP-Ren and IMP-SP limit warming
12 to 1.5°C with no or low overshoot (C1), while IMP-Neg has a higher overshoot and only returns to
13 nearly 1.5°C (50% chance) by 2100 (close to C2). In addition, two sensitivity cases for IMP-Ren and
14 IMP-Neg are considered that likely limit warming to 2°C (C3) rather than pursuing to limit warming to
15 1.5°C.

16 The IMPs are used in different parts of the report. We just mention some examples here. In Chapter 3,
17 they are used to illustrate key differences between the mitigation strategies, for instance in terms of
18 timing and sectoral action. In Chapter 6, Box 6.9 discusses the consequences for energy systems.
19 Chapter 7 discusses some of the land-use consequences. In Chapter 8, the implications of the IMPs are
20 further explored for urban systems where the elements of energy, innovation, policy, land use and
21 lifestyle interact {8.3, 8.4}. In Chapter 10, the consequences of different mitigation strategies for
22 mobility are highlighted in different figures. The IMPs are discussed further in Chapter 1.3, Chapter 3.2
23 and the respective sector chapters.

24

25

1 **Table II.2. Storylines for the two reference pathways and five Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs)**
 2 **limiting warming to 1.5-2°C considered in the Report.**

	General char.	Policy	Innovation	Energy	Land use, food biodiversity	Lifestyle	
Cur-Pol	Continuation of current policies and trends;	Implementation of current climate policies and neglect of stated goals and objectives; (Grey Covid recovery)	Business-as-usual; slow progress in low-carbon technologies	Fossil fuels remain important; lock-in	Further expansion of western diets; further slow expansion of agriculture area	Demand will continue to grow; no significant changes in current habits	
Mod-Act	NDCs in 2030; as announced in 2020, fragmented policy landscape; post-2030 action consistent with modest action until 2030	Strengthening of policies to implement NDCs; some further >2030 strengthening and mixed Covid recovery	Modest change compared to CurPol	Mostly moving away from coal; growth of renewables; some lock-in in fossil investments	Afforestation/reforestation policies as in NDCs	Modest change compared to CurPol	
IMP	Neg	Mitigation in all sectors also includes a heavy reliance on net negative emissions (supply-side)	Successful international climate policy regime with a focus on a long-term temperature goal	Further development of CDR options;	CDR, transport H2/Elec based on negative emissions	Afforestation/reforestation, BECCS, increased competition for land	Not critical – some induced via price increases
	Ren	Rapid deployment and technology development of renewables; electrification;	Successful international climate policy regime; policies and financial incentives favouring renewable energy	Rapid further development of innovative electricity technologies and policy regimes	Renewable energy, electrification; sector coupling; storage or power-to-X technologies; better interconnections		Service provisioning and demand changes to better adapt to high RE supply
	LD	Reduced demand leads to early emission reductions		Social innovation; efficiency; across all sectors	Demand reduction; modal shifts in transport; rapid diffusion of BAT in buildings and industry	Lower food and agricultural waste; less meat-intensive lifestyles	Service provisioning and demand changes; behavioural changes
	GS	Mitigation action is gradually strengthened until 2030 compared to NDCs,	Until 2030, primarily current NDCs are implemented – but move towards strong, universal regime > 2030		Similar to Sup, but with some delay.	Similar to Sup, but with some delay.	
	SP	<i>Shifting pathways.</i> Major transformations shift development towards sustainability and reduced inequality, including deep GHG emissions reduction	SDG policies in addition to climate policy (poverty reduction; environmental protection)		Demand reduction; renewable energy	Lower food and agricultural waste; less meat-intensive lifestyles; afforestation.	Service provisioning and demand changes

3

4 **Table II.3. Quantitative scenario selection by Chapter 3 to represent the two reference pathways and five**
 5 **Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs) limiting warming to 1.5-2°C for the assessment in Chapter 3. These**
 6 **quantitative representations of the IMPs have also been taken up by a few other chapters where suitable.**
 7 **The warming profile of IMP-Neg peaks around 2060 and declines to below 1.5 (50% likelihood) shortly**
 8 **after 2100. Whilst technically classified as a C3, it exhibits the characteristics of C2 high overshoot**
 9 **pathways.**

Acronym	Climate Category (II.3.2)	Model	Scenario name in the AR6 scenario database (II.3)	Reference
Cur-Pol	C7	GCAM 5.3	NGFS2_Current Policies	(NGFS 2021)
Mod-Act	C6	IMAGE 3.0	EN_INDCi2030_3000f	(Riahi et al. 2021)
Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs)				

Neg	C2*	COFFEE 1.1	EN_NPi2020_400f_lowBECCS	(Riahi et al. 2021)
Ren	C1	REMIND-MAGPIE 2.1-4.3	DeepElec_SSP2_HighRE_Budg900	(Luderer et al. 2021)
LD	C1	MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 1.0	LowEnergyDemand_1.3_IPCC	(Grubler et al. 2018)
GS	C3	WITCH 5.0	CO_Bridge	(van Soest et al. 2021)
SP	C1	REMIND-MAGPIE 2.1-4.2	SusDev_SDP-PkBudg1000	(Soergel et al. 2021)
Sensitivity cases				
Neg-2.0	C3	AIM/CGE 2.2	EN_NPi2020_900f	(Riahi et al. 2021)
Ren-2.0	C3	MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM_GEI 1.0	SSP2_openres_1c_50	(Guo et al. 2021)

1

2 2.5. Scenario approaches to connect WG III with the WG I and WG II assessments

3 2.5.1. Assessment of WG III scenarios building on WG I physical climate knowledge

4 A transparent assessment pipeline has been set up across WG I and WG III to ensure integration of the
5 WG I assessment in the climate assessment of emission scenarios in WG III. This pipeline consists of
6 a step where emissions scenarios are harmonised with historical emissions (harmonisation), a step in
7 which species not reported by an IAM are filled in (infilling), and a step in which the emission
8 evolutions are assessed with three climate model emulators (Annex III.I.8) calibrated to the WG I
9 assessment. These three steps ensure a consistent and comparable assessment of the climate response
10 across emission scenarios from the literature.

11 **Harmonisation:** IAMs may use different historical datasets, and emission scenarios submitted to the
12 AR6 WG III scenario database (Annex III.II.3) are therefore harmonised against a common source of
13 historical emissions. To be consistent with WG I, we use the same historical emissions that were used
14 for CMIP6 and RCMIP (Gidden et al. 2018; Nicholls et al. 2020b). This dataset comprises many
15 different emission harmonisation sources (Hoesly et al. 2018; van Marle et al. 2017; Velders et al. 2015;
16 Quéré et al. 2016; Gütschow et al. 2016; Meinshausen et al. 2017) including CO₂ from agriculture,
17 forestry, and land use change (mainly CEDS, (Hoesly et al. 2018)) that is on the lower end of historical
18 observation uncertainty as assessed in Chapter 2. The harmonisation is performed so that different
19 climate futures resulting from two different scenarios are a result of different future emission evolutions
20 within the scenarios, not due to different historical definitions and starting points. Sectoral CO₂
21 emissions from energy and industrial processes and CO₂ from agriculture, forestry, and land use change
22 were harmonised separately. All other emissions species are harmonised based on the total reported
23 emissions per species. For CO₂ from energy and industrial processes we use a ratio-based method with
24 convergence in 2080, in line with CMIP6 (Gidden et al. 2018, 2019). For CO₂ from agriculture, forestry,
25 and land-use change and other emissions species with high historical interannual variability, we use an
26 offset method with convergence target 2150, to avoid strong harmonization effects resulting from
27 uncertainties in historical observations. For all remaining F-Gases, constant ratio harmonisation is used.
28 For all other emissions species, we use the default settings of Gidden et al. (2018, 2019a).

29 **Infilling missing species:** Infilling ensures that scenarios include all relevant anthropogenic emissions.
30 This reduces the risk of a biased climate assessment and is important because not all IAMs report all
31 climatically active emission species. Infilling was only performed for scenarios where models provided
32 native reporting of CO₂ energy and industrial process, CO₂ land use, CH₄, and N₂O emissions to avoid
33 gases that have large individual radiative forcing contributions and cannot be infilled with high
34 confidence. Models that did not meet this minimum reporting requirement were not included in the
35 climate assessment. Infilling is performed following the methods and guidelines in Lamboll et al.
36 (2020). Missing species are infilled based on the relationship with CO₂ from energy and industrial
37 processes as found in the harmonised set of all scenarios reported to the WG III scenario database that
38 pass the vetting requirements. To ensure high stability to small changes, we apply a Quantile Rolling

1 Window method (Lamboll et al. 2020) for aerosol precursor emissions, volatile organic compounds and
2 greenhouse gases other than F-Gases, based on the quantile of the reported CO₂ from energy and
3 industrial processes in the database at each time point. F-Gases and other gases with small radiative
4 forcing are infilled based on a pathway with lowest root mean squared difference, allowing for
5 consistency in spite of limited independently modelled pathways in the database.

6 **WG I-calibrated emulators:** Using expert judgement, emulators that reproduce the best estimates and
7 uncertainties of the majority of WG I assessed metrics are recommended for scenario classification use
8 by WG III (see WG I Cross-Chapter Box 7.1). MAGICC (v7) was used for the main scenario
9 classification, with both FaIR (v1.6.2) and CICERO-SCM (v2019vCH4) being used to provide
10 additional uncertainty ranges on reported statistics to capture climate model uncertainty. The WG I
11 emulators' probabilistic parameter ensembles are derived such that they match a range of key climate
12 metrics assessed by WG I and the extent to which agreement is achieved is evaluated (WG I Cross-
13 Chapter Box 7.1). Of particular importance to this evaluation is the verification against the WG I
14 temperature assessment of the five scenarios assessed in Chapter 4 of WG I (SSP1-1.9, SSP1-2.6, SSP2-
15 4.5, SSP3-7.0, and SSP5-8.5). The inclusion of the temperature assessment as a benchmark for the
16 emulators provides the strongest verification that WG III's scenario classification reflects the WG I
17 assessment. The comprehensive nature of the evaluation is a clear improvement on previous reports and
18 ensures that multiple components of the emulators, from their climate response to effective radiative
19 forcing through to their carbon cycles, have been examined before they are deemed fit for use by WG
20 III.

21 **Scenario climate assessment:** For the WG III scenario climate assessment, emulators are run hundreds
22 to thousands of times per scenario, sampling from an emulator-specific probabilistic parameter set,
23 which incorporates carbon cycle and climate system uncertainty in line with the WG I assessment (WG
24 I Cross-Chapter Box 7.1). Percentiles for different output variables provide information about the
25 spread in individual variables for a given scenario, but the set of variables for a given percentile do not
26 form an internally consistent climate change projection. Instead, joint distributions of these parameter
27 sets are employed by the calibrated emulators. Consistent climate change projections are represented
28 by individual ensemble member runs and the whole ensemble of these individual member runs. To
29 facilitate analysis, multiple percentiles of these large (hundred to thousand member) ensemble
30 distributions of projected climate variables are provided in the AR6 scenario database. The emulators
31 provide an assessment of global surface air temperature (GSAT) response to emission scenarios and its
32 key characteristics like peak warming and year of peak warming, ocean heat uptake, atmospheric CO₂,
33 CH₄ and N₂O concentrations and effective radiative forcing from a range of species including CO₂,
34 CH₄, N₂O and aerosols for each emissions scenario as well as an estimate of CO₂ and non-CO₂
35 contributions to the temperature increase. The climate emulator's GSAT projections are normalized to
36 match the WG I Ch.2 assessed total warming between 1850-1900 and 1995-2014 of 0.85°C.

37 The GSAT projections from the emulator runs are used for classifying those emissions scenarios in the
38 AR6 database that passed the initial vetting and allowed a robust climate assessment. MAGICC (v7)
39 was selected as emulator for the climate classification of scenarios, as it happens to be slightly warmer
40 than the other two considered climate emulators, particularly for the higher and long-term warming
41 scenarios - reflecting long-term warming in line with ESMs (WG1 Cross-Chapter Box 7.1). This means
42 that scenarios identified to stay below a given warming limit with a given probability by MAGICC will
43 in general be identified to have this property by the other two emulators as well. There is the possibility
44 that the other two emulators would classify a scenario in a lower warming class based on their slightly
45 cooler emulation of the temperature response. Unlike during the assessment of the SR1.5 database in
46 the IPCC SR1.5 report, the updated versions of FaIR and MAGICC are however very close, providing
47 robustness to the climate assessment. The other two emulators (FaIR and CICERO-SCM) were still
48 used to assess the overall uncertainty in the warming response for a single scenario or a set of scenarios,

1 including both parametric and model uncertainty. Specifically, the 5th to 95th percentile range across the
2 three emulators is calculated, characterizing the joint climate uncertainty range of the three models.

3 **Carbon budgets in WG1 and WG3:** The remaining carbon budget corresponding to a certain level of
4 future warming depends on non-CO₂ emissions of modelled pathways. Cross-Working Group Box 1
5 highlighted this key uncertainty in estimating carbon budgets. In this section (Figure II.2.), we put this
6 into the context of the dependence of carbon budgets on two aspects of the non-CO₂ warming
7 contribution: (i) assumptions on historical non-CO₂ emissions and how they can impact future non-CO₂
8 warming estimates relative to a recent reference period (2010-2019) (Panel A) and (ii) the scenario set
9 underlying estimates of non-CO₂ warming at the time of reaching net zero CO₂ (Panel B). Both aspects
10 affect the estimated remaining carbon budget by changing the non-CO₂ warming contribution from the
11 base year to the time of reaching net zero CO₂. MAGICC7 is used in WGI in conjunction with different
12 input files for the historical warming. For the reported remaining carbon budget estimates (WG1 CB)
13 WGI is using the non-CO₂ warming contributions from MAGICC7 in line with Meinshausen et al.
14 (2020) and in line with the CMIP6 GHG concentration projections, while the WGI emulator setup in
15 line with WG1 Cross Chapter box7.1 was used for the WG3 climate assessment. The WGIII assessment
16 uses thus MAGICC7 in line with Nicholls et al. (2021) in line with the emission harmonisation process
17 employed in WG3 (see above). The difference in historical assumptions changes the estimated non-CO₂
18 contribution by up to ~0.05°C for the lower temperature levels, or slightly more than 10% of the
19 warming until 1.5°C relative to 2010-2019. For peak warmings around 2°C relative to pre-industrial
20 levels (~0.97C warming relative to 2010-2019 in below plots), the difference is offset by the difference
21 arising from using either the SR1.5 or AR6 scenario databases (see panel B in below plot).

22 Estimates of the remaining carbon budget that take into account non-CO₂ uncertainty are not only
23 dependent on historical assumptions, but also on future non-CO₂ scenario characteristics, which are
24 different across the various scenarios in the AR6 database. In panel B of Figure II.2., we show how the
25 SR15 database of scenarios, which was used to inform the WG1 remaining carbon budget, differs from
26 the larger set considered in the WG3 report (both using MAGICC7 using input files in line with Nicholls
27 et al. (2021)). Overall, there is limited difference in the covered range of non-CO₂ warming at different
28 peak surface temperature levels, leading to no clear change in estimated carbon budgets compared to
29 SR1.5 based on the full scenario database. However, as discussed in Cross-Working Group Box 1 and
30 shown in panel C of Figure II.2., mitigation strategies expressed by both the IAM footprint and scenario
31 design (e.g. dietary change scenarios) can have strong effects on estimated carbon budgets for staying
32 below 1.5°C.

33




Figure II.2. Comparison of non-CO₂ warming relevant for the derivation of cumulative carbon budgets - and its sensitivity to A) assumptions on historical emissions and B) the set of investigated scenarios (right). Panel C) shows how the relationship across scenarios between peak surface temperature and non-CO₂ warming and peak cumulative CO₂ is different for modelling frameworks. All dashed regression lines are at the 5th and 95th percentile, solid lines are a regression at the median.

All panels depict non-CO₂ warming in relation to 2010–2019 at the time of peak cumulative CO₂, using MAGICC7. Coloured are those scenarios that reach net-zero CO₂ this century, with dots in grey indicating scenarios that do not reach net-zero CO₂ but still remain below 2°C median peak warming relative to 2010–2019 levels in this century. The scenario set “AR6 database” in B) includes only scenarios of those model frameworks that are shown in panel C) which have a detailed land-use model and enough scenarios to imply a relationship.

Panel A) The WG1 remaining carbon budget takes into account the non-CO₂ warming in dependence of peak surface temperatures via a regression line approach (lighter blue-coloured solid line). For the same scenario set, with historical emissions assumptions as used in CCB7.1 (darker blue-coloured solid line) a relationship is found with a difference of approximately 0.05°C.

Panel B) The WG3 database of scenarios tends to imply very similar non-CO₂ warming at peak cumulative CO₂ as the SR15 scenario database, especially around 1.5°C above pre-industrial (0.43°C above 2010–2019 levels), though with slightly lower non-CO₂ warming for higher peak temperatures.

Panel C) Regressions at the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile indicate a model framework footprint affecting the relationship between peak warming and non-CO₂ warming at peak cumulative CO₂.

2.5.2. Relating the WG II and WG III assessments by use of warming levels

WG II sets out common climate dimensions to help contextualize and facilitate consistent communication of impacts and synthesis across WGII, as well as to facilitate WG I and WG II integration, with the dimensions adopted when helpful and possible across WGII (AR6 WGII Cross-Chapter CLIMATE Box 1.1). “Common climate dimensions” are defined as common Global Warming Levels (GWLs), time periods, and levels of other variables as needed by WGII authors (see below for a list of variables associated with these dimensions). Projected ranges for associated climate variables were derived from the AR6 WGI report and supporting resources and help contextualize and inform the projection of potential future climate impacts and key risks. The information enables the mapping of

1 climate variable levels to climate projections by WGI (WGI SPM Table SPM.1) and vice versa, with
2 ranges of results provided to characterize the physical uncertainties relevant to assessing climate
3 impacts risk. Common socioeconomic dimensions are not adopted in WG II due to a desire to draw on
4 the full literature, inform the broad ranges of relevant possibilities (climate, development, adaptation,
5 mitigation), and be flexible. The impacts literature is wide-ranging and diverse, with a fraction based
6 on global socioeconomic scenarios. WGII's approach allows chapters and cross-chapter boxes to assess
7 how impacts and ranges depend on socioeconomic factors affecting exposure, vulnerability, and
8 adaptation independently as appropriate for their literature. For example, WG II Chapter 16 assesses
9 how Representative Key Risks vary under low vs. high exposure/vulnerability conditions by drawing
10 on impact literature based on Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs). In general, WGII chapters,
11 when possible and conducive with their literature, used GWLs or climate projections based on
12 Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) or SSPs to communicate information and facilitate
13 integration and synthesis, with impacts results characterized according to other drivers when possible
14 and relevant, such as socioeconomic condition.

15 In the context of common climate dimensions, WGII considers common projected GWL ranges by time
16 period, the timing for when GWLs might be reached, and projected continental level result ranges for
17 select temperature and precipitation variables by GWL (average and extremes), as well sea surface
18 temperature changes by GWL and ocean biome. Where available, WGII considers the assessed WGI
19 ranges as well as the raw CMIP5 and CMIP6 climate change projections (ranges and individual
20 projections) from Earth system models (Hauser et al. 2019). With WGII's climate impacts literature
21 based primarily on climate projections available at the time of AR5 (CMIP5) and earlier, or assumed
22 temperature levels, it was important to be able to map climate variable levels to climate projections of
23 different vintages and vice versa. WG II's common GWLs are based on AR6 WGI's proposed "Tier 1"
24 dimensions of integration range—1.5, 2.0, 3.0, and 4.0°C (relative to the 1850 to 1900 period), which
25 are simply proposed common GWLs to facilitate integration across and within WGs (WGI Chapter 1).
26 Within WG II, GWLs facilitate comparison of climate states across climate change projections,
27 assessment of the full impacts literature, and cross-chapter comparison. Across AR6, GWLs facilitate
28 integration across WGs of climate change projections, climate change risks, adaptation opportunities,
29 and mitigation.

30 For facilitating integration with WG III, GWLs need to be related to WG III's classification of
31 mitigation efforts by temperature outcome. WG III's Chapter 3 groups full century emissions
32 projections resulting from a large set of assessed mitigation scenarios into temperature classes (Annex
33 III.II.2.4, II.3.2.1, Chapter 3.2, 3.3). Scenarios are classified by median peak global mean temperature
34 increase since 1850-1900 in the bands <2°C, 2-2.5°C, 2.5-3°C, 3-4°C, and >4°C, with the range below
35 2°C broken out in greater detail using estimates of warming levels at peak and in 2100 for which the
36 warming response is projected to be likely higher (33th percentile), as likely as not higher or lower
37 (median), and likely lower (67th percentile) (Chapter 3.2, Annex III.II.3.1). WG II's common GWLs
38 and WG III's global warming scenario classes are relatable but differ in several important ways. While
39 GWLs represent temperature change that occurs at some point in time, emissions scenarios in a
40 temperature class result in an evolving warming response over time. The emissions scenario warming
41 also has a likelihood attached to the warming level at any point in time, i.e. actual warming outcomes
42 can be lower or higher than median warming projections within the range of the estimated uncertainty.
43 Thus, multiple WGII results across GWLs will be relevant to any particular WGIII emissions pathway,
44 including at the peak temperature level.

45 However, socioeconomic conditions are an important factor defining both impacts exposure,
46 vulnerability, and adaptation, as well as mitigation opportunity and costs, that needs special
47 considerations. The WG III scenario assessment is using additional classifications relating to, inter alia,
48 near term policy developments, technology availability, energy demand, population and economic

1 growth (Annex III.II.3.2.2, Chapter 3.3), and a set of illustrative mitigation pathways with varying
2 socio-techno-economic assumptions (Annex III.II.2.4, Chapter 3.2). Synthesizing WG II assessments
3 of climate change impacts and WG III assessments of climate change mitigation efforts for similar
4 GWLs / global warming scenario classes would have to address how socio-techno-economic conditions
5 affect impacts, adaptation, and mitigation outcomes. Furthermore, a synthesis of mitigation costs and
6 mitigation benefits in terms of avoided climate change impacts would require a framework that ensures
7 consistency in socioeconomic development assumptions and emissions and adaptation dynamics and
8 allows for consideration of benefits and costs along the entire pathway (O'Neill et al. 2020) (Cross
9 Working Group Box 1 “Economic benefits from avoided climate impacts along long-term mitigation
10 pathways”).

12 3. WG III AR6 scenario database

13 *[Note: The scenario numbers documented in this section refer to all scenarios that were submitted and not*
14 *retracted by the literature acceptance deadline of October 11, 2021, and that fulfilled the requirement of being*
15 *supported by an eligible literature source. Not all those scenarios were used in the assessment, e.g. some did not*
16 *pass the vetting process as documented in II.3.1.*

17
18 As for previous IPCC reports of Working Group III, including the Special Report on 1.5 degrees (SR15)
19 (Huppmann et al. 2018; Rogelj et al. 2018a) and the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (Clarke et al. 2014;
20 Krey et al. 2014), quantitative information on mitigation pathways is collected in a dedicated AR6
21 scenario database⁸ to underpin the assessment.

22 By the time of the AR6 Literature Acceptance deadline of IPCC WGIII (11th October 2021) the AR6
23 scenario database comprised 191 unique modelling frameworks (including different versions and
24 country setups) from 95+ model families –, of which 98 globally comprehensive, 71 national or multi-
25 regional, and 20 sectoral models – with in total 3,131 scenarios, summarized in Table II.4.-Table II.10.
26 (global mitigation pathways), Table II.11. (national and regional mitigation pathways) and Table II.12.
27 (sector transition pathways) below.

28 3.1. Process of scenario collection and vetting

29 To facilitate the AR6 assessment, modelling teams were invited to submit their available emissions
30 scenarios to a web-based database hosted by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
31 (IIASA)⁹. The co-chairs of Working Group III as well as a range of scientific institutions, including the
32 Integrated Assessment Modelling Consortium (IAMC), University of Cape Town (UCT) and the Centre
33 International de Recherche sur l'Environnement (CIRED), support the open call for scenarios which is
34 subdivided into four dedicated calls,

- 35 1. a call for global long-term scenarios to underpin the assessment in Chapter 3 as well as
36 facilitating integration with sectoral chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11,
- 37 2. a call for short- to medium-term scenarios at the national and regional scale underpinning the
38 assessment in Chapter 4, and
- 39 3. a call for building-focused scenarios to inform the assessment in Chapter 9, and
- 40 4. a call for transport-focused scenarios to inform the assessment in Chapter 10.

FOOTNOTE⁸ <https://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/ar6-scenario-submission/>

FOOTNOTE⁹ <https://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/ar6-scenario-submission/#/about>

1 A common data reporting template with a defined variable structure was used and all teams were
2 required to register and submit detailed model and scenario metadata. Scenarios were required to come
3 from a formal quantitative model and the scenarios must be published in accordance with IPCC
4 literature requirements. The calls for scenarios were open for a period of 22 months (September 2019-
5 July 2021), with updates possible until October 2021 in line with the literature acceptance deadline. The
6 data submission process included various quality control procedures to increase accuracy and
7 consistency in reporting. Additional categorization and processing of metadata over the full database
8 provided a wide range of indicators and categories that were made centrally available to Lead Authors
9 of the Report to enhance consistency of the assessment, such as: climate, policy and technology
10 categories; characteristics about emissions, energy, socioeconomics and carbon sequestration; metadata
11 such as literature references, model documentation and related projects.

12 For all scenarios reporting global data, a vetting process is undertaken to ensure that key indicators were
13 within reasonable ranges for the baseline period – primarily for indicators relating to emissions and the
14 energy sector (Table II.4). As part of the submission process, model teams were contacted individually
15 with information on the vetting outcome with regard to their submitted scenarios giving them the
16 opportunity to verify the reporting of their data. Checks on technology-specific variables for nuclear,
17 solar & wind and CCS screen not only for accuracy with respect to recent developments, but also
18 indicate reporting errors relating to different Primary Energy accounting methods. Whilst the criteria
19 ranges appear to be large, the focus of these scenarios is the medium-long term and there is also
20 uncertainty in the historical values. For vetting of the Illustrative Mitigation Pathways, the same criteria
21 were used, albeit with narrower ranges (Table II.4). Future values were also assessed and reported to
22 Lead Authors, but not used as exclusion criteria. Where possible the latest values available were used,
23 generally 2019, and if necessary extrapolated to 2020 as most models report only at 5-10 year intervals.
24 2020 as reported in most scenarios collected in the database does not include the impact of the COVID-
25 19 pandemic.

26 Almost three-quarters of submitted global scenarios passed the vetting. The remaining quarter
27 comprised a fraction of scenarios that were rolled over from the SR1.5 database, and were no longer
28 up-to-date with recent developments (excluding the COVID shock). This included scenarios that started
29 stringent mitigation action already in 2015. Other scenarios were expected to deviate from historical
30 trends due to their diagnostic design. All historical criteria for reported variables needed to be met in
31 order to pass the vetting.

32 2266 global scenarios were submitted to the scenario database that fulfilled a minimum requirement of
33 reporting at least one global emission or energy variable covering multiple sectors. 1686 global
34 scenarios passed the vetting criteria described in Table II.4. These scenarios were subsequently flagged
35 of meeting minimum quality standards for use in long term scenarios assessment. Additional criteria
36 for inclusion in the Chapter 3 climate assessment are described in Section 3.2.1. Climate classification
37 of global pathways

38

39

1 **Table II.4. Summary of the vetting criteria and ranges applied to the global scenarios for the climate**
 2 **assessment and preliminary screening for Illustrative Mitigation Pathways. Rows do not sum to the same**
 3 **total of scenarios as not all scenarios reported all variables. EIP stands for energy and industrial process**
 4 **emissions**

	Reference value	Range (IP range)	Pass	Fail	Not reported
<i>Historical Emissions (sources: EDGAR v6 IPCC and CEDS, 2019 values)</i>					
CO₂ total (EIP + AFOLU) emissions	44,251 MtCO ₂ /yr	±40% (±20%)	1848	23	395
CO₂ EIP emissions	37,646 MtCO ₂ /yr	±20% (±10%)	2162	55	49
CH₄ emissions	379 MtCH ₄ /yr	±20% (±20%)	1651	139	476
CO₂ emissions EIP 2010-2020 % change	-	+0 to +50%	1742	74	450
CCS from Energy 2020	-	0-250 (100) Mt CO ₂ /yr	1624	77	565
<i>Historical energy production (sources: IEA 2019; IRENA; BP; EMBERS; trends extrapolated to 2020)</i>					
Primary Energy (2020, IEA)	578 EJ	±20% (±10%)	1813	73	380
Electricity Nuclear (2020, IEA)	9.77 EJ	±30% (±20%)	1603	266	397
Electricity Solar & Wind (2020, IEA, IRENA, BP, EMBERS).	8.51 EJ	±50% (±25%)	1459	377	430
Overall			1686	580	-
<i>Future criteria (not used for exclusion in climate assessment but flagged to authors as potentially problematic)</i>					
No net negative CO₂ emissions before 2030	CO ₂ total in 2030 >0		1867	4	395
CCS from Energy in 2030	< 2000 Mt CO ₂ /yr		1518	183	565
Electricity from Nuclear in 2030	< 20 EJ/yr		1595	274	397
CH₄ emissions in 2040	100-1000 MtCH ₄ /yr		1775	15	476

6 3.2. Global pathways

7 Scenarios were submitted by both individual studies and model inter-comparisons (see factsheets in the
 8 Supplementary Material to this Annex). The main model inter-comparisons submitting scenarios are
 9 shown in Table II.5. Model inter-comparisons have a shared experimental design and assess research
 10 questions across different modelling platforms to enable more structured and systematic assessments.
 11 The model comparison projects thus help to understand the robustness of the insights.

12 The number of submitted scenarios varies considerably by study, e.g. from 10 to almost 600 scenarios
 13 for the model inter-comparison studies (Table II.5). The numbers of scenarios also vary substantially
 14 by model (Table II.8.), highlighting the fact that the global scenario set collected in the AR6 scenario
 15 database is not a statistical sample (Section II.2.2.).

1 **Table II.5. Model inter-comparison studies that submitted global scenarios to the AR6 scenario database**
 2 **and for which at least one scenario passed the vetting. Scenario counts refer to all scenarios submitted by**
 3 **a study (in brackets), those that passed vetting (centre) and those that passed the vetting and received a**
 4 **climate assessment (left).**

Project	Description	Publication year	Key references	Website	Number of scenarios
SSP model-comparison	The SSPs are part of a new framework that the climate change research community has adopted to facilitate the integrated analysis of future climate impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation, and mitigation (II.1.3).	2018	(Riahi et al. 2017; Rogelj et al. 2018b)	https://tntcat.iiias.ac.at/SspDb	70 / 77 (126)
ADVANCE	Developed a new generation of advanced IAMs and applied the improved models to explore different climate mitigation policy options in the post-Paris framework.	2018	(Luderer et al. 2018; Vrontisi et al. 2018)	http://www.fp7-advance.eu/	37 / 40 (72)
	Industry sector study	2017	(Edelenbosch et al. 2017b)	http://www.fp7-advance.eu/	0 / 6 (6)
CD-LINKS	Exploring the complex interplay between climate action and development, while simultaneously taking both global and national perspectives and thereby informing the design of complementary climate-development policies.	2018	(McCollum et al. 2018; Roelfsema et al. 2020)	https://www.cd-links.org/	41 / 52 (77)
COMMIT	Exploring new climate policy scenarios on the global level and in different parts of the world	2021	(van Soest et al. 2021)	https://themasite.s.pbl.nl/commit/	41 / 59 (68)
ENGAGE	Exploring new climate policy scenarios on the global level and in different parts of the	2021	(Riahi et al. 2021)	http://www.engage-climate.org/	591 / 591 (603)

	world				
EMF30	Energy Modelling Forum study into the role of non-CO ₂ climate forcers	2020	(Smith et al. 2020a; Harmsen et al. 2020)	https://emf.stanford.edu/projects/emf-30-short-lived-climate-forcers-air-quality	61 / 69 (149)
EMF33	Energy Modelling Forum study into the role of bioenergy	2020	(Rose et al. 2020; Bauer et al. 2020a)	https://emf.stanford.edu/projects/emf-33-bio-energy-and-land-use	67 / 68 (173)
EMF36	Energy Modelling Forum study into the role of carbon pricing and economic implications of NDCs	2021	(Böhringer et al. 2021)	https://emf.stanford.edu/projects/emf-36-carbon-pricing-after-paris-carpri	0 / 305 (320)
NGFS	Study for scenario-based financial risk assessment with details on impacts, and sectoral and regional granularity	2021	(NGFS 2021) (NGFS 2020)	https://www.ngfs.net/ngfs-scenarios-portal	24 / 24 (24) 2 / 2 (2) ¹⁰
PARIS REINFORCE	Study on the long-term implications of current policies and NDCs	2020	(Perdana et al. 2020)	https://paris-reinforce.eu	3 / 25 (39)
PARIS REINFORCE	Study with a focus on harmonizing socio-economics and techno-economics in baselines	2021	(Giarola et al. 2021)	https://paris-reinforce.eu	0 / 8 (16)
CLIMACAP-LAMP	Study on the role of climate change mitigation in Latin America	2016	(van der Zwaan et al. 2016)	n.a.	0 / 10 (22)
				Total	937 / 1336 (1697)

1

2

FOOTNOTE¹⁰ The first NGFS scenario publication in 2020 comprised 15 scenarios from the literature and 2 newly developed scenarios. The 15 scenarios are also contained in the database under their original study name.

1 **Table II.6. Single model studies that submitted global scenarios to the AR6 scenario database and for**
 2 **which at least one scenario passed the vetting. Scenario counts refer to all scenarios submitted by a study**
 3 **(in brackets), those that passed vetting (center) and those that passed the vetting and received a climate**
 4 **assessment (left).**

Title of study	Literature reference ¹¹	Number of scenarios
Quantification of an efficiency–sovereignty trade-off in climate policy.	(Bauer et al. 2020b)	4 / 4 (4)
Transformation and innovation dynamics of the energy-economic system within climate and sustainability limits.	(Baumstark et al. 2021)	18 / 18 (18)
Tracing international migration in projections of income and inequality across the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways.	(Benveniste et al. 2021)	0 / 10 (10)
Targeted policies can compensate most of the increased sustainability risks in 1.5 °C mitigation scenarios.	(Bertram et al. 2018)	3 / 3 (12)
Long term, cross country effects of buildings insulation policies	(Edelenbosch et al. 2021)	0 / 8 (8)
The role of the discount rate for emission pathways and negative emissions.	(Emmerling et al. 2019)	4 / 4 (28)
Studies with the EPPA model on the costs of low-carbon power generation, the cost and deployment of CCS, the economics of BECCS, the global electrification of light duty vehicles, the 2018 food, water, energy and climate outlook and the 2021 global change outlook	(Reilly et al. 2018; Morris et al. 2019, 2021; Smith et al. 2021; Fajardy et al. 2021; Paltsev et al. 2021, 2022)	7 / 7 (10)
Transportation infrastructures in a low carbon world: An evaluation of investment needs and their determinants	(Fisch-Romito and Guivarch 2019)	0 / 24 (32)
Measuring the sustainable development implications of climate change mitigation.	(Fujimori et al. 2020)	5 / 5 (5)
How uncertainty in technology costs and carbon dioxide removal availability affect climate mitigation pathways.	(Giannousakis et al. 2021)	9 / 9 (9)
A low energy demand scenario for meeting the 1.5 °C target and sustainable development goals without negative emission technologies.	(Grubler et al. 2018)	1 / 1 (1)
Global Energy Interconnection: A scenario analysis based on the MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM Model.	(Guo et al. 2021)	20 / 20 (20)
Climate–carbon cycle uncertainties and the Paris Agreement.	(Holden et al. 2018)	0 / 5 (5)

FOOTNOTE¹¹ Publication date of scenarios coincides with year of publication.

Ratcheting ambition to limit warming to 1.5 °C—trade-offs between emission reductions and carbon dioxide removal.	(Holz et al. 2018)	6 / 6 (6)
Peatland protection and restoration are key for climate change mitigation	(Humpenöder et al. 2020)	0 / 3 (3)
Energy Technology Perspectives 2020.	(IEA 2020b)	0 / 1 (1)
World Energy Outlook 2020 – Analysis - IEA	(IEA 2020a)	0 / 1 (1)
Net Zero by 2050 – A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector.	(IEA 2021)	0 / 1 (1)
Global Renewables Outlook: Energy transformation 2050.	(IRENA 2020)	0 / 2 (2)
Climate mitigation scenarios with persistent COVID-19-related energy demand changes.	(Kikstra et al. 2021a)	19 / 19 (19)
Global anthropogenic emissions of particulate matter including black carbon.	(Klimont et al. 2017)	0 / 2 (2)
Global energy perspectives to 2060 – WEC’s World Energy Scenarios 2019.	(Kober et al. 2020)	0 / 4 (4)
Prospects for fuel efficiency, electrification and fleet decarbonisation	(Kodjak and Meszler 2019)	0 / 4 (4)
Short term policies to keep the door open for Paris climate goals.	(Kriegler et al. 2018b)	18 / 18 (18)
Deep decarbonisation of buildings energy services through demand and supply transformations in a 1.5°C scenario.	(Levesque et al. 2021)	4 / 4 (4)
Designing a model for the global energy system-GENeSYS-MOD: An application of the Open-Source Energy Modeling System (OSeMOSYS)	(Löffler et al. 2017)	0 / 1 (1)
Impact of declining renewable energy costs on electrification in low emission scenarios.	(Luderer et al. 2021)	8 / 8 (8)
The road to achieving the long-term Paris targets: energy transition and the role of direct air capture.	(Marcucci et al. 2017)	1 / 1 (3)
The transition in energy demand sectors to limit global warming to 1.5 °C.	(Méjean et al. 2019)	0 / 3 (27)
Deep mitigation of CO ₂ and non-CO ₂ greenhouse gases toward 1.5 °C and 2 °C futures	(Ou et al. 2021)	34 / 35 (36)
Alternative electrification pathways for light-duty vehicles in the European transport sector.	(Rottoli et al. 2021)	8 / 8 (8)
Economic damages from on-going climate change imply deeper near-term emission cuts.	(Schultes et al. 2021)	24 / 24 (24)

A sustainable development pathway for climate action within the UN 2030 Agenda.	(Soergel et al. 2021)	8 / 8 (8)
Delayed mitigation narrows the passage between large-scale CDR and high costs	(Strefler et al. 2018)	7 / 7 (7)
Alternative carbon price trajectories can avoid excessive carbon removal.	(Strefler et al. 2021b)	9 / 9 (9)
Carbon dioxide removal technologies are not born equal.	(Strefler et al. 2021a)	8 / 8 (8)
The Impact of U.S. Re-engagement in Climate on the Paris Targets.	(van de Ven et al. 2021)	0 / 10 (10)
The 2021 SSP scenarios of the IMAGE 3.2 model.	(Müller-Casseres et al. 2021; van Vuuren et al. 2014, 2021)	40 / 40 (40)
Pathway comparison of limiting global warming to 2°C.	(Wei et al. 2021)	0 / 5 (5)
	Total	265 / 350 (421)

1

2 **3.2.1. Climate classification of global pathways**

3 The global scenarios underpinning the assessment in Chapter 3 have been classified, to the degree
4 possible, by their warming outcome. The definition of the climate categories and the distribution of
5 scenarios in the database across these categories is shown in Table II.7. (Chapter 3.2). The first four of
6 these categories correspond to the ones used in the IPCC SR1.5 (Rogelj et al. 2018a) while the latter
7 four have been added as part of the AR6 to capture a broader range of warming outcomes.

8 For inclusion in the climate assessment, in addition to passing the vetting (Section II.3.1.), scenarios
9 needed to run until the end of century and report as a minimum CO₂ (total and for energy & industrial
10 processes (EIP)), CH₄ and N₂O emissions to 2100. Where CO₂ for AFOLU was not reported, the
11 difference between total and EIP in 2020 must be greater than 500 Mt CO₂. Of the total 2425 global
12 scenarios submitted, 1594 could be assessed in terms of their associated climate response, and 1202 of
13 those passed the vetting process.

14

15 **Table II.7. Classification of global pathways into warming levels using MAGICC (Chapter 3.2)**

Description	Definition	Scenarios	
		Passed Vetting	All
C1: Below 1.5°C with no or low overshoot	<1.5°C peak warming with ≥33% chance and < 1.5°C end of century warming with >50% chance	97	160
C2: Below 1.5°C with high overshoot	<1.5°C peak warming with <33% chance and < 1.5°C end of century warming with >50% chance	133	170
C3: Likely below 2°C	<2°C peak warming with >67% chance	311	374
C4: Below 2°C	<2°C peak warming with >50% chance	159	213

C5: Below 2.5°C	<2.5°C peak warming with >50% chance	212	258
C6: Below 3°C	<3°C peak warming with >50% chance	97	129
C7: Below 4°C	<4°C peak warming with >50% chance	164	230
C8: Above 4°C	>4°C peak warming with ≥50% chance	29	40
No climate assessment	Scenario time horizon <2100; insufficient emissions species reported	484	692
Total:		1686	2266

1

2 **Table II.8.** Global scenarios by modelling framework and climate category. Table includes scenarios numbers
3 that passed all vetting and checks and received categorization (in brackets total number of scenarios categorized
4 but not passing vetting). Unique model versions have been grouped into modelling frameworks for presentation
5 in this table¹². For a full list of unique model versions, please see the AR6 Scenario Database.

Model group	C1: Below 1.5°C with no or low OS	C2: Below 1.5°C with high OS	C3: Likely below 2°C	C4: Below 2°C	C5: Below 2.5°C	C6: Below 3.0°C	C7: Below 4.0°C	C8: Above 4.0°C	No climate assessment	Grand Total
AIM/ CGE+Hub	4 (18)	3 (7)	17 (37)	8 (23)	13 (23)	4 (7)	6 (32)	- (8)	7 (7)	55 (162)
C-ROADS	3 (3)	2 (2)						1 (1)		6 (6)
COFFEE	1 (1)	4 (7)	14 (16)	15 (22)	21 (24)	9 (11)	1 (3)			65 (84)
DNE21+	- (4)		- (7)	- (10)	- (3)	- (4)	- (8)		9 (10)	- (46)
EPPA			1 (3)	3 (4)		1 (1)	2 (2)			7 (10)
En-ROADS	- (2)							- (1)		- (3)
GCAM	6 (10)	6 (9)	13 (17)	9 (16)	6 (13)	- (1)	4 (6)	1 (1)	18 (63)	45 (136)
GCAM-PR					- (1)	1 (3)	2 (3)		13 (14)	3 (21)
GEM-E3	2 (2)	10 (10)	12 (12)	6 (6)	5 (5)	3 (3)	3 (3)		4 (11)	41 (52)
GRAPE-15				- (1)	- (7)	- (8)	- (2)			- (18)
IMAGE	7 (16)	9 (9)	34 (34)	18 (18)	22 (22)	16 (16)	34 (34)	2 (2)	2 (2)	142 (153)
MERGE-ETL	- (1)			1 (1)				- (1)		1 (3)
MESSAGE		- (1)	- (4)	- (3)			- (1)		- (1)	- (10)
MESSAGE-GLOBIOM	20 (20)	43 (48)	59 (61)	39 (40)	57 (59)	20 (22)	28 (33)	- (1)		266 (284)
POLES	4 (14)	10 (15)	26 (26)	24 (26)	20 (21)	11 (12)	19 (23)		1 (1)	114 (138)
REMIND	13 (15)	12 (19)	34 (39)	1 (1)	7 (8)	6 (6)	22 (24)	9 (9)		104 (121)

FOOTNOTE¹² Scenario numbers by modelling framework combine submissions from different model versions of the same model (indicated by version number or project name in the AR6 scenario database). For the AIM, MESSAGE and REMIND modelling frameworks, the grouping covers the following distinct models (including different versions):

AIM/ CGE+Hub: AIM/CGE, AIM/Hub

MESSAGE: MESSAGE, MESSAGE-Transport

MESSAGE-GLOBIOM: MESSAGE-GLOBIOM, MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM.

REMIND: REMIND, REMIND-H13, REMIND-Buildings, REMIND-Transport, REMIND_EU

REMIND-MAgPIE	28 (36)	32 (33)	50 (50)	15 (15)	27 (27)	13 (13)	26 (26)	2 (2)		193 (202)
TIAM-ECN			20 (20)	6 (6)	10 (10)	4 (4)	5 (5)		- (13)	45 (58)
TIAM-UCL			- (4)	- (1)			- (2)			- (7)
TIAM-WORLD					- (3)	- (2)	- (4)		- (2)	- (11)
WITCH	5 (13)	1 (9)	29 (35)	14 (16)	24 (24)	9 (9)	4 (4)	4 (4)		90 (114)
WITCH-GLOBIOM	4 (5)	1 (1)	2 (9)	- (4)	- (8)	- (7)	8 (15)	10 (10)		25 (59)
Total	97 (160)	133 (170)	311 (374)	159 (213)	212 (258)	97 (129)	164 (230)	29 (40)	54 (124)	1202 (1698)

1

2 **Table II.9. Global scenarios by modelling framework that were not included in the climate assessment**
3 **due to a time horizon shorter than 2100 or a limited reporting of emissions species that did not include**
4 **CO₂ (total emissions or emissions from energy and industry), CH₄ and N₂O. Unique model versions have**
5 **been grouped into modelling frameworks for presentation in this table¹³. For a full list of unique model**
6 **versions, please see the AR6 Scenario Database.**

Model framework	Time horizon	Passed vetting	Total
BET	2100	0	16
C-GEM	2030	32	32
C3IAM	2100	5	14
CGE-MOD	2030	32	32
DART	2030	17	32
E3ME	2050	10	10
EC-MSMR	2030	32	32
EDF-GEPA	2030	32	32
EDGE-Buildings	2100	8	8
ENV-Linkages	2060	7	15
ENVISAGE	2030	32	32
FARM	2100	0	13
GAINS	2050	2	2
GEMINI-E3	2050	6	6
GENeSYS-MOD	2050	1	1
Global TIMES	2050	0	14
GMM	2060	4	4
Global Transportation Roadmap	2050	4	4
ICES	2030/2050	32	43
IEA ETP	2070	1	1
IEA WEM	2050	2	2
IRENA REmap GRO2020	2050	2	2
IMACLIM	2050/2080	30	68
IMACLIM-NLU	2100	1	3
LUT-ESTM	2050	0	1
MAgPIE	2100	3	3

FOOTNOTE¹³ Scenario numbers by modelling framework combine submissions from different model versions of the same model (indicated by version number or project name in the AR6 scenario database).

MIGRATION	2100	10	10
MUSE	2100	5	11
McKinsey	2050	0	3
PROMETHEUS	2050	7	7
SNOW	2030	32	32
TEA	2030	32	32
TIAM-Grantham	2100	17	19
WEGDYN	2030	32	32
Total		430	568


1

2 **Changes in climate classification of scenarios since SR1.5:** Since the definition of warming classes
3 was unchanged from SR1.5 for the lower range of scenarios limiting warming to 2°C and below,
4 changes in overall emissions characteristics of scenarios in these classes from SR1.5 to AR6 would
5 need to come from the substantially larger ensemble of deep mitigation scenarios collected in the AR6
6 database compared to the SR1.5 database and from updates in the methodology of the climate
7 assessment. Updates since SR1.5 include the methodology for infilling and harmonization and the use
8 of an updated climate emulator (MAGICC v7) to provide consistency with WGI AR6 assessment
9 (II.2.5.1). Out of the full set of SR1.5, 57% of the 411 scenarios that were represented with global
10 temperature assessments in SR1.5 also have been assessed in AR6. Some SR1.5 scenarios could not be
11 taken on board since they are outdated (too early emissions reductions) and failed the vetting or do not
12 provide sufficient information/data to be included in AR6.

13 Comparison between SR1.5 and AR6 scenarios and associated climate responses are shown in Figure
14 II.3, bottom panel. We show that changes in the climate assessment pipeline are minor compared to
15 climate model uncertainty ranges in WGI (in the order of 0.1°C), but show considerable variation due
16 to different scenario characteristics. The updated harmonization and infilling together have a small
17 cooling effect compared to raw modelled emissions for the subset of 95 scenarios in C1, C2, and C3
18 that also were assessed in SR15 (SR1.5 Chap. 2, Table 2.4). This is due to both applying more advanced
19 harmonization methods consistent with the CMIP6 harmonization used for WGI, and changing the
20 historical harmonization year from 2010 to 2015. Together with the update in the climate emulator, we
21 find that the total AR6 assessment is remarkably consistent with SR1.5, albeit slightly cooler (in the
22 order of 0.05°C at peak temperature, 0.1°C in 2100).

23 The lowest temperature category (C1, limiting warming to 1.5 with no or low overshoot) used for
24 classifying the most ambitious climate mitigation pathways in the literature, indicates that emissions
25 are on average higher in AR6 in the near term (e.g., 2030) and the time of net zero CO₂ is later by about
26 5 years compared to SR1.5 (Figure II.3, middle panel). These differences can in part be ascribed to the
27 fact that historical emissions in scenarios, especially among those that passed the vetting, have risen
28 since SR1.5 in line with inventories. This increase has moved the attainable near-term emissions
29 reductions upwards. As a result, the scenarios in the lowest category have also a lower probability to
30 stay below 1.5°C peak warming. Using the WGI emulators, we find that the median probability to stay
31 below 1.5°C in the lowest category (C1) has dropped from about 46% in the SR1.5 scenarios to 38%
32 among the AR6 scenarios. Note that the likelihood of the SR1.5 scenarios limiting warming to 1.5C
33 with limited or no overshoot has changed from 41% in SR1.5 to 46% in AR6 due to the updated climate
34 assessment using the WGI AR6 climate emulator. Within C1, the vast majority of scenarios that are
35 submitted to AR6 but were not assessed in SR1.5 have a median peak temperatures close to 1.6°C. The
36 AR6 scenarios in the lowest category show higher emissions and have a lower chance to keep warming
37 below 1.5°C, as indicated by the panels showing the distribution of peak warming and exceedance
38 probability in AR6 vs SR1.5, with for instance C1 median peak temperature warming going from
39 1.55°C in SR1.5 (1.52°C if reassessed with AR6 assessment pipeline) to 1.58°C in AR6.

1



2

3 **Figure II.3. Comparing multiple characteristics of scenarios underlying SR1.5 Table 2.4 to the AR6**
 4 **assessment.**

5 **Top row: The probability of exceeding 1.5C for scenarios using the AR6 climate assessment pipeline for**
 6 **C1, C2, and C3.** AR6 shows all scenarios in AR6 that pass vetting requirements and get climate classification
 7 C1, C2, or C3, ('AR6 (n=541)'). The scenarios that are both in the AR6 database (passing the vetting) and were
 8 used for SR1.5 Table 2.4, and are classified as C1, C2 and C3 using the AR6 assessment, are labelled as 'AR6
 9 and SR1.5 overlap (n=95)'. 'SR1.5 (n=127)' shows all SR1.5 scenarios (except 5 that were not resubmitted for
 10 the AR6 report), including those that fail AR6 vetting, that are classified C1, C2, C3 with the updated AR6
 11 temperature assessment. Dashed lines indicate cut-off temperature exceedance probabilities that align with AR6
 12 category definitions. The violin area is proportional to the number of scenarios. Coloured lines indicate the 25th
 13 and 75th percentile, while the dashed black line indicates the median. The insets in each figure show how the
 14 temperature category classification have changed from SR1.5 to AR6 for those scenarios that are in both
 15 databases.

16 **Middle row: Characteristics of CO₂ emissions pathways and the distribution of median peak temperature**
 17 **assessments for C1 and C3.** From left to right: (i) change in CO₂ emissions levels and reductions in 2030, 2040
 18 and 2050 between the AR6 (n=408), AR6 and SR1.5 overlap (n=60) and SR1.5 sets (n=91). (ii) The distribution
 19 of scenarios with different median peak temperature scenario outcomes for C1 and C3 for AR6 and SR1.5 (both
 20 with AR6 temperature assessment as a solid line and with SR1.5 temperature assessment as a dashed line with
 21 median in yellow). (iii) Year of net-zero CO₂ for C1 and C3 for AR6 and SR1.5. Within C3, 27 AR6 scenarios
 22 and 2 SR1.5 scenarios with no net-zero year before 2100 have not been visualised. The violin area is proportional
 23 to the number of scenarios. Coloured lines indicate the 25th and 75th percentile, while the dashed black line
 24 indicates the median.

25 **Bottom-row: Change in median global-mean surface air temperature (GSAT) between the AR6 and SR1.5**
 26 **climate assessments for both 2100 values and peak temperature values during the 21st century.** Positive
 27 values indicate that the temperature assessment is higher for the same scenario than the SR1.5 climate assessment.

1 From left to right, the effect of using MAGICCv7 calibrated to the WGI assessment compared with MAGICC6
 2 as used in SR1.5. The effect of more advanced emissions harmonization and infilling methods. The total is the
 3 sum of the three components. Boxplots show the median and interquartile range, with the whiskers indicating the
 4 95% range.

5

6 **3.2.2. Policy classification of global scenarios**

7 Global scenarios were also classified based on their assumptions regarding climate policy. This
 8 information can be deduced from study protocols or the description of scenario designs in the published
 9 literature. It has also been elicited as meta-information for scenarios that were submitted to the AR6
 10 database. There are multiple purposes for a policy classification, including controlling for the level of
 11 near-term action (Chapter 3.5) and estimating costs and other differences between two policy classes
 12 (Chapter 3.6). Policy classes can be combined with climate classes, e.g. to identify scenarios that follow
 13 the NDC until 2030 and likely limit warming to 2°C.

14 Table II.8 presents the policy classification that was chosen for this assessment and the distribution of
 15 scenarios across the policy classes. There is top level distinction between diagnostic scenarios, scenarios
 16 from cost-benefit analyses, scenarios without globally coordinated action, scenarios with immediate
 17 such action, and hybrid scenarios that move to globally coordinated action after a period of diverse and
 18 uncoordinated nation. On the second hierarchy level, scenarios are classified along distinctive features
 19 of scenarios in each class. Scenarios without globally coordinated action are often used as reference
 20 scenarios and come as baselines without climate policy efforts, as an extrapolation of current policy
 21 trends or as implementation and extrapolation of NDCs (Grant et al. 2020). Scenarios that act
 22 immediately to limit warming to some level can be distinguished by whether or not they include
 23 transfers to reflect equity considerations (Tavoni et al. 2015; van den Berg et al. 2020; Bauer et al.
 24 2020c) or by whether or not they assume additional policies augmenting a global carbon price (Soergel
 25 et al. 2021). Scenarios that delay globally coordinated action until 2030 can differ in their assumptions
 26 about the level of near-term action (van Soest et al. 2021; Roelfsema et al. 2020).

27 To identify the policy classification of each global scenario in the AR6 database, classes are first
 28 assigned via text pattern matching on all the metadata collected when submitting the scenarios to the
 29 database. The algorithm first looks for keywords and text patterns to establish whether a scenario
 30 represents a global, fragmented, diagnostic or CBA policy setup. Then it looks for evidence on the
 31 presence of specific regional policies, delayed actions and transfers of permits. Eventually the different
 32 pieces of evidence are harmonized into a single policy categorization decision. The process has been
 33 calibrated on the best-known scenarios belonging to the larger model intercomparison projects, and
 34 fine-tuned on the other scenarios via further validation against the related literature, consistency checks
 35 on reported emission and carbon price trajectories, exchanges with modellers and supervision by the
 36 involved IPCC authors. If the information available is enough to qualify a policy category number but
 37 not sufficient for a subcategory, then only the number is retained (e.g., P2 instead of P2a/b/c). A suffix
 38 added after P0 further qualifies a diagnostic scenario as one of the other policy categories.

39

40 **Table II.10. Policy classification of global scenarios. If the total for a class exceeds the sum of the**
 41 **subclasses, there are scenarios in the class that could not be assigned to a subclass.**

Class	Definition	Number of scenarios	
		Passed vetting	All
P0	Diagnostic scenario	99	138
P1	No globally coordinated climate policy and either	500	632

P1a	• no climate mitigation efforts	124	179
P1b	• current national mitigation efforts	59	72
P1c	• NDCs	160	184
P1d	• other policy assumptions	153	189
P2	Globally coordinated climate policies with immediate (i.e. before 2030) action and	634	992
P2a	• without any transfer of emission permits	435	610
P2b	• with transfers	70	143
P2c	• with additional policy assumptions	55	83
P3	Globally coordinated climate policies with delayed (i.e. from 2030 onwards or after 2030) action, preceded by	451	502
P3a	• no mitigation commitment or current national policies	7	9
P3b	• NDCs	426	464
P3c	• NDCs and additional policies	18	29
P4	Cost-benefits analysis	2	2
	Total	1686	2266

1

2 3.3. National and regional pathways

3 National and regional pathways have been collected in the AR6 scenario database to support the Chapter
4 4 assessment. In total more than 500 pathways for 24 countries/regions have been submitted to the AR6
5 scenario database by integrated assessment, energy-economic and computable general equilibrium
6 modelling research teams. This represents a limited sample of the overall literature on mitigation
7 pathways at the national level. The majority of these pathways originate from a set of larger model
8 intercomparison projects, JMIP/EMF35 (Sugiyama et al. 2020a) focusing on Japan, CD-LINKS
9 (Schaeffer et al. 2020; Roelfsema et al. 2020), COMMIT (van Soest et al. 2021), ENGAGE (Fujimori
10 et al. 2021), Paris Reinforce (Perdana et al. 2020; Nikas et al. 2021) each covering several
11 countries/regions from the following set of countries: Australia, Brazil, China, EU, India, Indonesia,
12 Japan, Korea, Russia, Thailand, USA, Vietnam. The remaining pathways stem from individual
13 modelling studies that were submitted/collected (Table II.11.).

14

15 **Table II.11. National and regional mitigation pathways by modelling framework, region and scenario**
16 **type.**

Region	Model	CP	NDC	Other	Total
ARG	IMACLIM-ARG		1	2	3
AUS	TIMES-Australia	1		7	8
BRA	BLUES-Brazil	2	2	15	19
BRA	COPPE_MSB-Brazil			8	8
BRA	IMACLIM-BRA			5	5
CHE	STEM-Switzerland	1		11	12
CHN	AIM/Hub-China	1	1	7	9
CHN	C3IAM		3	11	14
CHN	DREAM-China			1	1
CHN	GENeSYS-MOD-CHN			3	3

Country	Project Name	Final Government Distribution	Annex III	IPCC AR6 WGIII	
CHN	IPAC-AIM/technology-China	1	1	11	13
CHN	PECE-China			2	2
CHN	TIMES-Australia		1		1
CHN	TIMES-China	1	2	8	11
ECU	ELENA-Ecuador			2	2
ETH	TIAM-ECN ETH	1		1	2
EU	E4SMA-EU-TIMES	1			1
EU	eTIMES-EU			23	23
EU	JRC-EU-TIMES			8	8
EU	PRIMES	2	2	9	13
EU	REMIND_EU			9	9
FRA	TIMES-France			8	8
GBR	7see			11	11
IDN	AIM/Hub-Indonesia			2	2
IDN	DDPP Energy			4	4
IND	AIM/Enduse India	1	1	5	7
IND	AIM/Hub-India	1	1	7	9
IND	MARKAL-INDIA	2	3	13	18
JPN	AIM/CGE-Enduse-Japan			6	6
JPN	AIM/Enduse-Japan	3	3	69	75
JPN	AIM/Hub-Japan	1	2	42	45
JPN	DNE21-Japan		1	30	31
JPN	DNE21+ V.14 (national)	1	1	4	6
JPN	IEEJ-Japan		1	34	35
KEN	TIAM-ECN KEN	1	1	2	4
KOR	AIM/CGE-Korea	1	1	6	8
KOR	AIM/Hub-Korea	1	1	7	9
MDG	TIAM-ECN MDG	1	2		3
MEX	GENeSYS-MOD-MEX			4	4
PRT	TIMES-Portugal		1	3	4
RUS	RU-TIMES	1	1	4	6
SWE	TIMES-Sweden			4	4
THA	AIM/Hub-Thailand	1	2	19	22
USA	GCAM-USA	2	2	9	13
USA	RIO-USA			12	12

VNM	AIM/Hub-Vietnam	1	2	14	17
ZAF	TIAM-ECN AFR			4	4
Total		29	39	466	534

Notes: The following scenario categories are distinguished in this table, CP = current policies, NDC = implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) by 2025/30, Other = all other scenarios.

3.4. Sector transition pathways

Sectoral transition pathways based on the AR6 Scenario database are addressed in a number of Chapters, primarily Chapter 6 (Energy systems), 7 (AFOLU), 9 (Buildings), 10 (Transport) and 11 (Industry). These analyses cover both contributions from global IAMs and from sector-specific models with regional or global coverage. The assessments cover a variety of perspectives, including long-term global and macro-region trends for the sectors, sectoral analysis of the Illustrative Pathways, and comparison of the scenarios between full-economy IAMs and sector-specific models on shorter time horizons. These perspectives have a bi-directional utility – to understand how well IAMs are representing sectoral trends from more granular models, and position sectoral models in the context of full economy transitions to verify consistency with different climate outcomes.

Table II.12. Overview of how models and scenarios were used in sectoral chapters. All scenario and model counts listed in the table are contained in the AR6 scenario database, with one exception: Chapter 9 (Buildings), which supplemented its dataset with a large number of scenarios separately pulled from the sectoral literature. Scenario counts represents unique model-scenario combinations in the database.

Sector	# models	# scenarios	Key sections	Key perspectives
Energy systems (Ch6)	12	476	6.6	Regional and global energy system characteristics along mitigation pathways and at net-zero emissions specifically: CO ₂ and GHG emissions; energy resource shares; electricity and hydrogen shares of final energy; energy intensity; per-capita energy use; peak emissions; energy investments
	18	536	6.7	
	13	776	6.7.1	
AFOLU (Ch7)	11	384	7.5.1	Regional and global GHG emissions and land use dynamics; economic mitigation potential for different GHGs; integrated mitigation pathways
	14	572	7.5.2, 7.5.4	
	13	559	7.5.5	
	3	4		

Buildings (Ch9)	80 <i>(of which 2 are in AR6 scenario database)</i>	82 <i>(of which 4 are in AR6 scenario database)</i>	9.3, 9.6	A mixture of top-down and bottom-up models. The former were either national, regional or global while the latter were global only with a breakdown per end use, building type, technologies and energy carrier
Transport (Ch10)	24	1210	10.7	Global and regional transport demand, activity, modes, vehicles, fuels, and mitigation options.
Industry (Ch11)	14	508	11.4.2	Global final energy use, CO ₂ emissions, carbon sequestration, fuel shares

1 Note 1: The number of models and scenarios reported in the table cannot be summed across chapters, as there is
2 considerable overlap in selected model-scenario combinations across chapters, depending on the filtering
3 processes used for relevant analyses. Moreover, the numbers in the table - and certainly not their sum - are not
4 intended to match those reported by Chap. 3 in Section II.3.2.

5 Note 2: Numbers shown in the model-count column are arrived at through the authors' best judgement. This has
6 to do with the overlapping nature of unique model versions (within a given model family) as models evolve over
7 time. In this case, model versions with substantial overlap were considered the same model, whereas model
8 versions that differ significantly were counted as unique. For example, 'MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 1.0' and
9 'MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM_1.1' are counted as the same model, while 'MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 1.0' and
10 'MESSAGE' are counted as different. If instead counting all model versions uniquely, then the following counts
11 would apply to each chapter: Energy systems (30/38/29), AFOLU (18/27/25/4), Buildings (80), Transport (50),
12 Industry (32).

13 Note 3: The Transport chapter figures of Section 10.7 are produced from the final AR6 scenario database by the
14 code accompanying this report. The set of model and scenario names appearing in each plot or figure of 10.7
15 varies, depending on whether particular submissions to the database included the specific variables appearing in
16 that plot. Authors advise inspecting the data files accompanying each figure for the set of models/scenarios
17 specific to that figure, or running the code against the final database snapshot to reproduce the figures in question.

18

1 **References**

- 2 Absar, S. M., and B. L. Preston, 2015: Extending the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways for sub-national
3 impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability studies. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **33**, 83–96,
4 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.04.004>.
- 5 Abujarad, S. Y., M. W. Mustafa, and J. J. Jamian, 2017: Recent approaches of unit commitment in the
6 presence of intermittent renewable energy resources: A review. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.*, **70**,
7 215–223, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.11.246>.
- 8 ADB, 2017: *Pathways to Low-Carbon Development for Viet Nam*. Asian Development Bank.
- 9 Admiraal, A. K., A. F. Hof, M. G. J. den Elzen, and D. P. van Vuuren, 2016: Costs and benefits of
10 differences in the timing of greenhouse gas emission reductions. *Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Glob.*
11 *Chang.*, **21**, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-015-9641-4>.
- 12 Aghajani, G. R., H. A. Shayanfar, and H. Shayeghi, 2017: Demand side management in a smart micro-
13 grid in the presence of renewable generation and demand response. *Energy*, **126**, 622–637,
14 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2017.03.051>.
- 15 Aguiar, A. P. D., D. Collste, Z. V. Harmáčková, L. Pereira, O. Selomane, D. Galafassi, D. Van Vuuren,
16 and S. Van Der Leeuw, 2020: Co-designing global target-seeking scenarios: A cross-scale
17 participatory process for capturing multiple perspectives on pathways to sustainability. *Glob.*
18 *Environ. Chang.*, **65**, 102198, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2020.102198>.
- 19 Alaidroos, A., and M. Krarti, 2015: Optimal design of residential building envelope systems in the
20 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. *Energy Build.*, **86**, 104–117,
21 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2014.09.083>.
- 22 Ameli, N., and Coauthors, 2021: Higher cost of finance exacerbates a climate investment trap in
23 developing economies. *Nat. Commun.*, **12**, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-24305-3>.
- 24 Anderson, K., and G. Peters, 2016: The trouble with negative emissions. *Science (80-.)*, **354**, 182–183,
25 <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aah4567>.
- 26 Andrijevic, M., J. Crespo Cuaresma, R. Muttarak, and C.-F. Schleussner, 2019: Governance in
27 socioeconomic pathways and its role for future adaptive capacity. *Nat. Sustain.*,
28 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0405-0>.
- 29 —, —, T. Lissner, A. Thomas, and C.-F. Schleussner, 2020a: Overcoming gender inequality for
30 climate resilient development. *Nat. Commun.*, **11**, 6261, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19856-w>.
- 31 —, C.-F. Schleussner, M. J. Gidden, D. L. McCollum, and J. Rogelj, 2020b: COVID-19 recovery
32 funds dwarf clean energy investment needs. *Science (80-.)*, **370**, 298–300,
33 <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abc9697>.
- 34 —, R. Sioshansi, J. X. Johnson, and G. A. Keoleian, 2019: The role of energy storage in
35 deep decarbonization of electricity production. *Nat. Commun.*, **10**,
36 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-11161-5>.
- 37 —, K., and Coauthors, 2013: Determining Benefits and Costs for Future Generations. *Science (80-*
38 *.)*, **341**, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1235665>.
- 39 —, A., G. Luderer, M. Pehl, B. L. Bodirsky, and E. G. Hertwich, 2018: Deriving life cycle
40 assessment coefficients for application in integrated assessment modelling. *Environ. Model.*
41 *Softw.*, **99**, 111–125, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2017.09.010>.
- 42 —, C., E. Kriegler, H. Carlsen, K. Kok, S. Pedde, V. Krey, and B. Müller, 2021: Climate change
43 scenario services: From science to facilitating action. *One Earth*, **4**, 1074–1082,
44 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.07.015>.
- 45 —, K. A., R. A. Begum, and F. F. Said, 2017: Application of computable general equilibrium
46

- 1 (CGE) to climate change mitigation policy: A systematic review. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.*,
2 **78**, 61–71, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.04.064>.
- 3 Babiker, M. H., and R. S. Eckaus, 2007: Unemployment effects of climate policy. *Environ. Sci. Policy*,
4 **10**, 600–609, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2007.05.002>.
- 5 Badesa, L., F. Teng, and G. Strbac, 2020: Optimal Portfolio of Distinct Frequency Response Services
6 in Low-Inertia Systems. *IEEE Trans. Power Syst.*, **35**, 4459–4469,
7 <https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2020.2997194>.
- 8 Baitz, M., 2017: Attributional Life Cycle Assessment. *Goal and Scope Definition in Life Cycle*
9 *Assessment*, Springer, Dordrecht, 123–143.
- 10 Bajželj, B., K. S. Richards, J. M. Allwood, P. Smith, J. S. Dennis, E. Curmi, and C. A. Gilligan, 2014:
11 Importance of food-demand management for climate mitigation. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **4**, 924–929,
12 <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2353>.
- 13 Bamber, N., I. Turner, V. Arulnathan, Y. Li, S. Zargar Ershadi, A. Smart, and N. Pelletier, 2020:
14 Comparing sources and analysis of uncertainty in consequential and attributional life cycle
15 assessment: review of current practice and recommendations. *Int. J. Life Cycle Assess.*, **25**,
16 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11367-019-01663-1>.
- 17 Baños, R., F. Manzano-Agugliaro, F. G. Montoya, C. Gil, A. Alcayde, and J. Gómez, 2011:
18 Optimization methods applied to renewable and sustainable energy: A review. *Renew. Sustain.*
19 *Energy Rev.*, **15**, 1753–1766, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2010.12.008>.
- 20 Barker, T., and S. Scricciu, 2010: Modeling low climate stabilization with E3MG: Towards a “new
21 economics” approach to simulating energy-environment-economy system dynamics. *Energy J.*,
22 **31**, 137–164, <https://doi.org/10.5547/issn0195-6574-ej-vol31-nosi-6>.
- 23 Barter, G. E., M. A. Tamor, D. K. Manley, and T. H. West, 2015: Implications of modeling range and
24 infrastructure barriers to adoption of battery electric vehicles. *Transp. Res. Rec.*, **2502**, 80–88,
25 <https://doi.org/10.3141/2502-10>.
- 26 Bashmakov, I., 2017: Improving the Energy Efficiency of Russian Buildings. *Probl. Econ. Transit.*, **58**,
27 1096–1128, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10611991.2016.1316099>.
- 28 Bauer, N., O. Edenhofer, and S. Kypreos, 2008: Linking energy system and macroeconomic growth
29 models. *Comput. Manag. Sci.*, **5**, 95–117, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-007-0042-3>.
- 30 Bauer, N., I. Mouratiadou, G. Luderer, L. Baumstark, R. J. Brecha, O. Edenhofer, and E. Kriegler, 2016:
31 Global fossil energy markets and climate change mitigation – an analysis with REMIND. *Clim.*
32 *Change*, **136**, 69–82, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0901-6>.
- 33 Bauer, N., and Coauthors, 2017: Shared Socio-Economic Pathways of the Energy Sector – Quantifying
34 the Narratives. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **42**, 316–330,
35 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.07.006>.
- 36 —, and Coauthors, 2020a: Global energy sector emission reductions and bioenergy use: overview of
37 the bioenergy demand phase of the EMF-33 model comparison. *Clim. Change*, **163**, 1553–1568,
38 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2226-y>.
- 39 —, C. Bertram, A. Schultes, D. Klein, G. Luderer, E. Kriegler, A. Popp, and O. Edenhofer, 2020b:
40 Quantification of an efficiency–sovereignty trade-off in climate policy. *Nature*, **588**, 261–266,
41 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2982-5>.
- 42 —, —, —, —, —, —, —, and —, 2020c: Quantification of an efficiency–
43 sovereignty trade-off in climate policy. *Nature*, **588**, 261–266, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2982-5>.
- 44 —, D. Klein, F. Humpenöder, E. Kriegler, G. Luderer, A. Popp, and J. Strefler, 2020d: Bio-energy
45 and CO2 emission reductions: an integrated land-use and energy sector perspective. *Clim. Change*,
46 **163**, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02895-z>.
- 47

- 1 Baumstark, L., and Coauthors, 2021: REMIND2.1: transformation and innovation dynamics of the
2 energy-economic system within climate and sustainability limits. *Geosci. Model Dev.*, **14**, 6571–
3 6603, <https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-14-6571-2021>.
- 4 Beach, R. H., J. Creason, S. B. Ohrel, S. Ragnauth, S. Ogle, C. Li, P. Ingraham, and W. Salas, 2015:
5 Global mitigation potential and costs of reducing agricultural non-CO₂ greenhouse gas emissions
6 through 2030. *J. Integr. Environ. Sci.*, **12**, 87–105,
7 <https://doi.org/10.1080/1943815X.2015.1110183>.
- 8 Beck, S., and M. Mahony, 2017: The IPCC and the politics of anticipation. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **7**, 311–
9 313, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3264>.
- 10 Bednar, J., M. Obersteiner, and F. Wagner, 2019: On the financial viability of negative emissions. *Nat.*
11 *Commun.*, **10**, 1783, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-09782-x>.
- 12 Bellocchi, S., M. Manno, M. Noussan, M. G. Prina, and M. Vellini, 2020: Electrification of transport
13 and residential heating sectors in support of renewable penetration: Scenarios for the Italian energy
14 system. *Energy*, **196**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.117062>.
- 15 Benveniste, H., J. C. Cuaresma, M. Gidden, and R. Mutarak, 2021: Tracing international migration in
16 projections of income and inequality across the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. *Clim. Chang.*
17 *2021 1663*, **166**, 1–22, <https://doi.org/10.1007/S10584-021-03133-W>.
- 18 van den Berg, N. J., and Coauthors, 2020: Implications of various effort-sharing approaches for national
19 carbon budgets and emission pathways. *Clim. Change*, **162**, 1805–1822,
20 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02368-y>.
- 21 Bertram, C., G. Luderer, R. C. Pietzcker, E. Schmid, E. Kriegler, and O. Edenhofer, 2015:
22 Complementing carbon prices with technology policies to keep climate targets within reach. *Nat.*
23 *Clim. Chang.*, **5**, 235–239, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2514>.
- 24 —, and Coauthors, 2018: Targeted policies can compensate most of the increased sustainability risks
25 in 1.5 °C mitigation scenarios. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **13**, 064038, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aac3ec>.
- 27 —, and Coauthors, 2021: Energy system developments and investments in the decisive decade for
28 the Paris Agreement goals. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **16**, 074020, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/AC09AE>.
- 30 Bierwirth, A., and S. Thomas, 2019: Estimating the sufficiency potential in buildings: The space
31 between under-dimensioned and oversized. *Eceee Summer Study Proc.*, **2019-June**, 1143–1153.
- 32 Bijl, D. L., P. W. Bogaart, S. C. Dekker, and D. P. van Vuuren, 2018: Unpacking the nexus: Different
33 spatial scales for water, food and energy. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **48**, 22–31,
34 <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GLOENVCHA.2017.11.005>.
- 35 Bistline, J. E. T., and D. T. Young, 2019: Economic drivers of wind and solar penetration in the US.
36 *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **14**, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ab4e2d>.
- 37 Blanford, G., J. Merrick, R. Richels, and S. Rose, 2014a: Trade-offs between mitigation costs and
38 temperature change. *Clim. Change*, **123**, 527–541, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0869-2>.
- 39 Blanford, G. J., E. Kriegler, and M. Tavoni, 2014b: Harmonization vs. fragmentation: Overview of
40 climate policy scenarios in EMF27. *Clim. Change*, **123**, 383–396, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0951-9>.
- 42 Blass, V., and C. J. Corbett, 2018: Same Supply Chain, Different Models: Integrating Perspectives from
43 Life Cycle Assessment and Supply Chain Management. *J. Ind. Ecol.*, **22**,
44 <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12550>.
- 45 Böhringer, C., S. Peterson, T. F. Rutherford, J. Schneider, and M. Winkler, 2021: Climate policies after
46 Paris: Pledge, Trade and Recycle: Insights from the 36th Energy Modeling Forum Study (EMF36).
47 *Energy Econ.*, **103**, 105471, <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ENERCO.2021.105471>.

- 1 Bonsch, M., and Coauthors, 2015: Environmental flow provision: Implications for agricultural water
2 and land-use at the global scale. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **30**, 113–132,
3 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.10.015>.
- 4 Bos, A. B., V. De Sy, A. E. Duchelle, S. Atmadja, S. de Bruin, S. Wunder, and M. Herold, 2020:
5 Integrated assessment of deforestation drivers and their alignment with subnational climate change
6 mitigation efforts. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **114**, 352–365,
7 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2020.08.002>.
- 8 Bosetti, V., G. Marangoni, E. Borgonovo, L. Diaz Anadon, R. Barron, H. C. McJeon, S. Politis, and P.
9 Friley, 2015: Sensitivity to energy technology costs: A multi-model comparison analysis. *Energy*
10 *Policy*, **80**, 244–263, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.12.012>.
- 11 Bourdeau, M., X. qiang Zhai, E. Nefzaoui, X. Guo, and P. Chatellier, 2019: Modeling and forecasting
12 building energy consumption: A review of data-driven techniques. *Sustain. Cities Soc.*, **48**,
13 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scs.2019.101533>.
- 14 Brear, M. J., R. Baldick, I. Cronshaw, and M. Olofsson, 2020: Sector coupling: Supporting
15 decarbonisation of the global energy system. *Electr. J.*, **33**,
16 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2020.106832>.
- 17 Bréchet, T., F. Gerard, and H. Tulkens, 2011: Efficiency vs. Stability in Climate Coalitions: A
18 Conceptual and Computational Appraisal. *Energy J.*, **32**, [https://doi.org/10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-](https://doi.org/10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol32-No1-3)
19 [EJ-Vol32-No1-3](https://doi.org/10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol32-No1-3).
- 20 Brooker, A., J. Gonder, S. Lopp, and J. Ward, 2015: ADOPT: A Historically Validated Light Duty
21 Vehicle Consumer Choice Model. *SAE Technical Papers*, Vol. 2015-April of.
- 22 Brown, T., J. Hörsch, and D. Schlachtberger, 2018: PyPSA: Python for Power System Analysis. *J. Open*
23 *Res. Softw.*, **6**, <https://doi.org/10.5334/jors.188>.
- 24 Brugger, H., W. Eichhammer, N. Mikova, and E. Dönitz, 2021: Energy Efficiency Vision 2050: How
25 will new societal trends influence future energy demand in the European countries? *Energy Policy*,
26 **152**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112216>.
- 27 Brutschin, E., S. Pianta, M. Tavoni, K. Riahi, V. Bosetti, G. Marangoni, and B. J. van Ruijven, 2021:
28 A multidimensional feasibility evaluation of low-carbon scenarios. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **16**,
29 <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abf0ce>.
- 30 Budinis, S., S. Krevor, N. Mac Dowell, N. Brandon, and A. Hawkes, 2018: An assessment of CCS
31 costs, barriers and potential. *Energy Strateg. Rev.*, **22**, 61–81,
32 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2018.08.003>.
- 33 Bürger, V., T. Hesse, B. Köhler, A. Palzer, and P. Engelmann, 2019: German Energiewende—different
34 visions for a (nearly) climate neutral building sector in 2050. *Energy Effic.*, **12**,
35 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-018-9660-6>.
- 36 Burniaux, J.-M., and J. Chateau, 2010: *An Overview of the OECD ENV-Linkages model*.
37 <https://www.oecd.org/env/45334643.pdf> (Accessed August 25, 2021).
- 38 Butler, C., A. Denis-Ryan, P. Graham, R. Kelly, L. Reedman, I. Stewart, and T. Yankos, 2020:
39 *Decarbonisation futures: Solutions, actions and benchmarks for a net zero emissions Australia*.
- 40 Butnar, I., P. H. Li, N. Strachan, J. Portugal Pereira, A. Gambhir, and P. Smith, 2020: A deep dive into
41 the modelling assumptions for biomass with carbon capture and storage (BECCS): A transparency
42 exercise. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **15**, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ab5c3e>.
- 43 Cabrera Serrenho, A., M. Drewniok, C. Dunant, and J. M. Allwood, 2019: Testing the greenhouse gas
44 emissions reduction potential of alternative strategies for the english housing stock. *Resour.*
45 *Conserv. Recycl.*, **144**, 267–275, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2019.02.001>.
- 46 Calise, F., F. L. Cappiello, M. Vicidomini, J. Song, A. M. Pantaleo, S. Abdelhady, A. Shaban, and C.
47 N. Markides, 2021: Energy and economic assessment of energy efficiency options for energy

- 1 districts: Case studies in Italy and Egypt. *Energies*, **14**, 1–24, <https://doi.org/10.3390/en14041012>.
- 2 Calvin, K., J. Edmonds, B. Bakken, M. Wise, S. Kim, P. Luckow, P. Patel, and I. Graabak, 2014a: EU
3 20-20-20 energy policy as a model for global climate mitigation. *Clim. Policy*, **14**, 581–598,
4 <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2013.879794>.
- 5 ———, M. Wise, P. Kyle, P. Patel, L. Clarke, and J. Edmonds, 2014b: Trade-offs of different land and
6 bioenergy policies on the path to achieving climate targets. *Clim. Change*, **123**, 691–704,
7 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0897-y>.
- 8 Calvin, K., and Coauthors, 2017: The SSP4: A world of deepening inequality. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*,
9 **42**, 284–296, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.06.010>.
- 10 Calvin, K., and Coauthors, 2019: GCAM v5.1: representing the linkages between energy, water, land,
11 climate, and economic systems. *Geosci. Model Dev.*, **12**, 677–698, <https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-12-677-2019>.
- 13 ———, and Coauthors, 2021: Bioenergy for climate change mitigation: Scale and sustainability. *GCB*
14 *Bioenergy*, **13**, <https://doi.org/10.1111/gcbb.12863>.
- 15 Cameron, C., S. Pachauri, N. D. Rao, D. McCollum, J. Rogelj, and K. Riahi, 2016: Policy trade-offs
16 between climate mitigation and clean cook-stove access in South Asia. *Nat. Energy*, **1**, 1–5,
17 <https://doi.org/10.1038/nenergy.2015.10>.
- 18 Capellán-Pérez, I., and Coauthors, 2020: MEDEAS: A new modeling framework integrating global
19 biophysical and socioeconomic constraints. *Energy Environ. Sci.*, **13**, 986–1017,
20 <https://doi.org/10.1039/c9ee02627d>.
- 21 Capros, P., D. van Regemorter, L. Paroussos, P. Karkatsoulis, C. Fragkiadakis, S. Tsani, I.
22 Charalampidis, and T. Revesz, 2013: *GEM-E3 Model Documentation*. 1–154 pp.
- 23 Capros, P., and Coauthors, 2014: European decarbonisation pathways under alternative technological
24 and policy choices: A multi-model analysis. *Energy Strateg. Rev.*, **2**, 231–245,
25 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2013.12.007>.
- 26 Cedillos Alvarado, D., S. Acha, N. Shah, and C. N. Markides, 2016: A Technology Selection and
27 Operation (TSO) optimisation model for distributed energy systems: Mathematical formulation
28 and case study. *Appl. Energy*, **180**, 491–503, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.08.013>.
- 29 Cetinkaya, E., I. Dincer, and G. F. Naterer, 2012: Life cycle assessment of various hydrogen production
30 methods. *Int. J. Hydrogen Energy*, **37**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2011.10.064>.
- 31 Chaichaloempreecha, A., P. Winyuchakrit, and B. Limmeechokchai, 2017: Long-term energy savings
32 and GHG mitigations in Thailand’s building sector: Impacts of energy efficiency plan. *Energy*
33 *Procedia*, **138**, 847–852, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egypro.2017.10.110>.
- 34 Chang, J., P. Havlík, D. Leclère, W. de Vries, H. Valin, A. Deppermann, T. Hasegawa, and M.
35 Obersteiner, 2021: Reconciling regional nitrogen boundaries with global food security. *Nat. Food*,
36 **2**, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s43016-021-00366-x>.
- 37 Chen, Y.-H. H., S. Paltsev, J. M. Reilly, J. F. Morris, and M. H. Babiker, 2016: Long-term economic
38 modeling for climate change assessment. *Econ. Model.*, **52**,
39 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2015.10.023>.
- 40 Cheng, R., Z. Xu, P. Liu, Z. Wang, Z. Li, and I. Jones, 2015: A multi-region optimization planning
41 model for China’s power sector. *Appl. Energy*, **137**, 413–426,
42 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2014.10.023>.
- 43 Christensen, P., K. Gillingham, and W. Nordhaus, 2018: Uncertainty in forecasts of long-run economic
44 growth. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.*, **115**, 5409–5414,
45 <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1713628115>.
- 46 Chu, Z., U. Markovic, G. Hug, and F. Teng, 2020: Towards optimal system scheduling with synthetic
47 inertia provision from wind turbines. *IEEE Trans. Power Syst.*, **35**, 4056–4066,

- 1 <https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2020.2985843>.
- 2 Clark, M. A., N. G. G. Domingo, K. Colgan, S. K. Thakrar, D. Tilman, J. Lynch, I. L. Azevedo, and J.
3 D. Hill, 2020: Global food system emissions could preclude achieving the 1.5° and 2°C climate
4 change targets. *Science (80-.)*, **370**, 705–708, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aba7357>.
- 5 Clarke, L., J. Edmonds, V. Krey, R. Richels, S. Rose, and M. Tavoni, 2009: International climate policy
6 architectures: Overview of the EMF 22 International Scenarios. *Energy Econ.*, **31**, S64–S81,
7 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2009.10.013>.
- 8 Clarke, L. E., and Coauthors, 2014: Assessing transformation pathways. *Climate Change 2014:
9 Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report
10 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, R.P.-M. Edenhofer, O., S. Y. Sokona, E.
11 Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J.
12 Savolainen, and T.Z. and J.C.M. (eds. . Schlömer, C. von Stechow, Eds., Cambridge University
13 Press, 413–510.
- 14 Colenbrander, S., A. Sudmant, N. Chilundika, and A. Gouldson, 2019: The scope for low-carbon
15 development in Kigali, Rwanda: An economic appraisal. *Sustain. Dev.*, **27**, 349–365,
16 <https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.1906>.
- 17 Collins, M., and Coauthors, 2013: Long-term Climate Change: Projections, Commitments and
18 Irreversibility. *Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group
19 I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, T.F. Stocker
20 et al., Eds., Cambridge University Press, 1029–1136.
- 21 Crespo Cuaresma, J., 2017: Income projections for climate change research: A framework based on
22 human capital dynamics. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **42**, 226–236,
23 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.02.012>.
- 24 Creutzig, F., and Coauthors, 2014: Bioenergy and climate change mitigation: an assessment. *GCB
25 Bioenergy*, n/a--n/a, <https://doi.org/10.1111/gcbb.12205>.
- 26 —, P. Agoston, J. C. Goldschmidt, G. Luderer, G. Nemet, and R. C. Pietzcker, 2017: The
27 underestimated potential of solar energy to mitigate climate change. **2**, 17140.
- 28 —, and Coauthors, 2018: Towards demand-side solutions for mitigating climate change. *Nat. Clim.
29 Chang.*, **8**, 268–271, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0121-1>.
- 30 Csoknyai, T., S. Hrabovszky-Horváth, Z. Georgiev, M. Jovanovic-Popovic, B. Stankovic, O. Villatoro,
31 and G. Szendrő, 2016: Building stock characteristics and energy performance of residential
32 buildings in Eastern-European countries. *Energy Build.*, **132**, 39–52,
33 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2016.06.062>.
- 34 Curran, M. A., 2013: Life Cycle Assessment: a review of the methodology and its application to
35 sustainability. *Curr. Opin. Chem. Eng.*, **2**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.coche.2013.02.002>.
- 36 Daly, H. E., and B. Fais, 2014: UK TIMES Model. 1791–1798.
- 37 Daly, H. E., K. Ramea, A. Chiodi, S. Yeh, M. Gargiulo, and B. O. Gallachóir, 2014: Incorporating
38 travel behaviour and travel time into TIMES energy system models. *Appl. Energy*, **135**, 429–439,
39 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2014.08.051>.
- 40 Deetman, S., S. Marinova, E. van der Voet, D. P. van Vuuren, O. Edelenbosch, and R. Heijungs, 2020:
41 Modelling global material stocks and flows for residential and service sector buildings towards
42 2050. *J. Clean. Prod.*, **245**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.118658>.
- 43 Dellink, R., J. Chateau, E. Lanzi, and B. Magné, 2017: Long-term economic growth projections in the
44 Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **42**, 200–214,
45 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.06.004>.
- 46 Deng, Y. Y., M. Haigh, W. Pouwels, L. Ramaekers, R. Brandsma, S. Schimschar, J. Grözinger, and D.
47 de Jager, 2015: Quantifying a realistic, worldwide wind and solar electricity supply. *Glob.*

- 1 *Environ. Chang.*, **31**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.01.005>.
- 2 Department of Environmental Affairs, 2014: *South Africa's Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Mitigation*
3 *Potential Analysis*. 152 p. pp.
- 4 Després, J., 2015: Modelling the long-term deployment of electricity storage in the global energy
5 system. Université Grenoble Alpes, <https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01231455v1/document>
6 (Accessed December 19, 2020).
- 7 Dietrich, J. P., and Coauthors, 2019: MAgPIE 4 – a modular open-source framework for modeling
8 global land systems. *Geosci. Model Dev.*, **12**, 1299–1317, [https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-12-1299-](https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-12-1299-2019)
9 2019.
- 10 Dioha, M. O., N. V. Emodi, and E. C. Dioha, 2019: Pathways for low carbon Nigeria in 2050 by using
11 NECAL2050. *Renew. Energy Focus*, **29**, 63–77, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ref.2019.02.004>.
- 12 Dodds, P. E., I. Keppo, and N. Strachan, 2015: Characterising the Evolution of Energy System Models
13 Using Model Archaeology. *Environ. Model. Assess.*, **20**, 83–102, [https://doi.org/10.1007/s10666-](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10666-014-9417-3)
14 014-9417-3.
- 15 Doelman, J. C., E. Stehfest, A. Tabeau, and H. van Meijl, 2019: Making the Paris agreement climate
16 targets consistent with food security objectives. *Glob. Food Sec.*, **23**,
17 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2019.04.003>.
- 18 —, and Coauthors, 2020: Afforestation for climate change mitigation: Potentials, risks and trade-
19 offs. *Glob. Chang. Biol.*, **26**, 1576–1591, <https://doi.org/10.1111/GCB.14887>.
- 20 Drouet, L., and Coauthors, 2021: Net zero emission pathways reduce the physical and economic risks
21 of climate change. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **Accepted**, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01218-z>.
- 22 Duerinck, J., and Coauthors, 2008: *Assessment and improvement of methodologies used for Greenhouse*
23 *Gas projections*.
24 https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/strategies/2020/docs/assessing_methodologies_for_g
25 [hg_projections_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/strategies/2020/docs/assessing_methodologies_for_g_hg_projections_en.pdf) (Accessed December 22, 2020).
- 26 Duscha, V., J. Wachsmuth, J. Eckstein, and B. Pfluger, 2019: *GHG-neutral EU2050 – a scenario of an*
27 *EU with net-zero greenhouse gas emissions and its implications*.
- 28 Dvorkin, Y., H. Pandžić, M. A. Ortega-Vazquez, and D. S. Kirschen, 2015: A hybrid stochastic/interval
29 approach to transmission-constrained unit commitment. *IEEE Trans. Power Syst.*, **30**, 621–631,
30 <https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2014.2331279>.
- 31 Earles, J. M., and A. Halog, 2011: Consequential life cycle assessment: a review. *Int. J. Life Cycle*
32 *Assess.*, **16**, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11367-011-0275-9>.
- 33 Edelenbosch, O., D. Rovelli, A. Levesque, and E. Al., 2021: Long term, cross country effects of
34 buildings insulation policies. *Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change*, **170**, 120887.
- 35 Edelenbosch, O. Y., and Coauthors, 2017a: Decomposing passenger transport futures: Comparing
36 results of global integrated assessment models. *Transp. Res. Part D Transp. Environ.*, **55**, 281–
37 293, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2016.07.003>.
- 38 —, and Coauthors, 2017b: Comparing projections of industrial energy demand and greenhouse gas
39 emissions in long-term energy models. *Energy*, **122**, 701–710,
40 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2017.01.017>.
- 41 Edenhofer, O., and M. Kowarsch, 2015: Cartography of pathways: A new model for environmental
42 policy assessments. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **51**, 56–64, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2015.03.017>.
- 43 Ellenbeck, S., and J. Lilliestam, 2019: How modelers construct energy costs: Discursive elements in
44 Energy System and Integrated Assessment Models. *Energy Res. Soc. Sci.*, **47**, 69–77,
45 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.08.021>.
- 46 Emmerling, J., and Coauthors, 2016: The WITCH 2016 Model - Documentation and Implementation

- 1 of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. *SSRN Electron. J.*,
2 <https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2800970>.
- 3 —, L. Drouet, K.-I. van der Wijst, D. van Vuuren, V. Bosetti, and M. Tavoni, 2019: The role of the
4 discount rate for emission pathways and negative emissions. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **14**, 104008,
5 <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/AB3CC9>.
- 6 Energetics, 2016: *Modelling and analysis of Australia's abatement opportunities*. 60 p. pp.
- 7 Eriksson, M., 2020: Afforestation and avoided deforestation in a multi-regional integrated assessment
8 model. *Ecol. Econ.*, **169**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.106452>.
- 9 Eureka, K., P. Sullivan, M. Gleason, D. Hettinger, D. Heimiller, and A. Lopez, 2017: An improved global
10 wind resource estimate for integrated assessment models. *Energy Econ.*, **64**,
11 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2016.11.015>.
- 12 Eyckmans, J., and H. Tulkens, 2003: Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the
13 climate change problem. *Resour. Energy Econ.*, **25**, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0928-](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0928-7655(03)00041-1)
14 [7655\(03\)00041-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0928-7655(03)00041-1).
- 15 Eyring, V., S. Bony, G. A. Meehl, C. Senior, B. Stevens, R. J. Stouffer, and K. E. Taylor, 2015:
16 Overview of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 6 (CMIP6) experimental design
17 and organisation. *Geosci. Model Dev. Discuss.*, **8**, 10539–10583, [https://doi.org/10.5194/gmdd-8-](https://doi.org/10.5194/gmdd-8-10539-2015)
18 [10539-2015](https://doi.org/10.5194/gmdd-8-10539-2015).
- 19 Fajardy, M., J. Morris, A. Gurgel, H. Herzog, N. Mac Dowell, and S. Paltsev, 2021: The economics of
20 bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) deployment in a 1.5 °C or 2 °C world. *Glob.*
21 *Environ. Chang.*, **68**, 102262, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2021.102262>.
- 22 Fattahi, A., J. Sijm, and A. Faaij, 2020: A systemic approach to analyze integrated energy system
23 modeling tools: A review of national models. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.*, **133**,
24 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2020.110195>.
- 25 Fazlollahi, S., P. Mandel, G. Becker, and F. Maréchal, 2012: Methods for multi-objective investment
26 and operating optimization of complex energy systems. *Energy*, **45**, 12–22,
27 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2012.02.046>.
- 28 Feijoo, F., and Coauthors, 2018: The future of natural gas infrastructure development in the United
29 states. *Appl. Energy*, **228**, 149–166, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.06.037>.
- 30 Filippi Oberegger, U., R. Perneti, and R. Lollini, 2020: Bottom-up building stock retrofit based on
31 levelized cost of saved energy. *Energy Build.*, **210**, 109757,
32 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2020.109757>.
- 33 Finnveden, G., and Coauthors, 2009: Recent developments in Life Cycle Assessment. *J. Environ.*
34 *Manage.*, **91**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2009.06.018>.
- 35 Fisch-Romito, V., and C. Guivarch, 2019: Transportation infrastructures in a low carbon world: An
36 evaluation of investment needs and their determinants. *Transp. Res. Part D Transp. Environ.*, **72**,
37 203–219, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2019.04.014>.
- 38 Fishman, T., N. Heeren, S. Pauliuk, P. Berrill, Q. Tu, P. Wolfram, and E. G. Hertwich, 2021: A
39 comprehensive set of global scenarios of housing, mobility, and material efficiency for material
40 cycles and energy systems modeling. *J. Ind. Ecol.*, **25**, 305–320,
41 <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.13122>.
- 42 Fleiter, T., M. Rehfeldt, A. Herbst, R. Elsland, A.-L. Klingler, P. Manz, and S. Eidelloth, 2018: A
43 methodology for bottom-up modelling of energy transitions in the industry sector: The
44 FORECAST model. *Energy Strateg. Rev.*, **22**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2018.09.005>.
- 45 Forster, P., and Coauthors, 2021: *The Earth's Energy Budget, Climate Feedbacks, and Climate*
46 *Sensitivity. In Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group*
47 *I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Masson-*

- 1 *Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, A. Pirani, S.L. Connors, C. Péan, S. Berger, N. Caud, Y. Chen, L. Goldfarb,*
2 *M.I. Gomis, M. Huang, K. Leitzell, E. Lonnoy, J.B.R. Matthews, T.K. Maycock, T. Waterfield, O.*
3 *Yelekçi, R. Yu, and B. Zhou (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press,.*
- 4 Fouré, J., and Coauthors, 2020: Macroeconomic drivers of baseline scenarios in dynamic CGE models:
5 review and guidelines proposal. *J. Glob. Econ. Anal.*, **5**, 28–62,
6 <https://doi.org/10.21642/jgea.050102af>.
- 7 Frame, B., J. Lawrence, A.-G. Ausseil, A. Reisinger, and A. Daigneault, 2018: Adapting global shared
8 socio-economic pathways for national and local scenarios. *Clim. Risk Manag.*, **21**, 39–51,
9 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2018.05.001>.
- 10 Frank, S., and Coauthors, 2017: Reducing greenhouse gas emissions in agriculture without
11 compromising food security? *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **12**, 105004, [https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-](https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa8c83)
12 [9326/aa8c83](https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa8c83).
- 13 —, and Coauthors, 2018: Structural change as a key component for agricultural non-CO2 mitigation
14 efforts. *Nat. Commun.*, **9**, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-03489-1>.
- 15 —, and Coauthors, 2019: Agricultural non-CO2 emission reduction potential in the context of the 1.5
16 °C target. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **9**, 66–72, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0358-8>.
- 17 —, and Coauthors, 2021: Land-based climate change mitigation potentials within the agenda for
18 sustainable development. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **16**, 024006, [https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-](https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ABC58A)
19 [9326/ABC58A](https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ABC58A).
- 20 Fricko, O., and Coauthors, 2017: The marker quantification of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 2:
21 A middle-of-the-road scenario for the 21st century. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **42**, 251–267,
22 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.06.004>.
- 23 Fripp, M., 2012: Switch: A Planning Tool for Power Systems with Large Shares of Intermittent
24 Renewable Energy. *Environ. Sci. Technol.*, **46**, <https://doi.org/10.1021/es204645c>.
- 25 Fujimori, S., T. Masui, and Y. Matsuoka, 2014: Development of a global computable general
26 equilibrium model coupled with detailed energy end-use technology. *Appl. Energy*, **128**,
27 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2014.04.074>.
- 28 —, and Coauthors, 2016: Will international emissions trading help achieve the objectives of the Paris
29 Agreement? *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **11**, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/11/10/104001>.
- 30 —, T. Hasegawa, T. Masui, K. Takahashi, D. S. Herran, H. Dai, Y. Hijioka, and M. Kainuma, 2017:
31 SSP3: AIM implementation of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **42**, 268–
32 [283, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.06.009](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.06.009).
- 33 —, —, J. Rogelj, X. Su, P. Havlik, V. Krey, K. Takahashi, and K. Riahi, 2018: Inclusive climate
34 change mitigation and food security policy under 1.5 °C climate goal. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **13**,
35 [074033, https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aad0f7](https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aad0f7).
- 36 —, and Coauthors, 2019a: A multi-model assessment of food security implications of climate change
37 mitigation. *Nat. Sustain.*, **2**, 386–396, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0286-2>.
- 38 —, J. Rogelj, V. Krey, and K. Riahi, 2019b: A new generation of emissions scenarios should cover
39 blind spots in the carbon budget space. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **9**, 798–800,
40 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0611-9>.
- 41 —, and Coauthors, 2020: Measuring the sustainable development implications of climate change
42 mitigation. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **15**, 85004, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ab9966>.
- 43 —, and Coauthors, 2021: A framework for national scenarios with varying emission reductions. *Nat.*
44 *Clim. Chang.*, **11**, 472–480, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01048-z>.
- 45 Fulton, L., P. Cazzola, and F. Cuenot, 2009: IEA Mobility Model (MoMo) and its use in the ETP 2008.
46 *Energy Policy*, **37**, 3758–3768, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.065>.

- 1 Fuso Nerini, F., I. Keppo, and N. Strachan, 2017: Myopic decision making in energy system
2 decarbonisation pathways. A UK case study. *Energy Strateg. Rev.*, **17**, 19–26,
3 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2017.06.001>.
- 4 Fuss, S., and Coauthors, 2014: Betting on negative emissions. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **4**, 850–853,
5 <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2392>.
- 6 —, and Coauthors, 2018: Negative emissions - Part 2: Costs, potentials and side effects. *Environ.*
7 *Res. Lett.*, **13**, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aabf9f>.
- 8 Gagnon, Peter, Margolis, Robert, Melius, Jennifer, Phillips, Saleb, Elmore, R., 2016: *Photovoltaic*
9 *Technical Potential in the United States: A Detailed Assessment*. 82 pp.
- 10 Gambhir, A., and Coauthors, 2017: The Contribution of Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gas Mitigation to
11 Achieving Long-Term Temperature Goals. *Energies*, **10**, <https://doi.org/10.3390/en10050602>.
- 12 —, I. Butnar, P. H. Li, P. Smith, and N. Strachan, 2019: A review of criticisms of integrated
13 assessment models and proposed approaches to address these, through the lens of BECCs.
14 *Energies*, **12**, <https://doi.org/10.3390/en12091747>.
- 15 Geels, F. W., F. Berkhout, and D. P. van Vuuren, 2016: Bridging analytical approaches for low-carbon
16 transitions. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **advance on**, 576–583, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2980>.
- 17 Gerbaulet, C., C. von Hirschhausen, C. Kemfert, C. Lorenz, and P. Y. Oei, 2019: European electricity
18 sector decarbonization under different levels of foresight. *Renew. Energy*, **141**, 973–987,
19 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2019.02.099>.
- 20 Giannousakis, A., J. Hilaire, G. F. Nemet, G. Luderer, R. C. Pietzcker, R. Rodrigues, L. Baumstark,
21 and E. Kriegler, 2021: How uncertainty in technology costs and carbon dioxide removal
22 availability affect climate mitigation pathways. *Energy*, **216**, 119253,
23 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.119253>.
- 24 Giarola, S., and Coauthors, 2021: Challenges in the harmonisation of global integrated assessment
25 models: A comprehensive methodology to reduce model response heterogeneity. *Sci. Total*
26 *Environ.*, **783**, 146861, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2021.146861>.
- 27 Gibon, T., A. Arvesen, and E. G. Hertwich, 2017: Life cycle assessment demonstrates environmental
28 co-benefits and trade-offs of low-carbon electricity supply options. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.*,
29 **76**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.03.078>.
- 30 Gidden, M. J., S. Fujimori, M. van den Berg, D. Klein, S. J. Smith, D. P. van Vuuren, and K. Riahi,
31 2018: A methodology and implementation of automated emissions harmonization for use in
32 Integrated Assessment Models. *Environ. Model. Softw.*, **105**, 187–200,
33 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2018.04.002>.
- 34 Gidden, M. J., and Coauthors, 2019: Global emissions pathways under different socioeconomic
35 scenarios for use in CMIP6: A dataset of harmonized emissions trajectories through the end of the
36 century. *Geosci. Model Dev.*, **12**, 1443–1475, <https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-12-1443-2019>.
- 37 Gillingham, K., W. Nordhaus, D. Anthoff, G. Blanford, V. Bosetti, P. Christensen, H. McJeon, and J.
38 Reilly, 2018: Modeling uncertainty in integrated assessment of climate change: A multimodel
39 comparison. *J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ.*, **5**, 791–826, <https://doi.org/10.1086/698910>.
- 40 Global Energy Monitor, 2021: Global Energy Monitor.
41 <https://doi.org/https://globalenergymonitor.org/>.
- 42 Gollier, C., 2013: *Pricing the Planet's Future: The Economics of Discounting in an Uncertain World*.
43 Princeton University Press,.
- 44 —, and J. K. Hammitt, 2014: The Long-Run Discount Rate Controversy. *Annu. Rev. Resour. Econ.*,
45 **6**, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-100913-012516>.
- 46 González-Mahecha, R. E., A. F. P. Lucena, R. Garaffa, R. F. C. Miranda, M. Chávez-Rodríguez, T.
47 Cruz, P. Bezerra, and R. Rathmann, 2019: Greenhouse gas mitigation potential and abatement

- 1 costs in the Brazilian residential sector. *Energy Build.*, **184**,
2 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2018.11.039>.
- 3 Gota, S., C. Huizenga, K. Peet, N. Medimorec, and S. Bakker, 2019: Decarbonising transport to achieve
4 Paris Agreement targets. *Energy Effic.*, **12**, 363–386, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-018-9671-3>.
- 5 Grande-Acosta, G. K., and J. M. Islas-Samperio, 2020: Boosting energy efficiency and solar energy
6 inside the residential, commercial, and public services sectors in Mexico. *Energies*, **13**,
7 <https://doi.org/10.3390/en13215601>.
- 8 Grant, N., A. Hawkes, T. Napp, and A. Gambhir, 2020: The appropriate use of reference scenarios in
9 mitigation analysis. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0826-9>.
- 10 Grassi, G., J. House, F. Dentener, S. Federici, M. Den Elzen, and J. Penman, 2017: The key role of
11 forests in meeting climate targets requires science for credible mitigation. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **7**,
12 220–226, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3227>.
- 13 —, and Coauthors, 2021: Critical adjustment of land mitigation pathways for assessing countries’
14 climate progress. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **11**, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01033-6>.
- 15 Griscom, B. W., and Coauthors, 2017: Natural climate solutions. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.*, **114**,
16 11645–11650, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1710465114>.
- 17 Grubler, A., and Coauthors, 2018: A low energy demand scenario for meeting the 1.5 °C target and
18 sustainable development goals without negative emission technologies. *Nat. Energy*, **3**, 515–527,
19 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-018-0172-6>.
- 20 Grübler, A., and N. Nakicenovic, 2001: Identifying dangers in an uncertain climate. *Nature*, **412**, 15,
21 <https://doi.org/10.1038/35083752>.
- 22 Guan, J., H. Tang, K. Wang, J. Yao, and S. Yang, 2020: A parallel multi-scenario learning method for
23 near-real-time power dispatch optimization. *Energy*, **202**,
24 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.117708>.
- 25 Guedes, F., A. Szklo, P. Rochedo, F. Lantz, L. Magalar, and E. M. V. Arroyo, 2019: Climate-energy-
26 water nexus in Brazilian oil refineries. *Int. J. Greenh. Gas Control*, **90**,
27 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijggc.2019.102815>.
- 28 Guinée, J. B., R. Heijungs, G. Huppes, A. Zamagni, P. Masoni, R. Buonamici, T. Ekvall, and T.
29 Rydberg, 2011: Life Cycle Assessment: Past, Present, and Future. *Environ. Sci. Technol.*, **45**,
30 <https://doi.org/10.1021/es101316v>.
- 31 Guivarch, C., and J. Rogelj, 2017: *Carbon price variations in 2°C scenarios explored*.
32 <http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/14685> (Accessed October 28, 2021).
- 33 Guivarch, C., R. Crassous, O. Sassi, and S. Hallegatte, 2011: The costs of climate policies in a second-
34 best world with labour market imperfections. *Clim. Policy*, **11**, 768–788,
35 <https://doi.org/10.3763/cpol.2009.0012>.
- 36 Guo, F., B. van Ruijven, B. Zakeri, V. Krey, and K. Riahi, 2021: Global Energy Interconnection: A
37 scenario analysis based on the MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM Model.
- 38 Gütschow, J., M. L. Jeffery, R. Gieseke, R. Gebel, D. Stevens, M. Krapp, and M. Rocha, 2016: The
39 PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series. *Earth Syst. Sci. Data*, **8**, 571–603,
40 <https://doi.org/10.5194/essd-8-571-2016>.
- 41 Hagelaar, G., 2001: Environmental supply chain management: using life cycle assessment to structure
42 supply chains. *Int. Food Agribus. Manag. Rev.*, **4**, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1096-7508\(02\)00068-](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1096-7508(02)00068-X)
43 X.
- 44 Hall, L. M. H., and A. R. Buckley, 2016: A review of energy systems models in the UK: Prevalent
45 usage and categorisation. *Appl. Energy*, **169**, 607–628,
46 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.02.044>.

- 1 Hall, P. J., and E. J. Bain, 2008: Energy-storage technologies and electricity generation. *Energy Policy*,
2 **36**, 4352–4355, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2008.09.037>.
- 3 Hammad, E., A. Farraj, and D. Kundur, 2019: On Effective Virtual Inertia of Storage-Based Distributed
4 Control for Transient Stability. *IEEE Trans. Smart Grid*, **10**, 327–336,
5 <https://doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2017.2738633>.
- 6 Hanaoka, T., and T. Masui, 2020: Exploring effective short-lived climate pollutant mitigation scenarios
7 by considering synergies and trade-offs of combinations of air pollutant measures and low carbon
8 measures towards the level of the 2 °C target in Asia. *Environ. Pollut.*, **261**,
9 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envpol.2019.113650>.
- 10 Hanes, R. J., and A. Carpenter, 2017: Evaluating opportunities to improve material and energy impacts
11 in commodity supply chains. *Environ. Syst. Decis.*, **37**, 6–12, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10669-016-9622-5>.
12
- 13 Hanna, R., and R. Gross, 2020: How do energy systems model and scenario studies explicitly represent
14 socio-economic, political and technological disruption and discontinuity? Implications for policy
15 and practitioners. *Energy Policy*, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111984>.
- 16 Hänsel, M. C., M. A. Drupp, D. J. A. Johansson, F. Nesje, C. Azar, M. C. Freeman, B. Groom, and T.
17 Sterner, 2020: Climate economics support for the UN climate targets. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **10**,
18 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0833-x>.
- 19 Hansen, K., C. Breyer, and H. Lund, 2019: Status and perspectives on 100% renewable energy systems.
20 *Energy*, **175**, 471–480, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2019.03.092>.
- 21 Hanssen, S. V., and Coauthors, 2019: Biomass residues as twenty-first century bioenergy feedstock—
22 a comparison of eight integrated assessment models. *Clim. Change*, **163**,
23 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02539-x>.
- 24 Hardt, L., and D. W. O'Neill, 2017: Ecological Macroeconomic Models: Assessing Current
25 Developments. *Ecol. Econ.*, **134**, 198–211, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.12.027>.
- 26 Harmsen, J. H. M., and Coauthors, 2019: Long-term marginal abatement cost curves of non-CO2
27 greenhouse gases. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **99**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2019.05.013>.
- 28 Harmsen, M., and Coauthors, 2020: The role of methane in future climate strategies: mitigation
29 potentials and climate impacts. *Clim. Change*, **163**, 1409–1425, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02437-2>.
30
- 31 —, and Coauthors, 2021: Integrated assessment model diagnostics: key indicators and model
32 evolution. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **16**, 54046, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abf964>.
- 33 Hartin, C. A., P. Patel, A. Schwarber, R. P. Link, and B. P. Bond-Lamberty, 2015: A simple object-
34 oriented and open-source model for scientific and policy analyses of the global climate system
35 Hector v1.0. *Geosci. Model Dev.*, **8**, 939–955, <https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-8-939-2015>.
- 36 Hasegawa, T., S. Fujimori, A. Ito, K. Takahashi, and T. Masui, 2017: Global land-use allocation model
37 linked to an integrated assessment model. *Sci. Total Environ.*, **580**, 787–796,
38 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2016.12.025>.
- 39 —, and Coauthors, 2018: Risk of increased food insecurity under stringent global climate change
40 mitigation policy. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **8**, 699–703, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0230-x>.
- 41 —, R. D. Sands, T. Brunelle, Y. Cui, S. Frank, S. Fujimori, and A. Popp, 2020: Food security under
42 high bioenergy demand toward long-term climate goals. *Clim. Change*, **163**,
43 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02838-8>.
- 44 —, and Coauthors, 2021: Land-based implications of early climate actions without global net-
45 negative emissions. *Nat. Sustain. 2021*, 1–8, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-021-00772-w>.
- 46 Havlík, P., and Coauthors, 2014: Climate change mitigation through livestock system transitions. *Proc.*
47 *Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.*, **111**, 3709–3714, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1308044111>.

- 1 Hawkins, T. R., B. Singh, G. Majeau-Bettez, and A. H. Strømman, 2013: Comparative Environmental
2 Life Cycle Assessment of Conventional and Electric Vehicles. *J. Ind. Ecol.*, **17**,
3 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2012.00532.x>.
- 4 Hejazi, M., and Coauthors, 2014: Long-term global water projections using six socioeconomic
5 scenarios in an integrated assessment modeling framework. *Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change*, **81**,
6 205–226.
- 7 Hejazi, M. I., and Coauthors, 2015: 21st century United States emissions mitigation could increase
8 water stress more than the climate change it is mitigating. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.*, **112**, 10635–
9 10640, <https://doi.org/10.1073/PNAS.1421675112>.
- 10 Hellweg, S., and L. Milà i Canals, 2014: Emerging approaches, challenges and opportunities in life
11 cycle assessment. *Science (80-.)*, **344**, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1248361>.
- 12 Herrendorf, B., R. Rogerson, and Á. Valentinyi, 2014: Growth and Structural Transformation.
13 *Handbook of Economic Growth*, Vol. 2 of, 855–941.
- 14 Hertwich, E., R. Lifset, S. Pauliuk, N. Heeren, and IRP, 2020: Resource Efficiency and Climate Change:
15 Material Efficiency Strategies for a Low-Carbon Future. *Hertwich, E., Lifset, R., Pauliuk, S.,*
16 *Heeren, N. A Rep. Int. Resour. Panel*, 1–2.
- 17 Hertwich, E. G., and J. K. Hammitt, 2001a: A decision-analytic framework for impact assessment. *Int.*
18 *J. Life Cycle Assess.*, **6**, <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02978787>.
- 19 —, and —, 2001b: A decision-analytic framework for impact assessment part I: LCA and decision
20 analysis. *Int. J. Life Cycle Assess.*, **6**, <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02977588>.
- 21 Heuberger, C. F., I. Staffell, N. Shah, and N. Mac Dowell, 2018: Impact of myopic decision-making
22 and disruptive events in power systems planning. *Nat. Energy*, **3**, 634–640,
23 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-018-0159-3>.
- 24 Ho, E., D. V. Budescu, V. Bosetti, D. P. van Vuuren, and K. Keller, 2019: Not all carbon dioxide
25 emission scenarios are equally likely: a subjective expert assessment. *Clim. Change*, **155**, 545–
26 561, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02500-y>.
- 27 Hoesly, R. M., and Coauthors, 2018: Historical (17502014) anthropogenic emissions of reactive gases
28 and aerosols from the Community Emissions Data System (CEDS). *Geosci. Model Dev.*, **11**, 369–
29 408, <https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-11-369-2018>.
- 30 Holden, P. B., and Coauthors, 2018: Climate–carbon cycle uncertainties and the Paris Agreement. *Nat.*
31 *Clim. Chang.* 2018 87, **8**, 609–613, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0197-7>.
- 32 Holz, C., L. S. Siegel, E. Johnston, A. P. Jones, and J. Sterman, 2018: Ratcheting ambition to limit
33 warming to 1.5 °C—trade-offs between emission reductions and carbon dioxide removal. *Environ.*
34 *Res. Lett.*, **13**, 064028, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/AAC0C1>.
- 35 Horváth, M., D. Kassai-Szoó, and T. Csoknyai, 2016: Solar energy potential of roofs on urban level
36 based on building typology. *Energy Build.*, **111**, 278–289,
37 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2015.11.031>.
- 38 Houghton, R. A., J. I. House, J. Pongratz, G. R. Van Der Werf, R. S. Defries, M. C. Hansen, C. Le
39 Quéré, and N. Ramankutty, 2012: Carbon emissions from land use and land-cover change.
40 *Biogeosciences*, **9**, 5125–5142, <https://doi.org/10.5194/bg-9-5125-2012>.
- 41 Howells, M., and Coauthors, 2013: Integrated analysis of climate change, land-use, energy and water
42 strategies. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **3**, 621–626, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1789>.
- 43 Humpenöder, F., and Coauthors, 2018: Large-scale bioenergy production: How to resolve sustainability
44 trade-offs? *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **13**, 024011, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa9e3b>.
- 45 —, K. Karstens, H. Lotze-Campen, J. Leifeld, L. Menichetti, A. Barthelmes, and A. Popp, 2020:
46 Peatland protection and restoration are key for climate change mitigation. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **15**,
47 <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abae2a>.

- 1 Huppmann, D., J. Rogelj, E. Kriegler, V. Krey, and K. Riahi, 2018: A new scenario resource for
2 integrated 1.5 °C research. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **8**, 1027, [https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0317-](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0317-4)
3 4.
- 4 Huppmann, D., and Coauthors, 2019: The MESSAGEix Integrated Assessment Model and the ix
5 modeling platform (ixmp): An open framework for integrated and cross-cutting analysis of energy,
6 climate, the environment, and sustainable development. *Environ. Model. Softw.*, **112**, 143–156,
7 <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ENVSOFT.2018.11.012>.
- 8 Hurtt, G. C., and Coauthors, 2020: Harmonization of global land use change and management for the
9 period 850–2100 (LUH2) for CMIP6. *Geosci. Model Dev.*, **13**, 5425–5464,
10 <https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-13-5425-2020>.
- 11 IEA, 2020a: *World Energy Model*. <https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-model> (Accessed
12 December 19, 2020).
- 13 —, 2020b: *Energy Technology Perspectives 2020*. [https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-](https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2020)
14 [perspectives-2020](https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2020) (Accessed December 19, 2020).
- 15 —, 2021: *Net Zero by 2050 – A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector*.
16 <https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050> (Accessed August 27, 2021).
- 17 IPCC, 1990: *Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment*. <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar1/wg1/>
18 (Accessed August 27, 2021).
- 19 —, 2000: *Special Report on Emissions Scenarios: A Special Report of Working Group III of the*
20 *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. N. Nakićenović and R. Swart, Eds. Cambridge
21 University Press, 612 pp. <http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/emission/index.php?idp=0>
22 (Accessed April 4, 2017).
- 23 —, 2019a: *2019 Refinement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories*.
24 [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/2019-refinement-to-the-2006-ipcc-guidelines-for-national-](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/2019-refinement-to-the-2006-ipcc-guidelines-for-national-greenhouse-gas-inventories/)
25 [greenhouse-gas-inventories/](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/2019-refinement-to-the-2006-ipcc-guidelines-for-national-greenhouse-gas-inventories/) (Accessed December 19, 2020).
- 26 —, 2019b: *Climate Change and Land. An IPCC Special Report on climate change, desertification,*
27 *land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in*
28 *terrestrial ecosystems*.
- 29 Iqbal, M., M. Azam, M. Naeem, A. S. Khwaja, and A. Anpalagan, 2014: Optimization classification,
30 algorithms and tools for renewable energy: A review. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.*, **39**, 640–654,
31 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2014.07.120>.
- 32 IRENA, 2020: *Global Renewables Outlook: Energy transformation 2050*. Edition: 2.
- 33 Iten R., Jakob M., Catenazzi G, Reiter U., Wunderlich A., S. D., 2017: *Auswirkungen eines subsidiären*
34 *Verbots fossiler Heizungen*.
- 35 Ivanova, D., J. Barrett, D. Wiedenhofer, B. Macura, M. Callaghan, and F. Creutzig, 2020: Quantifying
36 the potential for climate change mitigation of consumption options. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **15**,
37 <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ab8589>.
- 38 Iyer, G. C., L. E. Clarke, J. A. Edmonds, B. P. Flannery, N. E. Hultman, H. C. McJeon, and D. G.
39 Victor, 2015: Improved representation of investment decisions in assessments of CO2 mitigation.
40 *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **5**, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2553>.
- 41 Jewell, J., and Coauthors, 2018: Limited emission reductions from fuel subsidy removal except in
42 energy-exporting regions. *Nature*, **554**, 229–233, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nature25467>.
- 43 Jiang, L., and B. C. O'Neill, 2017: Global urbanization projections for the Shared Socioeconomic
44 Pathways. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **42**, 193–199, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.03.008>.
- 45 Jiang, R., J. Wang, and Y. Guan, 2012: Robust unit commitment with wind power and pumped storage
46 hydro. *IEEE Trans. Power Syst.*, **27**, 800–810, <https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2011.2169817>.

- 1 Jochem, P., J. J. Gómez Vilchez, A. Ensslen, J. Schäuble, and W. Fichtner, 2018: Methods for
2 forecasting the market penetration of electric drivetrains in the passenger car market. *Transp. Rev.*,
3 **38**, 322–348, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01441647.2017.1326538>.
- 4 ———, E. Szimba, and M. Reuter-Oppermann, 2019: How many fast-charging stations do we need along
5 European highways? *Transp. Res. Part D Transp. Environ.*, **73**,
6 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2019.06.005>.
- 7 Johansson, D. J. A., C. Azar, M. Lehtveer, and G. P. Peters, 2020: The role of negative carbon emissions
8 in reaching the Paris climate targets: The impact of target formulation in integrated assessment
9 models. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **In press**, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abc3f0>.
- 10 Johnson, N., and Coauthors, 2019: Integrated Solutions for the Water-Energy-Land Nexus: Are Global
11 Models Rising to the Challenge? *Water*, **11**, 2223, <https://doi.org/10.3390/w11112223>.
- 12 Jones, B., and B. C. O'Neill, 2016: Spatially explicit global population scenarios consistent with the
13 Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **11**, 84003, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/11/8/084003>.
- 15 Kamal, A., S. G. Al-Ghamdi, and M. Koç, 2019: Role of energy efficiency policies on energy
16 consumption and CO2 emissions for building stock in Qatar. *J. Clean. Prod.*, **235**, 1409–1424,
17 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.06.296>.
- 18 Kc, S., and W. Lutz, 2017: The human core of the shared socioeconomic pathways: Population
19 scenarios by age, sex and level of education for all countries to 2100. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **42**,
20 181–192, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.06.004>.
- 21 Keppo, I., and M. Strubegger, 2010: Short term decisions for long term problems - The effect of
22 foresight on model based energy systems analysis. *Energy*, **35**, 2033–2042,
23 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2010.01.019>.
- 24 ———, and Coauthors, 2021: Exploring the possibility space: Taking stock of the diverse capabilities and
25 gaps in integrated assessment models. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **16**, 053006.
- 26 Keramidas, K., A. Kitous, J. Després, and A. Schmitz, 2017: *POLES-JRC Model Documentation*.
27 <https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC107387/kjna28728enn.pdf>
28 (Accessed October 29, 2021).
- 29 Khalili, S., E. Rantanen, D. Bogdanov, and C. Breyer, 2019: Global transportation demand development
30 with impacts on the energy demand and greenhouse gas emissions in a climate-constrained world.
31 *Energies*, **12**, <https://doi.org/10.3390/en12203870>.
- 32 Khan, M. M. A., M. Asif, and E. Stach, 2017: Rooftop PV potential in the residential sector of the
33 kingdom of Saudi Arabia. *Buildings*, **7**, <https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings7020046>.
- 34 Kikstra, J. S., and Coauthors, 2021a: Climate mitigation scenarios with persistent COVID-19-related
35 energy demand changes. *Nat. Energy 2021*, 1–10, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-021-00904-8>.
- 36 ———, A. Mastrucci, J. Min, K. Riahi, and N. D. Rao, 2021b: Decent living gaps and energy needs
37 around the world. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **16**, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ac1c27>.
- 38 Kikstra, J. S., P. Waidelich, J. Rising, D. Yumashev, C. Hope, and C. M. Brierley, 2021c: The social
39 cost of carbon dioxide under climate-economy feedbacks and temperature variability. *Environ.*
40 *Res. Lett.*, **16**, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ac1d0b>.
- 41 Klimont, Z., K. Kupiainen, C. Heyes, P. Purohit, J. Cofala, P. Rafaj, J. Borken-Kleefeld, and W. Schöpp,
42 2017: Global anthropogenic emissions of particulate matter including black carbon. *Atmos. Chem.*
43 *Phys.*, **17**, 8681–8723, <https://doi.org/10.5194/ACP-17-8681-2017>.
- 44 Kober, T., H. W. Schiffer, M. Densing, and E. Panos, 2020: Global energy perspectives to 2060 –
45 WEC's World Energy Scenarios 2019. *Energy Strateg. Rev.*, **31**, 100523,
46 <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ESR.2020.100523>.
- 47 Kodjak, D., and D. Meszler, 2019: *Prospects for fuel efficiency, electrification and fleet*

- 1 *decarbonisation*. 31 pp. <https://www.globalfueleconomy.org/>.
- 2 Kok, K., S. Pedde, M. Gramberger, P. A. Harrison, and I. P. Holman, 2019: New European socio-
3 economic scenarios for climate change research: operationalising concepts to extend the shared
4 socio-economic pathways. *Reg. Environ. Chang.*, **19**, 643–654, [https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-018-1400-0)
5 018-1400-0.
- 6 Kowarsch, M., and Coauthors, 2017: A road map for global environmental assessments. *Nat. Clim.*
7 *Chang.*, **7**, 379–382, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3307>.
- 8 Krarti, M., 2019: Evaluation of Energy Efficiency Potential for the Building Sector in the Arab Region.
9 *Energies*, **12**, 4279, <https://doi.org/10.3390/en12224279>.
- 10 —, F. Ali, A. Alaidroos, and M. Houchati, 2017: Macro-economic benefit analysis of large scale
11 building energy efficiency programs in Qatar. *Int. J. Sustain. Built Environ.*, **6**, 597–609,
12 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijse.2017.12.006>.
- 13 Kreidenweis, U., F. Humpenöder, M. Stevanović, B. L. Bodirsky, E. Kriegler, H. Lotze-Campen, and
14 A. Popp, 2016: Afforestation to mitigate climate change: Impacts on food prices under
15 consideration of albedo effects. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **11**, 85001, [https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-](https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/11/8/085001)
16 9326/11/8/085001.
- 17 Krey, V., 2014: Global energy-climate scenarios and models: a review. *Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Energy*
18 *Environ.*, **3**, 363–383, <https://doi.org/10.1002/wene.98>.
- 19 —, and K. Riahi, 2013: Risk hedging strategies under energy system and climate policy uncertainties.
20 *Int. Ser. Oper. Res. Manag. Sci.*, **199**, 435–474, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-9035-7_17.
- 21 Krey, V., and Coauthors, 2014: Annex II: Metrics & Methodology. *Climate Change 2014: Mitigation*
22 *of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the*
23 *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, O. Edenhofer et al., Eds., Cambridge University
24 Press.
- 25 Krey, V., and Coauthors, 2016: *MESSAGE-GLOBIOM 1.0 Documentation*.
26 <http://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/message-globiom/> (Accessed December 19, 2020).
- 27 Krey, V., and Coauthors, 2019: Looking under the hood: A comparison of techno-economic
28 assumptions across national and global integrated assessment models. *Energy*, **172**, 1254–1267,
29 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2018.12.131>.
- 30 Kriegler, E., B. C. O’Neill, S. Hallegatte, T. Kram, R. J. Lempert, R. H. Moss, and T. Wilbanks, 2012:
31 The need for and use of socio-economic scenarios for climate change analysis: A new approach
32 based on shared socio-economic pathways. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **22**, 807–822,
33 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.05.005>.
- 34 —, and Coauthors, 2014a: The role of technology for achieving climate policy objectives: Overview
35 of the EMF 27 study on global technology and climate policy strategies. *Clim. Change*, **123**, 353–
36 367, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0953-7>.
- 37 Kriegler, E., and Coauthors, 2014b: What does the 2°C target imply for a global climate agreement in
38 2020? The limits study on Durban Platform scenarios. *Clim. Chang. Econ.*, **4**,
39 <https://doi.org/10.1142/S2010007813400083>.
- 40 Kriegler, E., J. Edmonds, S. Hallegatte, K. L. Ebi, T. Kram, K. Riahi, H. Winkler, and D. P. van Vuuren,
41 2014c: A new scenario framework for climate change research: The concept of shared climate
42 policy assumptions. *Clim. Change*, **122**, 401–414, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0971-5>.
- 43 —, and Coauthors, 2015a: Diagnostic indicators for integrated assessment models of climate policy.
44 *Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change*, **90**, 45–61, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.09.020>.
- 45 —, and Coauthors, 2015b: Making or breaking climate targets: The AMPERE study on staged
46 accession scenarios for climate policy. *Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change*, **90**, 24–44,
47 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.09.021>.

- 1 —, and Coauthors, 2016: Will economic growth and fossil fuel scarcity help or hinder climate
2 stabilization?: Overview of the RoSE multi-model study. *Clim. Change*, **136**, 7–22,
3 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-016-1668-3>.
- 4 Kriegler, E., and Coauthors, 2017: Fossil-fueled development (SSP5): An energy and resource intensive
5 scenario for the 21st century. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **42**, 297–315,
6 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.05.015>.
- 7 Kriegler, E., and Coauthors, 2018a: Pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C: A tale of turning around in
8 no time? *Philos. Trans. R. Soc. A Math. Phys. Eng. Sci.*, **376**,
9 <https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2016.0457>.
- 10 —, and Coauthors, 2018b: Short term policies to keep the door open for Paris climate goals. *Environ.*
11 *Res. Lett.*, **13**, 74022, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aac4f1>.
- 12 Kriegler, E., D. Messner, N. Nakicenovic, K. Riahi, J. Rockström, J. Sachs, S. van der Leeuw, and D.
13 P. van Vuuren, 2018c: *Transformations to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals - Report*
14 *prepared by The World in 2050 initiative*. 157 pp.
- 15 Kuhnenn, K., L. Costa, E. Mahnke, L. Schneider, and S. Lange, 2020: A Societal Transformation
16 Scenario for Staying Below 1.5°C. *Publ. Ser. Econ. Soc. Issues*, **23**, 100.
- 17 Kuramochi, T., M. den Elzen, and G. P. Peters, 2020: *Global emissions trends and G20 status and*
18 *outlook*. In: *Emissions Gap Report 2020*.
19 [https://wedocs.unep.org/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/34428/EGR20ch2.pdf?sequence=](https://wedocs.unep.org/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/34428/EGR20ch2.pdf?sequence=3)
20 [3](https://wedocs.unep.org/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/34428/EGR20ch2.pdf?sequence=3) (Accessed December 19, 2020).
- 21 Kusumadewi, T. V., and B. Limmeechokchai, 2015: Energy Efficiency Improvement and CO2
22 Mitigation in Residential Sector: Comparison between Indonesia and Thailand. *Energy Procedia*,
23 **79**, 994–1000, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egypro.2015.11.599>.
- 24 —, and —, 2017: CO2 Mitigation in Residential Sector in Indonesia and Thailand: Potential of
25 Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency. *Energy Procedia*, **138**, 955–960,
26 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egypro.2017.10.086>.
- 27 Kwag, B. C., B. M. Adamu, and M. Krarti, 2019: Analysis of high-energy performance residences in
28 Nigeria. *Energy Effic.*, **12**, 681–695, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-018-9675-z>.
- 29 de la Rue du Can, S., D. Pudleiner, and K. Pielli, 2018: Energy efficiency as a means to expand energy
30 access: A Uganda roadmap. *Energy Policy*, **120**, 354–364,
31 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.05.045>.
- 32 —, A. Khandekar, N. Abhyankar, A. Phadke, N. Z. Khanna, D. Fridley, and N. Zhou, 2019: Modeling
33 India's energy future using a bottom-up approach. *Appl. Energy*, **238**,
34 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.01.065>.
- 35 Lam, A., and J.-F. Mercure, 2021: Which policy mixes are best for decarbonising passenger cars?
36 Simulating interactions among taxes, subsidies and regulations for the United Kingdom, the
37 United States, Japan, China, and India. *Energy Res. Soc. Sci.*, **75**, 101951,
38 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.101951>.
- 39 Lamboll, R. D., Z. R. J. Nicholls, J. S. Kikstra, M. Meinshausen, and J. Rogelj, 2020: Silicone v1.0.0:
40 an open-source Python package for inferring missingemissions data for climate change research.
41 *Geosci. Model Dev.*, **13**, 5259–5275, <https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-13-5259-2020>.
- 42 von Lampe, M., and Coauthors, 2014: Why do global long-term scenarios for agriculture differ? An
43 overview of the AgMIP Global Economic Model Intercomparison. *Agric. Econ.*, **45**,
44 <https://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12086>.
- 45 Lauri, P., N. Forsell, A. Korosuo, P. Havlík, M. Obersteiner, and A. Nordin, 2017: Impact of the 2 °C
46 target on global woody biomass use. *For. Policy Econ.*, **83**,
47 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2017.07.005>.

- 1 Leclère, D., and Coauthors, 2020: Bending the curve of terrestrial biodiversity needs an integrated
2 strategy. *Nature*, **585**, 551–556, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2705-y>.
- 3 Leggett, J., W. J. Pepper, R. J. Swart, J. Edmonds, L. G. Meira Filho, I. Mintzer, M. X. Wang, and J.
4 Wasson, 1992: Emissions scenarios for the IPCC: an update. *Climate change 1992: The*
5 *Supplementary Report to the IPCC Scientific Assessment*, J.T. Houghton, B.A. Callander, and S.K.
6 Varney, Eds., Cambridge University Press, 69–95.
- 7 Leimbach, M., and A. Giannousakis, 2019: Burden sharing of climate change mitigation: global and
8 regional challenges under shared socio-economic pathways. *Clim. Change*, **155**, 273–291,
9 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02469-8>.
- 10 —, E. Kriegler, N. Roming, and J. Schwanitz, 2017a: Future growth patterns of world regions - A
11 GDP scenario approach. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **42**, 215–225,
12 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.02.005>.
- 13 —, A. Schultes, L. Baumstark, A. Giannousakis, and G. Luderer, 2017b: Solution algorithms for
14 regional interactions in large-scale integrated assessment models of climate change. *Ann. Oper.*
15 *Res.*, **255**, 29–45, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2340-z>.
- 16 Lenton, T. M., J. Rockström, O. Gaffney, S. Rahmstorf, K. Richardson, W. Steffen, and H. J.
17 Schellnhuber, 2019: Climate tipping points — too risky to bet against. *Nature*, **575**,
18 <https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-019-03595-0>.
- 19 Lepault, C., and F. Lecocq, 2021: Mapping forward-looking mitigation studies at country level.
20 *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **16**, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ac0ac8>.
- 21 Lester, M. S., R. Bramstoft, and M. Münster, 2020: Analysis on Electrofuels in Future Energy Systems:
22 A 2050 Case Study. *Energy*, **199**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.117408>.
- 23 Levesque, A., R. C. Pietzcker, and G. Luderer, 2019: Halving energy demand from buildings: The
24 impact of low consumption practices. *Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change*, **146**, 253–266,
25 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2019.04.025>.
- 26 —, R. C. Pietzcker, L. Baumstark, and G. Luderer, 2021: Deep decarbonisation of buildings energy
27 services through demand and supply transformations in a 1.5°C scenario. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **16**,
28 054071, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ABDF07>.
- 29 Li, N., and Coauthors, 2019: Air Quality Improvement Co-benefits of Low-Carbon Pathways toward
30 Well below the 2 °c Climate Target in China. *Environ. Sci. Technol.*, **53**, 5576–5584,
31 <https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.8b06948>.
- 32 Linton, C., S. Grant-Muller, and W. F. Gale, 2015: Approaches and Techniques for Modelling CO2
33 Emissions from Road Transport. *Transp. Rev.*, **35**, 533–553,
34 <https://doi.org/10.1080/01441647.2015.1030004>.
- 35 Liu, J., D. Yang, W. Yao, R. Fang, H. Zhao, and B. Wang, 2017: PV-based virtual synchronous
36 generator with variable inertia to enhance power system transient stability utilizing the energy
37 storage system. *Prot. Control Mod. Power Syst.*, **2**, <https://doi.org/10.1186/s41601-017-0070-0>.
- 38 Löffler, K., K. Hainsch, T. Burandt, P. Y. Oei, C. Kemfert, and C. Von Hirschhausen, 2017: Designing
39 a model for the global energy system-GENeSYS-MOD: An application of the Open-Source
40 Energy Modeling System (OSeMOSYS). *Energies*, **10**, 1468,
41 <https://doi.org/10.3390/en10101468>.
- 42 —, T. Burandt, K. Hainsch, and P. Y. Oei, 2019: Modeling the low-carbon transition of the European
43 energy system - A quantitative assessment of the stranded assets problem. *Energy Strateg. Rev.*,
44 **26**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2019.100422>.
- 45 Löschel, A., 2002: Technological change in economic models of environmental policy: A survey. *Ecol.*
46 *Econ.*, **43**, 105–126, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009\(02\)00209-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8009(02)00209-4).
- 47 Lucas, P. L., D. P. van Vuuren, J. G. J. Olivier, and M. G. J. den Elzen, 2007: Long-term reduction

- 1 potential of non-CO₂ greenhouse gases. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **10**, 85–103,
2 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2006.10.007>.
- 3 Lucena, A. F. P., and Coauthors, 2016: Climate Policy Scenarios in Brazil: A Multi-Model Comparison
4 for Energy. *Energy Econ.*, **56**, 564–574, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2015.02.005>.
- 5 Luderer, G., V. Bosetti, M. Jakob, M. Leimbach, J. C. Steckel, H. Waisman, and O. Edenhofer, 2012:
6 The economics of decarbonizing the energy system—results and insights from the {RECIPE}
7 model intercomparison. *Clim. Change*, **114**, 9–37, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0105-x>.
- 8 Luderer, G., R. C. Pietzcker, C. Bertram, E. Kriegler, M. Meinshausen, and O. Edenhofer, 2013:
9 Economic mitigation challenges: How further delay closes the door for achieving climate targets.
10 *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **8**, 034033, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/8/3/034033>.
- 11 Luderer, G., and Coauthors, 2018: Residual fossil CO₂ emissions in 1.5–2 °C pathways. *Nat. Clim.*
12 *Chang.*, **8**, 626–633, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0198-6>.
- 13 ———, and Coauthors, 2021: Impact of declining renewable energy costs on electrification in low
14 emission scenarios. *Nat. Energy*, accepted, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-021-00937-z>.
- 15 Lund, H., F. Arler, P. A. Østergaard, F. Hvelplund, D. Connolly, B. V. Mathiesen, and P. Karnøe, 2017:
16 Simulation versus optimisation: Theoretical positions in energy system modelling. *Energies*, **10**,
17 <https://doi.org/10.3390/en10070840>.
- 18 Lund, P. D., J. Lindgren, J. Mikkola, and J. Salpakari, 2015: Review of energy system flexibility
19 measures to enable high levels of variable renewable electricity. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.*, **45**,
20 785–807, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.01.057>.
- 21 Marangoni, G., and Coauthors, 2017: Sensitivity of projected long-term CO₂ emissions across the
22 Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **7**, 113,
23 <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3199>.
- 24 Marcucci, A., S. Kypreos, and E. Panos, 2017: The road to achieving the long-term Paris targets: energy
25 transition and the role of direct air capture. *Clim. Chang. 2017 1442*, **144**, 181–193,
26 <https://doi.org/10.1007/S10584-017-2051-8>.
- 27 Markard, J., N. Bento, N. Kittner, and A. Nuñez-Jimenez, 2020: Destined for decline? Examining
28 nuclear energy from a technological innovation systems perspective. *Energy Res. Soc. Sci.*, **67**,
29 101512, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101512>.
- 30 Markewitz, P., P. Hansen, W. Kuckshinrichs, and J. F. Hake, 2015: Strategies for a low carbon building
31 stock in Germany. *8th International Scientific Conference on Energy and Climate Change*.
- 32 Markovic, U., Z. Chu, P. Aristidou, and G. Hug, 2019: LQR-Based Adaptive Virtual Synchronous
33 Machine for Power Systems With High Inverter Penetration. *IEEE Trans. Sustain. Energy*, **10**,
34 1501–1512, <https://doi.org/10.1109/TSTE.2018.2887147>.
- 35 van Marle, M. J. E., and Coauthors, 2017: Historic global biomass burning emissions for CMIP6
36 (BB4CMIP) based on merging satellite observations with proxies and fire models (17502015).
37 *Geosci. Model Dev.*, **10**, 3329–3357, <https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-10-3329-2017>.
- 38 Marquardt, S. G., and Coauthors, 2021: Identifying regional drivers of future land-based biodiversity
39 footprints. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **69**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2021.102304>.
- 40 Material Economics, 2019: *Industrial Transformation 2050 - Pathways to Net-Zero Emissions from EU*
41 *Heavy Industry*. [https://materialeconomics.com/material-economics-industrial-transformation-](https://materialeconomics.com/material-economics-industrial-transformation-2050.pdf?cms_fileid=303ee49891120acc9ea3d13bbd498d13)
42 [2050.pdf?cms_fileid=303ee49891120acc9ea3d13bbd498d13](https://materialeconomics.com/material-economics-industrial-transformation-2050.pdf?cms_fileid=303ee49891120acc9ea3d13bbd498d13) (Accessed December 19, 2020).
- 43 Mbow, C., and Coauthors, 2019: *Food Security*. In: *Climate Change and Land: an IPCC special report*
44 *on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security,*
45 *and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems*.
46 <https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/4/2020/02/SRCCL-Chapter-5.pdf> (Accessed
47 December 19, 2020).

- 1 McCollum, D. L., V. Krey, and K. Riahi, 2011: An integrated approach to energy sustainability. *Nat.*
2 *Clim. Chang.* 2011 19, **1**, 428–429, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1297>.
- 3 McCollum, D. L., V. Krey, K. Riahi, P. Kolp, A. Grubler, M. Makowski, and N. Nakicenovic, 2013:
4 Climate policies can help resolve energy security and air pollution challenges. *Clim. Change*, **119**,
5 479–494.
- 6 ———, J. Jewell, V. Krey, M. Bazilian, M. Fay, and K. Riahi, 2016: Quantifying uncertainties influencing
7 the long-term impacts of oil prices on energy markets and carbon emissions. *Nat. Energy*, **1**,
8 16077, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nenergy.2016.77>.
- 9 McCollum, D. L., and Coauthors, 2017: Improving the behavioral realism of global integrated
10 assessment models: An application to consumers' vehicle choices. *Transp. Res. Part D Transp.*
11 *Environ.*, **55**, 322–342, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2016.04.003>.
- 12 McCollum, D. L., and Coauthors, 2018: Energy investment needs for fulfilling the Paris Agreement
13 and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. *Nat. Energy*, **3**, 589–599,
14 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-018-0179-z>.
- 15 McJeon, H. C., L. Clarke, P. Kyle, M. Wise, A. Hackbarth, B. P. Bryant, and R. J. Lempert, 2011:
16 Technology interactions among low-carbon energy technologies: What can we learn from a large
17 number of scenarios? *Energy Econ.*, **33**, 619–631, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2010.10.007>.
- 18 Meibom, P., R. Barth, B. Hasche, H. Brand, C. Weber, and M. O'Malley, 2011: Stochastic optimization
19 model to study the operational impacts of high wind penetrations in Ireland. *IEEE Trans. Power*
20 *Syst.*, **26**, 1367–1379, <https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2010.2070848>.
- 21 Meinshausen, M., S. C. B. Raper, and T. M. L. Wigley, 2011: Emulating coupled atmosphere-ocean
22 and carbon cycle models with a simpler model, MAGICC6 – Part 1: Model description and
23 calibration. *Atmos. Chem. Phys.*, **11**, 1417–1456, <https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-11-1417-2011>.
- 24 Meinshausen, M., and Coauthors, 2017: Historical greenhouse gas concentrations for climate modelling
25 (CMIP6). *Geosci. Model Dev.*, **10**, <https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-10-2057-2017>.
- 26 Meinshausen, M., and Coauthors, 2020: The shared socio-economic pathway (SSP) greenhouse gas
27 concentrations and their extensions to 2500. *Geosci. Model Dev.*, **13**, 3571–3605,
28 <https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-13-3571-2020>.
- 29 Méjean, A., C. Guivarch, J. Lefèvre, and M. Hamdi-Cherif, 2019: The transition in energy demand
30 sectors to limit global warming to 1.5 °C. *Energy Effic. 2018* 122, **12**, 441–462,
31 <https://doi.org/10.1007/S12053-018-9682-0>.
- 32 de Melo, C. A., and G. de Martino Jannuzzi, 2015: Cost-effectiveness of CO2 emissions reduction
33 through energy efficiency in Brazilian building sector. *Energy Effic.*, **8**, 815–826,
34 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-014-9322-2>.
- 35 Mercure, J.-F., A. Lam, S. Billington, and H. Pollitt, 2018: Integrated assessment modelling as a
36 positive science: private passenger road transport policies to meet a climate target well below 2
37 °C. *Clim. Change*, **151**, 109–129, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2262-7>.
- 38 Mercure, J. F., F. Knobloch, H. Pollitt, L. Paroussos, S. S. Scricciu, and R. Lewney, 2019: Modelling
39 innovation and the macroeconomics of low-carbon transitions: theory, perspectives and practical
40 use. *Clim. Policy*, **19**, 1019–1037, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1617665>.
- 41 Merini, I., A. Molina-García, M. Socorro García-Cascales, M. Mahdaoui, and M. Ahachad, 2020:
42 Analysis and comparison of energy efficiency code requirements for buildings: A Morocco-Spain
43 case study. *Energies*, **13**, <https://doi.org/10.3390/en13225979>.
- 44 Messner, S., and L. Schrattenholzer, 2000: MESSAGE-MACRO: Linking an energy supply model with
45 a macroeconomic module and solving it iteratively. *Energy*, **25**, 267–282,
46 [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0360-5442\(99\)00063-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0360-5442(99)00063-8).
- 47 Millar, R. J., and Coauthors, 2017: Emission budgets and pathways consistent with limiting warming

- 1 to 1.5 °C. *Nat. Geosci.*, **10**, 741–747, <https://doi.org/10.1038/NGEO3031>.
- 2 Millward-Hopkins, J., J. K. Steinberger, N. D. Rao, and Y. Oswald, 2020: Providing decent living with
3 minimum energy: A global scenario. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **65**,
4 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2020.102168>.
- 5 Minami, S., T. M. Ayako, Y. Yohei, and S. Yoshiyuki, 2019: Required specification of residential end-
6 use energy demand model for application to national GHG mitigation policy making - Case study
7 for the Japanese plan for global warming countermeasures. *Build. Simul. Conf. Proc.*, **6**, 3706–
8 3713, <https://doi.org/10.26868/25222708.2019.211100>.
- 9 Minx, J. C., and Coauthors, 2018: Negative emissions—Part 1: Research landscape and synthesis.
10 *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **13**, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aabf9b>.
- 11 Mirasgedis, S., Y. Sarafidis, and E. Georgopoulou, 2017: *Long-term planning for the energy system of*
12 *Greece*.
- 13 Momonoki, T., A. Taniguchi-Matsuoka, Y. Yamaguchi, and Y. Shimoda, 2017: Evaluation of the
14 greenhouse gas reduction effect in the Japanese residential sector considering the characteristics
15 of regions and households. *Build. Simul. Conf. Proc.*, **1**, 494–501,
16 <https://doi.org/10.26868/25222708.2017.718>.
- 17 Monforti, F., T. Huld, K. Bódis, L. Vitali, M. D’Isidoro, and R. Lacal-Arántegui, 2014: Assessing
18 complementarity of wind and solar resources for energy production in Italy. A Monte Carlo
19 approach. *Renew. Energy*, **63**, 576–586, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2013.10.028>.
- 20 Moomaw, W., and Coauthors, 2011: Renewable Energy and Climate Change. *Renewable Energy*
21 *Sources and Climate Change Mitigation*, O. Edenhofer et al., Eds., Cambridge University Press,
22 161–208.
- 23 Morren, J., S. W. H. de Haan, W. L. Kling, and J. A. Ferreira, 2006: Wind turbines emulating inertia
24 and supporting primary frequency control. *IEEE Trans. Power Syst.*, **21**, 433–434,
25 <https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2005.861956>.
- 26 Morris, J., J. Farrell, H. Khesghi, H. Thomann, H. Chen, S. Paltsev, and H. Herzog, 2019: Representing
27 the costs of low-carbon power generation in multi-region multi-sector energy-economic models.
28 *Int. J. Greenh. Gas Control*, **87**, 170–187,
29 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijggc.2019.05.016>.
- 30 —, H. Khesghi, S. Paltsev, and H. Herzog, 2021: Scenarios for the deployment of carbon capture and
31 storage in the power sector in a portfolio of mitigation options. *Clim. Chang. Econ.*, **12**, 2150001,
32 <https://doi.org/10.1142/S2010007821500019>.
- 33 Mosnier, A., P. Havlík, M. Obersteiner, K. Aoki, E. Schmid, S. Fritz, I. McCallum, and S. Leduc, 2014:
34 Modeling Impact of Development Trajectories and a Global Agreement on Reducing Emissions
35 from Deforestation on Congo Basin Forests by 2030. *Environ. Resour. Econ.*, **57**, 505–525,
36 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-012-9618-7>.
- 37 Moss, R. H., and Coauthors, 2010: The next generation of scenarios for climate change research and
38 assessment. *Nature*, **463**, 747–756, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nature08823>.
- 39 Mouratiadou, I., and Coauthors, 2016: The impact of climate change mitigation on water demand for
40 energy and food: An integrated analysis based on the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. *Environ.*
41 *Sci. Policy*, **64**, 48–58, <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ENVSCI.2016.06.007>.
- 42 Müller-Casseres, E., O. Y. Edelenbosch, A. Szklo, R. Schaeffer, and D. P. van Vuuren, 2021: Global
43 futures of trade impacting the challenge to decarbonize the international shipping sector. *Energy*,
44 **237**, 121547, <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ENERGY.2021.121547>.
- 45 Muratori, M., and Coauthors, 2021: The rise of electric vehicles—2020 status and future expectations.
46 *Prog. Energy*, **3**, 022002, <https://doi.org/10.1088/2516-1083/abe0ad>.
- 47 Nadel, S., 2016: *Pathway to Cutting Energy Use and Carbon Emissions in Half*. 43 p. pp.

- 1 Napp, T., D. Bernie, R. Thomas, J. Lowe, A. Hawkes, and A. Gambhir, 2017: Exploring the feasibility
2 of low-carbon scenarios using historical energy transitions analysis. *Energies*, **10**,
3 <https://doi.org/10.3390/en10010116>.
- 4 Negawatt, 2017: *Scénario négaWatt : Un scénario de transition énergétique*. 4 p. pp.
- 5 NGFS, 2020: *NGFS climate scenarios for central banks and supervisors | Banque de France*.
6 <https://www.ngfs.net/en/ngfs-climate-scenarios-central-banks-and-supervisors> (Accessed
7 October 29, 2021).
- 8 —, 2021: *NGFS Climate Scenarios for central banks and supervisors | Banque de France*.
9 <https://www.ngfs.net/en/ngfs-climate-scenarios-central-banks-and-supervisors-june-2021>
10 (Accessed October 29, 2021).
- 11 Niamir, L., O. Ivanova, T. Filatova, A. Voinov, and H. Bressers, 2020: Demand-side solutions for
12 climate mitigation: Bottom-up drivers of household energy behavior change in the Netherlands
13 and Spain. *Energy Res. Soc. Sci.*, **62**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2019.101356>.
- 14 Nicholls, Z., J. Lewis, C. J. Smith, J. Kikstra, R. Gieseke, and S. Willner, 2020a: OpenSCM-Runner:
15 Thin wrapper to run simple climate models (emissions driven runs only). *GitHub Repos.*,.
- 16 Nicholls, Z., and Coauthors, 2021a: Reduced Complexity Model Intercomparison Project Phase 2:
17 Synthesizing Earth System Knowledge for Probabilistic Climate Projections. *Earth's Futur.*, **9**,
18 <https://doi.org/10.1029/2020EF001900>.
- 19 —, and Coauthors, 2021b: Reduced Complexity Model Intercomparison Project Phase 2:
20 Synthesizing Earth System Knowledge for Probabilistic Climate Projections. *Earth's Futur.*, **9**,
21 <https://doi.org/10.1029/2020EF001900>.
- 22 Nicholls, Z. R. J., and Coauthors, 2020b: Reduced Complexity Model Intercomparison Project Phase
23 1: introduction and evaluation of global-mean temperature response. *Geosci. Model Dev.*, **13**,
24 5175–5190, <https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-13-5175-2020>.
- 25 Nikas, A., and Coauthors, 2021: Where is the EU headed given its current climate policy? A
26 stakeholder-driven model inter-comparison. *Sci. Total Environ.*, **793**, 148549,
27 <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.SCITOTENV.2021.148549>.
- 28 Nogueira, L. A. H., G. M. Souza, L. A. B. Cortez, and C. H. de Brito Cruz, 2020: Biofuels for Transport.
29 *Future Energy*, Elsevier, 173–197.
- 30 Nordelöf, A., M. Messagie, A.-M. Tillman, M. Ljunggren Söderman, and J. Van Mierlo, 2014:
31 Environmental impacts of hybrid, plug-in hybrid, and battery electric vehicles—what can we learn
32 from life cycle assessment? *Int. J. Life Cycle Assess.*, **19**, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11367-014-0788-0>.
- 34 Nordhaus, W., 1993: Optimal greenhouse-gas reductions and tax policy in the DICE model. *Am. Econ.*
35 *Rev. (United States)*, **83**:2, 313–317.
- 36 Nordhaus, W., 2015: Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy. *Am.*
37 *Econ. Rev.*, **105**, <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.15000001>.
- 38 —, 2018: Evolution of modeling of the economics of global warming: changes in the DICE model,
39 1992–2017. *Clim. Change*, **148**, 623–640, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2218-y>.
- 40 Novikova, A., T. Csoknyai, M. J. Popović, B. Stanković, and Z. Szalay, 2018a: Assessment of
41 decarbonisation scenarios for the residential buildings of Serbia. *Therm. Sci.*, **2018**,
42 <https://doi.org/10.2298/TSCI171221229N>.
- 43 —, —, and Z. Szalay, 2018b: Low carbon scenarios for higher thermal comfort in the residential
44 building sector of South Eastern Europe. *Energy Effic.*, **11**, 845–875,
45 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-017-9604-6>.
- 46 NREL, 2020: Integrated Energy System Simulation. [https://www.nrel.gov/grid/integrated-energy-](https://www.nrel.gov/grid/integrated-energy-system-simulation.html)
47 [system-simulation.html](https://www.nrel.gov/grid/integrated-energy-system-simulation.html) (Accessed December 19, 2020).

- 1 O'Neill, B. C., E. Kriegler, K. Riahi, K. L. Ebi, S. Hallegatte, T. R. Carter, R. Mathur, and D. P. van
2 Vuuren, 2014: A new scenario framework for climate change research: The concept of shared
3 socioeconomic pathways. *Clim. Change*, **122**, 387–400, [https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0905-2)
4 0905-2.
- 5 —, and Coauthors, 2016: The Scenario Model Intercomparison Project (ScenarioMIP) for CMIP6.
6 *Geosci. Model Dev.*, **9**, 3461–3482, <https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-9-3461-2016>.
- 7 O'Neill, B. C., and Coauthors, 2017: The roads ahead: Narratives for shared socioeconomic pathways
8 describing world futures in the 21st century. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **42**, 169–180,
9 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.01.004>.
- 10 O'Neill, B. C., and Coauthors, 2020: Achievements and needs for the climate change scenario
11 framework. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **10**, 1074–1084, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-00952-0>.
- 12 Obersteiner, M., and Coauthors, 2016: Assessing the land resource–food price nexus of the Sustainable
13 Development Goals. *Sci. Adv.*, **2**, <https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.1501499>.
- 14 —, and Coauthors, 2018: How to spend a dwindling greenhouse gas budget. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **8**,
15 7–10, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-017-0045-1>.
- 16 Obi, M., S. M. Jensen, J. B. Ferris, and R. B. Bass, 2017: Calculation of levelized costs of electricity
17 for various electrical energy storage systems. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.*, **67**, 908–920,
18 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.09.043>.
- 19 OECD, 2021: Effective Carbon Rates 2021. [https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/effective-carbon-](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/effective-carbon-rates-2021_0e8e24f5-en)
20 rates-2021_0e8e24f5-en.
- 21 Olovsson, J., M. Taljegard, M. Von Bonin, N. Gerhardt, and F. Johnsson, 2021: Impacts of Electric
22 Road Systems on the German and Swedish Electricity Systems—An Energy System Model
23 Comparison. *Front. Energy Res.*, **9**, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fenrg.2021.631200>.
- 24 Oluleye, G., L. Vasquez, R. Smith, and M. Jobson, 2016: A multi-period Mixed Integer Linear Program
25 for design of residential distributed energy centres with thermal demand data discretisation.
26 *Sustain. Prod. Consum.*, **5**, 16–28, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spc.2015.11.003>.
- 27 —, J. Allison, N. Kelly, and A. D. Hawkes, 2018: An optimisation study on integrating and
28 incentivising Thermal Energy Storage (TES) in a dwelling energy system. *Energies*, **11**, 1–17,
29 <https://doi.org/10.3390/en11051095>.
- 30 Onyenokporo, N. C., and E. T. Ochedi, 2019: Low-cost retrofit packages for residential buildings in
31 hot-humid Lagos, Nigeria. *Int. J. Build. Pathol. Adapt.*, **37**, 250–272,
32 <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJBPA-01-2018-0010>.
- 33 Ostermeyer, Y.; Camarasa, C.; Naegeli, C.; Saraf, S.; Jakob, M.; Hamilton, I; Catenazzi, G., 2018:
34 *Building Market Brief. United Kingdom*. 70 p. pp.
- 35 Ostermeyer, Y.; Camarasa, C.; Saraf, S.; Naegeli, C.; Jakob, M.; Palacios, A, Catenazzi, G. L. D., 2018:
36 *Building Market Brief. France*. 70 p. pp.
- 37 Ostermeyer, Y., C. Camarasa, S. Saraf, C. Naegli, M. Jakob, H. Visscher, and A. Meijer, 2018: *Building*
38 *Market Brief. The Netherlands*. 70 p. pp.
- 39 —, and Coauthors, 2019a: *Building Market Brief. Poland*. 64–75 pp.
- 40 —, C. Camarasa, S. Saraf, C. Naegli, M. Jakob, J. Von Geibler, K. Bienge, and L. Hennes, 2019b:
41 *Building Market Brief. Germany*. 70 p. pp.
- 42 Ou, Y., and Coauthors, 2021: Deep mitigation of CO₂ and non-CO₂ greenhouse gases toward 1.5 °C
43 and 2 °C futures. *Nat. Commun.*, **12**, 6245, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-26509-z>.
- 44 Overmars, K. P., E. Stehfest, A. Tabeau, H. van Meijl, A. M. Beltrán, and T. Kram, 2014: Estimating
45 the opportunity costs of reducing carbon dioxide emissions via avoided deforestation, using
46 integrated assessment modelling. *Land use policy*, **41**, 45–60,

- 1 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.04.015>.
- 2 Paltsev, S., and P. Capros, 2013: Cost Concepts for Climate Change Mitigation. *Clim. Chang. Econ.*,
3 **04**, 1340003, <https://doi.org/10.1142/S2010007813400034>.
- 4 Paltsev, S., and Coauthors, 2021: *2021 Global Change Outlook: Charting the Earth's Future Energy,*
5 *Managed Resources, Climate, and Policy Prospects*. 52 pp.
- 6 Paltsev, S., A. Ghandi, J. Morris, and H. Chen, 2022: Global Electrification of Light-duty Vehicles:
7 Impacts of Economics and Climate Policy. *Energy J.*, **11**, in press, [https://doi.org/10.5547/2160-](https://doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.11.1.spal)
8 [5890.11.1.spal](https://doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.11.1.spal).
- 9 Pan, X., M. den Elzen, N. Höhne, F. Teng, and L. Wang, 2017: Exploring fair and ambitious mitigation
10 contributions under the Paris Agreement goals. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **74**, 49–56,
11 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.04.020>.
- 12 Papadopoulos, S., and E. Azar, 2016: Integrating building performance simulation in agent-based
13 modeling using regression surrogate models: A novel human-in-the-loop energy modeling
14 approach. *Energy Build.*, **128**, 214–223, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2016.06.079>.
- 15 Parkinson, S., and Coauthors, 2019: Balancing clean water-climate change mitigation trade-offs.
16 *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **14**, 14009.
- 17 Pastor, A. V., A. Palazzo, P. Havlik, H. Biemans, Y. Wada, M. Obersteiner, P. Kabat, and F. Ludwig,
18 2019: The global nexus of food–trade–water sustaining environmental flows by 2050. *Nat.*
19 *Sustain.*, **2**, 499–507, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0287-1>.
- 20 Pauliuk, S., and N. Heeren, 2021: Material efficiency and its contribution to climate change mitigation
21 in Germany: A deep decarbonization scenario analysis until 2060. *J. Ind. Ecol.*, **25**, 479–493,
22 <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.13091>.
- 23 —, A. Arvesen, K. Stadler, and E. G. Hertwich, 2017: Industrial ecology in integrated assessment
24 models. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **7**, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3148>.
- 25 —, T. Fishman, N. Heeren, P. Berrill, Q. Tu, P. Wolfram, and E. G. Hertwich, 2021a: Linking service
26 provision to material cycles: A new framework for studying the resource efficiency–climate
27 change (RECC) nexus. *J. Ind. Ecol.*, **25**, 260–273, <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.13023>.
- 28 —, N. Heeren, P. Berrill, T. Fishman, A. Nistad, Q. Tu, P. Wolfram, and E. G. Hertwich, 2021b:
29 Global scenarios of resource and emission savings from material efficiency in residential buildings
30 and cars. *Nat. Commun.*, **12**, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-25300-4>.
- 31 Paustian, K., J. Lehmann, S. Ogle, D. Reay, G. P. Robertson, and P. Smith, 2016: Climate-smart soils.
32 *Nature*, **532**, 49–57, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nature17174>.
- 33 Pehl, M., A. Arvesen, F. Humpenöder, A. Popp, E. G. Hertwich, and G. Luderer, 2017: Understanding
34 future emissions from low-carbon power systems by integration of life-cycle assessment and
35 integrated energy modelling. *Nat. Energy*, **2**, 939–945, [https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-017-0032-](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-017-0032-9)
36 [9](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-017-0032-9).
- 37 Peng, W., and Coauthors, 2021: Climate policy models need to get real about people — here's how.
38 *Nature*, **594**, 174–176, <https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-01500-2>.
- 39 Perdana, S. P., and Coauthors, 2020: A multi-model analysis of long-term emissions and warming
40 implications of current mitigation efforts. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*,
- 41 Pereira, L. M., and Coauthors, 2020: Developing multiscale and integrative nature–people scenarios
42 using the Nature Futures Framework. *People Nat.*, **2**, 1172–1195,
43 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/pan3.10146>.
- 44 Perez, M., R. Perez, K. R. Rábago, and M. Putnam, 2019: Overbuilding & curtailment: The cost-
45 effective enablers of firm PV generation. *Sol. Energy*, **180**, 412–422,
46 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.solener.2018.12.074>.

- 1 Peters, G. P., 2018: Beyond carbon budgets. *Nat. Geosci.*, **11**, 378–380, [https://doi.org/10.1038/s41561-](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41561-018-0142-4)
2 018-0142-4.
- 3 Pfenninger, S., and B. Pickering, 2018: Calliope: a multi-scale energy systems modelling framework.
4 *J. Open Source Softw.*, **3**, 825, <https://doi.org/10.21105/joss.00825>.
- 5 ———, A. Hawkes, and J. Keirstead, 2014: Energy systems modeling for twenty-first century energy
6 challenges. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.*, **33**, 74–86, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2014.02.003>.
- 7 Pietzcker, R. C., and Coauthors, 2017: System integration of wind and solar power in integrated
8 assessment models: A cross-model evaluation of new approaches. *Energy Econ.*, **64**, 583–599,
9 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2016.11.018>.
- 10 Pindyck, R. S., 2013: Climate change policy: What do the models tell us? *J. Econ. Lit.*, **51**, 860–872,
11 <https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.51.3.860>.
- 12 ———, 2017: The use and misuse of models for climate policy. *Rev. Environ. Econ. Policy*, **11**, 100–114,
13 <https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rew012>.
- 14 Piontek, F., M. Kalkuhl, E. Kriegler, A. Schultes, M. Leimbach, O. Edenhofer, and N. Bauer, 2018:
15 Economic Growth Effects of Alternative Climate Change Impact Channels in Economic
16 Modeling. *Environ. Resour. Econ.*, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-018-00306-7>.
- 17 Plevin, R. J., M. A. Delucchi, and F. Creutzig, 2014: Using Attributional Life Cycle Assessment to
18 Estimate Climate-Change Mitigation Benefits Misleads Policy Makers. *J. Ind. Ecol.*, **18**,
19 <https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.12074>.
- 20 Ploss, M., T. Hatt, C. Schneider, T. Roskopf, and M. Braun, 2017: *Modellvorhaben „KliNaWo“*.
21 *Klimagerechter Nachhaltiger Wohnbau*.
- 22 Polasky, S., and N. K. Dampha, 2021: Discounting and Global Environmental Change. *Annu. Rev.*
23 *Environ. Resour.*, **46**, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-020420-042100>.
- 24 Pongratz, J., C. H. Reick, R. A. Houghton, and J. I. House, 2014: Terminology as a key uncertainty in
25 net land use and land cover change carbon flux estimates. *Earth Syst. Dyn.*, **5**, 177–195,
26 <https://doi.org/10.5194/esd-5-177-2014>.
- 27 Popp, A., H. Lotze-Campen, and B. Bodirsky, 2010: Food consumption, diet shifts and associated non-
28 CO₂ greenhouse gases from agricultural production. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **20**, 451–462,
29 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.02.001>.
- 30 ———, and Coauthors, 2014a: Land-use transition for bioenergy and climate stabilization: Model
31 comparison of drivers, impacts and interactions with other land use based mitigation options.
32 *Clim. Change*, **123**, 495–509, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0926-x>.
- 33 ———, and Coauthors, 2014b: Land-use protection for climate change mitigation. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **4**,
34 1095–1098, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2444>.
- 35 ———, and Coauthors, 2017: Land-use futures in the shared socio-economic pathways. *Glob. Environ.*
36 *Chang.*, **42**, 331–345, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.10.002>.
- 37 Portugal-Pereira, J., J. Nakatani, K. H. Kurisu, and K. Hanaki, 2015: Comparative energy and
38 environmental analysis of Jatropha bioelectricity versus biodiesel production in remote areas.
39 *Energy*, **83**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2015.02.022>.
- 40 ———, A. C. Köberle, R. Soria, A. F. P. Lucena, A. Szklo, and R. Schaeffer, 2016: Overlooked impacts
41 of electricity expansion optimisation modelling: The life cycle side of the story. *Energy*, **115**,
42 1424–1435, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2016.03.062>.
- 43 ———, A. Koberle, A. F. P. Lucena, P. R. R. Rochedo, M. Império, A. M. Carsalade, R. Schaeffer, and
44 P. Rafaj, 2018: Interactions between global climate change strategies and local air pollution:
45 lessons learnt from the expansion of the power sector in Brazil. *Clim. Change*, **148**, 293–309,
46 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2193-3>.

- 1 Prada-hernández, A., H. Vargas, A. Ozuna, and J. L. Ponz-tienda, 2015: Marginal Abatement Costs
2 Curve (MACC) for Carbon Emissions Reduction from Buildings : An Implementation for Office
3 Buildings in Colombia of Carbon Emissions from. 175–183.
- 4 Prina, M. G., G. Manzolini, D. Moser, B. Nastasi, and W. Sparber, 2020: Classification and challenges
5 of bottom-up energy system models - A review. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.*, **129**,
6 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2020.109917>.
- 7 Prussi, M., and Coauthors, 2021: CORSIA: The first internationally adopted approach to calculate life-
8 cycle GHG emissions for aviation fuels. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.*, **150**,
9 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2021.111398>.
- 10 Quéré, C. Le, and Coauthors, 2016: Global Carbon Budget 2016. *Earth Syst. Sci. Data*, **8**, 605–649,
11 <https://doi.org/10.5194/essd-8-605-2016>.
- 12 Radpour, S., M. A. Hossain Mondal, and A. Kumar, 2017: Market penetration modeling of high energy
13 efficiency appliances in the residential sector. *Energy*, **134**, 951–961,
14 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2017.06.039>.
- 15 Rajão, R., and Coauthors, 2020: The rotten apples of Brazil’s agribusiness. *Science (80-.)*, **369**, 246–
16 248, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aba6646>.
- 17 Ramsey, F. P., 1928: A Mathematical Theory of Saving. *Econ. J.*, **38**, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2224098>.
- 18 Rao, N. D., B. J. Van Ruijven, K. Riahi, and V. Bosetti, 2017a: Improving poverty and inequality
19 modelling in climate research. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **7**, 857–862, [https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-017-0004-x)
20 017-0004-x.
- 21 Rao, N. D., P. Sauer, M. Gidden, and K. Riahi, 2019: Income inequality projections for the Shared
22 Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs). *Futures*, **105**, 27–39,
23 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2018.07.001>.
- 24 Rao, S., S. Pachauri, F. Dentener, P. Kinney, Z. Klimont, K. Riahi, and W. Schoepp, 2013: Better air
25 for better health: Forging synergies in policies for energy access, climate change and air pollution.
26 *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **23**, 1122–1130, <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GLOENVCHA.2013.05.003>.
- 27 Rao, S., and Coauthors, 2017b: Future air pollution in the Shared Socio-economic Pathways. *Glob.*
28 *Environ. Chang.*, **42**, 346–358, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.05.012>.
- 29 Realmonte, G., L. Drouet, A. Gambhir, J. Glynn, A. C. Köberle, M. Tavoni, and A. Hawkes, 2019: An
30 inter-model assessment of the role of direct air capture in deep mitigation pathways. *Nat.*
31 *Commun.*, **10**, 1–12, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-10842-5>.
- 32 Rebitzer, G., and Coauthors, 2004: Life cycle assessment. *Environ. Int.*, **30**,
33 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2003.11.005>.
- 34 Reilly, J., and Coauthors, 2018: *Food, Water, Energy, Climate Outlook: Perspectives from 2018*. 48 pp.
- 35 Reinhart, C. F., and C. Cerezo Davila, 2016: Urban building energy modeling - A review of a nascent
36 field. *Build. Environ.*, **97**, 196–202, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.buildenv.2015.12.001>.
- 37 Riahi, K., and Coauthors, 2012: Chapter 17: Energy Pathways for Sustainable Development. *Global*
38 *Energy Assessment - Toward a Sustainable Future*, Cambridge University Press and the
39 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1203–1306.
- 40 —, and Coauthors, 2015: Locked into Copenhagen pledges - Implications of short-term emission
41 targets for the cost and feasibility of long-term climate goals. *Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change*, **90**,
42 8–23, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.09.016>.
- 43 Riahi, K., and Coauthors, 2017: The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and their energy, land use, and
44 greenhouse gas emissions implications: An overview. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **42**, 153–168,
45 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.05.009>.
- 46 Riahi, K., and Coauthors, 2021: Long-term economic benefits of stabilizing warming without overshoot

- 1 – the ENGAGE model intercomparison. *Rev.*,
2 Ringkjøb, H. K., P. M. Haugan, P. Seljom, A. Lind, F. Wagner, and S. Mesfun, 2020: Short-term solar
3 and wind variability in long-term energy system models - A European case study. *Energy*, **209**,
4 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.118377>.
- 5 Ritchie, H., D. S. Reay, and P. Higgins, 2018: The impact of global dietary guidelines on climate
6 change. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **49**, 46–55, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.02.005>.
- 7 Robinson, J. B., 1982: Energy backcasting A proposed method of policy analysis. *Energy Policy*, **10**,
8 337–344, [https://doi.org/10.1016/0301-4215\(82\)90048-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/0301-4215(82)90048-9).
- 9 Robinson, S., 1989: Chapter 18 Multisectoral models. *Handbook of Development Economics*, Vol. 2 of,
10 885–947.
- 11 —, A. Yúnez-Naude, R. Hinojosa-Ojeda, J. D. Lewis, and S. Devarajan, 1999: From stylized to
12 applied models: Building multisector CGE models for policy analysis. *North Am. J. Econ. Financ.*,
13 **10**, 5–38, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1062-9408\(99\)00014-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1062-9408(99)00014-5).
- 14 Roca-Puigròs, M., R. G. Billy, A. Gerber, P. Wäger, and D. B. Müller, 2020: Pathways toward a carbon-
15 neutral Swiss residential building stock. *Build. Cities*, **1**, 579–593, <https://doi.org/10.5334/bc.61>.
- 16 Rochedo, P. R. R., and Coauthors, 2018: The threat of political bargaining to climate mitigation in
17 Brazil. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **8**, 695–698, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0213-y>.
- 18 Roelfsema, M., and Coauthors, 2020: Taking stock of national climate policies to evaluate
19 implementation of the Paris Agreement. *Nat. Commun.*, **11**, 2096, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-15414-6>.
- 20
- 21 Rogelj, J., and Coauthors, 2011: Emission pathways consistent with a 2 °C global temperature limit.
22 *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **1**, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1258>.
- 23 —, D. L. McCollum, A. Reisinger, M. Meinshausen, and K. Riahi, 2013a: Probabilistic cost estimates
24 for climate change mitigation. *Nature*, **493**, 79–83,
25 <https://doi.org/http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/abs/nclimate1758.html#supplementary-information>.
- 26
- 27 —, D. L. McCollum, and K. Riahi, 2013b: The UN’s “Sustainable Energy for All” initiative is
28 compatible with a warming limit of 2 °C. *Nat. Clim. Chang.* 2013 36, **3**, 545–551,
29 <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1806>.
- 30 —, M. Schaeffer, P. Friedlingstein, N. P. Gillett, D. P. Van Vuuren, K. Riahi, M. Allen, and R. Knutti,
31 2016: Differences between carbon budget estimates unravelled. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **6**, 245–252,
32 <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2868>.
- 33 —, O. Fricko, M. Meinshausen, V. Krey, J. J. J. Zilliacus, and K. Riahi, 2017: Understanding the
34 origin of Paris Agreement emission uncertainties. *Nat. Commun.*, **8**, 15748,
35 <https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms15748>.
- 36 Rogelj, J., and Coauthors, 2018a: Mitigation pathways compatible with 1.5°C in the context of
37 sustainable development. *Global Warming of 1.5 °C. An IPCC special report on the impacts of*
38 *global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission*
39 *pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change*, V.
40 Masson-Delmotte et al., Eds., p. in press.
- 41 Rogelj, J., and Coauthors, 2018b: Scenarios towards limiting global mean temperature increase below
42 1.5 °C. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **8**, 325–332, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0091-3>.
- 43 Rogelj, J., P. M. Forster, E. Kriegler, C. J. Smith, and R. Séférian, 2019a: Estimating and tracking the
44 remaining carbon budget for stringent climate targets. *Nature*, **571**, 335–342,
45 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1368-z>.
- 46 —, D. Huppmann, V. Krey, K. Riahi, L. Clarke, M. Gidden, Z. Nicholls, and M. Meinshausen, 2019b:
47 A new scenario logic for the Paris Agreement long-term temperature goal. *Nature*, **573**, 357–363,

- 1 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1541-4>.
- 2 ———, O. Geden, A. Cowie, and A. Reisinger, 2021: Net-zero emissions targets are vague: three ways
3 to fix. *Nature*, **591**, 365–368, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-00662-3>.
- 4 Rogner, H.-H., and Coauthors, 2012: Chapter 7 - Energy Resources and Potentials. *Global Energy*
5 *Assessment - Toward a Sustainable Future*, 423–512.
- 6 Rosa, I. M. D., and Coauthors, 2020: Challenges in producing policy-relevant global scenarios of
7 biodiversity and ecosystem services. *Glob. Ecol. Conserv.*, **22**, e00886,
8 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gecco.2019.e00886>.
- 9 Rosas-Flores, J. A., and D. Rosas-Flores, 2020: Potential energy savings and mitigation of emissions
10 by insulation for residential buildings in Mexico. *Energy Build.*, **209**,
11 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2019.109698>.
- 12 Roscini, A. V., O. Rapf, and J. Kockat, 2020: *On the way to a climate-neutral Europe. Contribution*
13 *from the building sector to a strengthened 2030 climate target*.
- 14 Rose, P. K., and F. Neumann, 2020: Hydrogen refueling station networks for heavy-duty vehicles in
15 future power systems. *Transp. Res. Part D Transp. Environ.*, **83**,
16 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2020.102358>.
- 17 Rose, S. K., N. Bauer, A. Popp, J. Weyant, S. Fujimori, P. Havlik, M. Wise, and D. P. van Vuuren,
18 2020: An overview of the Energy Modeling Forum 33rd study: assessing large-scale global
19 bioenergy deployment for managing climate change. *Clim. Change*, **163**, 1539–1551,
20 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02945-6>.
- 21 Rosenzweig, C., and Coauthors, 2020: Climate change responses benefit from a global food system
22 approach. *Nat. Food*, **1**, 94–97, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s43016-020-0031-z>.
- 23 Rottoli, M., A. Dirnaichner, R. Pietzcker, F. Schreyer, and G. Luderer, 2021: Alternative electrification
24 pathways for light-duty vehicles in the European transport sector. *Transp. Res. Part D Transp.*
25 *Environ.*, **99**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2021.103005>.
- 26 Sachs, J., Y. Meng, S. Giarola, and A. Hawkes, 2019a: An agent-based model for energy investment
27 decisions in the residential sector. *Energy*, **172**, 752–768,
28 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2019.01.161>.
- 29 Sachs, J. D., G. Schmidt-Traub, M. Mazzucato, D. Messner, N. Nakicenovic, and J. Rockström, 2019b:
30 Six Transformations to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. *Nat. Sustain.*, **2**, 805–814,
31 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0352-9>.
- 32 Sanchez, D. L., N. Johnson, S. T. McCoy, P. A. Turner, and K. J. Mach, 2018: Near-term deployment
33 of carbon capture and sequestration from biorefineries in the United States. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.*
34 *U. S. A.*, **115**, 4875–4880, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1719695115>.
- 35 Sandberg, N. H., J. S. Næss, H. Brattebø, I. Andresen, and A. Gustavsen, 2021: Large potentials for
36 energy saving and greenhouse gas emission reductions from large-scale deployment of zero
37 emission building technologies in a national building stock. *Energy Policy*, **152**,
38 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.112114>.
- 39 Sani Hassan, A., L. Cipcigan, and N. Jenkins, 2018: Impact of optimised distributed energy resources
40 on local grid constraints. *Energy*, **142**, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2017.10.074>.
- 41 Schaber, K., F. Steinke, and T. Hamacher, 2012: Transmission grid extensions for the integration of
42 variable renewable energies in Europe: Who benefits where? *Energy Policy*, **43**, 123–135,
43 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.12.040>.
- 44 Schaeffer, M., L. Gohar, E. Kriegler, J. Lowe, K. Riahi, and D. van Vuuren, 2015: Mid- and long-term
45 climate projections for fragmented and delayed-action scenarios. *Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change*,
46 **90**, 257–268, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.09.013>.
- 47 Schaeffer, R., and Coauthors, 2020: Comparing transformation pathways across major economies.

- 1 *Clim. Change*, **162**, 1787–1803, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02837-9>.
- 2 Schäfer, A. W., 2017: Long-term trends in domestic US passenger travel: the past 110 years and the
3 next 90. *Transportation (Amst)*, **44**, 293–310, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11116-015-9638-6>.
- 4 Schleussner, C.-F., and Coauthors, 2016: Differential climate impacts for policy-relevant limits to
5 global warming: the case of 1.5°C and 2°C. *Earth Syst. Dyn.*, **7**, 327–351,
6 <https://doi.org/10.5194/esd-7-327-2016>.
- 7 Schmitz, C., and Coauthors, 2014: Land-use change trajectories up to 2050: Insights from a global agro-
8 economic model comparison. *Agric. Econ. (United Kingdom)*, **45**, 69–84,
9 <https://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12090>.
- 10 Scholz, Y., H. C. Gils, and R. C. Pietzcker, 2017: Application of a high-detail energy system model to
11 derive power sector characteristics at high wind and solar shares. *Energy Econ.*, **64**, 568–582,
12 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2016.06.021>.
- 13 Schultes, A., M. Leimbach, G. Luderer, R. C. Pietzcker, L. Baumstark, N. Bauer, E. Kriegler, and O.
14 Edenhofer, 2018: Optimal international technology cooperation for the low-carbon
15 transformation. *Clim. Policy*, **18**, 1165–1176, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2017.1409190>.
- 16 —, F. Piontek, B. Soergel, J. Rogelj, L. Baumstark, E. Kriegler, O. Edenhofer, and G. Luderer, 2021:
17 Economic damages from on-going climate change imply deeper near-term emission cuts. *Environ.*
18 *Res. Lett.*, **16**, 104053, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/AC27CE>.
- 19 Schwanitz, V. J., 2013: Evaluating integrated assessment models of global climate change. *Environ.*
20 *Model. Softw.*, **50**, 120–131, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2013.09.005>.
- 21 Scricciu, S., A. Rezai, and R. Mechler, 2013: On the economic foundations of green growth discourses:
22 The case of climate change mitigation and macroeconomic dynamics in economic modeling.
23 *Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Energy Environ.*, **2**, 251–268, <https://doi.org/10.1002/wene.57>.
- 24 Sharma, S., S. H. Huang, and N. D. R. Sarma, 2011: System inertial frequency response estimation and
25 impact of renewable resources in ERCOT interconnection. *IEEE Power Energy Soc. Gen. Meet.*,
26 <https://doi.org/10.1109/PES.2011.6038993>.
- 27 Sharp, B. E., and S. A. Miller, 2016: Potential for Integrating Diffusion of Innovation Principles into
28 Life Cycle Assessment of Emerging Technologies. *Environ. Sci. Technol.*, **50**,
29 <https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.5b03239>.
- 30 Shukla, P. R., and V. Chaturvedi, 2011: Sustainable energy transformations in India under climate
31 policy. *Sustain. Dev.*, **21**, 48–59, <https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.516>.
- 32 Sinsel, S. R., R. L. Riemke, and V. H. Hoffmann, 2020: Challenges and solution technologies for the
33 integration of variable renewable energy sources—a review. *Renew. Energy*, **145**, 2271–2285,
34 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2019.06.147>.
- 35 Skar, C., G. Doorman, G. A. Pérez-Valdés, and A. Tomasgard, 2016: A multi-horizon stochastic
36 programming model for the European power system. *CenSES Work. Pap.*, 1–30.
- 37 Skea, J., P. Shukla, A. Al Khourdajie, and D. McCollum, 2021: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
38 Change: Transparency and integrated assessment modeling. *WIREs Clim. Chang.*, **12**, e727,
39 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.727>.
- 40 van Sluisveld, M. A. E., and Coauthors, 2015: Comparing future patterns of energy system change in 2
41 °C scenarios with historically observed rates of change. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **35**, 436–449,
42 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.09.019>.
- 43 —, S. H. Martínez, V. Daioglou, and D. P. van Vuuren, 2016: Exploring the implications of lifestyle
44 change in 2°C mitigation scenarios using the IMAGE integrated assessment model. *Technol.*
45 *Forecast. Soc. Change*, **102**, 309–319, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2015.08.013>.
- 46 —, M. J. H. M. Harmsen, D. P. van Vuuren, V. Bosetti, C. Wilson, and B. van der Zwaan, 2018:
47 Comparing future patterns of energy system change in 2 °C scenarios to expert projections. *Glob.*

- 1 *Environ. Chang.*, **50**, 201–211, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.03.009>.
- 2 Smith, C. J., P. M. Forster, M. Allen, N. Leach, R. J. Millar, G. A. Passerello, and L. A. Regayre, 2018:
3 FAIR v1.3: a simple emissions-based impulse response and carbon cycle model. *Geosci. Model*
4 *Dev.*, **11**, 2273–2297, <https://doi.org/10.5194/gmd-11-2273-2018>.
- 5 Smith, E., J. Morris, H. Kheshgi, G. Teletzke, H. Herzog, and S. Paltsev, 2021: The cost of CO2
6 transport and storage in global integrated assessment modeling. *Int. J. Greenh. Gas Control*, **109**,
7 103367, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijggc.2021.103367>.
- 8 Smith, P., and Coauthors, 2014: *Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU)*. In: *Climate*
9 *Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth*
10 *Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*.
11 https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ipcc_wg3_ar5_chapter11.pdf (Accessed
12 December 19, 2020).
- 13 Smith, P., and Coauthors, 2016: Biophysical and economic limits to negative CO2 emissions. *Nat. Clim.*
14 *Chang.*, **6**, 42–50,
15 <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2870> <http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v6/n1/abs/nclimate2870.html#supplementary-information>.
- 16
17 Smith, P., and Coauthors, 2019: *Interlinkages Between Desertification, Land Degradation, Food*
18 *Security and Greenhouse Gas Fluxes: Synergies, Trade-offs and Integrated Response Options*. In:
19 *Climate Change and Land: an IPCC special report on climate change, desertification, land*
20 *degradati*. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/4/2019/11/09_Chapter-6.pdf (Accessed
21 December 19, 2020).
- 22 Smith, S. J., and Coauthors, 2020a: Impact of methane and black carbon mitigation on forcing and
23 temperature: a multi-model scenario analysis. *Clim. Change*, [https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02794-3)
24 02794-3.
- 25 —, Z. Klimont, L. Drouet, M. Harmsen, G. Luderer, K. Riahi, D. P. van Vuuren, and J. P. Weyant,
26 2020b: The Energy Modeling Forum (EMF)-30 study on short-lived climate forcers: introduction
27 and overview. *Clim. Change*, **163**, 1399–1408, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02938-5>.
- 28 Soergel, B., and Coauthors, 2021: A sustainable development pathway for climate action within the UN
29 2030 Agenda. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **11**, 656–664, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01098-3>.
- 30 van Soest, H. L., and Coauthors, 2019: Analysing interactions among Sustainable Development Goals
31 with Integrated Assessment Models. *Glob. Transitions*, **1**, 210–225,
32 <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GLT.2019.10.004>.
- 33 —, and Coauthors, 2021: A Global Roll-out of Nationally Relevant Policies can Bridge the Emissions
34 Gap. *Nat. Commun.*, **Rev.**
- 35 Soria, R., and Coauthors, 2016: Modelling concentrated solar power (CSP) in the Brazilian energy
36 system: A soft-linked model coupling approach. *Energy*, **116**, 265–280,
37 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2016.09.080>.
- 38 Springmann, M., H. C. J. Godfray, M. Rayner, and P. Scarborough, 2016: Analysis and valuation of the
39 health and climate change cobenefits of dietary change. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.*, **113**, 4146–
40 4151, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1523119113>.
- 41 Statharas, S., Y. Moysoglou, P. Siskos, and P. Capros, 2021: Simulating the Evolution of Business
42 Models for Electricity Recharging Infrastructure Development by 2030: A Case Study for Greece.
43 *Energies*, **14**, <https://doi.org/10.3390/en14092345>.
- 44 von Stechow, C., and Coauthors, 2015: Integrating Global Climate Change Mitigation Goals with Other
45 Sustainability Objectives: A Synthesis. *Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour.*, **40**, 363–394,
46 <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-021113-095626>.
- 47 Stehfest, E., D. P. van Vuuren, L. F. Bouwman, and T. Kram, 2014: *Integrated Assessment of Global*
48 *Environmental Change with*.

- 1 —, and Coauthors, 2019: Key determinants of global land-use projections. *Nat. Commun.*, **10**,
2 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-09945-w>.
- 3 Stern, 2006: The Stern Review on the Economic Effects of Climate Change. *Popul. Dev. Rev.*, **32**,
4 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2006.00153.x>.
- 5 Stern, N., 2016: Current climate models are grossly misleading. *Nature*, **530**, 407–409,
6 <https://doi.org/10.1038/530407a>.
- 7 Strbac, G., D. Pudjianto, R. Sansom, H. Djapic, Predrag Ameli, N. Shah, N. Brandon, A. Hawkes, and
8 M. Qadrdan, 2018: *Value of Flexibility in a Decarbonised Grid and System Externalities of Low-*
9 *Carbon Generation Technologies: For the Committee on Climate Change*.
10 [https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-](https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/CCC_Externalities_report_Imperial_Final_21Oct20151.pdf)
11 [content/uploads/2015/10/CCC_Externalities_report_Imperial_Final_21Oct20151.pdf](https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/CCC_Externalities_report_Imperial_Final_21Oct20151.pdf) (Accessed
12 December 19, 2020).
- 13 Strefler, J., O. Edenhofer, A. Giannousakis, N. Bauer, E. Kriegler, A. Popp, A. Giannousakis, and O.
14 Edenhofer, 2018: Between Scylla and Charybdis: Delayed mitigation narrows the passage
15 between large-scale CDR and high costs. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **13**, 044015,
16 <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aab2ba>.
- 17 —, N. Bauer, F. Humpenöder, D. Klein, A. Popp, and E. Kriegler, 2021a: Carbon dioxide removal
18 technologies are not born equal. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **16**, 74021, [https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-](https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ac0a11)
19 [9326/ac0a11](https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ac0a11).
- 20 —, E. Kriegler, N. Bauer, G. Luderer, R. C. Pietzcker, A. Giannousakis, and O. Edenhofer, 2021b:
21 Alternative carbon price trajectories can avoid excessive carbon removal. *Nat. Commun.*, **12**,
22 2264, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-22211-2>.
- 23 Streicher, K. N., D. Parra, M. C. Buerer, and M. K. Patel, 2017: Techno-economic potential of large-
24 scale energy retrofit in the Swiss residential building stock. *Energy Procedia*, **122**, 121–126,
25 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egypro.2017.07.314>.
- 26 Subramanyam, V., M. Ahiduzzaman, and A. Kumar, 2017a: Greenhouse gas emissions mitigation
27 potential in the commercial and institutional sector. *Energy Build.*, **140**, 295–304,
28 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2017.02.007>.
- 29 —, A. Kumar, A. Talaei, and M. A. H. Mondal, 2017b: Energy efficiency improvement opportunities
30 and associated greenhouse gas abatement costs for the residential sector. *Energy*, **118**, 795–807,
31 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2016.10.115>.
- 32 Sugiyama, M., and Coauthors, 2019: Japan’s long-term climate mitigation policy: Multi-model
33 assessment and sectoral challenges. *Energy*, **167**, 1120–1131,
34 <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ENERGY.2018.10.091>.
- 35 —, and Coauthors, 2020a: EMF 35 JMIP study for Japan’s long-term climate and energy policy:
36 scenario designs and key findings. *Sustain. Sci.*, **Rev.**
- 37 Sugiyama, M., A. Taniguchi-Matsuoka, Y. Yamaguchi, and Y. Shimoda, 2020b: Required Specification
38 of Residential End-use Energy Demand Model for Application to National GHG Mitigation Policy
39 Making - Case Study for the Japanese Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures. *Proceedings*
40 *of Building Simulation 2019: 16th Conference of IBPSA*, Vol. 16 of, 3706–3713.
- 41 Tan, X., H. Lai, B. Gu, Y. Zeng, and H. Li, 2018: Carbon emission and abatement potential outlook in
42 China’s building sector through 2050. *Energy Policy*, **118**, 429–439,
43 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.03.072>.
- 44 Tavoni, M., and R. S. J. Tol, 2010: Counting only the hits? The risk of underestimating the costs of
45 stringent climate policy: A letter. *Clim. Change*, **100**, 769–778, [https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-010-9867-9)
46 [010-9867-9](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-010-9867-9).
- 47 Tavoni, M., and Coauthors, 2014: The distribution of the major economies’ effort in the Durban
48 Platform scenarios. *Clim. Chang. Econ.*, **4**, <https://doi.org/10.1142/S2010007813400095>.

- 1 Tavoni, M., and Coauthors, 2015: Post-2020 climate agreements in the major economies assessed in
2 the light of global models. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **5**, 119–126, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2475>.
- 3 Taylor, K. E., R. J. Stouffer, and G. A. Meehl, 2011: An Overview of CMIP5 and the Experiment
4 Design. *Bull. Am. Meteorol. Soc.*, **93**, 485–498, <https://doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-D-11-00094.1>.
- 5 Taylor, P. G., P. Upham, W. McDowall, and D. Christopherson, 2014: Energy model, boundary object
6 and societal lens: 35 years of the MARKAL model in the UK. *Energy Res. Soc. Sci.*, **4**, 32–41,
7 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.08.007>.
- 8 Teng, F., and G. Strbac, 2017: Full Stochastic Scheduling for Low-Carbon Electricity Systems. *IEEE*
9 *Trans. Autom. Sci. Eng.*, **14**, 461–470, <https://doi.org/10.1109/TASE.2016.2629479>.
- 10 Timilsina, G., A. Sikharulidze, E. Karapoghosya, and S. Shatvoryan, 2016: *How Do We Prioritize the*
11 *GHG Mitigation Options? Development of a Marginal Abatement Cost Curve for the Building*
12 *Sector in Armenia and Georgia*. 37 p. pp.
- 13 TNO, 2021: *GenX: Configurable Capacity Expansion Model*. [https://tlo.mit.edu/technologies/genx-](https://tlo.mit.edu/technologies/genx-configurable-capacity-expansion-model)
14 [configurable-capacity-expansion-model](https://tlo.mit.edu/technologies/genx-configurable-capacity-expansion-model) (Accessed August 25, 2021).
- 15 Tokimatsu, K., L. Tang, R. Yasuoka, R. Ii, N. Itsubo, and M. Nishio, 2020: Toward more
16 comprehensive environmental impact assessments: interlinked global models of LCIA and IAM
17 applicable to this century. *Int. J. Life Cycle Assess.*, **25**, 1710–1736,
18 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11367-020-01750-8>.
- 19 Toleikyte, A., L. Kranzl, and A. Müller, 2018: Cost curves of energy efficiency investments in buildings
20 – Methodologies and a case study of Lithuania. *Energy Policy*, **115**, 148–157,
21 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.12.043>.
- 22 Tosatto, A., G. Misyris, A. Junyent-Ferré, F. Teng, and S. Chatzivasileiadis, 2020: Towards Optimal
23 Coordination between Regional Groups: HVDC Supplementary Power Control. *IEEE*, **1**, 1–8.
- 24 Trottier, 2016: *Canada's challenge & opportunity. Transformations for major reductions in GHG*
25 *emissions*. 321 p. pp.
- 26 Trutnevyte, E., L. F. Hirt, N. Bauer, A. Cherp, A. Hawkes, O. Y. Edelenbosch, S. Pedde, and D. P. van
27 Vuuren, 2019: Societal Transformations in Models for Energy and Climate Policy: The Ambitious
28 Next Step. *One Earth*, **1**, 423–433, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2019.12.002>.
- 29 Tubiello, F. N., and Coauthors, 2015: The Contribution of Agriculture, Forestry and other Land Use
30 activities to Global Warming, 1990-2012. *Glob. Chang. Biol.*, **21**, 2655–2660,
31 <https://doi.org/10.1111/gcb.12865>.
- 32 Tulkens, H., 2019: *Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements*. WORLD
33 SCIENTIFIC,.
- 34 Turnheim, B., F. Berkhout, F. Geels, A. Hof, A. McMeekin, B. Nykvist, and D. van Vuuren, 2015:
35 Evaluating sustainability transitions pathways: Bridging analytical approaches to address
36 governance challenges. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **35**, 239–253,
37 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.08.010>.
- 38 UNEP, 2019: Bridging the Gap – Enhancing Mitigation Ambition and Action at G20 Level and
39 Globally: Pre-release version of a chapter in the forthcoming UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2019.
40 *Emiss. Gap Rep. 2019*, 82.
- 41 Valin, H., and Coauthors, 2014: The future of food demand: Understanding differences in global
42 economic models. *Agric. Econ. (United Kingdom)*, **45**, 51–67,
43 <https://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12089>.
- 44 van de Ven, D.-J., and Coauthors, 2021: The Impact of U.S. Re-engagement in Climate on the Paris
45 Targets. *Earth's Futur.*, **9**, e2021EF002077, <https://doi.org/10.1029/2021EF002077>.
- 46 Velders, G. J. M., D. W. Fahey, J. S. Daniel, S. O. Andersen, and M. McFarland, 2015: Future
47 atmospheric abundances and climate forcings from scenarios of global and regional

- 1 hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) emissions. *Atmos. Environ.*, **123**, 200–209,
2 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.atmosenv.2015.10.071>.
- 3 Virage-Energie Nord-Pas-de-Calais., 2016: *Mieux Vivre en Région Nord-Pas-de-Calais – Pour un*
4 *virage énergétique et des transformations sociétales*. 28 p. pp.
- 5 Vishwanathan, S. S., P. Fragkos, K. Fragkiadakis, L. Paroussos, and A. Garg, 2019: Energy system
6 transitions and macroeconomic assessment of the Indian building sector. *Build. Res. Inf.*, **47**, 38–
7 55, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09613218.2018.1516059>.
- 8 de Vos, L., H. Biemans, J. C. Doelman, E. Stehfest, and D. P. van Vuuren, 2021: Trade-offs between
9 water needs for food, utilities, and the environment—a nexus quantification at different scales.
10 *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **16**, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ac2b5e>.
- 11 Vrontisi, Z., J. Abrell, F. Neuwahl, B. Saveyn, and F. Wagner, 2016: Economic impacts of EU clean
12 air policies assessed in a CGE framework. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **55**, 54–64,
13 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2015.07.004>.
- 14 —, and Coauthors, 2018: Enhancing global climate policy ambition towards a 1.5 °C stabilization: a
15 short-term multi-model assessment. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **13**, 44039, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aab53e>.
- 17 van Vuuren, D. P., and Coauthors, 2008: Temperature increase of 21st century mitigation scenarios.
18 *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.*, **105**, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0711129105>.
- 19 van Vuuren, D. P., and Coauthors, 2009: Comparison of top-down and bottom-up estimates of sectoral
20 and regional greenhouse gas emission reduction potentials. *Energy Policy*, **37**, 5125–5139,
21 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.024>.
- 22 —, and Coauthors, 2011a: How well do integrated assessment models simulate climate change? *Clim.*
23 *Change*, **104**, 255–285, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-009-9764-2>.
- 24 —, and Coauthors, 2011b: The representative concentration pathways: An overview. *Clim. Change*,
25 **109**, 5–31, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0148-z>.
- 26 van Vuuren, D. P., and Coauthors, 2012: A proposal for a new scenario framework to support research
27 and assessment in different climate research communities. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **22**, 21–35,
28 <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.08.002>.
- 29 van Vuuren, D. P., and Coauthors, 2014: A new scenario framework for Climate Change Research:
30 Scenario matrix architecture. *Clim. Change*, **122**, 373–386, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0906-1>.
- 32 —, and Coauthors, 2015: Pathways to achieve a set of ambitious global sustainability objectives by
33 2050: Explorations using the IMAGE integrated assessment model. *Technol. Forecast. Soc.*
34 *Change*, **98**, 303–323, <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.TECHFORE.2015.03.005>.
- 35 van Vuuren, D. P., and Coauthors, 2017a: Energy, land-use and greenhouse gas emissions trajectories
36 under a green growth paradigm. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **42**, 237–250,
37 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.05.008>.
- 38 —, and Coauthors, 2017b: The Shared Socio-economic Pathways: Trajectories for human
39 development and global environmental change. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **42**, 148–152,
40 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.10.009>.
- 41 van Vuuren, D. P., and Coauthors, 2018: Alternative pathways to the 1.5 °C target reduce the need for
42 negative emission technologies. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **8**, 391–397, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0119-8>.
- 44 —, and Coauthors, 2019: Integrated scenarios to support analysis of the food–energy–water nexus.
45 *Nat. Sustain.*, 1–10, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0418-8>.
- 46 van Vuuren, D., and Coauthors, 2021: The 2021 SSP scenarios of the IMAGE 3.2 model. *EarthArXiv*,
47 <https://doi.org/10.31223/X5CG92>.

- 1 Waffenschmidt, E., and R. S. Y. Hui, 2016: Virtual inertia with PV inverters using DC-link capacitors.
2 2016 18th European Conference on Power Electronics and Applications, EPE 2016 ECCE
3 Europe, IEEE.
- 4 Wakiyama, T., and T. Kuramochi, 2017: Scenario analysis of energy saving and CO2 emissions
5 reduction potentials to ratchet up Japanese mitigation target in 2030 in the residential sector.
6 *Energy Policy*, **103**, 1–15, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.12.059>.
- 7 Waldhoff, S., D. Anthoff, S. Rose, and R. S. J. Tol, 2014: The Marginal Damage Costs of Different
8 Greenhouse Gases: An Application of FUND. *Econ. Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal*,
9 **8**, 1–33, <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2014-31>.
- 10 Warszawski, L., and Coauthors, 2021: All options, not silver bullets, needed to limit global warming to
11 1.5 °C: a scenario appraisal. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **16**, 064037, [https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-](https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abfec)
12 [9326/abfec](https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abfec).
- 13 Weber, C., and Coauthors, 2018: Mitigation scenarios must cater to new users. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **in**
14 **press**.
- 15 Wei, Y.-M., and Coauthors, 2021: Pathway comparison of limiting global warming to 2°C. *Energy*
16 *Clim. Chang.*, **2**, 100063, <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.EGYCC.2021.100063>.
- 17 Weidema, B. P., M. Pizzol, J. Schmidt, and G. Thoma, 2018: Attributional or consequential Life Cycle
18 Assessment: A matter of social responsibility. *J. Clean. Prod.*, **174**,
19 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.10.340>.
- 20 Weindl, I., H. Lotze-Campen, A. Popp, C. Müller, P. Havlík, M. Herrero, C. Schmitz, and S. Rolinski,
21 2015: Livestock in a changing climate: production system transitions as an adaptation strategy for
22 agriculture. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **10**, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/10/9/094021>.
- 23 ———, and Coauthors, 2017: Livestock and human use of land: Productivity trends and dietary choices
24 as drivers of future land and carbon dynamics. *Glob. Planet. Change*, **159**, 1–10,
25 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloplacha.2017.10.002>.
- 26 Wender, B. A., R. W. Foley, T. A. Hottle, J. Sadowski, V. Prado-Lopez, D. A. Eisenberg, L. Laurin,
27 and T. P. Seager, 2014: Anticipatory life-cycle assessment for responsible research and
28 innovation. *J. Responsible Innov.*, **1**, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23299460.2014.920121>.
- 29 Weyant, J., 2017: Some Contributions of Integrated Assessment Models of Global Climate Change.
30 *Rev. Environ. Econ. Policy*, **11**, 115–137, <https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/rew018>.
- 31 Weyant, J. P., 2009: A perspective on integrated assessment. *Clim. Change*, **95**, 317–323,
32 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-009-9612-4>.
- 33 Wilkerson, J. T., B. D. Leibowicz, D. D. Turner, and J. P. Weyant, 2015: Comparison of integrated
34 assessment models: Carbon price impacts on U.S. energy. *Energy Policy*, **76**, 18–31,
35 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.10.011>.
- 36 Wilson, C., A. Grubler, K. S. Gallagher, and G. F. Nemet, 2012: Marginalization of end-use
37 technologies in energy innovation for climate protection. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **2**, 780–788,
38 <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1576>.
- 39 Wilson, C., A. Grubler, N. Bauer, V. Krey, and K. Riahi, 2013: Future capacity growth of energy
40 technologies: Are scenarios consistent with historical evidence? *Clim. Change*, **118**, 381–395,
41 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-012-0618-y>.
- 42 Wilson, C., and Coauthors, 2017a: Evaluating Process-Based Integrated Assessment Models of Climate
43 Change Mitigation. *IIASA Work. Pap. WP-17-007*,.
- 44 Wilson, C., A. Grubler, N. Bento, S. Healey, S. De Stercke, and C. Zimm, 2020: Granular technologies
45 to accelerate decarbonization. *Science (80-.)*, **368**, 36–39,
46 <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaz8060>.
- 47 Wilson, C., C. Guivarch, E. Kriegler, B. van Ruijven, D. P. van Vuuren, V. Krey, V. J. Schwanitz, and

- 1 E. L. Thompson, 2021: Evaluating process-based integrated assessment models of climate change
2 mitigation. *Clim. Change*, **166**, 3, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-021-03099-9>.
- 3 Wilson, E., and Coauthors, 2017b: *Energy Efficiency Potential in the U. S. Single-Family Housing*
4 *Stock*. 157 p. pp.
- 5 Xing, R., T. Hanaoka, and T. Masui, 2021: Deep decarbonization pathways in the building sector:
6 China's NDC and the Paris agreement. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **16**, [https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-](https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abe008)
7 [9326/abe008](https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abe008).
- 8 Yang, Z., 2008: *Strategic Bargaining and Cooperation in Greenhouse Gas Mitigations - An Integrated*
9 *Assessment Modeling Approach*. MIT Press, undefined-208 pp.
- 10 Yeh, S., and Coauthors, 2016: A modeling comparison of deep greenhouse gas emissions reduction
11 scenarios by 2030 in California. *Energy Strateg. Rev.*, **13–14**, 169–180,
12 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2016.10.001>.
- 13 —, G. S. Mishra, L. Fulton, P. Kyle, D. L. McCollum, J. Miller, P. Cazzola, and J. Teter, 2017:
14 Detailed assessment of global transport-energy models' structures and projections. *Transp. Res.*
15 *Part D Transp. Environ.*, **55**, 294–309, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2016.11.001>.
- 16 Yu, S., M. Evans, P. Kyle, L. Vu, Q. Tan, A. Gupta, and P. Patel, 2018: Implementing nationally
17 determined contributions: building energy policies in India's mitigation strategy. *Environ. Res.*
18 *Let.*, **13**, 034034, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aaad84>.
- 19 Yumashev, D., and Coauthors, 2019: Climate policy implications of nonlinear decline of Arctic land
20 permafrost and other cryosphere elements. *Nat. Commun.*, **10**, [https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-09863-x)
21 [019-09863-x](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-09863-x).
- 22 Zhang, R., S. Fujimori, and T. Hanaoka, 2018: The contribution of transport policies to the mitigation
23 potential and cost of 2°C and 1.5°C goals. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **13**, 054008,
24 <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aabb0d>.
- 25 Zhang, S., and Coauthors, 2020: Scenarios of energy reduction potential of zero energy building
26 promotion in the Asia-Pacific region to year 2050. *Energy*, **213**,
27 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.118792>.
- 28 Zhong, X., and Coauthors, 2021: Global greenhouse gas emissions from residential and commercial
29 building materials and mitigation strategies to 2060. *Nat. Commun.*, **Accepted**, 1–10,
30 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-26212-z>.
- 31 Zhou, N., N. Khanna, W. Feng, J. Ke, and M. Levine, 2018: Scenarios of energy efficiency and CO2
32 emissions reduction potential in the buildings sector in China to year 2050. *Nat. Energy*, **3**,
33 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-018-0253-6>.
- 34 van der Zwaan, B. C. C., K. V. Calvin, and L. E. Clarke, 2016: Climate Mitigation in Latin America:
35 Implications for Energy and Land Use: Preface to the Special Section on the findings of the
36 CLIMACAP-LAMP project. *Energy Econ.*, **56**, 495–498,
37 <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ENECO.2016.05.005>.
- 38