29 Apr 2020

#WhoReallyTargetsYou: DSA and political microtargeting

By Panoptykon Foundation

Europe is about to overhaul its 20-year-old e-Commerce Directive and it is a once-in-a-decade chance to correct the power imbalance between platforms and users. As part of this update, the Digital Services Act (DSA) must address the issue of political microtargeting (PMT).

Microtargeting, and PMT in particular, has the alarming power to derail democracy, and should be regulated. According to self-assessment reports, political advertisers spent €31 million (excluding the UK) on Facebook, and only €5 million on Google between March and September 2019. Facebook’s role in developing and targeted adverts goes far beyond a simple presentation medium — its tools for optimising ad delivery, targeting audiences and defining delivery criteria are far beyond the capacity of most political parties alone. A detailed report based on data collected during two Polish election campaigns in 2019 carried out by Panoptykon and partners, shed critical light on the role of the company, and what it revealed was extremely informative:

The study found that Facebook’s transparency and control tools that would explain how ad targeting works offered to both researchers and users are “insufficient and superficial.” Users are targeted by Facebook’s algorithm based on potentially thousands of distinct selectors following a a set of criteria that only the company knows. Advertisers on Facebook can opt to select audiences on obvious factors such as age, gender, language spoken and location. But the Facebook machine also steers them towards increasingly narrower criteria such as interests (political affiliation, sex orientation, musical tastes, etc…), “life events” and behaviour, as well as more than 250,000 free-text attributes including, for example, Adult Children of Alcoholics, or Cancer Awareness, which constitute a deeper privacy concern.

Facebook is not merely a passive intermediary; its algorithms interpret criteria selected by advertisers and deliver ads in a way that fulfils advertisers’ objectives, and actively curate the content that users see in their timelines based on those assumptions. In 2016, the company introduced a feature allowing them to target “lookalikes” – profiles similar to a target audience. It also allows A/B testing so advertisers can compare which ads are more effective.

But Facebook’s “why am I seeing this ad?” transparency tool can be misleading, revealing only the “lowest common denominator” attribute. For example, according to the report, during the European elections campaign in Poland in May 2019, a person who was pregnant saw a political ad referring to prenatal screenings and perinatal care. “Why am I seeing this ad?” informed her that she was targeted because she was interested in “medicine” (potential reach 668 million) rather than “pregnancy” (potential reach of 316 million). Users can only verify (check, delete, or correct) a short list of interests that the platform is willing to reveal.

Here is where upcoming regulation comes into play: At the very least, the Digital Services Act should prohibit PMT based on characteristics which expose our mental or physical vulnerabilities (e.g. depression, anxiety, addiction, illness). But if the EU wants to be ambitious and tackle many of the associated problems with the current business model, the DSA should go further and regulate any sort of advertising aimed at profiling users, particularly as there appears to be a gap between ads labelled as “political” by the platform, and ads perceived as political by researchers.

Regulating targeted ads, requiring greater transparency for researchers and users, opt-in rather than opt-out, tighter requirements for political advertising and recognising PMT as an application of AI that poses serious risks for human rights will not solve all the problems of political disinformation in society, but they would certainly eliminate some of the worst practices today.

Member in the spotlight: Homo Digitalis

By EDRi

This is the tenth article of the series “EDRi member in the Spotlight” in which our members introduce themselves and their work in an in-depth highlight in interview format.

Today we introduce our Greek member: Homo Digitalis.

1. Who are you and what is your organisation’s goal and mission?

Homo Digitalis is the only digital rights civil society organization in Greece. Our goal is the protection of human rights and freedoms in the digital age. We strive to influence legislators & policy makers on a national level, and to raise awareness amongst the people of Greece regarding digital rights issues. Moreover, when digital rights are jeopardized by public or private actors, we carry out investigations, conduct studies and proceed to legal actions.

2. How did it all begin, and how did your organisation develop its work?

Homo Digitalis was founded in 2018 by 6 tech lawyers with a strong passion about the protection and promotion of digital rights. No digital rights organisations existed in Greece before. So, we wanted to create an organisation that could bring like-minded people together and shake things up. After two years of voluntary work, we have managed to grow into an organization with more than 100 members, who bring together a wide variety of disciplines such as law, computer science, humanities and social sciences.

We aim to transform Homo Digitalis from an organization based on voluntary work to a strong watchdog with a long-term strategy and full-time personnel. It will be a long and difficult path, but we have started acquiring our first grants and we are confident that we will grow, gaining more recognition and support for us and our vision.

3. The biggest opportunity created by advancements in information and communication technology is…

…facilitating access to information all around the globe, and building bridges between people. These advancements constitute a driver for positive change in our societies, and could lead to enhanced equality and transparency.

4. The biggest threat created by advancements in information and communication technology is…

…mass surveillance of our societies and power asymmetry in the information economy.

5. Which are the biggest victories/successes/achievements of your organisation?

Becoming a full member of EDRi is certainly a great success of Homo Digitalis so far!

Additionally, Homo Digitalis has managed to achieve important accomplishments over the last two years. We have increased public awareness on digital rights issues by generating media interest in our actions, visiting educational institutions and participating in events, campaigns, and giving talks all around Greece. Moreover, we were instrumental in influencing the public debate around data protection reform in Greece by cooperating with related stakeholders, and by filing complaints and requests before EU and national authorities, respectively.

Also, through access to information requests, complaints, and investigations we have attained a high level of scrutiny regarding projects on technology-led policing and border management activities in Greece. In addition, we have collaborated with investigative journalists to reveal important facts. Even though we are an organization based solely on volunteers, we give our best to respond quickly to the challenges that arise.

Furthermore, we have been fortunate enough to participate shoulder to shoulder with powerful digital rights organisations in EU-wide projects and campaigns and to learn from their expertise and knowledge. Finally, we also had the great opportunity to present our views and opinions in important fora, such as the UN Human Rights Council 39th session in Geneva or the European Parliament in Brussels.

All these accomplishments over the last two years give us the strength to continue our work towards the protection and promotion of human rights in the digital age.

6. If your organisation could now change one thing in your country, what would that be?

Active participation of people in collective activities such as digital rights activism. If individuals could devote a part of their knowledge and time to such activities, we would have a stronger voice to influence policy makers and legislators towards political decisions that respect our rights and freedoms and not violate them, instead.

7. What is the biggest challenge your organisation is currently facing in your country?

After 10 years of financial crisis and austerity measures in Greece that limited public spending, we witness over the last years an increase in funds used for technology-led policing and border managements projects. Thus, we must stay wide-awake in order to challenge and fight back the implementation of intrusive tools and technologies in our societies that limit our rights and freedoms.

8. How can one get in touch with you if they want to help as a volunteer, or donate to support your work?

You can visit our website to help us as a volunteer or to donate and support our work.

Also, we always appreciate a good conversation, so feel free to reach out to info@homodigitalis.gr. Last but not least, you can subscribe to our newsletter here.

Read more:

EDRi member in the spotlight series
https://edri.org/member-in-the-spotlight/

Join Homo Digitalis as member/supporter/volunteer
https://www.homodigitalis.gr/en/join-us

Donate to Homo Digitalis
https://www.homodigitalis.gr/en/donations/help-us-grow

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29 Apr 2020

Why COVID-19 is a Crisis for Digital Rights

By Guest author

The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered an equally urgent digital rights crisis.

New measures being hurried in to curb the spread of the virus, from “biosurveillance” and online tracking to censorship, are potentially as world-changing as the disease itself. These changes aren’t necessarily temporary, either: once in place, many of them can’t be undone.

That’s why activists, civil society and the courts must carefully scrutinise questionable new measures, and make sure that – even amid a global panic – states are complying with international human rights law.

Human rights watchdog Amnesty International recently commented that human rights restrictions are spreading almost as quickly as coronavirus itself. Indeed, the fast-paced nature of the pandemic response has empowered governments to rush through new policies with little to no legal oversight.

There has already been a widespread absence of transparency and regulation when it comes to the rollout of these emergency measures, with many falling far short of international human rights standards.

Tensions between protecting public health and upholding people’s basic rights and liberties are rising. While it is of course necessary to put in place safeguards to slow the spread of the virus, it’s absolutely vital that these measures are balanced and proportionate.

Unfortunately, this isn’t always proving to be the case. What follows is an analysis of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the key subset of policy areas related to digital rights:

a) The Rise of Biosurveillance

A panopticon world on a scale never seen before is quickly materialising.

“Biosurveillance” – which involves the tracking of people’s movements, communications and health data – has already become a buzzword, used to describe certain worrying measures being deployed to contain the virus.

The means by which states, often aided by private companies, are monitoring their citizens are increasingly extensive: phone data, CCTV footage, temperature checkpoints, airline and railway bookings, credit card information, online shopping records, social media data, facial recognition, and sometimes even drones.

Private companies are exploiting the situation and offering rights-abusing products to states, purportedly to help them manage the impact of the pandemic. One Israeli spyware firm has developed a product it claims can track the spread of coronavirus by analysing two weeks’ worth of data from people’s personal phones, and subsequently matching it up with data about citizens’ movements obtained from national phone companies.

In some instances, citizens can also track each other’s movements – leading to not only vertical, but also horizontal sharing of sensitive medical data.

Not only are many of these measures unnecessary and disproportionately intrusive, they also give rise to secondary questions, such as: how secure is our data? How long will it be kept for? Is there transparency around how it is obtained and processed? Is it being shared or repurposed, and if so, with who?

b) Censorship and Misinformation

Censorship is becoming rife, with many arguing that a “censorship pandemic” is surging in step with COVID-19.

Oppressive regimes are rapidly adopting “fake news” laws. This is ostensibly to curb the spread of misinformation about the virus, but in practice, this legislation is often used to crack down on dissenting voices or otherwise suppress free speech. In Cambodia, for example, there have already been at least 17 arrests of people for sharing information about coronavirus.

At the same time, many states have themselves been accused of fuelling disinformation to their citizens to create confusion, or are arresting those who express criticism of the government’s response.

As well as this, some states have restricted free access to information on the virus, either by blocking access to health apps, or cutting off access to the internet altogether.

c) AI, Inequality and Control

The deployment of AI can have consequences for human rights at the best of times, but now, it’s regularly being adopted with minimal oversight and regulation.

AI and other automated learning technology are the foundation for many surveillance and social control tools. Because of the pandemic, it is being increasingly relied upon to fight misinformation online and process the huge increase in applications for emergency social protection which are, naturally, more urgent than ever.

Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, the digital rights field had consistently warned about the human rights implications of these inscrutable “black boxes”, including their biased and discriminatory effects. The adoption of such technologies without proper oversight or consultation should be resisted and challenged through the courts, not least because of their potential to exacerbate the inequalities already experienced by those hardest hit by the pandemic.

d) Eroding Human Rights

Many of the human rights-violating measures that have been adopted to date are taken outside the framework of proper derogations from applicable human rights instruments, which would ensure that emergency measures are temporary, limited and supervised.

Legislation is being adopted by decree, without clear time limitations, and technology is being deployed in a context where clear rules and regulations are absent.

This is of great concern for two main reasons.

First, this type of “legislating through the back door” of measures that are not necessarily temporary avoids going through a proper democratic process of oversight and checks and balances, resulting in de facto authoritarian rule.

Second, if left unchecked and unchallenged, this could set a highly dangerous precedent for the future. This is the first pandemic we are experiencing at this scale – we are currently writing the playbook for global crises to come.

If it becomes clear that governments can use a global health emergency to instate human rights infringing measures without being challenged or without having to reverse these measures, making them permanent instead of temporary, we will essentially be handing over a blank cheque to authoritarian regimes to wait until the next pandemic to impose whatever measures they want.

Therefore, any and all measures that are not strictly necessary, sufficiently narrow in scope, and of a clearly defined temporary nature, need to be challenged as a matter of urgency. If they are not, we will not be able to push back on a certain path towards a dystopian surveillance state.

e) Litigation: New Ways to Engage

In tandem with advocacy and policy efforts, we will need strategic litigation to challenge the most egregious measures through the court system. Going through the legislature alone will be too slow and, with public gatherings banned, public demonstrations will not be possible at scale.

The courts will need to adapt to the current situation – and are in the process of doing so – by offering new ways for litigants to engage. Courts are still hearing urgent matters and questions concerning fundamental rights and our democratic system will fall within that remit. This has already been demonstrated by the first cases requesting oversight to government surveillance in response to the pandemic.

These issues have never been more pressing, and it’s abundantly clear that action must be taken.

If you want to read more on the subject, follow EDRi’s new series #COVIDTech here: https://edri.org/emergency-responses-to-covid-19-must-not-extend-beyond-the-crisis/

This article was originally published at: https://digitalfreedomfund.org/why-covid-19-is-a-crisis-for-digital-rights/

Everything you need to know about the DSA

By Chloé Berthélémy

In her political guidelines, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen has committed to “upgrade the Union’s liability and safety rules for digital platforms, services and products, with a new Digital Services Act” (DSA). The upcoming DSA will revise the rules contained in the E-Commerce Directive of 2000 that affect how intermediaries regulate and influence user activity on their platforms, including people’s ability to exercise their rights and freedoms online. This is why reforming those rules has the potential to be either a big threat to fundamental rights rights or a major improvement of the current situation online. It is also an opportunity for the European Union to decide how central aspects of the internet will look in the coming ten years.

A public consultation by the European Commission is planned to be launched in May 2020 and legislative proposals are expected to be presented in the first quarter of 2021.

In the meantime, three different Committees of the European Parliament have announced or published Own Initiative Reports as well as Opinions in view of setting the agenda of what the DSA should regulate and how it should achieve its goals.

We have created a document pool in which we will be listing relevant articles and documents related to the DSA. This will allow you to follow the developments of content moderation and regulatory actions in Europe.

Digital Services Act: Document pool

By EDRi

In her political guidelines, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen has committed to “upgrade the Union’s liability and safety rules for digital platforms, services and products, with a new Digital Services Act” (DSA). The upcoming DSA will revise the rules contained in the E-Commerce Directive of 2000 that affect how intermediaries regulate and influence user activity on their platforms, including people’s ability to exercise their rights and freedoms online. This is why reforming those rules has the potential to be either a big threat to fundamental rights rights or a major improvement of the current situation online. It is also an opportunity for the European Union to decide how central aspects of the internet will look in the coming ten years.

A public consultation by the European Commission is planned to be launched in May 2020 and legislative proposals are expected to be presented in the first quarter of 2021.

In the meantime, three different Committees of the European Parliament have announced or published Own Initiative Reports as well as Opinions in view of setting the agenda of what the DSA should regulate and how it should achieve its goals.

In this document pool we will be listing relevant articles and documents related to the DSA. This will allow you to follow the developments of content moderation and regulatory actions in Europe.

Last update: 27 April 2020

Table of content

EDRi’s analysis and recommendations
Legislative documents
EDRi’s blogposts and press releases
EDRi members’ publications
Key policymaker
Key dates

EDRi’s analysis and recommendations

EDRi Position Paper on the Digital Services Act: Platform Regulation Done Right (9 April 2020)
Joint Report:Civil society calls for evidence-based solutions to disinformation (19 October 2018) with Access Now and Civil Liberties Union for Europe
EDRi response to European Commission E-Commerce Directive Consultation (10 November 2010)

Legislative documents

European Commission

Public consultation announced for May 2020
Legislative proposals announced for Q1/2021

European Parliament

Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO)
- Lead Report: 2020/2018 (INL) Legislative initiative procedure – Digital Services Act: Improving the functioning of the Single Market – Draft
Legal Affairs Committee (JURI)
- Lead Report: 2020/2019 (INL) Legislative initiative procedure – Digital Services Act: Adapting commercial and civil law rules for commercial entities operating online – Draft
  - Draft Opinion of the Culture and Education Committee (CULT)
  - Draft Opinion of the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO)
Civil Liberties Committee (LIBE)
- Lead Report: 2020/2022 (INI) Own-initiative report procedure – Digital Services Act and fundamental rights issues posed
  - Draft Opinion of the Culture and Education Committee (CULT) (in German only)
  - Draft Opinion of the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO)

Key dates

European Commission’s consultation: May 2020
European Commission’s legislative proposal: Q1 2021

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28 Apr 2020

COVID-19: A Commission hitchhiker’s tech guide to the App Store

By EDRi

“We’re being asked what do we want these systems to look like. If we don’t make the decision it will be made for us (…) This virus will pass, but the measures will last”
Edward Snowden

According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), closely watching contacts during a pandemic “will prevent further transmission of the virus”. In response to the COVID-19 crisis many technical responses (or acts of techno-solutionism) arose shortly after the pandemic was declared by the WHO. Contact–tracing applications are one of the notable solutions brought forward, and currently occupy the center of the public debate in the European space.

Whether contact-tracing technology will help or not, however, is still contested. Technology is not a silver bullet, as Carly Kind, director of AI research center Ada Lovelace Institute, puts it. Moreover, Dr. Michael Ryan, a key advisor for the WHO, warned that “when collecting information on citizens or tracking their movements there are always serious data protection and human rights principles involved”. Several voices in the EDRi community also question whether the risks in using apps may outweigh the benefits (La Quadrature du Net) and if apps are just “we-did-something” political responses (FIPR – Ross Anderson).

That said, if apps (and technology in general) are proven to be useful in any significant way, they need to fully protect fundamental rights, since the risks created by these technologies could outlast the pandemic itself.

European Digital Rights, as the voice of 44 organisations working to advance and uphold human rights in the digital space, warned early on of the potential problems that a rushed technological solution could lead us to.

In reaction to the debate regarding the safeguards potential technical solutions must provide, the European Commission (EC) has published a toolbox and guidelines for ensuring data protection standards. The two instruments aim to guide the responses that Member States are already preparing nationally, sometimes in very different directions.

In this article, we aim to provide insight into European Commission’s proposals and how they fit with civil society views on this subject.

A techie toolbox

A fragmented and uncoordinated approach to contact tracing apps risks hampering the effectiveness of measures aimed at combating the COVID-19 crisis, whilst also causing adverse effects to the single market and to fundamental rights and freedoms”
European Commission Common EU Toolbox for Member State

The EC argued for the need of a toolkit as national authorities are developing mobile applications (apps) to monitor and mitigate the COVID-19 pandemic. The Commission agrees that contact tracing, as usually done manually by public health authorities, is a time-consuming process and that the “promising” technology and apps in particular could be useful tools for Member States.

However, the EC points out that, in order for apps to be efficient, they need to be adopted by 60-75% of population – a very high threshold for a voluntary app. As comparison, in the famous case of Singapore, only 20% of the population downloaded the app.

The toolbox calls for a series of concrete requirements for these apps: interoperability (apps must work well with each other in order to be able to trace transnational cases); voluntary; approved by the national health authorities; privacy-preserving and dismantled as soon as they are no longer needed.

The time principle was a key point in our statement laying out fundamental rights – based recommendations for COVID-19 responses. On apps in particular, EDRi member Access Now advocates that access to health data shall be limited to those who need information to conduct treatment, research, and otherwise address the crisis . Finally, EDRi members Chaos Computer Club (CCC), Free Software Foundation Europe (FSFE) and noyb are among those that agree on the need for the apps to be voluntary.

Decentralised or centralised, that is the question

The Toolbox describes two categories of apps: those that operate via decentralised processing of personal data, which would be stored only on a person’s own device; and those operating via a centralised back-end server which would collect the data. The EC argues that this data should be reduced to the “absolute minimum” necessary, with technical requirements compiled by ENISA (encryption, communications security, user authentication….) and “preferably” the Member State should be the controller for the processing of personal data. The Annexes list key recommendations, background information on contact tracing , background on symptom checker functionalities and an inventory of existing mobile solutions against COVID-19.

Our member noyb agrees with the Commission requiring strong encryption, an essential element of secure technologies for which we have also advocated before. More, EDRi member CCC sides with the decentralisation option rather than a centralised one, as well as with strong communication security and privacy requirements.

Readers who liked the Toolbox… also liked the Guidelines

People must have the certainty that compliance with fundamental rights is ensured and that the apps will be used only for the specifically-defined purposes, that they will not be used for mass surveillance, and that individuals will remain in control of their data.
European Commission Guidance on Apps supporting the fight against COVID 19 pandemic in relation to data protection

The Commision guidance summarises some of the key points of the Toolbox but provides more insight on some of the features, as well details on ensuring data protection and privacy safeguards. The guidance focuses on apps which are voluntary and that offer one or more functionalities: provide accurate information to individuals about the pandemic or provide questionnaires for self-assessment and guidance for individuals (symptom checker). Other functionalities could include alerting individuals if they have been in close contact with an infected person (contact tracing and warning functionality) and/or provide means of communication between patients and doctors.

The guidance relies heavily on references to the ePrivacy Directive (currently blocked by EU Member States from becoming an updated Regulation for 3 years and 4 months) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) . The references include data minimisation, purpose limitation, time limitation (apps deactivated after the pandemic is over) and top-of the-art security protections.

Our member Access Now has thoroughly gone through the data protection and privacy requirements of purpose limitation, data minimisation and time limitation , largely coinciding with the Commission, while Bits of Freedom has also mentioned the minimal use of data needed and time limitation, in addition to the apps being based on scientific insight and demonstrable effectiveness.

Location data is not necessary, decentralisation is

The Commission states that location data is not necessary for the purpose of contact tracing functionalities and that it would even be “difficult to justify in light of the principle of data minimisation”, and that it can create “security and privacy issues”. Regarding the debate of centralisation vs decentralisation, the Commission believes that decentralisation is more in line with the minimisation principle and that, as Bits of Freedom, CCC and many other groups have suggested, only “health authorities should have access to proximity data [which should be encrypted]” and therefore no law enforcement agencies can access the data. What about the well-intended but risky use of data for “statistics and scientific research”? Commission says no, unless it is necessary and included in the general list of purposes and clearly communicated to users.

Get us some open code. And add good-old strong encryption to go with it, please

The Commission asks for the source code to be made public and available for review. In addition to this, the Commission calls for the use of encryption when transmitting the data to national health authorities, if that is one of the functionalities. Both of these conclusions have been some of the key requests from EDRi members such as FSFE, both for transparency and security purposes but also as a an appeal for solidarity. We consider the call for openness as a positive request from the Commission.

Finally, the guidance brings back the forgotten Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) who, as we have also suggested, should be the ones consulted and fully involved when developing and implementing the apps.

Moving forward

We have many uncertainties regarding the actual pandemic, especially regarding whether any technical solution will help or not. Furthermore, it is unclear how these technologies should be designed, developed and deployed in order to avoid mass surveillance of citizens, stigmatisation of those who are sick and reinforced discrimination of people living in poverty, people of colour and other individuals of groups at risks who are already disproportionately affected by the pandemic.

The voices of experts and civil society must be taken into consideration, before taking the road of an endless “war on virus” that normalises mass surveillance. If proven that technologies are indeed helpful to combat this crisis, technological solutions need to comply with very strong core principles. Many of these strong principles are already present in the Commission’s two documents and in many of the civil society views in this ongoing debate.

In the meantime, strong public health systems, strong human rights protections (including extra protections for key workers), a human-rights centric patent system that puts humans at its core and open access to scientific knowledge are key principles that should be implemented now.

EDRi is looking for a Communications and Media Manager (Permanent position)

By EDRi

European Digital Rights (EDRi) is an international not-for-profit association of 42 digital rights organisations from across Europe and beyond. We advocate for robust and enforced laws, inform and mobilise people, promote a healthy and accountable technology market and build a movement of organisations and individuals committed to digital rights and freedoms in a connected world.

EDRi is looking for an experienced Communications and Media Manager to join EDRi’s team in Brussels. This is a unique opportunity to help shape and lead on the communications of a well-respected network of NGOs at a time of numerous challenges to our rights and freedoms in the digital age. The deadline to apply is 22^ndMay 2020. This is a full-time, permanent position and the start date is expected to be July 2020.

The Communications and Media Manager leads and is responsible for EDRi’s strategic communications and engagement with the media. We are looking for an individual that will bring a strategic and creative mindset to communicate about complex human rights and technology issues in a diverse, fast-changing political environment. The successful candidate will have a strong track record in working with European and national media, excellent storytelling and drafting skills, as well as the ability to establish a network of journalists.

We are an equal opportunities employer with a strong commitment to transparency and inclusion. We strive to have a diverse and inclusive working environment. We encourage individual members of groups at risk of discrimination to apply for this post.

Job title: Communications and Media Manager
Start date (expected): July 2020
Reports to: Executive Director
Location: EDRi Office, Brussels, Belgium

RESPONSIBILITIES:
As Communications and Media Manager, working closely with EDRi’s Policy, Campaigns and Network colleagues, you will:

Develop EDRi’s communications and media engagement long term strategies and short term plans;
Promote EDRi’s work and narrative to the media, raising the profile of the EDRi network, including by helping to disseminate their work;
Establish and maintain a robust network of media contacts and relationships;
Support the production and secure the publication of EDRi op-eds and other materials in leading outlets;
Write, edit and send press releases and manage media inquiries;
Support the production and editing of content for EDRi’s website and of the EDRi-gram bi-monthly newsletter;
Oversee EDRi’s social media presence;
Oversee the editing and design of EDRi’s publications;
Analyse media coverage and contribute to report on EDRi’s media exposure and communication work.

QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE:

Minimum 3 years of relevant experience in a similar role;
A university degree in journalism, communications, media studies, EU affairs, public relations or related field or equivalent experience;
Demonstrable knowledge of the European media landscape and of European institutions, and an interest in communicating about and framing of human rights, in particular privacy, surveillance and law enforcement, freedom of expression, as well as other internet policy issues;
Experience in media relations, leading networks of journalists and creating networks of influence;
Exceptional writing skills in particular for op-eds and press releases;
Ability to create visuals for social media, work on simple graphic designs and formatting.
Strong multitasking abilities and ability to manage multiple deadlines;
Experience of working with and in small teams;
Excellent level of English;
Knowledge of another European language is an advantage;
Knowledge of database management systems, mailing list and free and open software is an advantage.

HOW TO APPLY:
To apply, please send a maximum one-page cover letter and a maximum two-page CV in English (including two professional references) and in .pdf format to applications(at)edri.org by 22^ndMay 2020.

Please note that only shortlisted candidates will be contacted.

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15 Apr 2020

COVID-Tech: Emergency responses to COVID-19 must not extend beyond the crisis

By Ella Jakubowska

In EDRi’s new series on COVID-19, we will explore the critical principles for protecting fundamental rights while curtailing the spread of the virus, as outlined in the EDRi network’s statement on the virus. Each post in this series will tackle a specific issue at the intersection of digital rights and the global pandemic in order to explore broader questions about how to protect fundamental rights in a time of crisis. In our statement, we emphasised the principle that states must “[i]mplement exceptional measures only for the duration of the crisis”. In this first post of the series, we take a look at what experiences in the UK, Poland and Hungary could teach states as they work out the most effective ways of stopping the spread of coronavirus – without leaving the door ajar for future fundamental rights violations to creep in.

Public health responses to the coronavirus pandemic are putting unprecedented limits on the daily lives of people across the world. A range of important rights, including to life and health, are of course threatened by COVID-19 – but the responses that we are seeing across Europe also threaten fundamental liberties and freedoms, both freedoms to do things (express ourselves, associate in public) and freedom from things (government surveillance, abuses of power, discrimination). In some cases, fundamental rights in the EU are not just under threat, but are already being unjustifiably, disproportionately and unlawfully violated under the guise of public health.

The state of play in Hungary:

On 30 March 2020, the Prime Minister of Hungary was granted sweeping powers to rule the country by decree. Hungary has been under the EU’s spotlight over the last two years for failing to comply with the EU’s core values, with the European Parliament launching infringement proceedings about the deteriorating respect for the rule of law, and civil society raising serious concerns including lack of respect for privacy and data protection, evidence of widespread state surveillance, and infringements on freedom of expression online. Following the enactment of a state of emergency on 11 March and the tabling of the indefinite decree on 23 March, ostensibly in response to the coronavirus pandemic, EU Parliament representatives issued a clear warning to Hungary, stating that “extraordinary measure adopted by the Hungarian government in response to the pandemic must respect the EU’s founding values.” This warning did little to temper Orbán’s ambitions, and leaves the people of Hungary vulnerable to expanded powers which can be abused long after the spread of coronavirus has been checked.

The state of play in Poland:

The European Parliament have also raised concerns about the worsening rule of law in Poland, in particular threats to the independence of the judiciary, with investigations activated in 2016. On 19 March 2020, the country’s efforts to tackle the spread of coronavirus received widespread attention when the government announced the use of a ‘Civil Quarantine’ app which they explained would require people in quarantine to send geo-located selfies within 20 minutes of receiving an alert – or face a visit from the police. according to the announcement, the app even uses controversial facial recognition technology to scan the selfies.

Early in April, the Polish government looked to make the use of the app mandatory, in a move which, as reported by EDRi member Panoptykon, was not proportionate [PL] (due to factors like people’s images being sent to government servers) and additionally not compliant with Poland’s constitution [PL]. Panoptykon emphasise important rules [PL] when implementing technological applications to combat COVID-19 such as minimising the data collected and having strict time periods for its retention, which states must follow in order to comply with fundamental rights.

The state of play in the UK:

The UK’s Coronavirus Act was passed on 25 March 2020, giving the UK government a suite of extraordinary powers for a period of 2 years. Following pressure from civil society, who called the proposed Bill “draconian”, the disproportiontely long period for the restrictions of people’s rights was adjusted to include parliamentary checks every 6 months. Yet NGOs have continued to question why the Bill is not up for renewal every 30 days, given the enormous potential for abuse of power that can happen when people’s fundamental rights protections are suspended or reduced. This is especially important given that, as EDRi member Privacy International has pointed out, the UK already has worryingly wide powers over forms of surveillance including bulk data interception and retention.

The UK has also come under fire for the sharp rise in disproportionate police responses since the introduction of the Bill, including stopping people from using their own gardens or using drones to chastise dog walkers. If not properly limited by law, these powers (and their abuse) have the potential to continue in ordinary times, further feeding the government’s surveillance machine.

POLITICO reports that UK authorities are not alone, with countries across Europe exploiting the climate of fear to encourage people to spy on and report their neighbours, alongside a rise in vigilante attacks, public shamings and even support for police violence. Such behaviour indicates an increasingly hostile, undemocratic and extra-judicial way of enforcing lockdowns. And it is frighteningly reminiscent of some of the most brutal, repressive twentieth-century police states.

What an open door could mean for the future of digital rights:

Allowing states to dispense with the rule of law in times of crisis risks putting those rights in a position of vulnerability in ordinary times, too. The legitimation and normalisation of surveillance infrastructures creates a sense that being watched and analysed all the time is normal (it is not) and contributes to societies filled with suspicion, abuse and mistrust. Before coronavirus was a household name, for example, Hungary’s secretive Szitakötő project was preparing to install 35,000 facial recognition cameras across the country for mass surveillance. This would allow the state to undermine the principle of investigatory warrants, and instead watch and analyse everyone, all the time. The current, indefinite state of emergency could remove any potential checks and balances on the Szitakötő plans, and allow Orbán to push through a wide range of ever-more-violatory measures such as repression of the free media, freedom of expression and political dissent.

Throughout 2019, Poland made its aspirations for global AI leadership clear, having experimented with automating state welfare since at least 2015. As UN Special Rapporteur Philip Alston has emphasised, the global uptake of “automated welfare” is a direct result of government goals to spend less on welfare, control people’s behaviour and punish those who do not conform. There is a risk that the Polish state could exploit new tech, like their quarantine app, to expand an undemocratic agenda and make technology the go-to solution for any public or societal issue. And the UK is already infamous for having one of the highest rates of surveillance cameras per capita in the world. Combined with the fact that the UK’s health service have employed the help of notorious personal-data-exploiting software company Palantir to manage coronavirus data, this suggests that the UK’s pre-existing public-private surveillance economy is the one area profiting from this crisis.

Conclusion:

Desperate times call for desperate measures – or so the saying goes. But this should not undermine the core values of our societies, especially when we have many reasons to be positive: compassionate and brave health workers treating patients; civil society working to protect rights in coronavirus apps and help governments make the right decisions; and global health organisations working to prevent future incidences of the virus and develop vaccines.

As the EU’s Committee for civil liberties state, mass surveillance does not make us safer. It puts undue limits on our liberties and rights which will continue long after the current emergency has been eased. As a result, we will all be less safe – and that really would be desperate times. In the words of Yuval Noah Harari:

[T]emporary measures have a nasty habit of outlasting emergencies, especially as there is always a new emergency lurking on the horizon […] Centralised monitoring and harsh punishments aren’t the only way to make people comply with beneficial guidelines. […] A self-motivated and well-informed population is usually far more powerful and effective than a policed, ignorant population.

Read more:
Fundamental rights implications of COVID-19 (various dates)
https://fra.europa.eu/en/themes/covid-1

Extraordinary powers need extraordinary protections (20/03/2020)
https://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/3461/extraordinary-powers-need-extraordinary-protections

Use of smartphone data to manage COVID-19 must respect EU data protection rules (07.04.2020)
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20200406IPR76604/use-of-smartphone-data-to-manage-covid-19-must-respect-eu-data-protection-rules

Contract Tracing in the Real World (12.04.2020)
https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2020/04/12/contact-tracing-in-the-real-world/

(Contribution by Ella Jakubowska, EDRi Policy Intern)

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15 Apr 2020

By Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte

Former Member of the European Parliament Julia Reda has joined the EDRi member German Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte (GFF, Society for Civil Rights). The copyright reform activist will coordinate control ©, a new project to defend freedom of communication. Control © will explore the friction between copyright law and fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, ban on censorship and others. It will operate as a strategic legal guardian, bringing strategic copyright cases to court and ensuring that fundamental rights considerations are at the forefront of those cases.

Last year, Germany was on of the key focal points of protests against the European directive on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market (DSM Directive). A strong civil society movement, including EDRi and its members, formed against the most controversial provisions, Article 15 on the neighboring right for press publishers and Article 17 (former Article 13 <saveyourinternet.eu/>) on liability of online content sharing service providers.

The then former MEP and copyright reform activist Julia Reda led the opposition against the DSM Directive within the European Parliament, pointing towards its likely incompatibility with the EU’s Charter of Fundamental rights. To date, it is still disputed whether the requirements of Article 17 can be met without the installation of upload filters. Upload filters restrict free communication, because they invariably lead to the blocking of legal uses under copyright exceptions such as citations. Platforms that fail to cooperate with rightsholders to block the uploads of infringing content can be held liable for copyright infringements by their users.

The German government promised to avoid the introduction of upload filters as they would restrict free online communication to a critical degree, possibly violating freedoms guaranteed by the German basic law. This concerns the right to freedom of opinion and freedom of information and, depending on the functioning of these filters, the rights to data protection and confidentiality of communications.

Securing fundamental rights in copyright through strategic litigation

Whichever approach will be taken by Germany and other EU member states, the DSM Directive will expose existing problems and cause new ones between copyright law and fundamental rights. Government solutions to these problems are likely to benefit large right holders (music companies, film industry), neglecting the rights of users such as scientists, teachers, activists and also of small copyright holders and authors.

Thus, control © will use strategic litigation to fight for an implementation of the DSM Directive that is in conformity with European and German fundamental rights. Strategic litigation has proven an invaluable tool to combat fundamental rights violations in the digital era. Since 2016, GFF has gone to court to defend civil rights in the face of mass-surveillance, e xcessive secret service powers or opaque state authorities. Control © will make use of this strategic tool in yet another area of law, profiting from GFF’s and Julia Reda’s combined expertise.

Beyond upload filters: cultural heritage and freedom of science

Beyond upload filters, there are more open questions regarding the interplay of copyright law and fundamental rights. The copyright Directive introduces new rules on digitizing making out-of-print works available. This holds the chance to unlock a huge treasure of pictures, music, poems and other works that are no longer in commercial use. We will help institutions such as libraries, museums and archives to make use of these new opportunities in order to strengthen freedom of culture, science and information.

Finally, academic freedom requires the circulation of knowledge as well as legal certainty. Too often, authors of scientific publications are being forced to cede the rights to their studies to commercial scientific publishers. The paywalls they install impede the access to knowledge and scientific progress. Strategic litigation in this field aims to clarify the regulations around Open Access publishing in order to make this option more feasible for more scientists.

Read more:
Introducing control © – Strategic Litigation for Free Communication (13.04.2020)
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2020/04/13/introducing-control-strategic-litigation-for-free-communication/

Control ©: Copyright and freedom of communication (in German only) (13.04.2020)
https://freiheitsrechte.org/urheberrecht/

About GFF (English)
https://freiheitsrechte.org/english/

(Contribution by Luisa Podsadny, from EDRi member GFF)

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15 Apr 2020

Technology, migration, and illness in the times of COVID-19

By Petra Molnar

In our ongoing work on technology and migration, we examine the impacts of the current COVID-19 pandemic on the rights of people on the move and the increasingly worrying use of surveillance technology and AI at the border and beyond.

Refugees, immigrants, and people on the move have long been linked with bringing disease and illness. People crossing borders whether by force or by choice are often talked about in apocalyptic terms like ‘flood’ or ‘wave,’ underscored by growing xenophobia and racism. Not only are these links blatantly incorrect, they also legitimise far-reaching state incursions and increasingly hardline policies of surveillance and techno-solutionism to manage migration.

These practices become all the more apparent in the current global fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.

In a matter of days, we saw Big Tech present a variety of ‘solutions’ for fighting the coronavirus sweeping the globe. Coupled with extraordinary state powers, the incursion of the private sector leaves open the possibility of grave human rights abuses and far reaching effects on civil liberties, particularly for communities on the margins. While emergency powers can be legitimate if grounded in science and the need to protect health and safety, history shows that states commit abuses in times of exception. New technologies can often facilitate these abuses, particularly against marginalised communities.

As more and more states move increasingly towards a model of bio-surveillance to contain the spread of the pandemic, we are seeing an increase of tracking, automated drones, and other types of technologies developed by the private sector purporting to help manage migration and stop the spread of the virus. However, if previous use of technology is any indication, refugees and people on the move will be disproportionately targeted. Once tools like virus-killing robots, cellphone tracking, and‘artificially intelligent thermal cameras’ are turned on, they will be used against people crossing borders and bring far reaching ramifications. Our research has repeatedly shown that migration technological experiments are often discriminatory, breach privacy, and even endanger lives.

Pandemic responses are political. Making people on the move more trackable and detectable justifies the use of more technology and data collection in the name of public health and national security. Even before the current pandemic, we have already been documenting a worldwide roll-out of migration “techno-solutionism.” These technological experiments occur at many points in a person’s migration journey. Well before you even cross a border, Big Data analytics are used to predict your movement and biometric data is collected about refugees. At the border, AI lie detectors and facial recognition have started to scan people’s faces for signs of deception. Beyond the border, algorithms have made their way into complex decision-making in immigration and refugee determinations, normally undertaken by human officers. A host of people’s fundamental human rights are impacted, including freedom from discrimination, privacy issues, and even life and liberty.

In some cases, increased technology at the border has sadly already meant increased deaths. In late 2019, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, commonly known as Frontex, announced a new border strategy called ECOSUR which relies on increased staff and new technology like drones. This strategy is similar to the Horizon 2020 ROBORDER project which ‘aims to create a fully functional autonomous border surveillance system with unmanned mobile robots including aerial, water surface, underwater and ground vehicles.’ In the U.S., similar ‘smart-border’ technologies have been called a more ‘humane’ alternative to the Trump Administration’s calls for a physical wall. However, these technologies can have drastic results. For example, border control policies that use new surveillance technologies along the US–Mexico border have actually doubled migrant deaths and pushed migration routes towards more dangerous terrain through the Arizona desert, creating what anthropologist Jason De Leon calls a ‘land of open graves’. Given that the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has reported that due to recent shipwrecks, over 20,000 people have died trying to cross the Mediterranean since 2014, we can only imagine how many more bodies will wash upon the shores of Europe as the situation worsens up in Greece and Turkey.

The COVID pandemic will greatly also affect refugees living in informal settlements or securitised camps. Cases have already been reported on the Greek Island of Lesbos, which has been hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees since the start of the Syrian War in 2011. Italy has also just announced that it has closed its ports to refugee ships because of the coronavirus until July 31. However, the answer to stopping the spread of the virus is not increased surveillance through new technology, building new detention camps, and preventing access into the camps for NGO workers and medical personnel. Instead, we need a redistribution of vital resources, free access to healthcare for all regardless of immigration status, and more empathy and kindness towards people crossing borders.

While technology can offer the promise of novel solutions for an unprecedented global crisis, we must ensure that COVID technology does not unfairly target refugees, racialised communities, the Indigenous communities, and other marginalised groups, and make discriminatory inferences that can lead to detention, family separation, and other irreparable harms. Technological tools can quickly become tools of oppression and surveillance, denying people agency and dignity and contributing to a global climate that is increasingly more hostile to people on the move. Most importantly, technological solutions do not address the root causes of displacement, forced migration, and economic inequality, all of which exacerbate the spread of global pandemics like COVID-19. Unless all of us are healthy, including marginalised communities, no one is.

In times of exception like a global pandemic, the hubris of Big Tech thinking it has all the answers is not the solution to a complex global health crisis.

Read more:
Press Release: EDRi calls for fundamental rights-based responses to COVID-19 (01.04.2020)
https://edri.org/edri-calls-for-fundamental-rights-based-responses-to-covid-19/

Accountable Migration Tech: Transparency, governance and oversight (11.03.2020)
https://edri.org/accountable-migration-tech-transparency-governance-and-oversight

Emerging Voices: Immigration, Iris-Scanning and iBorderCTRL–The Human Rights Impacts of Technological Experiments in Migration (19.08.2019)
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/08/19/emerging-voices-immigration-iris-scanning-and-iborderctrl-the-human-rights-impacts-of-technological-experiments-in-migration/

The Privatization of Migration Control (24.02.2020)
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/privatization-migration-control

(Contribution by Petra Molnar, Mozilla Fellow, EDRi)

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Agenda

#WhoReallyTargetsYou: DSA and political microtargeting

Member in the spotlight: Homo Digitalis

Why COVID-19 is a Crisis for Digital Rights

Everything you need to know about the DSA

Digital Services Act: Document pool

Table of content

EDRi’s analysis and recommendations

Legislative documents

EDRi’s blogposts and press releases

EDRi members’ publications

Key policymakers

Key dates

COVID-19: A Commission hitchhiker’s tech guide to the App Store

A techie toolbox

Decentralised or centralised, that is the question

Readers who liked the Toolbox… also liked the Guidelines

Location data is not necessary, decentralisation is

Get us some open code. And add good-old strong encryption to go with it, please

Moving forward

Read more:

EDRi is looking for a Communications and Media Manager (Permanent position)

COVID-Tech: Emergency responses to COVID-19 must not extend beyond the crisis

Control ©: defending free online communication through litigation

Technology, migration, and illness in the times of COVID-19