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.@USAID has resisted becoming as involved in the project's second attempt, in Sudan, as it was in Burkina Faso — wary of a similar interagency morass. It’s a bad sign for the #GlobalFragilityAct, which requires similar cooperation between @USAID and @StateDept.

“There is a lesson here about country selection and being very careful about figuring out where you really can do meaningful prevention work without violence erupting in the near term that could prevent that work from going forward.”

Those involved in the project expressed frustration about using a large amount of staff time and resources on a project that ultimately went nowhere and about its inability to effectively program any violence prevention activities in a deteriorating security situation.

Shortly after, the onset of COVID-19 solidified the decision to abandon the project — nearly a year after the @USIP report — given the challenges the pandemic would pose to international travel to the field.

Despite those challenges, the interagency group agreed in February to continue pursuing implementation of violence prevention activities. But just a few weeks later, the U.S. ambassador to Burkina Faso decided to cancel the project.

After the embassy drawdown, those in Washington continued to try to find a way for violence prevention activities to go forward in Burkina Faso. By the start of 2020, an average of more than 4,000 people per day were fleeing attacks from extremists and local authorities.

Staffing for project work in Burkina Faso was something of a Catch-22. Those at the post resented having personnel sent from Washington, while at the same time recognizing they did not have sufficient staffing levels on their own to dedicate to implementation.

“I would point to that moment as the place where the window was really closing fast. We spent a lot of time after that happened in November trying to figure out what set of activities would make sense, given what was happening — and it was very, very difficult to figure it out."

A delegation from Washington visited in October to scope out the project, but only a few weeks later the U.S. Embassy in Ouagadougou ordered nonemergency staffers out of the country due to increased violence. This left them with little capacity to implement the pilot project.

“I’m a big believer in bureaucratic momentum, and I think one of the things we need to do sometimes is try to move processes faster than processes want us to work them. … This kind of got bogged down in process,” @USAID’s Rob Jenkins said.

The process of choosing Burkina Faso for the demonstration project took several months, delayed by desk reviews and interagency meetings. When it was formally picked in August 2019, the country had already exceeded the total number of attacks it had experienced the previous year.

The demonstration project was to pilot the task force's recommendations for a new U.S. approach to preventing violent extremism with an emphasis on better interagency coordination, particularly between @USAID and @StateDept.

The project grew out of the @USIP Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, driven by @LindseyGrahamSC, examining the U.S. track record in countering violent extremism and past failures to effectively execute counterterrorism programming in fragile states and intervene in time.

What exactly went wrong? There's not universal agreement on that, but explanations from those involved include: — A lack of true interagency cooperation. — A missed prevention window in Burkina Faso. — COVID-19.

“It illustrates, in one discrete effort, so many different worst practices of how the interagency does not work effectively together,” a person familiar with the project told @Devex.