GiveDirectly

From Subsistence to Rebuilding:

An internal evaluation of large cash transfers to refugees and host communities in Uganda

September 2018

With funding support from our partners: The IKEA Foundation, UK's Department for International Development, Comic Relief, UBS Optimus Foundation, the Tent Partnership for Refugees, and the Vitol Foundation













Executive summary

There are more displaced people in the world today than at any time since the second world war. Conflicts are becoming increasingly protracted, and so too the displacement of those who flee them. A refugee today can expect to spend years, decades, even a lifetime in exile. Our current humanitarian system is built to deal with the immediate crisis, providing vital, life-saving support in doing so. However, protracted situations need solutions that address the long term. Supporting refugees as they rebuild their lives, not just saving them, is becoming the new humanitarian imperative.

At GiveDirectly, we are seeking to understand what role cash transfers could play in delivering this goal. While cash is growing in humanitarian aid, it makes up a small share of overall programming, is often delivered with restrictions on its usage, and most transfers are sized only for survival support. Our goal is to explore whether a larger investment of capital, delivered to refugees with no strings attached, can deliver more transformative outcomes. In 2017, we partnered with a coalition of like-minded donors to do so: the IKEA Foundation, the UK's Department for International Development, Comic Relief, the UBS Optimus Foundation, the Tent Foundation, and the Vitol Foundation.

We designed a two-phased pilot:

- The first phase, implemented in 2017-2018, was an operational pilot that tested the feasibility of the program and gathered illustrative evidence on impact. This report evaluates this first phase.
- The second phase, due to start in late 2018, will seek to deliver the program at greater scale, with an accompanying rigorous study of impact, carried out by independent researchers.

This report lays out the background, goals and results of the first phase of the pilot: a program that delivered transfers of ~\$660 to households living in extreme poverty in both refugee and local, host communities. The program was implemented in Uganda: home to over a million refugees, and also some of the world's most progressive policies towards them. Here, refugees have the right to work, set up businesses, and are given small plots of land on which to live and farm. As such, it provides the opportunity to test the impact of large, unrestricted cash transfers, in an environment where refugees have relative freedom to invest them. It should be noted that in settings where refugees' freedoms are more restricted, the findings we document in this report might not be replicated. We are planning to explore this further ourselves, by implementing a similar program in Rwanda, where refugees' have less opportunity to seek work and travel freely.

In this context, we find that:

- 1. It is operationally feasible and efficient to deliver large, unrestricted cash transfers to refugee and host communities. Organizations can send, and recipients can receive, withdraw and safely spend large cash transfers. Local markets appear responsive, though there is some indication of price rises, likely short-term. This can be achieved while setting a high benchmark for efficiency.
- 2. There is evidence of wide-ranging positive outcomes and immediate improvements in recipients' lives. Cash is adaptable to recipients' varying, and sometimes changing, needs. This report suggests considerable improvement across a wide-range of outcomes.
- 3. Taken together with the existing evidence-base around cash, we consider cash transfers one of the most effective livelihoods-improving interventions in refugee settings. Where other interventions lack positive evidence, or any evidence at all, we invite donors and implementing organisations to ask themselves: "why not cash?"
- 4. Refugees' lives are exposed to shocks and instability; the flexibility of cash allows recipients to adapt and respond. Cash can provide refugees with a critical financial lifeline in their inherently unstable environments.

Important questions remain unanswered, from the magnitude and duration of impact, to which groups are best targeted and when. The second phase of our pilot, due to begin in late 2018, will look to address these questions, and others, with more robust and rigorous evidence.

About GiveDirectly

GiveDirectly is a non-profit that delivers unconditional cash transfers to households living in extreme poverty. This approach stems from rigorous experimental evidence of impact and core values of efficiency, transparency, and respect. GiveDirectly has been operational in Uganda since 2013. This document reports on GiveDirectly's first program working with refugee communities.

About the authors:

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1. Context and motivation.

1.1. The global displacement crisis.

There are over 68.5 million displaced people in the world today, the highest number in a generation. Over 25 million are refugees, driven across borders by conflict and persecution¹. While newspaper headlines focus on the minority who attempt to reach the shores of the West, fully 86% of refugees remain in their region of origin, taking refuge in often poor and insecure neighboring countries. The humanitarian aid system has by necessity focused on the most pressing needs of rescue and survival. This support is vital, the difference between life and death for millions of the globally displaced. But it is not enough. Conflicts are becoming increasingly protracted; just 2.5% resolve in under three years. As a result, the duration of displacement has grown².

Conventionally, there have been three 'durable' solutions to refugee crises: repatriation, when conflicts end; resettlement to a third country, where global politics permit; or local integration in the host country. In 2015, it was estimated that just 2% of the world's refugees had access to any of these three³. The vast majority of refugees are trapped in limbo, unable to achieve true self-sufficiency in their adopted homes, but with little hope of leaving them. Acknowledging this, in 2016 world leaders signed the UN's landmark 'Declaration for Refugees and Migrants'⁴. One of the primary goals was to place a new emphasis on supporting refugees as they rebuild their lives, regain their independence, and thrive in new, adopted homes. The question that remained was how?

1.2. Cash transfers in humanitarian settings.

In recent years, the use of cash transfers in humanitarian settings, as a replacement for traditional 'in-kind' aid, has grown. According to the 2018 'State of the World Cash Report', cash transfers now account for 10% of humanitarian spending, 40% higher than the previous year⁵. In 2015, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) reviewed the available evidence base. Their report showed marked improvement in results when cash was compared against in-kind interventions: evidence from studies in Rwanda and Uganda illustrated greater economic benefit, within refugee and local communities, when aid was delivered as cash; studies in Ethiopia and Somalia showed considerable increases in efficiency; and a study in Lebanon showed that 80% of recipients prefer to receive cash⁶.

Recent evaluations suggest there is room for further growth. In 2016, the Global Public Policy Institute estimated that if cash was used wherever the evidence suggests it should be, it would account for 40% of humanitarian aid, four-times its current share⁷. Cash transfers in humanitarian settings are also often restrictive, delivered as vouchers that limit recipients to approved vendors. Such restrictions prioritize control for the implementing organization over benefit to recipients, as vouchers have been shown to be less effective and less efficient than unrestricted cash⁸. The value of each cash transfer is also often small, sized for a subsistence food ration but no more. By design, they provide recipients with no opportunity to save or invest, only to meet their most immediate survival needs.

1.3. Large, unrestricted cash transfers.

Outside of the humanitarian setting, organizations have been providing recipients with larger, unrestricted transfers, and evaluating the impact of doing so. A study nine-months after a transfer from GiveDirectly, averaging \$500, shows the broad range of potential positive impact. Recipients in the study experienced increases in asset value (+61%), earnings (+33%) and food expenditure (+19%), as well as significant

¹ UNHCR, 2016, Statistical Yearbooks, http://www.unhcr.org/uk/figures-at-a-glance.html.

² Crawford et al, Overseas Development Institute, 2016, *Protracted displacement: uncertain paths to self-reliance in exile*, https://www.odi.org/publications/9906-refugee-idp-displacement-livelihoods-humanitarian-development

³ Betts and Collier, 2017, Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World

⁴ UN, 2016, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/1

⁵ Smith et al, CaLP, *The state of the world's cash report*, http://www.cashlearning.org/downloads/calp-sowc-report-web.pdf

⁶ High level panel on cash transfers, ODI, 2015, *Doing cash differently: how cash transfers can transform humanitarian aid*, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9828.pdf

⁷ Steets et al, GPPI, 2016, Drivers and inhibitors of change in the humanitarian system,

 $[\]label{lem:http://www.cashlearning.org/downloads/Fast%20and%20Central\%20Africa\%20CVTWG/drivers-and-inhibitors-of-change-in-the-humanitarian-system report.pdf$

⁸ Boston Consulting Group, 2017, *Food: restricted voucher or unrestricted cash?*https://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/communications/wfp291346.pdf

improvements in food security, psychological well-being and female empowerment⁹. A three-year follow-up showed that considerable asset increases were sustained, although the extent to which other impacts were still visible depended on varying approaches to measurement of the study¹⁰. There are a few studies of longer-term impact now emerging too. In Northern Uganda, a four-year study showed cash transfer recipients were earning 38% more than non-recipients, after a one-off transfer¹¹. A ten-year follow-up is imminent, where we'll learn the extent to which impacts are sustained. In Sri Lanka, meanwhile, a five-year study showed incomes 64-96% higher among recipients than non-recipients, although these results were only evident amongst men¹².

1.4. Large cash transfers to refugees.

In 2017, we designed a pilot to examine the potential for providing larger transfers to refugee communities. In doing so, we sought to understand whether a large investment of unrestricted capital would allow refugees to begin rebuilding their lives and thrive in their adopted homes. This intervention was one of the first of its kind in a refugee setting, and as such addresses a clear gap in the humanitarian evidence base.

To do so, we developed a two-phased pilot. The first phase, implemented in 2017-2018, was an operational pilot that tested the feasibility of the program and gathered illustrative evidence on impact. This report evaluates this first phase. The second phase, due to start in late 2018, will seek to deliver the program at greater scale, with an accompanying rigorous study of impact, carried out by independent researchers.

1.5. Goals for the first phase of the pilot.

The first phase of the pilot had two core goals:

- 1. First, we sought to deliver direct benefit to the program's recipients: families living in extreme poverty, often unable to meet their basic needs. Specifically, we looked to answer the following questions:
 - A. What was the state of livelihoods amongst the recipients before transfers?
 - B. What was the immediate impact of the transfers?
 - C. What indication do we have of longer-term impact?
 - D. What was the impact on social cohesion within communities, and between the refugee and host communities?
- Second, we sought to address a series of key questions related to the feasibility of delivering large transfers in refugee settings. Specifically, we looked to answer:
 - A. Can organizations effectively and efficiently deliver large transfers in refugee settings?
 - B. Can recipients safely receive and withdraw large cash transfers in refugee settings?
 - C. How do local markets respond to an injection of cash transfers?
 - D. How would recipients themselves have improved on the delivery of the program?

This report explores the evidence gathered on each of the above.

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⁹ Haushofer and Shapiro, "The Short-Term Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers to the Poor", 2016, https://www.princeton.edu/~joha/publications/Haushofer_Shapiro_UCT_2016.04.25.pdf

¹⁰ GiveDirectly blog, 2018, Our take on HS18, revisited, https://www.givedirectly.org/blog-post?id=8949137018980120769

¹¹ Blattman et al, "The Economic and Social Returns to Cash Transfers", 2013, http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/cega_events/53/WGAPE_Sp2013_Blattman.pdf

¹² De Mel et al, "One-Time Transfers of Cash or Capital Have Long-Lasting Effects on Microenterprises in Sri Lanka", 2012, http://science.sciencemag.org/content/335/6071/962.full

2. Program Design and Execution.

Location. This pilot was implemented in Uganda, home to around 1.4 million refugees¹³, the highest refugee population in Africa, and also some of the most progressive policies towards refugees in the world. Here, refugees have the right to work, set up businesses, and are given small plots of land on which to live and farm. As such, Uganda provides the opportunity to test the impact of unrestricted cash transfers, in an environment where refugees have relative freedom to invest them. In settings where refugees' freedoms are more restricted, the findings we document in this report might not be applicable. We are planning to test this ourselves, by implementing a similar program in Rwanda, where refugees' have less opportunity to seek work and travel freely.

We worked in the Kyaka II refugee settlement, in South-Western Uganda. Kyaka II is home mostly to refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo, alongside a smaller population of Rwandan refugees. Until recently, the settlement had a mostly stable population. However, in late 2017 fresh conflict in neighboring Congo saw an influx of arrivals to Uganda, and Kyaka II became a 'receiving settlement' once again.

Target population: refugees. We chose to target protracted refugees, families who have been in exile for years, decades, even lifetimes. We did so for three reasons. Firstly, protracted refugees are overlooked by the existing humanitarian system, which focuses its limited resources on emerging and ongoing crises. While protracted refugees have often had their humanitarian support reduced or removed entirely, anecdotal evidence suggests that they have rarely graduated to an improved economic state. Secondly, protracted refugees could represent a high-potential group to target. Having spent many years in Uganda, they are more likely to have built social capital and links to the local economy. As such, they could have an enhanced ability to invest a larger sum of money. Thirdly, protracted refugees are an important group to target, and will be increasingly so. More than 80% of refugee crises now last for ten years or more ¹⁴, and thus the protracted refugee population grows with each year. The GiveDirectly pilot program targeted all protracted refugees in the Kyaka II settlement, a total of 2,231 households.

Target population: host nationals. In addition to targeting refugees, the program targeted Ugandan 'host' nationals living in direct proximity to the settlement. These households live in poverty comparable to that of their refugee neighbors, but are largely overlooked by aid organizations: 99% of host households in the program reported that they had never received aid prior to GiveDirectly. We were not able to target all households within this community, and so used a poverty based criteria, the 'Poverty Prediction Index' (PPI)¹⁵, to select households in each recipient village. The program reached 2,140 households in the host community.

Transfer sizing. Recipients received a transfer of 2,400,000 UGX (~\$660) per household. The transfer size was approximately aligned to the World Food Programme (WFP) ration received by an average family over the course of a year. In doing so, the program ensured that recipients received a considerable sum, but also an amount that is not necessarily out of the operational scope of the humanitarian sector's largest cash transfer agency. Transfers were split over three monthly payments.

Payment modality. Transfers were delivered through one of two modalities. 3,424 households, a mixture of refugees and hosts, received transfers through the MTN mobile money payments platform. 947 households, almost entirely in the refugee community, received transfers through PostBank, a bank owned by the Government of Uganda, with considerable experience of delivering cash in refugee settings.

Coordination. This program was conceived and designed in close partnership with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Uganda; the funders of the program; the Government of Uganda's Department for Refugees, within the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM); and District-level local government. Throughout delivery of the program, we closely engaged with communities of practice, most notably the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UNHCR-coordinated "Uganda Cash Working Group".

Monitoring and evaluation. This report draws on data from three sources:

- Data collected as part of GiveDirectly's standard enrollment process, providing insight on recipient experience and operational delivery.
- A longer follow-up survey with a sample of 484 households, 11% of the program's recipients. This sample was chosen using a stratified randomization, to ensure a representative sample of men,

¹³ There is an ongoing verification of these figures, conducted by UNHCR, live data can be tracked here: https://im.unhcr.org/uga/

¹⁴ Crawford et al, ODI, 2016

¹⁵ https://www.povertyindex.org/country/uganda

- women, refugee, host, vulnerable, non-vulnerable, and recipients receiving transfers through MTN mobile money and PostBank. Experienced GiveDirectly field staff were trained on the survey, and the survey itself was piloted and cognitively tested, according to industry best practice¹⁶, to ensure it was understood as intended by recipients.
- Six focus groups, purposively sampled to ensure we captured the views of men, women, refugee,
 host, and recipients of both payment providers. Participants within each stratum (e.g. male refugees
 receiving transfers through MTN) were randomly selected. GiveDirectly field staff underwent
 qualitative research training with an independent, experienced qualitative researcher before
 conducting the focus groups and applied a common discussion guide. Interactions were recorded,
 transcribed verbatim, translated into English, coded, and analyzed thematically.

Recipient involvement in the evaluation was voluntary, with surveys and focus groups only undertaken with relevant consent collected.

In this evaluation, we elected not to carry out in-depth interviews, with stakeholders from other organizations involved in the refugee response for instance: an approach that will be considered in future research. No baseline data were collected, and no 'control' group of non-recipients was tracked. Data were collected by GiveDirectly field staff, who had been involved in the enrollment of households, and this report has been written by GiveDirectly staff. As such, its findings should be considered descriptive and illustrative only, intended to report recipients' own views of the intervention, not as a rigorous or robust evaluation of impact.

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
¹⁶ Hofmeyer et al, "Do You Understand What I Mean? How Cognitive Interviewing Can Strengthen Valid, Reliable Study Instruments And Dissemination Products", 2015, https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/F11078374.pdf

3. Results.

3.1. Effects on recipients' lives.

A. Prior to transfers, recipients in the refugee and host communities lived in comparable and considerable levels of poverty, although refugees experienced an additional negative shock just weeks before receiving their transfers.

Measured according to the Poverty Prediction Index (PPI), the average refugee recipient had a 76.7% chance of living below the World Bank's global poverty line (less than \$3.10 PPP per day) before receiving transfers. The average host, an 88.1% chance. The distribution is illustrated in *Figure A* below.



In both communities, female-headed households were poorer than their male neighbors. At the time of enrolment, agriculture was the primary occupation for both communities: 78% of refugees and 87% of host households self-identified as subsistence farmers. 2.7% of households were categorized as vulnerable, defined as household heads who are either: elderly, under 18, physically disabled, mentally ill or with a learning disability. There was slightly higher vulnerability recorded amongst the refugee community.

Within the host community, life was hard, dictated by the land and the seasons. When yields were poor, or prices at markets were low, the needs of the family went unmet. Those without land were forced to seek work as manual laborers, in exchange for food or a small wage. Such work was hard to find. Even for those with land, life was difficult. In focus groups, the host community talked of children out of school, unhappy homes, and a pervading sense of desperation:

"I could not manage all the needs for my household members because sometimes I would plant and harvest with poor yields." Male recipient in the host community

"My family wasn't happy because we had little... Whenever a child would be sent from school and stayed at home for two days they would hate me and yet there was no money to pay and thus happiness would disappear." Male recipient in the host community

"I would work hard looking for food through digging for people. Sometimes I would fail and the pressure was killing me." Female recipient in the host community

One member of the community poignantly summarized her experience of a life of poverty:

"Can a home with misery be having laughs? Can I be happy yet I live in Poverty?" Female recipient in the host community

Refugees' lives are additionally affected by their exposure to a series of shocks that have dominated their recent lives. The first is exile. Fleeing their homeland at a time of conflict and persecution, often with only what they could carry on their backs, the refugees appeared thankful for the role that UNHCR and the Government of Uganda played in providing a safe-haven. The period immediately after their arrival in Uganda appears to have been one of relative calm:

"We are refugees in this country and we were glad that the country supported us and allowed us to farm... We were comfortable and our children were always happy and satisfied..." Male recipient in the refugee community

"UNHCR received us well and we were given land. We began to make good changes. We would farm and look after our families. The children were happy, had food to eat and were attending school." Male recipient in the refugee community

Within a few years, however, refugees experienced their second shock. This time, their removal from humanitarian support: a subsistence food ration they had received since arrival, usually for a period of three to five years. The result had a considerable negative impact:

"Life was very bad. I had been put off food. I have many children; some had dropped out of school. Getting food and basic needs was not easy." Female recipient in the refugee community.

With land to farm, however, the community still had some level of self-reliance, living off their harvests and selling any surplus. It was a similar life to that of their neighbors in the host community.

The third shock was therefore perhaps the greatest. In late 2017, Kyaka II saw the arrival of thousands of new refugees from the re-emerging crisis in the Congo. To accommodate them, the original refugee population was forced to cease farming the land they had previously been farming. In one fell swoop, refugees lost both their primary source of food and income. Replacing this lost land by purchasing another plot was not an option. Even with the money to do so, recipients reported that buying land in Uganda is prohibited "as long as you are a refugee". The result, as reported by recipients, was devastating. Refugees responded by introducing coping strategies: children were taken out of school, meals per day were reduced, and many recipients took out large debts with crippling interest rates.

"I had no sources of income. I had land on which I would cultivate and get food for my family but the land was taken away. I didn't have money to buy food, buy clothes and shoes for my children and they stopped going to school." Female recipient in the refugee community.

"The piece of land was taken away from me. I wanted all my children to go to school but I couldn't afford it.... Most times we would go hungry." Female recipient in the refugee community.

"We would struggle to live and get food. Children were unable to go to school... We would at times go to the nationals' farms to dig for food and money for catering for the family. We had no happiness both in the family and the community." Female recipient in the refugee community.

Falling incomes affected the wider economy, and local shops began to close:

"I had a business back then... a shop and bar. When they brought more people, things started changing and my income reduced since all the [community's] money was being spent on basic needs and medication. It continued until my business collapsed." Male recipient in the refugee community.

Even manual labor in the host community was harder to find, likely due to the surge in supply of available workers:


"Even in the nationals where we used to run to, work is scarce because the number of refugees has increased." Male recipient in the refugee community.

"At times we would walk around the nationals' farms and find no work to do. We would then come back home and sleep on empty stomachs and children would have no potential to go to school." Female recipient in the refugee community.

The refugee community felt betrayed, abandoned, even dehumanized by the experience. It was, as one refugee remembered: "A life of animals." When we evaluate the impact of the program, it is important to do so in the context of this shock.

B. There is evidence, in both the refugee and host community, of substantial immediate impact.

Recipient spending illustrates the wide range of investment available to recipients of cash transfers.





As illustrated in *figure B*, Cash allows recipients to meet their diverse needs, in ways that a single, in-kind intervention cannot. Between the refugee and host recipients, we see similarities in spending behavior, but divergence too. We see that host households spent greater sums on agricultural investment than refugees, for instance. This could result from the refugees' recent loss of their primary source of income: their land. Refugees appear to have spent more on meeting immediate needs than host households: clearing more debt, buying more food, and retaining more money for future needs. Again, this could be indicative of losing their sole source of income. Refugees invested substantially more in non-agricultural business activity than the host community, however, possibly indicating that they were adapting away from agriculture and towards sources of income that were less reliant on farmland.

When we disaggregate spending by gender, in *figure C* and *figure D*, we see little variation in spending between men and women. Whether an individual was a member of the refugee or host community appears to have affected their spending to a far greater degree than gender. This aligns to the markedly similar results for male and female recipients reported in a 2016 randomized controlled trial evaluating our work in Kenya¹⁷.

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 $^{^{}m 17}$ Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016





Refugee and host recipients reported considerable impact after the transfers. Both noted improved happiness within their homes and the local community; improved ability to meet basic needs, including sending more children to school; and increased earnings. One recipient summarized the variety of impact the transfers had:

"Many things changed, the family was happy since we were able to acquire things we had longed to have. Our family relations improved. Our relationship with our neighbors improved and we all live in peace. My abilities in the family improved since I was empowered to do, and acquire, what I wanted using the money. I sent back my children to school, bought home basic needs and food. Life changed and the health of the family members improved since we eat well." Female recipient in the refugee community.

Some recipients spoke in terms of increased empowerment and a sense of renewal:

"I feel safe without fear.... I feel proud and very strong after the transfer... because you gave us the money and we used it well." Female recipient in the host community.

"I was helpless but this money from GiveDirectly will build me up." Male recipient in the refugee community.

At the most extreme end of the responses, some recipients believed the GiveDirectly transfer had saved their lives:

"[Without GiveDirectly support] I would be dead... The transfer facilitated me to go the hospital for treatment. Or I would be in prison because of the debts that had have accumulated like I told you due to sickness. I am alive because of GiveDirectly." Male recipient in the host community.

"I had even got a rope so that they would find me swinging after killing myself in that old house. They would ask themselves: why? I don't drink, it is poverty that was going to make me kill myself. This organization saved me." Female recipient in the host community.

The follow-up survey data supports the focus group findings:

- 95% of the sample reported improved family relations. 84% reported improved community relations.
- 87% reported that their incomes had increased after transfers. In the host community, the figure was 96%.
- There was a 31-percentage point increase in the number of refugees who were involved in non-agricultural business, from 24% to 55% of the sample. This aligns with the increased spending on non-agricultural business that we recorded in *Figure B*.
- Host households' increased investment in agriculture is also reflected in a seven-percentage point increase in agricultural business, from 83% to 90% of the sample, as well as a 13-percentage point increase in non-agricultural business, from 11% to 24% of the sample.
- We see a considerable increase in attendance at school amongst the refugee community, with 43% of refugees able to put another child into schooling, many of whom may have been removed from school after the loss of farmland.
- We also see considerable improvement in financial inclusion. At the end of the program, 91% of refugees and 99% of hosts reported that they expected to continue using their mobile money accounts.
 - Among the host community, we saw increased access to formal financial services (savings and loans products);
 - Among refugees, informal loans and savings are more common, however, suggesting that refugees struggle more to access formal financial service products than their neighbors in the host community do.

The considerable impact of the loss of farmland on refugees is evident, however. Subsistence farming dropped by a devastating 69 percentage points, from 80% to just 11% of households. Agricultural business also dropped, by 21 percentage points, from 26% to 5% of the sample reporting farming for an income. Unemployment within the refugee community also grew. The number of refugees reporting no source of income increased by 24 percentage points, from 1% of households to a quarter of the sample. In contrast, unemployment amongst the host recipients decreased, dropping three percentage points to just 1% of the sample.

Annotated results, disaggregated by community and gender, tables can be found in Annex 5.4.3.

C. Host households were positive about their long-term futures; refugee households were more circumspect.

Both communities were asked about their expectations for the future, after receiving the GiveDirectly transfers. The host community's outlook was markedly positive. Recipients were optimistic about the investments they made, and the continued impact these would have on their lives:

"I bought land... The tools I bought for my carpentry will keep on bringing in more money that will help in looking after my family." Male recipient in the host community.

"I will continue going ahead getting food from the land that I bought and also continue sleeping in the house I built... someone's riches here is in land." Male recipient in the host community.

"The transfer will have a lasting effect because the things I am doing will reproduce others and the effect will thus last longer – like grazing, farming and this will sustain me." Male recipient in the host community.

For those recipients whose lives had been most desperate before receiving their transfers, the transfers provided a deeper sense of direction and purpose, even a reason to live:

"I could not differentiate where I was from and where I was heading, now I see where I am heading." Female recipient in the host community.

"A plan? It was the one of killing myself, but when I got the money, I decided to live." Female recipient in the host community.

In the refugee community, a minority of recipients reported a similarly positive view of the future. This was most common amongst those who had invested in improving their homes, starting businesses, or purchasing livestock:

"I used to sleep in a bad house, but I have constructed a good house in which am living. I believe the transfer has a lasting effect." Female recipient in the refugee community.

"The impact will be long term because we bought livestock which will multiply and we will sell some. The house we built has an iron sheet roof, and so won't get old easily." Male recipient in the refugee community.

Most refugees, however, were notably less optimistic. The loss of land appeared to color many refugees' visions of their future. Even amongst those with revenue-generating investments, a sense of the precariousness of their situation endured:

"I started a small business which may not be able to generate enough money to cater for basic needs so this has a short-term effect." Female recipient in the refugee community.

"I don't have land that I farm on, or money to spend. If I get any problem, I'll sell my cow so that I can get money. I have nowhere else to go..." Female recipient in the refugee community.

Some recipients appealed to GiveDirectly for further support:

"If God is able to provide GiveDirectly... with funds to continue supporting us, we would be assured of a positive future. Our future is uncertain. If God continues to protect us, we will live." Male recipient in the refugee community.

D. Both refugee and host communities reported improvements in relations within communities and between the two communities.

In focus groups, recipients reported that transfers either maintained or improved relations within each community and between the two communities:

"We are more relaxed and happy; the community is safe and we have good relations with the nationals as well." Female recipient in the refugee community.

The fact that both communities received the intervention was reviewed positively, especially amongst the host community. Host recipients were clearly not used to receiving the same interventions as their refugee neighbors. Our follow-up survey reported that 99% of host recipients in the sample had never received any aid intervention, despite spending their lives in immediate proximity to Kyaka II.

Some host recipients alluded to an economic multiplier resulting from the new-found wealth in the refugee community:

"Money changes hands between us and them, so money has increased". Male recipient in the host community

Others noted that historic, negative engagement between the two communities had declined, bluntly noting:

"They had been stealing from us, but now they received money... you find that a refugee ... has work to do." Male recipient in the host community.

A few individuals in focus groups noted an increase in jealousy towards them, from non-recipients within their community. However, this appeared to be a minority opinion, both within the focus groups and the follow-up surveys, where 84% of the sample reported improved community relations, 16% unchanged community relations, and no-one reported worsened relations.

3.2. Operational feasibility.

A. Organizations can effectively and efficiently deliver large transfers to recipients in refugee settings.

In the period from December 2017 to May 2018, we delivered 92% of the program's transfer budget of \$2.65m to recipients, with a small tail of transfers due to complete by September 2018.

GiveDirectly calculates efficiency according to a simple formula:

$$Efficiency = \frac{Total\ transfer\ budget}{Total\ program\ budget}$$

It is important to note that the denominator ('total program budget') accounts for *all* direct and indirect spending associated with the program, including proportional shares of organization-wide costs. This pilot reported efficiency of $83.4\%^{18}$. This means that ~83 cents of every dollar donated by the program's donors reached the hands of a recipient in Kyaka II.

While comparisons to other interventions are hard to draw, as different organizations report efficiency in different ways (or not at all), this figure is 1.6x the efficiency recorded for the delivery of food aid in the 2015 Ethiopia study¹⁹ cited in the introduction to this report, where the value of food delivered was 53% of the total project budget.


B. Recipients can safely and securely receive and withdraw transfers.

The delivery of transfers to recipients can be broken into two stages. First, the digital send: moving money from GiveDirectly's account to a recipient's. Then, the physical 'cashing-out', as recipients convert digital money to physical cash.

- 1. In the first instance, the program recorded considerable success: 99.99% of transfers were reported by recipients to have been successfully digitally received.
- 2. In the second instance, payment providers proved responsive to demand. MTN mobile money recipients were cashed-out by a network of local mobile money agents, who convert digital money into physical cash, generating their margin through a 'withdrawal fee' (paid by GiveDirectly). These agents were engaged by GiveDirectly prior to payment to ensure they had the cash required to serve recipients. PostBank recipients were cashed out monthly, when the PostBank payments van visited the settlement. The time taken for recipients to cash-out, illustrated in *Figure C*, was comparable between the two.

¹⁸ As of April 2018, 95% of the program budget has been spent. The figure above is therefore an estimate, with projected costs for the small team who are due to be retained until September 2018.

¹⁹ Venton et al, *Value for money of cash transfers in emergencies*, 2015, http://www.cashlearning.org/downloads/summary-yfm-cash-in-emergencies-report-final.pdf



A detailed comparison between the two payment providers is included as an annex to this report.

Cases of theft and other adverse events were low. In total, the combined loss of transfers to theft and other adverse events was just 0.15% of the total transfer size. This is within our targeted maximum of 0.5%, and amounts to an average of 0.94 USD per person. Just over one in every 100 recipients was a victim of one of these events, within our target of 2 or fewer.

C. Markets responded to increased demand, although there is anecdotal evidence of price increases at local markets.

Focus groups suggested that the transfers resulted in considerable improvement in local economic activity, with recipients reporting new goods, new services and new shops at local markets:

"A good number of people have opened up shops since GiveDirectly started giving out money." Female recipient in the refugee community.

"Retail shops and small businesses mushroomed." Female recipient in the refugee community.

"The shops increased. Many people started businesses. Before the transfers, people didn't have a lot of money but afterwards, whoever received a transfer went and bought a shop or started a business." Male recipient in the refugee community.

Many recipients in focus groups, although not all, reported price increases in the period after transfers were received. The majority attributed this to the arrival of GiveDirectly transfers:

"Prices of some things went high when traders and other business people heard that people had received GD money." Female recipient in the refugee community.

"When we received GD transfers, prices of goods went high because traders knew we have money." Female recipient in the refugee community.

"They heard that the older refugees would be receiving a lot of money so they increased the prices." Female recipient in the refugee community.

"When the traders saw people receiving transfers, the hiked prices claiming we had free money." Male recipient in the refugee community.


Some, however, attributed it to other factors:

"Sometimes prices are high or low but the traders claim it is because of fuel prices." Female recipient in the refugee community.

"The price has increased but it is not because of GiveDirectly transfers, but it is on the local government side due to increase in fuel prices leading to high transport costs that is why the prices are high." Male recipient in the host community

The literature around the impact of cash transfers on prices suggests there is little evidence of sustained inflation. A report carried out by UNICEF, for instance, noted that in six such studies, no inflation was detected ²⁰. This is in comparison to evidence that in-kind support, such as food-aid, has a deflationary effect on local prices, with a negative impact on local traders and food producers ²¹. In areas where markets are weaker, however, there is evidence that cash transfers can cause short-term price increases. A non-experimental analysis of inflation after larger, one-off transfers, implemented in Northern Uganda in 2010, showed some evidence of short-term, localized price rises, with prices returning to normal within two weeks ²². It is possible this is what we witnessed here, and could explain why not all recipients reported witnessing price rises. Our ongoing monitoring suggested, for instance, that 55% of recipients witnessed price rises, while 45% didn't. The World Food Programme also picked up no notable price rises in their monthly food-basket price monitoring in Kyaka II, as illustrated below.

Figure F: World Food Programme price monitoring to March 2018.



D. Recipients reported a strong preference for receiving cash over in-kind aid, although views varied on the phasing of transfers.

We sought feedback on recipient preference on: (a) cash compared to in-kind support, and (b) the sizing and phasing of transfers.

(a) Recipients were almost universal in their preference for cash transfers over in-kind aid. In the follow-up survey, 99% of the sample reported that they would prefer to receive cash transfers. In focus groups, every recipient declared that their preference was for cash:

"With [cash] I can buy livestock, build a house, buy a shamba (farm) and pay school fees for my children, but with livestock or food, I cannot do all that. I might receive livestock and they'll get diseased any time and die. Or food: we'll eat some, then sell the rest." Female recipient in the refugee community.

"According to the way how we are in our village we would wish to have cash because... my need can't be the same as for the other" Male recipient in the host community.

"Money is better because everything is bought by money ... someone's needs require money." Male recipient in the host community.

Even those households with specific needs noted they would rather receive cash and purchase for themselves:

²⁰ UNICEF, Myth-busting? Confronting Six Common Perceptions about Unconditional Cash Transfers as a Poverty Reduction Strategy in Africa, https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/IWP-2017-06.pdf

²¹ Cunha et al, *The price effects of cash versus in-kind transfers*, 2015,

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/120806/1/832778362.pdf
²² Creti, P, A case study of unstructured markets in Northern Uganda, 2010,

http://www.cashlearning.org/downloads/resources/calp/impact-of-cash-transfers-on-local-markets-text-only.pdf

"I wanted food, but money can buy food so I would rather have the money." Female recipient in the refugee community

(b) GiveDirectly delivered transfers in three 'lump-sums', rather than in a stream of smaller, monthly payments. Focus group recipients reported a strong preference for transfers delivered as lump sums, which enabled them to deliver on larger-scale plans, when compared to smaller, subsistence-style support:

"Bigger instalments are better because... you can buy something of value, like a motorcycle or cows... smaller amounts would be easier to waste." Female recipient in the refugee community.

Within each group, however, there were differing opinions regarding how a transfer should be broken up: a question that potentially warrants further, more robust investigation. In our focus groups, some noted that they would rather receive a single transfer:

"If you have given me the money at once, I would have saved some money to buy something useful but because of the way the money was sent, I wasn't able to do those things." Male recipient in the refugee community.

Others, however, preferred transfers phased over three months, as delivered by GiveDirectly, as they allowed recipients to plan more effectively:

"[Receiving the full transfer at once] would be wasted because you'll get it and spend on each and everything and it won't help, but the monthly method [three instalments over three months] helped us plan for each transfer and how it will be spent." Female recipient in the refugee community.

The operational "lessons learned", and how these will impact the future design of our programming in refugee settings, area documented in Annex 5.2.

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4. Conclusions.

With growing numbers of refugees living in protracted displacement, many of whom may spend their entire lives in exile, humanitarian organizations must focus on rebuilding lives, not just saving them. It was in this context that we launched a two-phased pilot to better understand how large, unrestricted cash transfers could play their part in achieving this goal.

The context in which the first phase of the pilot was implemented should be noted. Uganda, while home to one of the largest refugee populations in the world, is also a uniquely progressive environment, where refugees enjoy relative freedoms. In settings where refugees' freedoms are more restricted, our findings might not be replicated. We will explore this further, by implementing a similar program in Rwanda, where refugees' have less opportunity to seek work and travel freely.

With this context, we draw four key conclusions from the first phase of this pilot:

- 1. It is operationally feasible to deliver large, unrestricted cash transfers to refugee and host communities. Organizations can send, and recipients can receive, withdraw and spend, large cash transfers. Both traditional banking and mobile money providers respond to the required demand. Recipients can put large transfers to work, with diversified spending that appears designed to account for both immediate and future needs. Markets respond, though there is some indication of price rises, likely short-term.
- 2. There was evidence of wide-ranging positive outcomes and immediate improvement in recipients' lives. Cash allows recipients to invest according to wide-ranging needs and is adaptable to changing situations. This report suggests considerable improvement across a wide-range of outcomes, including the ability to generate income, improve food security, invest in education and healthcare, and support cohesion between the two communities.
- 3. There is considerable evidence to suggest that cash is one of our most effective livelihoods-promoting interventions. We see no reason to expect considerable deviation in refugee settings from the broader evidence base around the benefits of cash. Taking this evidence base alongside the pilot, we believe there is a strong case for cash to be considered one of our most well-evidenced and effective livelihoods interventions, for refugee and host communities alike. Where other interventions lack positive evidence, or any evidence at all, we would invite donors and implementing organisations to ask themselves: "why not cash?"
- 4. Refugees' lives are exposed to shocks and instability; the unique flexibility of cash allows recipients to adapt and respond. Refugees in Kyaka II were hit by the considerable shock of losing their land prior to receiving their first GiveDirectly transfer. Cash provided recipients with the ability and flexibility to respond, and thus generated considerable positive impact. However, more of the refugee community's transfers appeared to be forced towards addressing immediate needs than in the host community. Had this shock not occurred, or had refugees had the legal right to purchase more land, it is possible that results for the refugee community might have more closely mirrored those in the host community.

We complete the first phase of this pilot knowing that there is much still to be discovered, and key questions to be answered: from the magnitude and duration of impact, to which groups are best targeted and at what moment. Ultimately, answering these questions will help us better understand the place of large, unrestricted cash transfers in humanitarian aid: how they might promote self-sufficiency, and possibly even reduce the huge caseload of displaced people, reliant year-in, year-out on humanitarian support. The second phase of our pilot, due to begin in late 2018, will look to further our understanding with more robust evidence on the possible impact, the size of that impact, and its duration.

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5. Annexes.

5.1. Enrolment model detail

- (1) Stakeholder engagement with key officials. MOUs are signed with the Government of Uganda, at national and local levels, and with UNHCR, to approve operations and set reporting and coordination schedules.
- (2) Generating the recipient list (refugees-only). A list of recipients is generated to meet our targeting criteria (protracted refugees), developed by cross-referencing data from the Government of Uganda's Office of the Prime Minister and the World Food Programme.
- (3) Engagement with local leaders. We meet with local leaders in the refugee and host community, to share key messages about the program and consult on implementation best-practice.
- (4) List verification (refugees-only). We run an in-person verification exercise, physically verifying all households living in the settlement who met our criteria. At this stage, the recipient list was reduced from 2,950 to 2,250 households, removing all households who were not found.
- (5) Community meetings, or "barazas". GiveDirectly field officers visit each recipient village, introducing the program and holding Q&As with community members.
- (6) Census.
 - a. *Refugees*. Field officers visit all households who were on the recipient list, at their homes. Key identifying data is recorded and stored in GiveDirectly's secure data management platform: Segovia.
 - b. Host. As above, but all households in target villages are visited by field officers. After census, the Poverty Prediction Index criteria is applied to the data, algorithmically selecting the eligible recipients.
- (7) Registration. A second GiveDirectly field officer visits all eligible households at their homes again, "registering" them in the program and again collecting identifying data.
- (8) Audit. A subset of households is visited by a third field officer, with households selected either due to an inconsistency in their previously collected data or as part of a random sample. Again, data is collected to confirm identity.
- (9) *Transfers*. After extensive data checks, transfers are sent. Transfers are broken into three payments, primarily to minimize the liquidity demand on local payment providers. The size of each of these payments is below:
 - a. Token: 450,000 UGX (~\$124)
 - b. Lump sum 1: 975,000 UGX (~\$268)
 - c. Lump sum 2: 975,000 UGX (~\$268)
- (10) Follow-up. Recipients are contacted after each transfer by a second team of GiveDirectly staff, not involved in the enrolment of the eligible households. Their role is to confirm the identity of the recipient and the safe receipt of funds. No further transfers are sent until this check has taken place. ~2/3 of these follow-ups are done from a locally-based call center, 1/3 in-person. All follow-ups made to households categorized as 'vulnerable' take place in-person, at the recipient's home. The call-center team also operate a hotline and two check-in centers, one in each community, for recipient visits.
- (11) Internal audit. A subset of recipients is visited by an entirely independent, internal auditing function, to monitor any irregularities in GiveDirectly staff behavior. This teams' identities and activities are not known to other GD staff and they report directly to the Country Director.

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5.2. Operational learnings

Below, we document some of the key learnings that we take into our future work in refugee settings:

Targeting: Country	Uganda is home to over a million refugees, with two ongoing emergencies on its borders and a growing protracted refugee crisis. It's uniquely progressive policies towards refugees, however, make it a favorable environment for cash transfers. As such, we intend to scale our work in Uganda as the second phase of the pilot. We are also planning to test the intervention when refugees' freedoms are more restricted,
	by implementing a similar program in Rwanda, where refugees' have less opportunity to seek work and travel freely.
Targeting: Settlement	The directional evidence in this report supports our rationale for targeting protracted refugees, as outlined in Section 2: an overlooked population and a growing one, with the potential to put a large sum of capital to work. The selection of a settlement will therefore be partially guided by a desire to continue working with protracted refugees.
Targeting: Refugees and Host communities.	In the refugee community, close engagement with settlement authorities, especially UNHCR and OPM, was vital in building targeting criteria that were accepted within the community. Crucially, community leaders, and members of the community themselves, were also consulted. We found that our simple criteria, targeting all households who were not receiving WFP support, met with widespread acceptance in the community, because it was easily understood and considered 'fair'. While the precise criteria may change in other settings, the desire to design something auditable and understandable by the community will be retained. In the host community, we used targeting criteria that sought to exclude only the wealthiest
	~20% of households within the community, ensuring the majority of the village was enrolled, which met with widespread acceptance. Enrolling host households was justified both in light of the desire to strengthen cohesion between refugees and host communities, and by their relative poverty: host recipients were, on average, poorer than refugee recipients, according to the Poverty Prediction Index (see Section 3.1).
Transfers: Size	Sizing transfers approximate to a WFP annual ration appeared to allow recipients to invest beyond solely their immediate priorities, as evidenced in section 3.1 of this report. Taking these findings, alongside the existing evidence base on the impact of large cash transfers, we will again deliver large cash transfers in the second phase of the pilot. The precise sizing of the transfer will be determined in a context-specific assessment of the next area of operation.
Transfers: Modality	A detailed analysis of the two payment providers used in this pilot is covered in Annex 5.3.
Transfers: Phasing	Given the mixed feedback we received from recipients on the phasing of large transfers, with some recipients favoring the transfers as they were delivered by GiveDirectly (in three installments) and others wishing to receive the transfers in a single payment, we will likely be guided in this decision by what is most feasible, specifically with regards to the ability of payment providers to handle varying levels of demand for their services.
Enrollment: Community engagement	Ensuring clear and consistent messages to the community, where misinformation is liable to spread, is a challenge, especially within refugee communities. Engaging key influencers, from within the settlement leadership, community leadership and the community themselves, can ensure messages are clearly shared. Engaging the community directly, through program staff, is also vital in ensuring that messages are delivered as intended.
Enrollment: Household verification	The GiveDirectly enrollment process involves multiple household visits. In a refugee setting, where recipient lists have historically contained errors and the location of refugees is not always clear, this proved a vital component of ensuring that only eligible households were enrolled.
Enrollment: Call-center operations	GiveDirectly operate a call-center, through which households are contacted after their transfers, confirming the safe and secure receipt of the transfer. In refugee settings, mobile phone connectivity can be a barrier to this practice. Budgeting for a higher proportion of this engagement to be delivered via household visits will likely be required in most refugee settings.
Coordination: Partners	The size of the Ugandan refugee response means that within each refugee settlement, multiple organizations are operational. Close coordination with these organizations, through settlement-level and national structures, is vital in coordinating implementation, leveraging opportunities to collaborate, and sharing learnings and new information.
Monitoring and evaluation.	This program was the first of a two-phased pilot. It leaves open questions, with regards to the causality, magnitude and duration of impact, that can only be answered through rigorous, robust, ideally experimental evaluation, delivered by independent researchers. The second phase of the pilot will seek to deliver this evidence.

5.3. Payment provider comparison

GiveDirectly tested two payment providers in this pilot:

- 3,424 households received transfers through MTN, Uganda's largest mobile money platform;
- 947 households received through PostBank, a government-owned bank with considerable experience distributing cash transfers to refugee communities.

To evaluate the relative value of the two approaches, we look across four core metrics:

- Recipient experience. As noted in Figure C, there was little difference in cash-out times between the two groups of recipients. Recipients were asked to record their payment provider preference in focus groups after the program, but in an interesting illustration of the so-called 'endowment effect', every recipient strongly preferred the payment provider they had received through.
- Financial inclusion. Recipients' mobile money accounts are permanent. The bank accounts provided to refugees, on the other hand, were closed at the end of the GiveDirectly program, standard practice for bank payments to refugees in Uganda. The difference could be considerable. Research in Kenya has illustrated the benefits that the spread of financial inclusion through mobile money has had on reducing extreme poverty, estimating that since 2008, 2% of Kenyan households were lifted out of poverty simply through being connected to mobile money²³.
- Efficiency. Direct PostBank costs were 2% of the total transfer cost; direct MTN costs were just 1.4%. If PostBank had been used to deliver transfers to all recipients in the pilot, this would have amounted to an additional 15,730 USD in operational cost. In addition to this direct cost, engaging with PostBank's less sophisticated software added an estimated 14,208 USD in management and technical team cost. In total, this amounts to an additional cost of 29,938 USD. While this comprises just 0.9% of the total budget, but is worth placing in a human context. With transfers of 2.4 million UGX per household, and an operating efficiency of 83.4%, the choice to use MTN mobile money over PostBank would allow an organisation to reach an additional ~200 individuals in ~40 households.
- Risk. This is perhaps the most complicated of these categories. The opinion of the operational team
 was that PostBank provided a less secure and robust payments platform than MTN: less automated,
 more prone to human error, and thus less reliable. While MTN systems were superior, however,
 mobile money in Uganda faces greater external risk than the formal banking sector. In March 2018,
 the registration of all new SIM cards was banned nationwide, with considerable impact on
 GiveDirectly operations. With this ban lifted, in June 2018, Uganda's parliament passed a bill to apply
 a 1% tax on all mobile money transactions.


²³ Suri, 2016, The long-run poverty and gender impacts of mobile money, http://science.sciencemag.org/content/354/6317/1288.full

- 5.4. Demographic and descriptive impact data.
- 5.4.1 Demographic data.

A. Recipient population (all eligible households)

	Households
Refugees	2,231
Male-headed household	1,341
Female-headed household	890
Host nationals	2,140
Male-headed household	992
Female-headed household	1,148


B. Age of recipient head of household (all eligible households)




C. Vulnerability (all eligible households)

Vulnerability	
All households	2.7%
Host	2.3%
Refugee	3.1%
Type of vulnerability	% of vulnerable
Elderly	58%
Physically disabled	19%
Orphaned	17%
Mentally ill or with learning difficulties	6%
Other	1%

D. Refugee demographics (follow-up survey only, n=484)





E. Previous experience of aid programs

	Refugee	Host
Food rations	100%	0%
Cash transfers	0%	0%
Housing materials	83%	0%
Training programs	15%	0%
Livestock	1%	0%
Agricultural inputs	82%	0%
Healthcare	74%	1%
Education	9%	0%
No aid interventions	0%	99%

5.4.2. Operational feasibility data.

A. Transfers per month, USD, projected from July onwards.



B. Time taken to collect transfers, mins, by payment provider.

Average minutes to collect transfers

	PostBank	MTN
Dec-17	4	181.9
Jan-18	-	119.1
Feb-18	94.8	109.8
Mar-18	130.5	147.5
Apr-18	144.7	126.5
May-18	112.8	123.9
Jun-18	-	85.0

C. Theft and adverse events.

Adverse Events			
	Actual	Target	
Theft, % of recipients	1.14%	2.00%	
Theft, % of transfers	0.15%	0.50%	

D. Budget, actual to May, projected from June onwards.

Program budget						
Expense	Actual	Forecast	Total			
Transfers, to recipients	2,875,010	10,499	2,885,509			
Salaries	215,884	10,169	226,053			
Professional services fees	295	=	295			
Allowances (field-staff travel, etc.)	72,215	8,430	80,645			
Air travel	951		951			
Software	45,507	166	45,673			
Telco	6,819	2	6,819			
Other travel	24,914	2	24,914			
Field office occupancy	373	₽1	373			
Supplies	2,832	=)	2,832			
Field team equipment	14,405	=	14,405			
Mobile money and banking	41,657	145	41,802			
FX costs 1	- 17,465	5.5	17,465			
FX costs 2	18,977	=	18,977			
Insurance	37	4	37			
Allocations of GD-wide operational costs	128,487	1,101	129,588			
Total expense	3,430,898		3,461,408			
Efficiency	83.8%		83.4%			

5.4.3. Directional and illustrative impact data

All data reported by recipients in follow-up surveys n=484

A. Changes to income.

Reported change to income								
	Total	Refugee	Male ref	Female ref	Host	Male host	Female host	
Increased	87%	79%	77%	82%	97%	96%	97%	
Same	6%	8%	9%	6%	3%	4%	3%	
Decreased	7%	13%	13%	12%	0%	0%	0%	

In both communities, we witnessed a significant number of households recording increased incomes after the transfers. In the host community, a greater proportion of households reported higher incomes than in the refugee community. In both communities, the recorded proportion was slightly higher for female than male recipients.

B. Changes to employment

Emplo	yment, before and afte	er transfers		
	Refuge	es	Host	
	Male-headed	Female-headed	Male-headed	Female-headed
Before transfers: employed before in agriculture	3.3%	1.9%	20.6%	41.1%
After transfers: employed before in agriculture	0.7%	2.8%	2.9%	2.4%
Change	-2.6%	0.9%	-17.6%	-38.7%
Before transfers: employed before in non-agriculture	7.9%	0.9%	7.8%	5.6%
After transfers: employed before in non-agriculture	8.6%	1.9%	7.8%	5.6%
Change	0.7%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%
Before transfers: subsistence farming	77.5%	85.0%	89.2%	89.5%
After transfers: subsistence farming	15.2%	5.6%	93.1%	89.5%
Change	-62.3%	-79.4%	3.9%	0.0%
Before transfers: own farm business	25.2%	28.0%	84.3%	82.3%
After transfers: own farm business	6.0%	4.7%	90.2%	89.5%
Change	-19.2%	-23.4%	5.9%	7.3%
Before transfers: own non-farm business	26.5%	20.6%	16.7%	5.6%
After transfers: own non-farm business	54.3%	56.1%	29.4%	20.2%
Change	27.8%	35.5%	12.7%	14.5%
Before transfers: no employment	2.0%	0.0%	4.9%	3.2%
After transfers: no employment	21.2%	30.8%	1.0%	0.8%
Change	19.2%	30.8%	-3.9%	-2.4%

In the host-community, we see a decrease in households employed by others in agricultural work. This could have resulted from an increase in host households working on their own farms, an increase in host households running their own non-agricultural businesses, or possibly a reduction in demand for such labour. There was no reported change in host households who were working in other people's non-agricultural businesses, and little change to the already high levels of subsistence farming. There were increases in ownership of both agricultural and non-agricultural businesses. Households reporting no employment decreased after transfers fell to just 1% of the sample.

In the refugee-community, there was little change in employment on others' farms or in others' businesses. There was a considerable decrease in subsistence farming and in commercial farming, likely due to the loss of access to farmland documented in Section 3.1. of this report. There was also an increase in recipients recording having no employment. On the other hand, there was a considerable increase in recipients reporting that they were running their own non-agricultural business, after the transfers, possibly an indication of households adapting to no longer having access to farmland and seeking new sources of income.

C. Changes to family and community relations.

<u> </u>	V2	36	Famil	y relations		S	
	Total	Refugee	Male ref	Female ref	Host	Male host	Female host
Improved	95.5%	96.9%	96.0%	98.1%	93.8%	93.1%	94.4%
Same	4.1%	2.3%	2.6%	1.9%	6.2%	6.9%	5.6%
Worsened	0.4%	0.8%	1.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
			C	nity relations			
		15 16	Commu	iity relations		Y	
	Total	Refugee	Male ref	Female ref	Host	Male host	Female hos
Improved	Total 84.3%	Refugee 86.4%			Host 81.9%	Male host 78.4%	Female hos
Improved Same	10.0000	4 0000000000000000000000000000000000000	Male ref	Female ref	N. 1. N. P. S.		0.100.000

In both communities, we see a high proportion of households reporting improved family relations. Within both communities, this is marginally more prevalent in female-headed households.

In both communities, we see a high proportion of households reporting improved community relations; this is marginally higher within the refugee community than in the host community. Again, this is more prevalent amongst female-headed households than male-headed households.

D. Changes to number of children in school.

Reported changes to schooling							
	Total	Refugee	Male ref	Female ref	Host	Male host	Female host
More in school	27%	43%	46%	38%	9%	9%	9%
Same in school	58%	39%	35%	45%	80%	80%	79%
Fewer in school	0%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%
None schoolgoing age	14%	17%	18%	16%	12%	11%	12%

In both communities, we see more children being reported as being in school after transfers. This is notably higher amongst the refugee community, however. Taking this alongside reports from focus groups of households taking children out of school in the aftermath of losing access to farmland, it is possible that the GiveDirectly transfer has allowed refugees to return children to school.

E. Changes to financial inclusion.

	All	D-f	0.0-1	Farmed and	Host	Male host	Female host
	All	Refugees	Male ref	Female ref	HOST	waie nost	remaie nost
Mobile money							
Will continue using mobile money	95.6%	90.5%	92.1%	88.4%	99.1%	98.0%	100.0%
Savings and loans							
Had informal savings before	32.2%	28.7%	29.8%	27.1%	36.3%	34.3%	37.9%
Has informal savings now	31.6%	35.7%	37.7%	32.7%	27.0%	27.5%	26.6%
Change	-0.6%	7.0%	7.9%	5.6%	-9.3%	-6.9%	-11.3%
Had formal savings before	25.2%	17.4%	19.9%	14.0%	34.1%	38.2%	30.6%
Has formal savings now	39.7%	14.7%	16.6%	12.1%	68.1%	65.7%	70.2%
Change	14.5%	-2.7%	-3.3%	-1.9%	34.1%	27.5%	39.5%
Had access to informal loans before	46.7%	56.2%	57.6%	54.2%	35.8%	32.4%	38.7%
Has access to informal loans now	42.1%	61.6%	64.9%	57.0%	19.9%	20.6%	19.4%
Change	-4.5%	5.4%	7.3%	2.8%	-15.9%	-11.8%	-19.4%
Had access to formal loans before	22.9%	8.9%	11.3%	5.6%	38.9%	43.1%	35.5%
Had access to formal loans after	38.4%	11.6%	11.3%	12.1%	69.0%	68.6%	69.4%
Change	15.5%	2.7%	0.0%	6.5%	30.1%	25.5%	33.9%

In both communities, a considerable majority of recipients expected to continue using mobile money after transfers. Amongst the host community, there were notable increases in access to formal savings and loans, and a decrease in use of informal savings and loans. In the refugee community, access to formal financial services appeared to be a barrier, with use of formal savings declining and access to formal loans only marginally increasing. Instead, we see that refugees are still reliant on informal savings and loans, access to both of which increased after the transfers.


F. Likelihood to migrate (refugees-only)

Migration	Refugee	Male	Female	
More likely to leave settlement	23%	28%	16%	
Less likely to leave settlement	33%	28%	40%	
No change / don't know	44%	44%	44%	

Cash appears to engender a diversity of views on the likelihood of leaving the settlement after receipt: for some, it appears to encourage moving out of the settlement; for a higher proportion, staying in the settlement; however, the greatest proportion simply record no change at all to the likelihood of their migrating.

G. Markets data.

WFP monitoring data.



GiveDirectly ongoing monitoring				
Witnessed no price rises	45%			
Witnessed price rises	47%			
Witnessed significant price rises	8%			

For market impact analysis, see section 3.2.C.

5.5. Survey tools.

A. Endline survey

Demographics

- If a refugee, what year did refugee arrive in Kyaka II?
- If a refugee, what country is the recipient originally from?
- What support has the recipient previously received from aid organizations?
- What support is the recipient currently receiving from other aid organizations?
- Does the recipient prefer aid organizations to provide cash support, or something else of the same value (e.g. food rations, livestock, etc.)?

Spending

- Was the recipient able to visit a local market to spend their transfers?
- How much of the recipient's transfer did they spend on: Food spending (e.g. meat, matooke, beans, etc. for consumption) -- answer in UGX
- How much of the recipient's transfer did they spend on: Health spending (e.g. clinic visits, immunizations, tests, medicines, hospital costs) -- answer in UGX
- How much of the recipient's transfer did they spend on: Education spending (e.g. school fees, uniforms) -- answer in UGX
- How much of the recipient's transfer did they spend on: Alcohol and tobacco spending -- answer in UGX
- How much of the recipient's transfer did they spend on: Livestock assets (goats, cows, etc.) -answer in UGX
- How much of the recipient's transfer did they spend on: Agricultural assets (e.g. seeds, grain, farming land, etc.) -- answer in UGX
- How much of the recipient's transfer did they spend on: Non-farm business assets (e.g. motorbike, business property, store inventory) -- answer in UGX
- How much of the recipient's transfer did they spend on: Housing investment (improved roof, floor, latrine, new house) -- answer in UGX
- How much of the recipient's transfer did they spend on: Personal/household assets (e.g. bedding, cooking implements, radio, clothes, furniture, solar panels, generator) -- answer in UGX
- How much of the recipient's transfer did they spend on: Social spending (e.g. bride price, other wedding expenses, funerals, entertainment) -- answer in UGX
- How much of the recipient's transfer did they spend on: Debt repayments -- answer in UGX
- How much of the recipient's transfer did they spend on: Remittances (i.e. sending money to friends/family elsewhere) -- answer in UGX
- How much of the recipient's transfer did they spend on: Migration travel, or transport costs (e.g. moving out of settlement, travel to town for work) -- answer in UGX
- How much of the recipient's transfer did they spend on: Savings -- answer in UGX
- What else did the recipient spend transfers on, and how much?
- How much of the recipient's transfers is currently unspent? -- answer in UGX

Impact

- Before transfers, what was the recipient's occupation?
- After transfers, what is the recipient's occupation?
- Before transfers, did the recipient employ anyone else?
- After transfers, is the recipient employing anyone else?
- Has the recipient's income changed since receiving the transfers?
- Is the recipient working more, less or the same as you were before the transfers?
- Has the number of your children attending school changed?

Financial inclusion

- Did the recipient have a mobile money account before being enrolled by GiveDirectly?
- Does the recipient have a mobile money account now?

- Does the recipient expect to continue sending and receiving mobile money on their account in the future?
- Did the recipient have a bank account before being enrolled by GiveDirectly?
- Does the recipient have a bank account now?
- Does the recipient expect to continue using their bank account in the future?
- Before receiving the transfer, did the recipient have any savings? Specify what kind.
- Does the recipient have savings now? Specify what kind.
- Before receiving the transfer, was the recipient able to take out a loan? Specify what kind.
- Does the recipient now have the ability to take out a loan? Specify what kind.

Community relations

- Did the recipient's relationships with their family (spouse and children) change after receiving transfers?
- Did the recipient's relationships with others in the village change after receiving transfers?

Migration

- If a refugee, does the recipient think that receiving transfers makes them more or less likely to return to their country of origin?
- If a refugee, does the recipient think it is more or less likely that you will leave the settlement and move elsewhere in Uganda (e.g. Kampala)?

B. Focus group discussion guide.

Life before the transfers

- Before transfers, what did a typical day look like for you?
 - How did you make an income?
 - Were you able to meet your family's basic needs?
 - Were you and your family happy?
 - Was the community happy and peaceful?

Transfer spending

- What did you spend your transfers on?
- Why did you decide to spend that way?
 - o How did you make the decision?
 - O Did you make a plan at once, or did you keep money to spend as you needed it?
 - Who was involved in making the decision?
- Did you spend all of your transfer, or have you saved some?
 - Why did you not spend your entire transfer?
 - Do you have a plan for how you will spend the rest of your transfer?
- Were you able to buy everything you wanted to buy, or were there some things you were unable to buy? If so, why were you unable to buy them?
 - Were there items that shops weren't selling?
 - Were there items where prices were too high?
 - Were there items that you were not allowed to buy like land?
 - Or things you weren't allowed to do, like build?

The impact of receiving GD transfers

- How did you feel when you found out you would receive a GiveDirectly transfer?
 - o Why?
 - What was your immediate reaction?
 - O How did your family members react?
- What has changed since you received your transfers?
 - Probe for:
 - Any change to happiness?

- Any change to stress levels?
- Any change to relationships?
- Any change in ability to look after self and family?
- Any change to ability to earn an income?
- Feel more or less positive about the future?
- Any change to spending on children (schooling)?
- Any change in ability to spend on healthcare?
- [also probe based on what recipients said they spent on and possible impact]
- Would life be different if you hadn't received a transfer?
 - o If so, how?
- Do you believe that this transfer will have a lasting effect, or just a short-term impact on your life?
 - o If so, why?
- Has receiving a cash transfer changed your plans for the future?
 - Have your ambitions changed for you or your family?
 - Do you feel differently about the idea of staying in the settlement/area?
- Have you noticed any changes in the community after transfers?
 - Have relations inside the village changed?
 - Do you feel more or less safe as a result of receiving transfers?
 - o [if refugee] Have relations with the host community changed?
 - [if host] Have relations with the refugee community changed?
- Have you noticed changes at local markets after transfers?
 - Has there been a change in the range of goods for sale?
 - Have you seen a change in the number of shops at your local market?
 - Have traders changed their prices? (and have they told you why?)

Feedback on the program

- Would you have rather received cash, or something else (of the same value) as cash, such as food or livestock?
 - o If non-cash, what would you have preferred and why?
- GiveDirectly sends cash in three payments -- do you think they should change this approach?
 - If so, would fewer, larger payments or more, smaller payments have been better?
- Would you rather have received transfers through PostBank / MTN / any other means?
 - o Why?
- Did you face any challenges with the GiveDirectly program?
- Was the program fair?
 - Were the right people enrolled?
 - Was GiveDirectly transparent and clear about the program?
- If GiveDirectly could have changed the program in one way, what should they have done?