

JOINT THREAT ASSESSMENT



(U) 59th Presidential Inauguration, Washington, DC

14 January 2021



Federal Bureau of Investigation



Homeland Security



National Capital Region Threat Intelligence Consortium



United States Secret Service



Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center



United States Park Police



Virginia Fusion Center



United States Capitol Police



Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia



Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region

Office of Intelligence and Analysis

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(U) 59th Presidential Inauguration
Washington, DC
20 January 2021

(U) Scope Note

(U//FOUO) This *Joint Threat Assessment (JTA)* addresses threats to the 59th Presidential Inauguration taking place in Washington, DC, on 20 January 2021. This JTA is co-authored by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/US Secret Service (USSS), with input from multiple US Intelligence Community and law enforcement partners. It does not include acts of non-violent civil disobedience (i.e., protests without a permit), which are outside the scope of federal law enforcement jurisdiction.

(U//FOUO) This product is intended to support federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government agencies and authorities in identifying priorities, as well as private sector security partners, for protective measures and support activity regarding terrorism and other existing or emerging threats to homeland security. Information in this assessment is current and accurate as of 14 January 2021.

(U) Key Findings

(U//FOUO) As of 14 January 2021, the FBI, DHS, USSS, US Capitol Police (USCP), National Capital Region Threat Intelligence Consortium (NTIC), Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR), Virginia Fusion Center (VFC) and the Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center (NVRIC), Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia (MPDC), and US Park Police (USPP) assess that domestic violent extremists (DVEs) pose the most likely threat to the 59th Presidential Inauguration in Washington, DC, on 20 January 2021 due to recent incidents of ideologically motivated violence, including at the US Capitol Building.^a In light of the storming of the US Capitol on 6 January, planned events in Washington, DC, in the lead up to and day of Inauguration Day offer continued opportunities for violence targeting public officials, government buildings, and federal and local law enforcement.

(U//FOUO) Additionally, unaffiliated lone offenders and homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) remain a concern due to their ability to act with little to no warning, willingness to attack civilians and soft targets, and ability to inflict significant casualties with weapons that do not

^a (U//FOUO) The FBI and DHS define domestic violent extremists (DVEs) as individuals based and operating primarily within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power who seek to further political or social goals, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of force or violence. The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute violent extremism and may be constitutionally protected.

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require specialized knowledge, access, or training.^{b,c} Additionally, foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) continue to express their intent related to attacking mass gatherings, landmarks, and critical infrastructure present in the National Capital Region (NCR).

(U//FOUO) Since the incident at the US Capitol on 6 January, Russian, Iranian, and Chinese influence actors have seized the opportunity to amplify narratives in furtherance of their policy interest amid the presidential transition. We have not identified any specific, credible information indicating that these actors intend to explicitly commit violence. Furthermore, we have not identified any specific, credible cyber threat to critical infrastructure supporting the upcoming Presidential Inauguration nor a specific credible cyber threat to military or law enforcement personnel supporting the event.

(U//FOUO) In addition, we assess that unauthorized unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operations can disrupt law enforcement operations at the 59th Presidential Inauguration, present a hazard to civilians around the event, or delay the event's proceedings, though we possess no specific, credible information indicating malicious actors have plans to use UAS to target the 59th Presidential Inauguration. We also continue to maintain awareness of threat reporting suggesting acts of violence directed at law enforcement officers, US Government officials, or bystanders at the 59th Presidential Inauguration. In addition to the recent events at the US Capitol, in June 2020, law enforcement agencies and assisting partner agencies in the NCR observed individuals attempting to violently engage law enforcement officers and using incendiary devices such as fireworks and Molotov cocktails.

(U//FOUO) *Domestic Violent Extremists*

(U//FOUO) **We assess that DVEs pose the most likely threat to the Presidential Inauguration or associated events, particularly those who believe the incoming administration is illegitimate.** Recent ideologically-motivated violence in Washington, DC, underscores the symbolic nature of the NCR and DVEs' willingness to travel to events and violently engage law enforcement and their perceived adversaries. Recent violent interactions between law enforcement and DVEs at these events will likely exacerbate DVE grievances,

^b (U//FOUO) The FBI and DHS define a homegrown violent extremist (HVE) as a person of any citizenship who has lived or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization. HVEs are distinct from traditional domestic terrorists who engage in unlawful acts of violence to intimidate civilian populations or attempt to influence domestic policy without direction from or influence from a foreign actor.

^c (U//FOUO) The FBI and DHS define a lone offender as an individual acting alone or without the willing support of others to further social or political goals, wholly or in part, through activities that involve unlawful acts of force or violence. Lone offenders may act within the context of recognized domestic violent extremist ideologies, their own interpretation of those ideologies, or personal beliefs. The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute violent extremism, and may be constitutionally protected.

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particularly militia extremists.^d The known standing date of Inauguration Day conceivably offers DVEs more time to plan acts of violence and open source reports indicate calls to violent action ahead of or on Inauguration Day. In particular, we are concerned about racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs), anti-government or anti-authority violent extremists, specifically militia extremists, and anarchist extremists targeting the events or perceived ideological opponents.^{e,f,g}

- (U//FOUO) On 6 January 2021, multiple individuals used physical force to enter the Capitol Building during the certification of the presidential election, according to local Washington, DC, press reporting. During this incident, an officer killed one individual inside the Capitol and more than 50 MPD and USCP officers were injured, according to a USCP public statement. The individuals stormed both houses of Congress, smashing windows, assaulting police officers, and destroying property, forcing elected officials to seek safety in secure, shelter-in-place locations. Police arrested more than 70 individuals, many from out of state. Following the event, a USCP officer died from injuries received while physically engaging with rioters, according to open source reports.
- (U//FOUO) On 6 January 2021, MPD Explosive Ordinance and FBI Special Agent Bomb Technicians responded to reports of two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) at the headquarters of the Republican and Democratic National Committees, according to local Washington, DC, press reporting. On the same day, according to local law enforcement statements to local press reporters, a cooler was discovered filled with incendiary devices and a long gun on Capitol grounds.
- (U//FOUO) According to open source reports, calls for violent action online discuss targeting public officials, ideological opponents, and government property in the lead up to and during the inauguration. Open source media reporting notes that violent planning has begun for Inauguration Day on various social media platforms. Underscoring these

^d (U//FOUO) The FBI and DHS define militia extremists—which fall within the anti-government/anti-authority violent extremist threat category—as individuals who seek, wholly or in part through unlawful acts of force or violence, to advance their ideology, based on their belief that the US government is purposely exceeding its Constitutional authority and is attempting to establish a totalitarian regime. Consequently, these individuals oppose many federal and state laws and regulations, particularly those related to firearms ownership. Militia extremists take overt steps to violently resist or facilitate the overthrow of the US Government. The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute violent extremism and may be constitutionally protected.

^e (U//FOUO) The FBI and DHS define anarchist extremists as individuals who seek, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of force or violence, to further their opposition to all forms of capitalism, corporate globalization, and governing institutions, which they perceive as harmful to society. The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute violent extremism and may be constitutionally protected.

^f (U//FOUO) The FBI and DHS defines racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism as the threat that encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas, which are deemed to derive from bias, often related to race or ethnicity, held by the actor against others, including a given population group.

^g (U//FOUO) The FBI and DHS define anti-government or anti-authority violent extremism as the threat that encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas, which are deemed to derive from anti-government or anti-authority sentiment, including opposition to perceived economic, social, or racial hierarchies; or perceived government overreach, negligence, or illegitimacy.

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reports, on 11 January 2021, the National Park Service (NPS) suspended tours of the Washington Monument through 24 January due to “credible threats to visitors and park resources” and continued threats to disrupt the inauguration, according to a NPS official statement. Nationwide, State Capitols are preparing for potential violence in their jurisdictions.

- (U//FOUO) On 12 December 2020, following an election-related protest in Washington, DC, four people were stabbed during a fight outside a bar. Media reports indicate the bar was being used as a gathering point for the Proud Boys^{USPER}, a self-described “western chauvinist organization”. Prior to the stabbings, an identified USPER militia extremist and Florida resident burnt a Black Lives Matter flag at a church in the District. This individual was later arrested in Washington, DC, after they returned to participate in the protest on 6 January 2021 for destruction of property and possession of high-capacity firearm magazines. A judge ordered the individual to leave Washington, DC, and banned him from returning except for very limited conditions, including meeting with their attorney or attending a court date, according to *The Associated Press*^{USPER} on 5 January 2021.

(U//FOUO) Inauguration Day follows a series of events in 2020 and 2021 that have fueled plotting and attacks, including COVID-19-related lockdown measures, grievances surrounding policing and police brutality, and perceptions of the presidential election and its result. We assess that these plots and attacks highlight the persistent and lethal threat DVEs pose to soft targets, government officials, and law enforcement.

- (U) According to ABC News^{USPER} reporting as of 23 October 2020, an USPER militia extremist who self-described as a member of the “Boogaloo Bois” was charged with participating in a riot after they allegedly shot approximately 13 rounds from an AK-47 assault rifle into a Minneapolis, Minnesota Police Department building during the violence surrounding lawful protests following the death of George Floyd in late May 2020.^h The USPER allegedly exchanged messages with another individual who was involved in killing a Federal Protective Service (FPS) contract security guard Protective Security Officer (PSO) in Oakland, California in late May 2020. Two additional “Boogaloo Bois” faced federal charges for their role in the Minneapolis riots.
- (U) According to a federal criminal complaint, as of 8 October 2020, alleged USPER individuals were arrested for planning to kidnap the Governor of Michigan prior to the November US presidential election. Group members, who included a Delaware resident, discussed the violent overthrow of certain government and law enforcement officials, to include multiple state governments they believed were violating the Constitution. In addition to making plans to kidnap the Michigan Governor, the group developed plans to

^h (U//FOUO) “Boogaloo” is a colloquial term used by some violent extremists from a variety of movements—including some RMVEs that believe in the superiority of the white race, militia extremists, and anti-government extremists. The term refers to a coming civil war or the fall of civilization, according to a federal criminal complaint.

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attack the Michigan Capitol Building and planned to create a diversion for law enforcement during the kidnapping by demolishing a bridge. In addition, members of the group successfully detonated an IED wrapped with shrapnel to test its anti-personnel capabilities. The individuals were charged with making terrorist threats, material support for terrorist acts, gang membership, and firearms offenses.

- (U) On 29 May 2020, two USPERs who were known violent adherents of the Boogaloo movement, killed an FPS contract security guard PSO, who was stationed outside a federal building in Oakland, California, according to a June 2020 *Washington Post*^{USPER} article. On 6 June 2020, one of the individuals was arrested for the death of a Santa Cruz County Sheriff Deputy and injuring another with an IED, according to open source reporting. A caller to 911 saw guns and bomb-making materials inside a van, and responding deputies encountered gunfire and IEDs as they approached the individual, according to the same source. One deputy was shot and killed on the scene, while another was either shot or struck by shrapnel and then struck by a vehicle as the individual fled the property, according to the same source. The individual pled not guilty to the charges of killing the sheriff's deputy, according to reporting from *The Air Force Times*^{USPER} in August 2020.

(U//FOUO) Foreign Influence

(U//FOUO) Since the incident at the US Capitol on 6 January 2021, Russian, Iranian, and Chinese influence actors have seized the opportunity to amplify narratives in furtherance of their policy interest amid the presidential transition. We lack specific, credible information indicating that these actors and their identified proxies are seeking to commit violence. Our collection on these efforts, however, is limited by the number of actors on the Internet and we do note numerous mentions of the possibility of violence, as well as the amplification of grievance narratives that have been staples for actors seeking to provoke violence.ⁱ

- (U//FOUO) *Russian* state and proxy media outlets have amplified themes related to the violent and chaotic nature of the Capitol Hill incident, impeachment of President Trump, and social media censorship. In at least one instance, a Russian proxy claimed that ANTIFA members disguised themselves as supporters of President Trump, and were responsible for storming the Capitol building.
- (U//FOUO) *Iranian* state media has continued to stoke claims that President Trump encouraged and incited the violence, as well as calls to invoke the 25th amendment.

ⁱ (U) US persons linking to, citing, quoting, or voicing the same arguments raised by these foreign influence actors likely are engaging in First Amendment-protected activity, unless they are acting in concert with a threat actor. Furthermore, variants of the topics covered in this section, even those that include divisive terms, should not be assumed to reflect foreign influence or malign activity absent information specifically attributing the source of the messaging to malign foreign actors. This information should be considered in the context of all applicable legal and policy authorities to use open source information while protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.

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Iranian outlets also have amplified perceived concerns related to President Trump's mental health and the prospect of other risky actions he could take before leaving office.

- (U//FOUO) *Chinese* media have seized the story to denigrate US democratic governance—casting the United States as broadly in decline—and to justify China's crackdown on protestors in Hong Kong.

(U//FOUO) *Homegrown Violent Extremists*

(U//FOUO) At this time, we have not identified any actionable or credible threats to the 59th Presidential Inauguration involving HVEs. The unpredictable nature of HVEs and other lone offenders are of particular concern due to their ability to remain undetected until operational; their continued willingness to attack civilians and soft targets; and their willingness to carry out attacks using weapons that are easy to obtain and require little to no training. While HVE-related incidents in the United States and Western Europe targeted publicly accessible locations with little security, attacks or attempted attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) supporters indicate some terrorists remain undeterred in attempting to breach security at government facilities.

- (U) According to open source reporting from BBC News, as of 2 November 2020, a gunman opened fire in Vienna, Austria, killing approximately four people and wounding another 22 people. The gunman began the attack near the Seitenstettengasse Stadttempel synagogue, though it was unclear whether it was the primary target of the attack. Authorities identified the perpetrator, who was killed during the attack, as an ISIS supporter who was arrested in April 2019 for attempting to cross the Turkish border into Syria to join ISIS. The individual had been sentenced to 22 months in prison but was released in December 2019.
- (U) Open source reporting from the Associated Press, as of 29 October 2020, indicated a Tunisian national attacked two individuals in Nice, France, with a knife during morning mass at the Notre-Dame basilica. The attacker was seriously wounded by police and hospitalized in life-threatening condition after the attack. French authorities identified the attacker as a Tunisian national who was not previously known to counterterrorism authorities.
- (U) According to FBI Houston public statements, as of 21 May 2020, an individual drove onto a naval base in Corpus Christi, TX and opened fire on personnel. Additional reporting from *The New York Times*^{USPER} from 21 May 2020 indicated one security guard was wounded and the attacker was killed during the incident. According to the same source, the individual's social media accounts revealed support for ISIS and al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
- (U) On 28 March 2019, a Maryland-based USPER was arrested and subsequently charged on 3 April 2019 with interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle after allegedly

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stealing a rental van from a parking garage in Alexandria, VA, according to a Department of Justice (DOJ) press release from April 2019. He was allegedly planning to run over pedestrians near the National Harbor in Fort Washington, MD. Authorities maintained that the individual was allegedly inspired by ISIS. On 28 August 2019, he was charged on a superseding indictment for attempting to provide material support to ISIS, according to ABC News press reporting from August 2019. A judge ruled in March 2020 that the individual be held for assessment as to whether he was mentally competent to stand trial, according to Washington, DC press reporting.

(U//FOUO) We assess that the consumption of online violent extremist media remains one of several significant influences identified by the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) in the radicalization and mobilization process of US-based violent extremists, and such messaging may be interpreted by ISIS or al-Qa'ida supporters as encouragement to target mass gatherings or high-profile events in the NCR.^j Although the continued broadcast of pro-ISIS media contributes to the lone offender and HVE threat, including content depicting or referencing the NCR, we assess that this messaging does not indicate active plotting by ISIS or al-Qa'ida.

- (U//FOUO) On 18 October 2020, the ISIS media arm Al-Furqan Establishment released a 32-minute Arabic language audio production via Telegram to encourage ISIS supporters and fighters throughout the world to conduct attacks. The audio piece encouraged supporters who are unable to travel to conduct violent attacks in their own countries.
- (U) On 8 September 2020, Thabat Media released a message in Arabic and English praising a "record number" of global attacks in a single week. The publication claimed some of the targets were US and French military forces and boasted about al-Qa'ida's resilience on the anniversary of the invasion of "Manhattan." Thabat Media claimed more than 357 people were allegedly killed and more than 259 wounded in al-Qa'ida attacks, highlighting recent attacks in Afghanistan, Mali, and Somalia.
- (U) On 13 September 2020, AQAP released a lengthy publication titled "Who is the Victor?" commemorating the 9/11 attacks, which was distributed by the al-Malahem Media Foundation. The publication claimed the United States was a loser in its 19-year "War on Terror" and called on lone offenders to attack American interests worldwide.

^j (U//FOUO) The FBI and DHS define radicalization as the process through which an individual changes from a nonviolent belief system to a belief system that includes the willingness to actively advocate, facilitate, or use unlawful violence as a method to affect societal or political change.

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(U//FOUO) Foreign Terrorist Organizations

(U//FOUO) We also remain concerned about the sustained interest of FTOs in attacking gatherings, landmarks, and critical infrastructure present in the NCR. Terrorist groups such as ISIS, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliates remain intent on attacking Western targets and individuals, calling on individuals to conduct independent attacks in the United States using a range of weapons and tactics, including small arms and IEDs or improvised incendiary devices (IIDs). In addition, we remain concerned about Iran or its partner Hizballah seeking to conduct operations in the United States in response to the targeting of IRGC-Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.

- (U) According to Associated Press reporting as of May 2020, a Saudi Royal Air Force officer who was training at a naval base in Pensacola, Florida shot and killed three US sailors and wounded eight people on 6 December 2019 with a semi-automatic handgun before being killed during the incident. DOJ and FBI indicated the individual was in contact with al-Qa'ida operatives about planning and tactics in the months before the shooting.
- (U) Two weeks before the one-year anniversary of Soleimani's death, Iran's Supreme Leader renewed his promise of revenge, saying the United States will pay for the drone strike that killed the commander near the Baghdad airport on 3 January 2020.

(U//FOUO) Unmanned Aircraft System Concerns

(U//FOUO) Although we possess no specific, credible information indicating malicious actors have plans to use UASs to target the 59th Presidential Inauguration, we assess that unauthorized UAS operations can disrupt law enforcement operations, present a hazard to civilians around the event, or delay the event's proceedings. While there are no indications of threats to the event from a UAS standpoint, the technology from the easily accessible commercial off-the-shelf UAS platforms continues to advance and become more affordable. Overseas media examples include actors employing UASs for nefarious purposes that could potentially inspire US-based individuals to employ such tactics.^k

- (U) On 18 September 2020, a Los Angeles, California-based USPER allegedly operated a UAS which struck a Los Angeles Police Department helicopter, forcing it to make an emergency landing, according to press reporting from CBS Los Angeles^{USPER}. The UAS allegedly damaged the helicopter's nose, antenna, and bottom cowlings as well as a vehicle on the ground.

^k (U//FOUO) Washington, DC, is a designated Flight Restricted Zone, meaning it is unlawful to pilot a UAS in the District of Columbia, and the area around the US Capitol Complex is designated as prohibited airspace. However, these designations may not deter someone intent on using an UAS for attack purposes or disruptive purposes.

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- (U) According to *Washington Post* press reporting, as of 5 August 2020, a Major League Baseball^{USPER} game in Minneapolis, Minnesota, was delayed when an individual flew an unauthorized UAS over Target Field. The UAS departed the premises after causing a nine-minute delay to the game.
- (U) Reuters press reporting as of 12 April 2019 indicated an unauthorized UAS, which appeared to be a DJI Phantom, flew over Fenway Park in Boston, Massachusetts, during a baseball game. The user reportedly overrode the UAS's geofencing system designed to prevent flights over restricted areas, to include sporting events.
- (U) On 11 October 2019, an Ohio-based USPER pleaded guilty to unsafe operation of an aircraft for repeatedly operating a UAS within 200 feet of a Columbus, Ohio, Police Department helicopter on routine patrol on the evening of 9 July 2019, according to court documents and local press reporting from WBNS^{USPER}. This activity endangered both those on-board and on the ground, according to the statements from a Columbus Police Department detective and is under investigation by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). During their court appearance, the individual was fined and sentenced to one year of probation.
- (U) On 4 August 2018, up to three UASs, each carrying approximately one kilogram of C-4 explosives, detonated in Caracas, Venezuela, during a military parade in a likely attempt to target key Venezuelan politicians for attack, including the President, according to press reporting from *The New York Times* citing statements from Government of Venezuela officials. The attempted attack demonstrated the ability of a weaponized UAS to cause casualties and disrupt outdoor events/mass gatherings and highlights the viability of using UASs for targeted strikes, according to the same source.

(U//FOUO) Concerns of Violence and Criminal Activity During Lawful Protests

(U//FOUO) We remain concerned of potential violence directed toward public safety officials and bystanders due to observed violence surrounding lawful protests ongoing throughout the United States that began in May 2020 in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Louisville, Kentucky. We assess that acts of violence and criminal activity can take place with little or no warning and be directed toward law enforcement officers, public property, and bystanders around the White House and the National Mall.

- (U) MPD information as of 15 December 2020 indicated MPD had made five arrests and recovered approximately eight firearms during a First Amendment-protected event that took place in Washington, DC, in November 2020.
- (U) According to press reporting from ABC News as of 27 July 2020, local police in Portland, Oregon, identified a bag containing loaded rifle magazines and Molotov cocktails at a park near ongoing lawful protests on 26 July 2020.

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(U) According to NPR reporting as of 10 June 2020, individuals in Washington, DC, threw bottles at law enforcement officers and set fires to cars and to the basement of historic St. John's Church^{USPER}. Additionally, according to press reporting from *The Washington Post* as of 3 June 2020, individuals launched fireworks and other projectiles at law enforcement officials deployed to Lafayette Square in Washington, DC.

(U//FOUO) *Ideologically Motivated Malicious Cyber Actors*

(U//FOUO) **We have not identified any specific credible cyber threat to critical infrastructure supporting the upcoming Presidential Inauguration, nor a specific credible cyber threat to military or law enforcement personnel supporting the event.** However, we note that it is relatively common to observe ideologically motivated cyber actors use high-profile events and symbolic targets to attempt to disrupt public and private sector networks, mainly as a means of elevating their ideology or message. We are unaware of DVE groups, which we assess pose the most likely physical threat to the inauguration, displaying cyber capabilities in the past that would be impactful to the event. Malicious cyber actors, unaffiliated with DVEs and potentially even including foreign adversaries, could also seize this period of Presidential transition to conduct disruptive cyber or influence operations for various purposes.

- (U//FOUO) Although we have no reason to suspect connections or similar motivations between DVEs and these previous incidents, since mid-2020 we have observed numerous criminal cyber-attacks conducted by suspected anonymous-affiliated criminal cyber actors, including the compromise of and distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS) against state government networks; doxing of law enforcement personnel; and unsubstantiated claims of shutting down law enforcement and state and local government networks.
- (U//FOUO) Iranian Government actors since at least October 2020 engaged in cyber and influence efforts designed to spread anti-American messaging and disinformation about the 2020 presidential election. This included the sending of spoofed e-mails in mid-October 2020 with messages of voter intimidation appearing to come from the Proud Boys to intimidate voters in at least Alaska and Florida, according to the same sources. Iranian state media reacted to these deceptive October voter intimidation e-mails by amplifying a nexus between the Proud Boys and President Trump.

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(U) Event Overview

(U//FOUO) The 59th Presidential Inauguration will take place on 20 January 2021 outside of the US Capitol Building. Attendees will include members of Congress, Supreme Court Justices, various high-ranking government officials, and other guests. It will be broadcast live by the major television networks and cable news channels. The DHS Secretary declared it as a National Special Security Event (NSSE) in an official memorandum dated 24 September 2018. The 59th Presidential Inauguration is anticipated to include events tentatively scheduled on 19 January 2021, 20 January 2021, and 21 January 2021.

(U) Potential Threat Indicators

(U//FOUO) Absent a specific, actionable threat to the 59th Presidential Inauguration, we are providing indicators to aid law enforcement and first responders in identifying and mitigating threats. The totality of behavioral indicators and other relevant circumstances should be evaluated when considering any law enforcement response or action. (Note: Behaviors associated with the below indicators can include constitutionally protected activities. The FBI does not initiate any investigative activity based solely on the exercise of First Amendment activities or on the race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity of the subject, or a combination of only such factors.)

(U//FOUO) Possible indicators of pre-operational surveillance or attack planning include:

- (U//FOUO) Documenting or recording the locations of Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras, police, fire, hospitals, and other key infrastructure facilities, without a reasonable alternative explanation;
- (U//FOUO) Prestaging of objects that can be used as weapons, such as bricks, rocks, poles, and other potential weapons;
- (U//FOUO) Unusual or prolonged interest in or attempts to gain sensitive information about security measures of personnel, entry points, peak days and hours of operation, or access controls such as alarms or locks to secure areas;
- (U//FOUO) Unexplained attempts to acquire medical equipment, emergency personnel uniforms, ambulances, or vehicles that can be converted into ambulances;
- (U//FOUO) Unusual or prolonged interest in security reaction drills or procedures, or the presence of multiple false alarms or fictitious emergency calls to same locations or similar venues without a reasonable alternative explanation;
- (U//FOUO) Discreet use of cameras or video recorders, drones, sketching, or note-taking consistent with pre-operational surveillance;

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- (U//FOUO) Unusual interest in speaking with building maintenance personnel without a reasonable alternative explanation;
- (U//FOUO) Unusual observation of or questions about facility security measures, including barriers, restricted areas, cameras, and intrusion detection systems without a reasonable alternative explanation;
- (U//FOUO) Unusual observation of or questions about facility air conditioning, heating, and ventilation systems without a reasonable alternative explanation;
- (U//FOUO) Suspicious purchases of dual-use items that could be used to construct an explosive device to create an explosive diversion, including hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane, or fertilizer without a reasonable alternative explanation;
- (U//FOUO) Suspicious activities in storage facilities or other areas that could be used to construct an explosive device; and
- (U//FOUO) Attempted or actual unauthorized access to rooftops or other potentially sensitive areas without a reasonable alternative explanation.

(U//FOUO) Possible indicators of threats involving UASs include:

- (U//FOUO) Beginner-level hobbyists attempting to purchase expensive, difficult-to-fly UASs in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person;
- (U//FOUO) Operation of a video-equipped UAS near sensitive locations or ongoing law enforcement operations in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person;
- (U//FOUO) Attempts to modify a UAS with explosives or chemical agents, or with explosives- or chemical-delivery mechanisms, including sprayers or foggers;
- (U//FOUO) Suspicious attempts to interview, interface with, or interact with employees or individuals knowledgeable about key personnel, critical infrastructure, or key resource facilities, networks, or systems with no alternate reasonable explanation;
- (U//FOUO) Individuals who are unable or unwilling to answer basic questions on the use, application, safety, or handling of UASs or who are evasive or vague about their intended use for the system; and

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- (U//FOUO) Theft or unusual or unauthorized acquisition of containers capable of holding lethal chemical agents or explosive materials.

(U//FOUO) Possible indicators of cyber or cybersecurity threat activity include:

- (U//FOUO) Online forum or social media discussions among cyber actors indicating disruptive or damaging cyber attacks targeting 59th Presidential Inauguration-related networks, systems, or websites;
- (U//FOUO) Criminal hacker groups publicly encouraging cyber attacks against the 59th Presidential Inauguration prior to the event; and
- (U//FOUO) Threats that use a combination of computer intrusion, social engineering, e-mail spoofing, or malware.

(U//FOUO) Please report suspicious activities associated with any of the indicators listed above to the contact information at the end of this document.

(U) Report Suspicious Activity

(U) The FBI encourages recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). The FBI's Washington Field Office can be reached at 202-278-2000 or by e-mail at WFOFOUO.fbi.gov.

(U) Tracked by: HSEC-1.1, HSEC-1.2, HSEC-1.3, HSEC-HSEC-1.5, HSEC-7.1, HSEC-7.2, HSEC-7.3, HSEC-7.5, HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.3, HSEC-8.5, HSEC-8.6.2.19, HSEC-8.8

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Product Title:

All survey responses are completely anonymous. No personally identifiable information is captured unless you voluntarily offer personal or contact information in any of the comment fields. Additionally, your responses are combined with those of many others and summarized in a report to further protect your anonymity.

1. Please select partner type: _____ and function: _____

2. What is the highest level of intelligence information that you receive?

3. Please complete the following sentence: "I focus most of my time on:"

4. Please rate your satisfaction with each of the following:

	Very Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	N/A
Product's overall usefulness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's relevance to your mission	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's timeliness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's responsiveness to your intelligence needs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

5. How do you plan to use this product in support of your mission? (Check all that apply.)

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Drive planning and preparedness efforts, training, and/or emergency response operations | <input type="checkbox"/> Initiate a law enforcement investigation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Observe, identify, and/or disrupt threats | <input type="checkbox"/> Intiate your own regional-specific analysis |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Share with partners | <input type="checkbox"/> Intiate your own topic-specific analysis |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Allocate resources (e.g. equipment and personnel) | <input type="checkbox"/> Develop long-term homeland security strategies |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Reprioritize organizational focus | <input type="checkbox"/> Do not plan to use |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Author or adjust policies and guidelines | <input type="checkbox"/> Other: <input type="text"/> |

6. To further understand your response to question #5, please provide specific details about situations in which you might use this product.

7. What did this product not address that you anticipated it would?

8. To what extent do you agree with the following two statements?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N/A
This product will enable me to make better decisions regarding this topic.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This product provided me with intelligence information I did not find elsewhere.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

9. How did you obtain this product?

10. Would you be willing to participate in a follow-up conversation about your feedback?

To help us understand more about your organization so we can better tailor future products, please provide:

Name: <input type="text"/>	Position: <input type="text"/>
Organization: <input type="text"/>	State: <input type="text"/>
Contact Number: <input type="text"/>	Email: <input type="text"/>



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