By Henry Birge-Lee, Grace Cimaszewski, Liang Wang, Cyrill Krähenbühl, Kerstin Fagerstrom, and Prateek Mittal Today we are announcing the development of a new open source project by our research group at Princeton University designed to strengthen certificate issuance against Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing attacks. Recent years have seen an uptick in a very powerful […]
Security Analysis of the Dominion ImageCast X
June 14, 2023 by
Today, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Georgia permitted the public release of Security Analysis of Georgia’s ImageCast X Ballot Marking Devices, a 96-page report that describes numerous security problems affecting Dominion voting equipment used in Georgia and other states.
The anomaly of cheap complexity
August 3, 2022 by
Why are our computer systems so complex and so insecure? For years I’ve been trying to explain my understanding of this question. Here’s one explanation–which happens to be in the context of voting computers, but it’s a general phenomenon about all our computers: There are many layers between the application software that implements an electoral […]
Toward Trustworthy Machine Learning: An Example in Defending against Adversarial Patch Attacks (2)
July 19, 2022 by
By Chong Xiang and Prateek Mittal In our previous post, we discussed adversarial patch attacks and presented our first defense algorithm PatchGuard. The PatchGuard framework (small receptive field + secure aggregation) has become the most popular defense strategy over the past year, subsuming a long list of defense instances (Clipped BagNet, De-randomized Smoothing, BagCert, Randomized […]
