Syria- A Short History

                                                                                                                                                                               

 

SYRIA - A SHORT HISTORY

By Phillip K. Hitti, Colier Books, New York 1961

 

This book is an abridgement of the author's previous work 'History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine' (1951). Before the present 'Arab Spring' and the subsequent civil war in Syria this country wasn't of great interest to the average person. This had not, however, always been the case. In the past Syria and its Lebanese gateway had at time been very much in the centre of events.

 

     The author opens with a brief synopsis of Syria's history, and continues with an overview of its climate and topology. There are five general zones in the land. Despite the general misconception Syria is far from being an unremitting desert.

 

     Hitti begins with the prehistory of the area and goes on to the Semitic origins of the population. This was shared by the Babylonian Empires and the Phoenicians. Syria from the beginning had the misfortune of being a crossroads for empires and migrations. On the other hand the country's position lent itself admirably to commerce. Its language, Aramaic, became a lingua franca of not just the area itself but also of the Persian Empire.

 

    A gradual infiltration of Hellenistic influences began shorty before the conquests of Alexander the Great and accelerated thereafter. This continued with Greek colonization and the Seleucid Empire, but crumbled under subsequent Roman, Partian and Arab pressure and the persistent rebellions of the Jews. Pressure developed from the Arab Nabateans with their capital at Petra south of the Dead Sea. Under Pompey in 64 BC all of Syria was organized into a single Roman province. The area was rapidly becoming an agricultural/horticultural centre. An important textile industry developed, and the area remained prominent in international trade. Syria's upper classes remained Hellenistic from the time of Alexander until the total victory of Islam in 633-640 AD.

 

 

     The Muslims fanned out in all directions from what they had made their Syrian base. They went southwest to Egypt and east to Mesopotamia and Persia. The newly conquered populations often welcomes the Arab armies as being an improvement on their previous rulers, and they certainly proved more tolerant than Byzantine Christianity. Soon, however, factions developed within Islam. Under the first caliph, Muawiyah (proclaimed in 661) Islam split between Shia and Sunni. The Sunni capital of Damascus was able to assert hegemony, but the split became a lasting source of conflict within the Islamic world.

 

     The caliphate pressed eastwards into Central Asia and westward across the North African littoral. The northern frontier, however, remained blocked as the Arabs and Byzantines fought back and forth across Asia Minor. The Arabs reached Constantinople twice, but were unsuccessful both times.

 

     Shortly before his death Muawiyah appointed his son Yazid as his successor thereby introducing the dynastic principle into the Caliphate. This became one of the reasons why Muawiyah has been unpopular amongst subsequent Muslim historians. Before this time Islamic traditions came to refer to his predecessors as the "righteous Caliphs".

 

Despite almost unrelenting internal conflict under this Umayyad dynasty the Muslim Empire reached its maximum united extent. Victory came in both the Indus Valley in the east and in the west where a Muslim army of only 7,000 defeated a Visigoth horde of 25,000 in Spain in 711. The conquest of half of Spain was accomplished in 6 months. The advance was halted more because of petty dynastic jealousies than for military reasons. The Sunni/Shia schism persisted, and the Shia developed an ideology that was possibly more totalitarian than the Sunni and certainly more bizarre.

 

     The end of the larger Umayyad caliphate came about because of this division. In 750 Damascus was captured by the Shiites, and the Abbasid caliphate was established. One of the heirs of the Umayyads escaped the inevitable slaughter and made his way to Spain where he established an independent caliphate in Cordova.

 

     Under the Abassids Damascus lost its central position in Islam, and the capital of the new dynasty was established in Iraq. The new caliphate was considerably more bloodthirsty and theocratic than the old. It was also more oriented to Persia as opposed to Arabia where Mecca and Medina sunk in importance along with Damascus. Syria and other Muslim provinces proved restive under the new caliphate in Baghdad, but the Abassids were successful in repressing this discontent.

 

     The rule of Baghdad is often represented as a "golden age" of the Islamic Empire, based upon the growth a an extensive literature in translation. Much of this translation was accomplished by Syrians. At the same time in Syria itself Aramaic was evolving into an unique dialect of Arabic.

 

     The Abassid dynasty died a slow death, undermined by Turkish conquests. In 877 Ahmad ibn-Tulun, a Turkish deputy governor of Egypt marched into Syria, and the area became a frontier for Egypt. After years of war the Caliph was forced to recognize both the independence of Egypt and its suzerainty over Arabia. Meanwhile the Fatamid dynasty arose in present day Tunisia and rapidly extended its rule eastward to include Syria. Just to emphasize the back and forth nature of the times the Fatimids were also Shiites, though of a much more tolerant strain than the Abassids.

 

     The subsequent history of Syria was once more a never ending succession of dynastic conflicts which ended with Turkish rule. By the time of the Crusades Syria was partitioned between the Egyptian Fatamids and several petty Turkish emirates. Meanwhile a storm was rising in the West. Following a Papal call in 1095 150,000 crusaders set out for Palestine in 1097. The force, once the Byzantines were (gratefully !) free of it fractured as various leaders hove off to establish their own states. The First crusading horde descended on the eastern Mediterranean littoral. The heart of Syria itself was never conquered, but divisions amongst the local Muslim statelets left the invaders free to sweep on to Jerusalem. There the "soldiers of the Cross" perpetrated a massacre that left a black mark on history.

 

     The history of Syria itself and the so-called 'Holy Land' was bound up with alternating periods of alliance and opposition between 'the Franks' and the local Muslims. This was ended with the growing power of Egypt's Saladin of the Ayyubid dynasty who rapidly became master of Syria as well. He then moved on to retake Palestine. Christian attempts to recover lost ground failed. Meanwhile in Egypt the Ayyubids were replaced by the Turkish (more or less) Mamluks. These rulers checked the Mongol invasion which had swallowed up the eastern area of Islam.

 

     A lasting effect of the Crusades was to shift the Middle Eastern balance of power from Shites to Sunnis. The political chaos of the era and Mamluk rule ended being disastrous for both Egypt and Syria. Despite the persistence of some commerce the population of Syria fell to 1/3rd of its previous level. The Mongol khan Tamerlane took both Damascus and Aleppo, and in 1402 he defeated the Ottaman Turks at Ankara.

 

     Internal strife ended Tamerlane's brief empire, and Syria became a bone of contention between the Ottamans and the Mamluks. Meanwhile in Persia the Safawid dynasty came to power. In 1516 the Ottomans defeated the Mamluks and in 1517 occupied Egypt itself. They were to remain in control of Syria for 400 years.

 

     The Ottoman Empire reached its height in the reign of Sulaymin I ('The Magnificent') when it stretched from Morocco in the west to Mesopotamia in the East. It also took in most of the Balkans. Syria failed to prosper under the corrupt rule of Ottoman pashas (deputy governors), and the central government in Istanbul cared little as long as tax farming gave sufficient loot.

 

     Trade withered as the 'age of exploration' allowed western commerce with the Orient to bypass the Middle East. What little trade there was was increasingly dominated by foreigners - Venetian, French and English. The western barbarians had returned. The French were most successful, and much later they went on to govern the area as a protectorate. Ottoman rule was punctuated by several rebellions, especially in Lebanon, and once more Istanbul paid little attention as long as taxes were collected. In 1860 France occupied the Levant.

 

     European ideas and culture gradually penetrated the area in the course of the 19th century. The economy began to expand. Western culture spread. Population grew. A worldwide pattern of emigration developed as the Lebanese sought their fortunes elsewhere. In the homeland ideas of democracy and nationalism took hold. Syrian nationalism developed as part of pan-Arabism. In the areas that it still held the Ottoman Empire became more and more repressive. The unpopularity of the Turks led to the dismemberment of the Empire after WW1. Non-Turkish areas were ceded by the Ottomans, but by the treaty of Serres (1926) Turkish rule was replaced by the French mandate over the entire Syrian area. Independence was put off to some unknown future. The French proved to be as unpopular rulers as the Turks had been. Pushed to the limit by the treachery the population rebelled in 1925-1927.

 

     World War 2 gradually eroded French control, and the French grudgingly ceded more power to the locals. In 1948, however, the state of Israel was created and was supported by western powers. This led Syria to a growing friendship with the USSR.

 

     This book ends with the creation of the short-lived United Arab Republic with Egypt's Nasser as head of state. The more recent history is very much the story of the Arab-Israeli wars and the coming to power of the Assad rulers. The present civil war in Syria is the stuff of current events, though the friendship of the regime and Russia continued through many vicissitudes.

 

     I found this book very interesting as it dealt with many subjects of which I had only a passing acquaintance. I don't know if others would also enjoy it. To some degree it clarified the matter of the various Muslim caliphates, something I have always found confusing. It helps that the author has constructed a good balance of government and social history, and such matters can be set in a firm basis of socioeconomic reality.

 

     The book lacks any attempt to draw "general lessons" from the history except for perhaps a highlighting of the persistence of custom and economic interest under the surface changes of politics. The writing is clear and coherent. There are, however, only two maps included, insufficient in my opinion, and there are no other illustrations. This makes for what some might find to be a rather dry narrative. Still the book has its attractions.

 

    

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS; THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS:

THE POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF REVOLUTION:


I guess that one might consider me fortunate to have lived through three different eras of international revolutionary ferment. The first was the late 60s, early 70s. The next was the late 80s, early 90s with the fall of the Soviet bloc. Now there is the revolutionary wave sweeping the Arab world. In the first I was a full fledged participant. In the second I did my little bit of solidarity work. This time around, aside from signing petitions and going to the occasional demonstration I am very much only a spectator and commentator.


To be honest the first period left me with something of a sour taste in my mouth, but I responded quite differently than the majority of the so-called "new left" did. Behind all the bombastic rhetoric and grandiose fantasies there was far less of the reality of a revolution than the participants imagined. In the country where I live, Canada, most of the "flaming revolutionaries" became simple bureaucrats via either the NDP or even the Liberals. Others took a brief detour through the mindless maze of trying to recreate Leninist fantasy parties. Which, I suppose, just goes to show that they were not too bright in the first place. Myself I became an anarchist.


My own anarchism, however, became increasingly heterodox as I became familiar with not only the anarchist critique of class societies, both western and 'Marxist' but also with a wide range of other "left wing alternatives" and other economic literature that was basically unknown to the simplistic Marxists of that era. From Bernstein and Berle and Means to Max Nomad to Jan Machaijski , to Berle and Means to the transitional ideas of Burnham as he went from Trotskyism to conservatism, I read them all. As the "new left" circled the drain into the cesspool of Maoism and terrorism I became increasingly convinced that "revolution" was impossible in an advanced industrial society while also simultaneously believing that only in such a society could the sort of libertarian socialism I now favoured be built.



As to the "impossibility" of revolution in advanced countries I was wrong, and I guess I should have noticed this much earlier than I did. It's an old truism that, "if something can't go on forever it won't". This applies to countries and economic systems as well as to most other things. It took the revolutions against Communism to make me doubt my earlier doctrine about the "impossibility" of revolution. Especially as at least one of these revolutions occurred in a nuclear armed country with one of the largest if not most effective armies on Earth. No doubt revolution was "impossible" in the Soviet Union from a purely military perspective. Any revolt could very easily be crushed as previous attempts in eastern Europe had amply demonstrated. But what I ignored in my thoughts were some very important things about actual revolutions rather than the cartoonish Marxist ideas I was familiar with. My thinking changed. I also grew to understand that the earlier period of "revolution" ie the 60s/70s that I dismissed as simply grandstanding and third world nationalism was actually a real revolution, ie the completion of the "managerial revolution". Nothing to do with achieving a classless society of course, but definitely a re-division of the spoils amongst different segments of the ruling class.


As I came to understand that the "revolution of our times" was not a libertarian or even a socialist one I came to understand it as an expansion of the power of the managerial class into hitherto "unknown frontiers" of exercising power and "incidentally" making money. Yes, I am of a generation that understands and remembers how sick and how weird such things as the "grief industry" are ! The Third World revolutions of the late 60s/early 70s reproduced the usual Stalinoid bureaucracies, and when the Soviet bloc collapsed their "proletarian heroes" engaged in the same sort of looting that established a new class order in the ex-communist countries. This was one of the things that "sharpened" my own ideas about "revolution". Even in Poland where a large sector of the working class was attached, at least slightly, to the idea of "self-management" the resulting economic order contained no trace of such ideals. What went wrong ?


When all the dust had settled down I came to understand that it was not only that pretty well all modern revolutions served the interests of a managerial class. It was also that NO class system could exist in its pure form. Soviet society depended on the underground economy (capitalist ? but at least "free market") to continue its existence. The great mass of the economy of the modern world is similarly "mixed" having characteristics of both managerial/government control and a free market that is allowed to exist because of necessity. Is such a thing stable ? Personally I don't know having abandoned the religious precepts of Marxist dialectics many decades ago. There is no foreordained march of history, only possibilities and probabilities.


All that being said how do I view the 'Arab Revolutions' ? Unlike some I don't expect any great "libertarian upsurge" from them though I am sure that anarchist groups will be formed in the countries where the revolution has been "successful". The independent actions of the working class will be suppressed as they are today in Egypt.


The Arab revolutions have, however, shaken the forces of international imperialism. As such I personally support them even if I am sure that the resulting polity will be not even close to what I might want. THAT is the message that I would like to leave with people. Support what you can, but don't expect miracles. Revolutions are only possible in the modern world when certain conditions are met. These conditions simultaneously both make the revolution possible and also limit the amount of change that one can expect from such events. In the end I am just as firmly convinced that a libertarian society can only come about gradually, but I also feel that anarchists/libertarian socialists cannot divorce themselves from revolutionary events if they occur as some outcomes are infinitely better than others for a "slow march" to a free society to take place.



In previous posts on this blog I have mentioned how revolutions, being as they are essentially unpredictable movements of large segments of the population, cannot be "planned" or called into being by "revolutionary conspiracy". The efforts of Leninist groupuscles or so-called "insurrectionists" are nothing but magical thinking. The forces behind revolutionary moments are as far outside of the farcical plotting of such groups as is the movement of the planets. Even the "Model-T of Revolutions", the Russian Revolution was not produced by the Bolsheviks. What that party actually did was take advantage of a revolution already in process to achieve a coup-d'etat, and later they created their own managerial rule as the original revolution was defeated.


While revolutions cannot be conjured out of the ground there are, however, certain conditions that are necessary before any such event can occur. First of all there has to be mass disbelief in a given sociopolitical economic system. This doesn't necessarily mean that the majority of people suddenly join the revolutionaries, merely that the majority are more than content to at least "stand aside" in the conflict between the old order and the revolution, having no overwhelming loyalty to the regime. As a matter of fact it is quite rare (though not non-existent) that an actual majority join the revolution from day 1, except perhaps in restricted locales. The fact that revolutions rarely have the participation of a majority, only their passive acquiescence, is already a "snake in Eden" for the Revolution as the active minority must of necessity act boldly in order to avoid defeat, and they thereby act in a relationship of power vis-a-vis the inactive majority. Great dictatorships from many such little acts grow.


As unfavourable as such necessities may be for actually resulting in a truly more equal and free society the problem is not insurmountable. What is insurmountable is the fact that revolutions are inevitably pluralistic. All sorts of people come to oppose the dying regime because of all sorts of different reasons. This has sometimes included those such as Leninist groupuscles or Islamist ideologues in the Arab world who think this pluralism is a Very Bad Thing. Those to whom the whole idea of pluralism is anathema. Whether these people will be "compromisers" as the Egyptian Islamists appear to be or those who hope to advance their own cause by pushing the revolution as far ahead of the majority as possible depends upon circumstance. A lot depends upon the exact level of another condition for revolution...the ruling class must be divided. At least a large segment of this class must be willing to see the old order crumble and either stand passively by or actively help to tear it down. Lacking this the inevitable military realities that led me to first discount the possibility of revolution still hold true.


Revolutions are carried out, at least initially, by minorities. Military necessity requires this minority to carry out actions without any sanction from the majority. Revolutions are inevitably pluralistic and inevitably are open to the influence both of parts of the old ruling class and to would be ruling classes whose rule is often far worse than the old order. Where does this leave those who style themselves anarchists or libertarian socialists ? Many (almost all ?) of those who want to retain what I call the "romance of revolution" respond by imagining a non-pluralistic revolution, one more purely "anarchist". This is maintained by having, against all historical evidence, what may be unbounded faith in the "libertarian instincts of the masses". No doubt revolutions, by their very nature, develop instances of self-management. This is necessary if the revolution is to survive and grow. Or at least if the population is to fed. Yet even in the most fertile historical ground, Spain of the 1930s, the anarchists attracted the participation or approval of only 1/3rd of the population. The Spanish Revolution was inevitably pluralistic, and all appeals to greater militancy simply ignore this inevitable fact of both then and even more now.


This almost inevitable fact of pluralism sets natural limits as to what can be accomplished by a revolution. What this means in actuality is being demonstrated these days in both Tunisia and Egypt. Also in both cases what is usually a military necessity of a successful revolution ie the desertion of at least sizable chunks of the military and police hamstrings that revolution in terms of how far it can go. In other words all these factors together could be summed up as, "the conditions necessary for a revolution to succeed inevitably lead to restricting what it can achieve". Thermidor is the Siamese twin of revolutions, sharing the same vital organs.


How does all this affect what I think now ? I no longer think revolution in an advanced society is impossible, but I am even more convinced that it can never lead to any great gains that last. Such gains can only come about in a slow, patient and "non-heated" atmosphere where social experiments can be tried out for their viability without any "war necessity" looming over them. This doesn't mean that revolutions are a matter of indifference. Such events can hopefully be influenced to result in situations where such experimentation is more possible and easier. Doing this, however, requires a much "finer touch" than the usual libertarian response of "always push harder and harder". In some cases this might be just what is needed. In other cases, such as choosing the wrong allies and dealing with those that we have made, it can be disastrous.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS-PALESTINE:

A DEATH IN BIL'IN:

As the clash of states and political parties goes on in Israel/Palestine, others from both sides have come together to jointly oppose the separation wall that Israel is building across the West Bank. This struggle has brought Israelis and Palestinians together across the national divide like no other initiative has. Last Friday there was a casualty in this struggle. Here is the story from the Ilan Against the Wall blog via the Anarkismo website.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Another casualty of the joint struggle against the separation fence:

Yesterday in the joint Friday demonstration against the separation fence and occupation, a tear gas missile shot directly to the chest of Basem Ibrahim Abu-Rahme - while standing between two Israeli activists of the Anarchists Against the Wall, caused fatal injury. The video at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlbzuZ_50mU He died on the way to hospital. The tear gas missile which is a military weapon for the range of four hundred meters, is the same one nearly murdered a month ago Tristan Anderson in a demonstration against the separation fence in Ni'ilin. - For years, the Israeli state force use the demonstrations as experimental field for police weapons for dispersing crowds. Lately they also use them for the testing of the military tear gas missile also used in the last Gaza war.

A comrade reported:

"This Friday some 15 Israelis and 15 internationals joined a few dozen Palestinians in their weekly demo in Bil'in. The demonstration's theme was Palestinian prisoners' day, and the demo was headed by people carrying posters demanding the release of Palestinians held by the Israeli occupation forces. As usual, upon reaching the fence the demo was met with shock and gas grenades. The strong wind blew in the direction of the demonstrators and spread the gas among them, so only a small group of demonstrators managed to stay close to the fence. This, however, only encouraged the soldiers to keep shooting relatively large amounts of gas and other ammunition. The first victim was a French demonstrator superficially wounded in her face by a rebound shrapnel. Shortly after, a soldier shot an extended range gas projectile from a few meters away directly at Bassem Abu Rahme who was standing at the fence, knocked him over, left a gaping hole in the middle of his torso, and put him into respiratory distress and shock. Since no ambulance was at the scene, Bassem (a.k.a. Phil, aged 30) was evacuated in a private car toward Ramallah. Some demonstrators maintained their presence at the fence for a while, but as the last of them left the scene, the news of Bassem's death reached at the village."

The Friday demonstration in Ni'ilin ended abruptly when the participants heard about the murder of Basem in Bil'in and the AAtW activists - all knew Basem from previous demonstrations, and the AAtW people rushed to the nearby Bil'in.

Many of us approached to hold hands with his younger brother Ashraf - another persistent activist, who became "famous" as the media all over the world showed few months ago how a regional commander ordered a soldier to shoot his leg while he was handcuffed and blind folded.

Today (Saturday) we gave Basem the last honer. About 60 activists of the Anarchists Against the Wall joined thousands Palestinians from Bil'in village and the region in the funeral of Basem Ibrahim Abu-Rahme. One of the Bil'in group of people dedicated to the struggle against the separation fence. In four years of Friday demonstrations, I do not recall even one Friday I have not seen him active in the preparation for the demonstration, marching in the first lines, and defying the tear gas near the gate to the route of the separation fence.

At the evening we had a demonstration in Tel Aviv. About 500 people (including 10 of the legendary antiauthoritarian anticapitalist Matzpen - most active from the late 1960s to the early 1980s) mainly from among the thousands who participated in the Friday demonstrations in Bil'in with Basem during the last 4 years. We marched and chanted all the way from the center of town towards the War ministry compound where. There we had a meeting with few speakers.

Friday 10.4.2009 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jy47y59WtQc video of Ni'ilin demonstration
Related Link: http://ilanisagainstwalls.blogspot.com

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS-ISRAEL/GAZA:

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON GAZA:

Very many of the facts about the situation of Israel's war on Gaza are hard to come by. This is not just because of the desire of the media to look for image rather than substance. It is also a fact that Israel has done its best to deny the media access to the besieged area. Here from Z Communications is a story that asks questions about the situation and gives answers to the inquiring. It links to a much longer (37 pages) article that covers things not discussed below. Very good if you want to know more than the superficialities of the conflict.

...........................
Special Update: Gaza Crisis Q&A by Stephen Shalom:
On December 27, 2008, Israel launched its assault on Gaza: Operation Cast Lead.

ZCom/ZNet has been has been addressing the rapidly worsening conditions by publishing numerous articles each day from diverse international writers. However, by far the most extensive piece so far is the very important Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) by Z's own Stephen Shalom.

Shalom's FAQ is an exhaustive analysis that collects in one place the most frequently asked questions about Israel's war on Gaza, along with succinct answers, including extensive footnotes and sources. All told Shalom includes 34 questions and answers.

Below are five randomly selected questions and their answers to indicate the type of treatment Shalom provides. We also list the 34 questions (without answers) - to show the full range of concerns Shalom addresses. We provide only this summary here, by email, because the total FAQ is too long to send.

You can access the whole FAQ online including all questions, answers, and extensive footnotes and references. You can navigate the FAQ by viewing only questions that interest you in any order you like, by assessing questions grouped by topic, or by simply reading through the whole thing, sequentially which we very highly recommend.

Click here to go straight to the full Q/A: http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/20269
Brief Sample from Question and Answer on Gaza

By Stephen Shalom

1. Doesn't Israel have the right to defend itself and its population from rocket attacks?

Rockets from Gaza aimed at Israeli civilians violate international law.

But any assessment of whether Israeli military actions constitute lawful self-defense has to take account of the context and the question of proportionality.

The broad context is that the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories is illegal and unjust and Israel can't claim self-defense when Palestinians struggle by legitimate means to end the occupation. (In the same way, Japanese troops couldn't claim self-defense when they were attacked by guerrillas in occupied China or the occupied Philippines during World War II.)

The proper Israeli response to such Palestinian actions is not "self-defense," but full withdrawal from the occupied territories.

13. How can Israel be accused of terrorism since it doesn't intentionally kill civilians, and views all civilian deaths that it causes as regrettable accidents?

Keep in mind the official U.S. definition of terrorism: "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets."[36]Three points need to be noted here.

First, inflicting pain on civilians for political purposes has long been official Israeli policy. When Hamas kidnapped an Israeli soldier in June 2006, Israel responded by destroying Gaza's only power plant, causing massive suffering.[37] Israeli leaders have openly acknowledged that they intended to cripple Gaza's economy as a way to undermine support for Hamas. (That this is a foolish policy makes it no less immoral. That the governments of the United States, the European Union, and Egypt are complicit in the policy likewise makes it no less immoral.) Gazans have seen poverty and unemployment soar and their health and welfare decline as Israel has closed their borders, cut fuel and power supplies, and denied them their own tax revenues. Human rights groups[38] and United Nations officials[39] have condemned this policy of economic strangulation, deeming it "collective punishment."

When New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman writes that he hopes Israel is pursuing a strategy in Gaza of trying to inflict "heavy pain on Gaza civilians," he is endorsing a policy that is indistinguishable from the above-cited official U.S. government definition of terrorism.[40]

Second, over the years Israel has intentionally killed civilians. Among other instances, it has used lethal fire against demonstrators who posed no serious threat.[41] It has targeted and killed medical personnel and journalists.[42] And now it has targeted and killed civilian police and non-military government personnel in Gaza (as will be discussed below).

Third, even when civilians have not been specifically targeted, Israel has shown reckless disregard for the welfare of civilians, killing many. These are not "unfortunate accidents," but the result of willful, criminal negligence. It is true that in domestic law we distinguish between intentional and unintentional killing, with the former being a much more serious offense than the latter. But domestic law also recognizes that sometimes criminal negligence can be as condemnable as premeditation. As the Palestinian human rights organization Al Haq correctly puts it, "the choice of targeted areas, methods of attack and the number of civilians killed and injured clearly indicate a reckless disregard for civilian life synonymous with intent."[43]

Consider the record before the current Israeli attack on Gaza. According to statistics from the Israeli human rights group B'Tselem, from the beginning of the second Intifada on September 29, 2000, until November 30, 2008, 2,990 Palestinians in Gaza were killed by Israeli security forces. Of these, 1,382 were known not to be taking part in hostilities.[44] (During this same seven year period, Palestinian rockets or mortars from Gaza killed a grand total of 22 Israeli civilians.[45]) If these Palestinian rockets constituted terrorism and war crimes -- and they do -- how much greater were the crimes of the Israeli government?

And this is so whether Israeli officials express pro forma regret or instead declare, as Prime Minister Ariel Sharon did in March 2002, "The Palestinians must be hit and it must be painful. We must cause them losses, victims, so they feel the heavy price."[46]
19. What were the terms of the June 2008 ceasefire with Israel?

In June 2008, after almost a year of military engagements and Israel's crippling blockade of Gaza, Hamas and Israel agreed to a ceasefire, also called a truce or lull or calm. The two sides would not speak to one another directly and so there was an Egyptian mediated understanding, whose terms were never formally written down. The Associated Press reported the terms as follows:

"The truce takes effect at 6 a.m. Thursday (11 p.m. EDT Wednesday) [June 19].

"All Gaza-Israel violence stops. After three days, Israel eases its blockade on Gaza, allowing more vital supplies in."

A week later, Israel further eases restrictions at cargo crossings.

"In the final stage, talks are conducted about opening the Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt and a prisoner exchange to free Cpl. Gilad Schalit, held by Hamas-affiliated groups for two years."[60]

And although Israel tried to claim in December 2008 that the lull was of unlimited duration,[61] everyone (including the Israeli government in June 2008) referred to the lull as scheduled to last for six months, with hopes that it might be extended.[62] Hamas had wanted the lull to apply to both Gaza and the West Bank, but Israel refused.[63]

Various Palestinian armed groups -- though not Hamas -- had reservations about the lull, but they agreed to respect it. Islamic Jihad said, however, that while it would abide by the truce, it considered the West Bank and Gaza indivisible, so it reserved the right to retaliate from Gaza for an attack on its members in the West Bank.
31. Haven't the vast majority of those killed by Israel been, not civilians, but terrorists?

Not by a long shot. Obviously it is difficult to confirm the identity and activity of each person who was killed while the Israeli offensive is going on. This has led some human rights groups and aid agencies to report the number of women and children killed as an absolute minimum of the number of civilians killed. But as they have made clear,[109] this was not meant to suggest that this was the complete count of civilian casualties nor that any adult male killed was automatically a combatant.

As of January 14, the Palestinian Ministry of Health reported 1,013 deaths, of which 40 percent were women and children.[110] The killing of numerous male civilians has been well-documented: in addition to police and government personnel, an anti-Hamas judge (and father of a Human Rights Watch consultant), medical staff, drivers, and many more.[111]

As of January 14, more than 4,500 were reported wounded, half of them women and children.[112] Moreover, many of the wounded will die because of a lack of timely and adequate medical care. Gaza's hospitals are overwhelmed and lack reliable power and sufficient supplies, ambulances are afraid to travel and Israel has blocked access by emergency medical vehicles.[113] According to Human Rights Watch, "Only four critically injured patients have been transferred to Israel since the start of the conflict," in part because Israel demanded financial guarantees for the medical costs of wounded Palestinians. Since the start of the ground campaign on January 3, transfers to Israel ended.[114]
33. Are Israelis unanimous in backing their government policy?

As in the United States, Israelis are often swayed by their government and a compliant media. On January 1, 2009, fewer than a fifth of the population supported advancing to an extensive ground war,[125] but once their leaders launched it, they endorsed it.

A poll published on January 15, showed 82 percent of Israelis don't think Israel has "gone too far" which means that almost the entire Jewish population is backing the war.[126] Almost. There have been many antiwar protests, most often in Arab areas, but sometimes including both Jewish and Palestinian Israelis. A demonstration numbering in the thousands took place in Tel Aviv on January 3.[127] A petition calling for an end to the IDF operation in Gaza and for a renewal of the truce with Hamas was signed by 500 residents of Sderot, the Israeli town bordering Gaza that has been on the receiving end of so many rockets.[128]

But there is no doubt that war-fever is running rampant in Israel. The Central Elections Committee has banned two Israeli Arab parties from running in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Even if the Supreme Court reverses this ruling, it is frightening that in addition to the rightwing parties, the two major government parties, Kadima and Labor, both voted for the ban.[129]
Below are all the FAQ questions.

Again, please go to the site to view whole FAQ online, with answers and sources.

1. Doesn't Israel have the right to defend itself and its population from rocket attacks?

2. While conquests in wars of aggression are clearly illegal, didn't Israel obtain the West Bank and Gaza as the result of a defensive war against an attack waged by neighboring Arab states?

3. Hasn't Israel withdrawn from Gaza, thereby ending its occupation?

4. Regardless of whether the occupation legally continues, didn't Israeli give up its settlements and its military bases in Gaza?

5. Why should Israel have an obligation to open its borders with or transmit electricty or fuel to Gaza? Doesn't it have the sovereign right to close its borders as it wishes?

6. Gaza shares a land border with Egypt. Why is Israel blamed for cutting off Gaza's borders?

7. Didn't Hamas just use the Israeli disengagement from Gaza as an opportunity to launch rockets at Israel without provocation?

8. How did Israel and the West react to Hamas's election victory?

9. How could Hamas be a partner for peace? Didn't they refuse the three U.S.-Israeli conditions: that they recognize Israel, renounce violence, and agree to accept all agreements previously accepted by the Palestinian Authority?

10. Hasn't Hamas refused to ever accept the existence of Israel?

11. Doesn't Hamas support Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Semitism?

12. Is Hamas a terrorist organization?

13. How can Israel be accused of terrorism since it doesn't intentionally kill civilians, and views all civilian deaths that it causes as regrettable accidents?

14. Isn't Hamas's firing of inaccurate rockets a violation of international humanitarian law?

15. Does the fact that Israel has killed civilians justify Palestinian attacks on civilians?

16. Didn't Hamas kidnap an Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit?

17. Didn't Hamas launch a military coup against Fatah and the Palestinian Authority in Gaza?

18. Isn't Hamas just a pawn of Iran?

19. What were the terms of the June 2008 ceasefire with Israel?

20. What did the lull terms say about the smuggling in of weapons?

21. What happened during the lull?

22. Wasn't it legitimate for Israeli troops to go into Gaza to destroy a tunnel being used for a planned kidnapping?

23. Why was the lull not extended?

24. Can Hamas be trusted not to break truces and ceasefires?

25. Given the barrage of rockets that was launched from Gaza after the lull ended on December 19, did Israel have any alternative to a military attack?

26. If the cease-fire had been extended, couldn't Hamas have smuggled in rockets of longer and longer range until even Tel Aviv was vulnerable? Doesn't that mean that any new ceasefire would have had to include a provision to prevent weapons smuggling, and hence would have been unacceptable to Hamas?

27. What does it mean to say that Israel should have responded proportionately?

28. Since Hamas places its military assets in civilian areas, thus using the population as human shields, isn't Hamas responsible for all the harm to civilians?

29. Israel calls the homes it is planning to attack and drops leaflets warning civilians to get away from military targets. Doesn't that meet its obligation to protect the civilian population?

30. Has Israel been intentionally targeting civilians in Gaza?

31. Haven't the vast majority of those killed by Israel been, not civilians, but terrorists?

32. Aren't there many things we don't know yet? Shouldn't we reserve judgment until all the facts are in?

33. Are Israelis unanimous in backing their government policy?

34. What has the role of the United States been?

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR-BANGLADESH/KUWAIT:

CLASS STRUGGLE AT HOME AND ABROAD:

The lot of the working class of Bangladesh is not an easy one. Facing vicious exploitation these people have acted to fight their bosses and their government-Bangladesh is under a 'State of Emergency' that prohibits such things as strikes and demonstrations. Molly has reported on many of their struggles in the past. Here's yet another report from the LibCom website about how these people are exploited when they go abroad to work, just as they are at home. In the context of South Asia this usually means going to the oil-rich Gulf states where the ruling class has far fewer compunctions about brutal treatment of their workers and far fewer restraints that rulers in other parts of the world do. The story....

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Bangladesh; migrants export class struggle:

In recent days over 800 Bangladeshi workers have been deported by the Kuwaiti government for organising strikes and violent protests.

There are about 200,000 workers from Bangladesh in the Gulf countries, mostly employed in cleaning services, security guards or construction. Every year thousands of poor Bangladeshis pay a labour recruiting agent (dalal) to arrange temporary jobs in Kuwait and other wealthy countries. Many workers find the labour brokers have ripped them off as pay is much less than promised - and sometimes less than other workers doing the same job. Others find on arrival the agents have failed to provide any work and so leave them stranded at the airport. Accommodation is also inadequate and expensive so that the whole point of the migration - to save and send money to family back home - becomes impossible.

It is common for employers to demand the passports of workers at beginning of employment, under threat of lower wages if workers refuse. But this makes workers vulnerable as they risk deportation if police find them without documentation. (Unsurprisingly therefore, there are thousand of illegal migrant workers, often using false ID.) If workers make demands on the boss he can simply inform the police that the worker is dismissed and so no longer has any legal right to remain in the country; wages owed to workers are sometimes used to pay for the travel costs of their own deportation.

Quote:

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Amin Ahmed Chowdhury, a former Bangladesh ambassador to Oman, told bd news24.com: "Brokers of employers and recruiting agents take workers' passports on arrival, saying they are necessary for making identity and medical cards."

"Their exploitation starts with the taking away of passports," said Amin, who pointed out the practice was illegal.

He added that the brokers of the recruiting agents often made workers sign new contracts in a foreign language for much lower wages than pledged in Bangladesh. (Independent-Bangladesh.com 7 Aug 08)
* * *
Kuwaiti newspaper Arab Times in a report yesterday said one of the workers alleged that the company has not paid two months' wages to a number of workers, and is not giving them weekly holiday.Some of them are even forced to work 16 hours a day without any payment for overtime work, he said.Another worker said the manager of the company beat up some workers for no reasons, and deducts five dinars per day if any worker fails to turn up for work due to illness.

He alleged that the company is compelling them to buy plane tickets from a certain travel agency, which charges exorbitant fares, the Arab Times reported.

“We want the company to pay our wages through bank, besides paying us for overtime. Most of the workers are falling sick because of the long hours of work. The company is also not allowing us to take sick leave. How can we work under such an environment?” the worker posed a question. (Daily Star 22 July 08)

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The trouble began in the last two weeks of July. Thousands of Bangladeshis and other South Asian migrants (from Nepal, India, probably Pakistan, etc.) employed as cleaners, rubbish collectors and stevedores/dockers went on strike over a long list of grievances; poor wages, poor working conditions, overtime without pay, lack of sick leave and time off, etc. The workers also claim that employers force workers to pay extra for health and accommodation — costs they say should be borne by the companies. Demonstrations at two sites where they're housed outside Kuwait City turned violent, with workers smashing windows, vandalising cars and clashing with camp officials, police and army - who moved in with tear gas and clubs. 800 Bangladeshi demonstrators were arrested on 28th July but clashes continued for several days.

"The army beat us mercilessly while breaking up the protest and also in detention camps," said Mohammad Ilyas, 28, who started work in Kuwait three years ago after selling everything he owned and borrowing from relatives to afford the agent fees. "Now I am a wretched person. My dream is over, he said." (Reuters, 1 Aug 08)

As the deportees arrive back in Bangladesh, evidence of beatings by Kuwaiti police and soldiers are plainly visible. While cracking down on the unfamiliar sight of public violent labour unrest by its normally invisible migrant labour force, the Kuwaiti state is obliged to recognise its dependency on exploiting cheap South Asian labour for its menial jobs. So it has conceded that it will abolish the dalal labour broking/pimping system and set a minimum wage at over double the present rates of pay.

The two exports; Ready Made Garments & Ready Made Workers

Bangladesh has also announced greater regulation of labour brokers' practices. Despite its complete disinterest in ever previously regulating or limiting workers' exploitation by local recruiting agents, the Bangladeshi state is now also anxious to resolve the labour unrest and repair the damaged reputation of their migrant workforce; over 5 million Bangladeshis work abroad, mostly in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries, sending home around $8 billion a year and providing a vital foreign exchange injection to Bangladesh's economy. This is almost as much as the $9 billion the country's other main export - ready made garments - brings into the country.

Keeping the home fires burning

The migrants return to the ongoing struggles at home. Despite the continued State of Emergency in Bangladesh, a report published this week describes the growth in unrest among garment industry workers over the first six months of 2008. There were 72 incidents of labour unrest related to unpaid wages, lay-offs and holiday time disputes; and in 13 cases, workers took to streets to protest at the killing or torture of fellow workers. At least 988 workers were injured in clashes with police; 45 workers were arrested, over 10,000 were fined and at least 78 sacked over participation in demonstrations. The incidents have been spread over all the main ready made garment centers.

The protests and strikes followed a familiar pattern; an incident in one factory sparks a walkout, then those workers march to other factories and bring out many other workers. Demonstrations often become roadblocks; police actions can often result in rioting, fierce large-scale clashes with cops and sometimes attacks on bosses' property. All this is in the context of some of the lowest wages in the world, ever-higher food and fuel prices and employers often refusing to implement previously agreed improvements in pay and working conditions. Food prices have doubled in Bangladesh since September 2006, while wages have remained largely static.

The high level of struggle of the Bangladeshi working class continues and now spreads across borders.