

# **HON ANDREW LITTLE, MINISTER OF DEFENCE**

## **Defence Policy Review detailed submissions**

August 2023

This publication provides all of the detailed submissions made to the Defence Policy Review from 26 January – 30 April 2023.


This pack has been released on the Ministry of Defence website, available at:  
[www.defence.govt.nz/publications](http://www.defence.govt.nz/publications).

It has been necessary to withhold certain information in accordance with the following provisions of the Official Information Act 1982. Where information is withheld, the relevant sections of the Act are indicated in the body of the document. Two submissions are withheld from the document in full under section 9(2)(ba). Where information has been withheld in accordance with section 9(2) of the Act, no public interest has been identified that would outweigh the reasons for withholding it.

Information is also withheld in order to:

- protect the privacy of those who provided submissions [section 9(2)(a)]
- maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinions by or between or to Ministers of the Crown or members of an organisation or officers and employees of any department or organisation in the course of their duty [section 9(2)(g)(i)]
- enable any department or organisation holding the information to carry out, without prejudice or disadvantage, commercial activities [section 9 (2)(i)]

[Reply](#) - [Print](#) [View Images](#)

 NZDF personnel who are loyal to countries other than New Zealand

Sent: 26 January 2023 12:33 AM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Hello,

I am concerned that there are NZDF personnel who have loyalty towards non-democratic regimes such as China. I know of some ex-NZDF personnel who are Chinese ultra-nationalists, for example. I believe NZDF personnel should be loyal to New Zealand.

Thank you for reading my opinion above.

Regards,

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Print View Images

Defence Review Public Survey.

Sent: 26 January 2023 9:26 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Kia ora, tena koe,

When I was filling out the online survey, I forgot to add the following.

New Zealand should strategic relationships with Japan, Singapore, and South Korea because those three nations have similar outlooks to us. All three are astride our SLOC and it's to our strategic advantage. We should also seriously consider defence acquisitions from all three because it may be more cost effective than our usual US, UK and EU sources.

For example, we could build our frigates in South Korea using a licence from a third party source. It's cheaper than building in North America, UK, Western Europe, and Australia. An example would be acquiring a licence from Backcocks to build a NZ variant of the Arrowheads 140 and fitting it out to our requirements. The hull is large enough and has enough buoyancy to enable a fitout similar to the Canadian Surface Combatant, then Type 26 build. The design is also quite logical with easy access for maintenance, repairs etc., because the cabling and piping is not buried behind / underneath decks, bulkheads, or deckheads.

We require a proper military airlifter for our strategic airlift capability, that is not a converted airliner and that has rear ramp access. The Japanese have the KHI C-2 which can lift approximately 37 tonnes, almost twice that of the C-130J-30 Super Hercules and it has the range to fly to Phoenix Field in McMurdo sound and return to NZ, without the requirement for a Point of Safe Return. Something that the C-130J-30 or the Boeing 757 cannot achieve.


Thank you and my apologies for not adding this to my original survey response.

Nā mihi,

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Print View Images



Survey

Sent: 27 January 2023 8:47 AM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Read Peter Winley's excellent article on his blog.

s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence



Fwd: [Peter Winsley] Peter Winsley commented on How our defence investment decisions can help lift New Zealand's economic complexity and performance

Sent: 27 January 2023 9:14 AM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

Message


CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

Peter Winsley

## New comment!

 Peter Winsley just commented on [How our defence investment decisions can help lift New Zealand's economic complexity and performance.](#)


In response to [Cassandra](#):

*Can I add, Peter, that I'm disappointed that your very good article has only sparked this one brief comment. Sadly, New Zealanders are not interested. Contrast with Australia which is realistic and, under Labor now, rapidly rearming. The topic's importance can be measured by Luxon appointing as his defence spokesperson an unranked (after 20 who [...])*

Thanks for this comment – I agree with your points. Australia has a lot more realism about the importance of defence – noting of course that it has an Indonesia with 245M or so people next door not to speak of an increasingly abrasive China. We Kiwis have no sense of existential threat, unlike e.g. Finland, Israel or RoK. Also, I must admit I put very little effort into promoting my blog...

Peter

[Reply](#) [Print](#) [View Images](#)

 My article linked below is a contribution to the Defence Review. Happy to elaborate on any points.

Sent: 27 January 2023 10:20 AM

From: **s9(2)(a)**

To: Engage;

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

<https://breakingviewsnz.blogspot.com/2023/01/peter-winsley-how-our-defence.html>  
Sent from [Mail](#) for Windows

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply - Print View Images

Defence Assessment

Sent: 29 January 2023 7:24 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Kia Ora,

My two cents worth. My adult life has been in the navy. s9(2)(a)

Basically, we will always be short of funds. So, we need to do what we say about capability wrt interoperability etc. First priority are people. It is a package thing. It is pretty sad when you observe how other nations look after their people, especially when they retire. The NZDF is the first cap off the rank for disasters, fires in Aus, cleaning up beaches and training teams in the UK. But seem to get no support from governments for their efforts.

Collectively, as a Defence Force we are pretty small. We should leave service pride and tradition behind and start a new chapter (honouring the past), and restructure. Create a Marine Force model, with a Chief (CDF), of the Service Chiefs and boost the Component Commanders. All service personnel should have basic infantry skills. You can still have different uniforms, they will just be in the Maritime Component vice the Navy.

From a Maritime perspective we need to properly tailor our force around the High Value Units (HVV) whether that is (an) Amphibious platform or the tanker. Those units must be protected and we know that frigates more often than not, means that you might get one due to maintenance etc. Three should guarantee one. The South Pacific and Antarctica are our must go. Therefore, we need to actually create the Joint Amphibious Task Group (South Pacific/Sub-Antarctic) complete with communications that lets all three services can talk to each other.

The Maritime Component should look like (new capability in red):

1. 3+ Frigates;
2. AOTEAROA (ROA);
3. Two LST's (something like the Korean (we have had great success with the same Shipyard) Cheon Wang Bong Class with dock;
4. Two OPV's, SOPAC mainstay);
5. Southern Ocean OPV cw hydrographic systems (planned, ship not the hydro systems);
6. MANAWANUI;
7. Two IPV's;
8. A marinized helicopter across the NZDF. If we pursue the NH-90, get more for the Frigates and the Amphibs. We are two small a country to have small bespoke fleets (Blackhawks and Seahawks? and
9. 20m Littoral Warfare Support Vessel to support diving/hydrography/MCM around the NZ coast and seamanship training for Coxswains.

Comments:

Frigates are the right size vessel to protect the HVU. As mentioned two doesn't mean two (or even one). Three sounds a credible size for NZ. Frigates are the minimum to join international coalitions and be credible (with the right weapon systems).

CANTERBURY has been a great stepping stone for the NZDF. It was, however purchased to be the third wave (sea lift) of an amphibious operation, not the first wave as we have been operating the Ship. For safety's sake at least, a vessel(s) with a dock is a must. The operation of a) getting CAN's LCM's into the water is problematic, and b) trying to conduct a stern door marriage can be even more complicated. So sell CAN, buy two LSTs. The above mentioned *Cheon Wand Bong* ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cheon\\_Wang\\_Bong-class\\_tank\\_landing\\_ship](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cheon_Wang_Bong-class_tank_landing_ship)) is a very capable and versatile platform. And as mentioned, has a dock (safety and the ability to work in much worse conditions that CAN can). This is a amphibious platform not a sea lift platform (although it can do that).

Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel is a no brainer with the focus south. Join ROA as a mini task group (mutual support) when down in that area of operation (sub-antarctic and antarctica). Add a survey system to add to the national hydrographic database and our understanding of the environment.

Any helicopter that we buy, needs to be able to embark on a Amphib (troop movement) and it would make sense that there was also a naval version that embarked on the Frigates for ASW/ASuW etc.

All coastal countries are vulnerable to mining in a time of conflict. I believe that we are still attempting to hold onto Q Route survey for NZ Ports. This methodology, I believe needs to change. MATATAUA is expanding it's autonomus capabilities and the future method of countering this threat should be the Breakout (break in?) method. For this and other outputs like Coxswain training, and coastal hydro and support to diving courses, we should purchase a approx. 20m vessel with a A frame on the back for side scan sonar and AUV deployment.

IPV's training and should be east coast only. West coast is not inshore. That is where the OPV's come in.


Observations on land and air components:

**Land Component** – we need to ensure that everything they buy, can fit on a Amphib (and associated LCMs) and the New C-130J. We need enough MARS-L's for every Infantry Soldier to have their own weapon (familiarity, set-up and training etc) as they currently don't.

**Air Component** – Ensure that the helicopter fleet covers all three services requirements. Continue to explore UAV's (and be the Centre of Excellence for Army and Navy UAV's). Strategic Air Lift is under procurement, P8's are sorted. You could go somewhere towards having some 'teeth' by some ground attack aircraft by arming the Texans.

Released by the Minister of Defence

[Reply](#) [Print](#) [View Images](#)

 Your Questionnaire

Sent: 29 January 2023 9:39 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

Message

-----  
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.  
Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize  
the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the  
email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you  
-----

Dear Sir,

I completed your on line questionnaire on the future of NZ Defence. Although you may find my answers are somewhat critical they are well intentioned and are aimed at generating debate. I am more than willing to help / engage to ensure that NZ Defence is fit for purpose.

Kind Regards, s9(2)

s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)

Sent from my iPhone

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Print View Images

Mentions of invasion from prophecies

Sent: 1 February 2023 7:06 AM

From: [REDACTED]

To: Engage;

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Dear friend,

I'm sending this so you might know what's been happening in the Christian churches of Australia. It may be of value to your organisation/department.

Prophecy Newsletter 1.2.2023

Invasion of Australia by foreign army?

Q. Do we believe in revelations of the future. The born-again Christians do. We find that even today, God is still speaking to people in Divine dreams, visions, and prophetic words. If you decide this has any value, perhaps you could hang onto a copy.

As for me I've had several dreams of late with a similar theme: invasion of the region. Just the other night (21.1.2023) I had a dream that I was standing before a high school class telling the teenagers that a war was coming, and they may have to fight for their country. The teenagers were, as one might imagine, not amused yet some did listen.

Having been a collector of prophecies for many years I took this as a hint from The Lord to keep going. I was about to give up I was that burned out from so much writing over so long a period. Ok. On with the story.

Over the years I've observed that there's been a slowly increasing number of reports from the Christian churches, of God speaking about a future conflict in the Pacific.

Reports of dreams, visions, and prophetic words (through the laying-on-of-hands) of an invader first began appearing in the Christian churches in the early 1970s. The country, it seems would one day come under attack from a foreign power. The first revelation I had the opportunity to read came from Jack Burrell's 1974 book WHAT WILL BECOME OF AUSTRALIA (copies are in the National Library and on the internet).

Talking and writing to people here and there across the country I subsequently discovered other prophecies similar to Jack Burrell's. All in all, more than 30 prophetic revelations (mentions) of this invader before I generally gave up looking for more (30 or so mentions was enough to handle along with my daily output of writings).

Many Christians seemed to have knowledge of these prophecies and discussion had been ongoing amongst the fellowships for a long time. Could an invasion really happen? How would it unfold? Would land be lost?

Some prophesied events: An ill wind is coming to Asia. A foreign power will enter northern India and move down through southeast Asia and on to Australia. Paratroopers will land in northern parts of the country (possibly the Mt. Isa mines area).

One Christian lady pastor said, "Some twenty five years ago I heard a prophecy saying that an enemy would invade Australia from the north and God would allow them to come so far into Australia because Australia mostly has rejected God but then God would raise up another nation to fight on our side and God would put hooks in the jaws of the enemy and drive them back. When this happens don't give the people fighting on our side (the glory) but give God the glory". The enemy could be wearing white-oufits against the heat of the outback sun. Ships will enter the Gulf of Carpentaria and soldiers will disembark. There could be similar activity at 80 Mile beach, WA. There could be an air attack on Townsville barracks. Law and Order would be stretched and there would be a shortage of fuel. Food would also become scarce in some areas. Jacks vision suggests that the northern part of Australia, all of the land north of Byron Bay NSW, would eventually be owned by the enemy and there would be a communist style government in the south. There could be a move up from enemy bases in Antarctica connected to the invasion. Our allies may be occupied with other events for a short while. I also noted that the enemy hadn't been named and there hadn't been a time given for the invasion.

On a more cheerful note, the Christians would take it all in their stride, and help others adapt to the situation. The need for Christian Revival has also been mentioned many times in these revelations.

Basically, I've seen these revelations as warnings to Australia to encourage prayer to bring Gods help. Prayer changes things for people and for nations. As for our state of readiness we might reflect on Gideon in the Old Testament (Judges chapter 6). Gideon had only a small army, but He had God on His side. He got the victory over the enemy because he humbled himself before The Lord; and did what The Lord wanted. As with Gideon, so it can be with Australia. If the people turn back to God, He will turn to them. We will receive his Hand of Protection and our enemies will not prevail. NB: for a prophecy to be genuine it must actually come to pass. Until then we just have to wait and see. We take note of the prophecy and commit it to prayer seeking Gods help.

God bless [REDACTED] Sydney. Australia

<https://jackburrells1974visionexcerpts.blogspot.com/>

"Everyone who calls on the name of Jesus will be saved" ... Romans 10:13.

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply - Print View Images

Re: Automatic reply: Mentions of invasion from prophecies

Sent: 1 February 2023 7:51 AM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

An old Christian prophecy invasion australia @

<https://jackburrells1974vision excerpts.blogspot.com/>

----- Original Message -----

From: "Engage" <engage@defence.govt.nz>

s9(2)(a)

Sent: Tue, 31 Jan 2023 18:06:56 +0000

Subject: Automatic reply: Mentions of invasion from prophecies

Thank you for your feedback [unclassified]

Released by the Minister of Defence

Feedback Aotearoa-New Zealand Defence Review 2023

Sent: 5 February 2023 10:32 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To:

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@zdr.mil.nz and then delete the email from your inbox. Thank you.

Hon Andrew Little  
Défense Minister of NZ

Hon Members of the Shadow Government and Minor Parties

Hon Members of the  
NZ Defence Committee

05/02/2023

s9(2)(a)

Thank you for your time,

The current geopolitical landscape is complex and fast-changing, with numerous challenges and threats that require our immediate attention. One of the most pressing of these is the threat posed by China(1), its unofficial navy/fishing fleet(2), climate change(3), and its impacts on global stability(4), including the rise of climate refugees(5), the collapse of food chains(6), and more close to home a friendly reminder 'the shits going to hit the fan' the flooding in Tāmaki-makau-rau/Auckland.

These challenges are not only affecting the environment and natural resources, but also posing a threat to democracy and the security of nations around the world, including Aotearoa New Zealand.

Climate change is one of the most pressing environmental challenges facing our planet. Rising sea levels, more frequent and severe weather events, and other environmental degradation are threatening coastal communities, infrastructure, and natural resources. This is leading to the displacement of many people, who are becoming climate refugees, adding to the pressure on governments and communities around the world.

The collapse of food chains and the decline of the third world is also contributing to the instability and insecurity in the world. As temperatures continue to rise and weather patterns become more unpredictable, crop yields are declining, and food supplies are becoming scarce in many regions. This, in turn, is leading to food shortages, price hikes, and widespread hunger and malnutrition, particularly in the developing world.

China is also a growing threat, particularly in light of its increasing military and economic power. The country has a long history of territorial expansion, dating back to the Ming dynasty in the 15th century, when it claimed and occupied vast territories in Southeast Asia. In recent years, China has been using its economic and military might to assert its territorial claims in the South China Sea and other regions, leading to tensions with its neighbours and with the international community.

China's growing fishing fleet is also a major concern for many countries, including New Zealand. The massive size of this fleet and its activities are depleting fish stocks and disrupting marine ecosystems, with far-reaching impacts on food security and economic stability. This is particularly problematic for coastal communities, many of which rely on fishing for their livelihoods, and for nations that rely on the ocean for a significant portion of their food supply.

Furthermore, the threat to democracy is also of significant concern. Many countries around the world are facing a rise in authoritarianism and a decline in democratic institutions and values. This trend is particularly pronounced in China, which has been accused of suppressing dissent, violating human rights, and suppressing freedom of speech and the press. This threatens to undermine the stability of the international system and the principles of democracy, which are essential for maintaining global peace and security.

These challenges highlight the need for New Zealand to increase its defense spending to align with NATO countries' 2% GDP benchmark. This investment will help us to enhance our military capabilities and respond to any security threats that may arise as a result of climate change, China's fishing fleet, or other factors. By investing in our defense capabilities, we are demonstrating our commitment to addressing global challenges through collective action and reinforcing the international community's resolve in taking the necessary steps to mitigate the impacts of climate change and ensure a more stable and secure future for all nations.

A forgotten but equally important aspect for our Aotearoa/New Zealand survival is bipartisan & cooperation in military policy and spending which is crucial for ensuring the safety and well-being of our armed forces and maximizing the impact of taxpayer dollars.  
"We are too small to monkey around with our defence spending and policy"

In conclusion, the threat posed by China, its fishing fleet, climate change, climate refugees, the collapse of food chains, the decline of the third world, and the threat to democracy are significant and require a coordinated response from all nations. As a responsible member of the international community, New Zealand must take steps to address these threats, including Bipartisan Involvement & Cooperation in Military Policy and increasing defence spending to align with NATO countries' 2% GDP benchmark and This investment will help to enhance our security, demonstrate our commitment to addressing global challenges, and ensure a more stable and secure future for all.

A historical quote that captures the significance of this moment is from President John F. Kennedy, who said "the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing." It is our responsibility to take action and address these global challenges, to ensure that our world remains a stable and secure place for future generations

References:

1. Magic Weapons: China's political influence activities under Xi Jinping  
<https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2017-09/apo-nid108056.pdf>
2. The Strategic Significance of the Chinese Fishing Fleet  
<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2021/Panther-Maritime-Militia/>
3. UN climate report: It's 'now or never' to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees  
<https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115452>

Released by the Minister of Defence

[Reply](#) [Print](#) [View Images](#)

 Additional feedback - Defense Policy Review

Sent: 6 February 2023 12:51 AM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Sent from [Mail](#) for Windows

I Have completed the survey as requested.

My plea is that you take all our comments seriously and action the upgrade of capabilities to finally be a REAL defence partner with all of our allies especially Australia.

The previous defence minister was a real disappointment compared to the work done by Ron Marks.

You must plan NOW to maintain and improve the NZDF capabilities....which include salary and working conditions improvements for our magnificent personnel....AND upgrade capabilities, such as new naval helicopters, replacement of HMNZS Canterbury with a more capable ship and the planning to replace our combat frigates. (they will be out of date and useless by the early 2030s.) Major decisions also need to be made NOW as to how to replace our patrol fleet....

Wayne Mapp's article 17<sup>th</sup> of January sets out the issues and the urgency.

But the fundamental issue is LEADERSHIP from the Defence Minister.....LEADERSHIP to address decades of under investment in the NZDF.

I plead with anyone who will listen.....take heed. We have major geopolitical changes to face and as a Nation we cannot rely on our defence partners to do what we should have been doing for the last twenty years....


Let us invest in the NZDF so we can play our part in keeping the peace....

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence



[Reply](#) [Print](#) [View Images](#)

 Survey response

Sent: 8 February 2023 7:52 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Sent from [Mail](#) for Windows  
I offered to assist in training in order to release others for tasks under threat.  
Response was "not interested"  
Good luck. You turned down a total of 33 years Defence experience.

Released by the Minister of Defence

[Reply](#) [Print](#) [View Images](#)

 Recognize all Veterans as Veterans

Sent: 15 February 2023 6:15 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage:

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Kia Ora koe,

The NZDF are excellent at exclusion and poor at recording harm.

My knees are poked but I get no support after humping oversized packs through the boonies for over a decade and a half. No medical records to the.

Simply change the veterans eligibility to all those discharged from the NZDF without exemption! So yes the Gunner now bumbling jihadi would also be entitled, but of course subject to justice for any laws he may have broken.

Ngā mihi nui: s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

[Reply](#) [Print](#) [View Images](#)

 Defence Review

Sent: 15 February 2023 7:58 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

Message

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. In any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Kia Ora Team

I have just completed your online survey but just wanted to add the following.

I respect the hard work and total professionalism and commitment our Defence Force personnel give each and everyday and they have for far too long been using old and outdated and unreliable equipment.

New Zealand will always have like minded Defence partners like Australia and the US but we need to modernise and have more capability but on a smaller scale than our partners.

We need to increase our maritime capability with at least 1x extra P-8 Poseidon and a small amount of General Atomics Sea Guardians plus 3x modern onshore patrol vessels similar to Canadas Harry DeWolf class.

The navies Seasprite need to be replaced with the Sikorsky MR-60R Seahawk as operated by our close Defence partners.

When our ANZAC Frigates need replacing they should both be replaced with another combat capable frigate.

The Canterbury multi role ship should be replaced with helicopter landing dock ship.

The air forces rotary wing fleet needs to be increased by an additional 2x NH-90's and 3x A-109's.

The 757's need to be replaced with tanker capable aircraft like the KC-46 as both the Poseidon and C-130J are capable of being refuelled air to air and this aircraft can carry pallets and 100 passengers so it's a much needed asset.

The army needs to be modern and able to deploy fast and more investment in the SAS is much needed.

The Defence budget needs to be at least 2:2% of GDP.

Just my thoughts but we have a much more modern Defence Force than we do.

Ngā mihi nui

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Print View Images

NZDF Rocket Defense Development?

Sent: 16 February 2023 8:24 AM

s9(2)(a)

To: Engage:

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your inbox. Thank you.

Co-Develop NZDF Rocket defense and long range drones with the NZ based rocket and drone companies in NZ.

Be able to defend all NZ Territory and the Eastern Seaboard of Australia as a good wing man does.

Cheers s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

[Reply](#) [Print](#) [View Images](#)

intake  
Sent: 16 February 2023 7:53 PM  
s9(2)(a)  
To: Engage;

Message

-----  
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.  
Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize  
the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the  
email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you  
-----

i have a son working hard, train hard to get thru end of last year into the army recruit early this year but it was very disappointing towards the end of the process and one ear doesn't pass the requirement, only the small thing but my question is, why dont you put the full medical check at the beginning of the process so if something went wrong at least its at the beginning so my huge concern is my son is towards his final process and plus he hasn't working or study for the whole year because of awaiting for this army process, we confident that he will make it but his one ear fail the requirement, so not fair, we really sad about it.

hopefully will reached to responsible recruiter


s9(2)

Sent from my iPhone

Sent from my iPhone

Released by the Minister of Defence

 Reply  Print  View Images

 New Zealand Defence Survey

Sent: 17 February 2023 7:02 AM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

Message

-----  
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.  
Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize  
the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the  
email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you  
-----

Q: Why do you refer to New Zealand as Aotearoa New Zealand?


That is NOT the name of our country or the name of our Defence Force!

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

Released by the Minister of Defence

[Reply](#) [Print](#) [View Images](#)

 Survey, Defence force role  
Sent: 22 February 2023 7:31 PM  
From: s9(2)(a)  
To: Engage:


Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Hello,

The Defence Force need to reject the hysterical Climate change proposition. It is a political position that has nothing to do with the fundamental protection role of defence. Get back to the reason you exist. Reject the political expediency of Utopian advocates. There is no reason Defence should be side tracked into absurd nonsense about more catastrophes, more extreme weather, more severe natural disasters. These are weather events subject to variation through complex Climate cycles

[Reply](#) [Print](#) [View Images](#)

 (No subject)

Sent: 22 February 2023 7:43 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

Message

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Your survey was designed to get the answers you wanted from the person doing the survey.  
I am unhappy that I helped with the survey!  
Unhappy New Zealander!

Released by the Minister of Defence



Reply Print View Images

Additional feedback - Defence Policy Review

Sent: 23 February 2023 1:48 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage:

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. In any doubt, please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

i did complete the survey  
additional thoughts are  
in my opinion the nz defence force is poorly structured and equipped to handle any defence emergency  
and would only delay a well equipped aggressor by a small amount of time.  
by default nz defence has become an emergency service.

so, where to if we actually want a defence force  
my opinion is


1. armed neutrality with defence ties and links
2. compulsory national service for all citizens, training for 12 months with regular recalls and training after completion
3. model after other nations such as israel and switzerland
4. peacetime primary focus on border management and policing
5. break away from a few major defence bases within nz to add small defence services integrated bases in coastal locations around nz
6. plan and manage for future defence ground force resistance should an agressor arrive

s9(2)(a)  
s9(2)(a)  
s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

[Reply](#) [Print](#) [View Images](#)

 Questionnaire

Sent: 24 February 2023 1:01 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Kia ora

I have just completed the online survey concerning the NZ defence force.

Firstly let me congratulate you on the idea. If the defence forces of every country were governed by the people of that country there would be much less need for defence forces as instruments of war.

However, I found one of the questions at the beginning very difficult to answer.


I could not see how sending NZ defence personnel to the UK to train Ukraine soldiers could be seen as a peacekeeping effort.

Regards

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

[Reply](#) [Print](#) [View Images](#)

 What does Defence mean to you?

Sent: 24 February 2023 4:49 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage:

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Defence for me means defending our productive land against people who would not farm it as efficiently as us. It means defending our military against dilution by individuals who are not prepared to go to the same lengths to ensure the success of New Zealand. It means defending our population against dilution by individuals who do not have the same commitment to having a competitive nation.

I don't think New Zealand needs all the latest technology and equipment (not an expert) but I do think we need to have some of the latest equipment so that we at least are familiar with it.

Many Thanks,

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM




Sat 25/02/2023 11:02 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

review

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

 If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

I am an ex UK Gunner

Firstly the title defence force needs to change, an army by nature is an aggressive organisation and its title should reflect that. Defence force is too weak and does not project its self

The current geopolitical situation is worsening China is becoming an aggressor nation

India seems to be on the side lines but with tacit support for Russia the worst case scenario is for China India and Russia to form an alliance.

New Zealand's strength lies in its army and geographical positioning




Its navy and airforce have been neutered by successive governments

New Zealand needs to conduct joint military exercises with The UK Australia and the US.

we must accept the nuclear american carriers for re supply purposes because now is not the time to project a passive approach. Passivity will lead to defeat.

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

 Reply  Reply All  Forward  IM




Sun 26/02/2023 7:39 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Additional feedback - Defence Policy Review

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

 We removed extra line breaks from this message.

-----  
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.

Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you

-----  
I forgot to mention the army needs modern up to date equipment as well

Released by the Minister of Defence

 Reply  Reply All  Forward  IM




Sun 26/02/2023 9:29 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

survey

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

 We removed extra line breaks from this message.

-----  
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.

Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you

-----  
Hello Defence

I filled in the facebook survey to the best of my ability.

my interest is aviation and I have read widely in the history of aerial warfare and the kiwi contribution plus the campaigns of the Army and the Navy.

The thing that comes through is the thorough training that the armed forces provide and the ability to ramp up when required.

Also in my opinion the NZ armed forces are one of the most trusted groups in our society.

regards

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Mon 27/02/2023 5:34 a.m.

s9(2)(a)

Additional feedback - Defence Policy Review

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

**i** If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

I believe that we as one of the smallest countries an furthest from other countries I believe that we should look at what we do best an concentrate on that by asking our larger pacific family to join us to build a civil defense force to be there for any disasters with the right equipment too get the job done and when deployed they would rope an era or village off assisting local police they can protect property till the all clear is given gather intelligence and build friend's patrol our waters and it means Islanders can be come captains an go further in the military together we can achieve anything to train as soldiers we have Australia to train with where we concentrate on being there in a support roll with medical intelligence rebuild search and rescue and building relationship's with other countries etc thank you for your time.

Released by the Minister of Defence



Mon 27/02/2023 7:29 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Just finished your Online survey

To  Engage

**i** You replied to this message on 3/03/2023 2:18 p.m..

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your inbox. Thank you.

Am looking forward to hearing from you and opening a public debate, hopefully with the De-Fence Minister..

That De-fence which is between the people, between the houses and between a lot more, BUT NOT in DEFENCE of the COUNTRY..

People died in Defence of a Free World which New Zealand was part of.. Thats Defence.. playing nurse to poor uncared for people (by their own Governments) is not..

Seriously..

Oh and I would love a copy of MY survey response PLEASE and thank YOU..

I'm sure you will be able to find it.. It has my email address within so isn't that private.. OR do I need to make the request through the Privacy Commission??

Cheers

s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)


The Land of the Long white Cloud

Te Whenua o te Kapua mā Roa

Released by the Minister Of Defence



[Reply](#) [Print](#) [View Images](#)

 Re: Just finished your Online survey [unclassified]

Sent: 3 March 2023 4:04 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt, please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Sure they are anonymous, so be it.. I made mine not quite that by adding my email to an answer.. I'm sure some smart dude or dudette or whatever politically correct gender thingy one might want to be described as ight be able to find..

And we have De Fence Policy Review in Teams??

When do I get De Fence round my place, Nu Tirani, reviewed???

Thank You

s9(2)(a)

A Very Concerned New Zealander

On 3/03/2023 14:18, Engage wrote:

Kia ora,

Thanks for your email.

Responses to the survey are anonymous (you do not need to provide your contact details) although the comments you provide may be published in full. Please complete the survey only once.

Thank you,  
Defence Policy Review team

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Tue 28/02/2023 8:44 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Good Questionnaire

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

**i** You replied to this message on 17/03/2023 9:08 a.m..  
If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Happy to help.  
Social scientist. BA. Dip Teach Dip Ed.  
Taught in North and South Island.  
Taught decile 1 to 10.  
Taught in Taihape College. Over 50 percent Maori.  
Been on a health board and worked at National level for Education and curriculum development  
Taught at Takapuna Grammer. NAVY connections.  
Any way I can help?

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence



Thu 2/03/2023 2:16 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Poor Survey

To  Engage

Cc s9(2)(a)

Copied to DDMS

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Kia Ora

Your survey at <https://horizons.confirmit.eu/wix/p688339134865.aspx> is badly worded. Sometimes you have something I would agree with and another example which I don't agree with.

*For example, patrolling New Zealand's Exclusive Economic Zone (the area of sea around New Zealand that New Zealand has rights to), protecting shipping routes if they are under threat, and maintaining a combat force to protect New Zealand if the need arises.*

*I don't agree with my money being spent on combat forces.*

Working with other agencies to monitor and understand New Zealand's strategic environment

*What does this question mean? Which agencies? NZ Agencies? What does "strategic environment" mean? THIS IS ABSOLUTE RUBBISH.*

This does not qualify as a SURVEY. It is not up to scratch. It is muddled and totally unprofessional. I could write you a better one.

Ngā mihi o te tau hou ki a koe

*Best Wishes for the New Year*

s9(2)(a)




Released by the Minister of Defence

A bit more to add to your current survey

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

 If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

I was intrigued that a military organisation was asking Joe Public what they thought their priorities should be and how well they thought the military was prepared. Then I was a little concerned. Maybe this exercise is just to gauge public perception, to justify funding or has a political component. Or if someone just thought it was a good idea I guess we can at least be thankful for the creativity!

In any event, surely when a small countries nationwide military resource is to be prioritised, two main systemic drivers should firstly come into play. Neither of them involve Joe Public.

The first driver - Any mandate, agreement, convention or MOU that might be pre-existing with another country are considered, in other words, 'do we already have any obligations to put x, y or z on or even on the top of the list'.

The second driver would stem from where priorities lay based on a formal assessment of Critical and Relevant Risk. That's Critical and Relevant Risk to people. Not to your employees, as in a typical critical risk assessment, but risk to people anywhere where your services might be of value mitigating it. They pretty much become your external customers in a sense. Your external customers? Those people in a sinking yacht half way to Tonga.

In Phase I of that assessment you would consider every *general* situation the military could possibly ever be needed in, weighted and scored based on likelihood of occurrence, expected level of process/property or human cost, probable geographical placement, national loyalty and required response level. Critical Risk assessment systems are widespread in industry. They are easily adapted for your function. The concept is the same, just the risk is modelled to external customers and assessed accordingly. That assessment will give you a priority list, or at least a very clear start on one.

And you want to ask Joe Public as well? Don't forget Joe Public has a natural bias toward wherever his sympathies lie on the day or whatever might be topical and that bias could even be anti-military. Joe Public may feel quite important after having been presented with your survey, but you picked a time when public opinion leans toward you getting a stronger vote for operational/combat support outside our region (Ukraine) and also for climate change & natural disaster (Gabriel) – Just because both are topical and both have the sympathies of the Kiwi population.

And how well are you equipped? And how is Joe Public supposed to know the answer to that? Your staffing and general asset base is on your website. I guess that's half the story, though Joe Public will largely take a guess at the answers here and guessed answers are valueless. Even worse the survey is anonymous and you can do it ten times if you want. Oh dear. PR companies love your money. Maybe use them to show the world your plan when its finished and ask for feedback, comment and get some warm fuzzy hug-the-military stuff going after the event.

Surely your people know when an aircraft is going to be out of airframe hours and 'whats everyone else using for the same job?' and 'how many can we afford?' and 'Can we do it with a few less and multi-purpose something else for x years until after we buy the ....?'

And surely you have a record of everything the military has done in the last twenty years, you can adjust it based on expected influences and program your large asset replacements accordingly?

What isn't on your web site is if the C130 is sitting on the tarmac but suddenly needs to go half way to Tonga leaving in two hours to drop a liferaft, that you can guarantee it will actually leave on time. What your web site doesn't say is if the patrol vessel is available but theres a load of cocaine just crossing the economic zone to the West right now, that you can get a shot across it bows and stop it in plenty of time. What your web site doesn't say is if they need five medics and gear helicopter winched into Esk Valley by midday tomorrow, that it will actually happen.

What am I saying here? I'm saying its not whether you are well equipped and certainly not whether Joe 'guess the answer' Public thinks you are well equipped. What it is about is Phase II of your Critical and Relevant Risk assessment.

In Phase I you prioritised your basic responses – 'We do 'A' now, 'B' tomorrow, 'C' if we can find a crew next week' right through to politely declining UVWXY & Z' – Unless of course the Prime Minister moves 'K' up to 'A' tonight.

In Phase II you look at contingency models. We consider for example that 'D' in Phase I is a Climate Change or Natural Disaster event in the North Island that requires more a medical response higher than first aid.

Now go ask your logistics people if they can pull that together. If its complex then write a guide on how to pull that together. If you are missing equipment to do that, get it budgeted for. Do that for every modelled response to every situation you found in Phase I that requires urgent response. Just the urgent ones though. You dont need to model a response to something planned and happening in two months.

What I'm saying is take a clear look at your service deliveries and prioritise them on collective risk to people, weighted as above. Then model those deliveries and see if your staff, assets and skill levels meet them.

While I'm here (and off topic I know) (and just observations from the outside looking in – I can only guess the amount of money the NZDF is probably wasting on contractors. Contractors for this, contractors for that. I'm sure the contractors are laughing while they enjoy clipping the ticket but seriously in security, catering, FM and who knows what else....I thought you had security staff in house? If you haven't, they aren't difficult to train. Whats wrong with NZDF civilian employees as part of your catering staff? Whats wrong with NZDF civilian employees as groundsman? The franchisee of your local Z gas station will tell you that people happily pay for convenience, its been known for years. It is convenient to throw money at something and not have to worry about it. Years ago many companies engaged contractors as the latest fad. Later the companies that wanted to save money but also have people really owning their jobs and engaged, went back to having their own staff. Contractors are for specialist short term work, overload periods and capital projects. With a bit of effort I bet the NZDF could find millions to spend on more valuable things, a lot of that contractor labour margin back in their own pocket.

I hope you enjoyed my ramble!

Happy Days!

Reply Reply All Forward IM




Sat 4/03/2023 6:23 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Questionarre

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

 We removed extra line breaks from this message.

-----  
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.

Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you

-----

Hello I have just filled in a defence force survey..

I wanted to add:

Bring back Whenuapai Airbase as a fully functioning Air Force base..

it is there

It is prepared

Use it....

Thankyou

s9(2)(a)

Sent from my iPhone

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM




Sun 5/03/2023 1:53 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Additional feedback - Defence Policy Review

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

 If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

As a follow up to the Survey, I wish to add that since the contracting out of various services , that were previously facilitated by the NZDF, a decline in standards has prevailed. Poor accommodations, lack of meaningful recreational facilities. Poor food in several Bases coupled ,with outlandish Quarters and Rations charges, and low remuneration, these factors contribute to a low morale and feeling of frustration .In short more money needs to be allocated to NZDF.which provides a core of technical expertise throughout NZ Community, money seems to be available in abundance to many noncontributing organizations in NZ. These comments are in addition to the Survey.

Get [Outlook for Android](#)

Released by the Minister of Defence



Sun 5/03/2023 3:11 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Submission on a future Defence Strategy

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Hello

Please record the following as my submission.

## Submission on a future Defence Strategy

Aotearoa/New Zealand does not need a military defence force:

1. If we are a target by hostile nations it is likely that we cannot defend ourselves without the help of other nations.
2. Replacement equipment that is compatible with "friendly" nations is too expensive for a small nation, especially due to the costs incurred by climate change and natural disasters.
3. Peacekeeping roles, a function that is a large part of the New Zealand military, can be done by civilians.
4. Future hostile action will likely be cyber-attacks and therefore not require military personnel or hardware.
5. War may become an increasingly unpalatable event hence there would be a decreasing need for a defence force.

There should be a sinking lid policy on the defence force, the time frame of which would be determined by the most favourable outcome. As defence personnel retire they should not be replaced and ageing equipment should be scrapped. Suitable personnel and equipment should be transferred to civil defence organisations and to a civilian Coast Guard.

s9(2)(a)

March 2023

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Mon 6/03/2023 7:24 a.m.

s9(2)(a)

Deforce force

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Just want to say you guys and ladies have always made me proud of way you handle disasters here and abroad.  
In combat and disaster relief you have always punched above your weight.

Thanks for what you do.

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence



Reply Reply All Forward IM



Wed 8/03/2023 9:18 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Additional feedback - Defence Policy Review

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Why on earth would the so called "New Zealand Ministry of Defence", with an introduction headlined (and created") in the maori language expect the citizenry of NZ to respond to their requests?. Are you clowns not aware the maori never had a defence department and that only 4% of NZ's population are fluent in Te Reo? Stop this endless patronising and apartheid creating .I lost immediately any interest in doing your survey. Cheers. s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Wed 8/03/2023 9:26 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Military training

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

We removed extra line breaks from this message.

-----  
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.

Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you

-----  
Bring back Compulsive military training for all students leaving school

3 years in one of our armed forces units no questions asked nothing wrong with discipline n hard work generation these days to soft

Sent from my iPhone

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Sat 11/03/2023 12:35 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Retention

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

**i** Follow up. Completed on Monday, 20 March 2023.  
You forwarded this message on 17/03/2023 4:26 p.m..  
We removed extra line breaks from this message.

-----  
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.

Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you

-----  
Afternoon,

Just a quick suggestion, I have no idea who this email will go to but if you can flick it to someone who can pass it up. But thought I'd put it out there after completing the survey.

In order to help with retention issues and to boost recruitment numbers seeing as nothing has been done in the last 2 years to stop the droves of people leaving the NZDF, can the ministry make the first say \$50,000 of serving personnel's salary tax free? It would be no extra spending from the Defence budget and would only take a drop out of the tax pool.

As just a poor soldier with a serving wife (also on terrible defence wages) with kids and a mortgage, we love our jobs in the DF but it makes living hard when it shouldn't be.

There are probably things I've overlooked or haven't thought about in this idea but if it works it works.

Regards

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Wed 15/03/2023 7:21 a.m.

s9(2)(a)

Additional feedback - Defence Policy Review

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

We removed extra line breaks from this message.

-----  
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.

Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you

-----  
Hi,

I think we should become a mini Switzerland. We have their benefit of geography to help us. And occupation could be made more difficult with training of our youth in a defensive guerilla war, as in Switzerland.

Just as Switzerland has not been attacked we should operate politically in a similar manner. We should not be selling our land to overseas interests.

That's my 10 cents worth.

s9(2)(a)

Sent from my iPad

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Fri 17/03/2023 9:34 a.m.

s9(2)(a)

Additional feedback on the Defence Policy Review

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

**i** You replied to this message on 17/03/2023 4:29 p.m..  
If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

I think you've misused the word "personal" through the 'Have Your Say' survey. The word should be "personnel" when referring to personnel and equipment.

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Fri 17/03/2023 3:36 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Opportunities in artificial intelligence for the NZ defence force

To  Engage

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Hi,

I am interested in artificial intelligence, development, research, and will at the end of 2023 have completed a degree specialising in computer science with a minor in psychology, I am hoping there is an opportunity for me to continue research and potential application in my field of study under the New Zealand defence force as such. I don't particularly idealise the prospect of utilising ai in the setting of violence, however there are many applications in which the development of ai can be extended to benefit all. I understand that as such a new and perhaps optimistic development of the field of study I invest in, is often overlooked, and so I do not expect a particularly positive response to such an email, I do apologise for any offence, I do not mean to offend anyone, I simply believe strongly in the potential of ai. I truly appreciate any response.

Kind regards,

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Sun 19/03/2023 8:55 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

To  Engage

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Dear sir/madam,

I am Maori and was brought up with a patu and taiaha all my life my upbringing was severe to say the least and eventually went to jail for armed robbery. I was released from prison in 2007 and have not returned and have no intention to return.

I wish to go to Ukraine and believe I can make a good contribution to the Ukraine cause I have no fear of dying and have never stood down from a bully and NEVER will. I can tell you I am the last of that generation and if given the chance from the powers that be and Ukraine I will bring honour to this country or die trying.

I have been kept in a state of perpetual low income therefore cannot afford the fares to get there.

Sir or madam give me the chance and I will not disappoint I know I am the type of man that Ukraine needs.

Heoi ano

Na

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence



Fri 24/03/2023 3:38 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

### Additional feedback - Defence Policy Review

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

**i** We removed extra line breaks from this message.

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.

Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt, please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you

The Defence Policy Review survey is impossible to answer correctly as the questions group many conflicting responses.

#### Question

1. Peace-keeping and security operations to contribute to regional and global peace and security

For example, technical and training support for partner security and defence forces, supporting UN in regions such as in the Middle East, and patrolling the Exclusive Economic Zones of Pacific nations (at their request)

This is two separate questions.

My opinion and probably the opinion of many New Zealanders is that:

Peace-keeping and security operations Regional - Extremely Important Peace-keeping and security operations Global - Not at all important.

Spend money on our pacific region. Get out of Sudan, Middle East, Europe, South Korea

2. Contributing personnel and equipment to stabilisation and combat operations to do our part for regional and international peace and security

For example, sending personnel to the UK to help train Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Again,

Regional - Timor - Extremely Important

Global - Ukraine / Iraq / Africa / Korea - Not at all important

I do applaud you for encouraging citizen input on where our defence budget is spent. If the public had more say in these matters I am sure the public would call for more funding in specific areas of concern. Right now when we vote in a government we hand over the check book and they spend wherever they see fit without the public who end up paying having any say. I am all for the public having more say and oversight on government spending and regulation.

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence



Reply Reply All Forward IM



Sat 25/03/2023 6:03 a.m.

s9(2)(a)

Future of Defence

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Hi, I plan on attending the webinar next week and would like to understand:

- What are the risks and scenarios that we face or could face as a country, how does that align or not with our Partners. Partners being USA, UK, Aus, Japan, Korea.
- How does this view align with other nations in the Pacific and Asia
- What capabilities are required to respond to these risks effectively
- What capabilities is NZ planning to build, acquire, have to be able to respond to these risks
- Will investment will be made available to support an increased level of capability to respond to the risk and scenarios

Sent from [Mail](#) for Windows

Released by the Minister of Defence



Tue 28/03/2023 9:52 a.m.

s9(2)(a)

New Zealand Defence Policy Review 28 March 2023

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

Kia Ora,

s9(2)(a)

I am not connected to anyone in the military.

I have read the Defence Assessment 2021.

If I understand the situation correctly, the information in that document is now a couple of years old, and there have been several major developments since it was published.

This is what I think has happened:

In April 2022, China launched the Global Security Initiative, envisioning new global security architecture and an alternative to the Western-led International Rules Based security system that we currently operate under.

The NZ Defence Policy Review was announced on 7 July 2022, the same day Argentina announced it had made a formal application to become a member of BRICS, with support from China.

Within the last month, China has brokered a peace deal between Iran (who has already begun its BRICS application) and Saudi Arabia, and has extended an invitation to Saudi Arabia to join BRICS.

Saudi Arabia has lost faith in the USA to deliver on its defence capabilities and provide stability in the region, and is looking to China and Russia to control Iran and promote stability.

Egypt and Turkey are also looking to join BRICS.

This will mean BRICS membership will include Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey.

This group of countries accounts for a decent amount of the world's oil and gas supply, cotton and textiles, motor vehicles and parts, soy and

China is proposing that future oil sales are made in Chinese Yuan, which will re-structure the global economy.

The next BRICS summit is to be held in South Africa, probably in June or July of this year.

There is some doubt about whether this bloc can be stabilised successfully, as there is conflict between China and India, the two largest nations in BRICS, and also between several of the other member states. Iran is rogue and unpredictable.

If China is successful in uniting these countries into a single bloc, hegemonic power shifts from America to China, destabilising the International Rules Based System and uniting all of America's enemies in a single power bloc.

China has commissioned a base in the Solomon Islands, strengthening its position in the Pacific and putting it within striking distance of Australia – and New Zealand.

Ozzie is tooling up, purchasing 220 Tomahawk cruise missiles, high mobility artillery rocket systems (HIMARS), and Virginia Class nuclear powered submarines through the AUKUS agreement. This follows the purchase of 200 long-range anti-shiping missiles (LRASM) in 2020.

While NZ is not allied to the USA, and not a member of AUKUS, if the USA goes to war, NZ is dragged in through our alliance to Australia, which impinges on our good diplomatic and economic relationship with China. New Zealand cannot stay neutral.

A lot of NZs defence policy seems to rely on the military might of USA coming to save us if we get attacked. It's pretty obvious that the quick and dirty way to settle any conflict that comes out of this is for the BRICS bloc to attack the USA and disable their military capabilities.

The US economy doesn't seem like it's very stable, so if the right amount of economic pressure is applied, the US economy may collapse anyway and negate the need for military measures.

I think NZ should have a contingency plan in case the USA was not able to offer us support.

I think we should be investing in new, modern military technologies and boosting personnel numbers, with particular emphasis on the Navy.

It is imperative that our shipping and trade routes, and fish stocks are protected.

I agree that conflicts in foreign arenas are no longer as important as strengthening our position at home and across the Pacific. But I also agree that we have a responsibility to our international partners to support them in their conflicts. However, the scope and scale of NZs response to foreign conflict needs to be managed.

It is obvious that cyber attacks are increasing in frequency and scale. I don't know anything about the internet so I don't have any useful recommendations about how to mitigate this.

I was in Christchurch when the earthquake happened, and there was a collective sense of relief when the Army rolled in – The Defence Forces' role in domestic disasters is important and appreciated and needs to continue.

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Tue 28/03/2023 12:47 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Defence Policy Review

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

#### Questions & Considerations

1. Ref current war between Russia and Ukraine, the importance of logistics and information warfare in this and future conflicts. Comment on how policy review will consider this.
2. Is there consideration for a kind of Civilian Reserve? Many ex NZDF and current civil staff are willing to assist with background/supporting tasks in the case of a local relief response. Many current civilian NZDF staff identify strongly with being a Force for Good and would value the opportunity to assist in a live/real setting.

Nga mihi nui,

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence



Tue 28/03/2023 1:45 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

[View on restructure](#)

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Kia ora,

As we were asked for our opinions in the webinar on the future of NZDF may I present what I would actually like to see in NZ in the near future.

- 1) Strike wings consisting of SAAB Gripen (JAS39) aircraft. The choice for this is based on several factors. Firstly their running cost compared to comparable aircraft makes it extremely attractive (1/3<sup>rd</sup> the hourly cost of an EA/18, 1/2 the hourly running cost of an F-16 as of 2022), as well as their capabilities sitting well with our countries requirements, especially in coastal defence with anti-shipping capabilities that other fighters do not have ( see the RBS15 MK14 antishipping missile ). Adding to that their interoperability with NATO aircraft, systems and ammunition makes it easy to slot in with allies such as Australia.  
It is unrealistic to believe that the Poseidon's can patrol our waters AND skies when it may also need protection.
- 2) I would like to see the Navy expand in to the South Island. A potential new Naval Base that would support the southern ocean/Antarctica operations needs. This would take some of the stresses off Devonport at hosting the entire Navy and it's personnel. Auckland is expensive for personnel to live in and Devonport has no room for expansion or adaption.  
We have a large ocean and fisheries responsibility that really does require more vessels, bases and staffing.
- 3) A redevelopment of TF units that are ready to react for all uses INCLUDING civil defence on a nation wide scale. Army, Navy AND Airforce could all potentially have new TF units to help make up manpower shortages in the current climate. It is also feasible to redevelop interoperability for example to have TF Army Soldiers help with weekend patrols of our coastline alongside Navy personnel.
- 4) Better conditions for personnel. The NZDF needs to be attractive for people to both want to join but also make a career out of. This means that they need Equipment, accommodation and wages that reflect a good lifestyle since it is outside the scope of what a normal citizen experiences.

Thanks for allowing the opportunity to have our say!

s9(2)(a)

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Tue 28/03/2023 9:26 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

NZDF

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Hello,

Unsure if this was covered today in the webinar, unfortunately I missed it.

I am asking this as an enthusiast and former serving member. I know it is a fairly simplistic question.

But if the NZDF was given a substantial increase in funding, would it keep a similar structure that it has today, just bigger, or would there be a requirement to renew or increase capabilities.

Regards

s9(2)(a)

Sent from [Mail](#) for Windows

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Wed 29/03/2023 4:45 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

AIRFORCE

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

TO Whom it may concern

I am very concerned about the lack or no fighter jets to protect our borders, as we see around the world it seems to be a necessity now to have a genuine defence . We should not and cannot rely on other countries to maintain our own defence.

Kind Regards

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Thu 30/03/2023 6:49 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Additional feedback on the Defence Policy Review

To  Engage

Cc s9(2)(a)

Copied to DDMS

**i** You forwarded this message on 11/04/2023 2:28 p.m..  
If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Sir,

I am ex RNZAF

What I would ask is that NZDEF would stop avoiding its responsibilities to its personnel when they leave the service.

I left the RNZAF in 1972. I had a raft of paperwork to get signed off which included me having to pay for a tool that I had lost during my 8 years of service.

I was unaware of the fact that my service had caused a loss of hearing. I applied for and was found to have qualified for a pension.

The RNZAF should have advised of both my hearing loss and my entitlement when I left in 1972.

I hold that the NZDEF is derelict and should immediately rectify this oversight.

Yours Sincerely,

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Sun 2/04/2023 11:14 a.m.

s9(2)(a)

Defence force extra roles.

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Training should include management and control of insurrections, riots, demonstrations or internal conflicts between groups, tribes or differing sectors of our population.

Released by the Minister of Defence



Sun 2/04/2023 3:47 p.m.



s9(2)(a)

Survey

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Thanks for the opportunity to participate in the Defence Strategy Survey.

In my responses I suggested "capability building" as a key initiative that I felt that the NZDF should consider pursuing. This is an initiative I had been considering for some years, but not really sure how to pursue it, hence my approach now in this email. To expand on this, this is how it might work in practice:

- Legislative change if required to give CDF powers to raise a "foreign legion"
- Establishment - with the permission of the host government - of one platoon sized unit (up to 30 people or so) in a selected location such as Vanuatu or the Cook Islands made up of indigenous personnel. Unit to belong the NZDF Order of Battle and funded by NZ, but by agreement under daily operational command of the CDF or the local military force. Wages and conditions of service to be comparable to the local military force, unit to be dressed in NZDF uniforms with some form of identifying insignia or dress embellishment.
- Role as Assault Pioneers, and progressively trained in
  - o search and rescue
  - o firefighting
  - o basic and combat first aid
  - o operation of plant such as graders, bulldozers, forklifts etc (selected personnel)
  - o some trade training, oriented around small motor maintenance, basic carpentry, plumbing or house hold electrical repairs
  - o urban policing
  - o vehicle recovery
  - o infantry section battle drills
  - o preventive health measures (water quality and infection control)
- NZ Senior NCO or WO attached to mentor and train section leaders/ICs
- Locally run Junior NCO courses, open to attendance by local military
- Purpose of the unit includes:
  - o Provide a pool of local manpower suitably trained and equipped to provide immediate disaster response and to aid in recovery
  - o Augment local civilian leadership and provide a development pathway for local population into trade or vocational training
  - o Local intelligence gathering
  - o Augment local police and military in dealing with non-disaster related situations such as local security, running of elections etc
- Augment NZDF efforts in the region and provide auxiliary personnel to draw on (by transfer of individuals rather than mobilisation of formed units, for wider international obligations e.g. RAMSI, East Timor etc.

If the pilot program is successful this could potentially be scaled up and rolled out more broadly. If not successful the overall commitment has not been too big and worst case is that a number of local citizens would be better equipped to deal with an emergency, and the programme discontinued.

Would be grateful if you could either pass this proposition to the right people or point me in the right direction for me to do so.

Thanks for your consideration,

Kind regards

s9(2)(a)



Released by the Minister of Defence



Mon 3/04/2023 2:41 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

New Zealand Ministry of Defence Policy Consultation - Southon

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

**i** You replied to this message on 5/04/2023 2:40 p.m..  
If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

New Zealand Ministry of Defence Policy Consultation  
For Delivery 4th April 2023 To: [engage@defence.govt.nz](mailto:engage@defence.govt.nz)

s9(2)(a)

I appreciate the opportunity of presenting my views to the Defence Policy consultation as our defence posture makes a major impact on how we see ourselves as a nation, and on our fortunes which are determined by peace and conflict. While I value responding to the on-line survey on activities and theatres, I also wish to address the broader issues of strategies and purpose.

New Zealand has some quite distinctive characteristics which need to be confirmed. Our anti-nuclear policies, for instance, not only demonstrated our independence from our traditional alliances, as well as from the security commitments of virtually all other nations, but also demonstrated our commitment to the common human interests concerning the atrocities of such weapons. Such a position earned us the enduring respect around the world and immeasurably enhanced our security standing. Similar examples of independent thinking for the common good have occurred with the further development of our nuclear policies, with our actions on the Security Council, and with our innovative troop deployments in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands.

Such characteristics have supported the long-standing claim that, until recently, New Zealand has no enemies. But more importantly, it has a wide range of friends. Such relationships are very valuable security assets.

It is crucial, therefore, that such assets are clearly confirmed by Defence policies, and that strategies be designed to enhance them and maximise their benefits.

To this end, it is important that NZ Defence

1. Recognises the complex dynamics of regional international relations, with an accurate understanding of the threats and strengths of the environment and of each nation.
2. In conjunction with MFAT and other agencies, continually seek ways in which NZ can contribute to the resolution of potential conflict situations. (e.g. Taiwan is one of many situations in which quality innovative civil and military diplomacy is desperately needed).
3. Acts judiciously to offset any movements that seek to polarise allegiances within our region and ensure that military forces are used for constructive purposes.
4. Ensures that defence postures minimise any alienation of other nations.
5. Ensures that combat forces have access to the most effective techniques that minimise violence in stabilisation and peacemaking operations
6. Works within the context of the wide range of security issues that face society (environmental, economic, social, technical etc) and with the variety of organisations necessary to address these issues.
7. Makes long term decisions in the context of clear understanding of security priorities, the uncertainty of future security threats, the need to ensure flexibility and to maximise the impact of available resources.
8. Supports research and practice that enhances understanding of our environment and the way that Defence can contribute to peaceful prosperity.

I suggest that these requirements would go a long way to ensure that Defence is clearly focussed on the genuine security interests of New Zealand and the international situation of which we are part.

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence



Mon 3/04/2023 10:31 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Submission to the 2023 Defence Policy Review by s9(2)(a)

To  Engage

We removed extra line breaks from this message.

-----  
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.

Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you

-----  
Submission to the 2023 Defence Policy Review by s9(2)(a)

Dear Sir/Madam

My concern is that it does not seem like the Ministry of Defence, or the New Zealand Defence Force, are sufficiently focused on the main strategic threat to New Zealand. In my view, the main strategic threat to New Zealand is China's increasing aggression in the Pacific. I have some suggestions on how to better prepare for the Chinese threat.

1 I believe that Defence spending needs to be doubled, if not increased even further.

2 I believe we need to grow the Royal New Zealand Navy and focus on maritime defence. After many years of dominating the New Zealand Defence Force, the New Zealand Army really needs to take a back seat to free up resources for our Navy and maritime-focused aircraft.

3 I think it may be prudent to dissolve the Royal New Zealand Air Force and transfer its assets and personnel to a Royal New Zealand Navy Fleet Air Arm. This would ensure tighter integration between the ships on the water and the aircraft flying above the water.

4 It may be useful to create a small and nimble Royal New Zealand Marine Corps, as part of the Royal New Zealand Navy.

5 The next Chief of Defence Force should be a Royal New Zealand Navy Vice Admiral.

6 The New Zealand Defence Force should not waste time and resources on gender-wokeness. I don't want to see the New Zealand Defence Force go down a similar path to the United States Military, which is banning titles like Sir and Ma'am. Those titles need to be retained, in order to properly distinguish between Commissioned and Noncommissioned Officers.

Please note that I do not mean any disrespect to any service member in uniform. My comments are merely suggestions on how to better prepare the New Zealand Defence Force for any possible future conflict with China. I have the utmost respect for each and every member of the New Zealand Defence Force serving our country.

Thank you very much for your time.

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Tue 4/04/2023 11:05 a.m.

s9(2)(a)

To  Engage

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

I was unable to type in an answer to what I thought was a problem that needed consideration. There is wide evidence of infiltration by right wing groups into armed forces we interact with, is there any assessment of the depth of infiltration in nzs forces and is there any security actions to prevent other nations who have been infiltrated accessing information about our security ?

Released by the Minister of Defence

FW: Policy feedback

Sent: 4 April 2023 3:53 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: s9(2)(a)

**Note:** Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

2 Attachments

Defence Policy Review input.docx (22 KB); ATT88990.jpg (41 KB);

Message

Some additional feedback for the records.

Nea Mibi  
s9(2)(a)

From: s9(2)(a)  
Sent: Tuesday, 4 April 2023 4:33 p.m.  
To: s9(2)(a)  
Subject: Policy feedback

Sir,

I attended a Defence Policy webinar last week and have completed an online survey. I have also attached a list of random thoughts for you to edit and do with as you like. I missed the start of the webinar so some of what I said may not be what you are after and to a level of detail you are not yet wanting, hence me sending to you rather than the generic feedback address. Hope you don't mind.

Also, my thoughts are skewed towards Air. I have just spent three years in the US and I feel that our relationships with our Five Eyes Air Force partners are at a delicate point; there is a willingness to help us but we need to demonstrate our intent or we could be left behind.

Hope all is well with you,

s9(

Defence Policy Review input.docx

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

## Defence Policy Review

Defence Assessment 2021 (DA21) document was written before Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Whilst Russia is mentioned as being a state undermining the international rules-based system (chap 2.2.3), does this conflict;

- a. change the prioritising of the Pacific and influence of China stated throughout the document, or,
- b. influence our thinking on the nature of war and the capabilities we may need in any future conflict we could be involved in; this applies to capabilities we may wish to field and be able to defend against ?

DA21 paras 7 and 8 state, in part:

*New Zealand's defence policy settings have remained broadly stable over at least recent years, but an approach developed for a less threatening world will not necessarily support New Zealand's national security interests into the future.*

*We consider New Zealand's defence policy should shift from a predominantly reactive risk management-centred approach to one based on a more deliberate and proactive strategy. A more strategy-led approach would better enable Defence to pre-empt and prevent security threats, and better build resilience against the impacts of climate change and other security challenges.*

The following observations are offered on the basis of these statements.

### Nuclear stance

With the above statements in mind, and with the overall theme of DA21 being increasing instability in the world and our region, some hard decisions may need to be made that may not be universally acceptable to the NZ public. That does not mean they should be avoided though. For example, is it now not time for the NZDF/MOD to advocate for discussion on the fact that nuclear power is not the same as nuclear weapons and that nuclear power is not an unsafe form of propulsion? NZ is regularly quoted as having an 'anti-nuclear' or 'no-nuclear' stance with the impression that nuclear power and nuclear weapons are inextricably linked. Australia's purchase of nuclear powered submarines will introduce a capability that is advantageous to NZ and which should be welcomed. The size of our EEZ and the oceans we have an interest in are vast but the threat, and therefore deterrence value, of the possibility of a nuclear submarine operating in an area is considerable<sup>1</sup>. Australia has said they will not own or deploy nuclear weapons yet NZ has already said their submarines will not be welcome in our EEZ. At the same time statements have also been made that Australia is our closest ally and DA21 para 29 says;

*Australia is New Zealand's only formal defence ally, and New Zealand's most important international partner overall. New Zealand and Australia work together across the span of defence and security activities to promote shared interests in the Pacific, the Indo-Pacific and further afield, with the two countries typically pursuing similar and/or complementary approaches to particular problems.*

It therefore seems short-sighted to announce upfront that Australian submarines will not be welcome when the Aussies are actually many years from having any boats in service and there is

---

<sup>1</sup> Consider the impact of submarines in the Falklands conflict where the threat of each others subs had significant impact on UK and Argentine operations with the Argentine fleet effectively remaining in port after the *Belgrano* was sunk by a sub-launched torpedo.

time to work this through. Any relationship has to be based on give and take and NZ should consider what it can give to this relationship to achieve best effect.

On that theme, rather than duplicate infrastructure and support organisations should we be considering greater integration of common fleets with the Aussies and operating them as an Anzac fleet? This would make more sense with high end capabilities (such as the P-8 which is complex and expensive to operate and has a large tail in terms of agencies and personnel to support operations) and where such an arrangement would be mutually beneficial to both nations. This should be possible without handing over sovereign ownership, in a similar way that nations allocate units and equipment to NATO.

### Resilience

Given we have no air combat and limited naval combat capabilities do we need to consider our ability to support allies who can field these capabilities in our region on our behalf; for example, how much aviation fuel do we store in NZ and can we support even a short or small deployment of allied tankers and combat aircraft, or even several transport aircraft staging through NZ? If our Pacific region is becoming more contested can we rely on sea and air links to remain open to deliver essential supplies when we want them? If not, what do we need to stockpile and for how long which raises the wider question around NZ's overall resilience if there is tension in the Pacific.

### Innovation

We tend to do our major capability acquisitions on a like-for-like replacement. Is now the time to take a greenfield review to define the capabilities that are essential for our own needs and look at innovative ways we could field these capabilities, at the same time considering new technologies and lessons learnt from recent and current conflicts? For example; swarming drones (as used by Iran in the Persian Gulf) and the range of UAVs and drones now available (from hand launched to Predator and everything in-between) offer alternative means of conducting defensive, offensive and ISR operations at a much more affordable cost and therefore the opportunity to introduce or enhance capabilities that are outside our price range using traditional platforms or delivery systems.

Both major political parties have stated recently that the re-introduction of an air combat capability will not happen. This is understandable given the time and prohibitive cost it would take to introduce and sustain a new combat fleet capable of contributing to coalition operations. However, given the recurring theme of DA21 around greater uncertainty in the Pacific region, is it not now time to consider whether we should have a lower level capability to launch or fire a weapon from the air? At the moment, unless the Navy happens to have a ship in the right place, NZ does not have the ability to fire shots across the bows of a fishing boat to stop it leaving our EEZ, or to shoot an unarmed reconnaissance balloon (acknowledging that altitude may preclude an engagement by anything other than an expensive fighter). This could potentially be done creatively and relatively cheaply. For example; with the US withdrawing their A-10 fleet, they could be very happy to give us some A-10s<sup>2</sup> and spares at very little, if any, cost. While the aim would not be to have a deployable combat capability, these could be used for JTAC training, a capability that is of value to our allies, while giving us an air weapons delivery platform for use in our own back yard (with the weapons being as simple (guns) or as sophisticated as we wish). This would also give us a foot in the door of the FVEY air combat club without calling it an air combat fleet. As mentioned above, drones can also be used to carry weapons and our T-6s could be armed.

---

<sup>2</sup> The A-10 is used to illustrate the concept and is not the only platform that could do this job.



Acknowledging we do not have the full range of capabilities to contribute to a high-end fight, NZ should determine what niche capabilities it can contribute to a coalition operation and do them well. From a Five Eyes Air (FVEY) perspective, with Canada's recently announced purchase of F-35 and E-7, NZ will be the only nation not part of the 5<sup>th</sup> Gen fighter club. The P-8 is therefore probably the only capability that can keep the RNZAF relevant as an air force able to contribute to a 5<sup>th</sup> generation networked coalition. If the RNZAF wishes to remain as a credible FVEY air force, then the P-8 and its support infrastructure must be funded for through-life upgrades to ensure it remains capable of being deployed in support of coalition operations.

### Relationships

DA21 highlights the importance of relationships with partners. I think we made a mistake when we downsized some of our overseas posts. In particular, our Attaches in Canberra, London, and Washington are at the O-5 level whilst we have an O-5 in Ottawa with no Attachè support. This means that our representatives are outranked against their equivalents in these locations who can be at the 1\* level. Acknowledging this comes with increased cost, having our Attaches as O-6s is a relatively cheap way to demonstrate our commitment to these relationships.

### EMAC

My understanding is that 4x P-8s were purchased on the basis that the complementary EMAC project was proceeding. To ensure that the P-8 is not mis-employed and can achieve it's planned life-of-type, as well as ensuring appropriate surveillance of our EEZ and support to other agencies, the EMAC project should be completed.

### Retention

Pay is being quoted as the reason for retention problems the NZDF is currently facing. I don't believe pay in itself is the problem and I also don't think that one-off retention payments work. If people are dis-satisfied for other reasons then pay will be quoted as a factor but if they are happy in their work, have a sense of purpose and are kept busy in meaningful employment doing the roles they were recruited for and trained to do, then pay is less of an issue. Having said that though, and acknowledging that the current generation joining the NZDF is much more likely to change jobs when dis-satisfied, there is currently no financial incentive to remain for a lengthy NZDF career. Also, in NZ the Govt makes it clear it is up to individuals to plan and fund their own retirement. Raising a family and funding a comfortable retirement from an NZDF career is challenging. Consideration of this may aid retention and acknowledge that NZDF service is not the same as working in other public agencies or the private sector, and this service is valued by the Govt. Our FVEY allies all have healthy military superannuation/pension schemes that allow personnel to effectively and comfortably retire after a service career of prescribed length. These countries also all have strong defence industries that value ex-military personnel for their military knowledge and experience; people can leave the military with a healthy pension and move into other defence related jobs if they wish which takes away the pressure to leave in order to retrain or upskill. In NZ, a military career brings no financial benefit in retirement while a career outside the NZDF is with very limited opportunity to transfer military experience. I don't believe a military pension or super scheme would be unpopular as my perception is a large portion of the public thinks we have a scheme already, as Police and Fire already do.





Wed 5/04/2023 1:56 a.m.

s9(2)(a)

I am a friend of the Navy (1) : Telling the Naval Story - introduction - postgraduate naval thesis - naval contact

To  Engage

**i** Follow up. Start by Thursday, 27 April 2023. Due by Thursday, 27 April 2023.

You forwarded this message on 5/04/2023 8:42 a.m..

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

**Please kindly forward to the Office of Rear Admiral Gilmour**

-----  
"I am a friend of the Navy."

*The voice quietly reached out through the predawn fog as silently the outrigger slid through the water towards the anchored warship, sensed more than seen in the shadows of the harbour.*

*After a moment of silence the prearranged reply drifted back across the waters.*

"And the Navy needs friends."

*The Captain peered down through the fog, the contact still unseen. The hour was early. The tasks ahead many. And yet, she sensed that this meeting was of import to both herself and the Navy.*

*She met the eyes of the Officer of the Watch.*

"Send him up."

*Who knows she thought, maybe he does have something of value.*

-----  
Dear Sir,

Thank you for providing the two public Defence Policy Review webinars last week. Thank you also for the answers during these webinars regarding my questions on alliance building with our neighbours, females in the navy, naval force composition, the RNZNVR, and your invitation to ask follow up questions by email.

s9(2)(a) writing my master's thesis on s9(2)(a) 9(2)(a) encouraged me to contact you.

During the second webinar you commented that the Navy needs to have its story told, hence I hope you can forgive the slightly unusual introductory story style forward above.

I would be honoured to help the Navy tell its story and am perhaps uniquely placed to help. By way of brief introduction s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)  
community as I can.

I sincerely hope that under your patronage you may kindly consider assigning a naval officer to answer my questions regarding the upcoming Defence Policy and Strategy Statement and Future Design Principles for Government Consideration, and also for occasional support for the aforementioned naval thesis for which I am dedicating five years of my life.

Should this be acceptable and a RNZN Officer kindly reply to this email I would then like to ask my first question please.

Please note that s9(2) has instructed me in the necessity of maintaining confidentiality and no answers received would be published or discussed without prior written consent.

Thanking you Admiral for your kind consideration of the above request.

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Tue 11/04/2023 10:35 a.m.

s9(2)(a)

### Additional feedback - Defence Policy Review

To  Engage

We removed extra line breaks from this message.

-----  
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.

Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you

-----

To whom it may concern

I did not see the initial survey

But, if possible, I would like to add my voice

- please, keep us out of AUKUS.

NZ has a proud and hard won recognition of and adherence to a nuclear free stance

- let us go forward as a voice of peace and reason, promoting respect and reconciliation amongst all nations, with particular focus on our region

- This stance would preclude involvement in war exercises in the Pacific / or any other zone

- no nuclear submarines : alignment to war promoting alliances and nations

- upgraded protection and patrolling of our waters

Peace is the pathway to peace - we could validly take up this position and actively broker peace

s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)

Sent from my iPhone

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM




Tue 11/04/2023 5:33 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Defence Policy Review

To  Engage

 If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Kia Ora - Hello

These are the points I would like to have incorporated into the Defence Policy Review

NZ remaining a staunchly Nuclear Free Zone and refusing to support AUKUS (nuclear submarines).

NZ should not be engaging in Pacific wargames eg RIMPAC and Talisman Sabre in the US led practice for War against China.

NZDF should focus on Peacemaking and Peacebuilding, providing Humanitarian Aid for victims of War, Climate or other disasters in NZ, the Pacific and other countries.

NZDF should focus on protection of NZ Exclusive Economic Zone to stop over fishing, waste dumping, illegal goods (drugs) trafficking, poaching, using NZ coastguard patrol boats.

Halt Rocket Lab deploying any military satellites from the Maldives Peninsula

Close Waihopai Satellite Station

Exit the 5 Eyes alliance

Declare NZ Neutral

Ka nui te mihi - Thank you very much

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Reply All Forward IM



Mon 24/04/2023 7:43 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Defence review -ANZAC Frigates

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Dear Panel,


At this time of heightened tension and NZ being in a large sea area, and the 2 ANZAC Frigates having been refurbished to last another 10 years. Now as we wait to see how the International situation evolves, we have the opportunity to have the 4 ANZAC Frigates originally envisaged. Australia starting this year is retiring it's ANZAC Frigates so we have the opportunity to buy 2 retired Frigates off Australia at the end of this year. We could send them to Canada for refurbishment and they would be in service in a one to two year time frame. We could have three complete crews with the fourth Frigate rotated into refurbishment at Devonport or better still Whangarei, so we always have three Frigates in operation. This would give us plenty of time to review more long term replacements. This would enable us to interact with other like minded Navies around the world and simultaneously have a permanent presence in NZ, and waters around the Islands.

Even with refurbishment costs in Canada the cost would be considerably less than say new Type 31 or Type 26 Frigates from the UK.

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

[Reply](#) [Print](#) [View Images](#)

 2023 Defence Policy Review submission

Sent: 14 March 2023 3:45 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

**Note:** Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

 1 Attachments Less ▾

 2023 Defence Policy Review submission.pdf (94 KB)

Message

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Dear Sir/Madam,

Please find attached my submission to the 2023 Defence Policy Review. Thank you for the opportunity to contribute.

Yours sincerely,

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

Firstly, thank you for the opportunity to express my views. Secondly, welcome to Mr Little; I hope you will be a better performer as Defence Minister than Mr Henare (sadly one of the worst, if not the worst, of all time - and that, by all that is holy, takes some doing - when you consider the list includes such luminaries as Jonathan Coleman and Mark Burton).

Sadly, in my view, this Defence Policy Review seems to be nothing but a gigantic time-wasting exercise; time we can ill-afford to lose. There wasn't a lot wrong with the 2018 Defence Assessment or the 2019 Defence Capability Plan (although I will suggest a few changes), other than that the government has now lost its nerve and has bailed on that plan in the hope of easy but strategically foolish savings. And I have to ask, why is the review process taking so long? There have been two delays (now > 6 months) for even the first milestone - a simple mission statement. Time is against us, the schedule of major projects needing action is already very full for the rest of the decade. For Mr Henare to waste two years and progress nothing, I see as the height of foolishness.

#### The Current Situation for the Defence Force:

After a too-brief bright period under the tenure of Ron Mark, in which several major long-overdue projects (namely the Orion, Hercules, & armoured Pinzgauer replacements) were finally progressed, the last two years under Mr Henare have seen a serious and very disappointing relapse. It must be said at this point, that primarily due to the poor governance of the last National-led administration (2008 - 2017), two of these major projects (the Orions & the Hercules replacements) have ended up having to happen at the same time, instead of being sensibly spaced out. This has placed extra stress on the Defence budget.

Personnel attrition has now surpassed 15% per annum (and is reportedly much higher for skilled NCOs, some 20% last December and expected to be 30% by March this year). Primarily this is due to inadequate pay (reportedly 5% - 15% below market rates), coupled with a cost of living crisis, a lack of affordable accommodation, degraded base infrastructure, and rampant inflation. The final straw though has been gross mismanagement of Defence personnel by the Government (ie Cabinet) during the COVID crisis, particularly a failure to relieve Defence Force personnel from MIQ duty in a timely manner (remembering that they were only called in as an emergency measure following the failure of other government sectors to manage it). Michael Joseph Savage would surely turn in his grave at the way a Labour government has abused (yes, that is the right word) a non-unionised workforce. The result is a seriously demoralised and ineffective Defence Force - many personnel have rushed to leave. The Chief of Defence Force (CDF) has estimated it may take 10 years to recover. That is time that we just don't have.

As I write this, at least three of the Royal New Zealand Navy's nine vessels (one entire third of the fleet!, including both OPVs) are unable even to be crewed (and that is not counting the 2 inshore patrol vessels Mr Henare recently sold to Ireland, or the Aotearoa which is in a maintenance period). Our one amphibious ship was inexplicably sent to Campbell Island during the peak of the cyclone season, so we had to use a frigate to deliver relief supplies in response to Cyclone Gabrielle's impact, and have HMNZS Manawanui doing EEZ patrol. Seriously, this looks like very poor planning.

The Royal New Zealand Air Force has had to retire the entire P-3 Orion fleet some 5 months earlier than planned (leaving us temporarily without a maritime patrol capability), and one of the five C-130 transport aircraft has just been retired (yet the first replacement C-130J isn't due to even

arrive in NZ until 2024). Only 3 Seasprites of the 8 are apparently flyable due to parts issues (they've only been in service 7 years), and the NZDF looks stretched to muster even 4 NH90 helicopters for the cyclone response. The future for the NH90 looks dubious now that Australia has announced that they are retiring theirs (the next closest users to us are Oman & Qatar I believe). Again, this is all very inadequate, and yet so entirely predictable.

The Army remains the most affected by attrition. Their force structure is at least a full regular infantry battalion short of a sensible complement, and even their current two regular infantry battalions are seriously understrength (currently down to 1300 from 1500 in 2021, it should be >1600). In short, for what is already a small force, they are far too small. The prospects for the proposed 6000-person army look bleak. Some of their major equipment is overdue for upgrade or replacement (artillery, LAV). What equipment they do have is suitable only for low intensity operations. Reserve forces have atrophied to the point of being useless (in my view - sold down the river by an NZDF brass in search of easy savings). Remember how we had to rely on the reserves during the East Timor crisis? There are crippling shortages in logistics & specialist technical trades (medics, mechanics, maintainers, signals etc).

Mr Henare failed to progress any new major MoD project work through Cabinet in the last two years, and several projects that were in the pipeline have stalled (eg. the Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel; the Enhanced Maritime Awareness Capability) - their current status publicly remains a mystery. Accommodation & Base Infrastructure remains substandard. Several major Defence-related infrastructure works need advancement (for example the proposed floating dry dock, if not a complete relocation of our only naval base). Some equipment fleets need urgent attention (eg. the Seasprite maritime helicopter fleet, the Boeing 757s, the Army's artillery and LAV armoured personnel carriers). Then, on top of all that, the clock is ticking very loudly on the Navy's frigate replacements, as well as the Project Protector fleet - all of which will need to happen by the early 2030s. In my opinion, thanks to Mr Henare's bungling, things are now horrifically bad.

The only good news is that the projects Mr Mark introduced are still progressing, and that the frigates have finally arrived back from Canada (very late, and they remain woefully underarmed). Mr Mark was unable however to repair several deep-seated issues (acute since at least the early 1990s) - inadequate base infrastructure (particularly housing) and uncompetitive pay. 30+ years of continued gross underinvestment and poor political leadership in this portfolio has taken its toll.

#### The Strategic situation

The 2018 Defence Assessment still holds up as a good assessment, so I will defer to that document. If anything, the situation in our region has deteriorated faster than anticipated. The Chinese move to gain influence in the Solomon Islands is a case in point (somehow this came as a "surprise" to Mr Henare - did he actually read the Defence Assessment, it was clearly highlighted there as a threat). The Australian intention to build a nuclear submarine base on their east coast (probably Port Kembla, near Woolongong) will bring all sorts of unwelcome guests into the Tasman (the Chinese definitely, probably the Russians as well) - intelligence gathering ships certainly, probably their nuclear submarines as well. I would expect increased presence of US & UK nuclear submarines in the Tasman as well.

Geography always matters, and our region is predominately maritime. Yet our force structure remains horrendously dated (to the period when British and then US naval preponderance in the Pacific could be relied upon - which probably ended at least 15 years ago) - right now, the NZDF is

still stuck in a 1990's 'peace dividend' mindset - it needs a major refresh, and that means spending serious money to rebuild capability and capacity.

### Sea Blindness:

One of the greatest lapses of our politicians (and the general public for that matter) is what is called 'sea-blindness' - an inability to comprehend how vital the sea is to NZ's national (and economic) security (see Till - a Guide to 21st Century Seapower). We are almost totally dependent on shipping for our trade (about 99%). Nearly all of that shipping is now owned and operated by foreign companies (and we have seen how vulnerable those links are during the COVID crisis, when the supply lines get stretched, and the ships decide not to come). We are at the raggedy end of a very long supply chain. NZ lacks basic maritime infrastructure (the aforementioned dry dock for example, noting the recent spate of ferry breakdowns) and a trained pool of merchant mariners & shipwrights. Reserve resource stocks (of fuel for example) are inadequate. Introducing legislation like the USA's Jones Act or some other form of cabotage rule would do a lot to increase our strategic preparedness. Nations like PNG and Australia seem more advanced than us in terms of strategic maritime awareness.

### Long term planning & administration structures:

I would like to suggest some changes to the way the Ministry of Defence & Parliament goes about things:

- a) get the MoD to adopt a budget reporting style similar to Japan's Ministry of Defence. Their annual budget request & finalised budget reports are comprehensive (and available in English!), covering everything from major equipment items to housing, personnel & infrastructure. Consequently, they look like an organisation that knows what it is doing. Our reports, including the Annual Report and even the Major Project reports just don't convey that image. NZ Defence planning seems haphazard - too much short-term reactive action if not persistent & deliberate deferment, and not enough steady-as-she-goes long-term planning.
- b) Introduce a 30-year shipbuilding plan (as the US Congress has, and now the UK & Australia have adopted). Again Japan is a gold standard here.
- c) I would like Parliament to detach Defence from the Foreign Affairs, Defence & Trade (FADT) Select Committee and have a separate Defence Committee (as the UK does). If you have ever watched a FADT Select Committee hearing on the MoD & NZDF, you will be shocked by the levels of ignorance and inane-ness of this oversight committee. Australia sometimes has the same problem with its Senate Estimates committee (but it is still a lot better than ours). For example, our public-session meetings barely last an hour, Australia usually takes a full day or more. The US Congress & UK defence committees at least seem much better informed on the subject matter (perhaps because they have a higher proportion of members who have seen military service).
- d) Perhaps introduce a Parliamentary Under Secretary for Defence (outside of cabinet). We seem under-gunned compared to Australia, the UK & the US - all of whom have multiple ministers in the Defence portfolio. We have one guy trying to cover everything (although we did have an associate minister briefly in the 1990s if I recall). Perhaps have the Under Secretary be responsible for Defence Estate & Infrastructure. We don't really however have a major Defence industrial base, so it seems pointless to have a person in that role.

### Force Structure:

Army



As per the 2019 DCP, I agree with the expansion to 6000 Army personnel. This should see the introduction of a proper 3rd light infantry battalion (as I understand it, this currently exists only as a "paper" force), as well as the fleshing out of the existing two. I see the NZ Army as primarily a "small wars" force (shall we say "banana republics a speciality!"). They are structured currently only for peacekeeping, but lack the size to ensure sustained operations even in that role. The Army should be the cheapest service to equip. I would, however, have to put the Army lowest in terms of priority amongst the services.

I would restructure our infantry battalions around more "independent" companies (a company being the smallest unit we would likely deploy). Battalion-sized deployments (or greater) would seem too much of a stretch at present.

Firstly, I would consider adding a heavy weapons section (about 10-12 people) permanently to each infantry platoon (with at least 2 tripod-equipped 7.62mm GPMG teams, and a man-portable anti-tank weapon team e.g. Carl Gustaf or RPG-7).

There should also be a small 60mm mortar section (say 2-3 mortars, mainly for smoke) and perhaps a lightweight recoilless rifle or two (eg. the old US 57mm recoilless or similar) - primarily as a portable direct-fire infantry gun - in a heavy weapons platoon at company level (another 20-30 personnel in total). Targets for the recoilless rifle would be bunkers, buildings, weapon emplacements and light vehicles, not main battle tanks - one should not have to waste expensive guided anti-tank missiles for this role eg. Milan in the Falklands, Javelin/TOW in the battle for Fallujah). This would give a company it's own cheap, unsophisticated immediate hip-pocket firepower support.

All of these weapons should be man-portable, yet reloadable, with ammunition distributed throughout the company. Any one-shot disposable weapons should be pooled at various headquarters, stowed in vehicles, or issued in response to a specific threat. In my view, an infantry company should be prepared to walk/march into battle and be able to fight independently if required. The cost of this restructuring is another 50-60 personnel per company. A few Jeep-like vehicles & trailers (perhaps more Polaris farm vehicles?) or Pinzgauers would be useful to bring forward ammunition for the company's weapons platoon (particularly the mortars) from battalion ammunition dumps. However, if a company was required to operate wholly on foot for sustained periods (say in jungle or mountain terrain), the addition of an extra platoon of infantry as ammunition porters (with reduced loads of personal ammunition, perhaps also issued with lighter-weight weapons) would be sensible. The porter role could be a good role for the Reserves. Filling out this proposed "independent" company would be a HQ/administration element (probably about the size of a platoon), plus a few attached personnel from other branches (medics, artillery & air liaison etc.). The Company HQ would normally be authorized at least one light truck and a few Jeep-types or Pinzgauers.

At battalion level, there should be a heavy weapons company composed of several weapons platoons and an HQ platoon - most of these platoons would definitely need their own vehicles to carry forward ammunition and to facilitate movement of their weapons. One of these platoons should be a platoon of 81mm mortars (preferably 6) with its own fire-direction team. This platoon would, in NZ's case, likely be formed by attached personnel from the artillery regiment. Also at this level should be a grenade machine gun platoon (a heavy water-cooled machine gun platoon in lieu of this might even be better) and a Javelin anti-tank missile platoon (or a heavier recoilless rifle

platoon [say 75mm, no heavier, as a longer range infantry gun] in lieu of the ATGMs, depending on the likely threat).

Filling out the battalion (I doubt we could deploy anything larger at present): - apart from a command section & a HQ Company (with HQ, signals and perhaps pioneer platoons) - I would think a sniper section, and a reconnaissance/intelligence section (perhaps with light drones) might also be useful at this level. Attached to the battalion as required would be elements from wider Army - artillery, armour, air (and naval?) liaison, engineer, transport, logistics and supply, medical/dental, police, & various other combat support and combat service support units.

One brief observation that I will make is that some of the infantry weapons that the NZ Army currently use (it seems to me) in dismounted roles, (eg. grenade machine guns and 0.50-cal heavy machine guns) need to be held back at battalion level and/or should be vehicle-mounted in normal use.

Artillery Branch need to become more mobile (I would suggest the option of an armoured personnel carrier with turret-mounted 120mm mortar eg. Patria NEMO, to keep up with motorised infantry and to avoid incoming counter-battery fires. Stay with 105mm field howitzers (not 155mm) or add 120mm mortars for towed artillery (in order to still be movable by NH90 helicopter). Perhaps move more of the towed artillery role to the reserves, as it is unlikely to be deployed in peacekeeping operations. As mentioned above, expect artillery personnel will continue to be required to operate the infantry battalion's 81mm mortars.

In terms of vehicles, the LAV fleet is due for an upgrade or preferably replacement (IED/mine protection is inadequate). I would be wary of going to a much heavier 8x8 vehicle though - the LAV is compromised enough off-road as it is. I would also question the current location of the LAV fleet - surely they would be better operating on the many roads of the Canterbury Plains than on the few roads in the hills/alpine regions of the central North Island? New light trucks are badly needed (ie. Unimog replacements) - hopefully this is already underway. A light 4x4 armoured & mine-protected patrol vehicle (eg. Foxhound/Ocelot, Hawkei, JLTV or RG-32) should be acquired for reconnaissance, peacekeeping patrol roles, and perhaps for transporting an infantry battalion's heavy weapons teams. More Bushmasters if possible please (for combat support and combat service support roles when in Peacekeeping operations).

One other type of vehicle that should be considered as an addition to the current fleet is an articulated amphibious (and possibly lightly armoured?) tracked vehicle (eg. Bronco 3 or BVS-10). This would allow better operations in poor terrain (beaches, swamps, snow, mud) than the current all-wheel drive vehicle fleet. Particularly, these vehicles would be useful deployed from HMNZS Canterbury in places where a coral reef and lagoon would impede delivery of supplies by landing craft. Such a vehicle would seem a better choice for winter operations in the Waiouru training area as well.

For such a small army, focused on expeditionary operations and "small" wars, I don't think we can justify (or support) heavily armoured tanks and greater use of other tracked AFVs. At best, a small number (< 10) of light or medium tracked vehicles (perhaps tank substitutes, like a 90mm-105mm turreted CV90 IFV) for infantry-tank familiarisation/co-operation training - at a small Armour School would be helpful (the German Army prior to WWII taught itself armoured tactics with the Panzer I & II light tanks, not Panthers & Tigers; a 105mm turreted CV90 is the weight of a WWII Sherman tank). Again Waiouru would seem a good place for such a school.

Ground based air defence needs a major rethink. Probably we need a dual gun + missile based solution (LAV based?) for our mobile forces (primarily to counter armed drones). Base air defence also needs improvement. I would suggest mobile batteries for each base using the truck-mounted CAMM missile (as this missile is already used by the Navy, and such a system is used by the UK)

Finally, the Army desperately needs to repair it's Reserve forces. Perhaps a greater variety of options could be provided again (such as artillery or armour), rather than the predominant infantry role. One role that could be useful for a reserve unit would be a port cargo handling unit.

## *Navy*

The most problematic service at the moment, particularly with respect to personnel and infrastructure. It needs the most improvement. Oddly, given our region's geography, the Navy is the smallest and lowest-funded service at present. That definitely needs to change. Quickly!

### 1. Frigates:

We need to expand to at least a 3 (perhaps 4) frigate Navy again. The roles of the Frigate force I propose are:

- a) to escort merchant shipping in convoy (our sea-based supply lines are vital - and one of our greatest strategic vulnerabilities) across the Tasman (at least 2 warships required per trip), if not further afield, and
- b) to provide a minimum of a single warship to contribute to collective security efforts in the wider region, if not globally, in at least a sustainable manner during peacetime.

The current two frigate fleet is inadequate in this regard (witness the high unavailability of the frigates during the last decade). In terms of quality, these new frigates should be near to the UK's Type 23 in capability and size. The British/Australian/Canadian Type 26 and US FFG-62 Constellation class seem excessive for our needs, and the Type 31 very inadequate (underarmed, noisy). I would prefer a boost gas-turbine propulsion arrangement over an all- diesel design. The Japanese Mogami class is pretty close to what is needed, but I doubt we will buy from outside of the Five Eyes group. We will definitely need to adopt or adapt an existing design - we are out of time to do otherwise and don't have the design experience or capacity in-house. That suggests to me that the option of a modernized Type 23 (this class, it should be remembered, was originally designed as a "meager" frigate itself) from a UK builder should be explored (Cammell-Laird in Liverpool would appear to be the only British yard still free, perhaps supported by fitting out at the RN frigate complex at Plymouth - who have been modernizing the UK Type 23s over recent years). Consideration should be given to ordering frigates one at a time rather than all at once, say at 3 year intervals, with the first in service before 2030. There is a definite "sticker shock" culture amongst the NZ political class, so breaking down such an expensive purchase into smaller chunks and spreading it out (even though it may be more expensive overall) seems wise.

Lastly, please arm the frigates with anti-ship missiles (it isn't the 1950s anymore).

### 2. Patrol Force.

I would suggest making this a formal sub-command within the Navy (much like the Norwegian coastguard is in the Norwegian Navy), so that it doesn't get ignored. I would hope that the current

OPVs and IPVs could be given life extensions. Although not perfect (the OPVs are now unable to undertake southern ocean patrols due to changing IMO polar class code rules) the OPVs, as they are, are adequate for EEZ & South Pacific work.

We have probably just lost an excellent opportunity to join on to Chile's Antarctic ship construction programme and their warm production line (thanks again to the bungling Mr Henare). The "Almirante Viel", which was launched last December and is currently fitting out, would have been an ideal type of vessel for the Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel (it meets our stated requirements very very well). Joining an already warm production line should have resulted in the lowest total project cost, and we could have avoided significant startup costs associated with yet another "one-off" RNZN vessel. Reported cost is just USD 217m (that however was pre-covid). The Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel capability is still needed - and will only grow in importance as the Antarctic Treaty expiration date approaches (2048).

I would also like to see a pair of coastal workboats (about 1000 tons displacement, 50-60m in length, diesel-electric propulsion with azipod-style rudder-propellers & a bow thruster, hopefully a Typhoon 25mm gun mount & electro-optic sensor) added to the fleet - perhaps we could call them "sloops"? The Canadian Kingston class MCDV is close to what I see as being required, although Fassmer & Damen currently offer similar vessels, and Norway has operated many similar sized vessels in her Coastguard fleet (eg. Nornen class). These would trade top speed (about 15 kts) for greater mission endurance & precise station-keeping vis-a-vis the IPVs. Should be capable of taking a 20ft container mission module on the quarterdeck. Hopefully a simple sonar/multi-beam echo sounder would be fitted. These vessels would do minor diving support, coastal hydrography, mine countermeasures training, and science support during peacetime - and perhaps coastal escort (what for example, protects the Cook Strait ferry link?) in wartime.

### 3. Maritime Helicopters

The Seasprite is pretty much at End-of-Life right now, but expected to serve till 2027, which seems unlikely. Recent Select Committee testimony reports that only 3 of the 8 SH-2G(I) models are being maintained in a flyable condition (ie. about 50% of what it should be), and spare parts have become very problematic. Urgent action is required to order a replacement capability. The 2019 DCP is correct in stating that at least 9 will be required (with search radar, a missile capability and preferably a dunking sonar). Realistically there are two options (that fit the current frigate hangars) - the Sikorsky MH-60R and the Leonardo AW159. Cost is highly likely to exceed \$1 billion.

That still leaves, however, the issue of helicopters for the Auxiliary fleet (Canterbury, Aotearoa, perhaps the SOPV in future), which has never been properly addressed. It is my view that the RNZN now needs two types of maritime helicopter - the sophisticated Seasprite replacements for the frigates (and perhaps the OPVs if small enough), and simpler but perhaps larger marinised cargo/utility helicopters for the Auxiliary fleet (at least 6 helicopters to generate at least two for Canterbury, or one each for the Aotearoa & SOPV, with the probability of having 3 helicopters embarked with the fleet for short periods). I would be wary of the ex-Australian MRH90s given their high operating cost and the problems the Australian Navy has had with them (at least two breakdowns on the flightdeck which required the helicopter to be craned off the ship). I'm not sure if they were fully marinised either. As I see it the proposed cargo/utility helicopter needs to be at least the size of a Seahawk, fully-marinised, with the ability to carry a section of troops, or a good underslung load (at least 6000lb max load), while having a decklock device and a landing footprint small enough to allow a potential landing on a frigate. Such a helicopter would bring an immediate

capability boost to the Canterbury and Aotearoa, allowing ship-to-shore movement or ship-to-ship replenishment while at sea (unlike the NH90 operations currently possible from Canterbury). The Seasprite lacks the cabin capacity and can lift at best a 4000lb underslung load.

I believe there is a possibility of immediately satisfying our requirement by refurbishing older retired USN Seahawks from the boneyard at AMARG in Arizona. These should be available quickly and at very low cost (if not free) as "excess defense articles". Spain, Israel and the USCG have already done this with former SH-60F models (the easiest to modify). Helicopters don't have the airframe fatigue issues associated with fixed wing aircraft (witness the current Seasprites - whose airframes date from the 1980s if not the 1960s). Apart from SH-60F models, the former USN HH-60H 'Rescue Hawk' model could be another option (perhaps preferable for our needs, as it has defensive systems already fitted). I would assume that the avionics & engines would need almost complete replacement, and that the refurbishment would need to be done by a US concern (SES in Huntsville, Alabama or the USCG in Elizabeth City, Virginia would be the obvious choices). Perhaps a small weather/SAR radar could be fitted to the nose, essentially making it similar to the USCG's MH-60T model. I believe this option should cost only a few hundred million (say \$200-300m, compared to the billion-plus for new helicopters), and could help us out of a hole in the short-term with respect to the Seasprites (which I believe won't last much beyond 2025, when Kaman's support agreement I think is due to end). I don't have any great preference for the Seahawk, other than it seems to me to be the only helicopter immediately available at low cost, and we don't have time to fiddle about with a tender competition due to the Seasprite situation. The US Military Sealift Command, for example, has been using contractor-operated ex-commercial helicopters for this same role (Airbus Pumas & Super Pumas, however - they are working from much larger vessels). The other considerations for the older-Seahawk are that it shares many parts with the Seasprite (engine parts especially), and would allow us to continue to piggyback off of USN and RAN supply chains (who both now use the MH-60H model). Finally, adding an additional helicopter type could help us in the long-term with readiness (which I will expound upon in the Air Force section below).

#### 4. The 2nd Sealift vessel

In the 2019 DCP mention was made of an "enhanced sealift vessel" to operate alongside HMNZS Canterbury (our one-and-only amphibious vessel, which can't be available all the time). This vessel would have a well-deck for landing craft, which would overcome the major limitations HMNZS Canterbury has with respect to seastate. A landing platform dock type (LPD) similar to the Enforcer-class (as used by the Dutch, Spanish, UK & Australian navies) would seem appropriate.

Given the current personnel crisis, I think this plan is now flawed. I would like to propose an alternative plan, one that should provide a second sealift vessel at a much lower project cost. I would still like the "enhanced sealift vessel" LPD, as specified, to be bought - but as the replacement for Canterbury when that vessel is retired.

To provide the second sealift vessel, I suggest borrowing a concept from the Americans - that of a 'ready reserve' vessel. In US practice, these vessels are maintained (mostly at 5 days notice to steam) by a small crew of active service maintainers (usually about 10) and crewed when needed by merchant mariners and/or reservists. If we were to adopt this practice, then the whole-of-life costs for the second sealift vessel would be much reduced. In NZ's case, I would be using more reservists than active merchant mariners to crew the vessel. I would have such a vessel based in Auckland, and would suggest working in conjunction with the maritime school at AUT to let it be



used as a dockside training vessel when not deployed (it could fulfil this purpose for the navy as well). I expect the vessel would get taken out to sea routinely perhaps once a year for a short (2 -3 weeks?) training cruise.

I would base the design of this vessel on a type which used to be called an amphibious cargo ship (AKA or LKA), an adapted breakbulk freighter. The design starting point I would follow would be similar to the former US Navy Charleston class (LKA 113), 5 of which served from the late 1960s to the early 1990s (several of which still exist in the US reserve fleet).

Suggested specifications: About 20000 tonnes full load displacement, 4 LCM8 size landing craft carried in cradles on the weather deck, and a helicopter landing pad aft (but no hangar or embarked helicopter - it is to be a reserve vessel, if need be a helicopter could be carried strapped to the flight deck). 4 main cargo holds (most with their own cargo elevators to the weather deck) served by 2 Stuelcken heavy-lift derricks (each of which can work two of the holds. Blohm & Voss now hold the IP rights I believe) plus either lighter cranes or derricks to service each hatch. Twin screw, diesel & diesel electric propulsion (I suggest using exactly the same propulsion plant as the Aotearoa - thus providing a ready source of spares for that ship), with additional generators to cater for a large hotel load. A central island superstructure for crew accommodations (including space for an embarked force of up to 250 Army personnel - as per Canterbury, but perhaps in hammocks rather than bunks), with a bridge & mast using as many of the same systems as Aotearoa for navigation equipment, sensors etc.

The reason I suggest this older style of ship over a Ro-Ro ferry type like Canterbury or a commercial container vessel is that much of the South Pacific has unfortunately missed the container revolution, so their ports don't have the facilities that a standard container vessel would require, let alone Ro-Ro docking facilities (some islands don't even have decent ports ie. Niue & Norfolk, or their facilities may well be damaged). Acquiring a second LPD type vessel would be too expensive (the reason we ended up with the Charles Upham and now the Canterbury is that we were too cheap to buy even one).

For the LKA type of vessel loading and unloading of cargo (lift on, lift off) would be significantly slower and more manpower intensive than a Ro-Ro. However, the LKA type carries twice as many landing craft as Canterbury (and could carry even more smaller landing craft, eg. up to 5 LCM6 size [30t load], and workboats/launches, in addition to the 4 LCM8 if required). When "the big one" hits Wellington, you will be wanting as many landing craft as you can get. An LKA can also transport heavier vehicles & equipment than Canterbury (up to approx 75t if the vessel can dock quayside, or 60t in the LCMs). Some NZDF vehicles are already too heavy for the ramp on Canterbury. Like Canterbury, loading operations would be limited by seastate (but that to me is acceptable for a reserve vessel).

In US Navy service at the height of the Cold War, the crew of the Charleston class was large (350-ish), but then it was expected to operate 9 landing craft & several launches around the clock and unload all holds as fast as possible, plus man several anti-aircraft guns, on top of basic operation of the ship. In NZ service, we would do things a lot differently. To operate the basic ship, without landing craft, would require a crew of 50 or less. Each hold would need a cargo handling team of about 14 (based on US experience), and each LCM8 a crew of about 5 (both multiplied by the number of watches per day [2 or 3]). I would look at creating a naval reserve unit (and perhaps an army reserve one as well) in Auckland to do the cargo handling and operate the landing craft (the US Navy Reserve Cargo Afloat Rig Teams [CARTs] and Naval Cargo Handling Battalions [NCHBs]

could be models to follow). I would also expect the embarked force to be helping with the unloading (rather than be fighting ashore, as was the case for the USN vessel), and I would think that civilians in an affected area for a HADR mission would be assisting as well. One of the 4 holds could be configured for containers/ammunition if that would help. The ship, probably without the landing craft embarked, could also be used as a stores ship for afloat solid stores replenishment. The US, incidentally, developed a portable STREAM replenishment rig in the 1990s to install on their reserve breakbulk freighter fleet called the Modular Cargo Delivery System. I would suggest acquiring perhaps a couple of such systems for the LKA type vessel. Another US system that might be worth investing in would be their modular lighterage system.

5. Lastly, Navy also needs to repair its Reserves, which have atrophied since the small inshore craft were taken from the regions and consolidated in Auckland (about 2007). I would suggest acquiring small vessels akin to the RNZN's previous HDML class for the regional Reserve units. These should be locally built.

### *Air Force*

The Air Force is currently in the best shape of the three services.

However, I would say the current force structure has some major structural problems:-

a) the squadrons are so small (particularly in numbers of aircraft & crews) that they cannot simultaneously operate and upgrade their aircraft. It is either one or the other. We are currently seeing this problem with 5 Sqn and soon 40 Sqn.

b) the squadrons can't mutually support each other very well. There isn't much overlap in roles between them. This leaves us with major gaps in capability if one squadron has some sort of availability problem. For example, the backup for the P-3 was often the Hercules. Similarly, the NH90 can't operate at sea in place of the Seasprite and vice-versa.

To correct these problems, I suggest that we need two additional squadrons (one fixed wing, one rotary wing). The fixed wing squadron would be a twin-engine maritime patrol aircraft / tactical cargo airlifter with a rear ramp & a modular roll-on roll off MPA suite. The current Enhanced Maritime Awareness Capability (EMAC) project - currently stalled - could be used to fill this gap, with an aircraft like the C295 (in the Portuguese VIMAR variant preferably) or the C-27J (in the US Coastguard configuration). The rotary wing squadron would be the maritime cargo helicopter previously mentioned in the Navy section. Both aircraft types would be able to cover for problems in the primary squadrons, albeit in a reduced capability. The C295/C-27J could cover for the P-8A and the C-130. The maritime cargo helicopter could cover for the NH90 and the Seasprite (or its replacement). Both of these new squadrons should be based at Whenuapai.

Elsewhere in the Air Force there are several projects that need advancement:

1. Most important is the Boeing 757 replacement (supposedly due to occur by 2027). These aircraft are old, too frequently break down, and require handling facilities at their destination to unload. Rather than another converted airliner, I would suggest a genuine strategic airlifter, with a rear ramp, should be the replacement. My clear preference would be for at least 3 of the Kawasaki C-2. A strategic airlifter would do the resupply missions to Scott Base much better than the Hercules. It would also allow NH90s to be deployed overseas quickly (mostly in disaster response missions), and potentially the LAV as well (although that is not a high priority mission). It should be comfortable enough inside for long-range troop deployments. The Airbus A400M would be the other contender (but less suitable for troop movements due to noise from the propellers). The C-

17 is too large for our needs and, even if it was still available, too expensive.

That leaves the question of what replaces the 757 in the VIP transport role. To my mind, this doesn't need to be an Air Force role. I would hope an arrangement for a leased aircraft could be made with Air New Zealand. Otherwise, a 767-based multi-role tanker transport (preferably one that shared engines with the C-2) would add a useful air-to-air refuelling capability (consider the extent of our maritime search and rescue zone - from the Equator to the South Pole, and from mid-Tasman across the Pacific halfway to Chile).

2. The EMAC project: 4 P-8s (replacing 6 P-3s) is simply inadequate for NZ's maritime patrol requirements. As detailed above, I believe the best choice to fulfil the EMAC requirements would be a new squadron with a twin engine MPA/tactical transport aircraft. Long-range drones could be experimented with to supplement the manned aircraft, but would require significant and continued investment in a satellite control network (particularly difficult in polar regions), and given the cost of large drones and the ground crew requirements wouldn't really save much over manned aircraft. Drones can stay aloft much longer than manned aircraft, but they lack ability to provide any response (such as dropping a life raft).

3. The NH90 fleet: Given the recent decision by Australia to dump their version of the NH90 (the MRH90), support for NZ's fleet is likely to deteriorate in the long term. As noted earlier, the next closest users are Oman & Qatar (with the remainder in Europe). We have recently doubled-down on the NH90 by introducing a simulator, so following Australia in dumping the NH90 is probably not an option. The NH90's operating costs remain very high, and difficulty with spare parts supply has led several European users to recently drop the NH90 (Norway, Sweden, Belgium). The RNZAF has done well in maintaining a good availability rate from our fleet (apparently we are the best in the world). It may be prudent to purchase several ex-ADF airframes & whatever spares we can get in order to bolster our local spares supply. I don't think expanding our fleet would be wise.

#### Defence Industry & Logistical Preparedness

With respect to Army in particular - what industry still exists within NZ to supply the NZDF? As I understand it, even their uniforms are being made offshore (now by an Australian firm). This is not really good enough and needs to change. I would expect, as the NZDF is a fairly big organization in NZ terms, that NZ companies could & should supply it for things like clothing and basic equipment (packs, tents, sleeping bags, webbing), even if such items were licence-produced. It should be made policy to buy NZ made in the first instance.

I understand that a NZ company currently supplies the NZDF with some small arms ammunition. What scope exists for NZ to produce it's own basic ordnance (eg. bullets, mortar rounds, grenades, perhaps artillery & naval shells, or recoilless rifle rounds)? Australia has the Lithgow arsenal - perhaps it is time that NZ should have it's own small state armoury? Could, again, this be a new use for Waiouru? It is certainly isolated enough (no one wants to live next to an explosives factory).

Lastly, what war-reserve weapon stocks remain (any Steyr AUGs, for example?) and what manufacturing capacity is there to equip the Army should we actually need to mobilise a brigade or a division? Not much I expect, given the last 30 years of neglect, yet this remains an important military logistics function (see "Producer Logistics" in Eccles - Logistics in the National Defence, 1959).



For the Army, a small-arms production facility (using designs made from strategic raw materials that we do have a good capacity to produce ourselves - such as steel and wood rather than polymers and aluminium; and I guess with minimal use of expensive optics) could be a sensible investment. It wouldn't need to be a big facility (perhaps more of a design workshop with a few robotic milling and CNC machines), and would probably use mostly milled rather than stamped construction (we don't need the huge numbers to justify stamping, a low volume steady-rate production should be sufficient if we start now). Perhaps this facility could licence-produce "standard" designs for reservists to use privately (and perhaps you would have to be a reservist to own one). For example: -

- a) a bolt-action 7.62mm scope-capable deer/pig hunting rifle (similar to the one adopted by the Canadian Rangers reservist regiment a few years ago) and
- b) a "street legal" 7-shot 5.56mm semi-automatic [& silenced?] goat-hunting carbine (a slightly modified Ruger Mini-14 perhaps, with a fixed magazine, stripper-clip fed to reduce carried weight). These weapons could be used by reserve, rear-echelon and non-infantry units, freeing up existing weapons for use by front-line infantry units - ie the same role as the M1 carbine filled in WWII.

For war-stocks, in addition to the above rifles, I would suggest producing something (or at least having the manufacturing design & legal work done) akin to: -

- a) the 7.62mm L4A4 Bren for a section automatic rifle/LMG (I would prefer a magazine fed weapon at that level - I expect this would also work better in NZ bush conditions than a belt-fed weapon), and
- b) a simple blowback 9mm SMG (the easiest weapon to mass produce- so maybe the Owen gun, or preferably the Beretta M38 model 5 [I believe current production Beretta SMGs such as the Model 12 still use the same magazines]).

Any of the last two types actually made would be going straight into cosmoline at a secure warehouse to build up a war reserve. These designs, though very dated, I suggest only to maximise use of wood and steel, while minimizing stamping.

One final recommendation on small arms - allow the adoption of a 9mm service revolver (3-4 inch barrel) as an option in place of the automatic pistol (or in lieu of the bayonet, which being nearly useless considering today's short rifles, should probably be retired) for whomever wishes to carry one in the field. A revolver has a much simpler manual of arms for inexperienced personnel, is safer to carry loaded, and can be operated one-handed if required. This policy could be extended to the Police as well, especially if they become routinely armed, which must happen eventually in my opinion).

#### Infrastructure

1. Despite the \$1.7b ear-marked for the Defence Estate in DCP 2019, the Defence Force's and NZ's national strategic infrastructure as a whole remains woefully substandard and inadequate. As mentioned above, creation of a 'Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Defence Estate & Infrastructure' role to oversee this seems the best way forward.
2. Defence Housing needs continued improvement to 'healthy home' standards. Navy, in particular, needs a new accommodation facility (high-rise apartment blocks?) at Devonport (if the Navy is to stay there).
3. The proposed floating dry-dock project in Northland needs to proceed. This will provide routine

maintenance in-country for HMNZS Canterbury & HMNZS Aotearoa (and potentially the future SOPV and 2nd Sealift Vessel), as well as for the Cook Strait ferries. I am concerned over the proposed size of the new Interislander ferries (2x 50000t?) - I would have thought more vessels of a smaller size i.e. with similar beam to Aotearoa and Canterbury, would fit better with the case for a new dry-dock. The dry-dock should be of a modular-construction type (each section should be routinely serviced within the remaining sections of the dry-dock). A tug or AHTS (anchor handling, towing & supply) vessel (perhaps an ocean-going tug like the USN's new Navajo class) should be purchased with the new dry-dock. I'm surprised that there still isn't one, given the Rena disaster occurred a decade ago.

It may be wise to move some (probably not all) of the Navy to Whangarei over the longer term. I would suggest starting with the Patrol Force. A new base and accompanying housing development would be needed. If a 3rd infantry battalion is raised, then Whangarei might well be a good home for it as well.

4. NZ's fuel stocks are well below the recommended 90-day minimum. Greater storage within NZ would seem sensible given the deterioration in the strategic outlook.

5. The decision to close the fuel refining capability at Marsden Pt was a serious mistake. It has also reduced our coastal merchant marine capacity (by the removal of the coastal tanker which supplied the South Island), which is strategically foolish.

6. Make better use of Whenuapai by basing the maritime cargo/utility helicopters and the EMAC fixed wing aircraft fleets there. Christchurch seems like the best place to base a strategic airlifter.

Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to the Policy Review. I hope it gives you some food for thought.

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply - Print View Images

Re: Submission to Defence Policy Review

Sent: 5 March 2023 7:28 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

CC: s9(2)(a)

Note: Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

1 Attachments

[Defence Policy and Strategy Statement Submission 2 PG.docx \(19 KB\)](#)

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Good morning,

Further to my colleague s9(2)(a) submission, I am attaching a brief submission of my own which also comments on s9(2)(a) recommendations.

Yours sincerely,

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

# Defence Policy and Strategy Statement and Future Force Design Principles Submission

s9(2)(g)(i)

and having completed the Ministry of Defence Review questionnaire, I am providing this further brief submission, the purpose of which is twofold:

- i) To highlight one area which this author sees as critical to the future development of the NZDF.
- ii) To endorse many of the points made by my colleague s9(2)(a) in his accompanying submission, and provide some small critique of others.

## Future development of the NZDF.

### *Recruitment and Retention.*

The Defence Assessment 2021 highlighted that there were two principal challenges to New Zealand's defence interests – 1) strategic competition, and 2) the impact of climate change. To these a third should be added, the impact of demographic change, of which the Ministry of Defence seems clearly aware. Nowhere is this more apparent currently than in Japan, yet the implications of low birth rates and ageing populations are being felt around the world, as well as here in New Zealand. On 1 March 2023 Business NZ released its report, **THE FUTURE OF WORKFORCE SUPPLY**, indicating that without significant increases in immigration, there would be a 250,000 shortfall in the workforce by 2048 (see Appendix).

The challenge of recruitment and the unprecedented level of attrition needs to be attended to by a realistic level of remuneration across all ranks as well as attending to issues such as military accommodation. However, greater attention should be paid to the place of reserve forces for all three services. The former Minister of Defence Ron Mark was committed to making reserve forces more attractive as an option and this is even more important in the contemporary environment.

The Defence Capability Plan 2019 envisaged an Army of 6000 by 2035. The number of Army personnel is listed as approximately 4500 as of June last year, but is likely well under 4000 now. This is not sufficient to undertake the tasks expected and aiming to meet establishment should at the very least be the government's priority. Increasing Army's capability beyond that may be best met by ensuring a well-trained reserve force which is provided with regular deployment opportunities.

### Endorsement of aspects of the Submission on Naval Force Design by s9(2)(a)

I fully endorse the following recommendations made by s9(2)(a):

- 1) It is recommended that the adoption of provably open computing architectures become a core fleet design principle.
- 2) It is recommended that modularity be adopted as a core fleet design principle.  
**Comment** - A minimum of four hulls should be purchased. Given the challenges of crewing ships, consideration should be given to crew size required. An ANZAC currently has a full complement of 178, a Type 31 frigate around 110, whilst the OPVs have 42.
- 4) It is recommended that maximum exploitation of autonomous systems become a core naval fleet design principle.
- 7) It is recommended that the retention of two IPVs be investigated.

- 8) It is recommended that the extent to which a requirement for seabed operations capability impacts future fleet design be investigated.

**Comment** - HMNZS *Manawanui* is a particularly capable ship, acquired at modest cost and, if a seabed operations capability is required it may be that a like for like replacement will fulfil future requirements.

With regards to recommendation 5) *A minimum of two sealift ships are required, each with a floodable well dock and aviation facilities*, it may well be helpful to support the undertaking of a significant piece of academic research on the utility provided to date by HMNZS *Canterbury*. How helpful has she been on deployment? What does NZDF require of her and how much utility has she provided on Pacific deployments? Whilst this ship has clear limitations with regards to the range of sea states she can operate in, she would appear nevertheless to have provided a significant capability.

With regards to recommendation 6) *It is strongly recommended that any future national ship acquired for Southern Ocean operations be operated by NIWA, not the navy*; for strategic reasons how useful is it to government to have a military patrol vessel available for Southern Ocean and Antarctic deployments? Given that this will likely be a dual-purpose patrol/research vessel, if a vessel is to be procured for Navy, how much operational and depreciation funding should be provided by NIWA?

s9(2)(a)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Released by the Minister of Defence

## Appendix

### Business NZ

Mar 1, 2023

#### THE FUTURE OF WORKFORCE SUPPLY 250,000 SHORTFALL BY 2048

##### Key points

Record labour shortages will worsen with ageing

- The New Zealand labour market is very tight and will get tighter with an ageing population.
- The share of the working age population in work is the highest on record and higher than comparable OECD countries. There are however gaps: *Māori, Pasifika women, and some older workers could be better utilised.*
- New Zealand is not alone. Labour shortages are intense in OECD countries, but New Zealand stands out for the intensity of our shortages. Other countries also face ageing populations and will be in direct competition for global talent.
- Core working age population (15-64) will shrink over coming decades, But the total population will still grow and demand for workers will increase.
- New Zealand's need for workers will outstrip supply by 250,000 people by 2048. But the shortages will not be even.

o Oversupplied with Management and Commerce, Creative Arts, Food Hospitality and Personal Services

o Undersupplied in Education, Engineering and related technologies, Health and Society and culture.

o There will be a significant shortfall of people with no post-school qualifications.

The labour market will not balance on its own

- In a slow population growth scenario (that is without migration), wages will rise by around 7% versus our baseline scenario, but older people are unlikely to retire much later. Rather, while wages will rise for younger people, and businesses will invest in labour saving capital, the economy will be weaker because older people – who will make up a large portion of the population – will be spending less.
- That means the economy will be smaller as a result an ageing population, in a no migration scenario.

The deficit can be met

- The labour deficit could be addressed through three levers:

o Inflow of people through net migration

o Increased participation and employment of Māori, Pasifika, women, and some older people.

o Easier capital investment in labour saving technology by firms

- Each lever requires stable and long-term policy setting and business approaches.

Reply Print View Images

Defence Policy Review Strategy Submission-NZNFPeacemakers

Sent: 7 March 2023 1:13 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

**Note:** Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

1 Attachments

DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW 2023.docx (19 KB)

Message

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

ATTENTION: NZMD - NZ Defence Policy Review Strategy-Public Consultation  
(See Attached Submission)

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW STRATEGY

PUBLIC CONSULTATION (4<sup>th</sup> March 2023)

Submission by s9(2)(a)

**BACKGROUND:** This submission addresses specific issues raised by the NZMD Policy Review.

s9(2)(a)

It is stated in this submission that this submission is on behalf of NZ Nuclear Free Peacemakers. It builds on my submissions to NZMD in previous years which recognises that **NZ Foreign Policy** is the fundamental platform of the Defence Policy. It reinforces the UNANZ position that the UN Charter which eschews warfare is the foundation of Common Human Security. It recognises that international cooperation and Law is essential for a genuine '**Multilateral Rules based Order**' by the majority of 194 nation states, who agree in principle to Human Rights, Social Justice and Ecological Health.

**Understanding threats to Global Security:** 500 major multinational corporations who have too much power over governments and the **Global Economic Order which is not committed to higher UN values**, are not held accountable for violation or damages. The Military industrial complex is most relevant in the context of this discussion because it wastes enormous resources and taxpayer money used for warfare and killing, rather than social/environmental well-being. In addition, it is a major user of fossil fuels and producer of carbon emissions destroying the Climate.

**Major Recommendation:** that New Zealand develops a **Nuclear Free International Peacemaker Defence and Foreign Policy which means decreasing not increasing military investment, production and training. The goal is demilitarization of the Pacific, withdrawal from ANZUS and military alliances** that obligate NZ to support warfare strategies and involves nuclear weapons. **NZ should cease to provide Technological support for conventional and nuclear warfare.**

**INTRODUCTION:** It is commendable that the **New Zealand government Ministry of Defence** is seeking public participation in developing Defence Policy and Strategy. It is correct to focus on the **major threat to Aotearoa, Pacific Islands, people and infrastructure which is Climate change (Destruction)**. It is vital for NZDF to admit that military defence, investment and wargame practice is useless to deal with environmental disasters and Climate Crisis threatening NZ and the Region.

The other major threat of '**strategic competition**' in the NZMD document is used to justify massive government investment in Military weapon systems, technology, machinery and methods to serve the wargame/warfare worldview. This involves \$20billion of taxpayers money. Obviously this would be better spent on protection and recovery from environmental devastation from storms, cyclones and extreme weather events in Aotearoa and the Pacific.

We are wise to question the assumption that NZ must comply with chosen allies in militarization of the Pacific (under the pretense of 'defence'). Surely **the goal should be 'Demilitarisation' of the Pacific** for protection of the people and natural environment from Climate degradation and other threats. The argument for NZ to be '**combat ready**' is for '**Interoperability**' with our allies- so we can participate in **wargame exercises** and REAL warfare supporting our allies. Is this what we really want? Or do we feel obliged to appease our militaristic friends and secure economic benefits?

**In order to protect and defend New Zealand we must correctly identify and define 'the enemy'.**

The principles of NZ Defence Strategy should be based on **United Nations Charter principles** not on military alliances, warfare capacity or weapon competition, under the aegis of 'defence'. Politicians and media must criticize 'global wargame plans and cultural indoctrination' of the public to accept



the ideology of warfare. **Past behaviours, policies, historic warfare and violent culture, should not be used to perpetuate and justify the Future Space Age High Tech Warfare.**

**The Military Industrial multinational corporate complex should no longer be given political licence for economic wealth production and profit.**

**Even if China poses a significant threat to US dominated interests both economic and military-this does not mean NZ must 'take sides' or become embroiled in military 'defence' postures between super powers.**

**The NZMD has correctly identified sources of insecurity as: 'emerging technologies, violent extremism and transnational crime'.** Its stated intention is to 'provide a roadmap' to navigate the dangers and propose appropriate responses. However, the online survey provided is inadequate, it ill-defines some Defence options with poor wording and then is misleading in terms of the choices.

**PROBLEMS in NZMD Online Survey:** One is caught in a 'Catch-22' situation because one disagrees with initial premises or lumping together ideas without clarification. Thus, the form of 'survey questions' and 'answers' do not allow participants to provide an authentic response and genuine policy guidance.

The most problematic 'double-bind' survey statements are about: '*Contributing personnel and equipment to stabilization and combat operations in NZ, in the South Pacific and beyond NZ and the South Pacific*' One could agree with 'stabilisation' if it means 'ceasefire' using Peacekeeping services, especially if it included 'Peacemaking and Peacebuilding' but this is not stated.

The more difficult element is equating 'stabilisation' with 'combat operations' which means NZers will be committed to killing and warfare. However, this is NOT stipulated in the online statements. Survey Participants cannot indicate qualified or nuanced distinctions in the rigid tick boxes provided.

Another problematic statement is: '*supporting formal government events hosting international dignitaries and participating in regional and global security exercises.*' One may agree to the first part 'hosting international dignitaries' but disagree with the 'exercises' in wargames eg. RIMPAC and 'Talisman Sabre', but this distinction is not disclosed to participants in the survey.

However, I agree with many NZMD survey proposals: \*Support NZ civilian presence in Antarctica  
\* Provide Disaster relief, search and rescue operations in NZ and the South Pacific  
\*Support other NZ government Dept. especially related to Conservation protection, monitoring ships for threats to biosecurity \* Support for rebuilding after disasters in NZ and in Pacific  
\* Contribute to Peacekeeping security operations in the South Pacific \* and some other regions

**Defence of NZ Exclusive Economic Zone-** it is reasonable and necessary to provide a policing element, to protect NZ's EEZ from poaching, overfishing, illegal goods trafficking, ocean pollution and waste dumping. This action may still be conducted as 'defence' but is focussed on policing our territorial waters and airspace from **transnational corporate criminal activity.** New Zealand Defence should be non-military in nature.

**NEW ZEALAND's ROLE as a Nuclear Free Peacemaker** is to provide **MEDIATION SERVICES in the Pacific Region**, to defuse and resolve conflicts, to prevent violence and warfare in order to improve **Global Security.** NZ's role as a recognized International Peacemaker Mediator was well demonstrated in its NZDF peacework process facilitating an end to the **Bougainville** civil war 1997.

**CONCLUSION:** The majority of NZMD survey questions and answers that support global security and focus on non-military protection in the Pacific are correct. **NZ must Minimise Military expenditure to Maximise Humanitarian Aid. It must redirect Defence budgets into Peacemaking Diplomacy, Peacebuilding Initiatives and Protection of the Environment.** s9(2)(a)

Reply - Print View Images

RE: NZDF Public Webinar response-Draft Report [unclassified]

Sent: 3 April 2023 4:00 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

**Note:** Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

1 Attachments

New Zealand Defence Strategy Webinar '23.docx (16 KB);

Message

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Hello-Here is my Draft Report attached. Do you have my original submission plus my NZDF survey response? Thanks

Released by the Minister of Defence

## New Zealand Defence Strategy Review WEBINAR

Online Meeting 28 & 29 March 2023 s9(2)(a)

**NZ Ministry of Defence and NZ Defence Force Officials conducted the Forum** eg. Commodores Woodhead and Gilmour, s9(2)(a). **Since the 2021 NZ Defence Assessment** there is an increasingly complex and challenging environment of strategic competition globally and in our Pacific Region. It demands a more pro-active NZDF response and an urgent Defence Policy Review.

### NZ's Security complex disruptors as follows:

- 1/ Geopolitical wars eg. Russia/Ukraine
- 2/ Transnational Crime
- 3/ Violent Extremism
- 4/ Climate Chaos Disaster events
- 5/ Strategic Competition and deterioration

### NZ's Sovereignty, Stability and Security Depends on:

- 1/ Collective Regional Security (South Pacific)
- 2/ Network of partnerships (US-Indo-Pacific)
- 3/ International Rules-based Order
- 4/ Contribution to Global economic system
- 5/ Increasing Technological investment for interoperability

Since 1990 there has been an erosion of 'peace policies' and non-compliance with rules-based order, moving from cooperation to coercion, in an increasingly congested and contested environment. Thus, the NZ Defence Policy is changing due to growing military threats in the region.

**My Question: Could the NZDF withdraw from RIMPAC and Talisman Sabre Wargames in the Pacific? How could the NZDF work to Demilitarise the Pacific?**

NZDF Answer: Yes, NZ Defence Force could do this (theoretically or in principle) but we need to work with 'host nations' and partners in the region so it would be a tough journey.

**My Question: Does the Min. Defence Strategy promote NZ as a Nuclear Free International Peace-maker nation providing Mediation and Peacemaking services to prevent and stop wars? Could the NZDF withdraw from the culture of mass military killing in warfare and instead provide non-combat services and Humanitarian Aid?**

NZDF Answer: The aim of the NZ Defence Ministry is to prevent war and the NZDF is a necessary military tool for this purpose. This requires regional security military exercises as well as environmental protection and Humanitarian aid.

The Min. Defence Poll Questions for online participants were vague generalisations eg. **Do you think the NZ has the capability to respond to the current strategic environment? YES/NO**  
**Do you think NZ has what it takes to counter Climate Change? YES/NO**

It was concerning that few people seemed to be on the NZDF Webinars and the survey poll showed that 97% of those who were 'know someone who is/was in NZDF'. Most questions were about NZDF working conditions or capabilities, not questioning military defence ideology, policy or methodology. Some Important questions were raised around: **1/ NZDF support for the US Space Force, which was deemed to be vital to protect Space assets etc.**

**2/ Lethal Autonomous Weapons-Regulations and control needed-but no real commitment to Ban or reject 'killer Robots' campaign.**

**3/ NZ Nuclear Free Zone legislation is still honoured, but pressure from AUKUS to be involved in technical support (interoperability etc) and need to be compatible with Australia our Defence partners.** (the NZDF/Min. good at waffling, evasion and deflection.)

Hopefully many more '**Anti-War Pro-Peace people**' will find time to write a submission, make the renewed effort to pull NZ back from the brink of participation in the **WARGAMES** Minister. The current trajectory Plan is leading us down into the **HELL of Warfare**, making the **Pacific into a Theatre of War**. We must do everything in our collective power to prevent or at least resist this.

**Issues that need to be pursued to PROTECT and Defend CLIMATE and Natural Environment:**

**1/Militarisation and Warfare are the worst form of Carbon Emissions:** The Min. Defence recognises that major threats to NZ security are from Climate Change, environmental disasters and social economic disruption. They are not military so investing in military solutions 'to fight climate crisis' is wrong in principle. The Min.Defence showed Stats. Plan for reducing its carbon footprint –but not reducing militarism nor horrendous costs of it. They only plan to make militarism a little less polluting eg. 21% CO2 emission reduction by 2025 and continue with warfare prep focus.

**2/Protection of NZ's Exclusive Economic Zone:** The real threats to NZ are from dumping toxic wastes, over fishing, Poaching, Piracy and Pollution. This requires extensive **NZ Coastguard Patrols** of our marine environment and policing of our EEZ, not militarization of the Pacific for warfare between competing nuclear nations. NZ has shown already how effective it can be in intercepting the illegal Drug Traffic Trade. **More biosecurity at our borders to keep out deadly pathogens and threats to health of people and environment, the native flora and fauna. Protection of food production and agriculture for economic well-being is the NZ security priority. The NZDF should help with this.**


**3/NZ Role in Regional Security:** NZ Foreign and Defence policy would benefit from study of the Costa Rica model which dismantled military defence 1949 in favour of Peacemaking and Environmental Defence etc. It has been successful over 60 years. If they can do it in Central America then NZ can do it in the South Pacific. NZ has proven success in the **Bougainville Peace Mediation Process in 1997.**

**4/Peacemaking Defence and Foreign Policy:** should be the foundation of NZ contribution to **Global Security**. The Min. Defence alludes to 'Future Force Design' as if there is no other choice or reality except preparation for military warfare. This simply reinforces the obsolete status quo paradigm to comply with a US led 'Rules' global order **via NATO and AUKUS and the QUAD.**

This is Not a genuine UN Rules-Based order- so NZ should clarify the misleading interpretation of equating US interests with UN ideals . If we can invest and **Plan a Future of War**, we can surely choose to invest and **Plan a Future of Peacemaking policy and practices that prevent or stop wars.**

**However, this will require extraordinary honesty, courage and collective political Will. Could the people of Aotearoa/NZ do this? YES!**

[Reply](#) [Print](#) [View Images](#)

 Additional feedback - Defence Policy Review

Sent: 3 April 2023 10:44 AM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

CC: s9(2)(a)

**Note:** Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

 1 Attachments Less

 NZ DPRK Society Submission to the NZ Defence Strategy Review.pdf (786 KB);

Message

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Please find attached submission to the Defence Strategy Review from the NZ DPRK Society

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence



N Z - D P R K S o c i e t y  
New Zealand-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Society

**Submission to the New Zealand Ministry of Defence  
2023 Defence Strategy Review**

**Also Submitted to the New Zealand Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs and Trade**

**Released by the Minister of Defence**

The NZ DPRK Society was formed in 1974 with the objective promoting peace and understanding between the people of the New Zealand and the DPRK

This submission may be freely reproduced, and quoted from,  
provided the content is attributed to the NZ-DPRK Society.

***“Know your enemy”***

Sun Tzu. 5<sup>th</sup> century B.C

***“Empathize with your enemies”***

Robert S. McNamara’s Lesson Number One, The Fog of War. 2005

***“If there is negotiation, it must be rooted in mutual respect and concern for the rights of others.”***

John F. Kennedy

***“We have proved over seven decades that we do not understand North Korea”***

Bruce Cumings, Professor of Modern Korean History. 2010

***“Defence must above all else have as its objective the pursuit of peace and peaceful ways to prevent, or where necessary to resolve, conflict.”***

Andrew Bridgman, Secretary of Defence,  
Te Tumu Whakarae mo- te Waonga 2021

Released by the Minister of Defence

# Contents

1. Executive Summary .....	4
2. Introduction .....	5
3. Korea 1945 – 1948 .....	6
4. 1948 – 1950 and the Outbreak of War .....	7
5. Role of the UN Security Council in Creating the Korean War .....	8
6. Current State of Affairs in N.E. Asia .....	9
7. The Curious Case of the Spurious United Nations Command (UNC) .....	10
8. General Assembly Recommendation to Dissolve the UNC .....	11
9. Uniting for Peace Resolution .....	11
10. Reported Request for “Reparticipation” in the War .....	13
11. Documented Consequence of Sanctions .....	13
12. Less Obvious, but Real Consequences of Sanctions .....	14
13. Strategic Patience .....	15
14. The Nuclear Issue .....	15
15. The Korean Nation Wants Peace .....	16
16. ROK – DPRK Peace Negotiations .....	16
17. United States Opposition to North Korea .....	18
18. United States Mistake in Korea and Vietnam .....	20
19. Comparison with Vietnam .....	21
20. Where the DPRK Finds itself Today .....	21
21. Likelihood of the United States Agreeing to Peace .....	22
22. What Does This All Add Up to For New Zealand? .....	22
23. Conclusion .....	23
24. Recommendations .....	24
ANNEX 1. ROK – DPRK Peace Communiqués and Declarations .....	26
ANNEX 2. The Pre-1950 Civil War .....	30
ANNEX 3. How the Security Council Contravened the United Nations Charter .....	34
ANNEX 4. Joint ROK-DPRK Communiqués, Agreements and Declarations .....	36
ANNEX 5. Role of a New Zealand Korean Peace Envoy .....	40

Released by the Minister of Defence



## 1. Executive Summary

The Korean War has dragged on for seventy-three years. This is not what the Korean Nation populace in the South or North want. Nor is it New Zealand's best interest.

Covid-19 has exposed how vulnerable New Zealand is to any disruption of shipping supply lines. Forty percent of New Zealand's international trade is with N.E. Asian countries. Reignition of the war in Korea would cause more disruption than Covid – the effect would be worse than the 1930s depression.

The United States and the United Nations Security Council has failed the 2,500 years old Sun Tzu dictate; *"know your enemy."* Had they taken the effort to understand the North Koreans in 1950, there would have been no war. The Korean Nation would not have been split and forced to live in two different states through to the present time.

Standing back and looking at all geopolitical events of the past seven decades in Korea presents a dark and dismal picture. The 1950 and 1951 post Armistice talks, the 1990s Four Party Talks, the 2000s Six Party talks and the 2018 Hanoi Summit, all failed.

Only one shaft of light and hope shines out – the desire for peace as expressed by the Korean people themselves. Although divided into two protagonist states, they do 'know their enemy' and therefore know how to end the state of war.

In 1972, 1991, 1992, 2000, 2007 and twice in 2018 the two Koreas have held high level officials, or Summit, Meetings after which they have issued jointly signed statements in which they have agreed that:

- They can transcend differences in ideas, ideologies and systems,
- They can peacefully co-exist together in some form of confederation – possibly along EU lines,
- They want a formal peace agreement to replace the armistice,
- They want the Korean Peninsula to become a nuclear-free zone,
- Inter-Korean relations are to all intents and purposes an internal matter and that they will resolve issues by the efforts of *"our Nation itself"*.

Most progress has been made, and all summit meetings have taken place when there has been a liberal administration in the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Following United States and United Nations Security Council, the current strategy for dealing with the Democratic republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of isolation and sanctions. This is failing and counterproductive.

Isolation rules out the ability to meet, discuss, find common ground, and therefore precludes reaching a mutually acceptable outcome.

Every time tighter sanctions are imposed the North Koreans become more determined to never ever acquiesce; the likelihood of peace becomes even more remote.

This submission posits that there is no sense in doing more of the same. New Zealand should adopt a new strategy unabashedly focussed on assisting the two Koreas *"resolve the issues by the efforts of our nation itself."*

The main text and annexes provide background information arguing for a fresh Korean Nation-focussed approach and detailed set of recommendations, the most important of which are:

- Immediately restore diplomatic relations between New Zealand and the DPRK,

- Appoint two Defence Attachés to the New Zealand Embassy in Seoul; one with primary responsibility to liaise with the ROK military and one with primary responsibility to liaise with the DPRK military,
- Instead of following past failed policies, New Zealand should offer both governments, South and North, full support and be willing to do whatever it can to assist them along their desired pathway to peaceful co-existence as laid out in their 1972 -2018 jointly signed declarations,
- Plan for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to appoint and adequately fund a Korean Peace Envoy the next time a liberal/social democrat party comes into power in the Republic of Korea,
- Instead of supporting the United Nations Command and the status quo, the New Zealand strategy for Korea should be aimed at eliminating all hostilities. This then produces a climate in which the creation of a nuclear free peninsula can be explored,
- All New Zealand Defence personnel should be withdrawn from assignment with the United Nations Command. Any future personnel deployed to Korea should be in response to a bilateral request with no third party involved and only for participation in a non-military peace seeking process.

The principal change recommended in the 2021 Defence Assessment, 'He Moana Pukepuke Ekenga E Te Waka' is for:

*“New Zealand’s defence policy to shift from a risk-management-centred approach to one based on a deliberate and proactive strategy, with more explicit – and explicitly prioritised – policy objectives. A more strategy-led approach would better able Defence – as part of broader national efforts – to pre-empt and prevent as well as respond to, security threats.”<sup>1</sup>*

This submission recommends a change from the current risk-management approach in Korea to a strategy with the policy objective of achieving peace and therefore pre-empting further risk of war on the peninsula.

## 2. Introduction

With the wisdom of hindsight it can be stated that the 1950-53 Korean War was a mistake. The DPRK government was not destroyed, and the Korean Nation remains divided seventy years later. This tells us that strategies being applied over the past seven decades have been ineffective. Although admittedly a minor player, New Zealand’s Korean policies are unintentionally contributing to this seeming perpetuation of the state of war between the ROK and the DPRK.

Given the passage of time and the availability of more information it is possible to understand the circumstances leading up to the Korean war with greater clarity than in the heat of the moment when they occurred.

This submission argues that an objective non-partisan facing up to the true facts of the Korean situation, points to the need for a total re-think. Adoption of a strategy that can contribute towards the attainment of peaceful co-existence and, ultimately, reunification of the Korean Nation is recommended.

*“Korea is an ancient nation, and one of the very few places in the world where territorial boundaries, ethnicity, and language have been consistent for well over*

*a millennium. It sits next to China and was deeply influenced by the Middle Kingdom, but it has always had an independent civilization.”<sup>1</sup>*

There would be few if any places on earth with greater homogeneity than the peninsula occupied by the Korean Nation, a nation which for close on 80 years has found itself divided and forced to live in two totally separate political states. This has caused untold misery with ten million families split and unable to communicate.

*“A Korean war was inconceivable before the division of Korea in August 1945. But because of that division it has been conceivable ever since. Right down to the voluble present.”<sup>2</sup>*

To understand how this has come about, it is necessary to review what happened on the Korean peninsula at the close of the Pacific War in 1945 and in the following years.

### **3. Korea 1945 – 1948**

After the Japanese announcement of early August 1945 that it would accept the terms of the Potsdam Agreement and surrender, it was agreed that the United States of America (USA) would accept the Japanese surrender in Korea south of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel, and the Russians would accept the surrender north of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel on the Korean Peninsula.

This placed the country of Korea under two military occupations, the United States in the South and Russia in the North. Each power commenced to introduce their system of government administration into the territory they were temporarily occupying.

In late September 1945 the Russians brought Kim Il-sung into the North. Kim, who had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1931, was a nationalist and guerrilla leader who had been fighting the imperialist Japanese since 1932, at first with the Chinese, and then with the Russians. With him came two hundred guerrilla fighters who were “*put in charge of almost everything*”<sup>3</sup> under his leadership.

Despite objections of the Department of State because they believed he was unsuitable, and their refusal to grant a passport to Syngman Rhee, General MacArthur, with Office of Strategic Services (OSS – forerunner to the CIA) approval, flew Rhee to Seoul in early October 1945 where he “*assumed the posts of president of the Independence Promotion Central Committee, chairman of the Korean People’s Representative Democratic Legislature and president of the Headquarters for Unification.*”<sup>4</sup>

Syngman Rhee was also a nationalist, but had spent some 40 years living in exile mostly in the USA, was married to an Austrian, and had lost touch with his fellow countrymen. Syngman was qualified in the eyes of the OSS and MacArthur because he spoke good English and was rabidly anti-communist.

Along with Kim and Rhee came two different ideologies, one liberal, and eager for land reform to dispose of historic feudalism; and one ultra-conservative and suspicious of change. This, on top of the still fresh experience of Japanese repression, created extraordinary tensions on the peninsula, and ultimately civil war as the two leaders and their respective ideologies came to tussle for national dominance.

Within a month of the Japanese surrender (before the arrival of Kim and Rhee) the People’s Republic of Korea was spontaneously established country-wide with local People’s Committees being formed by the populace to administrate themselves. In the North under

<sup>1</sup> Cumings, Bruce. *The Korean War – a history*. The Modern Library. 2010. P. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Pembroke, Michael. *Korea -Where the American Century Began*. Hardie grant Books. P.38.

<sup>3</sup> Cumings, Bruce. *The Korean War – a history*. The Modern Library. 2010. P. 55

<sup>4</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syngman\\_Rhee](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syngman_Rhee)

Kim, the people's committees were accepted and built upon to form a national government system. In the South, to the occupying USA Army Military Government, the OSS and Rhee, the People's Committees looked like communist cells and were outlawed, rigidly repressed and even slaughtered. Instead of establishing a new government framework, it was decreed that the existing administration (staffed by hated Korean collaborators) and all Japanese laws and decrees would remain in place.<sup>5</sup> To put it mildly, this was not popular.

On August 15, 1948, the government of Syngman Rhee unilaterally declared the Republic of Korea (ROK) with full authorisation of the USA Military Government in Korea.<sup>6</sup>

This was not acceptable in the North and an election was immediately organised. The 'Supreme People's Council for Korea', newly formed as a result of the election, appointed Kim Il-sung as premier of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) on September 9, 1948.<sup>7</sup>

Thus, the stage was set for a battle between the two ideologies. That battle of ideologies evolved into what we know as the 1950-53 Korean War and sadly continues to this day.

#### 4. 1948 – 1950 and the Outbreak of War

New Zealand's sending of troops to the Korean War was based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 82 of 27 June 1950 which requested that:

*"Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."*<sup>8</sup>

The Security Council had been led to believe that, as Wikipedia puts it, "On June 25, 1950, the Korean War broke out when DPRK breached the 38th parallel line to invade the South."<sup>9</sup>

It is now known that this was untrue. Irrefutable evidence now exists proving that a civil war had been being fought since at least 1948, with both South and North crossing the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel and most of the aggression coming from the South.

*"Although the South launched many small raids across the parallel before the summer of 1949, with the North happy to reciprocate, the important battles began at Kaesong [in the North] on May 4 1949, in an engagement that the South started. It lasted about four days and took an official toll of four hundred North Korean and twenty-two South Korean soldiers, as well as upwards of a hundred civilian deaths according to American and South Korean figures."*<sup>10</sup>

*"The worst fighting of 1949 occurred in early August, when North Korean forces attacked ROKA units occupying a small mountain north of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. It went on for days."*<sup>11</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Abrams A.B. *Immovable Object – North Korea's 70 years at war with American Power*. Clarity Press, 2020. P.p 19 – 28

<sup>6</sup> Ohn Chang-II. *The Causes of the Korean War, 1950-1953*. International Journal of Korean Studies · Vol. XIV, No. 2 Page 29 [https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/ijoks/v14i2/f\\_0019548\\_16694.pdf](https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/ijoks/v14i2/f_0019548_16694.pdf)

<sup>7</sup> Ibid

<sup>8</sup> <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/82>

<sup>9</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Korea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Korea)

<sup>10</sup> Cumings, Bruce. *The Korean War - A History*. The Modern Library, 2010. Page 140

<sup>11</sup> Ibid page 141

*“The head of United States’ Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), General William L. Roberts, observed of the border clashes that the ROK was the more belligerent party, stating that almost every incident has been provoked by the South Korean security forces..... The South Koreans wish to invade the North.”<sup>12</sup>*

*(For extensive documentation of this see ANNEX 2. The Pre1950 Civil War)*

The crossing of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel 25<sup>th</sup> June 1950 was wantonly misrepresented to the UN Security Council by the United States as an unprovoked invasion of the South.

Had the Security Council been aware that a civil war had been underway for several years with both parties breaching the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel, and that the DPRK 25 June 1950 crossing was neither unexpected nor an unprovoked action, it is most unlikely that they would have called for international intervention and there would have been no Korean War.

Blame for the internationalisation of the domestic civil war must be taken by the United States for not telling the full facts to the Security Council.

The Security Council however must be held equally culpable because, in breach of the United Nations Charter, it recommended members to go to war without determining the truth of the situation and determining whether or not it was a threat to international peace and security.

## **5. Role of the UN Security Council in Creating the Korean War**

By summarily asking ‘*Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack,*’ without any investigation to determine whether this was a domestic issue or threat to international peace, the Security Council negligently breached as many as seven Articles of the United Nations Charter under which it is meant to operate. (See ANNEX 3. *How the Security Council Contravened the United Nations Charter*)

**Article 2 Clause 7.** This clause was contravened because the United Nations is not authorised “*to intervene in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state.*”

**Article 34.** Had the Security Council followed the advice of this article they would have found out that the civil war being fought domestically within Korea was no threat to international peace and security and it is most unlikely that the issue would have been internationalised.

**Article 39.** The Security Council violated this article because it failed to determine whether there was any breach or threat to international peace and security.

**Article 40.** The Security Council failed to “*call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable*” before issuing its resolutions.

**Article 41.** The Security Council failed to identify or recommend measures “*not involving the use of armed force*” before issuing the resolutions calling for armed forces to be involved.

Had the Security Council followed proper procedures investigated the situation, and determined that under the Articles of the Charter they were not authorised to recommend international intervention, the Koreans would have sorted the matter out themselves. Professor Bruce Cumings, the preeminent scholar of modern Korean history and author of

---

<sup>12</sup> Abrams, A.B. *Immoveable Object – North Korea’s 70 Years at War with American Power.* Clarity Press. 2020. Page 42.



thirty-three books observes, had the United States not intervened and the Korean War not occurred:

*“a leftist regime would have taken over quickly, and it would have been a revolutionary nationalist government that, over time, would have moderated and rejoined the world community.”*<sup>13</sup>

As has happened in China, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

New Zealand adheres to a principled strategy on international peace and security issues by following the lead of the United Nations Security Council. However, even the Security Council can get it wrong and when it does, as in Korea, New Zealand is faced with a predicament.

**Recommendation:** Instead of turning a blind eye, New Zealand should recognise these unfortunate facts, and in the light of the now available evidence, accept that:

- There was a civil war underway in Korea from 1948 onwards,
- The United States misrepresented this to the United Nations Security Council; and that,
- The Security Council recommended UN members to become involved in the war without following the procedural checks specified in the United Nations Charter.

## 6. Current State of Affairs in N.E. Asia

A dangerous arms race is taking place in N E Asia, with South Korea, North Korea, Japan, Taiwan and China all increasing their military arsenals. Manifested in the *‘pivot to Asia’* the United States is encouraging (and largely supplying) the armament build-ups in South Korea, Japan and Taiwan as a part of its avowed intention to slow down the rise of China as a global power. In the case of South Korea and Japan, the arms build-up is being justified on the pretext of an aggressive an aggressive threat posed by DPRK. This is a falsehood.

The DPRK is an impoverished state with, according to most analysts, an annual military expenditure of around US\$5 billion. Using 2021 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) figures this places North Korean military expenditure at 0.1% of South Korea, 0.006% of Japan, and 0.006% of the United States.<sup>14</sup>

The pretext of an aggressive DPRK does not hold water. They are neither stupid nor suicidal and have been welcoming peace talks with the South ever since 1972. The true reason for the tri-lateral South Korea/Japan/USA build-up of arms is the United States desire to challenge the rise of China.

Peace benefits everybody. The protracted state of war only benefits the arms manufacturers.

The climate created by this N. E. Asia arms build-up is madness, a madness that New Zealand should refuse to be a part of. By deploying personnel to the United Nations Command, New Zealand is contributing, albeit in a small way, to the military build-up madness.

**Recommendation:** New Zealand presents itself to the world as a small, independent, fair-minded country. This being so, New Zealand should take a principled stance by refusing to take part in any bilateral or multilateral military activity on the Korean peninsula.

---

<sup>13</sup> Cumings, Bruce. *Korea's Place in the Sun*. W.W. Norton. 1998 Page 199

<sup>14</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_by\\_military\\_expenditures](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures)

## 7. The Curious Case of the Spurious United Nations Command (UNC)

Born in a burst of pacifist idealism after WWII, a new and naive United Nations allowed itself to be pressured by Washington's desire for war in Korea. In June and July 1950, the Security Council passed four resolutions.<sup>15</sup>

None of these resolutions refers to a 'United Nations Command' or gives the United States military force in the ROK permission to call itself the United Nations Command. The last two of these resolutions refer to a "Unified Command." SC Resolution 84 states that the Security Council requests the United States to "*designate the commander of such forces, and it authorizes the "Unified Command" at its discretion to use the United Nations flag "concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating."*

Throughout this period all United Nations and United States Government communications refer to the 'unified command'. The first United States Government communique that used the 'United Nations Command' designation was "Communique Number 135 of the Far East Command S/1629 25 July 1950".<sup>16</sup> It states:

*"The United Nations Command with Headquarters in Tokyo was officially established today with General Douglas MacArthur as Commander-in-Chief."*

It seems that MacArthur, a renowned narcissist, invented the name.

As an entity created by the United States, the United Nations has never recognised the United Nations Command (UNC).

*The UN did not have the intention to create a UNC in July 1950, and a proposal to establish a UNC had never been considered. And, the role of a unified command is different from that of the UN Command. The unified command has the authority to direct forces that participated in the Korean War, and is obligated to submit reports to the United Nations. So, in early July 1950, only the unified command had been established and the unified command did not have the authority to create an agency. The first time the title United Nations Command had been used was July 24, 1950 in Tokyo. The US replaced the unified command with United Nations Command without consulting the Security Council. As former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has noted, the UNC is not an agency under the UN, not a subsidiary agency under the UN, nor a subordinate agency under the UN. The UN has never received reporting or considered a budget for the UNC.*<sup>17</sup>

Eduardo del Buey, a spokesperson for Security General Ban Ki-Moon stated:

*"But the United Nations has never had any role in the command of any armed forces deployed in the Korean peninsula. In particular, the United Nations did not at any time have any role in the command of the forces that operated in Korea under the Unified Command between 1950 and 1953."*<sup>18</sup>

<sup>15</sup> SC 82 (V)-S/1501 on June 25 1950, SC 83 (V)-S/1511 on June 27 1950, SC 84 (V)-S/1588 on July 7, 1950, SC 85 (V)-S/1657 July 31, 1950

<sup>16</sup> Collins, Robert. A Brief History of the US-ROK Combined Military Exercises. 38 North. 26 Feb. 2014. <https://www.38north.org/2014/02/rcollins022714/>

<sup>17</sup> In Name Only: The United Nations Command and U.S. Unilateralism In Korea

<https://www.kpolicy.org/post/abuse-of-a-name-professor-jang-hie-lee-on-the-united-nations-command>

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2013/db130621.doc.htm>

Without licence from the Security Council, the 'United Nations Command' designation is being used by the United States to throw a cloak of respectability over its military actions in South Korea. New Zealand should not be a party to this subterfuge, especially so when the 'UN Command' is being misused to prolong the state of war

**Recommendations:** All New Zealand Defence personnel should be withdrawn from assignment with the 'United Nations Command. Any future personnel deployed to Korea should be in response to a bilateral request with no third party involved and only for participation in a non-military peace seeking process.

In the interests of peace, MFAT should restore diplomatic relations with the DPRK. New Zealand Defence personnel in Korea should be restricted to one, or ideally two Defence Attachés, assigned for liaison with the ROK and one for liaison with the DPRK.

## 8. General Assembly Recommendation to Dissolve the UNC

In June 1975, New Zealand along with 19 other countries sent a letter to the Secretary General requesting that the Korean question be dealt with at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly. <sup>19</sup> This resulted in General Assembly Resolution 3390A/3390B, "Question of Korea" in November 1975. November 18, 1975, which in section B stated that it: <sup>20</sup>

*"Considers that it is necessary to dissolve the "United Nations Command" and withdraw all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations;*

*(1) Calls upon the real parties to the Armistice Agreement to replace the Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement as a measure to ease tension and maintain and consolidate peace in Korea" <sup>21</sup>*

**Recommendation:** This resolution was never acted upon. New Zealand should advocate the re-introduction of, and action on this resolution.

## 9. Uniting for Peace Resolution

History of the past seven decades tells us that one of the major protagonists in the Korean War, - the United States - does not want an end to the state of hostilities. For its own hegemonic reasons, the United States desires to maintain the status quo.

This is contrary to the wishes of Koreans residing in both the ROK and the DPRK. Washington does not openly announce its desire for the status quo and pretends to go through the motions of seeking peace. It has successfully achieved this over recent decades by using the diversionary tactic of demanding a denuclearization of the DPRK.

If the United States genuinely wanted peace on the Korean peninsula, they would have made the negotiation of a peace settlement agreement - as provided for in Clause 60 of the Korean War Armistice – their top priority. Instead, they walked out of talks held for this purpose, in Korea October 1953 and in Geneva in 1954. With a peace settlement agreement the situation

<sup>19</sup> [https://cdn.un.org/unyearbook/yun/chapter\\_pdf/1975YUN/1975\\_P1\\_SEC1\\_CH9.pdf](https://cdn.un.org/unyearbook/yun/chapter_pdf/1975YUN/1975_P1_SEC1_CH9.pdf)

<sup>20</sup> <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/united-nationals-general-assembly-resolution-3390a3390b-question-korea>

<sup>21</sup> [https://documents-dds-](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/001/03/IMG/NR000103.pdf?OpenElement)

<ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/001/03/IMG/NR000103.pdf?OpenElement>



would not have deteriorated to the point where the DPRK felt it had to nuclearize in order to defend themselves

The current state of play is that the United States is demanding that the DPRK completely denuclearize, after which (they say) peace and a normalisation of relationships can be discussed. The DPRK says cease hostilities, sign a peace agreement and then we can talk about denuclearization. This impasse must be broken.

President Moon Jae-in campaigned internationally for the United Nations Security Council to agree to an easing of sanctions on a step-by-step basis as an encouragement to the DPRK to work towards denuclearization and be also be able to develop their economy, but got no support.

Three of the five permanent members of the Security Council disagreed with this approach – France, and the United Kingdom, led by the United States. Only two agreed - China and Russia. This illustrates what United Nations Secretary General António Guterres described at a May 2019 public meeting in Auckland NZ attended by the author as: “*the dysfunctionality of the Security Council means we cannot do much about serious peace and security issues*”.<sup>22</sup>

Although little used, there is in fact a United Nations General Assembly mechanism to address this situation.

The General Assembly 377 entitled “*Uniting for Peace Resolution*” states that where-as:

*failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities on behalf of all the Member States, particularly those responsibilities [maintenance of international peace and security, and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto,] does not relieve Member States of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security, that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security,*

Therefore: [the General Assembly]

*Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures.*<sup>23</sup>

A General Assembly Resolution 377 (V) resolving to support a Peace Settlement Agreement as provided for in Clause 60 of the Korean War Armistice would, in all likelihood, gain overwhelming international support. After-all who does not want peace?

**Recommendation:** New Zealand should advocate for the application of GA Resolution 377 (V) to facilitate a Korean Peace Settlement Agreement

<sup>22</sup> <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/389107/un-secretary-general-lays-down-challenge-for-nz-youth>

<sup>23</sup> [https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/otherdocs/GAres377A\(v\).pdf](https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/otherdocs/GAres377A(v).pdf)

## 10. Reported Request for “Reparticipation” in the War

A South Korean newspaper article 11 January 2023 has reported that the 16 ‘sender countries’ to the Korean War are going to be asked later this year to confirm commitment to ‘reparticipating’ in the war.<sup>24</sup>

A South Korea Defense Ministry senior official told the Korea Herald that “*Since 1953, we have not reconfirmed if the UN Command sending states still have the intention to abide by their commitment to reparticipating in the war.*”

Various articles have been written speculating on the impact of a second Korean War. While the figures vary, all agree that there would be large numbers of fatalities. It has been reported that one U.S. Department of Defense assessment states that a second Korean War could produce 200,000-300,000 South Korean and U.S. military casualties within the first 90 days, in addition to hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths.<sup>25</sup>

A resumption to war in Korea would not only cause disastrous loss of life and destruction of infrastructure on the peninsula, and international peace and security, but would also have a devastating effect on the New Zealand economy.

New Zealand’s economy is heavily dependent on N. E. Asia which accounts for 40% of international trade. As the Covid-19 pandemic has shown, international supply lines are easily be disrupted. A war in Korea would virtually cut off all shipping from N E Asia and the forty percent of trade dependent on N.E. Asia region the New Zealand economy would crash, causing a recession, the likes of which has not experienced since the early 1930s.

**Recommendation:** The Korean impasse can never be solved through military action. Only empathetic diplomacy and dialogue can achieve a resolution and this is what the New Zealand Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs and Trade should focus on.

## 11. Documented Consequence of Sanctions

North Korea has been subjected to sanctions for the past 73 years; since 28<sup>th</sup> June 1950 when the United States placed a total embargo on all exports to North Korea under Section 3 of the Export Control Act of 1949.<sup>26</sup> In late December 1950 the Department of the Treasury issued Foreign Assets Control Instructions to forbid any financial transactions involving North Korea or on behalf of North Korea.<sup>27</sup> Unable to use the US Dollar prevented the DPRK from trading internationally and restricted them to dealing only with what became the Soviet Union countries. Further unilateral United States sanctions have been decreed subsequently, with a very much increased intensity over the past ten years.

Since 2006 the UN Security Council has levied increasingly severe multilateral sanctions over concerns about North Korea’s nuclear weapon program.<sup>28</sup>

The sanctions have failed to stop the DPRK’s nuclear weaponry development which has accelerated since 2018. What the sanctions are doing is to adversely affect the innocent North Korean civilian population.

<sup>24</sup> <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230111000682>

<sup>25</sup> <https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/what-would-the-second-korean-war-look-like/>

<sup>26</sup> Semoon Chang. *The Saga of U.S. Economic Sanctions Against North Korea*. The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol 20, No 2 2006. Pp 109-139.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid

<sup>28</sup> <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/dprk-north-korea-sanctions-fact-sheet.pdf>

Despite all unilateral and multilateral sanctions documents stating that the sanctions are not applicable to humanitarian initiatives, the exemptions processes are so byzantine, time consuming and expensive to negotiate, that somewhere around 15 international humanitarian agencies ceased operations in the DPRK between 2017 and 2020.

*“The North Korean population suffers from extensive unilateral and UN sanctions that amount to an almost total ban on any DPRK-related trade, investment, and financial transactions. Mounting evidence of the impact on the North Korean population, especially vulnerable groups, has led to calls for humanitarian and human rights evaluations of this impact—in particular by the UN Panel of Experts and the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in the DPRK.*

- *The North Korean population has urgent and long-standing humanitarian needs that remain unmet. UN agencies have reported that large groups of vulnerable civilians lack access to adequate food and nutrition, health care, safe water and sanitation, disaster preparedness, shelter, and security.*
- *The sanctions are having unintended adverse humanitarian consequences. The World Food Programme in particular has raised the alarm with regard to the impact of sanctions on agriculture. Given the inadequate access to the country, there is as of yet no comprehensive understanding of the extent of the damage inflicted. However, the extensive list of humanitarian-sensitive items that are now sanctioned, as reported by the UN Panel of Experts, is a particular cause for concern. These items include, but are not limited to, irrigation equipment, such as generators, electric transformers and inductors, electric storage batteries, electrical apparatus, and prefabricated greenhouses; medical appliances, such as ultrasound machines, cardiograph machines, artificial respiration machines, X-ray machines, and orthopaedic appliances for persons with disabilities; and any item with a metallic component, such as sterilizers, UV lamps for disinfection, ambulances, carriages, syringes, needles, catheters, dental and ophthalmic equipment, microscopes, pumps, water heaters, machinery for filtering or purifying water, and machinery for water well drilling.*
- *The sanctions are affecting the work of international humanitarian entities through red tape and interference with funding. It is estimated that there have been at least 3 968 deaths (with 3 193 of those being children under age 5, and 72 of them pregnant women) in 2018 due to delays and funding shortfalls affecting UN programmes that address severe acute malnutrition, basic essential drugs, vitamin A, WaSH (water, sanitation, and hygiene), and emergency reproductive health kits. The actual number of deaths may be much higher, however, and the existing UN exemption mechanism is failing to remedy these impacts.”*<sup>29</sup>

By limiting availability of fuel, fertiliser medical supplies and assistance from international humanitarian agencies, sanctions are causing an increase in the death rate, malnutrition, stunting of children and a lowering of the quality of life.

## **12. Less Obvious, but Real Consequences of Sanctions**

In addition, there is another, unexpected consequence. In a mix of Murphy's Law and Newton's Third Law of physics - that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction

---

<sup>29</sup> <https://koreapeacenow.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/human-costs-and-gendered-impact-of-sanctions-on-north-korea.pdf>

- every time a more stringent sanction is applied the North Koreans become more determined to never, ever, yield to the pressure.

The development of the DPRK nuclear weapons programme, can be attributed in part to their determination to never yield to the sanctions pressure.

### 13. Strategic Patience

President Obama's North Korean policy of 'strategic patience,' is still being applied by President Biden and being blindly applied by most of the rest of the world. This is said to be a diplomatic policy of sanctions and isolation to drive North Korea to the negotiating table. But these are not tools of diplomacy, they are the antithesis of diplomacy. They are tools of war.

*"Sanctions are, after all, but the modern version of the age-old military tactic of the siege,"* says Tim Beal in his book 'Crisis in Korea'.<sup>1</sup> He goes on to say *"The aim of the siege is to reduce the enemy to such a state of starvation and deprivation that they open the gates..... and throw themselves on the mercy of their besiegers."*

Isolation is similarly a tool of war, if only because it precludes any dialogue or diplomacy, leaving thus only the military to fill the void.

With 73 years of history to prove that the policy of sanctions and isolation have not worked, an old aphorism comes to mind – insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result.

**Recommendation:** It is time to replace the insanity with sanity and common sense. New Zealand should end the policy of isolation and re-establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK.

### 14. The Nuclear Issue

Through the 1980s and 1990s the DPRK followed a strategy of achieving a nuclear armaments free Korea Peninsula. After discussions with the ROK a 'Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' was signed in January 1992.<sup>30</sup>

The George W. Bush inclusion of the DPRK in his 2002 'axis of evil' and pre-emptive first strike speeches, the 2003 invasion of Iraq even though they had no weapons of mass destruction, the 2011 bombing of Libya despite the security guarantee signed by NATO, the United States and Russia; and more recently the Russian invasion of a denuclearised Ukraine also despite a security guarantee signed by Russia in 1994, throw doubt on whether the DPRK might be still committed to a nuclear free peninsula.

A denuclearised Korean peninsula could have been possible in the 1980s and maybe in the 1990s. It is debateable now, although as recently as 2018 both South and North agreed in the Pyongyang Declaration *"that the Korean Peninsula must be turned into a land of peace free from nuclear weapons and threat"*, so there is still some hope.

The only way now to slow down, halt, or possibly get rid of the DPRK nuclear weapons programme, is to recognise and address the root cause of the tension, namely the hostile

<sup>30</sup> [https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/korea\\_denuclearization.pdf](https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/korea_denuclearization.pdf)

policies of the United States and the Conservative parties in the ROK. Only this will allow the people of the peninsula to do what they want what – live in peaceful co-existence.

**Recommendation:** Instead of supporting the United Nations Command and the status quo, the New Zealand strategy for Korea should be aimed at eliminating the hostilities. This then produces a climate in which the creation of a nuclear free peninsula can be explored. New Zealand is uniquely qualified to assist in this regard.

### 15. The Korean Nation Wants Peace

Throughout the 1948 – 1950 civil war between Syngman Rhee and Kim Il-sung the people of the peninsula considered Korea as one country and expected that in time the power struggle would be settled and they would be united again as one. Instead, with the United States initiated intervention what they got was a catastrophic ideological war.

A war which the Korean Nation did not ask for.

A war in which neither side was able to dominate.

A war in which an estimated 4 million Korean civilians died and which left the Korean Nation traumatised.

A war which forced the proudly homogenous Korean Nation to separate into two countries.

A war which left ten million families split<sup>31</sup> between the countries and unable to communicate.

A situation which still persists today.

A war which the rest of the world, including New Zealand, has found it convenient to ignore and forget. While it has been easy for the rest of the world to move on and forget the war, the Korean Nation does not have that luxury.

### 16. ROK – DPRK Peace Negotiations

Shell-shocked from the trauma, it took nineteen years for the two countries to start talking about getting back together again. Their first meeting was in 1972.

DATE	DOCUMENT TITLE
4 July 1972	Joint North South Communiqué
13 Dec. 1991	Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges & Cooperation
20 Jan 1992	Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
15 June 2000	Joint North South Declaration
4 Oct. 2007	Declaration for Development of North-South Relations & Peace & Prosperity
27 April 2018	Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula
18 – 20 September 2018	Pyongyang Joint Declaration

The 1972 meeting laid out three principles which have been built upon in all subsequent Declarations:

<sup>31</sup> Divided Families: why does it take so long to remedy unhealed wounds? Daniel Boo & Duck Lee. Korea Journal of Population and Development. Vol.2 December 1992, pp 145 – 174  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/43783259?seq=1>



*“The parties have agreed upon the following principles for the reunification.*

*“First, unification shall be achieved independently, **without depending on foreign powers and without foreign interference.***

*Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, **without resorting to the use of force against each other.***

*Third, a great national unity as one people shall be sought first, **transcending difference in ideas, ideologies and systems.**” [Emphasis added]<sup>32</sup>*

The April 2018 Summit Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula stated that:

1.  
**South and North Korea will reconnect the blood relations of the people and bring forward the future of co-prosperity and reunification led by Koreans by facilitating comprehensive and ground-breaking advancement in inter-Korean relations. Improving and cultivating inter-Korean relations is the prevalent desire of the whole nation and the urgent calling of the times that cannot be held back any further.**

(1) South and North Korea affirmed the principle of determining the destiny of the Korean nation on their own accord and agreed to **bring forth the watershed moment for the improvement of inter-Korean relations by fully implementing all existing agreements and declarations adopted between the two sides thus far.**<sup>33</sup> [Emphasis added]

The September 2018 Summit Pyongyang Joint Declaration stated that:

*The two sides agreed to fully abide by and faithfully implement the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain” adopted as an annex to the Pyongyang Joint Declaration, and to actively take practical measures to transform the Korean Peninsula into a zone of permanent peace.*<sup>34</sup>

(For further details of the seven co-signed peace declarations see ANNEX 4)

Reading the texts of these seven co-signed Declarations it becomes clear that both ROK and the DPRK want a cessation of war and seek a status of peaceful co-existence during which time they can figure out how to reunify back into one nation state.

While the DPRK has been consistently resolute in its desire for a peaceful reunification since 1972, the official government policy of the ROK has flipped and flopped depending on whether it is a conservative or a liberal social democrat administration. During the social democrat ‘Sunshine’ and ‘Moonshine’ years, tensions relaxed and four summits with their forward-planning Declarations took place. During conservative administrations, there is a reversion to more military activity and tensions rise.

Momentum towards a peaceful resolution took a leap forward during the President Trump and President Moon years, but this ceased after the February 2019 United States – DPRK Hanoi summit where no agreement was reached and no statement was issued, Subsequently Social Democrat President Moon Jae-In has been succeeded by Conservative

<sup>32</sup> [http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/CanKor\\_VTK\\_1972\\_07\\_04\\_north\\_south\\_joint\\_communique.pdf](http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/CanKor_VTK_1972_07_04_north_south_joint_communique.pdf)

<sup>33</sup> [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Translation:Panmunjom\\_Declaration](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Translation:Panmunjom_Declaration)

<sup>34</sup> For text see: [http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/CanKor\\_VTK\\_1972\\_07\\_04\\_north\\_south\\_joint\\_communique.pdf](http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/CanKor_VTK_1972_07_04_north_south_joint_communique.pdf)

President Yoon Suk-yeol and tensions have now risen to their highest temperature in many years.

When President Moon visited Pyongyang and addressed 150,000 North Koreans in September 2018, he received a prolonged and emotional standing ovation.<sup>35</sup> Time Magazine reported that Kim Jong-Un's popularity rating shot up to 78%, having been only 10% a month before, and Moon Jae-In's rating peaked at an unprecedented 86%.<sup>36</sup>

Unfortunately, ROK's current President Yoon has taken a hard-line towards the DPRK, with increased military spending, large war games, and dismantling President Moon's peace initiatives. It is significant that ROK citizens have not taken kindly to President Yoon who has consistently polled down in the 30s and 40s, plunging to a low of 28% mid 2022. It would seem that his low poll ratings are to a largely due to his policy of hostility to the DPRK.

Polls consistently show that irrespective of whether a liberal or conservative party is in power, the majority of South Koreans want rapprochement with the DPRK. In a 2021 poll 67.8% agreed that an end-of-war declaration is necessary.<sup>37</sup> Despite this, official policies flip flop between treating the DPRK as an estranged friend (liberal or social democrat party administrations) or as an enemy (conservative party administrations).

Progress towards a peaceful end to the war is made when a liberal party is in power, and regresses when a conservative party is in power as at present under President Yoon Suk-yeol.

It is clear that the Korean populace, South and North, desire an end to the war and that the best chance of achieving this is when there is a liberal party in power in the ROK.

Social democrat President Moon Jae-in progressed the pathway to peace with his two summits and could have achieved more had he received international support. He travelled the world asking support for a policy of relaxing of sanctions on a step-by-step basis for dismantlement of the North's nuclear programme, but received no support for this. In Europe, Merkel, Macron and May all refused to support this approach.<sup>38</sup> Had they and others done so, greater progress could have been made towards peace for Korea and the wider world.

The ROK now has a conservative administration and any talk of a peace accommodation is on hold.

**Recommendation:** Instead of standing back as a passive observer, as with the former President Moon Jae-in's administration, it is suggested that New Zealand should work closely with the next liberal administration, offering them whatever help they need in their quest for peace, and to encourage other countries to do the same.

## 17. United States Opposition to North Korea

There are many reasons why the United States is opposed to North Korea.

1. Visceral opposition to a socialist state of any hue.
2. A desire to maintain US military bases and troops in South Korea and Japan, close to their perceived nemesis, China. The deliberate fiction of an aggressive North Korea is used as a justification for these bases because they do not wish to openly state that they want to maintain bases close to China.

---

<sup>35</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-45578491>

<sup>36</sup> <https://time.com/5262898/kim-jong-un-approval-rating/>

<sup>37</sup> <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210929006500325>

<sup>38</sup> <https://www.dw.com/en/south-korean-president-falls-short-lobbying-for-pyongyang-in-europe/a-46019592>

3. Given a state of peace in Korea, the (so called) 'United Nations Command' would have no reason to exist. A termination of the United Nations Command would inevitably lead to closure of the three designated United Nations Command bases in South Korea and seven United Nations Command rear bases in Japan, all of which are occupied by the US military.
4. Peace would increase South Korean and Japanese public clamour for closure of the further eleven American military bases in South Korea and the fourteen bases in Japan.
5. Closure of the US occupied bases could result in China being able to exert more influence on South Korea and Japan.
6. A loss of South Korea as a vassal state could deprive the USA of the ability to use South Korean (and possibly 'sender country') troops as mercenaries, as they did in the Vietnam War.
7. Encouragement from Tokyo to maintain the myth of hostile North Korea so as to justify the Japanese march to re-militarization.
8. Maintenance of a state of war on the Korean Peninsula creates a market for US armaments manufacturers and private corporation suppliers of services to the US military. Over recent years 40% of all USA arms sales have been to NE Asia.
9. The US economy depends heavily upon profits generated by the military industrial complex.
10. The Pentagon does not want to lose the billions of dollars of annual budget funding allocated to it for the operation and maintenance of bases in South Korea and Japan.
11. Half of the billions of Pentagon budget funding goes to defence contractors supplying a multitude of services. The defence contractors do not want to lose their profitable contracts in South Korea and Japan.
12. Military officers do not want to jeopardise lucrative post-service employment prospects with armaments manufacturers and other defence contractors.
13. The corporate armaments manufacturers and defence contractors are generous donors to virtually every member of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
14. An army of writers in think tanks, specialised institutes, and the wider media earn their living by propagating the myth of an aggressive North Korea and publishing anti-North Korea propaganda. They do not want to lose their sources of income.
15. US hubris.
16. US 'exceptionalism' - a belief that the US has a mission to transform the world.
17. A desire to maintain the US imperial hegemony.
18. Resentment that US corporations are unable to do business in North Korea
19. The Europeans have in the past suggested that Korea, Japan and Taiwan form a NE Asian bloc as in the EU, or perhaps ASEAN. The US is opposed to this concept and knows this is unlikely to gain any traction while a lot of diplomatic energy is being absorbed by the North Korean situation.
20. A lingering resentment that the US was unable to win the Korean War outright.
21. An aversion to international treaties. *"We won't do nonaggression pacts or treaties, things of that nature"* as former Secretary of State Colin Powell reportedly declared in a media conference when asked about replacing the Korean War Armistice with a peace settlement agreement.

None of these reasons give any consideration to the wishes, or the wellbeing of the Korean Nation.

It is doubtful that New Zealand shares any of these reasons for considering North Korea as an enemy.

Arguably reason number 1, ideology, is at the core of the United States' aversion to North Korea. For reasons which are hard to fully understand in New Zealand, a social democratic state, the United States is inexorably opposed to anything that smacks of socialism. This is exemplified by a resolution passed in the House of representatives 7<sup>th</sup> February 2023 entitled '*Denouncing the Horrors of Socialism*' which states:



*“Whereas the United States of America was founded on the belief in the sanctity of the individual, to which the collectivistic system of socialism in all of its forms is fundamentally and necessarily opposed: Now, therefore, be it*

*Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That Congress denounces socialism in all its forms, and opposes the implementation of socialist policies in the United States of America.”* <sup>39</sup>

It is this implacable aversion to anything resembling socialism that has caused the United States to oppose government administrations in many countries,<sup>40</sup> not the least of which is North Korea, and is a major reason why the United States has been unable to bring itself to negotiate a peace settlement agreement as provided for in Article IV Clause 60 of the Korean War Armistice Agreement.

For a negotiation to be successful, both parties must genuinely want an outcome. Given the multitudinous range of reasons that the United States is opposed to the DPRK, it seems highly unlikely that they will ever be able to put these aside and be willing to genuinely negotiate.

**Recommendation:** The multitudinous range of reasons that the United States is opposed to the DPRK must be taken into consideration of reformulating New Zealand’s Korean strategy.

## **18. United States Mistake in Korea and Vietnam**

In retirement, former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, who had been involved in the 1960s build-up leading into the disastrous Vietnam War, set out to study and find out what had gone wrong. He came up with eleven lessons. Lesson Number One was ‘*Empathise with your Enemies.*’

*“Empathy is not sympathy or agreement, but the capacity to understand reality as someone else understands it – to articulate accurately the story others tell themselves, even though it may be uncomplimentary (to you), or even threatening.....The absence of empathy leads straightway to misperception, miscommunication and misjudgement – to mistakes – and thus to actions which in turn are likely to be misunderstood by an adversary.”* <sup>41</sup>

Sun Tzu in ‘*Art of War*’ had figured out the same thing some 2,500 years earlier.

McNamara concluded that the United States had not understood enough about North Vietnam, where they were coming from and what their viewpoint was. <sup>42</sup>

The same mistake was made 10 – 20 years earlier in Korea., and still pertains today. Nobody in Washington (or Wellington) has taken the effort to empathise (understand) the North Korean realities.

<sup>39</sup> <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/118/hconres9/text>

<sup>40</sup> For example: Bolivia, Chile, China, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Grenada, Haiti, Peru, Poland, Soviet Union, Venezuela.

<sup>41</sup> Blight, J.G and Lang, J.M. *The Fog of War – lessons from the life of Robert S McNamara.* Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2005. Page 13

<sup>42</sup>

[www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/CMC50/JamesBlightJanetLangLessonNumberOneEmpathizeWithYourEnemyPeaceAndConflictJournalOfPeacePsychology.pdf](http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/CMC50/JamesBlightJanetLangLessonNumberOneEmpathizeWithYourEnemyPeaceAndConflictJournalOfPeacePsychology.pdf)

**Recommendation:** Progress towards peace can only be made when the DPRK viewpoint is understood. *“Put yourself in their shoes to understand where they are coming from”* as the old proverb says.

## 19. Comparison with Vietnam

The parallels between Korea and Vietnam are remarkable. Both are elongated countries split in two after WWII with a United States appointed autocratic head of state in the South and a charismatic, communist leader in the North.

The United States waged war in both countries to crush the communism in the North and reunite the country under their man in the South. What they did not understand was that both Kim Il-sung and Ho Chi Minh were popular with the public because, above all, they were passionate nationalists and only secondarily communists.

The Korean War ended in a stalemate with the battle being transferred from military to other fronts; principally asymmetric battles on the economic and propaganda fronts. On the propaganda front the United States totally dominates, and as a result the DPRK suffers a very negative image around the world.

Vietnam ended with a United States withdrawal and the regime from the north achieving full control of the country in 1975. After a decade they decided that their rigid communist system did not work and converted to a market economy, whereupon normal relations were resumed with the United States.

It is many decades since North Korea claimed to be communist; today they remain proudly determined to exist as a socialist state. Over the past twenty years plus they have slowly adjusted their system and are introducing a centrally controlled market economy.

Where-as 25 years ago no English was taught below university level, English is now taught at primary and secondary school level because it is recognised that English is the international trading language and they want to be prepared and able to trade when peace finally comes.<sup>43</sup>

Where-as 25 years ago, all food produced by the farmer cooperatives had to be sold to the state. Today 70% is sold to the state and 30% sold in the open market.

In conjunction with entrepreneurial Singapore-based Choson Exchange, lecturers in all aspects of the market economy have been brought in, including management specialists, bankers, marketing experts and more. The *‘Women in Business Programme’* has trained close to 3,000 women many of whom have resigned from their government jobs and opened small retail outlets, tea shops restaurants and cafes.<sup>44</sup>

This reversion into a centrally regulated mixed market economy could be expected to accelerate given peace, cessation of sanctions and an opening up to international trade.

## 20. Where the DPRK Finds itself Today

Force your loving family pet into a corner, threaten it enough, and it will retaliate by scratching or biting. This is where the DPRK finds itself today; genuinely believing that they are at threat

---

<sup>43</sup> NZ NGOS were instrumental in formulations of the primary, secondary and tertiary English language teaching curriculums.

<sup>44</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Choson\\_Exchange#References](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Choson_Exchange#References)  
<https://www.chosonexchange.org/>

from the United States. Fortunately, they have not yet felt threatened enough to attack the ROK or the USA, but the risk is there.

Russia perceived the eastwards expansion of NATO as threatening and has fought back in Ukraine. Do we want the same thing to happen in Korea?

Every time the American and ROK troops practice manoeuvres, (as in the 2023 Freedom Shield and Warrior Shield combat war exercises) DPRK genuinely fears that an invasion might take place.

It is easy to scoff, but this is a feared reality so far as the DPRK is concerned. And this is where Robert McNamara's *'empathise with your enemy'* comes in.

**Recommendation:** No Korean strategy, formulated by either the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, will be of any relevance unless DPRK fears of invasion are understood and factored in.

## 21. Likelihood of the United States Agreeing to Peace

Reviewing events of the past 70 years, there is nothing to suggest that the United States will reverse their current policies, let bygones be bygones, and sign a peace settlement agreement with the DPRK.

Post Armistice peace meetings in October 1953 and July 1954 came to nothing because the USA and ROK would not agree with the other parties.

The 2003 – 2007 Six Party talks ended with frustration on the part of the DPRK side because they felt that the United States was not genuinely seeking a mutually agreeable outcome.

The Trump/Kim Jong-il summits ended with the DPRK walking out because the United States was demanding too much of them without any talk of a peace settlement agreement.

While opposition to a socialist state is still a consideration, in the final analysis, the United States has not brought the war to an end because the DPRK is acting as a convenient excuse to maintain military bases and build up arms against their prime competitor and (as they see it) opponent, China. This factor also must be understood in formulating the New Zealand Korean strategy.

It can be argued that the DPRK is being played as a convenient puppet. When the United States flies B-1 Lancer supersonic bombers close to the North's air space, sails ballistic nuclear submarines near the North's waters and carries out joint military manoeuvres in the ROK, the DPRK advances its nuclear programme and usually fires off some ballistic missiles to show that they have a deterrent. In response the United States then says *"see, we told you so, North Korea is a nuclear threat."*

Just as the United States has an aversion to socialist states, they also seem to be averse to peace agreements. *"We won't do non-aggression pacts or treaties, things of that nature,"* as former Secretary of State Colin Powell is reported to have put it.

For these reasons there is little likelihood of the United States holding out an olive branch, burying the hatchet and signing a peace agreement with the DPRK.

## 22. What Does This All Add Up to For New Zealand?

Arguably, the 2023 situation between South and North is the worst it has been since the 1940s. New Zealand accepting the recommendations of the UN Security Council, and therefore the lead of the United States over the past seven decades in all matters relating to peace and security in Korea, has not given any positive results.

More of the same is not going to get a different result. This fact must be acknowledged and accepted in formulating any new Korean strategies by the New Zealand ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

It should also be recognised, and accepted, that the only times summits have taken place and any progress towards peace has been made, has been when a Liberal or Social Democrat party has been in power. Poll popularity ratings for both South and North leaders skyrocket into the 70s and 80s at the time of these summits, proving that the Korean populace wants peace.

The signed summit declarations lay out an agreed upon roadmap for the two Koreas to peacefully co-exist and work towards a future reunification. Judged on past performance, this is an outcome that the United States and their 'UN Command' are unlikely to ever deliver. New Zealand should forget about the United States and the 'United Nations Command' and focus on the expressed peace aspirations of the two Koreas. They are the two entities most involved and therefore most motivated and qualified to negotiate and end their externally inflicted predicament.

### **23. Conclusion**

The ROK and the DPRK have documented their desire for peace in their seven 1972 – 2018 joint summit declarations. The United States has not been able to bring itself to agree with these because of: (i) their antipathy to any form of socialism; and (ii) their long established practice of using of an allegedly aggressive DPRK as an excuse to maintain their military bases in South Korea and Japan close to China.

The Covid-19 global pandemic has dramatically exposed how vulnerable New Zealand is to any disruption of shipping or air freight supply lines. Forty percent of New Zealand's international trade is with N.E. Asian countries. A recurrence of war in Korea would disrupt the freight supply lines far more than covid. This would cause a downturn in the New Zealand economy not experienced within living memory - i.e., since the early 1930's depression.

The extended state of war on the Korean Peninsula is benefitting no one except arms manufacturers. A state of peace benefits everybody.

Cessation of a state of war and peace on the Korean Peninsula would be of world-wide benefit.

- New Zealand benefits through eliminating risk of a reduction in trade due to drastically disrupted supply lines,
- The North Korean populace benefits through an improved standard of living with the DPRK able to trade internationally,
- 10 million split families benefit by being able to reunite for the first time in seven decades,
- International peace and security is enhanced with elimination of the risk of a war in Korea.

Standing back and looking at all geopolitical events of the past seven decades in Korea presents a dark and dismal picture. Only one shaft of light and hope shines out – the desire for peace as expressed by the Korean people themselves and documented in these agreements:

- 1972 Joint North South Communiqué
- 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation

- 1992 Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
- 2000 Joint North South Declaration
- 2007 Declaration for Development of North-South Relations & Peace and Prosperity
- 2018 Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula
- 2018 Pyongyang Joint Declaration

## 24. Recommendations

The Korean impasse can never be solved through military action. Only empathetic diplomacy and dialogue can achieve a resolution and this is what the New Zealand Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs and Trade should focus on.

Progress towards peace can only be made when the DPRK viewpoint is understood; *“put yourself in their shoes to understand where they are coming from”* as the old proverb says.

No Korean strategy formulated by either the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, will be of any relevance unless DPRK fears of invasion are understood and factored in. The multitudinous range of reasons that the United States is opposed to the DPRK must also be taken into consideration.

A total re-think of the Korean impasse and formulation of a forward-thinking New Zealand Defence and Foreign Affairs strategy is called for.

The NZ DPRK Society respectfully suggests that it is in the interest of New Zealand, the Korean Nation and the entire world population to:

- Immediately restore diplomatic relations between New Zealand and the DPRK,
- Appoint two Defence Attachés to the New Zealand Embassy in Seoul; one with primary responsibility to liaise with the ROK military and one with primary responsibility to liaise with the DPRK military,
- Instead of following past failed policies, New Zealand should offer both governments, South and North, full support and be willing to do whatever it can to assist them along their desired pathway to peaceful co-existence as laid out in their 1972 -2018 jointly signed declarations,
- Plan for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to appoint and adequately fund a Korean Peace Envoy the next time a liberal/social democrat party comes into power in the Republic of Korea, <sup>45</sup>
- Instead of supporting the United Nations Command and the status quo, the New Zealand strategy for Korea should be aimed at eliminating all hostilities. This then produces a climate in which the creation of a nuclear free peninsula can be explored,
- All New Zealand Defence personnel should be withdrawn from assignment with the United Nations Command. Any future personnel deployed to Korea should be in response to a bilateral request with no third party involved and only for participation in a non-military peace seeking process,

---

<sup>45</sup> For suggestions as to how a New Zealand Korean peace envoy could contribute to the achievement of peace in Korea see ANNEX 5. A New Zealand Korea Peace Envoy.

- Advocate amongst the 193 United Nations members for a General Assembly Resolution to withdraw permission for the 'United Nations Command' to use the United Nations Flag,
- Advocate amongst the 193 United Nations members for a General Assembly Resolution to dissolve the United Nations Command,
- Advocate amongst the 193 United Nations members for a General Assembly resolution invoked under the terms of the GA Resolution 377 (V) "Uniting for Peace" which would (i) Acknowledge that the Security Council has failed " *to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace*" in Korea; and (ii) Recommend that General Assembly members work with the ROK and the DPRK to assist them implement their jointly signed 1972 – 2018 declarations to create a status of peaceful co-existence.

New Zealand's track record which includes contributing to the formation of the United Nations, as an active proponent of free trade exemplified by the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), facilitation of peace in Bougainville PNG after a nine-year civil war, and participation in innumerable international peace-keeping efforts has built up a reputation as an independent, fair-minded honest broker.

NZ DPRK Society believes that New Zealand is well qualified to take a leading role in facilitating a peace in Korea.

s9(2)(a)

NZ DPRK Society

3<sup>rd</sup> April 2023

[nzdprksociety@gmail.com](mailto:nzdprksociety@gmail.com)

**About the author.**

s9(2)(a) has spent a life time involved with humanitarian work in the Asia/ Pacific region. This included working on poverty alleviation, agricultural, regional development, and post conflict restoration projects at field level in twenty-one countries; including some thirty projects in the DPRK. He believes that events of the 1940s and subsequent years have imposed an undeserved injustice upon the people of the Korean Nation.



## ANNEX 1. ROK – DPRK Peace Communiqués and Declarations

### 1972 Joint North South Communiqué <sup>46</sup>

Following talks between high level officials from both countries, the Communiqué was signed by both parties on 4 July 1972.

*“The parties have agreed upon the following principles for the reunification.*

*“First, unification shall be achieved independently, **without depending on foreign powers and without foreign interference.***

*Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, **without resorting to the use of force against each other.***

*Third, a great national unity as one people shall be sought first, **transcending difference in ideas, ideologies and systems.**”* [Emphasis added]

### Letter to the President of the United States <sup>47</sup>

To the frustration of the North, follow-on talks came to nothing and so in May 1974 the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly forwarded a letter addressed to President Gerald Ford, the United States Senate and the House of Representatives. The letter requested:

*“the conclusion of a peace agreement, as a step for converting the Armistice into a durable peace.”*

Forty-nine years later, DPRK has received no acknowledgement or reply to this request for an end to the state of war!

### 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges & Cooperation <sup>48</sup>

In 1988 ROK President Roh Tae-woo launched his Northern Diplomacy or ‘Nordpolitik’ foreign policy in which he proposed a ‘Korean Community’. This paralleled the DPRK’s proposal for a confederation. High level talks were held which resulted in the 1991 ‘Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation. The Preamble states that the two countries are:

*“Pledging themselves to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification.”*

Article 1 states that:

*“South and North Korea shall recognise and respect the system of each other.”*

This implicitly supports the concept of a confederation.

---

<sup>46</sup> [http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/CanKor\\_VTK\\_1972\\_07\\_04\\_north\\_south\\_joint\\_communique.pdf](http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/CanKor_VTK_1972_07_04_north_south_joint_communique.pdf)

<sup>47</sup> Click Transcript – original scan :

<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114199.pdf?v=cd0ef171ed9fcb19ebbe0b883d5103f7>

<sup>48</sup> [http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course\\_00S\\_L9436\\_001/North%20Korea%20materials/coree91.html](http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/coree91.html)

## 2000 The North South Joint Declaration <sup>49</sup>

In 1998 ROK President Kim Dae-jung announced a new 'Comprehensive Engagement Policy towards North Korea' which popularly became known as the Sunshine Policy. This policy was based on three principles:

*"No armed provocation from the North would be tolerated.*

*The South would not attempt to absorb the North in any way.*

*The South would actively seek cooperation."*

In June 2000, Kim Dae-jung met with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang and this summit produced the North South Declaration.

The June 15 Joint North South Declaration stated that:

*"The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of **reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people**, who are masters of the country.*

For achievement of reunification, we have **agreed that there is a common element in the South's concept of a confederation and the North's formula for a loose form of federation.** The South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction." [Emphasis added]

Although it had been agreed that Kim Jong-il would "visit Seoul at an appropriate time in the future" with President George W. Bush taking a tough stance against the DPRK, this did not happen. It was seven years before further summit was held.

## 2007 Declaration Development of North-South Relations Peace and Prosperity <sup>50</sup>

In October 2007, President Roh Moo-hyun, against Washington's wishes, walked across the DMZ at Panmunjom and travelled by road to Pyongyang where he met with Kim Jong-il. This resulted in the October 4 Declaration for Development of North-South Relations and Peace and Prosperity.

*"1. The South and the North shall uphold and endeavour actively to realize the June 15 Declaration"*

*The South and the North have agreed:*

- *to resolve the issue of unification on their own initiative and according to the spirit of "by-the-Korean-people-themselves."*
- *to firmly transform inter-Korean relations into ties of mutual respect and trust, transcending the differences in ideology and systems.*

---

<sup>49</sup>

[https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace\\_agreements/n\\_skorea06152000.pdf](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/n_skorea06152000.pdf)

<sup>50</sup> <http://www.zoominkorea.org/declaration-on-the-advancement-of-south-north-korean-relations-peace-and-prosperity/>



- **to closely work together to put an end to military hostilities, mitigate tensions and guarantee peace on the Korean Peninsula.**
- **both recognize the need to end the current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime.** [Emphasis added]

## 2017 President Moon Jae-in

In his 7 July 2017 Berlin speech Moon Jae-in stated:

*“We already know the road that leads to a peaceful Korean Peninsula. It is returning to the June 15 Joint Declaration and the October 4 Declaration.*

*Through these two declarations, the South and the North clearly stated that the owner of inter-Korean issues is our own nation, and committed to closely cooperate in easing tensions and guaranteeing peace on the Korean Peninsula. The two Koreas also promised to walk the path of common prosperity through cooperative projects in every sector of the society, including in the economic field.”*<sup>51</sup>

There is wide support in the ROK for President Moon’s stance. Polls show that over 70% of the population are supportive of his policy of rapprochement with the North.<sup>52</sup> 68% of teens think that reunification is necessary.<sup>53</sup>

## 2018 Kim Jong-un<sup>54</sup>

In his 2018 New Year Address Kim Jong-un took up this theme:

*“Inter-Korean relations are, to all intents and purposes, an internal matter of our nation which north and the south should resolve on their own responsibility. Therefore, they should acquire a steadfast stand and viewpoint that they will resolve all the issues arising in bilateral relations on the principle of **By Our Nation Itself**...”*

*We will, in the future too, resolve all issues by the efforts of **our nation itself** under the unfurled banner of national independence and frustrate the schemes by anti-reunification forces within and without on the strength of national unity, thereby opening up a new history of national reunification.* [Emphasis added]

## April 2018 Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification<sup>55</sup>

President Moon Jae In and Chairman Kim Jong Il met 27 April in the Peace House at Panmunjom in the DMZ and signed the declaration in which both agreed that:

- *Improving and cultivating inter-Korean relations is the prevalent desire of the whole nation and the urgent calling of the times that cannot be held back any further,*

<sup>51</sup> <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170707000032>

<sup>52</sup> <https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/how-do-south-koreans-view-a-possible-peace-treaty-with-north-korea/>

<sup>53</sup> <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200531000223>

<sup>54</sup> <https://www.38northref.org/kim-jong-uns-2018-new-year-address-full-english-text/>

<sup>55</sup> [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Translation:Panmunjom\\_Declaration](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Translation:Panmunjom_Declaration)

- *[they] will make joint efforts to alleviate the acute military tension and practically eliminate the danger of war on the Korean Peninsula,*
- *[they] will actively cooperate to establish a permanent and solid peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,*
- *the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.*

**September 2018 Pyongyang Joint Declaration** <sup>56</sup>

***The two leaders reaffirmed the principle of independence and self-determination of the Korean nation,*** and agreed to consistently and continuously develop inter-Korean relations for national reconciliation and cooperation, and unwavering peace and co-prosperity, and to make efforts to realize through policy measures the aspiration and hope of all Koreans that the current developments in inter-Korean relations will lead to reunification. [Emphasis added]

Released by the Minister of Defence

---

56

## ANNEX 2. The Pre-1950 Civil War

*“The Korean War was (and is) a civil war; only this conception can account for the 100,000 lives lost in the South before June 1950.”*<sup>57</sup>

With formerly classified documents in the USA, ROK, China and Russia now publicly available, contemporary scholarship is revealing that the Korean War did not suddenly start unexpectedly like a bolt of lightning on 25<sup>th</sup> June 1950.

Professor Bruce Cummings the pre-eminent modern Korean historian points out that it can be argued that the war started in late 1945 when the two occupying powers, the USA in the South and Russia in the North, introduced their respective political ideologies to the territory under their control.

The North Korean viewpoint is that they have been fighting a constant war (through to the present day) since 1932 against Japanese imperialism and 1945 against American imperialism.

Most contemporary commentators now agree that the war started in August 1948 when the government of Syngman Rhee in the South unilaterally declared the Republic of Korea with sovereignty over the entire peninsula. Within a month, Pyongyang declared formation of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea thus creating two states, each with overlapping claims to sovereignty over the entire peninsula and Korean nation.<sup>58</sup> This led to skirmishes across the border which degenerated into civil war.

As early as 1952 legendary journalist I. F. Stone reported that the North Korean alleged that “they counterattacked after repulsing invasion at three points.”<sup>59</sup> Nobody took any notice at the time, however modern studies now vindicate his reporting as being accurate.

**Burchett, Wilfred G. *This Monstrous War*** Joseph Waters, Melbourne. 1953

**Page 55.** The attack jumped off at dawn on July 25 [1949] as planned, but that is about all that did go according to plan. To the east and west of Kaesong and on Pine Tree Peak R.O.K. units started to move forward but soon ran into withering fire from Constabulary Units of the K.P.A. [i.e., the North Korean People's Army].

The *Seoul Free Press* on July 27, two days after the attack started, published the following item, under the heading "Occupation of the Highest Peak of Sangak Mountain (Pine Tree Peak)—Kaesong is Now Secure Thanks to the Fight of National Army."

**Page 60.** "The year 1949 drew to a close with Rhee firmly determined that come what may, the invasion of the North would take place in 1950. In a New Year message to the Korean people published in all South Korean papers on December 31, Rhee said: "In the New Year we shall all strive as one man to regain the lost territory..... it is our duty to unify Southern and Northern Korea by our own strength.".....There was not one person who read the South Korean press during the latter half of 1949 who could have had the slightest doubt that Rhee intended the armed invasion of the North at latest during the coming year."

**Page 62.** "In the *New York Times* of March 14, 1950, staff correspondent Sullivan reported that 13 members of the Rhee Assembly had been arrested and sentenced to from 18 months to 10 years' imprisonment for violations of the Security Act. Among the five charges levelled

<sup>57</sup> Cummings, Bruce. *The Korean War - A History*. The Modern Library, 2010. Page 66

<sup>58</sup> Abrams, A.B. *Immoveable Object – North Korea's 70 Years at War with American Power*. Page 40.

<sup>59</sup> I.F. Stone. *The Hidden History of the Korean War*. Monthly Review Press reprint 1971. Pp 13,48,51.

against them was that of opposing the invasion of North Korea by the R.O.K. Army. Of all the masses of evidence on the public record, proving Rhee's intention to invade the North, this is probably the most conclusive."

**Page 62 -63.** "On June 5-three weeks before the invasion started, one finds the *Herald-Tribune* carrying a report of an interview granted Miss Higgins by Major-General Roberts. "In Korea," Roberts stated, according to Miss Higgins, "the American taxpayer has an army which is a fine watchdog over investments placed in this country and a force that represents maximum results at a minimum cost."

63

"[Korea Military Advisory Group ] General Roberts added," quotes Miss Higgins, "that his Military Advisory Group is 'a living demonstration of how an intelligent and intensive investment of five hundred combat-hardened, American officers and men can train 100,000 men who will do the shooting for you.....it is true, Roberts said, "that many attacks on the region north of the 38th parallel have been launched by my orders and there will be many more in the days to come. But in many cases, units have attacked the North on their own accord and have spent a tremendous amount of ammunition with no results whatsoever except to suffer heavy losses."

**Page 66-67** "After Dulles returned from the 38th parallel, he had a final conference with Rhee and Shin Sungmo at which, according to Kim Hyo-suk, Dulles actually gave the word to launch the attack immediately, stating: "Start the invasion against the North accompanied by counter-propaganda to the effect that the North has invaded the South. If you can but hold out for two weeks, everything will go smoothly, for during this period the U.S.A., by accusing North Korea of attacking South Korea, will compel the United Nations to take action. And in the name of the United Nations, land, naval and air forces will be mobilised....."

In the small hours of June 25, while Dulles was still in Tokyo, the Dulles-Rhee-MacArthur plan was put into operation. Rhee troops launched their attack across the 38th parallel."

**Page 70** ."There never has been any evidence produced to prove that the North attacked the South. There was a belated attempt to scrape up proof in May, 1951, but the palpable forgeries which the U.S.A. submitted to the U.N. could only be regarded as final proof that there was no evidence and the Americans were forced to fabricate demonstrably false documents."

**Cummings, Bruce.** *The Korean War - A History.* The Modern Library, 2010.

**Page 109.** "By early 1946 Korea was effectively divided and the two regimes and two leaders (Rhee and Kim Il Sung) who founded the respective states in 1948 were effectively in place."

**Page 139-140.** "The United States, however pursued a civil-war deterrent in Korea, hoping to restrain both the enemy and the ally; it therefore refused to equip this army with heavy weaponry that could be used to support an invasion of the North.....and tried to keep hotheaded Southern commanders from provoking conflict along the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. They did not succeed in the latter case; much of the extensive fighting along the border that lasted from May to December 1949 was said by internal American account to have been started by Southern forces, and was a major reason for posting of UN military observes in Korea in 1950 – to watch *both* the North and the South.

Although the South launched many small raids across the parallel before the summer of 1949, with the North happy to reciprocate, the important battles began at Kaesong [in the North] on May 4 1949, in an engagement that the South started. It lasted about four days and took an official toll of four hundred North Korean and twenty-two South Korean soldiers, as well as upwards of a hundred civilian deaths according to American and South Korean

figures.<sup>60</sup> The South committed six infantry companies and several battalions, and two of its companies defected to the North (incongruous in their American military uniforms, Pyongyang made quick propaganda use of them). Months later, based on the defectors' testimony, the North Koreans claimed that several thousand troops led by Kim Sok-won [commander of 1<sup>st</sup> Division Republic of Korea Army) attacked across the parallel on the morning of May 4 near Mount Songkak, inauguration border fighting that lasted six months.”

61

**Page 141.** The worst fighting of 1949 occurred in early August, when North Korean forces attacked ROKA units occupying a small mountain north of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. It went on for days, right through an important summit conference between Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek. In the early hours on August 4 the North opened up great barrages of artillery and mortar fire and then at 5.30 a.m. some 4,000 to 6,000 North Korean border guard soldiers attacked, seeking in the Korea Military Advisory Group (American) commander Robert's words “ *to recover high ground in North Korea occupied by [the] South Korean Army.*” The southern side was ‘completely routed’ according to [USA] Ambassador Muccio; two companies of ROKA soldiers in the 18<sup>th</sup> Regiment were annihilated, leaving hundreds dead and the North in occupation of the mountains.<sup>62</sup>

**Page 143.** “North Korea was not ready to fight however, since it had tens of thousands of soldiers still fighting in Chin. It did not respond even to major provocations, such as several South Korean ships that invaded its waters and shell a small port in the summer of 1949.”

**Pembroke, Michael. *Korea - Where the American Century Began.*** Hardie Grant Books. 2018

**Page 50** “Hostilities started well before the formal invasion in June 1950. For much of the previous year both sides had been feinting and thrusting and skirmishing in both directions across the parallel. And not all of them were raids. In May 1949, the south initiated a battle at Kaesong that lasted four days and took an official toll of 400 North Korean and twenty-two South Korean soldiers as well as civilians..... In early August 1949, more than 4000 North Korean border guard soldiers attacked with artillery and mortar fire South Korean units that were occupying a small mountain north of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. The American ambassador Muccio said that the southern forces were ‘completely routed.’ And in late August, the south boldly sent several naval patrol boats up the Taedong River, ‘sinking four North Korean ships in the 35- to 45-ton class.”

**Abrams, A.B. *Immoveable Object – North Korea’s 70 Years at War with American Power.*** Clarity Press. 2020

**Page 46.** “The disastrous performance of Rhee’s Liberal Party in the ROK’s first parliamentary elections on May 30, 1950, less than a month before the outbreak of the Korean War, and considerable pressure from both the public and rival parties to begin peaceful reunification gave Pyongyang further cause to perceive a favourable resolution to forthcoming via peaceful means.”

**Page 41.** When on June 7, 1950 North Korean President Kim Il-sung called for nation-wide elections to be held in August, and for a consultative conference in Haeju from June 15 to 17, this was strongly opposed by both Rhee and the United States. When four days later the

<sup>60</sup> NA, 895,00 file box 7127, Muccio to State, May 13 1949; Drumwright to State, June 13 1949

<sup>61</sup> NDSM, Feb 6 1950. Mount Songkak is in the middle of Kaesong, and the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel cuts across it. When I visited Kaesong in 1987, this mountain was still pockmarked by the scars of artillery shells.

<sup>62</sup> MacArthur Archives, RG9, box 43, Roberts to Department of the Army, Aug1, Aug 9, 1949; *New York Times* Aug.5 1949. NDSM, Feb 6, 1950

DPRK sent three delegates to the south in a peace overture to begin talks on reunification, this too was rejected outright by Rhee.”

**Page 41.** “Reports from Western and international observers indicated that the president and much of the ROK’s military leadership appeared strongly inclined to initiate a conflict against the DPRK, staging frequent provocations across the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel for this purpose.”

**Page 41.** “Several skirmishes along the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel took place for May to December 1949 between the Republic of Korea Armed Forces (ROKAF) and the Korean People’s Army (KPA).”

**Page 42...** British sources reported just weeks before the outbreak of the war that KMAG [Korea Military Advisory Group] had raised concerns that the Republic of Korea Armed Forces (ROKAF) “over-aggressive officer in command positions along the parallel” presented a significant risk that “a border incident could precipitate a civil war.” Other British intelligence sources similarly concluded that the leadership in the south was willing to initiate a war of aggression, with one stating that the South Korea commanders’ heads “are full of idea of recovering the North by conquest.”

**Page 42.** “The head of United States’ Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), General William L. Roberts, observed of the border clashes that the ROK was the more belligerent party, stating that almost every incident has been provoked by the South Korean security forces..... The South Koreans wish to invade the North.”

**Page 42.** “Sources from the DPRK claim that thousands of South Korean troops led by Brigadier General Kim Suk-won, a close confidant of Syngman Rhee, led units from the ROKAF across the border on multiple unprovoked assaults – initiating six months of border fighting.”

**Page 43.** Preceding British and U.S. reports indicating it was the south which had initiated almost all border clashes strongly supports this, and gives a strong indication that it was most likely the ROK which first initiated hostilities.

Released by the Minister of Defence



## ANNEX 3. How the Security Council Contravened the United Nations Charter

Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed the Security Council that there had been a 25 June 1950 invasion from the North across the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel into the South. The United Nations Charter prescribes that the Security Council must follow a set of procedures before issuing a resolution and making a recommendation to members on an issue such as this. In passing a resolution without working through these procedures the Security Council was negligent in that it contravened six and arguably seven Articles of the United Nations Charter.

Had the Security Council adhered to the procedural rules of the Charter, it is most unlikely that the domestic Korean civil war would have been elevated into an international war.

### UNITED NATIONS CHARTER CHAPTER I PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

#### Article 2 Clause 7.

*Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.*

**This clause was contravened because the United Nations is not authorised “to intervene in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state.”**

### CHAPTER VI PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

#### Article 34

*The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.*

**Had the Security Council followed the advice of this article they would have found out that the civil war that was being fought domestically within Korea was no threat to international peace and security and it is unlikely that the issue would have been internationalised.**

### CHAPTER VII ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

#### Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

**The Security Council violated this article because it failed to determine whether there was any breach or threat to international peace and security.**

#### Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or

desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

**The Security Council failed to “call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable” before issuing its resolutions.**

Released by the Minister of Defence



## ANNEX 4. Joint ROK-DPRK Communiqués, Agreements and Declarations

Since 1972, there have been six occasions when the ROK and the DPRK have officially met.

Collectively the resultant jointly signed documents, in effect, lay out an agreed upon roadmap to peaceful co-existence and ultimate reunification.

DATE	DOCUMENT TITLE
	<b>High Level Officials Meetings</b>
4 July 1972	Joint North South Communiqué
13 Dec. 1991	Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges & Cooperation
20 Jan 1992	Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
	<b>Summits</b>
15 June 2000	Joint North South Declaration
4 Oct. 2007	Declaration for Development of North-South Relations, Peace & Prosperity
27 April 2018	Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula
18 – 20 September 2018	Pyongyang Joint Declaration

### 1972 Joint North South Communiqué <sup>63</sup>

Following talks between high level officials from both countries, the Communiqué was signed by both parties on 4 July 1972.

*“The parties have agreed upon the following principles for the reunification.*

*“First, unification shall be achieved independently, **without depending on foreign powers and without foreign interference.***

*Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, **without resorting to the use of force against each other.***

*Third, a great national unity as one people shall be sought first, **transcending difference in ideas, ideologies and systems.**”* [Emphasis added]

### Letter to the President of the United States

To the frustration of the North, follow-on talks came to nothing and so in May 1974 the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly forwarded a letter addressed to President Gerald Ford, the United States Senate and the House of Representatives. The letter requested:

*“the conclusion of a peace agreement, as a step for converting the Armistice into a durable peace.”* <sup>64</sup>

<sup>63</sup> [http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/CanKor\\_VTK\\_1972\\_07\\_04\\_north\\_south\\_joint\\_communique.pdf](http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/CanKor_VTK_1972_07_04_north_south_joint_communique.pdf)

<sup>64</sup> The letter can be read on: <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114199.pdf?v=cd0ef171ed9fcb19ebbe0b883d5103f7>

Forty-nine years later in 2023, DPRK is still waiting for a reply to this request for an end to the state of war!

### **1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges & Cooperation**

In 1988 ROK President Roh Tae-woo launched his Northern Diplomacy or 'Nordpolitik' foreign policy in which he proposed a 'Korean Community'. This paralleled the DPRK's proposal for a confederation. High level talks were held which resulted in the 1991 'Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation. The Preamble states that the two countries are:

*"Pledging themselves to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification."*

Article 1 states that:

*"South and North Korea shall recognise and respect the system of each other."*<sup>65</sup>

This implicitly supports the concept of a confederation.

### **1992 Denuclearization Agreement with South Korea**

On January 20, 1992, North Korea signed the "Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." This was viewed by North Korea as a first step towards creation of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in N E Asia.<sup>66</sup>

### **2000 The North South Joint Declaration**

In 1998 ROK President Kim Dae-jung announced a new 'Comprehensive Engagement Policy towards North Korea' which popularly became known as the Sunshine Policy. This policy was based on three principles:<sup>67</sup>

*"No armed provocation from the North would be tolerated.*

*The South would not attempt to absorb the North in any way.*

*The South would actively seek cooperation."*

In June 2000, Kim Dae-jung met with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang and this summit produced the North South Declaration.

The June 15 Joint North South Declaration stated that:

*"The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of **reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people**, who are masters of the country."*

For achievement of reunification, we have **agreed that there is a common element in the South's concept of a confederation and the North's formula for a loose form of**

---

<sup>65</sup>

[http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course\\_00S\\_L9436\\_001/North%20Korea%20materials/coree91.html](http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/coree91.html)

<sup>66</sup>

<http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/CanKor-VTK-1992-01-20-joint-declaration-denuclearization-korean-peninsula.pdf>

<sup>67</sup>

[https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace\\_agreements/n\\_skorea06152000.pdf](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/n_skorea06152000.pdf)

**federation.** The South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction.”<sup>68</sup> [Emphasis added]

Although it had been agreed that Kim Jong-il would “*visit Seoul at an appropriate time in the future*” with President George W. Bush taking a tough stance against the DPRK, this did not happen. It was seven years before further summit was held.

### **2007 Declaration for Development of North-South Relations and Peace and Prosperity**

In October 2007, President Roh Moo-hyun, against Washington’s wishes, walked across the DMZ at Panmunjom and travelled by road to Pyongyang where he met with Kim Jong-il. This resulted in the October 4 Declaration for Development of North-South Relations and Peace and Prosperity.

*“1. The South and the North shall uphold and endeavour actively to realize the June 15 Declaration.*

*The South and the North have agreed:*

- *to resolve the issue of unification on their own initiative and according to the spirit of “by-the-Korean-people-themselves.”*
- *to firmly transform inter-Korean relations into ties of mutual respect and trust, transcending the differences in ideology and systems.*
- *to closely work together to put an end to military hostilities, mitigate tensions and guarantee peace on the Korean Peninsula.*
- *both recognize the need to end the current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime.*<sup>69</sup> [Emphasis added]

### **2017 President Moon Jae-in**

In his 7 July 2017 Berlin speech Moon Jae-in stated:

*“We already know the road that leads to a peaceful Korean Peninsula. It is returning to the June 15 Joint Declaration and the October 4 Declaration.*

*Through these two declarations, the South and the North clearly stated that the owner of inter-Korean issues is our own nation, and committed to closely cooperate in easing tensions and guaranteeing peace on the Korean Peninsula. The two Koreas also promised to walk the path of common prosperity through cooperative projects in every sector of the society, including in the economic field.”*<sup>70</sup>

There is wide support in the ROK for President Moon’s stance. Polls show that over 70% of the population are supportive of his policy of rapprochement with the North.<sup>71</sup> 68% of teens think that reunification is necessary.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>68</sup> <http://www.zoominkorea.org/june-15th-south-north-joint-declaration/>

<sup>69</sup> <http://www.zoominkorea.org/declaration-on-the-advancement-of-south-north-korean-relations-peace-and-prosperity/>

<sup>70</sup> <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170707000032>

<sup>71</sup> <https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/how-do-south-koreans-view-a-possible-peace-treaty-with-north-korea/>

<sup>72</sup> <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200531000223>

## 2018 Kim Jong-un

In his 2018 New Year Address Kim Jong-un took up this theme:

*“Inter-Korean relations are, to all intents and purposes, an internal matter of our nation which north and the south should resolve on their own responsibility. Therefore, they should acquire a steadfast stand and viewpoint that they will resolve all the issues arising in bilateral relations on the principle of **By Our Nation Itself**...”*

*We will, in the future too, resolve all issues by the efforts of **our nation itself** under the unfurled banner of national independence and frustrate the schemes by anti-reunification forces within and without on the strength of national unity, thereby opening up a new history of national reunification.*<sup>73</sup> [Emphasis added]

## April 2018 Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula

President Moon Jae In and Chairman Kim Jong Il met on 27 April in the Peace House at Panmunjom in the DMZ and signed the declaration in which both agreed that:

- *Improving and cultivating inter-Korean relations is the prevalent desire of the whole nation and the urgent calling of the times that cannot be held back any further.*
- *[they] will make joint efforts to alleviate the acute military tension and practically eliminate the danger of war on the Korean Peninsula.*
- *[they] will actively cooperate to establish a permanent and solid peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.*
- *implement all existing agreements and declarations adopted between the two sides thus far.*<sup>74</sup>

## September 2018 Pyongyang Joint Declaration

*The two leaders reaffirmed the principle of independence and self-determination of the Korean nation, and agreed to consistently and continuously develop inter-Korean relations for national reconciliation and cooperation, and unwavering peace and co-prosperity, and to make efforts to realize through policy measures the aspiration and hope of all Koreans that the current developments in inter-Korean relations will lead to reunification.*<sup>75</sup> [Emphasis added]

The 2018 momentum towards a resolution of the vexed Korean situation ceased after the February 2019 United States – DPRK Hanoi summit where no agreement was reached and no statement was issued.

---

<sup>73</sup> [http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01\\_02\\_01&newsID=2018-01-02-0018](http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2018-01-02-0018)

<sup>74</sup> [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Translation:Panmunjom\\_Declaration](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Translation:Panmunjom_Declaration)

<sup>75</sup>

[https://kls.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/Panmunjom%20Monitor/3.%20Pyongyang%20Joint%20Declaration\\_Blue%20House%20\(2018.09.19\).pdf](https://kls.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/Panmunjom%20Monitor/3.%20Pyongyang%20Joint%20Declaration_Blue%20House%20(2018.09.19).pdf)

## ANNEX 5. Role of a New Zealand Korean Peace Envoy

### Tasks for New Zealand- Korean Peace Envoy

- In concert with NZ diplomatic staff and Defence Attaches, liaise with the governments of the ROK and the DPRK,
- Ascertain how New Zealand can assist each government to bring about their desired peaceful co-existence by following the road map as laid out in the 1972 – 2018 joint communique, agreement and declarations,
- Implement in so far as possible the requests for assistance and facilitation as identified by the governments of the ROK and DPRK,
- Encourage other countries to also support the ROK and the DPRK in achieving their quest for peaceful co-existence and ultimate reunification,
- Work with the New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations to bring about support for the ROK/DPRK initiated peace process through pertinent UN General Assembly resolutions,<sup>76</sup>
- Liaise with members of the Non-aligned Movement and members of the Group of 77 Plus to support for the ROK/DPRK initiated peace process through pertinent UN General Assembly resolutions,
- Advocate for the UN General Assembly to withdraw permission for the United States to use the words 'United Nations' in the name of any of their military commands,
- Advocate for the UN General Assembly to withdraw permission for the United States to use the United Nations Flag and the United Nations blue cap in Korea,
- Ascertain whether Indonesia is still interested in playing a role in seeking peace in Korea, and if so, cooperating with them in their efforts.

### Six Decades of Indonesia – DPRK Relations

Indonesia has a long history of expressing interest in assisting achievement of peace in Korea. Diplomatic relations were established with the DPRK in 1961. In 1964 President Sukarno visited Pyongyang and invited Kim Il-sung to join the Non-aligned Movement. In November 1965, Kim Il-sung accompanied by his son Kim Jong-Il visited Indonesia. Megawati Surkanoputri, 18-year-old daughter of Sukarno, presented flowers to Kim Jong-Il and performed an ethnic dance for him.

---

<sup>76</sup> Such General Assembly resolutions could include:

- Recommendation that the United Nations organise a mandatory meeting of all countries involved in the Korean War to convert the Armistice into a Peace Settlement Agreement as provided for in Clause 60 of the Armistice
- Withdrawal of permission for the United States to use the United Nations Flag in South Korea
- Demand that the United States no longer use the words 'United Nations' in relation to any of its military commands
- Recommend a step-by-step reduction in sanctions to the Security Council

They both met again 37 years later in 2002 when Megawati, by now President of Indonesia, made a state visit to Pyongyang acting as an envoy for South Korea at the request of ROK President Kim Dae-jung.<sup>77</sup>

Subsequently Kim Dae-jung's successor, Roh Moo-hyun, met with Megawati in 2005 prior to her visiting DPRK again and asked her to deliver a message saying he had intentions of making a visit to Pyongyang.<sup>78</sup> Roh met with Kim Jong-Il at a summit two years later in October 2007.

In 2006, Megawati's successor, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, offered Indonesia as neutral ground for ROK – DPRK talks and it was mooted that he would visit the DPRK.<sup>79</sup> This did not eventuate, but he did meet the DPRK's President Kim Jong Nam on his third visit to Indonesia in May 2012.<sup>80</sup>

In 2015, Megawati's sister Rachmawati awarded 'The Sukarno Prize' to Kim Jong Un.<sup>81</sup>

In 2017 newly elected ROK President Moon Jae-in asked Megawati to play a role in thawing tensions between the two Koreas.<sup>82</sup> The following year he asked President Widodo to support efforts to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.<sup>83</sup>

Somewhat surprisingly, conservative President Yoon Suk-yeol has also asked Megawati to continue to help or become a special envoy to make lasting peace between the two Koreas.<sup>84</sup>

Megawati was the keynote speaker at the September 2022 Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity.<sup>85</sup>

Joko Widodo became president in 2014 and soon after announced that Indonesia was available as neutral ground for the two Koreas to meet and talk. In April 2018 he offered Indonesia as the venue for the then mooted Trump – Kim Jong-un summit which was subsequently held in June in Singapore.

---

<sup>77</sup> <https://www.wowshack.com/rare-old-footage-of-kim-jong-il-meeting-megawati-soekarnoputri/>  
<https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-a-2002-03-30-7-indonesian-67262382/379491.html>

<sup>78</sup> <https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20050413/240791/1>

<sup>79</sup> <https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Susilo-to-visit-Pyongyang-5389.html>

<sup>80</sup> <https://en.antaranews.com/news/82113/yudhoyono-receives-north-korean-president>

<sup>81</sup> <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/north-korean-dictator-kim-jong-un-receives-global-statesmanship-award/fjg5nfd8l>

<sup>82</sup> <https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170529001004>


<sup>83</sup> <https://apnews.com/article/940933eaa04f4741a2f456d0d7f442bd>

<sup>84</sup> <https://voi.id/en/news/165934>

<sup>85</sup> <https://voi.id/en/news/210248>

<sup>86</sup> <https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Susilo-to-visit-Pyongyang-5389.html>

[Reply](#) [Print](#) [View Images](#)

 defence policy review

Sent: 27 April 2023 10:07 AM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

**Note:** Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

 1 Attachments Less ▾

 [S23.09 Defence Review.pdf \(329 KB\)](#)

Message

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and you are sure the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Attached please find a submission from the National Council of Women of New Zealand on the Defence Policy Review.

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence





27 April 2023

523.09

## Submission to the Ministry of Defence on the Defence Policy Review

### Introduction

1. The National Council of Women of New Zealand, Te Kaunihera Wāhine o Aotearoa (NCWNZ) is an umbrella group representing around 50 affiliated organisations and 300 individual members. Collectively our reach is over 200,000 with many of our membership organisations representing all genders. NCWNZ has 13 branches across the country.
2. NCWNZ's vision is a gender equal New Zealand and research shows we will be better off socially and economically if we are gender equal. Through research, discussion and action, NCWNZ in partnership with others, seeks to realise its vision of gender equality because it is a basic human right.
3. This submission has been prepared by the NCWNZ Safety, Health and Wellbeing Action Hub, drawing on NCWNZ's long history of commitment to peace and to ending violence in homes, in society and between nations. We have explicit understanding of the links between the social and cultural conditioning that drive sexism, gender discrimination, racism, xenophobia and violence against women and children, and wider violence and conflict both domestically and on the international stage. We are also acutely aware of the disproportionate impacts of war on women through rape and other forms of violence, through their caring for children and families in times of conflict and displacement, food shortages, destruction of homes, utilities and basic necessities.
4. In this submission NCWNZ is providing a gender lens to the review which is currently lacking.
5. We are appreciative of the Ministry of Defence's engagement with the public in this important review and welcome the opportunity to make a submission. In particular, we welcome the focus on the threats to peace and security through climate change and



global pandemics, and the important and positive role our Defence Forces can play in Aotearoa New Zealand and the Pacific.

## Recommendations

6. NCWNZ makes the following recommendations:

- The Defence Review be refocused from a focus on defence and security to creating and effecting the conditions for sustainable peace, founded on human rights, gender equality, the empowerment of women and sustainable, just development.
- That the review expressly identifies the contribution of the Defence Force (NZDF) to Aotearoa New Zealand's international obligations, including in particular the UN Declaration on Human Rights, CEDAW, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
- That the Government commit to the completion of the overdue, second New Zealand Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan (NAP) within one year.
- That the development of the NAP be led by the Minister for Women and the Minister for the Prevention of Family Violence and Sexual Violence, with support from women of the NZDF and with extensive engagement with women's organisations and other civil society groups.
- That the NAP is integrated with Te Aorerekura<sup>1</sup> Family and Sexual Violence Prevention Action Plan to promote awareness of the links between discrimination and violence against women and children in the home and society and international aggression and conflict.
- That the Government establish a Minister/Ministry for Peace or refocus the portfolio of Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control to Minister for Peace and Disarmament.
- That the Government advocate at regional and international level for a resumption of discussion on a human right to peace.
- That the Government reconsider the current disproportionate expenditure on the weapons and security component of defence compared with the current spending on actions to prevent family and sexual violence in Aotearoa New Zealand and on overseas development aid.

---

<sup>1</sup> Board for the Elimination of Family Violence and Sexual Violence. 2021. Te Aorerekura | National Strategy to Eliminate Family Violence and Sexual Violence. <https://tepunaaonui.govt.nz/assets/National-strategy/Finals-translations-alt-formats/Te-Aorerekura-National-Strategy-final.pdf>

## Summary

7. Security and the absence of conflict are not the same as sustainable peace. The Defence Review is an opportunity to reframe defence strategy and objectives from a narrow focus on security, preventing or mitigating the impacts of conflict and war, to the positive promotion of the conditions that build sustainable peace and development for all.
8. The review should act as a catalyst for the completion of the overdue, second New Zealand Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan (NAP) within one year.
9. The review should also act as a catalyst for wider Government measures to promote the conditions for peace at home and abroad. Such public education measures must highlight the increasing inequality between poorer and wealthier nations, the disproportionate impact of climate change on those least responsible, and acknowledge that the increasing competition for resources such as water will increase as a driver of conflict. The Government must also set an example and advocate for climate justice actions and maintain commitments given to shift resources to developing countries.
10. The Government must demonstrate bold leadership and advocate at regional and international level for a resumption of discussions on a human right to peace.
11. The Government should consider setting up a Minister/Ministry for Peace or refocus the portfolio of Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control to an alternative role of Minister for Peace and Disarmament.
12. For Budget 2023, the Government must review the amount of expenditure on weapons and the security component of defence compared with current expenditure allocated to reduce poverty and violence at home and on overseas humanitarian and development aid.

## Background

13. A commitment to peace and the eradication of all violence and abuse and conflict at home and abroad is one of NCWNZ's foundations. A resolution in 1898<sup>2</sup> stated:

*That National Council of Women of New Zealand deploras the continuous growth of armaments throughout the world. It sees that people are crushed by ever-increasing military expenditure, and that they are alienated from one another by the rivalries of their respective rulers. The Council deprecates any project likely to involve Australasia in the participation of warfare and strenuously protests against the Imperial consideration of these colonies as a recruiting ground for European militarism.*

14. This commitment has been repeatedly expressed for over 125 years in successive policies, resolutions, and submissions, as set out in Appendix 1.

---

<sup>2</sup> NCWNZ. 2012. *115 years of resolution*. 11.2.1. [https://bit.ly/ncwnz\\_resolutions\\_1896-2010](https://bit.ly/ncwnz_resolutions_1896-2010)

15. NCWNZ has supported Aotearoa's New Zealand's nuclear-free policies, support for arms control and peace-keeping operations.
16. NCWNZ has an explicit understanding of the links between the social and cultural conditioning that drive sexism, gender discrimination, racism and xenophobia, violence against women and children in the home and communities, and wider violence and conflict domestically and on the international stage.
17. In 1948 NCWNZ conference<sup>3</sup> resolved:

*That we pledge ourselves to strive to develop and maintain peace in our homes and in the community in which we live, and to refrain from all thoughts, words and deeds of intolerance or prejudice of any kind; and that in particular we take every opportunity to cultivate friendships with persons differing from ourselves in colour, nationality or creed...*

18. We are also acutely aware of the disproportionate impacts of war on women through rape and other forms of violence, and through caring for children and families through destruction of homes, basic utilities, food shortages and displacement. A particularly horrific element of warfare throughout history and still prevalent today is the use of rape and other violence against women as a "tactical weapon" of war.
19. We have also long advocated for women to be involved in peace-making initiatives at international, national and "grass roots" levels.
20. NCWNZ works to bring changes in attitudes and actions in national and international law, including contributing to monitoring reports on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

### International obligations

21. Below are details of international conventions and agreements to which Aotearoa New Zealand is a signatory, and which are critical to the Defence Review.

#### United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security

22. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS)<sup>4</sup> adopted in 2000 and the later nine complementary UNSC resolutions, set out four 'pillars' of priority issues: prevention of violent conflict; meaningful participation of women at all levels of peace and security governance; the protection of rights for women and girls in fragile, conflict and post-conflict situations; and ensuring women's engagement and addressing their needs in peacebuilding, relief and recovery.

---

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. 11.10.12

<sup>4</sup> United Nations Security Council. 2000. Resolution 1325 (2000). <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1325>

23. New Zealand's National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS)<sup>5</sup> explained how New Zealand will implement the UNSC resolutions on Women, Peace and Security for the period 2015-2019. The implementation of the plan consisted of four strategies:
- i. Prevention
  - ii. Participation
  - iii. Protection
  - iv. Peacebuilding, Relief and Recovery
24. It was noted that the plan mainly listed achievements, especially in increasing participation of women in defence forces, rather than identifying new goals and areas to support.
25. NCWNZ was strongly supportive of the draft NAP but, in our submission<sup>6</sup> called for more emphasis on improving the educational and economic situation of women in conflict-affected countries; education for males and females on gender violence; noted that peacekeeping missions were usually only short-term and focused on conflict resolution and not longer-term, more sustainable approaches of prevention and transformation, and that peacekeepers need to focus on the causes of the conflict, working with local people at community level to address the underlying issues. We stressed the importance of having more women in peacekeeping roles as they could relate better to the experience of local women.
26. An implementation report was published in January 2021<sup>7</sup> and a second NAP was to be developed but has not yet appeared.
27. In their submissions on the draft Implementation Report, civil society groups noted positive increases in the numbers of women in the NZ Defence Forces, considerable advocacy in international forums and promotion of WPS in the Pacific through funding programmes and events such as the WPS summit co-hosted with Samoa in 2019. Gaps and shortfalls identified included: lack of clear outcomes and consistent and coordinated engagement with women and other civil society organisations, (a glaring omission being the Ministry for Women), reference to Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and reference to the impacts of climate change.

---

<sup>5</sup> New Zealand National Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, including 1325, on Women, Peace & Security 2015–2019. <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Peace-Rights-and-Security/International-security/WPS-NAP-2015-2019.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> NCWNZ. 2015. Submission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade on the Draft New Zealand National Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions, including 1325, on Women, Peace and Security 2015 – 2019. [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wBsgHJb1q82zqvplv1oU8psiZXuQR3Qk/view?usp=share\\_link](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wBsgHJb1q82zqvplv1oU8psiZXuQR3Qk/view?usp=share_link)

<sup>7</sup> New Zealand's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2015 – 2019 Implementation Report January 2021. <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Peace-Rights-and-Security/International-security/WPS-NAP-Implementation-Report.pdf>

28. For NCWNZ a major deficiency was the focus was on stopping violence in other countries without acknowledgement of the endemic violence against women occurring in Aotearoa New Zealand where, in the homes of too many women and children, abuse and violence have been “normalised”. As the NAP<sup>8</sup> itself correctly stated:

*... Women’s experiences of violence and discrimination in conflict societies tend to reflect the attitudes and social norms of the communities in which they live during times of peace. Violence and inequalities that women face in crises do not exist in a vacuum.*

29. NCWNZ recommends that the NAP is integrated with Te Aorerekura Family and Sexual Violence Prevention Action Plan to promote awareness of the links between discrimination and violence against women and children in the home and society, and in international aggression and conflict.

30. NCWNZ acknowledges that some aspects of the civil society concerns have been addressed, including the NZDF Gender Equality Charter and the inclusion of Resolution 1325, reference to Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and climate change in the Defence Review.

31. It is disappointing that the second NAP has not yet been developed. We recommend that the Defence Review act as a catalyst for the development of the overdue second NZ Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan.

32. We also recommend that the development of the NAP be led by the Minister for Women and the Minister for the Prevention of Family Violence and Sexual Violence, is supported by women from the NZDF, along with extensive engagement with women’s organisations and other civil society groups.

## **CEDAW**

33. In its 2018 Concluding Observations<sup>9</sup>, the CEDAW Committee expressed many of the concerns discussed above, and made the recommendations below.

*Para 15 The Committee welcomes the State party’s launch in 2015 of its national action plan for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, for the period 2015–2019. The Committee further welcomes the fact that both the New Zealand Police and the New Zealand Defence Force have active programmes in place to increase the recruitment and retention of women and their promotion to senior positions, which will ultimately lead to more women being available for peacekeeping missions. Nevertheless, the Committee expresses concern about the lack of consultations with women’s human rights organizations conducted during the process of drafting the national action plan and the lack of sufficient resources allocated to the national action plan.*

---

<sup>8</sup> Op cit p. 6.

<sup>9</sup> Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 2018. Concluding observations on the eighth periodic report of New Zealand. CEDAW/C/NZL/CO/8. [https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/\\_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fNZL%2fCO%2f8&Lang=en](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fNZL%2fCO%2f8&Lang=en)

Para 16. The Committee recommends that the State party:

- a) Maintain its dedication to ensuring that the relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions on women and peace and security are effectively implemented in countries affected by conflict, including by ensuring that its national action plan contributes to significantly increasing the participation of women in peace processes.
- b) Allocate sufficient resources for the implementation of its national action plan and enhance consultations with women's human rights organizations, in order to ensure promotion of the meaningful involvement of women at all stages of the women and peace and security agenda.

### UN Sustainable Development Goals

34. The following Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)<sup>10</sup> are especially relevant to the Defence Review:

**Goal 5:** Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. Gender equality is not only a fundamental human right, but a necessary foundation for a peaceful, prosperous, and sustainable world.

**Goal 16:** Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels

### Te Tiriti o Waitangi | The Treaty of Waitangi

35. NCWNZ recognises the particular violence of the colonisation of indigenous people, the New Zealand Wars, and subsequent loss of culture, land and economic base still reflected in negative statistics for Māori today.

### Reframing the review, a strategic outlook

36. In his foreword to the Defence Assessment 2021<sup>11</sup>, the Secretary of Defence stated: "Defence must above all else have as its objective the pursuit of peace and peaceful ways to prevent or where necessary to resolve, conflict".

37. After this, the word "peace" is barely used in the review documents, and it is not in fact, listed as one of the objectives of the Defence Act 1990<sup>12</sup>.

38. NCWNZ agrees with the response from Peace Aotearoa to the Defence Review survey in 2022, that:

<sup>10</sup> United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Sustainable Development. 2015. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. <https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda>

<sup>11</sup> Ministry of Defence. 2021. He Moana Pukepuke e Ekengia e Te Waka | A Rough Sea can Still be Navigated: Defence Assessment 2021. <https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/publication/file/Defence-Assessment-2021.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> Defence Act 1990. [https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1990/0028/latest/DLM204973.html?search=ta\\_act%40act\\_D\\_a c%40ainf%40anif an%40bn%40rn\\_25\\_a&p=1](https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1990/0028/latest/DLM204973.html?search=ta_act%40act_D_a c%40ainf%40anif an%40bn%40rn_25_a&p=1)

*... The survey is based on outdated narrow notions of “military security” rather than real human security that is focused on human health and wellbeing, flourishing communities, climate action, protection of the natural environment and biodiversity, and care for the planet ...*

39. NCWNZ is mindful of the current and emerging international tensions globally especially in the Pacific Region. We also recognise the important role our Defence Forces have played as peacekeepers and in disaster relief. We also support our independent foreign policy along with obligations to allies. We believe, however, that the best role for the Government and Defence Forces is as an advocate and negotiator for peace and the upholding of human rights, development and equality which are the foundation stones of sustainable peace.
40. The focus of the review appears to be almost exclusively on security and the absence of conflicts. Security is not the same as sustainable peace. The Defence Review is an opportunity to reframe defence strategy and objectives from an almost sole focus on security, prevention or mitigation of the impacts of conflict and war, to a positive promotion of the conditions that build sustainable peace and development for all. The emphasis should be on the role of the Defence Forces in creating and effecting the conditions for sustainable peace, including human rights, gender equality, the empowerment of women and sustainable development.
41. It is encouraging to see that climate change has been identified as one of the two principal challenges to security interests. It is also pleasing to see the acknowledgement that increasing inequality between poorer and wealthier nations, the disproportionate impact of climate change on those least responsible, and increasing competition for resources like water will increase as drivers of conflict.
42. While references and frameworks appear in the review documentation, they must identify more clearly the Defence Force’s contribution to this country’s international obligations, including the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights<sup>13</sup>, CEDAW, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
43. The Government must more actively set an example and advocate for climate justice actions such as maintaining commitments given to shift resources to developing countries.

---

<sup>13</sup> United Nations. 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>



## A human right to Peace

### 53/243 A. Declaration on a Culture of Peace

44. In 1999 the United Nations adopted the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace<sup>14</sup> in which countries, including Aotearoa New Zealand agreed to the creation of a global culture of peace, and 2000 was designated International Year for the Culture of Peace.

45. Resolution A/53/243 called for the programme of action to include eight action areas:

- Sustainable economic and social development
- Culture of peace through education
- Respect for all human rights
- Equality between women and men
- Democratic participation
- Understanding, tolerance and solidarity
- Participatory communication and the free flow of information and knowledge
- International peace and security.

46. The action plan also included discussion on a draft Declaration of the Human Right to Peace. However, as one of the Working Party<sup>15</sup> concluded:

*After three years of global consultation, civil society was strong, clear and resolute, however ... it soon became apparent the major powers had no interest in advancing the concept of peace as a human right ...*

*... none of the powerful states were willing to envisage a condemnation of the arms race, a meaningful reduction on nuclear stockpiles, a programme to eliminate the root-causes of conflict, or any kind of monitoring mechanism ...*

47. Regretfully, today the world is a far less safe place than in 1999 with millions dead, injured and displaced by the multiple conflicts around the world.

48. NCWNZ urges the Government to demonstrate moral leadership and advocate at regional and international level for the resumption of discussion on a human right to peace.

### Minister/Ministry of Peace

49. As part of a new focus on peace in addition to defence, NCWNZ recommends that the Government give consideration to the establishment of a Minister or Ministry of Peace, or a refocus of the current role of Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control to Minister for Peace and Disarmament. The role would include ensuring NZDF and all Government Departments and Agencies are actively contributing to the international

<sup>14</sup> UN. General Assembly. 53rd session. 1999. 53/243 A. Declaration on a Culture of Peace. <http://www.un-documents.net/a53r243a.htm#:~:text=Adherence%20to%20the%20principles%20of,international%20environment%20conducive%20to%20pe>

<sup>15</sup> de Zayas A. 2021. Building a Just World Order. Charity Press.



obligations set out in this submission and other peace initiatives at home and abroad. Over time, we envisage a transition of military spending to agencies for humanitarian aid, violence prevention, social spending, disaster and emergency relief and fisheries and resource protection is envisaged.

### A proportionate budget

50. In 2022 the global military budget was over USD 2 trillion. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated in 2016 that 10 percent of money the world spends on its militaries every year would be enough to end global poverty and hunger in 15 years<sup>16</sup>. In Aotearoa New Zealand – which has unacceptable numbers of children living in poverty – defence spending in the 2022 Budget was \$4.9b for 2022/3 (in addition to \$20 billion announced in June 2019 to be spent over the next decade on increased combat capability, including new military aircraft and warships<sup>17</sup>).
51. In contrast, Budget 2022 provided \$114.5m over 4 years for Te Aorerekura action plan. For 2021-24 \$2.8b was provided for overseas aid.
52. Notwithstanding the strategic challenges for the NZDF set out in the Review, NCWNZ considers this is an unacceptable imbalance in funding of security and defence compared with funding allocated to keep New Zealand women and children alive and safe in their homes and communities.
53. NCWNZ recommends that the Government review the current disproportionate expenditure on the weapons and security component of defence compared with spending on actions to prevent family and sexual violence in Aotearoa New Zealand and on overseas development aid.

### Conclusion

54. NCWNZ welcomes the public consultation on the Defence Review and acknowledges the efforts and progress by NZDF on recruiting and promoting and keeping safe, women and LGBTQI people within the forces.
55. We wish, however, to see a fundamental refocus from the almost sole emphasis on defence and security to the creation and maintenance of conditions for peace at home and abroad. Specifically, and critically, these include ending violence and discrimination against women.
56. We further expect to see structured and consistent engagement with the Ministry for Women, Minister for the Prevention of Family Violence and Sexual Violence, our own organisation and other women's organisations in future reviews and consultations, most


---

<sup>16</sup> Tatyana K, 2016. Ten percent of global military budget would end world poverty and hunger. [https://www.inform.kz/en/ten-percent-of-global-military-budget-would-end-world-poverty-and-hunger\\_a2889004](https://www.inform.kz/en/ten-percent-of-global-military-budget-would-end-world-poverty-and-hunger_a2889004)

<sup>17</sup> Noting \$70m of this was for entitlements and services to veterans and their families.

importantly the development of the second National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.

s9(2)(a)



s9(2)(a)



s9(2)(a)



NCWNZ Board

s9(2)(a)



Safety, Health and Wellbeing Action Hub

Released by the Minister of Defence

## Appendix 1 NCWNZ resolutions and submissions relevant to Defence Review

### Resolutions

#### 11.2 DISARMAMENT

**11.2.1** That National Council of Women of New Zealand deplors the continuous growth of armaments throughout the world. It sees that people are crushed by ever-increasing military expenditure, and that they are alienated from one another by the rivalries of their respective rulers. The Council deprecates any project likely to involve Australasia in the participation of warfare and strenuously protests against the Imperial consideration of these colonies as a recruiting ground for European militarism. 1898, reiterated 1899.

#### 11.7 MANUFACTURE OF AND TRAFFICKING IN ARMS

**11.7.5** That the Council reaffirm its demand for the nationalisation of armaments. 1940.

**11.7.7** That NCWNZ urge the Government to work through the United Nations to improve and strengthen controls on the arms trade in order to achieve a more effective reduction in the production and trade of conventional weapons. 1999.

**11.7.8** That NCWNZ supports the development of a global treaty to ban cluster munitions. 2007.

#### 11.8 NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS

**11.8.11** That N.C.W. urge the Government to continue to protest strongly both to U.N. and directly to any nation concerned in the atmospheric testing of nuclear devices. 1970.

**11.8.13** That NCW reaffirms its support for a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific and urges the abolition of all nuclear weapon testing. 1977.

**11.8.15** That NCW request the Government of the U.S.A. through the U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand to end the manufacture and distribution of the neutron bomb. 1981.

**11.8.18** That NCWNZ urge the Government to discourage the visits of nuclear powered and/or nuclear armed ships and submarines to New Zealand ports. 1984.

**11.8. 21** That NCWNZ:

1. affirm its commitment to achieving total world nuclear disarmament; and
2. urge the Government to continue its leadership role at the United Nations by:
  - a) calling for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction; and
  - b) sponsoring a UN resolution calling for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. 2003.

**11.8.22** That NCWNZ affirm its support for the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987 and condemn any alteration that may weaken or change the intent of the Act. 2004.

#### 11.10 PEACE

**11.10.8** That practical ways be discussed by the Dominion National Council of Women for strengthening relations between it and the League of Nations Union in New Zealand, so as to make both more effective in the cause of world peace. 1937.

**11.10.9** That the NCW be urged to work unceasingly for world peace, this being the paramount need of the world today. 1937.

**11.10.10** That the National Council of Women of New Zealand urge for women representatives on any councils, national or international, authorised by Governments to discuss peace problems. 1940.

**11.10.11** That Branches be asked to set aside one meeting during the year for discussion on the subject of the part women can play towards peace and that affiliated societies be urged to do the same. 1947.

**11.10.12** That we pledge ourselves to strive to develop and maintain peace in our homes and in the community in which we live, and to refrain from all thoughts, words and deeds of intolerance or prejudice of any kind; and that in particular we take every opportunity to cultivate friendships with persons differing from ourselves in colour, nationality or creed.

That in our homes and churches, through youth organisations and through our schools we foster and encourage all schemes for the training of youth in international friendships and in particular that we encourage and develop schemes of correspondence between young people of different countries, including ex-enemy countries.

That we encourage women to be more aware of their privileges and duties as members of a democratic country and do all in our power to make possible the appointment or election of women of integrity and ability to every type of public office.

That we seek through the international organisations of the Council to build up personal friendships with women of other countries, particularly ex-enemy countries, providing material help where needed, and above all, establishing avenues of expression of that goodwill and sympathy so necessary to restore the morale of a distressed and defeated people. 1948.

**11.10.14** That the resolution ["about the training of troops for peace-keeping operations"] be accepted in principle. 1967.

**11.10.17** That NCWNZ endorses initiatives by women to negotiate for the peaceful resolution, at both local and global levels, of long-standing conflicts in their regions. 2006.

## **11.11 PEACE EDUCATION**

**11.11.2** That the Minister of Education be asked to implement the resolution passed at the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament to which our Government's delegation gave consent, that a programme of disarmament education and peace education be introduced into all schools and other educational institutions pointing out the harmful effects and dangers of the arms race. 1979.

## **11.15 WEAPONS OF WAR**

**11.15.2** a) That the N.C.W. of New Zealand seeks an international ban on the use of napalm, white phosphorus and similar devices and asks the Government to initiate such a ban through its officers at United Nations and through the International Red Cross at Geneva.

b) That the N.C.W. of New Zealand seeks the assistance of I.C.W. in having napalm, white phosphorus and similar devices banned as weapons of war. 1967.

## 12.2.7 Weapons, including Guns

12.2.7.5 That NCWNZ opposes the arming of Police with guns as the norm in our communities. 2020.

### Submissions

[S15.16](#) Submission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade on the Draft New Zealand National Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions, including 1325, on Women, Peace and Security 2015 – 2019

[S15.06](#) Submission to the Nonviolent Peaceforce on the UN Peace Operations

[S05.29](#) Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Arms Amendment Bill (No 3)

[S00.53](#) Submission to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee on the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Extension Bill.

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply - Print View Images

Defense Policy Review

Sent: 25 April 2023 7:53 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

Note: Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

1 Attachments

Less

Submission DPR.docx (86 KB)

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your inbox. Thank you.

Hi

I have a submission for the Defence Policy Review attached.

I am a New Zealand citizen and live here.

Thanks

Released by the Minister of Defence

# Defence Policy Review Submission

Released by the Minister of Defence

25 April 2023

## *Introduction*

I have felt the need to submit on the governments latest defence policy review as I believe the success of this process and implementation by the government is incredibly important to our nations future. We are living in a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment and the policy review gives us the opportunity to shape our defence force to make it much more suited to countering these increasing threats. Since the Defence Assessment 2021 was released to the public we have witnessed Vladimir Putin's Army brutally invade a peaceful, western leaning, Country with an independent foreign policy. One of the Defence Assessment's 'most threatening potential developments' appears to be coming to realization with an agreement reached between the PRC and Solomon Islands for a likely military base in the Pacific. Our ally has also had a number of unsafe encounters with the PLA. In February 2022, a RAAF P-8A Poseidon during a routine patrol of Australia's northern approaches had a laser aimed at it by a PLA-N warship (Defence Media, 2022). There was also a second instance where a RAAF P-8A was intercepted by a PLA-AF fighter, over the SCS, which flew dangerously close, sped in front and then released chaff into the P-8A's engines (Yeo, 2022) - this could have caused the Australian aircraft to crash and if this happened there would have been a very concerning escalatory risk between Allied and PLA forces. Our Australian ally is feeling increasingly threatened and therein lies a great strategic risk to New Zealand - the Australia New Zealand component of the ANZUS treaty is very much still active.

Professor Robert Ayson (2023), of Victoria University, has recently released a paper where he examines New Zealand's alliance commitments in an Australia-China war. Ayson argues that our obligations to come to Australia's aid are highest in the event of an armed attack on or near Australian territory. The author goes on to state that this would include attacks on Australian forces which are defending Australia's immediate maritime approaches, especially within Australia's territorial seas. Ayson also argues that New Zealand's alliance obligations are nearly as powerful in the South Pacific, with this particularly being the case in locations related to the security of Australia's territory and its northern approaches. While he does believe that our alliance commitments are comparatively weaker if ADF assets came under attack in maritime East Asia. He does appear to indicate that if ADF forces are stationed in the northern island chain, on an ongoing basis and came under attack and took losses, our ANZUS alliance commitments could be activated. The RAAF does operate out of RMAF Butterworth and in November of 2022 deployed 75 Squadron to the airbase with their F-35's to conduct exercise Elangaroo (Defence: Australian Government, 2022). If the Australians moved to a more permanent presence at the base, as they were between 1967 and 1983, and came under attack and took losses it does appear possible that our alliance commitments could be triggered. This may be an area that the NZDF may want take a closer look at, as would our alliance obligations if the ADF attempted to close the Sunda and Lombok Straits in a conflict and came under attack – as these are maritime approaches to Australia.

## *Defence Spending*

According to the World Bank (2023) New Zealand's defence spending as a proportion of GDP has declined from between 2 to 3% from 1960 to 1990, to 1.4% in 2021. Not only has defence spending declined considerably as a percentage of GDP the number of personnel in our defence force has declined from 12,000 in 1990 to 9,000 in 2019 and is likely even lower today with the issues related to operation protect and the cost of living. Over the same time period our population has moved from 3.3 million to over 5 million. Our current defence expenditure is also temporarily elevated due to the NZ First led polices and the one-off associated payments for acquisition of the Air Forces P-8A



and C-130J fleets. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine throughout the developed world we have seen government commitments to increase defence spending. We have even seen countries that have been called pacifists such as Japan and Germany commit to defence spending of 2% of their GDP. Our Australian ally currently spends 1.96% of GDP with funding expected to grow to at least 2.11% in 2023/2024 (Kerr and MacDonald 2022) – their recent AUKUS commitment is likely to push them even well above this level. From the 2021 Defence Assessment and the above analysis it is very evident that we are no longer in a benign strategic environment; rather we are moving toward a highly contested strategic environment. It is for this reason we must significantly increase defence spending to enable the NZDF to counter these threats arrayed against us. What is needed is a bipartisan political agreement between the Labour and National Parties to do so.

### Military Expenditure (% of GDP) – New Zealand



Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIRPI), *Yearbook, Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security*.

Source: World Bank (2023)

### The Frigates

One of the most important decisions the defence policy reviewers are likely to make is specifically what to recommend as replacements for our two ANZAC frigates and the OPV's. Arguably the most important defence capability we have as a maritime country is our frigates. They protect our trade

routes to and from market in both peacetime and in times of war. They provide real value to the international rules-based order, they deliver a significant contribution to our alliance with Australia and they protect our country. Our two ANZAC frigates have just gone through a considerable upgrade but due to the lead time on a new warship being about 10 years and due to their age, we need to order their replacement very soon.

The Defence White Paper 2016 states that it is critical that the Defence Force maintains its ability to operate effectively with its Australian counterpart. Any frigate the government chooses to acquire needs to be interoperable with our Australian ally - ideally it needs to be interchangeable with an Australian frigate as part of a task force. The design of our future frigate obviously needs to be targeted at the likely threats it will face and submarines are expected to be one particular threat that is of concern (Willet, 2023). The PLA Anti Access Area Denial capabilities are well known and will hold at risk any surface vessel within range of the PRC coastline; but one area the Allied naval forces still hold considerable advantage is with submarines (Paparo, 2023). Because of this the PRC is likely to do all they can to close this gap (Paparo, 2023), therefore submarine and anti-submarine warfare is only likely to grow in prominence – hence pillar one of AUKUS. There is also our geography to consider. A submarine is the most likely vessel to slip through the maritime chokepoints, to our north, into the Pacific undetected, and has the range and endurance to patrol our region for an extended period and in wartime poses a great threat to our SLOC. Those reasons all point to us acquiring a frigate that while still is multirole is an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) frigate. All four of the other Five Eyes partners have displayed their commitment to build ASW frigates – giving us four designs to choose from. The Australian and Canadian designs have taken BAE Systems Type 26 design and modified it, incorporating American and indigenous systems and weapons, and then have decided to build them locally to support their shipbuilders. While both of these designs will likely produce extremely capable warships, both will come at a cost that will not provide value for money for our scarce tax payers dollars and for this reason are unlikely to be suitable for the RNZN. We are left with the UK Type 26 and the US Constellation Class frigates as options.

To have one ship available for operation at all times requires a minimum of three ships. With only two frigates currently the crew and ship need to be pushed very hard to try to maintain availability, but because there is only two there are times when no frigates are available for tasking. With an increasing deteriorating geopolitical and geostrategic environment having periods when not even a single frigate is available is not realistic. As we currently fall below this minimum of three warships the government should have the first new frigate of the class arrive as soon as possible to take us up to three quickly. The other two can arrive when our ANZAC Class is decommissioned. There will be those that will argue that we used to have 4 Leander frigates and it was initially planned that we would get the same number of ANZAC's and therefore should move back to that number. However, any more than 3 ASW frigates will come at too large of a financial cost for a single capability and if the Navy wishes for more combatants, we should rather look at a more combat capable OPV replacement.

BAE Systems (2023) describes the Type 26 Global Combat Ship as a world class ASW frigate that is capable of undertaking a wide range of roles from high intensity warfare to humanitarian assistance, either operating independently or as part of a task group. Former British PM Boris Johnson said that he thinks New Zealand will 'come in' to the program and Steve Timms of BAE Systems stated that New Zealand is clearly interested (Dickie, 2019). Despite the interest there's been some concern that the warship may be too focused on ASW, that it should have a 'superior' AESA radar for air defence and for this reason it may not be ideally suited to a small navy that doesn't also have specialised air warfare platforms in the fleet. Precise details of its Artisan radars performance are classified but is likely underestimated and provides a good balance of capabilities, there also is great confidence in

the vessels modern Sea Ceptor air-defence system that has the range to defend a task group (Australian Naval Institute, 2022). One of the key elements of the Type 26 program is also to deliver interoperability, integration, and interchangeability within the partner Navies of the program (Willet, 2023). So, the vessels will have the critical interoperability with Australia's Hunter class frigates and probably also their Hobart class destroyers. There is also concern at BAE Systems that there looks to be a gap in the schedule between finishing the Type 26 builds and the start of the Type 83 destroyer program (Navy Lookout, 2022) – meaning build slots are available on a 'hot production line' at about the same time the RNZN would be looking at building new frigates. Also, if the RNZN were to place an order to follow the Type 26 batch 2 build this would likely be quite beneficial to the RN as BAE System's would be expected to be able to hold onto much of their skilled workforce, which would likely have cost, quality and schedule benefits for the RN's future destroyer program. This could even place the RNZN in a strong negotiating position to purchase one of the RN's batch 2 frigates with the RN taking one of the proposed later batch 3 slots in exchange – this would allow us to get up to the minimum of 3 frigates quicker. To give an indication of the cost of the warships the 5 batch 2 vessels cost the RN £4.2bn (BAE Systems 2022) or £840 million per frigate.

According to the US Navy (2022) the Constellation Class Frigate will be capable of defending the fleet, striking adversary forces in all domains, and expanding interoperability with allies and partners. The ships will assist the fleet by executing a range of missions, including anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, electromagnetic warfare/information operations and air warfare (US Navy 2022). The warships also carry many of the same weapons and sensors that is used by our Australian ally and the RAN go to great lengths to make their warships completely interoperable with the US Navy. The American frigates have the Aegis Baseline 10 combat system which will allow it to network with the RAN's Hobart class destroyers and Hunter class frigates, significantly improving a task forces defensive combat capability. The vessels also have an area air defence system that has similarities with the Hobart classes air warfare capabilities but with a lesser missile loadout – meaning it could also assist an Australasian task force with air warfare as well as the anti-submarine role. The US Navy has a fixed price contract with the manufacturer for the first 10 vessels with a current total planned build of 20. The warships are presently being constructed at a single shipyard, with an option of adding a second particularly if the construction rate rises above 2 ships per year. The 20-ship project has a total programmed procurement cost of US\$21.4 billion in then-year dollars, or an average of US\$1,071.1 million each (Congressional Research Service 2023). There however, is some uncertainty around the exact cost of the vessels after the first 10, with a Congressional led study concluding actual costs could be 40 percent higher (Congressional Research Service 2023).

There will be New Zealanders that will argue that spending upward of NZ\$5 billion on three warships is not wise use of our nations wealth and instead we should be spending more on social welfare, health or education. However, the single most important factor in wealth generation both internationally and for New Zealand is international trade and the navies of the world are what regulate access to the global trading system (Mahan cited by Lambert, 2022). They do this through control of the sea-lanes and our continued access to these critical arteries of world trade is unfortunately, certainly not assured in this age of strategic competition. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2023) states that our two-way trade sits at \$197 billion - with this made up of \$89.9 billion of exports and \$107.1 billion of imports. What a purchase of three world class ASW frigates is: it's an insurance policy to keep our international trade flowing unimpeded and it's a statement to the world that we are completely committed to uphold the international rules-based order - that we so critically rely on. If we look at the cost of these vessels and compare that with the exports and imports, they will protect over there 30 year lives, they in fact prove incredible value for money.

### *Naval Strike Missile*

Our current frigates also don't have an effective anti-ship missile fitted and instead rely on the embarked S-H2G(I) Sea Sprite helicopter to fire the Penguin Missile at an adversary but this poses a major problem. Because of the limited range of the Penguin Missile our Naval Helicopter likely has to fly inside the range of the hostile ships air defence system before being able to release the missile. This is a suicide mission for our aircrew and probably they will never get to fire their missile. Then once our helicopter is destroyed our frigate can't engage the hostile ship with an effective weapon - meaning we could also lose the frigate too. The Royal Australian Navy is installing the Naval Strike Missile on their ANZAC Frigates to increase the range they can engage an enemy ship, to protect our sailors, aircrew and country we should do the same. The NSM is also a standard fitment on the Constellation Class and the RN is also installing the NSM on its frontline combatants, so there is a fair chance it will be integrated on to the Type 26 frigate - so, we can transfer the system across to the new frigates when they arrive.

### *The OPV Replacement*

The OPV's are required to operate from the Southern Ocean all the way to the Pacific and immediately this poses a problem for vessel design. The Southern Ocean requires ice strengthening, particular sea keeping characteristics, and is subject to armament restrictions related to the Antarctic demilitarised zone. While the Pacific is becoming more contested and consequently requires at least much greater self-protection measures and has demands for HADJ. It is also evident that, like the frigates, 2 is simply not enough to provide continuous availability of the capability and that if we simply replace like for like, this is doubtful to meet our requirements in a more demanding environment. A potential option is that the Navy incorporate the deferred SOPV build into the future OPV program and purchase 3 vessels that are ice strengthened to reduce the number of vessel classes in the fleet. The Canadian Harry De Wolf class of Artic OPV is a possibility with the vessel designed to operate in both polar and tropical environments. The Harry De Wolf Class is not well armed for the Pacific however and would have limited utility during a conflict. A much more combat capable vessel and an option that would still allow 3 hulls to be purchased without increasing the planned number of total RNZN ships would be to roll the OPV and first vessel of the Enhanced Sealift Capability into one and purchase 3 Damen Crossovers to conduct both roles. However, this option will still require procurement of a specialized SOPV. The Damen Crossover has a considerable sealift capability, and also has characteristics from both the manufacturer's OPV program and that of its SIGMA Frigates (Damen, 2014). If a more combat focused Crossover was selected this would push the total number of combatants in the RNZN up to 6 and this would provide great value for ourselves and to our allies in a wartime situation; yet would still prove very capable for peacetime roles.

### *The Air Combat Force*

With the deteriorating strategic environment outlined in the 2021 Defence Assessment and the very concerning events since, the discussion needs to be opened of whether New Zealand needs to look at reactivation of the Air Combat Force (ACF). The ACF was our only real deterrence until it was disbanded by the Clark Government and its demise significantly weakened the combat capability of not only the Air Force but the whole NZDF. The three capabilities the ACF provided of close air support, air interdiction and maritime strike are now absent from the NZDF's toolbox and these are debatably some of the most valuable capabilities in a much more contested or wartime environment. It could be argued that the Penguin missile fired from the S-H2G(I) Seasprite is a form of maritime

strike although as outlined above this is no longer an effective capability. When the ACF was disbanded with it went a tremendous level of skill and institutional knowledge that was even acknowledged by the RAAF to be superior to what they had in certain areas (Burton 2000). To get this type of fast air capability back is a process that will take 10 years or more and will involve very heavily leaning on the other Five Eyes partners especially Australia. We will need to learn to crawl, walk then run again. Most likely, we will need to start with a Lead in Fighter Trainer (LIFT) aircraft and over time, adopt the Australians CONOPS and acquire the same maritime strike fighters they have.

We would also need to achieve this multi-billion-dollar project at the exactly the same time the great part of the RNZN's fleet reaches block obsolescence and requires replacement (Watts 2020). The Defence Assessment (2021) also states that our Australian ally believes that the 10-year strategic warning period for a major attack on its territory has now disappeared. We are also already in what is deemed the 'decade of concern' for a PLA attack on Taiwan, with the year of particular concern being 2027 (Fanell 2022) – and if that takes place the likelihood of our ANZUS commitments to Australia being triggered increases exponentially. While this author wishes to make no attempt to discredit those who would like to see the ACF reactivated, simply we may not have 10 years to wait and there are too many other NZDF capabilities that are in desperate need of replacement to be able to concurrently also finance a fast jet program. The question needs to be asked: is there another way of achieving the same type of capabilities the ACF can provide with other systems currently in use or nearing operating commission with our traditional allies? And, will these systems fit in with what we already have or is planned to be procured as indicated in DCP 2019? The answer to both questions in the opinion of this author is yes.

#### *Sea and Air Denial*

There are a number of projects in DCP 2019 that could provide the core to a series of capabilities that seek to deny a hostile power use of both air and sea space in our immediate region or in the defence of Australia. These projects include the maritime satellite surveillance project, the P-8A Poseidon, the future tactical air mobility project, enhanced maritime awareness capability, long endurance unmanned aerial vehicles and parts of other ISR and communication projects. To these projects we could then add additional future capabilities as part of the Defence Policy Review to greatly improve the combat effectiveness of the NZDF and provide deterrence against aggression.

#### *M142 HIMARS and Anti-Ship Missiles.*

Our Australian ally has just purchased the M142 HIMARS launcher that can potentially fulfil the requirements of two of their defence projects – land 8113 long range fires and land 4100 phase 2. Albert Palazzo (2020) of the Australian Army Research Centre describes 8113 long range fires as a momentous acquisition program that will transform the Army's place in the strategic defence of the nation. He goes on to say the importance of long-range precision fires to the nature of war will probably rank with the introduction of the tank and aeroplane. The program aims to provide the Australian Army a land based long range strike platform that is able to engage both land and maritime targets. The Australians have invested AU\$70 million in development of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). Lockheed Martin the manufacturer working on PrSM has also offered their surface launched version of the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) called LRASM-SL to Australia (Hughes 2022) and now looks to be manufacturing it in Australia (ANU Manufacturing 2023). With this system there is the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty to consider, that prohibits surface to surface

weapons with ranges between 500 and 5,500km. The reported range of LRASM is about 200 nm, with PrSM having a current range of 499km but it is likely a version will be built that can exceed this. For the NZDF any surface-to-surface weapon that exceeded 499km is obviously a complete nonstarter, but LRASM-SL is unlikely to be able to exceed 499km or will be limited to that range.

The introduction of M142 HIMARS and LRASM-SL to the NZDF's inventory would restore the maritime strike capability that was lost when the ACF was disbanded and would be a deterrent to aggression being launched against us or our interests. With the GMLRS rockets the army could also use it to provide long range fire support to soldiers in the field and also for counter battery fire. The Army's current towed artillery is now essentially nearing obsolescence with it being very vulnerable to counter battery fire. M142 HIMARS could be at least a partial replacement to our current artillery – with us possibly needing a self-propelled howitzer or vehicle-based mortars as well. M142 HIMARS also fits on our C130J so it can rapidly be transported around the country or overseas. This system could even be deployed on and launch missiles from our Naval vessels, with the US Navy recently demonstrating the capability off a LPD (Blenkin 2021),

Australian Army, artillery officer, Daniel Molesworth (2022) explains that this system requires a surveillance and target acquisition capability to provide targeting data to the launcher. Molesworth says that the most suitable platforms to provide this data is the P-8A Poseidon or the MQ-9B Sky Guardian. One of these platforms the NZDF already has and the other, the maritime version of the MQ-9B Sky Guardian, the MQ-9B Sea Guardian is being pitched for the maritime domain awareness projects by General Atomics. If the Government acquired the MQ-9B Sea Guardian we would have a very powerful ISR asset and the capability to target the M142 HIMARS – a capability that Australia doesn't even have yet. Australia purchased 20 M142 HIMARS launchers with GMLRS rockets and a number of other components for US \$385 Million (DefSec 2023). 200 of the air launched version of LRASM-SL, LRASM cost the ADF US \$990 million (Koper, 2022). 20 launchers could be easily afforded by the New Zealand Government as could the LRASM-SL missiles.

#### Air Defence Capability

The M142 HIMARS, with its large rocket trail marking its position once it fires, is very vulnerable to ground attack aircraft and therefore needs to be protected from attack from the sky. We also know with proliferation of armed drones throughout the world, such as the Bayraktar TB2, and great power competition that our armed forces need protection from air attack. One option as we need interoperability with the Australians is to acquire the same system as they have. The Australians have what they call an enhanced version of NASAMS, where they have integrated an Australian CEA Technology's AESA radar on to Raytheon-Kongsberg NASAM system (Defence 2019). A potentially even better option is to purchase what is essentially the land-based version of the Sea Ceptor air defence system on our frigates. It's called Sky Sabre and we already have people who are expert on this system in the Navy. Sky Sabre would allow commonality throughout the NZDF, with the Army able to pool missiles, knowledge and other resources with the Navy. The system will also be able to network with the frigates (Forces News, 2022), to improve our overall air defence capability.



### *The ISR Capabilities*

Senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Malcom Davis (2018), believes Australia should base a transmitter for their Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) in northern New Zealand. Davis writes that this would extend the ADF's over the horizon radar coverage deep into the South Pacific and provide complete air and sea surveillance to support the NZDF. JORN bounces a signal off the ionosphere, which is then refracted downward to illuminate a target, an echo then travels back to the receiver and provides real time tracking information (Dobell 2020). The system provides surveillance not only for the ADF, but also other government agencies as it assists with detecting illegal entry, smuggling and illegal fishing (Dobell 2020). If New Zealand could negotiate with the Australian Government to have a JORN transmitter and perhaps have them at least partially pay for the system, this would allow much better maritime domain awareness for the NZDF and also would enable better protection of Australia's East Coast. The program also would be expected to increase the efficiency of NZDF maritime patrol assets and would have great utility for the EMAC project.

While this Author accepts the EMAC project is an all of government program and should remain that way, the program is also likely to have significant utility for defence and we should incorporate that into the project's requirements. Jeff Kline professor of the US Naval Postgraduate School (2023) argues when allies of the US are procuring maritime awareness and security platforms incorporated into the design should be the ability to provide targeting data to combat platforms for times of war. We should follow his advice and add this requirement to our EMAC project. There also does appear to be scope for both the EMAC and the long endurance unmanned aerial vehicle projects to share a common platform. In the opinion of this Author one extremely suitable option for both of these projects is General Atomics MQ-9B Sea Guardian. The aircraft carries electrical optical infrared sensors, a synthetic aperture radar and a long-range maritime surface search radar. It has an extremely long loiter time and has much lower operating costs compared with other maritime patrol aircraft, such as the P-8A, and as already stated can provide high quality targeting data to other platforms. The Government should acquire at least 5 of the drones and do so as of matter of urgency.

### *P-8A Poseidon*

Defence has made an excellent choice with its selection of the P-8A Poseidon as the Airforce's future maritime patrol aircraft. However unfortunately only 4 have been ordered to replace 6 P3K2 Orion's. This means that if one of the P-8's is sent on an overseas tasking we likely will have periods when we don't even have a single Poseidon available in New Zealand to respond to an emergency. To solve this problem the government simply needs to order at least another two from the manufacturer. The P-8 manufacturing line is likely to close soon so this order needs to be placed quickly or the only option will be to purchase second hand – if they are even available.

The US Navy has commissioned Boeing to integrate LRASM onto the P-8A and this is expected to be completed by late 2025. Australia has ordered LRASM to fit to its F/A-18F Super Hornets as their primary airborne maritime deterrent and also has plans to equip their P-8A fleet with the weapons system. The NZDF should also purchase LRASM to fit to our P-8A aircraft as this would greatly improve the NZDF's anti-ship capability. If LRASM was purchased this would enable the RNZAF P-8A to be a potent long range maritime strike platform.

### *C-130J-30 Super Hercules*

To add maritime strike to the P-8's current roles of maritime patrol, search and rescue and ASW is likely to put No. 5 Squadron under significant strain and what clearly would be of great benefit is if another Airforce platform, ideally one we already have, could assist them with one of these roles. The US Airforce Research Laboratory (2023) has a program in development called Rapid Dragon that seeks to enable existing airlift platforms such as the C-130 to air drop palletised long range anti-ship missiles with no modifications to the aircraft. Rapid Dragon would enable our Airforce to deliver significant firepower – 2 RNZAF C-130J each carrying 2 6 cell Rapid Dragon pallets could carry the same number of extended range anti-ship missiles as what the RAAF can achieve with quarter the F/A-18F Super Hornet fleet. The C-130J also has another advantage, that it can take off from austere 3,000-foot airfields around Australasia or in the South Pacific, making it very difficult for an aggressor to narrow down exactly where it is taking off from and landing – making it challenging to target on the ground or avoid. While it is accepted that the C-130 is not survivable in a contested environment; due to the great range of the AGM-158B JASSM-ER missile, currently being integrated onto the system, the tactical airlifter can release its cargo well away from any threats to the aircraft itself. Our C-130 aircrew also already have the capability to airdrop palletised cargo, so it would be expected that once the Rapid Dragon program is complete, we could stand-up the capability very quickly – providing we could get the antiship missiles and Rapid Dragon pallets. The number of C-130J-30 ordered, like the P-8A, is too few in number particularly if we add an additional role to the Squadron. The government needs to add at least another 2 airframes to the C-130J-30 order.

### *Deterrence*

If a JORN transmitter was located in northern New Zealand and the NZDF has access to its data, we would be able to distinguish maritime and air contacts thousands of kilometres to our North. Once a maritime contact was acknowledged and was deemed suspicious, we could use our satellite surveillance, the MQ-9B Sea Guardian or P-8A to confirm its identity. If we were in a wartime environment and the contact was recognized as a threat, the P-8A would be able to engage the hostile vessel directly, or we could call in an RNZAF Rapid Dragon equipped C-130J-30. If an aggressor's naval vessels were able to penetrate the outer defensive layer provided by the Airforce the Royal New Zealand Artillery with their LRASM-SL equipped M142 HIMARS will be waiting for them. If the hostile power tried to use airpower against us, we would be able to contact the RAAF for support; but we would still be able to electively defend ourselves without help with our NASAMS or Sky Sabre system. If the aggressor tried to use submarines to attack us, or our interests, the Navy and Airforce with the ASW frigates, maritime helicopters and the P-8A Poseidon would be able to hold these submarines at considerable threat. These combined NZDF systems would likely create uncertainty in a potential aggressor's mind and make them think that any benefit likely to be achieved from aggression will be heavily outweighed by the costs the NZDF would be able to impose on them. The potential aggressor would then likely conclude that, in fact, aggression is not a good idea. Which is the whole point.



To conclude I leave you with the words of Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger (1949).

*It may be a good thing to continue doing nothing as at present and trust in the mercy of God to a people too selfish and lazy to help themselves. We can say, truly, that New Zealand cannot alone defend herself...so, perhaps, we had better leave it to others, or deny that there is any danger and get on with our amusements and the rapid erosion of our land. Or we can pull ourselves together and act as a grown-up Nation.*

(As cited by Cavanaugh, 2020)

Released by the Minister of Defence

## References

Airforce Research Laboratory, 2023, Rapid Dragon – Delivers Palletised Cruise Missiles from Cargo Aircraft, <https://afresearchlab.com/technology/rapid-dragon>

ANU Manufacturing 2023, Lockheed and Thales muscle in on Australian missile manufacturing opportunity <https://www.aumanufacturing.com.au/lockheed-and-thales-muscle-in-on-australian-missile-manufacturing-opportunity>

Australian Naval Institute, 2022, Overview of the Type 26 frigate <https://navalinstitute.com.au/overview-of-the-type-26-frigate/>

Ayson Robert, 2023, New Zealand's Alliance Obligations in a China-Australia War, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Taylor & Francis

BAE Systems 2023, Type 26 Global Combat Ship, <https://www.baesystems.com/en/productfamily/type-26>

BAE Systems 2022, BAE Systems awarded £4.2bn contract to build five more Type 26 frigates in Glasgow, <https://www.baesystems.com/en/article/bae-systems-awarded-4-2bn-contract-to-build-five-more-type-26-frigates-in-glasgow>

Blenkin Max, 2021, Australia considers its LAND 8113 Long Range Fires options, Australian Defence Business Review, <https://adbr.com.au/long-range-fires/>

Burton Mark, 2000, Review of the F16 Aircraft for the Royal New Zealand Airforce, Beehive <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/feature/review-f16-aircraft-royal-new-zealand-airforce>

Cavanaugh M, 2020, New Zealand's dangerous strategic apathy in an uncertain age, ASPI - The Strategist <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/new-zealands-dangerous-strategic-apaty-in-an-uncertain-age/>

Congressional Research Service, Mar 2023, Report to Congress on Constellation-class Frigate Program (FFG-62), USNI News, <https://news.usni.org/2023/03/28/report-to-congress-on-constellation-class-frigate-program-ffg-62-13>

Damen, 2014, DAMEN presents CROSSOVER ultimate mission modular naval concept at DIMDEX 2014, Navy Recognition, <http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-exhibitions/2014-archive-naval-exhibitions/dimdex-2014/1673-damen-presents-crossover-ultimate-mission-modular-naval-concept-at-dimdex-2014.html>

Davis Malcolm, 2018, 'Forward defence in depth' for Australia (part 3), The Strategist - Australian, Strategic Policy Institute, [www.aspistrategist.org.au/forward-defence-in-depth-for-australia-part-3/](http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/forward-defence-in-depth-for-australia-part-3/)

Defence 2019, Short Range Ground Based Air Defence, Australian Government – Defence <https://www.defence.gov.au/project/short-range-ground-based-air-defence>

Defence Media, 2022, Chinese ship lasing of P-8A Poseidon on 17 February 2022, <https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2022-02-22/chinese-ship-lasing-p-8a-poseidon-17-february-2022>

Defence: Australian Government, 2022, Lightning joins Malaysian homecoming.  
<https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2022-11-24/lightning-joins-malaysian-homecoming>

Defence White Paper, 2016, New Zealand Government.  
<https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/daac08133a/defence-white-paper-2016.pdf>

Def Sec, 2023, Australian Government purchases 20 Lockheed Martin High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), Line of Defence Magazine, <https://defsec.net.nz/2023/01/06/australia-purchases-high-mobility-artillery-rocket-systems/>

Dickie Mure, 2019, BAE hopeful of multimillion -pound deal with New Zealand. Financial Times  
<https://www.ft.com/content/c1364ce4-a3ed-11e9-974c-ad1c6ab5efd1>

Dobell Graeme, 2020, Jindalee extension will put a constant Australian eye on Melanesia, ASPI The Strategist, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/jindalee-extension-will-put-a-constant-australian-eye-on-melanesia/>

Fanell Jim, 2022, Understanding the Chinese Navy, US Naval Institute,  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M0aFqM4ES40>

Forces News, 2022 Sky Sabre: Up close with the Army's new air defence system  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IBq1074tM8E>

Hughes Robin, 2022, Lockheed Martin pitches surface-launched LRASM for Australian maritime strike programmes, Janes, <https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/lockheed-martin-pitches-surface-launched-lrasm-for-australian-maritime-strike-programmes>

Kerr Julian and MacDonald Andrew, 2022, Australia proposes defence spending boost for 2023, Janes Defence <https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/australia-proposes-defence-spending-boost-for-2023>

Kline Jeff interview, 2023, Proceedings Podcast: Sea Power and the Operational Level of War, Naval Institute, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=juDUmGK1QoY>

Kuper Steven 2022, US approves multimillion-dollar Australian LRASM acquisition request, Defence Connect, <https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/strike-air-combat/5557-us-approves-multi-million-australian-lrasm-acquisition-request>

Lambert Nicholas 2022, What is the Navy for? US Naval Institute,  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yC6o2Qcseas>

Molesworth Daniel, 2022, Australian Army's long-range strike capability could be firing blind, The Strategist - Australian, Strategic Policy Institute, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australian-armys-long-range-strike-capability-could-be-firing-blind/>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2023, NZ economic performance in 2022, and future prospect  
<https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/mfat-market-reports/nz-economic-performance-in-2022-and-future-prospects/s>

Navy Lookout, 2022, In focus: delivering the Type 26 Frigates, Independent Royal Navy news and analysis, <https://www.navylookout.com/in-focus-delivering-the-type-26-frigates/>

Palazzo Albert, 2020, Deterrence and Firepower: Land 8113 and the Australian Army's Future, Australian Army Research Centre, <https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/deterrence-and-firepower-land-8113-and-australian-armys-future-part-1-strategic-effect>

Paparo Samuel - interview, 2023, Is the Navy ready? How the U.S. is preparing amid a naval build up in China, 60 Minutes USA <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rEc5hsWNsCQ>

US Navy 2022, Navy Commences Construction of First Constellation Class Frigate <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3145941/navy-commences-construction-of-first-constellation-class-frigate/>

Watts Andrew, 2020, Designing the Next Fleet, Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy, Volume 1 | Number One | December 2020, <https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/search/SearchForm?Search=journal+royal+new+zealand+navy>

Willet Lee, 2023, Type 26 frigate promises naval interchangeability, Armada International, <https://www.armadainternational.com/2023/01/type-26-frigate-promises-naval-interchangeability/>

World Bank, 2023, Military Expenditure, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.ZS?end=2021&locations=NZ&start=1960>

Yeo Mike, 2022, Details surface on China's 'dangerous' interception of RAAF P-8A. Australian Defence Magazine, <https://www.australiandefence.com.au/defence/general/details-surface-on-china-s-dangerous-interception-of-raaf-p-8a>

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply - Print View Images

Submission to Defence Policy Review

Sent: 6 March 2023 12:50 PM  
From: s9(2)(a)  
To: Engage;

Note: Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

1 Attachments  
Submission to 2023 Defence Review - s9(2) v3.2.docx (57 KB)

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Good Afternoon,  
Please find attached a corrected version (v3.2) of a submission I emailed to you yesterday.  
Please accept my apologies for this inconvenience; a particularly important word needed to be inserted.  
Kind regards,  
s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

# Defence Policy and Strategy Statement and Future Force Design Principles

## Submission on Naval Force Design

By s9(2)(a)

5 March 2023

### The Author

s9(2)(a)

### Introduction

The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) must be designed as an integrated whole; no single domain should have ipso facto priority over the others. However, there are time critical aspects to the problem of identifying and investing in naval capabilities that warrant particularly close attention during this Review. This submission draws attention to those challenges and proposes force design principles that may permit a way ahead to be identified.

The most recent Defence Assessment (DA) draws a number of conclusions concerning New Zealand's geo-political environment that have a major bearing on naval capability requirements. In particular, the observation that the Pacific is no longer a wholly peaceful region and that more sophisticated defence capabilities will be needed in future Pacific operations is timely. The need for a broad range of naval capabilities is either explicitly stated or can be inferred from the DA and other recent policy statements. The fundamental geo-political requirement for naval forces is therefore not addressed in this submission.

However, it must be recognised that the "elephant in the room" when it comes to determining future naval requirements is the extent to which our navy should be capable of combat. This submission therefore draws attention to factors which must be taken into account in addressing combat capability, including the importance to world security and prosperity of free movement across and under the oceans, the fact that free movement is not a free good or a natural state of affairs, and the need for New Zealand to play a proportionate role in defending that free movement.

Taking the above into account, this submission draws attention to the incoherence, unsuitability, and unsustainability of New Zealand's current naval fleet and proposes the adoption of force design principles that could enable New Zealand maritime defence outcomes to be achieved within an acceptable cost envelope for both acquisition and sustainment.

### **Collective Security, Credibility, and the Need for a Combat Capable Navy**

Whether we like it or not, our partners take our willingness to contribute to collective deterrence into account in their relationships with us in other fields, including trade. For example, members of the Lange cabinet made no secret of the fact that the Australian government of the day made it plain that the next step in the developing Closer Economic Relationships arrangements depended on New Zealand commitment to the Anzac frigate project.

We must also consider the benefit we derive from the free movement of goods and services across and under the world's oceans. 90% of our trade by value and 99% by volume is carried by ships to and from our own ports, but our dependence on free movement across the seas is much deeper. The components which make up Apple computer products come from the US, UK, China, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Israel, Malaysia, Germany, Ireland, Austria, India, Japan, Vietnam, Brazil, France, Norway, Thailand, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Indonesia, the Netherlands, and Australia. Suppliers for a great many other goods essential to modern life no doubt come from a similarly diverse list of suppliers. These components and materials are travelling across every part of the world's oceans every day, which means that New Zealand is vulnerable to disruptions to free movement across the oceans wherever they occur, not just around our own shores. Vulnerability of course increases with proximity to our shores, and the greatest vulnerability arises from potential disruption to shipping moving directly to and from New Zealand, but disruption in the South China Sea, for instance, could have severe impacts on our economy and well-being.

The navies of the liberal democracies (in particular, the United States) have underwritten the freedom of the seas for so long that that freedom tends to be accepted as a natural state of affairs and a free good. This ignores the fact that serious piracy almost always arises wherever governance is weak, and populations disadvantaged. Suppressing piracy in the Horn of Africa, Malacca Straits and the Gulf of Guinea has required vast resources and multi-national effort. As soon as this effort is relaxed, piracy returns. Some nation states also ignore the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) when it suits them, impeding the free movement of shipping and ignoring legitimate and recognised EEZ and ECS claims. Some parts of the sea are far from peaceful, and our ability to cross it and manage and extract the resources it contains without interference must not be assumed.

Commentators sometimes advance the view that any New Zealand contribution to a coalition maritime operation would be so small as to be inconsequential. However, the likelihood is that our partners will be seriously challenged to maintain an adequate naval deterrent presence should regional tensions escalate. In particular, the main burden of "grey zone" operations (see below) will fall on surface combatants, and by their nature, grey

zone operations may last for months, if not years. In such circumstances, even one New Zealand surface combatant periodically on station would make an appreciable difference to our friends and partners. This was certainly the case during the deployment of *Te Kaha* and *Te Mana* in 2003-04 for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – at times the New Zealand ship was one of only two or three surface combatants on station in a very large area of operations.

Aotearoa New Zealand is completely dependent on the free movement of goods and services across the world's oceans. We should therefore make a proportionate contribution to the deterrence and defeat of threats to that free movement, and that requires naval combat capabilities.

### **The Current Situation – An Incoherent and Unsustainable Fleet**

The current naval force structure is the outcome of a collision between two separate streams of force development, each based on completely different geo-political outlooks. The two frigates represent a long-standing and bi-partisan view that Aotearoa New Zealand should be able to contribute combat forces to collective security arrangements. Had the frigate programme been carried through to fruition, the navy would have continued to be based on a core of surface combatants compatible with those of our closest ally, Australia, and “combat credible” to other defence partners.

The election of the Clark government in 1999 saw a complete change in defence policy emphasis as it affected the navy. Disaster relief, resource protection, border protection and other functions generally grouped under the patrol or “constabulary” heading were considered more important than combat. Instead of taking up options to acquire additional Anzac class frigates, Government allocated funding to the “Protector” fleet, which introduced much enhanced patrol and sealift capabilities. This has created a number of challenges:

It created a two ship naval combat force. Operational research carried out by Victoria University Wellington (on behalf of the NZ Treasury) in the late 90s (and repeated by the Defence Technology Agency in 2017) established that two ships were insufficient to ensure adequate availability in the event of contingencies requiring combat capability, and that even more critically, a naval combat work force could not be sustained over time with only two ships with which to both train and operate. Given typical work force attrition rates, a force of three frigates would see a steady deterioration in naval combat work force viability, while a force of only two was non-viable from the outset.

These predictions have come to pass. Frigate availability has been reduced below required output levels due to people shortages on many occasions in the past 20 years. In addition, the impact of work force shortages has been masked by the lengthy Platform Systems Upgrade (PSU) and Frigate Systems Upgrade (FSU) projects which took both ships out of service for years at a time. Post FSU, the navy is struggling to re-generate combat capability from a



very low base. There are now officers and ratings who have been in the navy for ten years and more who have never before served in a frigate.

The naval fleet now consists of eight ships of six different types. Had the Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel project not been suspended, in the near future the figures would have been nine ships of seven different types. There is almost no system standardization across the fleet as a whole. This creates a multitude of difficult to manage supply chains and the need to carry much higher and more expensive stores holdings than would be the case if systems were standardised.

Even more importantly, it creates very small pools of people competent in operating and maintaining systems unique to a given ship type. The smaller the competency pools and the greater the number of small pools, the greater the vulnerability of the work force as a whole to attrition shocks. Too often a vicious circle arises – members of a small competency pool leave the service creating pressure on those remaining who might have to remain at sea when they would otherwise enjoy a shore posting with their families. Dissatisfaction increases, more resignations follow, problems magnify, fleet availability reduces still further.

### **The Challenge, and the Opportunity**

Every ship in the current fleet except *Aotearoa* reaches the end of its viable service life (“life of type”) between 2032 and 2035.<sup>1</sup> Like for like replacement,<sup>2</sup> even if that were a sensible solution to future defence requirements, would perpetuate the capability imbalance and sustainability problem outlined above.<sup>3</sup> A new approach to naval capability is required. Such an approach is made possible by new ways of operating and paradigm shifts in naval and defence technology.

#### New Ways of Operating – Distributed Maritime Operations

A new way of designing and operating naval forces has been developed, known as Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO). DMO doctrine is not publicly available, but it has been referred to as a cornerstone of US Navy strategy by successive Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNO).

A key element of DMO is the distribution of capability across a wide area and a large number of platforms. Numbers are important, because numbers complicate an enemy's

---

<sup>1</sup> The term “viable service life” is used in the sense that beyond that time frame, the costs of maintaining the ship in service become disproportionate in relation to any additional service life gains and in relation to the through life cost of replacement capability.

<sup>2</sup> Meaning the replacement of the current fleet with the same number of ships of each type, including multi-function frigates with capability comparable to those of our main defence partners.

<sup>3</sup> And yet it is the basis for every high level statement of defence procurement plans, including the Defence Capability Plan Review carried out in 2019.

targeting problem and increase the risks associated with aggression,<sup>4</sup> enhancing deterrence. Therein lies our opportunity. Provided it can defend itself from the most likely threat – anti-ship missiles – while offering capability appropriate to a given mission, a combatant need not be capable across all mission areas in order to be valued, because its very presence complicates the adversary’s calculations and enhances deterrent effect. If smaller navies no longer have to invest in combatants permanently equipped with multi-dimensional capability in order to be operationally useful, they might be able to acquire specialised, valued combat capability that they can afford to acquire and sustain over time.

### **Enabling Technologies**

The available technological opportunities derive from accelerating trends in the development and adoption of open computing architectures, “modularity” in the conceptualisation of ship design, and autonomous systems. These enabling technologies allow the adoption of a fleet design concept based on DMO doctrine (and thus making a credible contribution to collective deterrence) to be considered.

#### Open Computing Architectures

Most new naval computing systems are based on open architecture software. An open architecture system is designed in such a way that it can be maintained and upgraded over time almost indefinitely. As the software evolves to incorporate new capabilities, hardware including processors (based on standard commercial as opposed to bespoke military hardware) can be iteratively replaced to provide the greater processing power required by a new software edition, or new functionality. As new weapons and sensors are developed, an open architecture Combat Management System (CMS)<sup>5</sup> can be integrated with them with relative ease. The RNZN has moved into this era with the Lockheed Martin Canada CMS 330 system installed in the Anzac class frigates.

In addition to CMS, open architectures can be applied to other key software defined naval systems, including Integrated Platform Management Systems (IPMS), Integrated Bridge Systems (IBS), and communications control systems, all of which have the same need for ongoing support and development as CMS. Finally, and again crucially, open architecture computing systems can be adapted to a wide range of functions and interfaced with a wide range of physical systems, enabling standardisation across a multi-function fleet. For a navy the size of the RNZN, the advantages thus gained in terms of standardised operator and maintainer interfaces and the rationalisation of supply chains could mean the difference between a fleet (and a work force) that is sustainable in the long term, and one that isn’t.

**It is recommended that the adoption of provably open computing architectures become a core fleet design principle.**

---

<sup>4</sup> The greater the number of platforms in a naval force and the more widely they are distributed, the greater the likelihood that considerable combat power will remain after a first strike, increasing the risk that the aggressor will face retaliation on a scale that makes aggression impractical in the first place.

<sup>5</sup> A CMS is the computing environment that controls all weapons and sensors, provides Command with an awareness of the operating environment, and supports tactical decision making.

## Modularity

Modularity de-couples a ship's platform and "payload" systems. A modular ship's hull and its core systems for propulsion, electrical power generation, accommodation, cooling, communications, and navigation are a backplane to which removable, modular payload systems tailored to a particular mission and level of capability are added. This is not an unproven concept. The Royal Danish Navy first deployed the STANFLEX modular system in the 1990's aboard the Flyvefisken class small combatants. A large, specialised fleet of 20 ships was replaced by 14 that could be adapted to ASW, Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), Mine Counter Measures (MCM) and other roles by the installation of role specific modules. Modules are designed to connect with standard container positions aboard the platform and use standard interfaces to connect with platform systems, including the CMS. The Royal Danish Navy has extended the modularity concept to its Absalon class support ships and Iver Huitfeldt class air defence frigates and plans to replace the Flyesfisken class with new platforms that take the modularity concept still further, using a system known as the Cube which allows rapid module interchange with a minimum of shore based support.

Modularity and the Royal Navy. The following excerpt from the Royal Navy's Maritime Operating Concept published in September 2022 further illustrates that modularity has taken hold as a key naval force design principle:

*Capability will be modular rather than platform-specific, and we will be more flexible, adaptable, upgradable and maintainable. We will cease vesting capability in singleton platforms, where utility and function are fixed. Instead, we will distribute capability in interchangeable modules such as PODS (Persistent Operational Deployment System) thus removing single points of vulnerability and maximising agility. This increased distribution possible through modular systems enables rapid reconfiguration, increases operational effect and presents our adversaries with more dilemmas.<sup>6</sup> The modular approach will be underpinned by the System of Systems approach, where individual capabilities are understood as system components within a 'plug and play' architecture..."*

In late 2022, the UK Ministry of Defence began concept work for the surface combatant that will follow the Type 31 frigate into production in the early 2030s. The follow on programme will be known as Type 32. Early publicity and the language used in the Maritime Operating Concept suggest that Type 32 will be designed with modularity as a core design and operating principle.

Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) have been signed by UK and Danish defence suppliers that enable Danish modular technology to be integrated with future Royal Navy platforms. A similar MOU has been signed by Danish industry and the Spanish naval design and construction house Navantia, which supplied the Royal Australian Navy's Air Warfare

---

<sup>6</sup> See above in relation to Distributed Maritime Operations – greater distribution of capability across multiple platforms increases an adversary's targeting problem, reducing the likelihood that a pre-emptive attack will succeed and thus enhancing a naval force's deterrent effect.

Destroyers. These developments suggest that the pace of modularity development and de-risking is likely to accelerate.

Obsolescence Management – Avoiding Risky and Expensive Mid-Life Upgrades. In addition to enabling the adoption of common platforms (thus reducing vulnerability to multiple supply chains and small work force competency pools) and greatly enhanced mission flexibility, modularity de-risks and simplifies obsolescence management. Upgrades to maintain viability in the face of emerging threats (such as the Frigate Systems Upgrade project) do not require the entire platform to be taken out of service for lengthy, risky, and expensive open-heart surgery. An upgrade to an ASW module, for example, can be managed within the module, either by upgrading components in the existing module or by replacing it entirely. If an existing module is being upgraded, it can be removed from the ship for the necessary work to be carried out while the ship remains available for operations that do not require that particular module.

LCS Experience. Any discussion on warship modularity must consider the experience of the US Navy with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). LCS has been subject to much public criticism, mainly on value for money grounds (costs have exceeded initial estimates by a factor of nearly three), but also because the platform design emphasises very high speed at the expense of other important characteristics such as range and seakeeping. Other anticipated gains, including the need for only a very small core ship's company, have proved illusory. In addition, difficulties and delays have been experienced with mission module technologies, notably the MCM package, and the ASW package has been cancelled altogether. However, the challenges that have been experienced with LCS should not be linked to the basic concept of modularity. LCS was a radical attempt to realise modularity gains without subjecting the concept as a whole to the rigorous testing and evaluation processes that have de-risked complex US naval projects in the past. The advantages described above in relation to obsolescence management and role flexibility achieved by de-coupling a platform from the mission systems it carries very much apply to LCS.

It is recommended that modularity be adopted as a core fleet design principle.

It is recommended that the potential for a teaming arrangement with the UK MOD for the acquisition of modular combatant be investigated.

#### Autonomy

Autonomous vehicles offer advantages in the maritime space analogous to those offered by Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAV), or drones. They can carry an array of sophisticated sensors over very large areas with endurance unconstrained by the limits of onboard human operators. Their demand for highly trained operators is not insignificant, but less than that of a manned ship or aircraft. In the case of vehicles operating in an ASW, MCM, or Expeditionary Reconnaissance (ER) role, their deployment does not entail the risk to human life associated with inhabited platforms. Autonomous vehicles dramatically increase the area over which a surface combatant is able to maintain situational awareness, and thus its effectiveness.

Autonomy is an excellent fit with modularity. For instance, the LCS MCM capability is based around an autonomous vehicle with supporting containerised equipment. Launch and recovery systems for surface and undersea systems can be standardised, as can the equivalents for aerial vehicles – the vehicles and their support systems are in themselves modules.

**It is recommended that maximum exploitation of autonomous systems become a core naval fleet design principle.**

### Bringing New Ways of Operating and Technology Together

Coupled with the technological opportunities offered by open computing architectures, modularity, and autonomy, the advent of DMO provides smaller navies with an opportunity for affordable yet valued contributions to multi-national operations, as outlined above. To repeat, a key element of DMO is the distribution of capability across a wide area and a large number of platforms. Provided it can defend itself from the most likely threat – anti-ship missiles – while offering capability appropriate to a given mission, a combatant need not be simultaneously capable across all mission areas in order to be valued, because its very presence complicates the adversary's calculations. If smaller navies no longer have to invest in combatants permanently equipped with multi-dimensional capability in order to be operationally useful, they might be able to acquire specialised, valued combat capability that they can afford to sustain over time. Modularity could enable them to field such capability tailored to the specific needs of a given operation, while at the same time addressing national requirements for non-combat related missions.

### **Revisiting Force Structure**

#### Modularity and Wider Naval Missions

The narrative above has focussed on the combat capabilities needed for navies like the RNZN to play a role in the preservation of the rule of law at sea. However, the RNZN is required to perform a wide range of other roles related to New Zealand's security and prosperity and that of our Pacific neighbours. Our navy has resources and borders to protect, and it must be able to project special and land forces and support them in operating areas remote from New Zealand. It has a critical role to play in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), both in New Zealand and in the wider region. It must be capable of search and rescue operations in some of the most challenging maritime environments in the world. Finally, it supports important scientific and conservation work carried out by other government agencies. Although important in and of themselves, these missions collectively contribute to the soft power that is an essential adjunct to combat capabilities in building a secure region. An affordable force structure which addresses all these needs must be designed.

#### Common Modular Patrol Combatant Platforms

Both combat and patrol platforms need range, endurance, and good seakeeping qualities. In some combat situations, such as choke point escort, speed is a critical tactical characteristic, but patrol platforms also need speed for interdiction and to respond to emergencies.

Combatant design needs to consider heat, acoustic, and magnetic signature control and radar cross section reduction to reduce the ranges at which they can be detected and their vulnerability to influence mines, anti-ship missiles and torpedoes. Combatants must also be able to sustain damage and survive, and in some instances, continue to operate. Specialised patrol platforms are much less expensive than combatants partly because their design does not take these factors into account. Being cheap to acquire, however, does not mean that they are cost effective. Our OPV do very important work in our EEZ and regionally, but they are only effective across a very limited arc of missions. They cannot be deployed on operations where threat levels rise above low level criminality – even criminal gangs can acquire weapons powerful enough to seriously damage or even sink an OPV. A common modular platform that can be adapted across the spectrum of naval combat and patrol functions would provide the basis for a much more flexible and cost effective fleet.

### Defending New Zealand in Northern Australia

A defence review has just been submitted to the Australian government. Early commentary suggests that the need for greater kinetic strike capability has been highlighted. In particular, it has been noted that the Australian fleet lacks enough missile silos to deter an adversary that threatens northern Australia. Assuming that contributing to such deterrence is a New Zealand defence priority, again noting that any meaningful direct threat to New Zealand must come through that region, a modular patrol combatant offers significant advantages.

Firstly, missile launchers can be designed as modules. A New Zealand patrol combatant deployed to northern Australia could be equipped with additional launcher modules, helping increase the combat power and deterrent value of a given naval force.

Secondly, enhanced ISR sensors can also be modularised; many passive sensors already are. Whilst not yet modular in rapidly interchangeable sense, the latest phased array radars are designed to be scalable for varying ship sizes and requirements. It is wholly conceivable that phased array modules could be developed in the near term, particularly given the direction outlined in the Royal Navy's maritime operating concept above.

Thirdly, and most importantly, a force based on modular patrol combatants is much more likely to be available for deployment than the current two ship naval combat force or any like for like replacement.

### The Grey Zone

*"Grey zone conflict is best understood as activity that is coercive and aggressive in nature, but that is deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of conventional military conflict and open interstate war. Grey zone approaches are mostly the province of revisionist powers—those actors that seek to modify some aspect of the existing international environment—and the goal is to reap gains, whether territorial or otherwise, that are normally associated with victory in war. Yet grey zone approaches are meant to achieve those gains without escalating to overt warfare, without crossing established red-lines, and thus without exposing the practitioner to the penalties and risks that such escalation might*



*bring... Gray zone challenges, in other words, are ambiguous and usually incremental aggression... they eat away at the status quo one nibble at a time.”<sup>7</sup>*

There are other, more academic definitions of the grey zone, but the quote above from an article on the Foreign Policy Research Institute web site is useful for its clarity. Grey zone strategies are being used in regions in which we have a critical economic stake, against countries and peoples whom we consider friends and partners, and with complete disregard for international law and for the courts that arbitrate disputes related to that law. As fisheries depletion continues and as technology makes seabed mineral extraction more practicable, the possibility that such strategies could be employed against our own resources and those of our Pacific partners must surely increase.

Operating in the grey zone requires sustained presence. Grey zone actors seek to normalise their actions by making them continuous; responses to those actions must be as correspondingly continuous as possible. This level of presence requires high platform availability and good seakeeping, range, and endurance. Our fleet must also have sufficient capacity to respond to other contingencies while grey zone deterrence is ongoing.

A modular patrol combatant fleet offers better options for grey zone operations than a fleet based on like for like replacement of current ships. A platform adaptable to the needs of a given grey zone contingency is more likely to be available and follow on platforms can be surged to reinforce or replace an on station patrol combatant with modules suited to the ways in which the contingency might develop.

### Sealift

Sealift capability is an essential component of a networked defence force. *Canterbury* has been invaluable in a wide range of real world contingencies since entering service in 2009 and provides the means to project and sustain land combat and support capabilities. However, it has two significant limitations.

*Canterbury* lacks a floodable well dock, which means it can only conduct significant ship-shore operations in benign sea states – the long, low swell often encountered in the South Pacific can cause enough ship motion to prevent safe operation of landing craft via the stern cargo ramp or using cranes for loading and unloading. This limitation impedes both disaster relief and land force projection operations.

We only have one sealift ship, which means that sealift availability in the event of a crisis is problematic. The navy manages *Canterbury*'s maintenance so that availability during the Pacific cyclone season is maximised, but contingencies requiring the ship's deployment including earthquakes, tsunamis, and outbreaks of instability can occur at any time.

It is possible for modular patrol combatants to incorporate useful sealift capability, but not enough to support a meaningful land combat deployment, even in aggregate across a patrol

---

<sup>7</sup> *Paradoxes of the Gray Zone*, Hal Brands, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 5 Feb 16; [Paradoxes of the Gray Zone - Foreign Policy Research Institute \(fpri.org\)](http://www.fpri.org)

combatant fleet. In particular, non-specialist platforms cannot support the ship to shore movement of the armoured vehicles and heavy equipment on which land forces depend. New Zealand's naval fleet therefore requires a minimum of two specialist amphibious sealift ships equipped with floodable well docks and the aviation facilities needed to support land force helicopter capability. However, amphibious ships can be designed to modularity standards, employing the same platform systems and with the space, weight, and interface provisions to accept many of the same mission modules as patrol combatants.

**It is recommended that two sealift ships be acquired, each with a floodable well dock and aviation facilities.**

### Southern Ocean Patrol

Government has a long standing requirement for a Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel (SOPV) capability. It has been assumed that the best way to achieve this is by the addition of a suitable ship to the RNZN fleet. However, information gathered during the requirements definition phase of the now suspended SOPV project suggests the following:

The primary users of the capability would be civilian agencies, including the National Institute for Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA), the Ministry for Primary Industries, Antarctic New Zealand, the Department of Conservation, and a broad range of scientific research enterprises, including universities. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials advised that there is a strong interest in a national presence at sea in the southern oceans, but that this need not be provided by a commissioned warship. A civilian operated vessel under the New Zealand flag would suffice.

An effective SOPV would need to be specifically designed for Southern Ocean conditions; a modified version of an OPV designed for temperate and tropical zone operations cannot operate safely in the extreme sea states, temperatures, and ice conditions prevalent in the Southern Ocean.

Southern Ocean environmental conditions make demands on shipboard equipment such that many SOPV systems will have to be non-standard, creating additional supply chain and training issues even if the rest of the fleet is standardised and modular.

NIWA operates three research vessels, the largest of which, RV *Tangaroa*, requires replacement. NIWA has a well-established maritime operations infrastructure and an in-house work force consisting of qualified civilian mariners experienced in Southern Ocean operations.



All identified SOPV functions could be performed by a civilian managed and operated ship, including law enforcement and resource protection with suitably empowered personnel embarked. The issue of *Tangaroa* replacement would be resolved, with the SOPV operating in the southern oceans during the Antarctic summer, and available for temperate zone operations at other times.

It is recommended that any future national ship acquired for Southern Ocean operations be operated by NIWA, not the navy.

#### “Right Sized” Pacific Engagement, Sea Training, and Professional Development

The navy must be equipped to operate effectively with the defence and security forces of our Pacific partners. However, this engagement must be right sized. A frigate or a modular patrol combatant can carry out very useful work in the Pacific, but their size and capability can seem overwhelming and disproportionate to our partners, highlighting the disparity between our capability and theirs and creating barriers to the development of relationships.

The two remaining Inshore Patrol Vessels (IPV) have been deployed for extended periods to Fiji where they operated very effectively with their Fijian counterparts, creating relationships that will stand the navy and the country in good stead for years to come. They were right sized and thus appropriate for the work they were assigned, and our Fijian partners adapted very well to working aboard and in conjunction with the IPV. It may not have been possible to establish such close working relationships had a larger ship been deployed.

The IPV are the only remaining small ships in the naval fleet. They provide opportunities for junior and mid-ranking naval officers and ratings to take on responsibilities and acquire experience that would not be available to them aboard larger ships. They also provide an intense sea-going immersion experience for the youngest and most junior personnel that sets them up for the remainder of their careers.

The inshore tasking for which the IPV were acquired was based on potential threats to the border and EEZ resources that have not yet materialised. Together with work force challenges, this led to the withdrawal from service and sale of the other two IPV of the original four. The operating costs for two IPV are negligible in relation to the remainder of the fleet. Potential benefits in terms of right sized engagement with Pacific partners and the professional development of naval people could warrant the retention of the IPV in service and their eventual replacement, even if they must be withdrawn from service from time to time to free up people for the larger vessels in the fleet. Retaining the IPV also hedges against the development of the border and resource threats that they were originally acquired to defeat.

It is recommended that the retention of two IPV be investigated.

## Aviation

Crewed helicopters are an intrinsic component of naval capability across the patrol/combatant spectrum. No navy has yet abandoned crewed helicopters and new and enhanced types continue to be introduced; UAV capability is viewed as complementing, not replacing crewed helicopters.

Some might argue that the optics and sensors carried by modern UAV and their potential for weaponization obviate the need for crewed helicopters, especially if UAV can be controlled in real time. This ignores two realities. Firstly, the real time usefulness of UAV optics and sensors is dependent on radio frequency data links to the host platform. Like all links, these can be disrupted. Secondly, the ability of trained aircrew to observe, orient, decide and act in response to highly nuanced situations<sup>8</sup> cannot yet be replicated by UAV. Even if UAV sensors were capable of providing the required definition, interpretation of what the sensors are seeing would require people trained in some ways to aviator standard aboard the host platform – better that they are aboard the aircraft and able to apply immediate, nuanced judgement to the situations they encounter. Finally, naval helicopters perform utility, transport, and search and rescue functions of which UAV are as yet incapable.

The foregoing is included because any submission about naval capability would be incomplete without reference to aviation. However, the author does not have the necessary aviation experience and qualifications to make clear recommendations except to observe that crewed helicopters will be an indispensable component of naval capability for the foreseeable future.

## Diving, Hydrographic Survey, and Seabed Operations

These are important naval capabilities currently supported by HMNZS *Manawanui*. It is anticipated that almost all these functions would in future be performed by a patrol combatant force, which would embark the necessary modules and people as required. Future modular sealift ships could also support these functions, which are in many ways integral to the force projection and disaster relief missions that are their primary roles. Diving and hydrographic survey capabilities are needed for expeditionary reconnaissance – ensuring that operations can be carried out over a particular beach or that a port is safe to use. Embarking these capabilities as modules in a patrol combatant or sealift ship is thus an efficient use of resources.

However, *Manawanui* is capable of seabed operations of which patrol combatant and sealift ships are unlikely to be capable. This has significance for the protection of the four undersea cables on which Aotearoa New Zealand depends for information links with the rest of the world.

**It is recommended that the extent to which a requirement for seabed operations capability impacts future fleet design be investigated.**

---

<sup>8</sup> Is this a terrorist vessel or an innocent fishing boat? Is the cyclone damage to this village more serious than it looks?

## Fleet Design Options

### Patrol Combatant and Sealift Separated

A fleet based on modularity, open computing architectures, maximum use of autonomous systems, and able to make a meaningful contribution to Distributed Maritime Operations, could consist of the following:

- Three to four modular patrol combatants (numbers to be determined by operational research) with the range, endurance, seakeeping, habitability, signature and cross section reduction, speed, navigation, and command, control and communications capability required for the full range of patrol and combatant missions.
  - Mission modules for:
    - Mine Countermeasures and Expeditionary Reconnaissance (MCM/ER)
    - Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)
    - Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW)
    - Anti-ship Missile Defence (ASMD)
    - Enhanced Command and Control (C2)
    - Search and Rescue
    - Special Forces support
    - Enhanced ISR
    - Medical emergencies/environmental health
    - Law enforcement/border protection/resource protection/maritime interdiction operations
    - Disaster relief
- Two amphibious sealift ships equipped with the same platform systems and module interfaces as the patrol combatant force, with floodable well docks and aviation facilities.
- A replenishment ship to support the patrol combatant and sealift force on station and transport disaster relief and land force supplies.
- Two Inshore Patrol Vessels to support “right sized” engagement with Pacific partners and provide sea training and professional development opportunities for naval people.
- A surface seabed operations capability for the protection of undersea cables, potentially integrated with components of the above fleet.

Determining the actual number of modular patrol combatants and the numbers and types of modules needed requires operational research based on desired policy outcomes and illustrative defence planning scenarios. It may be possible to limit the fleet to three ships, although this will likely require new people concepts (see below).

Not all capability modules need be acquired at the same time as the patrol combatant fleet, allowing investment to be phased and synchronised with budget flows. At a minimum, however, there will need to be ASMD and ASuW modules sufficient for combat operations, together with anti-ship torpedo defence. The exact nature of ASW capability required would

require the operational research effort detailed above – it may be possible to acquire it in stages.

### Patrol Combatant and Sealift Combined

The Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri has supplied the Algerian and UAE navies with a type of ship that combines the attributes of a sealift ship and a patrol combatant. These ships are equipped with area air defence sensors and weapons, medium calibre gunnery systems, and a range of self defence systems. They can also be equipped with ASW capability. In addition, they can carry over 400 soldiers and their vehicles and equipment and are fitted with a floodable well dock. They have a “through deck” flight deck similar to an aircraft carrier and extensive aviation facilities.

It could be possible to combine the patrol and combatant and sealift functions identified above into three such ships, with the actual number required established through operational research. The Italian ship is only partially modular, in the sense that its large internal spaces allow it to carry a wide range of modularised equipment. The design is also dated. However, enlargements and more truly modular enhancement to the design could meet New Zealand needs at a lower cost than the patrol combatant and sealift separated option described above.

### Options Evaluation

It is recommended that the force structure options above be subjected to operational research and cost comparison to identify which could most cost effectively deliver defence policy outcomes.

### **People**

People are the single most important aspect of defence capability; it is therefore incongruous that people related challenges are the last to be addressed in this submission. However, it was necessary to set the scene by describing technological drivers for fleet design and potential fleet composition options.

To state the obvious, there is no silver bullet solution to the people challenge. The navy has made enormous improvements in work force management, including heavy investment in career management and the management of operating tempos so that the demands on people are kept within acceptable limits. However, any new fleet design concept must consider the people element from the outset.

Most naval people enjoy life at sea; indeed, younger people often cite lack of seagoing opportunities as a cause for dissatisfaction. However, operating tempos and family separation are often the root cause of decisions to leave the navy, especially when people consider the rewards and opportunities available in civilian life. Future fleet design concepts must therefore address ways in which the operating tempo demands on naval people can be reduced.

A modular fleet design concept allows a new people concept to be considered. Instead of being permanently linked to a particular ship regardless of its current mission, people could

be linked to capability modules and deployed with those modules when they are required for operations. The navy already does this with MCM, hydrographic survey, and diving teams. People in these teams are assigned to HMNZS *Matataua*, which provides them with administration and leadership when they are not deployed. The CO *Matataua* is responsible for the operational standards of these teams so that they are available to deploy when needed. The CO's leadership and that of his or her command team supports pride in the *Matataua* identity comparable to that felt in their ship by the members of a traditional ship's company – a critical naval strength is thus preserved.

The *Matataua* concept could be extended to the capability modules identified above, potentially reducing operational tempo for a proportion of the naval work force. It would have to be very carefully planned and managed, and strong leadership to ensure that the sense of pride and identity so highly prized by naval people is preserved would be absolutely essential.

There would remain the question of managing demands on people whose competency relates to ship platforms as opposed to capability modules. Some of these competencies, including marine technicians, have historically high attrition rates. The Royal Navy has adopted a "three watch" concept for certain types of ship, whereby at any time a third of a ship's company is away from the ship for training, leave, and general respite while operations are carried out by the remaining two thirds. Each watch rotates through the "off-ship" respite phase. A similar concept might work for either of the fleet composition options outlined above, provided sufficient people can be recruited and retained.

### **Summary**

No defence domain should have ipso facto priority for resources over the others. The NZDF must be designed so that information, land, air, space, and naval capabilities deliver policy outcomes as an integrated whole. However, at this point in history there are pressing challenges in relation to naval force design that warrant the particular attention of this review. The current naval fleet is incoherent in design and unsustainable in operation, due to the multiplicity of unique ship types and systems that must be maintained and for which naval people must be trained. In particular, both operational research and actual experience have shown that it is not possible to sustain a naval combat work force with only two ships. This submission has proposed the adoption of force design principles that could address these challenges and ensure the continuation of naval capability.

### **Recommendations**

It is recommended that:

1. The adoption of provably open computing architectures become a core fleet design principle.
2. Modularity be adopted as a core naval fleet design principle.

3. It is recommended that the potential for a teaming arrangement with the UK MOD for the acquisition of modular combatants be investigated.
4. Maximum exploitation of autonomous systems become a core naval fleet design principle.
5. Two sealift ships be acquired, each with a floodable well dock and aviation facilities.
6. Any future national ship acquired for Southern Ocean operations be operated by NIWA, not the navy.
7. The retention of two IPV be investigated.
8. The extent to which a requirement for seabed operations capability impacts future fleet design be investigated.
9. The force structure options above be subjected to operational research and cost comparison to identify which could most cost effectively deliver defence policy outcomes.

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply - Print View Images

Submission to Defence Policy Review

Sent: 4 April 2023 1:44 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

**Note:** Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

1 Attachments

Less

Submission to NZ Defence Policy Review - s9(2)(a) (112 KB)

Message

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

As per the online questionnaire for the Defence Policy Review, which I completed online at 03/04/23 afternoon, please find attached my full submission.

Please feel free to contact me if I can clarify or help in the development of the technologies that I have mentioned in my submission.

Sincerely

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

# Submission to New Zealand Defence Policy Review

Author: s9(2)(a); 03/04/23

## Introduction

This document extends my online submission to the Defence Policy Review public questionnaire, to expand on some specific questions, and focus on some specific issues that I believe fall within the policy as framed by the questions. While I understand that the policy questions are perhaps necessarily general and focus on overall policy, I think it is timely to also now focus on aspects of policy implementation to help give relevance to the policy itself.

## Expansion of some of my online submission answers

(The most relevant questions and answers are copied here to provide additional answers and context to my submission below)

**Q: "Why do you think this is the Defence Force's most important role? (Defending New Zealand's territory and critical lines of communication)"**

*A: It ought to be self-definitive that defending New Zealand's territory is ultimately the single reason for the Defence Force.*

I would guess that most experts in defence would contend that the ultimate objective for the existence of a defence force is to defend the nation, and in order to do so, to help prevent attack by foreign nations and sub-groups, by activities, eg as presented in the questions to the policy review online public questionnaire.

**Activities to support this ultimate objective**, broadly starting from perhaps the most distant, long-term, strategic and benign, to the local, immediate, tactical and hostile, are -

1. Promoting and supporting diplomacy-led international treaties and laws
2. Promotion of goodwill towards New Zealand via assistance to foreign communities, with most focus on our closest neighbours, and specifically not the most distant
3. Tightly focussed and targetted international peacekeeping activities, necessarily limited by our financial and capability resources
4. Defence of our land territory and territorial waters from foreign commercial activities. This includes illegal fishing and mining within our territorial waters, and surreptitious sale of land areas or rights there to by foreign actors, as all these activities amount to the permanent take-over of New Zealand's means to wealth production in a way that is tantamount to or a direct substitute to physical invasion.
5. Mitigation and prevention of cyber attacks and infiltration on any of New Zealand's systems and therefore property, whether privately or publicly (eg government) owned
6. Defence from physical attack and invasion (by foreign nations and sub-groups)

Presumably if each of the earlier activities are successfully conducted then the risk of needing to engage in the final ultimate activity is greatly diminished. However the threat can never be completely eliminated, so there must be a plan for the ongoing development of an effective and cost-effective capability to engage in this activity.



*One of Defence's roles is to anticipate how New Zealand's safety and security situation might change over the coming years. When you think about New Zealand's safety and security situation over the next 10 years, what do you think are the greatest threats to our safety and security?*

1. In the 3 years that I have been back residing in New Zealand, I have seen no evidence that New Zealand Defence is focussed on developing the capability to address point 6 above effectively: Physical attack and invasion (by foreign nations and sub-groups). This is the central issue that is dealt with further in this submission.
2. I also have doubts that New Zealand Defence policy adequately addresses point 4 above: ie we have effective Defence of our land territory and territorial waters from foreign commercial activities. I understand that this is probably more of a responsibility of other government departments, but, as alluded to in the questionnaire, might be something that Defence has some input into as well. This issue is not dealt with any further in this submission.

*How ready do you think the Defence Force is to meet the challenge/s you identified in the previous question?*

**A: Not at all well**

*What do you think the Defence Force needs to do to get ready to meet the challenges you identified?*

*Refer My Submission, as per below*

*Defence Assessment 2021, identified two inter-related challenges the Defence Force thinks will have the greatest impact on New Zealand's security interests over the next ten years:*

1. *Climate change – changes in the climate will have environmental impacts (e.g., more frequent natural disasters, decline in fish stocks, decline in farmable land) and these will result in social and security concerns (e.g., damage to infrastructure, more competition between countries for resources (e.g., countries encroaching on other countries' territories for fish), land disputes between countries).*
2. *Strategic competition – increasing competition between countries, where one country seeks to further its interests at the expense of other countries. This could range from country sponsored industrial espionage to accessing another country's resources to invading another country and annexing their territory*

*How ready do you think the Defence Force is to meet these challenges over the next 10 years?*

**A: Not at all well**

*What do you think the Defence Force needs to do to get ready to meet the climate change and strategic competition challenges?*

Please refer to My Submission below

## What connection, if any, do you have with the New Zealand Defence Force?

*I have friends or family who are former members/employees of the Defence Force or Ministry of Defence*

1. My father was an Able Seaman in RNZN during WW2, assigned to HMS Isis (sunk off Normandy 1944)
2. My brother s9(2) was selected for officer cadet entry RNZN, s9(2)(a)  
( )

## My Submission

s9(2)(a)

. I have always taken a keen interest in global affairs. It is mainly against this background that I make this submission.

While I concur that the activities that I understand New Zealand Defence engage in as per listed at "Activities to support this ultimate objective" above, are generally appropriate, there seems to be little appropriate focus on solutions to the ultimate and immediately preceding list items, namely physical attack, cyber attack, and encroachment within territorial waters.

The wealth that New Zealand has in its fisheries farming and clean water make it potentially a target, particularly but not exclusively, for China. China in particular seems to have a very long-term strategy of buying up strategic assets in foreign nations to support itself. Many of its citizens and companies appear to be directly funded by their CCP government to purchase those assets for the good of China, not the host country. Once there is sufficient interest and population established in a foreign country, history tells us that this can be used as one means to attempt intervention and ultimately invasion of any foreign country, preceded by a period of insidious clandestine propaganda and infiltration within the public and community. It is naive and extremely dangerous to forget those many lessons of history. While I welcome immigrants in general, and have enjoyed a rich involvement in multi-cultural community groups in Australia, I recognise the importance of integrating immigrants into local life, promoting a single common language is a key to that end. This strengthens the development of ties and a sense of belonging and community between immigrants and their new country as opposed to where they left. Over time, this should help ensure less exposure to foreign propaganda from, for instance, Tencent, whose software products are ubiquitous and dominating in national life in China.

A key factor in the ability to defend any nation is having the appropriate weapons for the circumstances. I have found that both hardware and software technology in general has changed rapidly in the time I have been involved in it. Presumably one factor why New Zealand for instance left ANZUS and dispensed with its Skyhawk multi-role aircraft and its ageing offshore warships was, that at the time, there was insufficient real capability / benefit to be realised compared to the real cost of those facilities. Realising that those weapons were no longer a real asset, and dispensing with them, was probably very commendable. Assuming similar levels of training and thus operator expertise, generally only world leading technology prevails in battle, while the second rate systems become the cannon fodder. That sort of realisation has typically only occurred in the face of actual warfare, for instance when the value of battleships vs aircraft carriers became quickly obvious in the new early stages of World War 2.

However in response to these decisions concerning ANZUS and our fighting aircraft and warships, there does not seem to have been any commensurate adequate strategy to counter a physical invasion of New Zealand. In addition, if there is to be any sort of global conflict, I don't think we can rely on Australia or the USA to provide much assistance to us, if any. I submit that a strategy worth considering for New Zealand might be something similar to how it appears that the defence strategy of for instance Switzerland is realised: by the ability for a great deal of its own citizens to be efficiently prepared and able to be activated in an effective manner if required. The Defence Reserve Force might be involved in this, too.

Specifically, New Zealand Defence could focus on, or at least help sponsor, the development of smart ultra cheap microelectronic based systems including aerial drones and drone swarms, as seen effectively deployed in the Russia Ukraine war, by interested parties within our community. It would be very cost-effective to sponsor or partner with private organisations engaged in the community space who for instance develop open source microelectronic, robotic, IOT, systems at community makerspaces, and/or who are focusing on community goals like environment clean up, disaster monitoring and rescue, some of which New Zealand Defence would also directly in. Other individuals and groups, for instance UAV clubs, could be involved as well. Community outreach should be a focus of the strategy.

New Zealand Defence could in parallel develop military communications and warfare capability to attach to these devices and systems in the modular fashion. After appropriate systems are architected, designed, tested and realised for community use, by interested parties in those communities, and the defence force independently developed warfare capability add-ons, then when needed by any ultimate invasion, it would be relatively easy to manufacture these as weapons on a large-scale, even in New Zealand, if these products were architected for this and the production adequately planned. For instance some of the aerial drone weapons currently used in Ukraine are constructed primarily from wax coated cardboard, which has somewhat of a parallel to the highly successful Mosquito multi-role aircraft of World War 2.

The essential design elements for this ultimately mass-produced technology might include:

- Open source hardware and software except for the military add-on elements which would be proprietary to and perhaps secret within Defence;
- Based on a common architecture, whether for fixed or mobile systems, that might be terrestrial, airborne or water-borne.
- Ubiquitous IOT components that are based on open standards, for instance Arduino or similar micro-processors;
- Relatively simple designs with components that would be easily manufactured on commonly available machinery, for instance common 3D printers and laser cutters;
- Manufactured using maximum raw / input materials that would be always readily available in New Zealand;
- Military add-ons might include:
  - weapons carrying,
  - self-destruct software (software overwrite and hardware destruction capabilities)
  - targeting and firing capability,
  - military communications encryption.

Another area of focus should be to harness artificial intelligence, for instance as currently released publicly in such products as Chat GPT. This might provide decision support to semi-autonomous systems, and direct intelligent input into autonomous and automated systems, eg:

- detection of foreign propaganda on the internet that is targeted at New Zealand;
- physical hostile force detection, in conjunction with physical sensors on fixed or aerial drone platforms;
- semi or fully-autonomous control of drones and drone swarms.

In summary, as part of an ultimate defence response, New Zealand should depend upon its own ability to manufacture and deploy a mass of smarty automated and semi-automated aerial and also perhaps water-borne systems, in huge volume at minimal cost, in a decentralised but controlled manner. A significant part of the development and potential deployment could involve interested individuals within community groups. The technology itself would lie somewhere between that deployed currently in Ukraine and what has currently been developed for instance by Boston Dynamics. It should also have a focus on what Artificial Intelligence has to offer.

If this strategy were to be adopted, there would necessarily be elements that would be made public, and that would focus on the public application and benefit of the technologies. There would not need to be any public link to New Zealand Defence, but instead these elements of the program would link back to private enterprise sponsors championing the relevant community causes. For national security, the military elements of the program might be known only to defence personnel.

Reply - Print View Images

Difficult decisions around autonomous systems

Sent: 21 February 2023 9:54 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

Note: Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

2 Attachments

uavletter2001.pdf (41 KB); uav\_letter.pdf (556 KB);

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Dear Ministry,

Over the last two decades or more I have recommended to the development of autonomous combat systems. I am including these past documents in this email.

When I began recommending this course of action in 2001 we had a little bit of a lead time over our potential adversaries, but it is now quite evident that autonomous systems are already in play. We have seen limited use of them in Ukraine by both sides, although they have been little more than GPS guided bombs.

Various organisations who promote peace are very much against the development of autonomous weapons. I myself am part of groups promoting the ethical use of artificial intelligence, and to be frank I'm conflicted.

If we do not develop these weapons we will simply be outmatched. We can't afford manned combat aircraft, as the price is astronomical, especially the latest F35. It is also evident that survivability in the air is questionable even for the latest stealth aircraft.

Instead we could develop small, highly maneuverable cruise missiles that form a mesh network once airborne to coordinate distribution of sensor data and attack strategy in real time. They could be trained to engage either airborne or surface targets well away from the NZ coastline.

In terms of sensors we could employ solar powered aircraft that would act as observation platforms for long periods. They would also form a mesh network to transmit data back to the mainland for analysis. This would be able to monitor our EEZ in peace time, but also detect the approach of hostile aircraft or hostile naval shipping.

Submersibles that are also autonomous would also act as both observation platforms listening for shipping and missile launch platforms, being able to perform a 'one inch punch', aka launch missiles at close range to minimize the possibility of interception, having been guided in to intercept by the observation systems.

Once a hostile has been identified and the green light given by human operators the attack could be coordinated by AI systems which outperform humans.

Advanced systems are now being developed, primarily by China. Frankly I would prefer not to go to war, but sometimes war comes to you. The outline of this proposal is to have a coastal defence system. It is not an offensive system designed to project power, rather intended for interception over water where there are no dangers of civilian targets.

Could this help us provide aid in emergencies? Confusing the military role with civilian roles can be a dangerous distraction when they compromise military capability. Aka, leading not to have combat aircraft because they don't suit rescue would be such a compromise. However, many capabilities might have multiple uses. For example, observation platforms could have enforcement and scientific applications. Instead of bombs we could equip drones with humanitarian or rescue payloads.

If we were to go ahead with such a system I expect it would be developed in New Zealand, not farmed out to the US. US hardware is very expensive and aligned with a very different mission.

I know our armed forces have a long history of bravery and professionalism, and will no doubt continue to play a vital role, but I feel we need to give them modern tools so they have a fighting chance at meeting the enemy with something approaching technological parity.

The existing situation is putting the future of New Zealand in the hands of blind optimism; the hope we never need a force capable of actually defending us from competent hostile forces. Some of my friends suggest we can't afford it, which is very much like claiming you can't afford your home insurance.

The threat, from artificial intelligence itself. The technology is moving so fast that we may be adopting it before the implications are fully understood. There are obvious digital security implications around having lethal autonomous combat systems, but there are also questions around the use of ever increasingly advanced artificial intelligence which may become unpredictable.

I'm not part of the military, but I have been a student of it, and more to the point know about artificial intelligence. It is coming whether we accept it or not. And just like the longbow I would rather be pulling the string than receiving the pointy end.

Regards,

s9(2)(a)

PS: I figure it's too late actually - if we get in a war soon it's all over. And no doubt it is counter to the political position of those against war, making my recommendation politically almost impossible. I'm against war too - only I would like to stand in a position of strength to encourage peace.

Released by the Minister of Defence

9 July 2009,

Minister of Defense  
Parliament  
Wellington

Dear Sir,

**RE: Establishment of Effective Air Defense via New Zealand UAV technology.**

About ten years ago New Zealand gave up its air defense capability. At that time I wrote a letter to the Minister of Defense to bring his attention to UAV technology, which at the time was in it's infancy. I realised that UAV's have several advantages over conventional piloted combat aircraft. Had New Zealand developed a UAV defence capability at that time we would now have been able to sell into the US to supply its UAV technology. We would have also been at the forefront of this form of technology.


**Future Defensive Requirements**

New Zealand still has no air defence capability. We don't really notice our lack of defence because there are no immediate threats. However, this will probably change in the medium term as the below research shows!


*There is a 90% chance that 3 billion people will have to choose between going hungry and moving their families to milder climates because of climate change within 100 years, says new research.*

*The study forecasts that temperatures at the close of this century are likely to be above those that crippled food supplies on at least three occasions since 1900.*


Summers in 2040-2060 Warmer than Warmest on Record



percent (%)



Summers in 2080-2100 Warmer than Warmest on Record





*David Battisti, a climatologist at the University of Washington, used 23 models vetted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to calculate how temperatures will vary with climate change.*

*Unlike previous studies, his team focused on temperatures during growing seasons around the world. This allowed them to determine the effect on food supplies.*

*Their results show there is a 90% chance that average temperatures in the tropics and subtropics will be higher than the hottest heat waves of the past century. With more than 3 billion people living in those areas, most of whom rely heavily on locally produced crops for both food and income, the effects could be catastrophic (see maps).*

The effects of climate change will no doubt put pressure on the world's population, forcing them to move to survive. New Zealand on the other hand will become a bread basket, as our average temperatures will rise making more of our land arable. Our relatively low population and bountiful food supply will make us a target, especially if we have no defensive capability. In other words we are heading for a very unstable period during which we will have limited defensive capacity.

## **Current Defensive Capability**

Currently our defense capacity consists of some expensive ships and some personnel carriers. Surface ships without air cover make excellent targets but have very limited offensive capacity. These ships are designed to carry out specific roles within other groups, not act independently. Without support from other countries our surface ship fleet is next to useless. Similarly our ground assets are also vulnerable without air cover. Our current Air Force is limited to essentially troop transport. We certainly have no capability to intercept and destroy incoming aircraft.

## **Future Defensive Options**

Maintaining flight status of manned aircraft is very expensive. The aircraft themselves are expensive, and they require trained pilots keep them combat ready. Using aircraft for flight training risks those assets. Meanwhile the required facilities for these assets are easily identified and targeted by opposing forces.

The US is currently running a significant UAV program, but currently each UAV requires a person to be controlling it. Although these aircraft can be used in an offensive capacity, dropping smart bombs on targets, they generally do not have a strong air to air combat capacity. This will no doubt change over the next couple of years with the introduction of the next generation of UAV.

## **Technical Benefits of UAV combat aircraft:**

One of the primary limitations with manned aircraft is the man. People can only withstand G forces to about 12 G without blackout, and -4 G before redout. Combat aircraft are far stronger, capable of withstanding far higher G forces. Without a pilot they would be capable of tighter turns and thus be more capable in combat.

A UAV need not carry the same level of armour as piloted aircraft, nor do they need all the systems required to carry a pilot. They can be made from strong fibreglass composite materials, making them light, fast and manuverable. By using a vertical launch approach they can be located in all kinds of places without detection. Vertical launch would eliminate the undercarrage, thus improving performance and range. Parachutes would be used for "landing".



Because there are no pilots there is no need for training and maintaining combat ready pilots. By removing the requirement to maintain combat ready pilots we remove both the wear and tear on the aircraft and the risk of losing aircraft. And if we do lose aircraft the loss will be less in both cost and in terms of human life.

### **Artificial Intelligence in the UAV**

The US approach to UAV's has been to keep pilots firmly in control. The US Airforce has a requirement that a qualified pilot is always in direct manual control. This has resulted in many UAV accidents on landing. The US Army, who operates its own UAV program, uses automatic landing and autonomous control guided by operators. In other words the controllers say where to go and what to do, but do not control the aircraft itself. Targets are all human selected and weapons release is under human control.

We would develop a program to evolve flight combat software. We would use flight simulators and genetic algorithms to train the control software of the UAV's. Simulated UAV's would spend thousands of hours in flight simulators carrying out missions. Using the principles of evolution the best flight software would evolve. We would open the door to cooperative strategy with multiple UAV's communicating with each other to conduct coordinated attacks.

Unlike the US UAV program which uses human controllers, we would provide the UAV's with mission outlines, target areas and rules of engagement along with "No Fire Zones". All civilian aircraft will be grounded should an attack occur. Once launched the UAV's would follow its mission outline, which might be to scan for enemy aircraft and communicate among themselves in order to coordinate an attack. Weapons release would be totally autonomous, but only permitted outside the "No Fire Zones". These zones would be over major cities to prevent civilians from being hurt by friendly fire.

The flight combat capability of a UAV will far exceed that of piloted aircraft. Because of the cost we will also be able to build far more of them. It should be possible to use these UAV's for a variety of roles. It may also be of benefit to have a range of different style

UAV's specialized for their role.

## **Production**

### ***Airframe***

These UAV's would be produced in New Zealand. As previously stated they would be manufactured using Fibreglass composites. We have many boat companies familiar with making boats using the same technology, so retooling to make aircraft should be easily possible. This may also create a native capacity to manufacture light planes for commercial and personal use as a spin off.

### ***Engine***

Jet Engine technology is also well understood, so we should be able to build these ourselves. As I see it there will be a conventional jet engine and a solid rocket booster to get to altitude initially from a vertical position. Building a Jet Engine facility will also improve our native manufacturing capacity.

The Armament on these aircraft would primarily be radar or heat seeking missiles, also produced in New Zealand as a parallel effort.



### ***Avionics (Electronics Hardware)***

### ***Software***

Finally there is the software. The software would be developed in New Zealand by the Defense Forces in secret. Many other countries are developing UAV technology along the same lines as the US. The "secret sauce" to the New Zealand project would be the software as it would use techniques such as genetic algorithms and neural networks to develop might combat systems that are fully autonomous.

## **Financials**

The cost of piloted combat aircraft is substantial. For example, a news F-16 costs about thirty two million New Zealand dollars. Other more modern aircraft can be substantially more expensive. Modern combat aircraft also have export restrictions which makes obtaining them difficult. The reason for the high cost of these aircraft is their longevity. They are expected to operate for extensive periods to enable flight training and to keep pilots combat ready.



The point of a UAV is that it is almost expendable. For the cost of a single F-16 aircraft we could produce 320 UAV's. The cost of each aircraft should be constrained such that it is possible to economically make large numbers of them. Essentially we would use existing facilities and expertise in the civil sector to leverage into making these UAV's.

In a time of economic recession this program would inject money into New Zealand manufacturers, thus keeping resources in New Zealand, while developing new products that could be sold overseas. Specifically we could produce and sell unarmed UAV technology overseas for peaceful purposes. New Zealand needs to build its manufacturing base and expand beyond agricultural products, and this project would be ideal for helping achieve that goal.

Development costs would be in the order of twenty million dollars to develop the aircraft design, armament, and software. These projects would rely heavily on civilian technology rather than using expensive "military grade" components. Potentially this investment would become a net export earner for New Zealand.

## **Non-Combat Roles**

This technology is not only useful for combat. Its primary uses would be peaceful missions such as monitoring our territorial waters. They could be used for aerial photography or for real time observation of traffic conditions. Police could use UAV's for observation rather than helicopters, dramatically reducing costs. Scientists could use them to scan crops for diseases. Even crop dusting could be performed by UAV, delivering their payload more precisely than human pilots. Funding a military project would enable the development of UAV expertise in New Zealand. This expertise could be put to good use in peaceful applications.

## **Ethical Considerations**

The single most important consideration when it comes to autonomous weapons is the question of who makes the decision to release a weapon and when. The US approach has been to ensure that weapons release only occurs at the command of a human. US UAV technology has been limited to attacking ground targets using air to ground missiles. The use of this technology against targets that contained significant numbers of innocent civilians has resulted in substantial loss of innocent life, regardless of the fact that human beings were in control.

Native New Zealand UAV technology would primarily be used to engage hostile aircraft, usually at sea. As discussed previously there would be safeguards put in place to prevent weapons release close to populated areas to prevent civilian casualties. Intended ground targets would also be military in nature, primarily Naval vessels of an aggressor approaching New Zealand.

The role of these UAV's would be defensive; that is our objective will not be to develop long haul UAV technology to attack other countries. The objective is to provide a defensive capability to deter an attack. UAV's will respect rules of engagement more precisely than any human pilot.

## Conclusion

New Zealanders have the skills to be able to produce its own UAV technologies. We know that we are exposed and dependent on other nations for defense. By developing native capacity we could address both our defensive needs along with developing a civil capacity and export earner in the form of civil UAVs. My recommendation is that the Government fund a UAV development and deployment program.

Regards,

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

Released by the Minister of Defence

**From:** s9(2)(a)

**Sent:** Tuesday, 9 October 2001 11:39

**To:** s9(2)(a)

**Subject:** Airforce

Here is an idea on how to provide a cost effective air combat solution for NZ. The US is already developing the system I will talk about.

The current problem is that we need to maintain not only aircraft, but the pilots who fly the combat aircraft. To train and maintain pilot skill you need to use real combat aircraft - which is very expensive. In addition we currently purchase technology from overseas.

I believe there are the skills and resources within New Zealand to create an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle - or UAV. The technologies for doing this are now getting to the point of being trivial.

The advantage of UAV's are as follows:

1. **Initial Cost.** Each UAV is much cheaper to build than a manned combat aircraft. If built in NZ there would also be no money going to overseas or at least less than purchasing complete aircraft. If we build our own there might even be an opportunity to sell the UAV's to our friends like Australia, and make a PROFIT!
2. **Ongoing Cost.** As UAV's are unmanned, they do not require pilots to be continually trained. The personnel required to control the aircraft missions can be trained on the ground on the actual equipment used in a combat situation at minimal cost. They do not require infrastructure such as runways, or large air force bases. They do not require large maintenance crews.
3. **Combat Effectiveness.** Potentially UAV's are much better at 'dogfighting' than a manned aircraft. Without a requirement to have a pilot the aircraft can be designed to turn tighter, fly faster, and be much lighter. New technologies can also mean that the onboard computers are faster and more capable than any human.
4. **Less Infrastructure.** UAV's could be launched vertically from hidden locations, much like a rocket. This means that if the enemy takes out runways and other infrastructure we still have an ability to fight. UAV's would however be able to return - perhaps by parachute - to be rearmed for further missions, unlike cruise missiles which are similar to UAV's.
5. **Multiple Roles.** UAV's could be configured for various missions, such as air defence, coastal defence, and ground attack, with a variety of weapons packages - such as air to air missiles, torpedos, and large bombs.
6. **No risk to human life** (at least not on our side). UAV's can be shot down without risk to a pilots life.

I personally know that there are expertise within NZ to make such a project happen. The skills around fibreglass boatbuilding for example can be used to create fibreglass planes. I personally have the skills to develop the computer systems required to fly the aircraft, other individuals have skills in jet engine design.

It is said that NZ can't afford a defence force with sufficient ability to prevent a determined force. I believe 100 UAV's would probably be quite a force. They could do substantial damage to aircraft and shipping that approach NZ in anger. They could make control of NZ skies impossible and make troop landings by air impossible - or at least a very dangerous operation - since there would be no way to know how many UAV's were left.

Naturally not having heroic human pilots at the controls is not as romantic as having machines at the controls, but it makes a lot of economic and strategic sense.

If I were to put a price on this project, I would say \$20 Million for initial research and development, and somewhere between \$2-3 Million per aircraft. A team of say 50 - 60 engineers, would cost about \$5 Million each year to maintain the aircraft.

New Technologies - New Solutions

s9(2)(a)

## **Response from Max Bradford to my email regarding Air Defence**

Thank you for the proposal. It is one we have under review for certain capabilities needed for the air force, but I am sure you will appreciate that UAVs cannot undertake all missions that a manned combat aircraft can at least at this stage of development.

Max Bradford MP

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply- Print View Images

Defence Policy Review Submission from United Nations Association of New Zealand

Sent: 3 April 2023 1:21 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage;

CC: s9(2)(a)

Note: Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

1 Attachments

UNA NZ Defence Policy Submission.pdf (152 KB);

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Kia ora,

Please find attached a submission to the Defence Policy Review from the United Nations Association of New Zealand.

Please feel free to get in touch if you have any follow-up questions.

Ngā mihi,

s9(2)

s9(2)(a)

United Nations Association of New Zealand

[office@unananz.org.nz](mailto:office@unananz.org.nz)

0800 100 065

PO Box 24494, Wellington 8142

[unananz.org.nz](http://unananz.org.nz)

[facebook.com/unanewzealand](https://facebook.com/unanewzealand)

[twitter.com/unanz](https://twitter.com/unanz)

Released by the Minister of Defence



## Defence Policy Review Submission

Submission from the United Nations Association of New Zealand (UNA NZ) to the New Zealand Ministry of Defence.

### Principles

1. UNA NZ is dedicated to promoting the Charter of the United Nations (UN) based on common security, cooperation and international law amongst the world's nations.
2. Defence Policy Objectives (Assessment 2021, page 7)
  - a. Protecting New Zealand's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and promoting national resilience
  - b. Building a secure, stable region comprised of secure and resilient states
  - c. Contributing to the maintenance of global security and the international rules-based system
  - d. Promoting New Zealand's security through maintaining and contributing to New Zealand's security partnerships
3. The UN is central to the maintenance of global security and the international rules-based system. Major threats to global security included increased militarisation and environmental degradation. Military defence is not always a solution to the real threats. Defence policy must prioritise the protection of earth, air, and waters of all nations for the health and well-being of people and environment.
4. The nature of security issues are diverse
  - a. Need to recognise that the perception of threat may differ from the reality.
5. Central role of universal constructive international relations involving trust, cooperation, common security, and the rule of law in both the identification of threats and the response to them.
6. Recognising that increased militarisation, investment in technological weapon systems and the practice of military war games can be counterproductive to peace and security.
7. Defence Force works with other New Zealand and international entities, including the UN, in supporting our national security.

## Current Situation

8. Declining confidence in, and observance of, the rules-based international order.
9. Increased militarisation of international relations.
  - a. Enhancements of modes and capacity of military capabilities.
10. Proliferation of security threats, military and non-military.
11. Despite the above, there continues to be a substantial level of cooperative and common security systems, organisations and networks that underpin current society and the international and global services that we depend on. Global security is threatened by the declining international situation.

## Key proposals

12. Defence affirms that New Zealand security is integral with international security in general.
13. Defence re-affirms the crucial role of the rules-based international order for New Zealand and for the international community.
14. Defence recognises that New Zealand's independence in setting foreign policy and establishing relations with other countries is central to its security.
15. Defence recognises the central roles of international cooperation, conflict resolution, common security and observance of international law between nations in ensuring security against both military and non-military threats.
  - a. Defence pursues, in conjunction with other departments and nations, constructive relations with all other nations that can affect our security.
    - i. Working to develop understanding between governments and peoples.
    - ii. Seeking common interests to support collective security in accordance with international law including UN authority for New Zealand involvement in armed conflict.
    - iii. Working to resolve conflicts and animosities between nations.
  - b. Promoting principles of trust building, conflict resolution and negotiation
    - i. e.g. unarmed actions in Bougainville and Solomon Islands
16. Defence recognises that any activities that promote antagonisms amongst nations are contrary to the UN Charter and to New Zealand security interests. This is the key insight which the New Zealand Government must focus upon, to integrate defence and foreign



policy as a nuclear free peacemaker nation to protect humanity and the planet from warfare and destruction.

17. Defence works to counter actions that undermine confidence and trust between nations.
18. Defence works with other parties to ensure any military and intelligence alliances they belong to are sufficiently open and transparent to allay animosities and suspicion amongst nations.
19. Defence, in conjunction with the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), promotes research and practice in enhancing international cooperation and constructive approaches to violent action, particularly using non-violent techniques. This is the keystone of policy and requires full funding of non-violent, non-military warfare solutions. New Zealand's success in facilitation of peace in Bougainville after ten years of civil war provides an excellent model for application in other situations.
20. Defence promotes the above constructive defence principles and techniques through its network of cadet training programs. New Zealand can excel as the training ground for non-violent, non-military defence. Defusing conflicts, providing mediation services and facilitation of peacemaking agreements between warring factions is a valuable role New Zealand can play. The government and New Zealand Defence Force is well placed to develop and market these skills. This will increase economic, social and environmental security in the Pacific.
21. Defence works to engage UN agencies wherever relevant in its international activities.
22. Defence establishes policies as a whole of government process.

## UNA NZ Position

UNA NZ supports the basic principles of the New Zealand Defence Assessment 2021, along with the critical role of the UN, and promotes the central role of universal constructive international relations, involving trust, cooperation, common security and the rule of law in the identification of threats and the response to them.

For the Ministry of Defence to meet the security interests of New Zealand, its policies and practices need to be consistent with the support of such principles. This means that the promotion of international cooperation and the resolution of conflict will be major priorities for Defence. Thus, New Zealand's major contribution is to UN Peacekeeping and provision of humanitarian aid to victims of war.

In addition, New Zealand could offer peacemaking mediation to protagonists to help achieve human security of all parties. New Zealand will contribute to UN peace building to repair the infrastructure of civilian life disrupted by war, climate crises and other disasters. This is in the New Zealand national interest for defence of Aotearoa, the Pacific and global security.

Please feel free to contact [office@unanz.org.nz](mailto:office@unanz.org.nz) if you have any questions about this submission.

[United Nations Association of New Zealand | Te Roopu Whakakotahi Whenua o Aotearoa](#)

Released by the Minister of Defence



Thu 27/04/2023 7:00 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

submission to the Defence Review

To  Engage

Copied to DDMS

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

Message peace review submission.docx (14 KB)

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Kia ora, here is my submission to your review. Thank you for receiving it and thank you for reading and considering its content

Nga Mihi nui

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

s9(2)(a)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

27 April 2023

To the Ministerial Advisory Committee on Aotearoa Defence Review

### **This is my submission to Aotearoa Defence Review**

Thank you for the opportunity to submit to this review. I make the following points:

We need :

a panel for this review that includes those with a professional peace background

A comprehensive discussion/review of the purpose of our defence force

An independent foreign policy

To focus on peaceful solutions to conflict

To spend our budget on welfare not warheads

To consider effects on climate change of building and manufacturing warheads.

Not one person on the Advisory Panel has a peace background, a background that advocates for peaceful outcomes to conflict. Someone from Peace Studies at the University would be good. Therefore, the review's outcomes will not be made with balanced consideration.

"A Defence Policy Review is being undertaken to ensure that New Zealand's defence policy, strategy and planned capability investments remain fit for purpose. It will provide a roadmap for the future" I would suggest that prior to this review we need to understand what "fit for purpose" means. Does it mean fit to kill others? Does it mean building long term and positive relationships with other nations so to avert war? Does it mean what exactly? And accompanying this - what sort of roadmap? What is the end goal here? These statements are not clear. If it is to see how much better we can fight, what weapons we need, then that is not a review, it is just an opportunity for the Defence Force to see how best it can do its current job.

Is having an Armed force the best thing for Aotearoa? This review will not answer this very important question. A public debate will enable positive discussions about how we protect ourselves. It will determine if we want to spend billions of dollars on warheads or billions of dollars on welfare. A public debate would also enable to determine what is the climate cost to arming our country. It will also allow us to see who is making profit (and how much) by our military spending.

We need to have a very independent foreign policy. Aotearoa does not need to sign up with military alliances, that brings the whole country into danger of being invaded. We need to be non-aligned and we need to be focused on building strong, peaceful alliances.

We need to have a strong Peace Ministry, funding equivalent to the current defence force.

We need to stop buying warheads and put that money into welfare. Imagine the children who would benefit if they got the \$6 billion dollars allocated to defence in 2022. This was a 10% increase on actual spend in the previous year. Give that money to our tamariki, mokopuna.

Climate change is something that we are all grappling with. The increased manufacturing of warheads will increase our risk of climate damage and if we do have to use these warheads then we will be damaging our environment even more. We cannot do this. Those in the Pacific who are affected more acutely by climate change would welcome funding to help them combat that. The military money could go into that.

Released by the Minister of Defence



Sun 30/04/2023 1:35 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Additional feedback - Defence Policy Review

To  Engage

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

## NZ Defence Policy Review Submission

s9(2)(a)

### **Strategic Environment:**

There is no such thing as a benign strategic environment now or indeed in the past as New Zealand's involvements post- 2000 indicate. A multipolar strategic environment and the strategic challenges of climate change and resource depletion dictate New Zealand substantially increase defence expenditure to ensure it can follow a coherent doctrine.

### **New Zealand has bought capabilities on price rather than need:**

There has been too much politicalisation of defence capability that affects recruitment and retention. The deletion of the strike fighter capability; the lack of true towed sonar arrays or surface to surface strike missiles on the ANZAC's; LAVs designed for Europe not the Pacific; no air to surface strike missiles for the P8A or MALE drones to augment a reduction of MPA platforms; NH90's that have struggled in maritime environments; no organic RNZAF armed capability to train FAC's outside simulation.

### **New Zealand Defence Policy needs coherent doctrine:**

There is no coherent doctrine that in turn defines equipment choices and role. It has been based on what we can afford, not what is needed. That is not an invitation for costly equipment as it is recommended that we instead look to surplus Australian equipment to resurrect capabilities but in keeping with a maritime outlook.

It is posited that because New Zealand is a maritime nation with all trade crossing the ocean, by air and by sea, that we must embrace a maritime doctrine that in turn should drive equipment choices and doctrine for each of the services.

# Implications for future force design

## Royal New Zealand Navy

### **ANZAC frigates:**

- Acquire a surface-to-surface strike capability such as Naval Strike Missile as used by the USN, RN and RAN. If these become surplus, they can be put onto OPV assets deployed to sea and/or converted to operate as a mobile shore-based system by the Army.

### **Future Naval Combatants:**

- A surface vessel should not be a given and serious policy consideration be given to acquiring submarines for a modern strategic outlook than the North Atlantic in WW2.
- The RSN's 218SG "Invincible Class" offers around a month of submerged endurance due to AIP and would complement the RAN and its future SSNs as a tangible New Zealand contribution as a non-nuclear AUKUS partner. AIP SSK's are a Tier One capability, and the RNZN could leverage off allied training systems and maintenance e.g. the RAN and RSN.
- There are manifold advantages to submarines over surface combatants not counting future design options. Three boats based on the 218SG would cost under \$2 billion in 2023 dollars; an acquisition cost favourable to Type-31E frigates now building for the RN. Crew, the most-costly variable, number less than 30 on a 218SG, whereas *Te Mana/Te Kaha* have 178 crew each. Being the 'silent service,' SSK's offer sea denial, gather intelligence in the littorals and provides a means to deploy the SAS. It is a strike platform with NSM-SL likely to be in production by the 2030s. Finally, as SSBNs likely operate in our maritime area of responsibility, SSK's are an ASW platform par excellence.
- Hull numbers should be a minimum of three, however, a fourth hull would enable near continuous at sea patrols.

### **Landing Helicopter Docks:**

Released by the Minister of Defence

- The Defence Capability Plan proposal for enhanced sealift is endorsed and should be a Landing Helicopter Dock with sufficient hanger space to house and maintain 10 medium sized helicopters (or a mix of up to 12 aircraft), decks for around 40 armoured vehicles, the ability to sustain an enlarged army company with have full hospital facilities.

- An LHD is especially vital for New Zealand given the risk of natural disaster locally (Christchurch/Kaikoura earthquakes to Gabrielle). Let alone HADR in the Pacific that sees *Canterbury* well used.

- To avoid an unnecessary refit for *Canterbury*, the order should be for two vessels with one vessel in extended readiness/refit with one vessel available for deployment.

#### **Blue water Offshore Patrol Vessels:**

- To ensure constant EEZ patrols and to support pacific partners, the current OPV/IPV fleet needs to be replaced with six to eight Bluewater OPV's such as HHI's HDP-2200+. There may also be opportunities to enter government-to-government negotiations with Australia regarding its *Arafura class* (but equipped with a telescoping hanger and 57mm naval gun).
- Future OPV's should be optimised to carry modular MCM and ASW systems as USV's like what the RN is acquiring. This could be augmented by TEU containerised ASW sonar systems such as TRAPS and Captas-1. This allows capabilities to be acquired as much lower price points by bringing them to vessels going to sea, than building them into each vessel.
- Given the range of current SLBM's and the SSBNs carrying them, increasing passive sonars support the P8A as our current Tier 1 ASW platform. Moreover, we are acutely vulnerable to naval mines proven in both World Wars.
- Each new OPV should be equipped with Rotary UAVs in lieu of manned rotary wing assets, for example. the S-100 acquired by the RAN.



### **Replace the eight SH-2G(I) Seasprites:**

- This is supported and if a sub-service future naval combatant is acquired, it would allow for a reduction in aircraft from the current fleet of 8 down to 6.

### **Southern Ocean Patrol:**

- This should be a commercial icebreaker that is needed to support *HMNZS Aotearoa*, which is an ice strengthened vessel. This ensures the ability to operate in the Southern Ocean year-round and avoids the issues encountered with the current OPVs.

### **Diving Support as a Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance Ship:**

- This should be a commercially acquired vessel as per *Manawanui* with oil support vessels ideal as Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance Ships.

## Royal New Zealand Airforce

### **Replace the two B-757 with two Multi Role Tanker Transports (MRTTs):**

- The B-757's need replacement and are orphans in the Southern Hemisphere and must be replaced by widebody Multi Role Tanker Transports. The A330 MRTT is a well proven conversion of the A330 civilian aircraft with Covid-19 increasing the pool of candidate aircraft. The A330 MRTT is operated by the RAAF, the RSAF, ROKAF and the RAF meaning spares, maintenance and training are simplified.
- An A330 MRTT is a force multiplier enabling the P8A Poseidon to stay on station (by bringing fuel to the plane in the air) and enabling the C130J-30 to take off with maximum payload (similarly to be refuelled in the air like mid-Pacific). An MRTT is also a tangible coalition offer too, being able to refuel fast jets of allies.

- With a flexible configuration (VIP, austere passenger or freighter) it can carry passengers/cargo to Europe with one stop in Asia.

**Increase the C130J-30 fleet:**

- Acquire three additional C130-J Super Hercules to bring the Hercules fleet to eight aircraft that greatly enhances deployment and HADR capabilities.

**Acquire Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drones:**

- Acquire around eight Beyond Visual Line of Sight Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drones to complement the Boeing P-8A Poseidon for persistent maritime surveillance as ISR assets. Depending on platform, they can operate in a SAR role (e.g., Hermes 900) and even as ASW platforms.

**Increase the NH90 fleet to 18 operational aircraft using Australia's retired MRH-90s:**

- The RAN's/Australian Army acquisition of Seahawk and Blackhawk helicopters will see 46 MRH90 Taipans (what the Australian's designate the NH-90) become surplus. This provides an opportunity to double the RNZAF fleet that would enable NZ to offer a greatly enhanced HADR and force projection capability.
- Enter Government-to-Government negotiations with Australia to acquire 16 former MRH-90 Taipans. This would be used to increase 3 (NZ) Squadron to 9 NH-90s while standing-up a second rotary-wing squadron of 9 NH-90. The six remaining airframes to be used as donor aircraft.
- As New Zealand showed with the ex-RAN SH-2G(G) Seasprites and in the 1980's with the ex-RAN Skyhawk's, we can and do make projects work. This approach with Australian vessels, or aircraft, in the current time continues this can-do approach.

**Stand up 75 (NZ) Squadron with Australia acquiring its Eurocopter Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopter:**

- Enter Government-to-Government negotiations with Australia to acquire all 22 Eurocopter Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopter (ARH) as the Australian Army acquires the AH-64E Apache.

- The Australian Tiger's have been deployed on its much larger LHDs. A similar approach could be adopted with 75 (NZ) Squadron stood up with 15 ARH's with 7 airframes used as donor airframes. Depending on a New Zealand LHD and its hangar capacity, there could be sufficient space for up to eight medium sized helicopters and up to four armed reconnaissance helicopters to act as armed escorts.
  - This provides tangible FAC training and restores a close-air support in keeping with a marine doctrinal approach.
- Acquire additional rotary and fixed wing training aircraft:**
- Due to the increase in Rotary wing assets, five additional A109 training/light utility helicopters are likely needed, to be allotted to the new rotary wing squadron creating a combined fleet of 28 light and medium helicopters.
  - This expansion with the additional C130's, also requires additional fixed wing training aircraft to be also acquired. A flight of four Beechcraft AT6E Wolverine's, the light armed attack variant of the RNZAF's Beechcraft T6C trainer Fleet, should be acquired to provide lead-in training for the armed reconnaissance helicopters. As the AT6E is equipped with sensors, it can be used in a ISR role supporting other agencies.

## New Zealand Army

- Model and equip the regular New Zealand Army along the lines of a US Marine Littoral Regiment and deployable by air, rotary wing assets and by Landing Helicopter Dock(s).
- The LAV fleet should be transferred to Ukraine and replaced by Amphibious Combat Vehicles sufficient to equip one company with vehicle variants for command, engineering and direct fire support (i.e. 30mm canon).

- Focus should be on the acquisition ISR, portable anti-tank/vehicle based anti-tank weaponry, as well as man portable and area air-defence systems.

**-ENDS-**


Released by the Minister of Defence

Sat 29/04/2023 11:42 a.m.

s9(2)(a)

Fwd: Defence review Submission from s9(2)(a)

To  Engage; s9(2)(a)

 If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt, please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

----- Original Message -----

From: s9(2)(a)

To: "[engage@defence.govt.nz](mailto:engage@defence.govt.nz)" <[engage@defence.govt.nz](mailto:engage@defence.govt.nz)> s9(2)(a)

Date: 29/04/2023 11:39 NZST

Subject: Defence review Submission from s9(2)(a)

Defence Review Submission from s9(2)(a)

1. Although the perceived security situation around the world, including in the Pacific has become more uncertain, it would be an inappropriate and dangerous response to join military alliances with nuclear weapon states or to arm the New Zealand defence force with expensive, sophisticated and long-range attack weapons rather than those weapons most appropriate for our current roles.
2. The most appropriate roles for the New Zealand defence force are Pacific Region peacekeeping and peacemaking, disaster relief, development assistance, fisheries zones protection, search and rescue, helping prevent the spread of small arms to those people who are not part of the armed forces in Pacific countries, and nation building among Pacific Island countries.
3. The largest increase in any defence building is related to substantially improving the pay and conditions of defence staff to retain, train and pay them appropriately. It is also very desirable to greatly improve the quality and appropriateness of housing and accommodation for defence staff.
4. Most of the Pacific Island states have expressed that they do not want the militarisation and an armed race in the Pacific Ocean. Even more than with the Ukraine War competition over military bases for outside powers, pressure to arm themselves with sophisticated weapons and increased military and security tension would be outcomes the Pacific Island states simply could not afford financially or in terms development and maintaining stable democratic countries. If we were to pursue membership and the activities of AUKUS or any other alliance with a nuclear weapons state we would be tending to intensify these risks and harms.
5. What is needed are foreign affairs and defence policies that will seek common security rather than alliances and that would involve all the nations in the Pacific Region, particularly China, Singapore and Indonesia.
6. This also requires strong common action with those states on the issue of Climate Change which is the biggest and most immediate security threat to the Pacific Island states.
7. Protecting the terms of vital arms control treaties are a vital role - particularly the Treaty of Karotonga, the Antarctic Treaty, the Nuclear Weapons Ban treaty and the Arms Trade Treaty.

Regards

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence



Sat 29/04/2023 10:15 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

defence policy review

To  Engage

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Submission By s9(2)(a)

Tena koutou katoa.

I am pro peace and would prefer if Aotearoa was not involved in war. I believe talking issues through is a much better approach. I believe a comprehensive review is required. Climate changes and biological loss are both accelerating and I support decarbonization and restoration of wild places. I believe we should utilize the stuff we currently have and stop extracting. Our exploitation of the land, animals and each other is totally counterproductive - Earth Overshoot day for 2023 has come and gone. A comprehensive review should consider what benefit we get from having military abilities. I am all for humanitarian outreach and in fact we need more - Cyclone Gabrielle victims needed more help.. maybe still do. Defense can be one that defend against flood, fire, the ones that help with wellbeing, building bridges, drinkable wate.

So I ask for, more peace, more kindness, rescue support, more insulation - better for hot and cold. less war and macho power stuff. Pacific islands need us too. We have emitted GHG for too long. Thank you

Released by the Minister of Defence


Sun 30/04/2023 12:18 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Submission: Defence Strategy Review Update #6

To  Engage

Cc s9(2)(a)

 If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Defence Strategy Review

It is our belief that no decisions should be made about the armed forces until there has been a fully informed public discussion. Such a discussion would focus on the importance of ensuring the well being of all New Zealanders and make a peaceful and positive contribution to regional peace and human security, instead of NZ continuing to be actively involved in the global cycle of violence.

By just focussing on armed forces as our defence strategy the following facts remain.

- 1) There is a negative economic and social cost of maintaining armed forces.
- 2) Armed forces contribute to climate change.
- 3) Diplomacy is a better option than armed force; and the only reason to have a combat-ready armed force is for combat.

Instead we wish to see the NZDF replaced with dedicated civilian agencies, such as; civilian coast guard for inshore and offshore fisheries and resource protection, and maritime search and rescue. We'd also recommend civilian agencies specifically trained and equipped for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and land-based search and rescue as well as more funding for diplomatic efforts.

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence



Sat 29/04/2023 8:32 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

submissions, seek peace.

To  Engage

Cc s9(2)(a)

**i** Follow up. Completed on Monday, 1 May 2023.  
We removed extra line breaks from this message.

-----  
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.

Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you

- 
- 1 Australia's submarine plans are an insult. If they need nuclear powered subs, they can get French ones that use fuel that is not greatly enhanced; these more enhanced ones are only one political step away from nuclear weapon proliferation.
  - 2 Real threats are climate change and treating any countries as enemies. We are already committed to more than our share of any necessary military expenditure, by buying Poseidons for surveillance that are also suitable for military deployment. The last thing NZ needs is to subsidise and help manufacture war resources.

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence




Sun 30/04/2023 4:43 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Submission on Defence Policy Review

To  Engage

 If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your inbox. Thank you.

Kia Ora Koutou,

1. The Review process.

Having completed the Kantar survey associated with the review, I found it a very poorly-designed survey instrument, with questions directed at responses that favour the status quo and no space for answers containing even slight nuance. I conclude that the survey was in fact deliberately poorly-designed, and so I advise that **the Review Panel and Minister should not rely in any way on the survey findings**. I am happy to provide further information and examples if the Panel or Minister wish.

2. Principal challenges to our security.

It should be clear to the Government that **the biggest challenge to our security is climate change**. The Review website acknowledges the impacts of climate change as the second of two principal challenges. This emphasis is wrong: climate change must be placed first as the greatest risk to our country's security. Various consequences flow from this realistic assessment of the relative threats.

3. Core tasks.

The Review website states that "Conducting military operations is the NZDF's core task." Military operations, whether involving outright war abroad or 'peace-keeping' in other countries, cannot deal with the direct or even most of the indirect effects of climate change. While equipment like planes, ships, drones and their crews may be of assistance in New Zealand and South Pacific climate change disasters, or other events such as massive earthquakes, volcanoes etc., there is no need for these vehicles to be equipped with weapons or any materiel that is not associated with civilian rescue and rebuilding. **The core and only task of organised government forces should be civil defence.**

4. No wars on New Zealand soil.

Realistically, should some - apparently unidentifiable, but large - enemy attack our country using military force, our relatively small forces are unlikely to be able to do much except irritate the attacker. Australia might defend New Zealand out of self-interest because of proximity. But it is important to **avoid having fighting in our country which puts civilian populations and infrastructure at risk.**

5. What we can do instead.

As a very small country, too small to play against or with the world's superpowers, and hard-pressed economically, we need to realise **our best role is in moral leadership and diplomacy** for peace and non-violent resolution of international issues.

6. Use existing gear and expertise in civil defence.

The organising skills and (non-weaponry) equipment of the NZDF **can be re-purposed to meet the imminent challenges of climate change**. There is much work to be done organising and training rescue and rebuilding units throughout the country, and the expertise of current military staff would be ideal for this.

7. A timeframe for demilitarisation.

In the long-term, **current military structures need to be wound back**, by stopping recruitment of personnel and ceasing any further contracts, or withdrawing from contracts for new armed vehicles, planes and ships, or weapon systems. A timeframe is needed for the **conversion of the NZDF into a well-equipped and well-run civil defence force, with local operations around the country including both paid staff and trained volunteers.**

Thank you for your attention.

s9(2)(a)


Released by the Minister of Defence

Sun 30/04/2023 4:17 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Submission on the Defence Policy Review

To  Engage

 We removed extra line breaks from this message.

-----  
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.

Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you

-----

Tēnā koutou katoa,

Before the close of submissions at 5pm today, we wanted to take the opportunity to make a few comments about the Defence Policy Review.

1. We have chosen not to engage with your survey as the way these questions are framed makes very specific assumptions about the military that are problematic. In particular, the idea that national security is achieved by a combat ready military is not an assumption we agree with. Instead we are interested in a national security that centres real human security focused on Te Tiriti, human health and wellbeing, flourishing communities, climate action, protection of the natural environment and biodiversity, and care for the planet. Standing armies are not simply idle tools awaiting use. They are actively involved in creating situations of conflict and potential wars. The US and Chinese military training exercises around Taiwan are a recent case in point. So, too, is New Zealand's biannual participation in RIMPAC which is little more than a showcase of capabilities intended as a warning to China.
2. Aotearoa NZ needs a well-equipped and trained corp of people to deal with severe climate events, humanitarian catastrophes and natural disasters that are only set to increase in coming years. There is a huge appetite in the country for such an organisation. None of these roles require a combat training. Some of this work is done by the NZDF but only as an ancillary role to combat which also receives the bulk of the procurement. Eliminating the current combat role would free up essential resources to build a real "force for New Zealand" that could focus on ensuring the resilience that is going to become absolutely essential if we are survive the warming already locked in to our climate.
3. Moving towards greater integration with Australia, the US, the UK and NATO is moving in the wrong direction and towards greater militarism. We were greatly heartened by former Prime Minister Adern's statements indicating that increased militarism in the Pacific was not welcome. We were also heartened by Minitar Mahuta's statements stressing the importance of a free and independent Pacific. We are thus alarmed by information suggesting that New Zealand's involvement in Tier 2 of AUKUS is a "done deal", that NZ SAS and Australian SAS will be undertaking greater cooperation, and that NZ is seeking closer ties to NATO. The NZ government is locking us into the old colonial machinery, and is lining the country up to take sides in a conflict that we should be doing everything in our power to stay out of.
4. The cost of militarism is preventing us from doing the things we need here now - properly funding our health system in particular. We would like to see the billions earmarked for arms dealers to instead go to hospital infrastructure which is crumbling.
5. The systems within NZDF do not appear to be appropriate or robust. We have evidence of neo-nazis enlisting, of a culture of misogyny and sexual violence towards women, of extensive PFAS contamination around the country - yet the responses to these challenges are utterly inadequate time and time again. We do not have any confidence in the leadership of NZDF to deal with the basic running of an accountable organisation.

There is a clear need for a "defence policy review" but this highly orchestrated survey is not the way to do that. We believe that no decisions should be made about NZDF until there has been a fully informed public discussion that actually canvasses the impacts of an ongoing commitment to militarism for our social, economic and ecological future, and what genuine alternatives to this "combat ready" approach are.

Ngā mihi,

s9(2)(a)

for Peace Action Wellington

Released by the Minister of Defence



Sun 30/04/2023 3:44 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Defence Policy.Submission

To  Engage

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Here is my submission

..need of political leadership to provide for informed/public discussion re.policy

..biggest threat to our and Pacific Island nations' security is Climate Change/global warming

..NZ is NOT a client state of the USA

..reminiscent of The Emperor's New Clothes (Hans Christian Anderson),the USA is in decline and wanting to retain power at any cost

..please REMEMBER under the leadership of PM David Lange, the NZ people, we, supported the need for an Independent Foreign Policy to avoid entrapment by the war/defence policies especially of the USA

..war and war games and testing of weaponry are a MAJOR cause of Climate Change as well as the desecrating of humanity and their homes and horrible and untretractable pollution of water/food sources, etc.

..this century we have to negotiate with each other and not to war with each other

..pragmatic/realistic solutions must not be cosying up to war mongerers of any stripe including our own..it is good to remember what Caspar Weinberger thought of NZ if it was accidently erased from the world.....

..Foreign Affairs Minister Mahuta seems to approve of NEGOTIATION instead of capitulation to Aukus

..Please don't join Aukus..it's a clumsy acronym at best reminding US of the extinct AUK and doesn't bode well for any of the Pacific nations

Yours in Peace

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence



Sun 30/04/2023 1:56 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Submission on the Defence Policy Review

To  Engage

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

Message

Defence Policy Review submission - s9(2)(a)

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the contents are safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Kia ora,

Attached please find my submission on the Defence Policy Review

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

## Submission on the Defence Policy Review

It is past time that all nations move beyond using violence and the deaths of military personnel, as well as the citizens who live in areas of combat, to address conflict.

If we are to “never again” suffer or inflict atrocities upon our fellow humans, we must not prepare for the wars that repeat these atrocities.

New Zealand could make a greater contribution to regional and global peace and security by always advocating a diplomatic solution to conflict and to offer excellent trained personnel able to advance diplomatic discussions.

Rather than train soldiers, we should train diplomats.

Our New Zealand Defence Force should either transition to a civilian agency or pass over to civilian agencies the work that protects our fishing and our environment, helps during natural disasters and climate change emergencies both at home and abroad, supports search and rescue efforts and supports the police when this is needed.

If the aim of the NZ Defence Ministry is to prevent war, then it should not prepare for war, and our country should not form defence alliances with other countries.

We should not perpetuate the business of military equipment production. Military spending uses funds that are needed for other areas of essential spending.

We also need to adequately look after those New Zealanders who have previously served in the armed forces. We do not sufficiently support PTSD sufferers.

There needs to be a comprehensive political and public discussion on the economic and social costs of maintaining armed forces, and the alternatives, before decisions are made about the future of the New Zealand Defence Force.

Released by the Minister of Defence



Sun 30/04/2023 11:57 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Defence Strategy Review

To  Engage

Cc s9(2)(a)

Message Defence Strategy Review 30 Apr 2023 s9(2)(a) 193 KB

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your inbox. Thank you.

Kia Ora

Please find my submission for the Defence Strategy Review.

Ngā mihi nui  
*Kind Regards*

s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

*Poipoia te kākano, kia puāwai.*  
**Nuture the seed so that it may blossom.**

## DEFENCE STRATEGY REVIEW 2023

### INTRODUCTION

I am 76 and to my knowledge there have been no invasions of Aotearoa in my lifetime.

We have about 15,000 km of coastline which is apparently the ninth longest in the world (1). It would be impossible to patrol all coastlines to avoid being invaded by sea. We have a hard enough job to patrol our maritime Exclusive Economic Zone from 12 to 100 nautical miles and keep our fisheries safe.

We have no need for a so-called Defence Force which costs more than \$116 million per week plus the \$20 billion more this decade for military planes, frigates, other military paraphernalia and cyber warfare (2022 Budget). According to a recent Radio New Zealand (RNZ) report *The government has spent \$2.3 billion to buy new P8 Poseidons to replace the Air Force's ageing Orion planes. The fleet will be used for maritime patrols and overseas deployments, flying from Manawatu* (2).

We cannot have a well-trained combat-ready force to defend our country. A recent RNZ (Radio New Zealand) report noted that the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) has had an attrition rate of nearly 30 percent of its full-time, uniformed, trained and experienced staff over two years. This means that some ships and planes cannot be used for lack of personnel. The Defence Force has had to make two special payments this year in a bid to retain those still engaged in the Force. In addition, if new recruits come into the fold, it takes up to four years to train them (3).

### INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY

It is time for Aotearoa NZ to have a truly independent foreign policy. We have no business being in other people's wars.

We have gone to war a number of times with Britain. As many of us Pākehā have our origins in the British Isles, there was this loyalty to the "Mother Country." However, when it was time for Britain to join the European Union in

1973, there was no reciprocal loyalty shown to us in the downturn in trade with that country. We had to find new markets for our agricultural products.

We invaded Türkiye in World War 1 at great cost to both sides in lives lost or ruined. Later we invaded places like Vietnam under the umbrella of the Americans and caused endless damage to that country and its people and to our soldiers. These wars were not ours to fight. They were wars of modern imperialistic countries. Now we are training Ukrainian soldiers which effectively means that we are participating in this conflict with Russia.

By going to other people's wars we are just perpetuating war.

General Stanley McChrystal, then commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan told *Rolling Stone* in 2010 that *for every innocent person you kill, you create 10 new enemies*. Why make enemies when you could make friends?

The United States of America is the greatest threat to world peace. It has its finger in every war and it is there for its own gain. One gain is in natural resources such as oil or minerals. Another is to wield power. The USA uses its giant military industrial complex to make weapons and planes, rockets, ships and land vehicles and therefore money out of destroying other people's lives and the infrastructure of other countries. According to Noam Chomsky no president in living memory has been immune to this greed and wish to wield power (4).

New Zealand is part of the Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence alliance with Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the USA which effectively began in the 1940s (5). Part of the agreement was that member countries did not spy on each other's governments. However, documents have shown that members are intentionally spying on one another's citizens and then sharing that information amongst themselves. In 2013 Edward Snowden, an ex National Security Agency (NSA) employee in the USA, released classified NSA documents to journalists which showed the extent of the subterfuge and the activities of that organisation.


We have allowed the USA to have spy bases in our country, such as Waihopai here in the South Island. Even when we found out that they were spying on us and our Pacific neighbours, they were still not asked to leave (6).

What began as a small New Zealand company called Rocket Lab was the subject of debate in the New Zealand Parliament last year. Last October 2022



the Green Party claimed that by launching rockets on behalf of the US Defence Department (USDD) the company could be aiding the USDD to make war from space. The government (who have invested in the company) (7), and Rocket Lab have denied intending any harm but as yet, we have no rules about launching these rockets for foreign military powers.

These are all subjects for political debate but they need to be stated. It is clear as a small country we can do better, without engaging in other countries' dirty work.



## WAR & PREPARATION FOR WAR

There is nothing to recommend war especially if neither your country or near-neighbour is being invaded.

War is essentially immoral as stated by Curtis LeMay USA General later chief of Staff of the USA Air Force and even a vice-presidential candidate. It violates the third article of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) that states, *Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of Person.*

There is no such thing as a "just" war. Pope Francis has spoken of the right to defend oneself but not of any war being just. He rightly condemns the possession and use of nuclear weapons as "immoral". For Pope Francis war is essentially a lack of dialogue (8).

Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp run by the USA military has breached many human rights such as Article 5 of the UNDHR against *torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment*. Many prisoners were held indefinitely without trial and this blight on the world stage is still open. According to Wikipedia 30 remain there, 9 died in custody and 741 have been transferred elsewhere, whatever that means (9). Some years ago in New Zealand a female army padre resigned as her conscience would no longer allow her to work with a force that can kill others.



WARWICK SMITH

Kids at Whakarongo School try out a military Steyr rifle during a visit by Linton Army Base soldiers.

When I saw that the NZ Army took guns into Whakarongo Primary School in 2017 I had to speak out through a letter in the newspaper and direct emails to each member of the Board of Trustees and senior staff of the school. The soldiers allowed young children who were too young to own or to handle these guns in a normal setting to play with them (10). This also violated the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) Article 38, Clause 3 which states *Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces*. Is this what the army spends the more than \$1m that they get from the Education Budget on?



It is known that military activities cause a great deal of environmental damage which is not included in international agreements which limit emissions. New Zealand is no exception to that rule with emissions being reported as “not

occurring” as per the illustration above (11). Recently an airforce plane took Prime Minister Chris Hipkins to Australia (12). Could he not have taken a scheduled flight with Air New Zealand?

There are Defence Force sites which are closed to the public as they are used for combat practice. A Waitangi Tribunal claim was put in for that land in the North Island used for that purpose in December 2009 by Adam Heinz (13).

In 2021 RNZ reported that Devonport Naval Base was the most polluted site in the country as per a 2019 report released under the Official Information Act (OIA). At that time, it was estimated the clean-up might cost at least \$28m. In addition it was reported: *That does not cover groundwater. It also leaves out 19 other defence sites, dumps and firefighting training areas, and is focused on soil... The Defence Force has special exemptions from many of the country's hazardous substance control laws. It is meant to regularly audit how its own rules align with the laws, but has not done an audit since 2016* (14).

The New Zealand Navy has taken part in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise from at least 2012. It is the world's largest international maritime warfare exercise. RIMPAC is held biennially from Honolulu, Hawaii and hosted by the navy of the USA. Although ostensibly for countries of the pacific rim it seems to have hosted many non-Pacific countries including Norway and Russia. This exercise has been vehemently opposed by the native people of Hawaii for its devastating effects on land, water and people - especially indigenous Hawaiians, who have suffered more than 129 years of illegal occupation from the USA Navy (15).

The Defence Force spends money for weapons of destruction which could be better used to fund free health care for everyone. Schools could be better funded and more innovative ways of learning introduced. More social housing could also be built if we no longer were paying for the \$20B projected to pay for new military equipment this decade.

New Zealand is a “partner” of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the NATO website it says: *New Zealand has made valuable contributions to NATO-led efforts in Afghanistan and in the fight against piracy.* However we also know that some of our soldiers took part in the killing of some innocent Afghans which is a blot on our copybook. What is New Zealand doing taking part in such an organisation which is supposed to be in the Atlantic? Why is NATO moving into the Pacific? (16)

## **POSITIVE ROLE OF PRESENT DEFENCE FORCE IN NON-MILITARY ACTION**

As a taxpayer and an active citizen I have always supported New Zealand’s actions taken in helping our Pacific neighbours. There have been many natural disasters in which our Defence Forces have been able to relatively quickly proceed either by plane or boat or land to assist with basic needs for shelter, food and medical care. This has also been the case in the recent aftermath of cyclones and flooding in parts of the North Island.

I first learned about the New Zealand Army’s foray into Bougainville through the film *Hakas and Guitars* by Will Watson and his longer version of *Soldiers without Guns*. It seems that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs played a major role in working towards a final agreement of the warring parties at Burnham Military Camp in New Zealand in 1997. For their part the Army used Māori tikanga or practices of haka and waiata to gain the trust of the warring sides whilst in Bougainville. They also engaged the women of the warring parties by also bringing women in the army to the fore. The working together of New Zealand agencies to achieve this peaceful end of a long running conflict was an example of the way New Zealand should play its part for peace on our planet (17).

Back on 4 September 2010 when Christchurch city was struck by a 7.1 earthquake early in the morning, the Air Force was able to fly in an Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) team. The Army came from Burnham to work with the Christchurch City Council, the New Zealand Police and Civil Defence (18).


A second 6.3 earthquake on 22 February 2011 during daylight caused enormous devastation citywide. It was fortuitous that the amphibious sealift naval vessel *Canterbury* happened to be in Port Lyttelton loaded with equipment for such an event. All branches of the Defence Force played their part in helping at this very difficult time (19).

In 2019 Army engineers worked with Waka Kotahi, the New Zealand Transport Agency and Downer, an engineering and construction company, to build a Bailey Bridge in South Westland after the Waiho Bridge was washed away in a flood. The portable pre-fabricated Bailey bridge was particularly useful as it can be erected in a relatively short time (20).

During the height of the Covid pandemic in 2020 the Defence Force were able to assist with isolation and quarantine facilities working with police and customs and giving vaccinations (21).

The Navy is also available for Search and Rescue operations. It apparently assists the Department of Conservation but no examples were given on the website.

In the past the Defence Force has had a very good reputation for the offering of apprenticeships in a variety of trades (22). However in speaking today to a relative who was in the navy, I was disappointed to learn, that although the training covers all aspects of the trade skills, there is no paper qualification to be had if one leaves for civilian life.



## **A GLOBAL SECURITY SYSTEM: AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR**

I am a member of World Beyond War, a global non-violent movement to end war and establish a just and sustainable peace based in the USA (23). I have done a couple of their courses which I have found very useful but inevitably many of their examples are of wars started by the USA. However it is useful to



bust myths such as war is justified, war is inevitable and war is necessary. According to the Cultural Anthropologist, Margaret Mead: *War is an invention – not a biological need*. As not all countries engage in war, it is patently not part of human nature (24).

## DEMILITARIZE SECURITY

World Beyond War proposes a Global Security System as an alternative to war (25). They offer three broad strategies to achieve this goal.

The first is to demilitarize security. In New Zealand that would mean closing any foreign military bases such as Waihopai and Rocket Lab. It would entail closing some NZ Defence Force bases and repurposing and modernising others. Contracts for supply of expensive ships, planes and other military hardware would have to be terminated. New Zealand would withdraw from Military Alliances and find more peaceable ways of friendship and co-operation. These are just some of the basic changes which would have to be attended to.

## MANAGING CONFLICT WITHOUT VIOLENCE

The second plank of the plan is to manage conflict without violence. We saw this at Parihaka in Taranaki even before Gandhi started his non-violent campaign against the colonial government's monopoly of the salt tax. During World War 11 occupied Denmark resisted the Germans' efforts to deport Jews by smuggling them out to neutral Sweden. *The Singing Revolution* is the name given to the step-by-step process that led to the re-establishment of Estonian independence in 1991. This was a non-violent revolution that overthrew a very violent occupation. It was called the Singing Revolution because of the role singing of national songs played in the protests of the mid-1980s. There are many other stories of courage and success using non-violence.

Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, cited in World Beyond War's book on *A Global Security System* (p.38) created statistics that clearly show that from 1900 to 2006 non-violent resistance was twice as likely to succeed than armed violence. Furthermore, those democracies became more stable and less likely to revert to civil and international violence.

We need more women engaged in peace and security as the Bougainville story so clearly illustrated. After all, women comprise half the population. It is pleasing to see that four women are the present Commanding Officers of Navy ships with two more on shore women commanders as per *Navy Today* #275 which gives no date. When FARC (English translation: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the Colombian government sealed a peace deal after more than 50 years of civil war in 2016 the headline “No women, no peace” showed the part played by women in this process.

Most people in New Zealand would be unaware that we have a Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control. Phil Twyford is that minister but his role seems largely curtailed. The Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control (PACDAC) is a committee of experts that advises the Government on disarmament and arms control. It was established by the 1987 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act. If the website is up-to-date the last time the committee met was September 2022 (26). The minutes tend to give very little indication of any movement in either New Zealand’s or other governments’ policies on disarmament and arms control.

## **CREATING A CULTURE OF PEACE**

The third part of World Beyond War’s vision is a creating a Culture of Peace. World Beyond War recommended increasing the role of youth in peace and security. Tuning in with all the major religious groups all of which express the “golden rule” of “Do unto others what you would have them unto you,” is another way of reaching a lot of people. Robust, balanced, well-researched journalism is part of a working democracy and a peaceful society.

## **MY VISION FOR THE FUTURE IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND**

Firstly, no more money would be spent on arms, military equipment or any equipment for the preparation of war, military exercises or war itself whether on land, sea or in space. That means more money for Welfare not Warfare.

New Zealand would have a Ministry of Peace which would permeate all ministries as a matter of course. This would include a culture of peace in all educational institutions from pre-schools to tertiary level and beyond. Many schools already have programmes in place but this would take them further

with the aim of eliminating bullying of any sort and creating caring relationships.

The Principles of peace are the same whether it be in school, at home, in the community or internationally. These are how to solve our conflicts in win-win ways i.e. in ways that meet all people's needs. My kindergarten teaching was thus good training for my international peace and disarmament work.

Alyn Ware New Zealander & Peace Educator

Not having military alliances, we would step up our training in peace skills as mediators. Fellow Quaker and retired Foundation Director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at Otago University in Dunedin Professor Kevin Clements has been a regular consultant to a variety of non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations (27). We have other skilled practitioners who can teach, assist and mentor young people, in particular.

Learning such peace skills and training more people in skills for trading our goods and services would mean that we would continue to make friends through trade, as we do now with countries like China.

My dream is to see an unarmed Civilian Action Team (CAT) replacing the Defence Forces and other forces such as land and sea Search and Rescue and Civil Defence. It would take several years of planning to gradually make the changeover.

Young people could be invited to join for two years or more before tertiary study. If incentives, such as free university study in any subject and including reasonable living expenses, were offered, there would eventually be many people in our community who would have the skills to step up in any major emergency. At present university study is offered but only in the skills which the Defence Force requires. This would be offered to any reasonably fit person who wished to participate.

Apprenticeships would continue to be offered as before but better rates of pay, good accommodation, meals and facilities would attract more takers. Any training would be rewarded with a recognised certificate.

It is clear that the Defence Force does provide opportunities for its personnel to gain very practical and important skills. Ex military people would have some skills which would be of great use. There could be further training in areas



where expertise is needed for a new way of conducting our relationships with other countries. This would mean that they get to spend more time with their families. At least then they would not come home in a body bag.

We could continue to be available to assist our neighbours in the Pacific whenever and wherever and however needed. However we would not need ships built for military purposes and this would be an enormous saving.

Money saved, by not spending on military gear could be spent on teaching Peacemaking, on Housing, Health and Education.

CAT personnel could have overseas peace postings if requested by other countries and if the individuals chose to go. It is noted in Gittins (75) that according to Mel Duncan of Nonviolent Peaceforce the cost for a professional, paid, unarmed civilian peacekeeper was \$50,000 per annum whereas a soldier in Afghanistan cost \$1m per annum.

I rest my case that peacemaking costs less than war making and is better for everyone.

1. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coastline\\_of\\_New\\_Zealand](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coastline_of_New_Zealand)
2. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/488684/defence-force-new-zealand-facing-big-decisions-for-strategy-review-says-chris-hipkins>
3. <https://www.1news.co.nz/2023/04/03/military-pays-personnel-up-to-10k-each-to-stay-in-jobs/>
4. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5BXtgq0Nhsc>
5. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five\\_Eyes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Eyes)
6. <https://pmc.aut.ac.nz/pacific-media-watch/region-nz-spies-pacific-neighbours-secret-five-eyes-global-surveillance-9147>
7. [https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/peter-beck-the-man-with-the-one-million-horsepower-rocket/ZCZTPRVDPNQK37AADFCNVP5U/?c\\_id=3&objectid=11715402](https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/peter-beck-the-man-with-the-one-million-horsepower-rocket/ZCZTPRVDPNQK37AADFCNVP5U/?c_id=3&objectid=11715402)

8. <https://cruxnow.com/vatican/2022/07/pope-francis-confirms-right-to-defense-but-insists-on-rethink-of-just-war-doctrine>
9. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guantanamo\\_Bay\\_detention\\_camp](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guantanamo_Bay_detention_camp)
10. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/comment/editorials/93521007/editorial-kids-in-primary-schools-dont-need-to-play-with-guns>
11. <https://militaryemissions.org/>
12. <https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2023/02/chris-hipkins-travelling-to-australia-to-meet-with-anthony-albanese.html>
13. Wai 2180 by Adam Heinz
14. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/449527/defence-force-s-most-polluted-bases-revealed>
15. <https://fpif.org/a-call-to-cancel-rmpac-in-hawai%CA%BBi/>
16. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_52347.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52347.htm)
17. <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/cn/about-us/mfat75/bougainville-a-risky-assignment/>
18. <https://navymuseum.co.nz/explore/by-themes/1970-today/christchurch-earthquake/>
19. <https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/nzdf/what-we-do/supporting-people-and-communities/a-devastating-earthquake/>
20. <https://www.contactairlandandsea.com/2019/04/02/nz-army-engineers-assisting-on-longest-bailey-bridge-build-since-wwii/>
21. <https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/nzdf/significant-projects-and-issues/covid-19-response/>

Released by the Minister of Defence

22. <https://www.defencecareers.mil.nz/army/careers/apprenticeship-trades/>
23. <https://worldbeyondwar.org/who/>
24. <https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/margaret-meads-war-theory-kicks-butt-of-neo-darwinian-and-malthusian-models/#:~:text=Mead%20proposed%20her%20theory%20of,fact%20that%20not%20all%20societies>
25. World Beyond War *A Global Security System: An Alternative to War* Ed Phill Gittins 5<sup>th</sup> Edition
26. <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/peace-rights-and-security/disarmament/pacdac-public-advisory-committee-on-disarmament-and-arms-control/>
27. <https://www.otago.ac.nz/ncpacs/staff/otago014259.html>

s9(2)(a) [Redacted]

30 April 2023

s9(2)(a) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

s9(2)(a) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Released by the Minister of Defence





# Peace Movement Aotearoa

PO Box 9314, Wellington 6141, Aotearoa New Zealand. Tel +64 4 382 8129  
Email [icanz@xtra.co.nz](mailto:icanz@xtra.co.nz) Web site [www.converge.org.nz/pma](http://www.converge.org.nz/pma)

---

Ministry of Defence  
Email [engage@defence.govt.nz](mailto:engage@defence.govt.nz)

29 April 2023

## Submission: Defence Policy Review

Thank you for the opportunity to provide a written submission on the 2023 Defence Policy Review and for agreeing to our requests that the deadline for all written submissions be extended. Our comments below are grouped in 5 sections:

- A. Introduction
- B. Concerns about this Review
- C. What a genuine Review would look like
- D. Specific issues raised in the Review
- E. Recommendation

### A. Introduction

Peace Movement Aotearoa is the national networking peace organisation, established in 1981 and registered as an Incorporated Society in 1982. Our purpose is networking and providing information and resources on peace, humanitarian disarmament, justice and human rights issues. We have extensive national networks which include more than one hundred and fifty representatives of national or local peace, disarmament, human rights, justice, faith-based and community organisations.

Promoting disarmament and the realisation of human rights - in relation to social, economic, environmental and climate justice - are essential aspects of our work because of the crucial role these have in sustaining peaceful and just societies. We regularly provide information to United Nations human rights treaty monitoring bodies and to Special Procedures and mechanisms of the Human Rights Council<sup>1</sup> on a range of peace, human rights, disarmament and justice issues in Aotearoa New Zealand, including the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC), the Women, Peace and Security agenda, military conduct, the impacts of military activities and military spending.

### B. Concerns about this Review

We have serious concerns about the authenticity of this Review, which is based on outdated narrow notions of “military security”, rather than real human security that is focused on

human health and wellbeing, flourishing communities, climate action, protection of the natural environment and biodiversity, and care for the planet.

There is an underlying assumption that New Zealand will continue to have, and expand, combat-ready armed forces into the future: essentially, endless preparations for war. Yet none of the activities referred to in the Review online survey require combat-ready armed forces - except of course, combat.

The online survey, which apparently forms the bulk of public input into the Review, was framed in such a way as to ensure that a positive response to any of the questions would be used to justify increased levels of annual military spending and militarisation: for example, the first section had a list of activities - described inaccurately as NZDF roles - including humanitarian assistance, fisheries protection, transporting conservation supplies, disaster relief, hosting government events, search and rescue etc; and asked participants to rate "how important you think each is to New Zealand". It did not ask if it is appropriate or necessary to have combat-ready armed forces doing these activities, and there was no opportunity for submitters to make that distinction.

### **What a genuine Review would look like**

It is our view that this public consultation should have started by asking whether New Zealand needs armed forces; with a fully informed public discussion on the extent to which military activities and costs may be detrimental to real security that meets the needs of all, resilience and sustainability.

Such a discussion would focus on the importance of ensuring the wellbeing of all New Zealanders and making a peaceful and positive contribution to regional peace and human security, instead of New Zealand continuing to be actively involved in the global cycle of violence; and it would examine seven key issues:

- **the economic and social costs of maintaining combat ready armed forces** - including whether annual expenditure of \$6+ billion<sup>2</sup> for the foreseeable future, and the \$20 billion dollars allocated over the next decade for increased combat capability - including warships and military planes - and cyber warfare capacity, is the most productive use of public money that could otherwise be used to enhance human security, resilience, and sustainability for all New Zealanders;
- **the environmental and biodiversity costs of military operations here and overseas** - including the impact of military training, exercises and combat operations on the environment and biodiversity;
- **the impact of military activities on climate change** - including military consumption of non-renewable resources, military emissions, and the diversion of human and financial resources to military activities (see also section D.ii below);
- **the human rights implications of military training and overseas deployments** - including the NZDF's compliance with OPAC and other human rights instruments, and humanitarian law; the impact on New Zealand's reputation when military training and

exercises (here and overseas) or combat operations are conducted with the armed forces of states that are engaged in gross human rights violations, such as Indonesia in West Papua, or when New Zealand armed forces deployed overseas may be involved or implicated in such violations, and / or violations of humanitarian law;

- **issues around disarmament legislation and policy** - including whether military activities and cooperation with the armed forces of nuclear weapons states are a breach of the aiding and abetting provisions of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987, Section 5; whether it is desirable for New Zealand armed forces to be engaged in military training or deployments with armed forces that may use weapons prohibited by New Zealand law (including nuclear weapons, cluster munitions and landmines), or that are not a state party to the international disarmament treaties that New Zealand has joined, or that may be engaged in activities contrary to the 2022 Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas which New Zealand has endorsed; and if military training or deployment with those states may be detrimental to the overall international disarmament and arms control regime;
- **foreign policy implications** - including whether we could be making a more peaceful and positive contribution to global peace and security. We note in this regard that successive governments have placed much emphasis on their “independent” stance and making “a positive impact on international peace and security”, but can a foreign policy based on military alliances and allegiances, and apparently endless preparation for war as part of the global cycle of violence really be considered to be either independent or positive? Surely a genuinely independent and positive foreign policy would focus on diplomatic initiatives, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and so on that are aimed at preventing armed conflict, rather than militarised responses; as well as humanitarian assistance and diplomatic support for peace and reconciliation processes during, and after, situations of armed conflict, as well as an increased focus on promoting disarmament; and
- **alternatives to armed forces** - with the exception of combat, all of the “roles” that were listed in the online survey can be done by dedicated civilian agencies specifically trained and equipped for these purposes: fisheries and resource protection, maritime border control, and maritime search and rescue by a civilian coastguard with inshore and offshore capabilities, equipped with a range of vehicles, vessels and aircraft that are suitable for our coastline, Antarctica and the Pacific, which - along with equipping civilian agencies for land-based search and rescue, and for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance here and overseas - would be a much cheaper option as none of these require expensive combat hardware.

#### **D. Specific issues raised in the Review**

According to the Review information, it “*is important to make sure future investments are fit-for-purpose in a dynamic security environment, with a Pacific region grappling with climate change and the intensification of strategic competition*” - but the “investments” we really need to ensure a liveable future are those focused on achieving social justice and



climate justice, not militarisation. Our comments on two of the issues raised in this quote are included below.

**i) Intensification of strategic competition:** As with any competition, New Zealand has a choice as to whether it gets involved or not - it is not compulsory. There are many far more positive contributions we could be making to regional and global peace and security instead of choosing to be drawn in to “great power” rivalry.

The current rhetoric from media commentators, military personnel and politicians about the strategic threat from China’s increasing military spending and militarisation of the region is over-hyped and lacks balance: for example, there is seldom any reference to the US level of military spending, or that the latest global military spending figures clearly show that the US spends more than the ten next highest military spending states (including China) combined, or that the US has far more military bases in the Pacific (and elsewhere) than any other state.

In the face of intensifying strategic competition, New Zealand’s focus must be on increased diplomacy rather than increased militarisation. We note that in last year’s Budget, the amount allocated for MFAT - which includes all of New Zealand’s diplomatic activity, disarmament work, overseas development assistance, humanitarian aid, and more - was equivalent to less than 30% of the amount allocated to military spending. Imagine the difference it would make to New Zealand’s relationships with governments and communities in other parts of the world if those figures were reversed.

Now more than ever, with the future of life on earth at stake, states must work together to find sustainable solutions, instead of continuing to pour public money into destructive military activity - the ultimate in unsustainability.

It is more essential than ever before that New Zealand’s domestic, regional and international focus must be on cooperation for action on climate change; on working to ensure a decent standard of living for all, and that health and social welfare systems can function well in national, regional or global emergencies; and on promoting climate justice, flourishing communities and care for the planet - not on strategic competition.

**ii) Pacific region grappling with climate change:** We agree this is the major security threat to the region and to Aotearoa, with increasingly frequent severe weather events and rising sea levels.

However, what is not mentioned in the Review information is that military activities are a major contributor to climate change, with the global military carbon footprint estimated to be at least 5.5% - exceeded only by the carbon footprint of China, the US, and India. In addition, military spending and the focus on maintaining combat-ready armed forces are draining the financial and human resources urgently needed for action on climate change.

There is an increasingly desperate need for climate funding for the Pacific and for communities affected by sea level rises and extreme weather events here in Aotearoa, as well as for practical assistance in the form of equipment and personnel: as mentioned above, this - along with other activities such as humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, and so



on - are better done by specifically trained and equipped civilian personnel, which would also cost far less than using unsuitable military equipment and combat-trained personnel. Surely action on the climate emergency which threatens the future of life on earth must be the priority instead of endless preparations for war?

Some of the other issues facing the Pacific were referred to in the Review online survey, and again these needs can be better met and addressed more cheaply by civilian agencies, such as a civilian coastguard with vessels and aircraft for inshore and offshore fisheries and resource protection, maritime search and rescue, and border control when required.

## E. Recommendation

Our main recommendation is that no decisions should be made about the armed forces until there has been a fully informed public discussion, as outlined in the 'What a genuine Review would look like' section above. In the interim, serious consideration must be given to replacing the NZDF with dedicated civilian agencies, such as a civilian coastguard for inshore and offshore fisheries and resource protection, maritime search and rescue, and border control; and civilian agencies specifically trained and equipped for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and land-based search and rescue.

A transition from combat-ready armed forces to civilian agencies, along with increased funding for diplomacy, would ensure New Zealand could make a far more positive contribution to wellbeing and real security for all New Zealanders, and at the regional and global levels, than it can by continuing to maintain and re-arm small but costly armed forces.

Thank you for your consideration of our submission.

s9(2)(a)

## References

<sup>1</sup> For example, to the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People in 2005; to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2007, 2013 and 2017; to the Human Rights Committee in 2009, 2010, 2014 and 2016; to the Committee on the Rights of the Child in 2010, 2011, 2016, 2020, 2022 and 2023; to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 2011, 2012, 2016 and 2018; to the Committee Against Torture in 2015; to the Human Rights Committee for the General Discussion on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 2015 and 2017; to the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the Draft General Comment on Article 4 of the Convention (Public Spending) in 2015 and on the Draft General Comment No. 26 on Children's Rights and the Environment with a Special Focus on Climate Change in 2023; to the Biennial Reports of the UN Secretary-General on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education; and jointly with the Aotearoa Indigenous Rights Trust and others, to the Human Rights Council for the Universal Periodic Review of New Zealand in 2008, 2009 and 2014.

<sup>2</sup> The total across the three Budget Votes where most military expenditure is itemised: Vote Defence Force \$4,898,349,000; Vote Defence \$1,177,959,000; and Vote Education \$1,177,959,000. Vote Defence is included because the Ministry exists solely to provide support to the NZDF, military advice to government etc.



Sun 30/04/2023 3:54 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Defence Policy Review

To  Engage

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

Message Defence\_Review\_2023\_StAndrews\_commentsApril23.docx (66 KB)

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Kia ora  
Please find attached comments in response to the Defence Policy Review consultation made by St Andrew's On The Terrace.  
Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to this important work.  
Kind regards.

s9(2)(a)  
St Andrew's Parish Council  
30 The Terrace  
Wellington 6012  
[office@standrews.org.nz](mailto:office@standrews.org.nz)

Released by the Minister of Defence

27<sup>th</sup> April 2023

### **St Andrews comments to the Defence Policy Review 2023**

This submission is made by the Parish Council of St Andrew's on The Terrace, Wellington. St Andrew's on The Terrace is a Presbyterian congregation, first established in 1840 with a long and distinguished record of working for social justice and human rights. St Andrew's declared itself to be 'peace church' in August 1983<sup>1</sup> and has a long history of engagement with issues of peace and justice. These comments are in response to the public consultation by the Ministry of Defence as part of the Defence Policy Review<sup>2</sup>.

Working as part of the worldwide peace initiatives of the international Christian community as well as those of other faiths is central to the life of our faith community. The vision of peace is grounded in the understanding that God's love seeks for all people to know life in all its fulness, that the work of faith is to seek to be agents of peace and reconciliation in our communities and in the world<sup>3</sup>.

### **Summary of Key Points**

**Strategic Context:** We urge the Government to undertake a comprehensive re-orientation of strategy to genuinely respond to real and identified needs in 2023 and beyond. Those challenges are climate change, disaster and emergency response in this country and the Asia Pacific region and fisheries protection in Aotearoa New Zealand territorial waters.

We do not agree with the analysis that "strategic competition" should be prioritised in policy. We believe the peace and security of our nation over the medium to long term is better served by an independent and de-militarised approach to rights-based global citizenship as a nation.

**Capabilities and Resourcing:** Around \$6 billion of the annual government budget in 2022-23 is allocated to resourcing a combat-ready military. In addition to this, forward capital commitments of more than \$20 billion have been announced to purchase new military aircraft and warships. We believe this is a very inefficient use of resources that could be

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.standrews.org.nz/social-justice>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.defence.govt.nz/engage/what-is-the-defence-policy-review/>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.oikoumene.org/resources/documents/statement-on-the-way-of-just-peace>



better applied to providing services that deliver immediate as well as longer term benefit and security to New Zealanders through an efficient civilian coastguard service. Such a service would be equipped to deal effectively with disaster and emergency response in this country and the Asia Pacific region and fisheries protection in Aotearoa New Zealand territorial waters.

### **Independent and Peace-oriented Strategy**

The areas of our country's security addressed in the current review need to be seen in the context of wider international relations issues our country and region face. New Zealand's foreign policy and international trade interests rely heavily on our country being seen as a constructive and independent voice in foreign relations. The leadership shown by Pacific countries, including New Zealand, in initiating the international ban on nuclear weapons that is now on a path to ratification, is an example of what can be achieved when our focus as a nation is on promoting peaceful and ethical solutions to the very real and existential threat of nuclear weapons.

We wish to see New Zealand in its international relations focus all available resources on such work alongside organising, planning and preparing the Pacific to mitigate and respond to the impacts of climate change. One example of this could be, initiating a civilian Pacific 'Peace Corps' to support Pacific countries that are without military to organise their own resources and access international development aid and assistance that does not come with unwanted 'extras' such as pressure for military bases, military exercises and weapons testing.

### **Genuine Review of Armed Forces Needed**

St Andrews on The Terrace urges the New Zealand Government to comprehensively review the need for combat-ready armed forces that are hugely expensive yet offer little or no real security. We would welcome full discussion of basic principles of security and alternatives to armed forces. Such a discussion must address the opportunity cost of military spending compared to other urgent social and environmental priorities, the environmental impact of military activities in this country and overseas, tensions with New Zealand's legislated commitments to being nuclear-free, commitments to supposedly "independent" foreign policy, and the human rights aspects of overseas military deployments.

### **Outdated Understanding of Security**

Our country's approach to national security needs to be much broader than focusing on "military security", instead deciding how we prioritise resources based on real human



security. Our country is at risk of failing to address the real issues of human health and wellbeing, flourishing communities, climate action, protection of the natural environment and biodiversity, and care for the planet.

Internationally, military spending is so unimaginably high, estimated at US\$2,113 billion in 2022 or nearly \$6 billion every day, channelling resources away from the struggle to feed and provide food, clean water and basic amenities to millions of people worldwide. Continuing to participate in this wasteful military expenditure means failing to help prevent the deaths of 14,000 children who die each day from mainly preventable causes such as lack of access to such basic needs. New Zealand has the opportunity to choose to take leadership in moving to a de-militarised approach to foreign relations.

Within this country more than \$6 billion annually is allocated to military spending which is focused on combat-ready armed responses that are very poorly suited to meeting other non-military purposes such as search and rescue and disaster response. These funds could be far more effectively used to fund a civilian coastguard service well equipped to do disaster response, fisheries patrol and search and rescue, none of which requires expensive weapons and military hardware. Resources could be freed up for investment in, for example: Pacific climate change mitigation and responses or to reduce poverty and provide affordable housing. It is time for our country to 'budget for peace' recognising this is where we can make the greatest contribution to real human security in this country and globally.

Released by the Minister of Defence



Sun 30/04/2023 3:14 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Submission on the NZ Defence Strategy- Review No. 6.

To  Engage

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

Message Submission on NZ Defence Review April 2023.doc (29 KB)

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

To New Zealand Ministry of Defence,  
34 Bowen Street,  
Wellington.

Please find attached my submission on the NZ Defence Strategy- Review no.6.

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

## Submission on the New Zealand Defence Strategy Review No. 6.

### I wish to make the following comments:

I believe that the New Zealand public are inadequately informed on the issues surrounding the efficacy of running highly expensive armed forces vis-à-vis the immediate need to administer eg. climate change prevention procedures, and to provide and equip coastguard and fisheries protection vessels, land-based and maritime search & rescue and improvement of diplomatic relations. It should be noted too that to use military personnel and equipment for these non- military functions is more costly than when done by the proper civilian agencies, and that military expenditure is a major contributor to climate change. Diplomacy is a better option than using armed force.

The major threat to New Zealand and our Pacific neighbours at present are unusually extreme weather events, and rising sea levels. Money spent on the military, which is spending on preparing for combat, means less funds available to mitigate the effects of climate change, a more immediate threat. New Zealand's commitment to Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control in general displays our wish to contribute to a peaceful world, free from warfare of any nature. Meanwhile, it is alarming to see Australia's present huge increase in militarisation. None of our real current national security objectives would be reached by combat ready military means, a continual drain on resources. Furthermore, any future military alliances could lock us into an alliance with a country which has features otherwise incompatible with New Zealand's military outlook at the time.

### I wish to make the following recommendations:

- 1). That a full, comprehensive review be carried out prior to any decisions made on the future of our armed forces including surveying a fully informed New Zealand public.
- 2). That the New Zealand Defence Forces be replaced with dedicated civilian agencies, sometimes called "civilian based defence" such as; a civilian coastguard for inshore and offshore fisheries; disaster relief; maritime and land based search and rescue, trained and equipped for humanitarian assistance. Efforts in diplomacy would need to be strengthened.

s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)



Sun 30/04/2023 4:59 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Defence review 2023 - submission

To  Engage

**i** Follow up. Completed on Tuesday, 2 May 2023.

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

Message Defence Review - submission 2023.docx (18 KB)

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Hello Defence Review,

Attached is my submission to the Review. Thank you for accepting my submission.

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence



# Defence Review 2023 - Submission

## Context

What is truly remarkable here in 2023 is the new Australian understanding of the 2023 context and its remarkable, destabilizing, and dangerous proposed changes. Nuclear powered submarines, so outdated and aggressive. Even more aggressive a long distance missile? Dangerous to the point of courting suicide. There is no cold war. The Cold War post-WWII was a time which ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Transferring the cold war mentality onto the Pacific with a new emphasis on China is too easy, dangerous and counter productive. Now, we see only hot wars.

## Introduction

What is "defence"?

The term was long ago twisted to include goals and actions which are more often offence than defence, an attempt to gain advantage and dominance, many times in other parts of the world beyond the home country. In this submission I will try to identify what roles are actually needed for true defence and expose misconstrued roles which are not properly defence. True defence will require very little of the combat ready 'defence force' which seems to be the focus of the Defence Review.

There needs to be a comprehensive review of Aotearoa/New Zealand's security needs. No decisions should be made until there has been a fully informed public discussion.

## What constitutes true 'security'?

Climate change and natural resource depletion, disease, poverty, inequality and natural disasters are and will be defining challenges moving on to a hopefully sustainable future. Putting priorities on housing, food, health care and a future for their children are true security requirements. Low inequality results in a greater good for all, but for 40 years inequality has risen. Old perceived threats will take a back seat, or will be exposed as contrarily contributing to insecurities, in the future. These security issues will always be defined by the larger needs of society and the globe.

# Analysis of challenges and priorities

## Natural disasters

Cyclone Gabrielle and the 'rain bomb' on Auckland shows how far the threat of so-called 'natural disasters' has been advanced in our time. Climate change is clearly a part of these effects. This has revealed the insufficiency of national planning which should involve several civilian agencies, including relief capabilities which will not need combat ready troops of equipment. There has been a 'disaster research' effort going on since the 60s in the USA begun at the University of Delaware, USA. A/NZ has clearly not been doing its homework and planning. A proper capability for these roles is not combat ready, rather special purpose designed equipment and training for that role.

## Coastal and resource protection

Providing assistance to vessels in difficulty would be necessary and to assist in environmental cleanups after ship wrecks. Other maritime roles would include the ability to monitor and police activities of fishing vessels, oil drilling operations, etc., to protect natural ecosystems and their contribution to the health of the planet, such as to protect fish populations (sometimes in the form of strong fishing quotas) and to prevent illegal fishing intrusions such as whaling, and also to protect worker rights. Fishing quotas and whaling, fishing bans and employment laws are legally based on national and international law (e.g. United Nations and other treaties) and should be enforceable. Vessels, equipment and training appropriate to those roles must be available (too often equipment and training in NZ armed forces are designed for interoperability with US forces and inappropriate to the needs of real threats). These roles could be called 'coast guard' duties.

These roles must not be misconstrued as primarily to protect private commercial interests. Operations like fishing could just as well be publicly run. Also these roles should not be construed as intended to restrict other peoples' and nation's customary rights or to pursue economic dominance on behalf of interests in New Zealand or its allies.

## Ecosystem destruction by the military

The first priority of medicine or aid is to do no harm. But the NZ military in its training sites has been damaging. This contradicts the roles suggested in the previous section. Participation in the RIMPAC exercises in Hawaii does the same thing and that is not even a New Zealand operation.

## Financial costs of the NZ military

The New Zealand taxpayer funds more than 3.5B\$ each year (Billion!) for the NZ military. Given the many counterproductive ways it currently operates as discussed in previous sections of this submission, this amounts to another example of doing harm before actual needs are addressed. Useful climate change projects are being ignored.

# Overseas roles – United Nations

There are potential international roles to play similar to the ones described above on behalf of the United Nations, but New Zealand must be careful which ones to get involved in. Too easily the UN can be manipulated to serve the interests of the dominant nations (e.g. see “war on terror” below). Often times it is the elites (now called ‘oligarchs’, multi-billionaires) in each nation who benefit from such actions. There is no future in continued widening of the gap between the super-rich, the middle class and the poor. New Zealand would do better to make a non military contribution. Training of Ukranian military personnel is an example of something that could go wrong.

## Summary

The current military with its combat ready emphasis of purpose, equipment, and expenditure, is a counterproductive influence on New Zealand’s needs as described above throughout the submission. The ‘Defence Force’ should be drastically modified to fit real needs as described in the submission, or perhaps disbanded so that a fresh start could be made.

**Defence Review 2023 Ministry of Defence PO Box 12703 WELLINGTON 6144**

Submitted by:

s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)

30 April, 2023



Sun 30/04/2023 4:41 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Defence Strategy Review Update #6 Submission

To  Engage

We removed extra line breaks from this message.

Message Ministry of Defence. Strategic Review. 30.04.23.odt (22 KB)

-----  
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization.

Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you

-----

To Whom it may concern,

Please find attached my Submission to the above.

Yours Faithfully

s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence

## Defence Strategy Review Update #6 Submission

Please find herewith my Submission for the above Review:

Firstly, I might voice my displeasure of the heading photo on the page “What is the Defence Policy Review.” I find it somewhat offensive to show a happy smiling face on the military fatigues clad individual carrying a gun. This, I think, is totally inappropriate where the focus of combat is concerned. Do you really consider combat engagement that enjoyable?

I will keep this submission brief, but there are factors which I question the wisdom on and in other cases totally disagree. I will support these findings in my comments.

Firstly, on page headed “ Strategic Environment” under bullet point Strong international security partnerships and alliances. While these points are very important for co-operation and wellbeing of all nations, it is a matter of how this is achieved that is the crucial point. In this day and age of increasing violence and warfare, the obvious tendency is - apart from sanctions - to use military force.

**We should not be party to either of these scenarios.** All too often, dialogue, compromise and negotiation are ignored. We MUST NOT be party to those who use these tactics.

For this reason we should – no – MUST not become party to those who use these techniques. And the way to implement this is by being totally non-aligned and Neutral. This does not mean that we don't need a military but its use must be solely for defence of our own shores and for search and rescue and the like. There are still many Nations that are Neutral – Switzerland maintained this state, even with the Second World War raging around its borders. We do not need to support other people's wars, especially when we have no conflict with that State.

And for this reason, we MUST NOT join NATO. This organisation has changed dramatically from its original concept to its present day characteristics. It is no more

now than a defence organisation but simply a virtual militarised extension to another country with strong hegemonic and belligerent exploits. We can well see the devastation of the war in Ukraine, all based on the failure of basic agreements and future threats enacted and posed by this organisation and its partners.

We Must Not be party to this. Nor can we afford the financial cost of belonging to - or the obligations posed by becoming party to this organisation.

Note on the page headed “ Strategic Competition” the so-called illegal invasion.

As for the war itself, we should not have engaged in this proxy war either.

No mistake, Putin do not start this conflict but was drawn into it – 8 years late – to save the Russian people in the Ukraine. Again, this is further reason why we should distance ourselves from these conflicts which do not directly concern us.

We are in a unique position, sitting virtually in the middle of a vast ocean space. We can “stay safe, by being Neutral – or become a sitting duck” if we take the wrong side. And we don’t have an easy escape!

Also on this page is mentioned Strategic Competition. We are are small world now. More important that we can co-exist and work together in harmony. Only by fair and honest trading can this be achieved. Not, as we know others do, by trying to “take down” so-called opponents. This is where our civilisation must grow to adulthood and not act like bullying adolescent school children, who still have not learnt. Again, we must distance ourselves from this behaviour and those who employ these tactics.

Again, another concern is the AUKUS agreement, which we should have nothing to do with. It is fundamentally an extension of warmongering, where by building yet another organisation of conflict, it also requires further massive funding – and for what purpose, when de-escalation of war and nuclear threats is of far greater importance. And Australia, for example, seem to have walked into snare where, by spending a massive amount of taxpayer funding, will apparently be required to “lend” these submarines to the UK. Well done. Theoretically, none of these organisations

should be necessary, but of course in a far from perfect world, we at least do not need to become a further contributor to the chaos. In fact, we could well become an example to the world and encourage peace. Yes, I know there will be plenty who will laugh at this – but tell me how else are you going to achieve it? And New Zealand can and has proved previously been an example to the world.

30/04/2023

s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)

s9(2)(a)

Released by the Minister of Defence



Sun 30/04/2023 3:56 p.m.

s9(2)(a)

Re: Defence review submission preview

To  Engage

**i** Follow up. Completed on Tuesday, 2 May 2023.

If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of the organization. Do **not** follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

**Defence Review 2023 - Submission (outline only, will send whole submission before 5:00pm)**

**Context**

**Introduction**

**What constitutes true ‘security’?**

**Analysis of challenges and priorities**

**Natural disasters**

**Coastal and resource protection**

**Ecosystem destruction by the military**

**Financial costs of the NZ military**

**Overseas roles – United Nations**

**Summary**



The current military with its combat ready emphasis of purpose, equipment, and expenditure, is a counterproductive influence on New Zealand's needs as described above throughout the submission. The 'Defence Force' should be drastically modified to fit real needs as described in the submission, or perhaps disbanded so that a fresh start could be made.

**Defence Review 2023 Ministry of Defence PO Box 12703 WELLINGTON 6144**

s9(2)(a)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Hello Defence Review,

Shortly I will forward an outline of my Defence Review Submission.

Sincerely,

s9(2)(a)

[Redacted]

Released by the Minister of Defence

[Reply](#) [Print](#) [View Images](#)

Submission to New Zealand Defence Policy Review 2023

Sent: 30 March 2023 3:52 PM

From: the42group

To: Engage;

**Note:** Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

1 Attachments

42 Group - Defence Policy Submission March 2023 - signed.pdf (1 MB);

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to [spam@nzdf.mil.nz](mailto:spam@nzdf.mil.nz) and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Good afternoon,

42 Group is a small New Zealand-based independent think tank. It is not associated with any government, governmental body, commercial body, or lobby group. It is self-funded, consists entirely of New Zealand citizens and has no affiliation with any political party.

Please find attached our submission to New Zealand's 2023 Defence Policy Review, - which we would also be happy to discuss, or present in person.

42 Group  
[the42group@protonmail.com](mailto:the42group@protonmail.com)

Sent with [Proton Mail](#) secure email.

Released by the Minister of Defence

# 42 GROUP

Submission

New Zealand

Defence Policy Review 2023

Released by the Minister of Defence

March 2023

## About 42 Group

42 Group is a small New Zealand-based independent think tank. It is not associated with any government, governmental body, commercial body, or lobby group. It is self-funded, consists entirely of New Zealand citizens and has no affiliation with any political party.

Released by the Minister of Defence

## Contents

1. Background .....	4
2. Strategic context in 2023 .....	5
3. What has been demonstrated militarily since 2020? .....	6
The power of a mobilised population .....	6
A2/AD defences .....	6
Unmanned Systems .....	10
The gravity of urban environments .....	11
The need to be able to defend New Zealand unassisted.....	12
4. Defence policy submission 2023.....	13
5. Defence policy recommendations 2023 .....	14
6. Conclusion.....	16

Released by the Minister of Defence

## 1. Background

The 42 Group's last report on the global strategic environment and its impact on New Zealand defence policy was released in August 2020.

That report built on previous publications, which had responded both to a worsening global security environment – and the Ministry of Defence's Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 - by publishing a list of defence policy recommendations.

Those recommendations reflected the group's belief that:

- Increasing global insecurity, spurred on by climate change, strategic competition and a deterioration of the global rules-based order would be a source of increasing insecurity for New Zealand and the world during the decades ahead;
- Any assumption that New Zealand's allies could be relied upon to guarantee New Zealand's security in the future would be naïve and misguided;
- The risk of New Zealand having to actively defend itself against external aggression in the future was by no means so remote that it could be discounted;
- New Zealand's defence capabilities are inadequate and entirely unsuitable for unassisted defence of the nation against external aggression; and therefore that
- New Zealand must take significant steps over the coming years to guarantee its own security.

We believe this analysis and the reasoning that underpins it remain valid – and that is the basis of this submission to the defence policy review 2023.

Released by the Minister of Defence

## 2. Strategic context in 2023

A worsening global and regional security environment has, since 2020, only reinforced the concerns we expressed at that time.

- Tensions between the United States and China increasingly threaten global and regional security;
- COVID 19 has demonstrated all too clearly New Zealand's vulnerability to global supply chain disruption – even as we make ourselves more vulnerable to such disruptions through poor risk management and contingency planning<sup>1</sup>;
- Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine has illustrated the hollowness of a rules-based order rendered impotent by decades of western military interventions;
- The vulnerability of New Zealanders to information warfare has been amply demonstrated through the spread of COVID 19 disinformation and by an extended occupation of Parliament's grounds, which had to be ended forcibly by police on 2 March 2022;
- The grim reality of climate change has been driven home to all but the most wilfully misinformed, by severe weather events of ever-increasing frequency and intensity, most recently cyclone Gabrielle in February of 2023.

These and many other examples demonstrate that the world is continuing to become more dangerous, insular, and unstable.



Figure 1 - Cyclone Gabrielle wreaked havoc across large swathes of New Zealand in February of 2023.

<sup>1</sup> For example, through the premature closure – at least a decade early - of the Marsden Point oil refinery.  
<https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/443869/marsden-point-closure-could-expose-nz-to-fuel-security-risks-report-says>

### 3. What has been demonstrated militarily since 2020?

#### The power of a mobilised population

42 Group's previous reports asserted that augmentation of the New Zealand Defence Force with a sizeable volunteer force in times of national emergency would be critical to New Zealand's future security.

We believe the validity of this assertion has been amply demonstrated by the success with which Ukraine mobilised its own citizens in response to Russia's invasion of its territory in early 2022<sup>2</sup>.

Preparations to mobilise up to 1% of New Zealand's population, supported by extensive digital training, regular field exercises, and supporting legislation and investment must be prioritised so that, should New Zealand need to defend its territories in the future, a volunteer force is immediately available to:

- Protect critical infrastructure;
- Interdict key ground lines of communication;
- Assist with managing civilian population displacement due to enemy action;
- Support regular NZDF forces, so that they can concentrate on repelling an attacker.

Such a volunteer force would also be extremely valuable during civil emergencies.

#### A2/AD defences

42 Group has repeatedly argued that New Zealand should prioritise defence investments in A2/AD (Anti-Access / Area Denial) capabilities, from person-portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems, to artillery and longer-range air and coastal defence systems.

We point out that these are the very weapon systems that have been instrumental in allowing Ukraine to initially hold off - and even push back against - Russia's invading forces.

Javelin and NLAW anti-tank weapons have been very successfully used by Ukrainian infantry – even mobilised civilians - to defeat Russian tanks and armoured vehicles in significant numbers.

---

<sup>2</sup> As a side note we also suggest that, had the structures necessary to rapidly assemble and deploy such a volunteer force existed in February of 2023, New Zealand's response to Cyclone Gabrielle might have been considerably more effective





Figure 2 – Western powers provided Ukraine with significant numbers of Javelin, NLAW and other anti-tank weapons to combat Russian armour



Figure 3 - Russian armour has been highly vulnerable to the 'top attack' capabilities of both NLAW and Javelin

Man-portable and soviet era air defence systems have prevented Russia from gaining air superiority in the war – and this has allowed Ukrainian defenders to fight on far more effectively than would otherwise have been the case, right up until now, over a year later.



Figure 4 - Even Soviet era air defences like this Buk TELAR have helped Ukraine to prevent Russia from gaining air superiority

On 14 April 2022 Ukraine even used two anti-ship missiles (which may or may not have been domestically manufactured) to sink the Russian cruiser Moskva, the flagship of Russia's Black Sea Fleet.




Figure 5 - The Moskva was struck and later sank after being hit by what was claimed to be a pair of Ukrainian-made Neptune anti-ship missiles



## Ukraine's Neptune missile

The truck-launched RK-360 anti-ship cruise missile gives Ukraine a flexible, powerful punch against Russia's fleet.



**In service:** 2021-present

**Designer:** Luch Design Bureau,  
Kyiv

**Range:** About 200 miles

**Weight:** About 2,000 pounds

Source: Military-Today.com

WILLIAM NEFF/THE WASHINGTON POST

Figure 6 - Neptune is claimed to be a copy of the Soviet-era Kh-35 subsonic anti-ship missile

All this demonstrates what 42 Group has been saying all along. A2/AD systems are precisely the kind of capabilities a smaller nation needs to defend itself against aggression by a larger and more powerful adversary.

Some related points are, however, worthy of note.

One must always be wary of over-indexing on assumed parallels between a single real-world conflict and possible future events in a different theatre.

Ukraine has received significant and continuous support – including resupply of A2/AD systems from the west - for over a year and such support is the kind of thing we have always insisted that New Zealand must not assume (or be overly reliant upon) for its defence.

Ukraine also has land borders both with friendly states that are able to facilitate such resupply and with an aggressor armed with very large numbers of tanks and other armoured vehicles – while New Zealand is remote, which would complicate both resupply and the ability of an attacker to land mechanised forces here in significant numbers.

We believe these differences have several further implications:

- That New Zealand must already be in possession of the A2/AD systems it requires for its defence at the time when it might come under attack – i.e. it must not be reliant on resupply;

- That its remote nature and the difficulties inherent for an attacker that wishes to project assets into New Zealand’s territory would make possession of viable stocks of A2/AD systems by New Zealand potentially even more decisive than they have proved for Ukraine;
- That their relative cost, as well as the fact that local manufacture of complex A2/AD systems like AGTMs, MANPADS, antiship missiles and SAM systems is an unrealistic proposition at this time, mean that New Zealand must augment such defences with increased artillery capabilities, along with the ability to manufacture domestically ammunition for these much simpler systems<sup>3</sup>; and
- That the establishment by New Zealand of such capabilities, in combination with the other preparatory steps we have recommended elsewhere (and below), may be adequate to deter a potential attacker that might otherwise consider New Zealand a ‘soft target.’

## Unmanned Systems

42 Group has previously advocated for the importance of New Zealand developing effective drone and counter drone capabilities - and by this we didn’t mean eye wateringly expensive assets like Global Hawk, or Predator drones – but small, inexpensive platforms that can be deployed in significant numbers for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), as simple weapons platforms, or as loitering munitions.

Events in Ukraine have reenforced what was clearly demonstrated in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020 and before that in Syria and Libya over the preceding years – small to mid-sized unmanned systems are critical and game changing resources on the modern battlefield. Whether they are used to locate adversary forces, direct artillery fire, or strike directly against enemy assets, drones provide many of the advantages that you would otherwise need to have air superiority to enjoy – without many of the costs, risks and logistical challenges of deploying manned systems.

Released by the Minister of Defence

---

<sup>3</sup> Such capabilities should primarily include significant numbers of self-propelled or highly mobile mortar and MRLS systems



### The gravity of urban environments

Some experts in urban warfare now assert that the shift over recent decades towards smaller professional armies – even as urban environments have increased in size and density – increasingly cause opposing forces to be drawn, willingly or unwillingly, into urban conflict.

Whether you accept this assertion or not, it is generally accepted – and events in Ukraine tend to support - that:

- Urban conflict favours the defender - and can reduce the impact of any technological advantage, or numerical superiority of an attacker; and that
- Urban conflict is ultimately devastating to both the urban environment and its population.

Paradoxically, this means that some of the strategies and tactics that might give New Zealand the best advantage in terms of defeating an attacker, would be the most likely to devastate the very population centres and supporting infrastructure that New Zealand would be hoping to defend.

We therefore advocate strategies and tactics that would enable New Zealand to effectively defend its territory and drive off any attacker while minimising, where practical, the degree to which this would require conflict within urban centres.<sup>4</sup>

We note that some significant work in terms of developing such concepts has occurred in recent years, both in Australia and elsewhere.

<sup>4</sup> While 42 Group has developed significant collateral in terms of these strategies and tactics, we do not propose to discuss these in detail here.

## The need to be able to defend New Zealand unassisted

Finally, a clear-eyed assessment of recent events around Ukraine and in Ethiopian Tigray, in Nagorno Karabakh in 2020 and before that in Syrian Kurdistan, Yemen, Libya and in Afghanistan all make one thing clear: New Zealand's allies will act in what they believe to be *their own best interests* at the time of any emergency.

Even if New Zealand enjoyed some sort of formal alliance that included security guarantees (it does not), it would be naïve in the extreme to assume that New Zealand's allies would automatically be both willing, and in a position to come to our aid should New Zealand find itself under attack in the mid to longer-term future. It would be equally misguided to think that New Zealand can afford to make no serious provision for its own defence on the basis of such an assumption.

And to be clear, New Zealand's defence force, while it may be professional and competent, is currently neither large enough nor well-enough equipped to mount such a defence.

So, should New Zealand be attacked at some point in the future and find itself having to mount an unassisted defence, it will quickly find itself overwhelmed and fighting a bloody insurgency against occupying forces – and that will go very poorly for us all - unless we have prepared ourselves for such an eventuality over the preceding years.

There are, of course, those who will argue that New Zealand would be unable to defend itself against a determined aggressor no matter what it did, or how well it prepared. We dispute such nonsense in the strongest possible terms – it is ultimately merely a justification for doing nothing.

Yes, New Zealand's isolation would make it harder to sustain a defence, because it limits our ability to be resupplied – but that same isolation also complicates matters for an aggressor. We believe that these factors merely strengthen the arguments in favour of preparing sound defences over the coming years, lest we have cause to regret our inaction in the future.

Released by the Minister of Defence

## 4. Defence policy submission 2023

Our defence policy submission builds on 42 Group's previous defence policy recommendations for New Zealand.

These recommendations have reflected our belief that:

- New Zealand needs to update its defence policy, force structure and capabilities to better reflect the world it is likely to find itself in over the next thirty years; and that
- New Zealand must assert, along with its neighbours, a more self-reliant defence policy.

It is also our belief that such an approach must include:

- New Zealand taking urgent action to insulate itself as much as possible from future supply chain disruption and from a dependence on imported fossil fuels, medical materiel and other key essentials;
- New Zealand abandoning any comforting notion that the United States or any other country, will automatically come to its aid should it find itself under attack in the years ahead;
- New Zealand prioritizing funding to work with local industry on accelerating establishment of innovative, effective and sustainable defence capabilities, including unmanned, counter drone and electronic warfare systems; and
- New Zealand establishing, as a high priority:
  - The means to rapidly mobilise its population to effectively defend itself should it need to at any stage in the future;
  - The types of capabilities (such as Anti Access / Area Denial systems) that such a defence would require – sourcing these externally, or developing them domestically where appropriate and practical; and
  - How best to work with regional partners to ensure mutual security.

Released by the Minister of Defence

## 5. Defence policy recommendations 2023

Of the various recommendations 42 Group has made since 2019 we believe the following to be most relevant to the 2023 defence policy review.

**Recommendation #4** That New Zealand amend its defence policy, strategy and doctrine to remove any explicit or implicit assumption of timely assistance by its allies, or any assumption that New Zealand's geographical isolation will protect it from future attack.

**Recommendation #5** That New Zealand incorporate into both its military doctrine and crisis management planning the need to retain, secure and deploy in time of need, the fuel, medical supplies and other materiel necessary to sustain itself during periods of extended supply chain interruption and / or to mount a sustained national defence.

**Recommendation #6:** That New Zealand reduce its emphasis on purchasing bleeding edge military technology to maintain 'interoperability' with its allies, and instead focus on investing in assets that would enhance its real defensive capabilities; prioritizing value for money, survivability and shelf life in all related procurement activities, while being ready to source such capabilities from non-traditional suppliers, or to develop them domestically where appropriate, or necessary.

**Recommendation #7:** That New Zealand recognize the vulnerabilities inherent in overinvestment in small numbers of expensive, complex force projection and / or surveillance assets (like warships or maritime surveillance aircraft), at the expense of less costly defensive systems - and that it reprioritise its future defence expenditure accordingly.

**Recommendation #8:** That, New Zealand seek to focus upon and strengthen its regional alliances, accepting any impact upon its ability to participate in military operations beyond its own immediate region that our other recommendations might entail.

**Recommendation #9** That, although many New Zealanders may not perceive their nation as likely to be threatened in the foreseeable future, New Zealand's government should prepare to counter 'over the horizon' military threats.

**Recommendation #13:** That, in order to compensate for its lack of an effective air combat capability – and the likelihood that a capable attacker would otherwise soon neutralise all New Zealand's maritime, air, and fixed / unconcealed ground-based defence assets, New Zealand should bolster its air defence capabilities, with any related procurement activities prioritizing value for money, tactical versatility, concealment / survivability and shelf life.

**Recommendation #14:** That New Zealand defence force doctrine be amended to emphasise the rapid dispersal and concealment of special, regular, reserve and irregular infantry forces at short notice, along with the avoidance, where-ever possible, of the concentration of forces between engagements, or of their unnecessary exposure to aerial surveillance, or attack.<sup>5</sup>

**Recommendation #15:** That New Zealand establish several secure and concealed staging locations within each region for the storage and distribution of defence materiel.

**Recommendation #17:** That New Zealand urgently prioritise the establishment, through a mixture of local innovation and procurement, of effective unmanned, counter drone and electronic warfare capabilities – developing these domestically where practical and favouring value for money investment in smaller more numerous platforms over more costly big-ticket items.

---

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/publication/%E2%80%98skirmishing-mist%E2%80%99-dismounted-infantry-2030-concept>



**Recommendation #18:** That New Zealand invest to significantly enhance its meagre stocks of modern ATGM and similar person-portable systems, placing a high priority in related procurement activities on value for money, cost effectiveness, resistance to countermeasures and shelf life.

**Recommendation #19:** That New Zealand invest in mobile and concealable coastal defence assets consisting of a number of modern medium range anti-ship missile batteries - and that it disperse and rotate these between a number of coastal staging locations.

**Recommendation #20:** That New Zealand develop contingency plans for the disruption of an attacker's supply lines via air or sea.

**Recommendation #21:** That New Zealand establish a defence partnership with local business and academic institutions (including design schools), to develop innovative solutions for defence challenges.

**Recommendation #23:** That New Zealand conduct regional emergency muster exercises on a regular basis, that it use such exercises to practice the techniques and logistics of rapid force expansion and that it involve the public in them.

**Recommendation #25:** That New Zealand maintain stockpiles of the materiel and supplies needed to enable and sustain rapid force expansion - and that it store these securely in dispersed staging locations.

**Recommendation #26:** That New Zealand adopt a defence policy that emphasises i) Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2/AD), ii) a layered defensive posture, iii) rapid force expansion to enable a sustained asymmetric ground defence and iv) defence sourcing innovation.

**Recommendation #27:** That, in line with these recommended shifts in policy, New Zealand adjust its planned defence investments to ensure that establishment of the appropriate defensive capabilities and assets is prioritised.

**Recommendation #31:** That the New Zealand government allocate additional funding to enable its Defence Technology Agency to work with local industry to accelerate establishment of innovative, effective and sustainable defence capabilities.

**Recommendation #34:** That New Zealand progressively establish and maintain the development, production, manufacturing and logistical capabilities and capacity necessary to implement the above recommendations.

## 6. Conclusion

In summary, we advocate that the New Zealand Defence Force be treated less as a small standing military focused on overseas deployments within broader coalitions and more as the core around which a much larger volunteer force can be expanded to defend New Zealand in times of need.

Such a force must be ideologically neutral and purely defensive, its only purpose being to respond to external threats or natural disasters directly affecting New Zealand, or in extreme cases its closest and most vulnerable neighbours. This force must be able to expand during times of crisis to include people of all races, religions, ages, sexual orientations and economic classes, united in the cause of defending their homes and those of their neighbours.

We also wish to emphasise the importance of freeing New Zealand's defence policy from enslavement to the myth of 'interoperability' and the corresponding assumption that this automatically means spending billions on whatever overpriced big-ticket item our allies happen to be buying.

Instead, we advocate a shift in focus towards A2/AD capabilities, such as those that have recently enabled Ukraine's defence of its territory against invasion by Russia, and towards other pragmatic investments in capabilities well suited to the defence of New Zealand.

We also believe New Zealand must stimulate its economy and leverage its educated workforce through investment in innovative solutions to its sustainability, energy self-reliance, supply chain vulnerability and defence challenges.

42 Group will continue to build and expand upon the considerable body of contingency and capability plans, threat models and other collateral related to the defence of New Zealand that it has developed since 2018.

We would be happy to engage with officials to expand upon this submission, its underlying rationale and related analysis.

Kia pai, kia whakapehapeha, kia rite

42 Group,

26 March 2023

Reply Print View Images

Babcock Australasia Submission to the New Zealand Defence Policy Review (IN-CONFIDENCE)

Sent: 30 April 2023 6:05 PM

From: s9(2)(a)

To: Engage:

CC: s9(2)(a)

Note: Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

3 Attachments

image96cbb.PNG (98 B); image7a0935.PNG (5 KB); Babcock Submission to the New Zealand Defence Policy Review.pdf (1 MB);

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt, please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Classification: IN-CONFIDENCE

Dear Members of the Ministerial Advisory Panel,

On behalf of Babcock Australasia, please find attached a copy of our submission to the New Zealand Defence Policy Review. We would welcome the opportunity to discuss further the matters identified in this submission and answer any questions you may have.

Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to this important Review.

Kind regards,

s9(2)(a)

Corporate Services | Australasia  
Babcock International Group  
Level 9 | 70 Franklin Street | Adelaide | Kaurna Country | South Australia | 5000  
Postal Address: GPO Box 1275 | Adelaide | South Australia | 5001

s9(2)(a) s9(2)(a)  
[www.babcock.com.au](http://www.babcock.com.au)

**babcock**

Creating a safe and secure world, together

This electronic mail message, including any attachments, is a confidential communication exclusively between Babcock International Group PLC and the intended recipient(s) indicated in the header(s). It contains information which is private and may be proprietary or covered by legal professional privilege. If you receive this message in any form and you are not the intended recipient you must not review, use, disclose or disseminate it. We would be grateful if you could contact the sender upon receipt and in any event you should destroy this message without delay. Anything contained in this message that is not connected with the business of Babcock International Group PLC is neither endorsed by nor is the liability of this company.

Babcock International Group PLC.

Website: [www.babcockinternational.com](http://www.babcockinternational.com)  
Registered in: England and Wales  
Registration No: ACN050019517  
Registered Address: 699-695 Mersey Road, Osborne SA 5017, Australia

Released by the Minister of Defence

Reply Print View Images

AWS Submission: NZ Defence Policy Review

Sent: 28 April 2023 4:34 PM  
From: s9(2)(a)  
To: Engage;  
CC: s9(2)(a)

Note: Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

3 Attachments Less

image001.png (6 KB); image002.png (139 KB); AWS submission to NZ Defence Policy Review 28 April 2023.pdf (262 KB);

Message

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not follow guidance, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. If in any doubt please forward the email to spam@nzdf.mil.nz and then delete the email from your Inbox. Thank you.

Dear Sir/Madam,  
Please find attached a submission from Amazon Web Services (AWS) in response to the New Zealand Defence Policy Review.  
We are grateful for the opportunity to make this submission, and likewise, we would welcome any follow up discussion about the content of our submission.

Best Regards,  
s9(2)(a)

aws  
Australia and New Zealand  
Amazon Web Services  
s9(2)(a)



Released by the Minister of Defence