

*Thematic Variations in
Aristotle, Cicero, Newton, and Hegel*

MOTION AND

MOTION'S GOD

BY MICHAEL J. BUCKLEY, S.J.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 1971

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION: *Problem and Procedure* 3

PART I. ARISTOTLE

- I. *Problematic Method* 15
- II. *Nature: Hypothesis of Physics* 30
- III. *The Definition of Motion* 39
- IV. *Motions, Mobiles, and Movers* 44
- V. *The Eternality of Motion* 50
- VI. *The Unmoved Mover: The Principle of Motion* 55
- VII. *The Unmoved Mover: The Principle of Being* 73

PART II. CICERO

- VIII. *Operational Method* 89
- IX. *The Existence of the Gods* 104
- X. *The Identification of the Gods* 121
- XI. *The Nature of the Gods* 123
- XII. *The Judgment of Cicero* 145

PART III. NEWTON


- XIII. *Logistic Method* 159
- XIV. *Through Definition to Principle* 171
- XV. *Absolute Motion* 178
- XVI. *Motion in Statement and System* 186
- XVII. *The God of Natural Philosophy* 193

CONTENTS

PART IV. HEGEL

XVIII. <i>Dialectical Method</i>	207
XIX. <i>The True as Movement</i>	226
XX. <i>The Contingent as Motion</i>	232
XXI. <i>Nature as Motion</i>	244
XXII. <i>God as Motion</i>	254

CONCLUSION: <i>Theme and Pluralism</i>	267
INDEX OF PERSONS	277
INDEX OF SUBJECTS	280



XVIII.

Dialectical Method

THE FOOT of divergent philosophies are formed by the dominant intellectual tendency of an age to converge its inquiries either upon the structures of things or the processes of thought or the expressions of men in language and action. The "selection" of the philosophic community dictates both the primary area of discussion or investigation and the fundamental source of categories and principles. This selection is itself indicated by the subsequent doctrine elaborated on world-order. Aristotelian science came to bear directly upon the nature of things, and the god of movement entered in the constitution of a cosmos either for physics or for first philosophy. *Kóσμoς* translated into the Latin *mundus*, and in the pragmatic or semantic selection of Cicero, world-order converted into political interrelations, a republic of men and gods, mutually involved in the practical deeds of the body politic and in the philosophic interchanges of discourse. Newtonian mechanics recaptured the focus of Aristotle only in so far as it sought the subject-matter of its discipline, the simples of its arguments, and the principles of its conclusions within the extramental operations of things. In the *Principia*, *mundus* became *mundi systema*, the mechanical system of the universe of which the god of motion was both origin through his dominance and the final deflator of space and time through his existence. After the Kantian revolution, men sought the justification of science and the criteria for assertions in the processes of thought, and the consequent Hegelian dialectic formed an order which was neither primarily the physical universe nor the city of gods and men. Systems are above all systems of knowledge. The

Hegelian task is the elevation of *Wissen* to *Wissenschaft*, and the only form in which *Wissenschaft* can exist is *das wissenschaftliche System*.¹ The primary order to be obtained is one of thought, a project symptomatic of a philosophy which, while it will score the Kantian insistence upon antecedent critique, will itself erect as the first steps of science a phenomenology of consciousness, merge logic and metaphysics, and obtain existence through the actuality of pure thought.² In such a system, philosophy can develop finally from the mere love of knowledge to actual knowledge, and both the inner necessity of cognition and the progressive development of German theoretic science evince the pattern of this evolution. This twofold necessity can be substantiated only by the actual accomplishment of the system, for the order of knowledge not only unites divergent elements into a whole but reflexively justifies its own program within philosophy and its history.³ System mirrors the organic interrelations of truth itself. Truth is concrete, is a whole of which any concept or judgment is a balanced part. To remove parts is to author abstractions, and to leave them abstract is to commit them to falsity. "Truth is only possible as a universe or a totality of thought," and it is this universe which identifies as the system.⁴ Like the

truth which it realizes, the system must possess its own unifying processes and developmental movement. Here the proposals for system turn to the questions of method. For method identifies with system as the concrete form of truth. Method becomes of the same critical importance as the truth itself:

Method at first may appear as the mere manner and fashion of cognition, and indeed such is its nature. But manner and fashion as method are not only a modality of Being, determined in and for itself, but are posited as modality of cognition as determined by the Notion, and form in so far as form is the soul of all objectivity and every content otherwise determined has its truth in form alone.⁵

The question of method turns on the relation between the form and the content of knowledge. If the latter is made external to method, no ultimate assimilation is possible between the movement of thought and the processes of things; if, on the other hand, the form is not arbitrarily chosen and contingently superimposed upon the content, method becomes "the absolute foundation and ultimate truth."⁶ The alternative positions taken through the history of philosophical method not only exhaust the internal possibilities, but trace a successive, dialectical development of philosophic procedure which reaches its consummation in Absolute Idealism. The different methods structure different philosophic systems, and their differences, far from being a foundation for scepticism, indicate the dynamic unity possessed by the "one philosophy at different degrees of maturity."⁷ The identical evolution of cognition which expresses itself in the history of philosophy is also exhibited in the system of philosophy itself.⁸

This history of philosophic method, then, does not become a successive retutation and rejection of previous absurdities; such a posture would be predicated on an abstract opposition between the true and the false and a failure "to comprehend

¹ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Vol. v of *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1952), p. 12. Hereafter cited as PG. The English translation of the "Preface" is that of Walter Kaufmann, *Hegel: Texts and Commentary* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966). Hereafter cited as PGK. The English translation of the rest of PG is that of Sir James Ballie, *The Phenomenology of Mind* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964). Hereafter cited as PGB. A translation from the German by the author is indicated by an (m) after the citation of the German text. Whenever the German text is cited, the English translation is indicated in parentheses, thus: (PGK 12).

² G.W.F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, ed. Georg Lasson (2 vols.; Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1948), I, 6-8, 46-47, 52. Hereafter cited as WL. The English translation is that of W. H. Johnson and L. G. Struthers in *Hegel's Science of Logic* (2 vols.; London: Allen and Unwin, 1961). Hereafter cited as WLJS. (WLJS, I, 36-37, 74-75, 80.)

³ PG, p. 12 (PGK, p. 12).

⁴ G.W.F. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, ed. Friedrich Nicolai and Otto Pöggeler (Hamburg: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1959), No. 14, pp. 47-48. The work is divided into *Logik*, *Naturphilosophie*, and *Philosophie des Geistes*. Hereafter cited as EL, EN,

and EPG. The English translation of the *Logik* used is that of William Wallace, *The Logic of Hegel* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1904). Hereafter cited as ELW. (ELW, p. 24.)

⁵ WLJS, II, 467-68.

⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 478.

⁷ ELW, pp. 22-23.

⁸ EL, No. 13, pp. 46-47 (ELW, pp. 21-23).

the difference of the philosophic systems in terms of the progressive development of the truth.⁹ The movement is organic, not suicidal. One form in which a plant may exist is in bud, but this gives way to the blossom, and the blossom in turn is replaced by the fruit. "Those forms do not only differ, they also displace each other because they are incompatible. Their fluid nature, however, makes them, at the same time, moments of an organic unity."¹⁰ In the unity of the development of the whole, these moments not only do not conflict with one another, but are equally necessary and constitute the life of the plant. In the same manner the opposition of philosophic systems and their proper methods is an antagonism only if the movement of the developing philosophy is arrested. The understanding of their deficiencies is not to annihilate them, but to indicate that their truth lies beyond them in an assimilation into a more universal method.¹¹ Indeed the procedure proper to the philosophic only emerges in this fashion, as pure self-recognition is deepened rather than destroyed, in absolute otherness—a maxim which stands as the ground and basis of scientific knowledge in general.¹² The progressive contradiction of alien philosophic methods merely draws out their internal insufficiency and their orientation towards growth and completion. Refutation, correctly practiced through this internal contradiction, is the inner development of the refuted position and its fulfillment in a further assimilation.¹³ Contradiction is not justification for scepticism, but indication of the progressive nature of scientific method.

The refusal of all scientific method and the reliance upon the substantial immediacy of intuition, though revived by Jacobi, represents a pre-philosophic, early stage in the growth of consciousness.¹⁴ Truth here is not grasped, comprehended conceptually, but felt and intuited. The Intuitionalist rejects the concept as the element of the existence of truth, positing feelings and ecstasy through this exclusion of reflection and

demonstration.¹⁵ This "substantial knowledge without Concept" is the pre-philosophic dominance of a purely actional principle, one which claims to immerse the thinker in the sacred and profound, but in reality subjects the subject-matter to the contingencies of its enthusiasms and to the dominance of personal arbitrariness. The pretentious claims of intuition to a knowledge higher than science hide its primitive condition, "the unmethod [*die Unmethode*] of intimation and enthusiasm."¹⁶ This imperialism of intuition, whose function is not insight but edification, is not a development of the post-Anselmian philosophic spirit, but a throwback to the pre-scientific. Were it to prevail it would accomplish the destruction of humanity as a community in truth and consciousness. For it is the nature of this humanity to struggle for agreement and discourse with others, while "the anti-human, the animalic consists in remaining at the level of feeling and being able to communicate only through feelings."¹⁷ The Intuitionalist subject the deepest realities of human consciousness to the most arbitrary and contingent aspect of man, destroying not only the interchange through which philosophy proceeds but any alternative scientific method as well. It is the "crude rejection of all Method."¹⁸

The superiority of the pre-Kantian metaphysics lay in its assertion that truth could alone be apprehended through thought, in its position that harmony lay between things and thinking.¹⁹ Its defect was one of method, a logistic method. In

⁹ G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes. Werke* (Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigeten: Marheineke, Schulze, Cans, Henning, Hohn, Michelet, Förster; Berlin: Verlag von Duncker und Humboldt, 1840), xii, 359-61. Hereafter cited as VB. The English translation is from E. B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson in Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion Together With a Work on the Proofs of the Existence of God* (London: Kegan Paul, 1895), III. Hereafter cited as VBS. Any other reference to these *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* is cited as FR. (VBS, p. 156).

¹⁰ PGK, p. 74. Cf. VB, pp. 387-88 (VBS, pp. 182-83).

¹¹ PGK, pp. 104-106.

¹² WLJS, I, 64.

¹³ WLJS, I, 55: "The older Metaphysics had in this respect a loftier conception of Thought than that which has become current in more modern times. For the older Metaphysics laid down as fundamental that that which

⁹ PGK, p. 8.

¹¹ PG, p. 10 (PGK, p. 8).

¹³ PG, pp. 23-24 (PGK, p. 38).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹² PG, pp. 24-25 (PGK, p. 40).

¹⁴ PG, pp. 12-13 (PGK, p. 14).

order to obtain system, philosophers from Spinoza to Leibniz to Wolff modeled philosophic method upon the mathematical.²⁰ The paradigm was Euclidean geometry. Its manifest advantages told through its demand for insight into structures of meaning and for comprehension of causal relations.²¹ But the mathematical apprehension of the truth of a theorem is defective both in the diremption drawn between the movement of things and the movement of thoughts and also in the arbitrary, actional character of its principle. The movement of a mathematical demonstration is external to the figure demonstrated: the triangle does not take itself apart or construct other figures from which it is to be demonstrated. The logistic method does not obtain the becoming or internal movement of the essence, but only the becoming of the existence, i.e., the subjective knowledge of the truth of theorems. Philosophical knowledge unites both of these movements, while the logistic method attains its knowledge not through the internal genesis of its object, but through an activity which remains external to the object.²² As external to its object, the logistic method cannot take its principle of construction from the self-differentiations of the concept of the theorem, but from an arbitrary command given with a view to a prospective result. The source of mathematical procedure is as external to its concept as its method is to its result.²³ The application of mathematics to physics through mechanics has the improvement of treating movement instead of abstract magnitude, but the shift in object destroys whatever necessity mathematics possessed, applying formulae garnered from experience to assumptions about existents. The method is empirical, rather than mathematical,

by thinking is known of and in things, that alone is what is really true in them; that what is really true is not things taken in their immediacy, but only things when they have been taken up into the Form of Thought, as conceptions."²⁴

²⁰ WL, I, 35 (WLJS, I, 64).

²¹ PG, p. 35 (PGK, pp. 60-62). Cf. VB, pp. 370-75 (VBS, pp. 166-69).

²² PG, pp. 35-36 (PGK, pp. 62-64).

²³ PG, pp. 35-37 (PGK, pp. 64-66). In contrast to a method whose unicity mirrors the unicity of the concept, both mathematical and historical proofs are plural. "It is said that some twenty proofs of the Pythagorean problem have been discovered." VBS, p. 212.

and contains only the empty semblance of demonstrations.²⁵ In this dialectical history of method, Newton is not placed with Spinoza and Leibniz, but with the British Empiricists, treating concepts like sensuous things and responsible for the methodological separation of physics from true scientific method.²⁶ Neither the logistic method nor its empirical usages can furnish an ideal for philosophic procedure.

The Kantian revolution lay in the rediscovery of the triplicity of the rhythm of knowledge.²⁸ Without internal motion and still uncomprehended, the schema of a threefold division begins to appear: in the tables of the categories, the third category emerges from the connection of the second with the first; reason is seen as triadic in its governing ideas, and the critiques themselves divide into three. "Kant has thus made an historic statement of the moments of the whole, and has correctly determined and distinguished them: it is a good introduction to Philosophy."²⁷ The abstract form of this triplicity had been set up by the Neoplatonists but without finding it the necessity of mind itself. To have demonstrated "the form of the method as a whole as a triplicity" constitutes the infinit merit of Kant's philosophy.²⁸ Fichte seized upon this triad and raised it to an absolute importance.²⁹ But the central defect in their procedure lay in making the triplicity a non-dialectical schema, a set of determinations formally exhaustive of the possibilities from which predicates can be derived and applied to any form. The fixity of the lifeless matrix turns the discovered triplicity into operational uses, the method which Hegel calls "construction," and marks critical philosophy as formalistic:

Formalists have seized even upon triplicity, and have held fast to its skeleton; and this form has been rendered tedious

²⁴ PG, p. 38 (PGK, p. 66).

²⁵ G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. E. S. Haldane (London: Kegan Paul, 1892), III, 323-24. Hereafter cited as HP.

²⁶ HP, III, 477; PG, p. 42 (PGK, p. 74).

²⁷ HP, III, 478.

²⁸ WLJS, II, 479. For the trinity within neoplatonic thought, cf. HP, II, 440-50.

²⁹ PG, p. 42 (PGK, p. 74).

and of ill-repute by the shallow misuse and the barrenness of modern so-called philosophic *construction*, which consists simply in attaching the formal framework without concept and immanent determination to all sorts of matter and employing it for external arrangement. But its inner value cannot be diminished by this rapid misuse, and it must still be deemed a great matter that the outward form of rational procedure has been discovered, albeit not understood.³⁰

The very nature of formalism lies in the exhaustive classification of the living reality through the application of determinations from a schema; it is the "method of labeling everything in heaven and earth, all natural and spiritual forms," destroying the living organism of the universe through this pigeon-holing.³¹ The product of such a method is like the tabulation of a skeleton with small pieces of paper stuck all over it or like "the rows of closed, labeled jars in a spicer's stall."³² The living reality is killed in order to understand it. Through this operational reflection upon the Absolute, the living essence escapes the grasp of philosophy and thought is left with unresolved dualisms and diversities.³³ Kant had shown that dialectical contradiction is not an arbitrary movement, but the necessary procedure of reason. But because of this antinomic character of thinking, the critical philosophy separated the knowledge of appearances from the grasp of actualities and predicated cognition of understanding alone. Kant's refusal to put contradiction into things, "that tenderness towards things which will not permit any contradiction to be attached to them," authored the split worlds of Transcendental Idealism—phenomena and things-in-themselves. Even Fichte's denial of the noumenal did not bring about synthesis, for one is left with the double deductions of theory and practice.³⁴

Schelling attempted to overcome these operational dilemmas through an intuited Absolute in which all distinctions were merged into an undifferentiated unity. It was an attempt to synthesize the discriminations of the operational method

³⁰ WJJS, II, 479. Cf. PG, pp. 42-43 (PGK, p. 78).

³¹ PGK, p. 78.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ VBS, p. 252; HP, III, 499; WL, I, 38 (WJJS, I, 67).

through the introduction of a simple principle. The distinctions of the schema are ultimately merged into the monochromatic simplicity of absolute identity. Philosophy attains an Absolute as principle, the $A = A$, and imagines that its own actuality has been achieved in this "night in which all cows are black."³⁵ Within Schelling's principle, an abstract generality has been erected to solve the Fichtean dualisms, but this empty identity misses both the particularization of content and the cultivation of those forms through which actuality is obtained and grasped. In the loss of all concreteness and determinations, the principle explains nothing and supplements a lifeless method with a lifeless source.³⁶ The formalists remain incomplete because there is no internal movement to their principle and no organic relations between their method and the developments of life. What is needed is a principle which will synthesize the manifold of Fichte's deductions without the identity of Schelling's Absolute and a method whose own motion does not superimpose the foreign upon the object of its study.³⁷

As the rhythm of the true dictated the need for system, so it indicates the method and principle of philosophy. "Everything depends upon this, that we comprehend and express the true not as substance, but just as much as subject."³⁸ Like the Aristotelian nature, the true is subject and author of its own movement, and the identification of this source specifies the commensurate and reflexive nature of the Hegelian principle. Further, the movement of the principle specifies the movement of the method; and the internal motion of any actuality—organism or concept—is dialectical. This movement is not something the subject does; it is something the subject is.³⁹ Reflex-

³⁵ HP, III, 529-30, 542.

³⁷ PG, p. 16 (PGK, p. 24).

³⁸ WJJS, I, 36-37; "This movement of Mind, which in its simplicity gives itself its determinateness and hence self-equality, and which thus is the immanent development of the Notion—this movement is the Absolute Method of knowledge," *Ibid.*, I, 65; "It is clear that no expositions can be regarded as scientific which do not follow the course of this Method, and which are not conformable to its simple rhythm, for that is the course of the thing itself."

³⁶ PGK, p. 26.

³⁸ PGK, p. 28.

³⁹ WJJS, I, 36-37; "This movement of Mind, which in its simplicity gives itself its determinateness and hence self-equality, and which thus is the immanent development of the Notion—this movement is the Absolute Method of knowledge," *Ibid.*, I, 65; "It is clear that no expositions can be regarded as scientific which do not follow the course of this Method, and which are not conformable to its simple rhythm, for that is the course of the thing itself."

tion is not upon the concept; it is within the concept both for development and definition. It is this union of content and method that characterizes the philosophic method: "It is the nature of the content and that alone which lives and stirs in philosophic cognition, while it is this very reflection of the content which itself originates and determines the nature of philosophy."⁴⁰ Thus philosophic progress is obtained not by elaboration of problems and working out their solutions as in Aristotelian inquiry nor by the antinomic discrimination of perspectives as in the Ciceronian dialogues nor by the resolution of wholes into their parts as in Newtonian mechanics, but by following through the self-movement of the object of study as it passes through the forms or moments of its self-differentiation and recovery. To grasp any subject-matter truly is to grasp it as movement, and to follow it through its motion is the dialectical method of philosophy. This is the only true, universal method: "I know that it is the only true Method. This is evident from the fact that the Method is noways different from its object and content; for it is the content in itself, *the Dialectic which it has in itself*, that moves it on."⁴¹ The *Phenomenology of Spirit* furnished an example of this method working through consciousness to science, but the exposition of the method in itself is the work of logic since "method is the consciousness of the form taken by the inner spontaneous movement of the Logic."⁴²

In the history of thought, dialectic has been associated with a negativity; this is correct, though the negativity has often been misunderstood. Diogenes Laertius is cited for the origin of the three major divisions of philosophy. Natural philosophy is attributed to Thales, moral philosophy to Socrates, and dialectic to Plato. The elder Eleatic school, however, had employed its dialectic against motion; Plato had brought it to bear against contemporary ideas and concepts, pure categories and thought-determinations; later scepticism has used its dialectic against the data of experience, maxims of practical living, and the concept of science itself. The conclusion of the dialectic was contradiction, opposite determinations were dem-

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 36.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, I, 65.

⁴² *Ibid.*, I, 64.

onstrated of the same object, and the invalidity of the prior assertion was established through the contradiction of predicates. The dialectic could be objective if the object itself was held to be self-contradictory, as in the Eleatic discussions of motion; it was subjective if cognition was at war with itself, as in scepticism and in Kantian criticism. Within the middle ages, dialectic was an art, an external and negative skill brought to bear upon any subject-matter in order to disturb and unsettle.⁴³ The Kantian antinomies relieved dialectic from this form of deception or arbitrariness, and found it not merely a movement of the mind, but a necessary movement of the mind. The antinomies discovered contradiction at the very heart of reason, but Kant failed to exploit this discovery in a synthesis of objective and subjective dialectic. He distinguished thing from thought and confined dialectic to the latter. The major contribution of Absolute Idealism was to recognize dialectic as the law both of things and of thoughts—even of propositions—which allowed the movement of the mind to coincide with the reality of things.⁴⁴ This recognition permitted philosophic method to advance beyond the fixed diremptions of Transcendental Idealism, "a complete philosophy of Understanding which renounces Reason."⁴⁵ When contradiction is understood as the law of life, reason—in contradiction with itself—becomes the only means of grasping what is the case. The internal contradiction becomes the necessary source of the movement of both.

The movement itself is a composite of moments which both chart its progress and spell out the internal determinations of its result. Fichte had indicated the steps of his own triad as "thesis," "antithesis," and "synthesis," and Schelling had followed suit. Hegel did not, and his choice suggests a deliberate attempt to break away from the "lifeless schemata" of his predecessors with a flexibility of vocabulary indicative of "the fluid nature" of the reality which he studied.⁴⁶ A double negative

⁴³ WL, II, 491-93 (WLS, II, 473-74); EL, No. 81, pp. 102-103 (EDW, p. 149).

⁴⁴ WL, I, 38-40 (WLS, I, 67-68).

⁴⁵ HP, III, 476.

⁴⁶ PGK, p. 8.

moment follows within the movement of any being; but these determinations are not predicated of the content like a label, but issue out of the life of the content itself. The content or concept develops, becomes what it was not, and then reintegrates this "other" back into itself. It moves from a prior simplicity (antecedent to the new development) into its other, and then realizes this other as a determination and definition of its own nature. The other is the moment of self-positing, of self-determination through self-negation. One becomes something different, something other, and then comprehends this other as a determination of the self. The passage is from immediacy through a stage of negation of this immediacy in mediation to a merger in mediated immediacy. The concept or content passes from being in-itself (*An sich*) to that which is different or in contradiction for-itself (*Für sich*) to subsume (*aufheben*) this difference as that which is in-and-for-itself (*An-und-für-sich*).⁴⁷ Each of these moments needs attention.

Any method must have a beginning form. This is not the principle which authors the movement, but the initial phase out of which it moves. Because it is the beginning, its form is simple and its content is immediate, both of which merge into an abstract universality. It is not an entry of sensuous intuition or imagination, but of thought, for sense data present a manifold, while only thought-determinations can be simple, universal, and undifferentiated. Method, as rational process, does not originate without a rational beginning, and only thought-determinations are rational. These determinations, in their earliest stages, are simple and universal, while complexity indicates developed and elaborations. Any concept in its undifferentiated simplicity can constitute a beginning, but the first universality or the most abstract phase of simplicity in itself is Being, simple abstract self-reference, simple Being in-itself (*An sich*). "Method, as the consciousness of the concept," grasps even from the first that this universality is only a moment, that the virtualities of the concept must be posited, that

⁴⁷ PG, pp. 19-24 (PGK, pp. 28-38). For the dialectical method and its relationship to Hegelian ontological procedure, cf. Emericz Coreth, *Das Dialektische Sein in Hegels Logik* (Wien: Verlag Heder, 1952).

what is contained only in-itself must emerge as the other of this simplicity.⁴⁸

The second moment is essentially this development, but a development through the negation of the first. It is the stage of difference, determination, and judgment, but not as externally imposed upon the initial stage as dialectic is not a matter of external superimposition. The Hegelian "interpretation" contrasts very sharply with the Platonic dialectic at this point. Socrates will admit that opposite things come from opposite things, but he specifically denies that one opposite as such issues out of another: "We maintain that the opposites themselves would absolutely refuse to tolerate coming into being from one another."⁴⁹ Plato's ontological interpretation would allow him to separate *to enantion pragma* from *auto to enantion*, the former being in some imperfect and variant fashion a transcription of the latter within the continuous transmutations of space. For Plato, one form does not generate another; for Hegel, that is precisely what is done. The embryo is human in itself, but not for itself. It is only in generating what is other than the embryonic moment, the educated reason, that actuality is obtained. For Plato, the dialectic is subjective, working upon its subject-matter; for Hegel, it is the soul of the matter itself: "It is rather the matter's very soul putting forth its branches and fruit organically."⁵⁰ Hegelian dialectic is not ontological in its interpretation, but entitative: the concept develops itself out of itself through a process which is truly immanent in the engendering of its oppositions and determinations. This interpretation lodges the movement of the dialectic at the substructure of all reality, just as the principle united subject and object and the method lay with the movement through diversities into assimilation. The three together characterize what absolute idealism claimed as the "absolute method": "The absolute method does not hold the

⁴⁸ WLJS, II, 469-72.

⁴⁹ *Phaedo* 103^e, Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (eds.), *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, trans. Hugh Tredennick (New York: Pantheon, 1963), p. 84.

⁵⁰ G.W.F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962), pp. 34-35.

position of external reflection; it draws the determinate element directly from its object itself, since it is the object's immanent principle and soul."⁵¹

This second moment allows for a dialectical transmutation of the two forms of the Newtonian method—analysis and synthesis. The bifurcation of the simple beginning is an analytic moment insofar as the new determination is discovered immanently within the immediate; it is synthetic, as this determination shows itself to be other than the immediate, its contradiction in fact, and related to its beginning by "this relation of various."⁵² This second moment is the moment of judgment, of propositions and of two-term assertions. "This equally synthetic and analytic moment of the Judgment, by which the original universal determines itself out of itself to be its own Other, may rightly be called the *dialectical moment*."⁵³ This second term which arises is the first negative, the negation of the immediate; but as the negative of a specific immediate, it contains and preserves this first. "To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition."⁵⁴ The first term is in the second, while the second is the truth of the first, and the unity of both is expressed in a proposition. The immediate is the subject, and the mediate is the predicate. Philosophies which attempt to express truth in propositional, rather than systematic, form remain on this level; but the proposition fails to indicate the actual, synthetic movement of the subject. The judgment is always one-sided, and, insofar, false. Such philosophies become dogmatism, characterized by the opinion that "the true consists in a proposition that is a fixed result or that is known immediately."⁵⁵ Any conceptual determination involves its negation: extreme anarchy generates extreme despotism; pride goes before a fall; extreme pleas-

ure becomes painful. Implicit in any notion is its contradiction.⁵⁶ This negativity is the soul, the internal moving principle of the dialectic. So the second negative, the negation of the mediate as other, follows as the third moment of the dialectic. It is the transcendence of contradiction through assimilation. The moment of alienation is not annihilated, as it will be with the Marxian actional principle, but *aufgehoben*. The ambiguity of the terminology indicates the double meaning of the third moment. The mediated term is both preserved as a determination of the subject, but ceases as contradiction. Both the initial abstract beginning and its negation become internal determinations of the concrete result. Just as they are moments through which the concept passes in its own development, so they remain as forms through which its intelligibility is achieved and by which it is understood.⁵⁷ Insofar as intuition would fix upon the simplicity of the first or insofar as understanding would stabilize the differentiations and distinctions of the second, they falsify them. The assimilation into the third, into the concrete, is not through the return to undifferentiated simplicity as in Schelling, but through the reflexivity of a principle which returns to itself through its own contradiction. The transcendence achieved carries the internal dialectic—its own contradiction—within itself; and so the self-positioning and assimilation continues, endlessly spelling out the internal contradiction and the implication of any concept.⁵⁸ Concepts become self-movements in Absolute Idealism, and the pattern of their movement identifies with the dialectic method. The method of the system coincides with the structure of the motion, and in both fixity gives way to fluidity in thought and things.⁵⁹

The immanent dialectic indicates a radical shift in the problems of motion. Movement is no longer the Newtonian locomotion of bodies in the mathematical dimensions of space and time. Motion lies, rather, at the heart of the concept itself,

⁵¹ WLS, II, 472. VBS, p. 163: "Real knowledge, inasmuch as it does not remain outside the object, but in point of fact occupies itself with it, must be immanent in the object, the proper movement of its nature, only expressed in the form of thought and taken up into consciousness."

⁵² WLS, II, 473. For an application of analytic-synthetic to syllogism, cf. *ibid.*, II, 478.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, II, 473.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 476.

⁵⁵ PGK, p. 60.

⁵⁶ EL, No. 84, pp. 102-103 (ELW, pp. 150-51).

⁵⁷ WL, I, 93-95 (WLS, I, 119-20).

⁵⁸ WL, II, 497-500 (WLS, II, 478-80).

⁵⁹ PG, pp. 45, 47 (PGK, pp. 82, 86).

while the range of movement is through any actuality and supreme characteristic of spirit. Nor is motion the projection of Ciceronian dialogue, that which men call movement. Cicero's praise of Socrates has to be understood as indicating the need for human opinion to be elevated to the heavens before it can come into the homes of men; and this elevation of movement lies in that identity in which motion, thought, things, and discourse are one.⁶⁰ Nor can one adopt the Aristotelian analysis of motion as the actuality of a being in potency insofar as it is potency. Motion is far more the actuality of the potential qua actual; it indicates actuality rather than potentiality. It is not so much differentiated into variants and made the subject of a particular science as it is the constituting life of each science and the form of the single philosophic method. In the dialectical idealism of Hegel, motion and becoming identity in the supreme assimilation which is spirit and actuality.

Just as motion coincides with the method by which it is studied, so the subsequent affirmation of divine existence shifts. The theological question constitutes the highest problem of philosophy, for religion, art, and philosophy have the same object, but differ only in the form by which it is grasped. In art, the Absolute is grasped in the sense object; in religion, the Absolute is present in a figurative representative; philosophy "is the highest manner of comprehending the Absolute Idea, because its manner is the highest—the Notion."⁶¹ Despite the reservation of critical philosophy, human thought—either as common sense or as Absolute Idealism—cannot give over its attempt to demonstrate the divine existence and nature.⁶² It is the first concern of philosophy:

That which is in general at the present moment the first concern of philosophy, namely to place God once again abso-

⁶⁰ This dialectical transformation of Ciceronian pragmatism appears in Hegel's Latin dissertation, *Dissertatio de Orbibus Planetarum*. For the text in translation, see Walter Kaufmann, *Hegel: A Reinterpretation* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), p. 52. Hereafter cited as KH.

⁶¹ WLJS, II, 566. Cf. VB, p. 361 (VBS, p. 157).

⁶² VB, pp. 428-31 (VBS, pp. 229-32).

lutely right in front at the head of philosophy as the sole ground of everything, as the only *principium essendi* and *cognoscendi*, after he has been placed long enough alongside other finite things or entirely at the end as a postulate that issues from an absolute finitude.⁶³

This is the initial statement of the abiding Hegelian attempt to renovate the proofs for the existence of God, demonstrations of the pre-Kantian metaphysics subsequently destroyed in the Kantian discriminations between faith and understanding.⁶⁴ It would be the characteristic of philosophies of Understanding to rest with these abstract divisions and of dialectical philosophy to push beyond their contradiction into a synthesis.⁶⁵ The true nature of the proofs for the existence of God is only the reflective consciousness of the proper movement of the object considered in itself and of the motion of reason. The objective movement of the data and the subjective movement of the mind identify in the single elevation of the spirit to God.⁶⁶ Demonstration, in Aristotle, was a species of logical discourse in which an assertion was resolved in terms of its proper cause, the cause of science identified reflexively with the cause of the fact demonstrated. In Cicero, positions are proved through the discrimination of positions and their consequent clash in debate. In Newton, demonstration lies with the resolution of movements back to the forces which composed them or the comprehensive force which set them up. In Hegel, proof (*Beweis*) is the unfolding of the content of its object, and

⁶³ G.W.F. Hegel, "How Common Sense Takes Philosophy, shown through an analysis of the works of Herr Krug," KH, p. 60.

⁶⁴ VB, pp. 359-61 (VBS, pp. 155-56).

⁶⁵ VB, pp. 364-66 (VBS, pp. 160-61).

⁶⁶ VB, pp. 188-89: "This connection, which is thus present to consciousness must not be a subjective movement of thought outside of reality, but must follow this latter, and must simply unfold its meaning and necessity. Knowledge is just this unfolding of the objective movement of the content, of the inner necessity which essentially belongs to it, and it is true knowledge since it is in unity with the object. For us this object must be the elevation of our spirit to God, and is thus what we have referred to as the necessity of absolute truth in the form of that final result into which everything returns in the Spirit." (Italics added.)

thus the initial question of the dialectic comes to bear upon the movement of the concept.⁶⁷ What was the question of existence in Aristotelian inquiry becomes in Absolute Idealism the question of the subject of motion.

There is a multiplicity of metaphysical proofs of the existence of God, but the variety has been reduced to three, both by the evolution of the question in the history of philosophy and by the inner connection of the demonstration with the development of spirit.⁶⁸ One must simply deny the Thomistic assertion that one can know only that God is and not what God is;⁶⁹ each of the three demonstrations gives different characteristics or determinations of God, each successively deepens the internal determinations which constitute the divine essence until they terminate with God as spirit.⁷⁰ The first two begin with a finite content, either the contingency of the world or the purposiveness within nature; the last takes the infinite content as its beginning and moves to the being of the divine.⁷¹

As the question of existence transmutes to that of the subject of movement, so the question of definition shifts to the question of the initial determination of the divine in the cosmological proof—the demonstration from contingency. The qualitative question becomes the question of predicates exhibited by God in nature—the teleological proof. God as utterly reflexive principle even of his own being is the final development of the dialectic—the ontological proof. Each of these is a stage of the single proof, an elevation of the mind from the self-denying motion of the finite to the eternal, self-moving motion which is the result, the content, and the presupposition of the whole:

We do not have to prove this elevation from the outside; it proves itself in itself, and this means nothing else than it is by its very nature necessary. We have only to look at its own process, and we have there, since it is necessary in itself,

⁶⁷ VB, pp. 369-70 (VBS, p. 165). ⁶⁸ VB, pp. 413-16 (VBS, pp. 212-15).

⁶⁹ VB, pp. 395-99, 405ff. (VBS, pp. 192-93, 203).

⁷⁰ VB, pp. 416-17. To know God as creator is not adequate to the Christian standpoint; he must be known as spirit. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 380-81 (VBS, pp. 216, 176).

⁷¹ VB, p. 416 (VBS, p. 215).

the necessity, insight into the nature of which has to be vouched for by proof.⁷²

The dialectic transmutes the nature of motion and structure of argument, and it also changes the two foundations which underlay the argument from motion: the motion of the mind and the movement of things. In Aristotle, they did not identify, and the movement of things indicated the unmoved mover. The Epicureans reached god through the archetypes in the mind, the Stoics through the changes in things, the Academic through the traditions of the state, and Cicero through the movement of discourse and debate. Newton took an Epicurean physics and a Stoic argument to build a mechanical demonstration of a non-mechanical force. Hegelian method has characteristically identified the movement of thought and the motion of things, and it assimilates into a single demonstration the diverse proofs through which method passes. One set of proofs infers "From Being to the thought of God," while its opposite "proceeds from the thought of God, from truth in itself, to the Being of this truth."⁷³ The two extremes are being and thought, extremes brought into synthesis through proof, and either providing an initial step. In a manner somewhat reminiscent of Anselm, Idealism will use both, distinguishing the first into contingent and natural being, and comprehending all three into a single demonstration. Either way of demonstration, from being to thought or from thought to being, is one-sided; neither is indifferent to the other, for both enter into that movement which is the divine reality itself: Infinite Necessity, World Soul, Absolute Spirit.

⁷² VBS, p. 164.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 221.