



## Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis

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## CAUDILLO POLITICS: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS \*

The Latin-American Wars of Independence realized the long-standing hope of the *criollo*<sup>1</sup> gentry to rid themselves of Spanish limitations on their economic and political activities. From the beginning of the New World colonies, the Spanish rulers had labored diligently to check the aspirations of the colonial gentry by limiting their access to both land and status. Grants of *encomienda* had yielded up to the colonists use rights to Indian labor and produce, but not the ownership of land. At the same time, the Crown had curtailed the ability of *criollos* to obtain titles of nobility. These limitations had been supported by the prowess of Spanish arms, effective perhaps even more in keeping potential competitors at bay in Europe than in exercising viable military control in the New World. The failure of this ultimate means of control during the Napoleonic wars finally called into question also continued Spanish dominance over the American colonies.

In spite of the decline of Spanish power, however, the New World planter class proved too weak numerically and too lacking in cohesion to oust the Peninsular forces by its own unaided efforts. To gain their own independence they were therefore forced into political alliances with the numerically strong and highly mobile — yet at the same time economically, socially and politically disprivileged — social strata of the population which are designated collectively as *mestizos*.<sup>2</sup> Not without trepidation, *criollo* leaders armed elements derived from these propertyless strata and sent them to do battle against the Spaniards (Wolf, 1955). Success in maintaining the continuing loyalties of these elements depended largely upon the ability of leaders in building personal ties of loyalty with their following and in leading them in ventures of successful pillage.

The emerging pattern had colonial prototypes. Landowners had long maintained armed retainers on their own estates. The creation of a colonial army

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<sup>1</sup> Literally translated, *criollo* means a person of Spanish ancestry born in the New World.

<sup>2</sup> Literally translated, *mestizo* means a person of mixed Spanish and Indian ancestry.

had underwritten the creation of such localized militia. In Mexico, for instance, "the viceroy and the military authorities found it convenient that a militia be at one and the same time the landlord of the men who served under his command" (Wolf, 1955, 192). The Spanish government had thus contributed paradoxically to the diminution of its own power and to the formation of many local power centers. Yet the additional step of granting independent armament both to retainers and to other potential military elements in the population entailed further risks. Although the alliance of *criollos* and *mestizos* was instrumental in winning the Wars of Independence, granting arms to the *mestizo* elements freed these to create their own armed bands. The *mestizos* in turn were thus enabled to compete with the *criollos* for available wealth. The case of Venezuela, while unique in its extreme manifestations, nevertheless demonstrates this new and continent-wide ability of the *mestizos* to act on their own behalf. There the royalists were originally victorious by granting the *llanero* plainsmen, formerly *criollo* retainers, pillage rights against their own masters. Having eliminated their own masters, the *llaneros* then turned upon the royalists and massacred them in an effort to obtain additional loot (Hansen, 1965). In granting independent armament to the *mestizos*, therefore, the *criollo* gentry also sacrificed any chance it might have had to establish a monopoly of power.

The beneficiaries of this distribution of weaponry were the leaders on horseback, the *caudillos*,<sup>3</sup> the resultant political system, *caudillaje*. It came to be marked by four salient characteristics: (1) the repeated emergence of armed patron-client sets, cemented by personal ties of dominance and submission, and by a common desire to obtain wealth by force of arms; (2) the lack of institutionalized means for succession to offices; (3) the use of violence in political competition; and (4) the repeated failures of incumbent leaders to guarantee their tenures as chieftains. This paper is concerned with an analysis of this political system, and with a search for its causes and consequences. It also wishes to suggest that this is best accomplished by an understanding of the system in Latin American terms, rather than in terms of concepts derived from events in Europe. The broad diffusion of military power among wide strata of the population differentiates the Latin American experience from what happened in Europe; *caudillaje*, as Richard M. Morse has aptly said, "deranges the predictable interplay of hierarchical class relations" (Morse, 1954, 79).

### *The Criollo in Politics: "Anarchy" and Alliance*

The desire to make use of European models in analyzing the Latin American experience has also obscured the role of the *criollos* during the "state of

<sup>3</sup> *Caudillo* is best translated as chieftain. The term derived from the Latin *caput*, head. *Caudillaje* refers to the condition of caudillo competition and rule.

anarchy" which set in after Independence. Thus numerous historians appear to be speaking from the European point of view when they see the dominant political motif of this period in "the quest for stability" (e.g. Worcester and Schaeffer, 1962, 414). The assumption implicit in such formulations seems to be that stability would fulfill the same role in commercial development in Latin America that it had fulfilled in Europe. It may be argued, on the contrary, that — far from being anathema to the *criollos* — anarchy was a natural condition of their existence.

We must not forget that *criollo* wealth was ultimately upon the hacienda:

Organized for commercial ends, the hacienda proved strangely hybrid in its characteristics. It combined in practice features which seem oddly contradictory in theory. Geared to sell products in a market it yet aimed at having little to sell. Voracious for land, it deliberately made inefficient use of it. Operating with large numbers of workers, it nevertheless personalized the relations between worker and owner. Created to produce a profit, it consumed a large part of its substance in conspicuous and unproductive displays of wealth. Some writers have called the institution 'feudal', because it involved the rule of a dominant landowner over his dependent laborers. But it lacked the legal guarantees of security which compensated the feudal serf for his lack of liberty and self-determination. Others have called it 'capitalist', and so it was, but strangely different from the commercial establishments in agriculture with which we are familiar in the modern commercial and industrial world. Half 'feudal', half 'capitalist', caught between past and future, it exhibited characteristics of both ways of life, as well as their inherent contradictions. (Wolf, 1958, 204).

The success of this hybrid institution in the period after Independence was in large measure due to its ability to flourish under anarchic commercial conditions. During this period all industries which had depended upon mercantilist protection were buried under the onslaught of the open market; even mining, the motor of the colonial economy, ground to a halt. Yet the hacienda survived and flourished. It could withstand the vagaries of supply and demand, because — in slack periods — it could return to self-sufficiency.

If the hacienda provided a bulwark of defense against the laissez-faire market, the hacienda system itself militated against the development of a cohesive political association of hacienda owners. Geared to a stagnant technology, yet under repeated pressures to expand production, the hacienda tended to "eat up" land, in order to control the population settled upon the land. The aim of each hacienda was ultimately to produce crops through the arithmetic addition of workers, each one of whom — laboring with his traditional tools — would contribute to increase the sum of produce at the disposal of the estate. While in some parts of Latin America, notably in the Andes and in Middle America, the expansionist tendencies of the hacienda could be directed against Indian communities, in areas without Indians a hacienda could expand only at the expense of neighboring hacienda. Not surprisingly, therefore, we find that blood feuds among hacienda owners are a notable

feature of this period: each hacendado's bitterest enemy was potentially his closest neighbor. In this competition we must find the economic roots of *criollo* anarchy.

Such economic determinants of anarchy were reinforced further by social organizational factors. Competition and conflict on the economic plane could, to some extent, be compensated for through the workings of kinship. Arnold Strickon, writing about Argentina (1962), has noted that the *criollo* kinship system is radically different from that of other classes in Argentine society, in its tendency to build up extensive non-unilineal kindreds. He correctly ascribed this variation to the fact that the different classes have differential access to strategic resources. He notes, as others have done (e.g. Crow, 1946, 620; Worcester and Schaeffer, 1962, 414), the growth of regional aristocratic families and their role in national politics. We do not yet possess adequate data on how such alliances were formed, how many people were involved, and how much territory they covered. Theoretical considerations, however, lead us to believe that the organizing power of such alliances must have been relatively weak. If we assume that hacienda owners favored the maintenance of large estates through inheritance by primogeniture; if we assume further that the chances are equal that the chief heir will be either male or female; and if we postulate that each hacienda owner strives to maximize the number of his alliances, then it seems unlikely that the number of strategic alliances based on landed property between a hacendado family of origin and other hacendado families of procreation will exceed three. The marriage of Father with Father's Wife creates one such alliance; the marriage of the first-born son with a woman of another family swells the number to two; and the marriage of the eldest daughter with the first son of a third family brings the number of strategic alliances to three. These considerations are intended to yield a measure of insight into the inability of the *criollo* gentry to form a wide-ranging network of strategic alliances for political purposes.

Parenthetically, such considerations also throw light on the tendencies of the Latin American gentry to seclude women. William Goode (1959) has suggested that every society needs to curb love in order to preserve its social structure. Cultural restrictions upon love permit rational choices in the construction of alliances, while barring emotions from affecting the choices made. If kinship alliances concerted by males are crucial to the maintenance of property, then females become a strategic resource, symbolizing property and status capable of being joined together. The many strictures placed on the sexual activities of gentry women in Latin America dispose one to accept Gilberto Freyre's description of the hacienda Big House as a female's prison (1963, *passim*). Such extreme seclusion could be directed toward protecting women from interclass entanglements with seekers for status and power from disadvantaged groups, certainly a motive as *mestizo* aspirants to power became more numerous and important. Yet it also served to reduce the match-

maker's fear that a hacienda owner's daughter might become involved with the wrong hacienda owner's son, i.e. a partner in a non-strategic alliance. Female seclusion may thus be seen as still another indication of the difficulties involved in concerting alliances among *criollo* gentry families.

Rivalry over land and limitations on the numbers and kinds of alliances open to the hacienda owners thus render intelligible both the growth of regional kindreds, and the constant antagonistic relationships between such kindreds. At the same time, these factors account for the strong opposition shown by such kindreds to any effort to form a centralized government. Such a government, once established, would inevitably have possessed greater power than any kindred alliance, built up from three-family units. Economic and social organization thus conspired to guarantee the political disunity of the criollos in the period after Spanish *demise*.

### *Rise of the Mestizo*

The Wars of Independence initiated a period of political apprenticeship for the *mestizo* elements of society. If we view class relations as defined by differential access to strategic resources, the social position of the *mestizo* can be defined simply by his lack of access to such resources. *Mestizo* was, in fact, no more than a blanket term for the "dispossessed": Indians forced out of their communities, manumitted and run-away slaves, illegitimate and unclaimed offspring of *criollos* and non-*criollo* women, and the descendants of impoverished colonists (Marshall, 1939). During the colonial period such people had no access to formally allocated social positions; to survive, they had to live largely by their wits, ferreting out what extra-legal possibilities existed on the margins or in the interstices of the established order. Most of these possibilities were opened up in the course of attempts by the *criollos* to circumvent the mercantilist controls of the metropolis. From the *mestizo* category, therefore, were drawn the cattle rustlers, the buyers and sellers of clandestine property, the go-betweens and legal middlemen: in short, the gamut of undercover agents whose illicit transactions made colonial society work.

Paradoxically, the *criollos* were thus forced to rely on a category of the population which they both hated and feared. In a society which demanded that everyone adhere rigidly to his niche, they were drawn into dependence on socially mobile elements which called into question the very existence of that social order. In spite of the fact that the *mestizo* was the unrecognized ally of the *criollo*, the *criollo* gentry came to cast blame on the *mestizo* for precisely those "of their own activities that daily subverted an order of society they were formally committed to uphold" (Wolf, 1958, 238), an ambivalence fed continuously by the contradiction between social ideal and reality.

By arming *mestizo* elements in the course of the War of Independence, the criollos finally granted the *mestizo* the means for gaining alternative forms of wealth and power, wealth and power gained through political endeavor. Already trained by their colonial experience to be forever on the lookout for new possibilities not envisaged by the upholders of the established order, and skilled also through this experience in the manipulation of interpersonal relationships, the *mestizo* was now propelled into the political arena arms in hand. The resultant set of activities was continuous with that of the past: the advent of the *mestizo* did not constitute a social revolution; the formation of armed *mestizo* bands, captained by their own *caudillos*, constituted a simple widening of the range of economic activities in which they had already engaged under the old regime. Political warfare continued *mestizo* social strategy through the acquisition of new tactics.

### *The Caudillo and His Organization*

In analyzing the *caudillo* mode of political organization, we are forced to rely on materials dealing with *caudillos* who made their influence felt on the national level. The available literature deals mainly with the maximal bands, but sheds little light on how the minimal bands of chieftains and followers were first formed. The *caudillos* who emerged into the light of day are thus all leaders who proved capable of welding a series of structurally similar minimal bands into a maximal coalition, capable of exercising dominance over wide regions. The data dealing with such national *caudillos*, however, permit some generalizations about the patterns of coalition formation, about the distribution of wealth by the leader to his band, and about the sources of political strength and fragility. We are also enabled to make certain comparisons between the different problems faced by *mestizo* and *criollo* chieftains. In our discussion, we shall employ the ethnographic present.

The aim of the *caudillo* band is to gain wealth; the tactic employed is essentially pillage. For the retainers, correct selection of a leader is paramount. No retainer can guarantee that he will receive recompense from his leader in advance, because the band seeks to obtain wealth which is not yet in its possession. All know that the wealth sought after is finite; only certain resources are "safe game". The band cannot attack with impunity the basic sources of *criollo* wealth, such as land; and it cannot sequester, without international complications, the property of foreign firms operating in the area. Hence there is not only intense competition for movable resources, but great skill is required in diagnosing which resources are currently "available" and which taboo. The exercise of power therefore gives rise to a code which regulates the mode of access to resources. The code refers to two basic attributes of leadership: first, the interpersonal skills needed to keep the band

together; second, the acumen required to cement these relationships through the correct distribution of wealth. Possession of interpersonal skills is the initial prerequisite; it suggests to the retainers that the second attribute will also be fulfilled.

The social idiom in which the first of these attributes is discussed is that of "masculinity": the social assertion of masculinity constitutes what has come to be known as *machismo* (from *macho*, masculine). According to the idiom, masculinity is demonstrated in two ways: by the capacity to dominate females, and by the readiness to use violence. These two capacities are closely related; both point to antagonistic relations between men. The capacity to dominate women implies the further capacity to best other men in the competition over females. But the vocabulary of sexual relations, focusing on the interplay between active and aggressive males and passive, suffering females also covers situations in which one dominant and aggressive male bests another whose defeat thereby casts him in the role of the submissive and passive sufferer (Paz, 1961, 65-88). Assertion of masculinity in interpersonal relations thus implies a social ordering between a dominant leader and a following which suffers his dominance and admires his prowess. The theme of sexual competition should also be read against the wider social background, in which female seclusion on the part of the gentry symbolizes their hold on property and status. The assertion of masculinity on the part of the *caudillo* threatens that monopoly; like the possession of arms, it "threatens to derange the predictable interplay of hierarchical class relations" (Morse, 1954, 79).

Assertions of dominance are tested in numerous encounters, in which the potential leader must test himself against other potential claimants.

Although Latin American rural communities are frequently isolated by poor communication facilities, the local *caudillos* are thrown into contact from time to time . . . occasionally in activities such as drinking, card playing, carousing, and brawling, a man so stands out that the others automatically accept his authority and extend to him their loyalties. (Stokes, 1952, 448).

Such situations are charged with potential violence, for in such antagonistic confrontations, the claimants to victory must be prepared to kill their rivals and to demonstrate this willingness publicly. For the loser there is no middle ground; he must submit to the winner, or be killed. Willingness to risk all in such encounters is further proof of masculinity. The drama involved in such tests of leadership is illustrated by the following episode in the rise of a Bolivian *caudillo* (Crow, 1946, 623):

Mariano Melgarejo, an ignorant and drunken murderer given to the wildest sexual orgies, . . . ran the country from 1864-71. Melgarejo got into power by killing the country's dictator, Belzú, in the presidential palace. The shooting took place before a great crowd which had gathered in the plaza to see the meeting of the two rivals. When Belzú fell dead into the arms of one of his escorts, Melgarejo strode to the window and exclaimed: 'Belzú is dead. Now who are you shouting for?' The mob, thus prompted, threw off its fear and gave a bestial cry: 'Viva Melgarejo!'



Personal leadership may thus create a successful band; by the same token, however, the personal nature of leadership also threatens band maintenance. If the *caudillo* is killed or dies of natural causes, the band will disintegrate because there can be no institutionalized successor. The qualities of leadership reside in his person, not in the office. To establish a system of offices it would have been necessary to reorganize post-Independence society. Attempts in this direction were continuously thwarted by *criollo* arms; one has to note the defeat of the "centralists" in all parts of Latin America.

Proof of masculinity does not yet make a man a *caudillo*. Men will not flock to his banner unless he also proves himself capable of organizing a number of minimal bands into a maximal faction, and demonstrates his ability to hold the faction together. To this end, the *caudillo* must weld a number of lieutenants into a core of "right-hand men" (*hombres de confianza*). Important in this creation of a core of devoted followers is not merely assertion of dominance, but also calculated gift-giving to favored individuals who are expected to reciprocate with loyalty. Such gifts may consist of movable goods, money, or perquisites such as the right to pillage a given area or social group. The importance of such gifts is best understood as a prestation of favors defined not merely as objects, but also as attributes of the giver. Where the receiver cannot respond with a counter-gift which would partake equally of his own personal attributes, he is expected to respond with loyalty, that is, he makes a gift of his person for a more or less limited period of time. The existence of such a core of right-hand men produces its own demonstration effect. They are living testimony to the largesse of the *caudillo* aspirant and to his commitment to grant riches in return for personal support.

To satisfy this desire for riches, the *caudillo* must exhibit further abilities. We have already discussed some of the limitations under which the *caudillo* labors in acquiring wealth: there are certain groups he may not attack with impunity. To cast about in quest of riches may stir resistance; resistance may imply defeat. To be successful, therefore, a *caudillo* needs what we may call "access vision", capabilities closely related to the "business acumen" of the North American entrepreneur. He must be able to diagnose resources which are available for seizure with a minimum of resistance on the part of their present owners. He must estimate how much wealth is needed to satisfy his retainers. He must also control the freelance activities of his followers, such as cattle rustling and robbery, lest they mobilize the resistance of effective veto groups. He must be able to estimate correctly the forces at the disposal of those presently in control of resources; and he must be able to predict the behavior and power of potential competitors in the seizure of wealth. Nor can he rest content with initial success in his endeavors. He must continuously find new sources of wealth which can be distributed to his following, or he must attach resources which replenish themselves. Initial successes are therefore frequently followed by sudden failures: many *caudillo* ventures end as

“one-shot” undertakings. The *caudillo* may be successful in seizing the government treasury or the receipts of a custom house; then no other source of wealth is found, and the faction disintegrates. The more limited the supply of ready wealth, the more rapid the turnover of *caudillos*. Thus Bolivia, one of the most impoverished countries during this period, averaged more than one violent change of government every year (Crow, 1946, 620).

It follows from this that the *caudillo* with ties to the *criollo* gentry possesses advantages denied to his *mestizo* counterpart. The *criollo* may be able to draw on his own wealth at the beginning of his undertaking; when liquid wealth grows scarce, he can retrench to provide booty from his own estate. However much of a burden this may put on his own resources, it can enable him to weather a period of scarcity, while the *mestizo caudillo* requires continuing abundance.

Such considerations affected even the most successful *caudillos*, such as José A. Páez and Juan Manuel Rosas. Páez held sway in Venezuela for 33 years (1830-63); Rosas dominated Argentina for twenty years (1829-31, 1835-52). Both owned enormous cattle ranches which furnished large quantities of beef, the staple of the countryside. Both drew their retainers from the ranks of the fierce cowpunchers of the tall grass prairie, the *gauchos* in Argentina and the *llaneros* of Venezuela whose mode of livelihood provided ideal preparation for *caudillo* warfare. Time and again, both men defeated the attempts of rivals to set up centralized forms of government. Despite the initial advantages of abundant wealth, their control of “natural” military forces, and their ability to neutralize a large number of competitors, however, both men had to beat off numerous armed uprisings, and both ultimately met defeat. Their cases illustrate the difficulties which beset *caudillos* operating even under optimal conditions.

### *Salient Weaknesses of the Caudillo Organization*

The *caudillo* organization must thus face always the threat of insufficient “pay-off”. At the same time, it is also threatened from within, by the very nature of the social ties which hold it together. There are, at any one time, always more men qualified to become *caudillos*, or aspiring to demonstrate their capabilities as potential chieftains, than there are *caudillos*. Such competition necessarily encourages rivalry within the band for the position of chieftainship. Usually the salient rival is one of the *caudillo's* own “men of confidence”, a person who is himself a leader of men within the framework of the maximal band. Latin America's political history during this period is therefore expectably rife with examples of treachery by influential underlings. Thus Páez was betrayed by Monagas, to whom he had granted titular control over the government, and Rosas by his own General Urquiza (Crow, 1946, 610). In the absence of institutional controls, the *caudillo* himself can only

guess whether his subordinates are loyal or disloyal. The classic loyalty test occurs when rivals meet head-on in violent encounter, in a situation of public confrontation. Such a situation demands that retainers take a stand; they must "declare themselves" (*declararse*) for or against one of the protagonists. If they stand by their leader, their support constitutes a kind of vote of confidence; if they desert him, his career will come to an end. Such votes of confidence take various forms. Rosas' *gaucho* retainers deserted him on the field of battle. García Moreno, theocratic *caudillo* of Ecuador, was assassinated in plain view of his followers; Mexico's Santa Anna was declared "for" and "against" repeatedly, during the many crises of his government in its relations with France and the United States (Worcester and Schaeffer, 1962, 538). A far-sighted *caudillo* is well advised to plan his route of escape from the country in advance of the moment when his retainers transfer their loyalty to another, if he wishes to live to fight another day in an attempt to return to power.

#### *Caudillaje and Modern Latin America*

This paper has presented a model of *caudillo* organization, and has explored the causes underlying this political phenomenon. We have seen the reasons for its emergence in the inability of any socio-economic class to monopolize sufficiently both wealth and power in order to organize a centralized political apparatus. *Criollos*, while endowed with wealth, lacked the economic and social cohesion to develop the wide-mesh coalitions necessary to control government. The *mestizos*, on the other hand, lacked the permanent and replenishable sources of wealth necessary to support wide-ranging political activity. In the absence of a framework for institutional politics, Latin American politics became personalized.

In spite of its chaotic appearance, *caudillaje* was a true political system, an organized effort on the part of competing groups to determine who got what, when and where. For the *criollo caudillo*, possession of control often guaranteed a temporary position of preference in dealings with foreign trade interests; for the *mestizo* it meant access to a new arena in which to seek wealth. Given the terms of competition, violence constitutes a predictable aspect of the system. Leadership can be achieved only through violence; resources claimed only through violence; and the balance of power between *criollos*, *mestizos* and foreign traders only maintained by veto group violence against a *caudillo* who overstepped his bounds. While the endemic threat of violence rendered uncertain the tenure of any one *caudillo*, however, in the end it served to stabilize the system of *caudillaje* as a whole.

We have argued that the system depended upon a particular balance between *criollos*, *mestizos*, and foreign interests. We are thus arguing implicitly that the *caudillo* system could persist only as long as this balance of interests

prevailed. We would thus take issue with investigators who continue to see in *caudillaje* the dominant political system in Latin America down to the present day (e.g. Tannenbaum, 1962). While much of the code of *caudillo* behavior survives — in a continuing idiom of *machismo*, readiness to use violence, gift-giving, personalized loyalties — by the 1870's the *caudillo* system was giving way to a new political system, the dictatorships of "order and progress". While these dictatorships exhibited some *caudillo* features, the dictator functioned with an increasingly centralized governmental machinery, predicated upon a very different balance of social forces.

The cycle of change from *caudillaje* to these new dictatorships was triggered by the great European depression of 1873-86, which marked the onset of protectionism at home and of imperialist expansion abroad. Where overseas expansion before this time had been largely characterized by the simple extraction of goods from the dependent countries and the conversion of these goods into commodities on the home market, the new imperialists began to invest heavily in the transformation of certain sectors of production in the dependent areas. In Latin America, this signalled major changes in the production of cash crops; it also resulted in the growth of some light industry, primarily in urban areas. Most significantly, the hacienda — with its built-in defenses against the laissez-faire market — became a thing of the past. Large landed *criollo*-owned estates might remain intact, but they witnessed a wholesale transformation of their plant from labor-intensive hacienda to the mechanized and capital-intensive plantation, complete with railroad spur leading to the nearest port.

This transformation required the development of credit institutions, the stabilization of currencies, the improvement and widening of the network of transportation. In turn, these requirements demanded a modicum of political stability and an end to anarchic pillage. This need was met by the forging of alliances between foreign interests and native *criollo* oligarchies of landowners and merchants. The stability of such alliances for order and progress could be guaranteed by the use of foreign armed forces. The local representative of such an alliance was typically the new dictator, often a *caudillo* in origin, but no longer a *caudillo* in function. His recompense no longer derived from the systematic pillage of "free" resources; it was furnished by the alliance. In turn, he functioned as head of an alliance police force, neutralizing forcibly all threats to the alliance. The prototypical dictator of this type was Porfirio Díaz who ruled Mexico between 1876-1911. His expressive slogan *pan o palo* (bread or club) symbolizes the twin functions of his government: wealth (*pan*) to the beneficiaries of the alliance, the use of force (*palo*) against potential challengers. Thus while harbors were dredged, industry built, commerce expanded and foreign capital poured into the country, Mexico's prisons were filled to capacity.

The new balance of power represented by the alliances of order and prog-

ress spelled the end of the *caudillo* on horseback. On the national level, they produced dictatorships underwritten by foreign guarantees. At the same time, they drove the *mestizos*, deprived of resources which would have enabled them to participate in the alliance, to seek countervailing coalitions with groups not hitherto represented in the political process. They turned to the rural population of the hinterland. Everywhere they raised the slogans of land reform, popular education and mass participation in politics. In countries with strong Indian components, these countervailing alliances formed under the ideological banner of Indianism, a utopian ideology that envisaged a synthesis of the industrial age with the glorious Indian past; elsewhere they groped towards one form or another of populism (Worsley, 1964, 164-167). Cast in the organizational form of mass parties like the Peruvian APRA, the Mexican PRM, or the Bolivian MPR, they substituted for the insurrectionary *caudillo* a very different type of leadership, skilled in the management of the "organizational weapon" employed to synchronize divergent group interests. Thus politics in modern Latin America is no longer *caudillo* politics; it is a many-sided conflict between alliances of order and progress ranged against populist coalitions.

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