

# “Maybe I Voted?”



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**2019-2020**  
**Los Angeles County**  
**Civil Grand Jury**

## “Maybe I Voted?”

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2009, the Secretary of State of California (the State) mandated that all California counties would be required to replace their voting systems. As a result, the Los Angeles County Registrar/Recorder (the Registrar) signed a \$282 million contract with Smartmatic to create a system to be used for future elections.<sup>1</sup> The new system took 10 years to build, according to an NBC News report.<sup>2</sup> The system allows for voters to cast ballots over an 11-day period, instead of one 13-hour day. In addition, approximately 4,000 neighborhood polling sites were replaced with 1,000 Vote Centers containing electronic machines called Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs). BMDs replace the previous punch-card ballots. Los Angeles County (County) officials have stated the new system will cut down on mechanical breakdowns and crowding, and provide sophisticated protections against hacking, according to NBC News.<sup>3</sup>

Officials at the Registrar’s office, headed by Dean Logan, named the new election system Voting Solutions for All People (VSAP).<sup>4</sup>

To test the new system, the Registrar conducted a “mock” election on September 28, 2019 to familiarize the public with the BMD machines. This was followed by the November 5, 2019 mid-term election which was designated a “pilot” election. The Registrar stated that the mid-term election would test all components of VSAP.<sup>5</sup>

The Civil Grand Jury (the Jury) “Maybe I Voted” (Committee) completed extensive onsite and offsite research, including telephone conference calls, where concerns were repeatedly expressed to the Registrar on the efficacy of the VSAP and the BMDs. In numerous situations, the Committee was unable to receive requested clarification and consistent information from the Registrar. In all Committee research, including the March 2020 11-day election, the Committee found weaknesses throughout all systems, indicating moderate to severe function problems. These include flaws with the operation of the BMDs, and questionable conversion from the former paper ledger to the Electronic Poll Book (e-Poll)-necessitating that voters vote provisionally. The Committee observed inadequate staffing and/or absence of lead poll workers, requiring Vote Centers be closed. Also, the Committee noted insufficient training, and questionable ballot security at Vote Centers.

As all voting systems in the State of California must be certified by the Secretary of State, State officials conducted a three-week assessment of the BMDs in October and November 2019, and observed numerous difficulties with the system.<sup>6</sup> On January 24, 2020 and January 29, 2020, the State conditionally certified the new election systems,

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<sup>1</sup> <https://abc7.com/voting-system-new-la-los-angeles/3595736/> (accessed 8/30/19)

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/has-los-angeles-county-just-reinvented-voting-n1000761> (accessed 3/12/20)

<sup>3</sup> *ibid*

<sup>4</sup> <https://vsap.lavote.net/> (accessed 3/12/20)



<sup>5</sup> *ibid*

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ovsta/voting-technology-vendors/los-angeles-county-vsap> (accessed 3/12/20)

with 51 conditions. These conditions, (see pages 15, 24), were issued in two separate documents by Alex Padilla, the State of California Secretary of State. The conditions have staggered due dates for resolution leading up to November 3, 2020, the date of the general election. However, three of the conditions were required to be resolved before the March 3, 2020 election. The Committee was unable to determine if these conditions were met.

The Committee is concerned that these conditions must be resolved before the pivotal November 2020 presidential election. Based on onsite Committee observations and assessments, the Committee is particularly disturbed about all security issues that are addressed in the conditions, and requests that the Board of Supervisors (the Board) ensure that all State certification conditions are resolved.

**NOTE:** Throughout the Committee assessments of the VSAP, all security was of fundamental concern. This was magnified when the Committee visited elementary schools and observed open school entries with DIRECT ACCESS TO CHILDREN. In one instance the children were only a portable screen away from the vote activity. Other school entries were fully accessible by any and all people who wished to enter. All persons in the County are by law able to enter a vote site. Most disturbing was the Castelar Street Elementary School on Yale Street. Voters were in close proximity to children, and at times just a few feet away from them. The Castelar entry has security signs stating: “Persons must obtain approval of the site administrator before visiting classrooms or on school grounds.” “Do not enter this area protected by security system.”



## BACKGROUND

The California Voter's Choice Act is a law passed in 2016 that modernizes elections in California by allowing counties to conduct elections under a new model which provides greater flexibility and convenience for voters.<sup>7</sup>

In 2009, the State mandated that all California counties would be required to replace their voting systems. As a result, in Los Angeles County, the punch-card voting system was decertified in December 2019.<sup>8</sup> This system had been operating in the County since 2003. The State announced that the punch-card system is at capacity, and with continued use would not be able to contain a complete listing of candidates and/or propositions.<sup>9</sup>

The County specified that 31,000 BMDs, fundamental to VSAP, will be used in County elections.<sup>10</sup> The Registrar indicated to the Committee that the BMDs would be tested. The Committee has not been able to verify if testing has been done on all BMDs. The State tested 1,500 in the fall of 2019 and found numerous problems.<sup>11</sup>

An additional component of the VSAP system is the Interactive Sample Ballot (ISB), which allows voters to make their voting selections on a personal electronic device prior to going to the Vote Center. There, voters can then download their ballot choices.<sup>12</sup>

The State's two certifications were issued with 51 conditions. State VSAP conditional certifications were generated on January 24, 2020, and outline 35 conditions, three of which had to be met by March 3, 2020.<sup>13</sup> State conditional certification for the ISB was generated on January 29, 2020 and outlines 16 conditions.<sup>14</sup>

The Committee attended the Board meeting January 28, 2020, where only a few of the 51 conditions were addressed. It was not clear to the Committee if all conditions would be assessed and a plan put in place to resolve them.

Of particular concern to the Committee is State VSAP Condition #3, which outlines strict mandatory deadlines the County must meet.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> <https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voters-choice-act/> (accessed 3/11/20)

<sup>8</sup> [https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/los-angeles-countys-new-voting-machines-hailed-for-accessibility-dogged-by-security-concerns/2020/03/02/fabe5108-5768-11ea-ab68-101ecfec2532\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/los-angeles-countys-new-voting-machines-hailed-for-accessibility-dogged-by-security-concerns/2020/03/02/fabe5108-5768-11ea-ab68-101ecfec2532_story.html) (accessed 5/12/2020)

<sup>9</sup> <https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-02-24/california-presidential-primary-could-hinge-on-big-voting-changes-in-los-angeles> (accessed 5/12/20)

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.latimes.com/la-me-los-angeles-voting-guide-2020-story.html> (accessed 5/12/2020)

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ovsta/voting-technology-vendors/los-angeles-county-vsap/> (accessed 3/11/20)

<sup>12</sup> <https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/vendors/LAC/la-isb-12-cert.pdf> (accessed 5/12/2020)

<sup>13</sup> <https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/vendors/LAC/vsap20-cert.pdf> (accessed 3/11/20)

<sup>14</sup> <https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/vendors/LAC/la-isb-12-cert.pdf> (accessed 3/11/20)

<sup>15</sup> <https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/vendors/LAC/vsap20-cert.pdf> (accessed 3/11/20)

## METHODOLOGY

The Committee mission was to speak and/or meet with responsible and informed parties in order to achieve a full picture of the VSAP system. A number of actions on the part of the Committee provided development of the data contained in this report:

- The Committee made three visits to the Registrar’s Headquarters in Norwalk and met with his staff.
- The Committee initiated a series of telephone interviews/conference calls with Registrar staff.
- The Committee reviewed VSAP documents.
- The Committee reviewed numerous media sources/articles.
- The Committee initiated a series of telephone/conference calls with the Elections Division of the State.
- The Committee attempted on numerous occasions to meet with State officials in person during the October and November 2019 State review and assessment of VSAP. Despite numerous attempts, the Committee was unsuccessful.
- September 12, 2019, the Committee attended a presentation by a Registrar staff member in Monterey Park. The presentation was advertised as an “overview” of the VSAP system and a demonstration of the BMD machine. There was no BMD present at the location. The Committee observed that the explanation of how the VSAP system works was inadequate, and people in attendance expressed confusion. As of this date, the Vote Centers were not yet assigned.
- September 28, 2019, the Committee visited numerous sites throughout the County to observe the public’s use of the BMD machines, as well as to test the efficiency of the machines during an event publicized as a “Mock Election.”
- During the November 5, 2019 election, termed by the Registrar as a “pilot,” the Committee visited 29 of the 40 polling locations.
- January 14, 2020, Committee was escorted by members of the Registrar’s Office to four locations to observe the operations of the VSAP system:
  - ✓ Registrar/Recorder Headquarters, Norwalk
  - ✓ Election Operations Center (EOC), Santa Fe Springs
  - ✓ VSAP Operations Center (VOC), Whittier
  - ✓ Tally Operations Center (TOC), Downey
- January 28, 2020, the Committee attended the Board meeting to hear a presentation about the VSAP system by Dean Logan, County Registrar.
- February 22, 2020 through March 3, 2020, the Committee observed 22 Vote Centers during the Presidential Primary election.
- March 4, 2020, the Committee met with a law professor at a local university.

## RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

Throughout the months-long onsite assessments of the VSAP system, the Committee was unable to receive a majority of requested VSAP clarification and/or information from the Registrar, which impeded the Committee's ability to fully evaluate the VSAP system.

These are the findings of the Committee investigations:

### **1. Mock Election, September 28, 2019**

On September 28, 2019, the Committee made visits to 16 locations throughout the County to observe the "Mock Elections" held by the Registrar. The "elections" were primarily intended for testing of the new BMD.<sup>16</sup> Voters in the County were invited to attend a number of locations to "mock sign in" utilizing the electronic e-Poll, which replaces the paper ledger voter catalogues used in conjunction with the punch card system. The Registrar stated that voters could practice voting on the BMD system and use the e-Poll to sign in.<sup>17</sup>

The Committee observed voters using the machines and the poll workers interacting with voters. It was noted by the Committee that a number of voters had trouble signing into the e-Poll, and if and when a ballot was generated, the voters required poll workers to assist them with the BMD. In some locations, the poll workers had difficulty instructing the voters. This often required one poll worker per voter throughout the time the voter was completing their ballot, thus taking time away from assisting other voters. A majority of the poll workers stated that the Presidential Primary election would have both the VSAP and punch card system available.

The Committee observed during the "Mock Election:"

1. Evidence of poor/inadequate training on BMD resulting in staff confusion
2. Evidence of poor site choice, including impossibility of curbside voting, lack of parking, lack of direction signage, poor-to-no signage at site, and sites in high-traffic areas
3. Evidence of slow/very slow generation of ballots
4. Evidence of generation of blank ballots
5. Absence of significant prior advertising, leading to poor attendance
6. Insufficient staff to assist with BMD and e-Poll
7. Absence of signage/instructions on backdrop of every BMD
8. Questionable handicap access

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<sup>16</sup> Per Committee Interviews with Registrar/Recorder Office 2019

<sup>17</sup> *ibid*

In addition:

- Time consuming and confusing to figure out BMD toggle switch and button prompts
- Complaints heard from citizens trying to vote: "This isn't clear." "Why isn't there instruction on the machine to show me what to do?" "I don't see how to do it."
- Lengthy time (often up to 6 minutes) to pull up e-Poll voter information for ballot
- Staff unaware that November 5, 2019 election would be a "pilot"
- Staff stated that if BMDs don't work, the old punch card system would be available during the November 2019 and March 2020 elections
- Scanners for Interactive Sample Ballot absent, so unable to assess

## **2. Election November 5, 2019**

The Committee observed 29 of the 40 voting locations. At these locations, voters had a choice between using the BMDs or the punch card system.

Committee observed the following:

- Most voters chose the punch card system
- Late delivery of BMDs
- BMDs not set up at 7a.m. when polls opened
- BMDs being set up with use of instruction manual: confused and frustrated poll workers who had not been trained on BMD assembly
- Some BMDs not set up until late morning/noon
- Some precincts did not have any working BMDs
- Poll workers appeared poorly trained/untrained
- No tech support on site, and no access to roving IT workers
- Jammed ballots resulting in shut down of BMD
- Unused ballots were unsecured
- Numerous angry comments about lack of transportation to Vote Centers. This is critical, as previous 4000 voting sites, that were walkable, have been reduced to approximately 900, requiring transportation.

**NOTE:** Subsequent to our Committee visits, Committee made several requests to the Registrar to receive the curriculum for VSAP personnel training as well as training schedules. Committee did not receive either. Committee requested attendance at a training session and received no response.

The following chart is a consolidation of November 5 "pilot" election:

NOVEMBER 5, 2019 VOTING "PILOT" RESULTS OF JURY OBSERVATIONS				
Polling Location	Poll Worker Adequately Trained on BMD	% of BMDs in Working Order at Time of Jury Visit	County Lead Present	Notes
South Pasadena War Memorial Building	Unable to Determine	0%	Yes	Opened late at 7:10 a.m. BMDs arrived at 7:32 a.m. No County lead was present. Voting signage was poor.
San Marino High School	Yes	0%	Yes	Staff received eight hours of training.
Sierra Madre Congregational Church	Yes	100%	Yes	California State employee was present as an observer. Technical person was County employee. Two full-time County employees were present.
Sierra Madre Episcopal	Unable to Determine	Unable to Determine	Yes	
Monrovia Second Baptist Church	Unable to Determine	0%	Unable to Determine	BMDs were not working all day.
Monrovia Calvary Church	Unable to Determine	0%	Unable to Determine	BMDs were not working all day.
Monrovia Community Center	Unable to Determine	Unable to Determine	Unable to Determine	Poll workers had problems with BMDs.
Monrovia High School	See Notes	100%	Unable to Determine	BMDs arrived at 10:30 a.m. Technician did not receive hands-on training and stated training was through pictures.
South Pasadena Public Library	No	Unable to Determine	Yes	BMD not set-up at time of Jury arrival.
The Church of Latter-Day Saints South Pasadena	No	Unable to Determine	Unable to Determine	Ballots in white box not secured. e-Poll name misspellings hindered voting process.
Washington Middle School	N/A	N/A	N/A	Location closed. Voting transferred to Long Beach Mission. Voters confused.
Long Beach Rescue Mission	No	0%	Yes	No e-Poll lookup available; paper ledgers used
Roosevelt Elementary School	No	Unable to Determine	Yes	Poll workers not directing voters to BMDs.
Covenant Manor	No	50%	Yes	One poll worker had to stand over and instruct voter through entire process.



NOVEMBER 5, 2019 VOTING "PILOT" RESULTS OF JURY OBSERVATIONS				
Polling Location	Poll Worker Adequately Trained on BMD	% of BMDs in Working Order at Time of Jury Visit	County Lead Present	Notes
Long Beach Jenny Oropeza Community Center	Yes	Unable to Determine	Yes	Voter required hand holding and stated the system was difficult to use.
Drake Park	Unable to Determine	Unable to Determine	No	No BMDs were setup at time of Jury arrival
Lynwood Worship Center	Unable to Determine	Unable to Determine	Yes	No BMDs were setup at time of Jury arrival
Lincoln Elementary School	Unable to Determine	100%	Yes	Site inaccessible. No parking and no handicap accessibility available.
Lynwood High School	Yes	100%	Yes	By 1:00 p.m., 68 voters had voted, but no statistics available on whether they used the BMD.
Bateman Hall	Unable to Determine	100%	Yes	By 1:40 p.m., no one had used the BMD
Durfee Elementary School	Unable to Determine	0%	Unable to Determine	Still setting up BMDs. Using punch card system.
S. Ranchito Elementary School	Yes	100%	Unable to Determine	Trucks had left the yard at 6:50 a.m. Machines setup at 7:30 a.m.
Pico Rivera Library	No	Unable to Determine	Unable to Determine	BMDs delivered at 7:30 a.m. Driver ready to leave dispatch at 5:30 a.m., but left at 7:00 a.m.
Pico Park Community Center	No	Unable to Determine	Unable to Determine	Issue with the BMDs that needed to be replaced. Technician unable to correct problem.
Rivera Middle School	Unable to Determine	100%	Unable to Determine	BMDs installed at 9:30 a.m.
Birney Elementary School	No	Unable to Determine	Unable to Determine	BMDs setup at 8:00 a.m. One machine had paper jam. Voters apprehensive at using BMDs.
Century 21 Allstars	No	Unable to Determine	Unable to Determine	BMDs delivered at 8:00 a.m. and setup at 9:00 a.m. County worker injured back while delivering machines. Location on the 2nd floor of the building. Total lack of communication.

NOVEMBER 5, 2019 VOTING "PILOT" RESULTS OF JURY OBSERVATIONS				
Polling Location	Poll Worker Adequately Trained on BMD	% of BMDs in Working Order at Time of Jury Visit	County Lead Present	Notes
Montebello Gardens Elementary	Yes	100%	Unable to Determine	BMDs set-up at 8:15 a.m. and working well.
The Park	No	0%	Unable to Determine	BMDs arrived at 7:15 a.m. and ready at 7:45 a.m. No BMDs working.

3. **State of California Secretary of State Three-week Assessment, October & November 2019**


Independent Auditor: Freeman, Craft, McGregor Group

The Registrar underwent VSAP three-week testing for the BMDs under the direction of the California Secretary of State's Office in October and November 2019. This testing was required to certify the BMDs so that the County is able to utilize the BMDs on March 3, 2020, the Presidential Primary Election.

During this test of the BMDs, the State Independent Auditor (Freeman, Craft, McGregor Group) reported numerous problems with the BMDs.

See the following Freeman Craft Volume Test Summary Results<sup>18</sup> dated December 24, 2019.

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ovsta/voting-technology-vendors/los-angeles-county-vsap/>, (accessed 3/11/20)



FREEMAN, CRAFT, MCGREGOR GROUP

## **Volume Test Summary Results**

County of Los Angeles  
VSAP Version 2.0  
Ballot Marking Device  
Version 1.0  
Voting System

California SOS Contract  
#18S52064

Prepared for the California  
Secretary of State  
December 24, 2019



The Volume Test is intended to simulate conditions approximating the normal use by voters in a polling place on Election Day and verify that the equipment will operate reliably under those conditions. Twenty-five temporary employees were hired as test voters. They cast decks containing between 100 and 115 sheet ballots on 50 Ballot Marking Device (BMD) units. Two of the units were fed an additional 150 pre-marked ballots to test the capacity of the ballot boxes. Members of the Freeman, Craft McGregor Group observed the voting and documented any anomalies the voters encountered while operating the machines.

Twenty-nine of the 50 units (58%) experienced incidents that were logged. Test voters encountered 56 incidents, including ballot jams, one ballot printed over two cards and three machines with frozen screens, for a total of 172 anomalous conditions that were documented on incident logs. The data obtained from these incident logs are presented in Attachment A.

The most significant findings are as follows:

Overall, there were 52 paper jams. Four distinct types of paper jams were observed. The first occurred when a voter inserted the ballot into the BMD but pulled it back or did not continue to push the ballot before it loaded into the unit. This is sometimes referred to as a "timid jam" in the incident logs. This results in a false paper jam. The second occurs when a ballot is slightly skewed when the voter attempts to insert their ballot. When this occurs, the ballot gets caught in the printer and is damaged. In order to proceed with voting, the voter must contact an election worker to open the printer cover and the ballot box, clear the jam and replace the damaged ballot. The third jam results from the ballot getting caught in the printer fingers. If this happens after the voter has pressed the cast ballot selection, the ballot removed from the print head is blank and the voter has to re-vote their ballot. Even when this error occurs earlier in the process, the voter needs to summon an election worker to clear the jam and replace the damaged ballot. The fourth jam is caused by ballots not falling cleanly into the

ballot box and hanging just outside of the printer roller. As these ballots accumulate, they begin to interfere with other ballots exiting the printer/scanner head and prevent them from exiting the mechanism and falling cleanly into the box. This results in a paper jam. The ballot box must be opened in order to proceed with voting, but clearing the jam results in the BMD sensors not recognizing the ballot. As a result, the number of ballots in the ballot box does not match the number of ballots recorded on the closing report at the end of the voting session.

There was a total of 5,373 ballots cast during the test. Since there were 52 jams, the mis-feed rate for this test was 0.97%. Thirty-two (61.5%) of the jams resulted in having to restart the voting session. In addition, 23 (44.2%) of these jams damaged the ballot either when the jam occurred or when the ballot was removed and the jam cleared.

In three cases, the BMD became unresponsive to any input and had to be restarted via a forced power cycle. Each of these cases happened during the ballot printing phase of voting. Initially, the ballot stalled for approximately 23 seconds in the printing operation, then was ejected without being printed. The ballot was fed back into the BMD and the attempted printing operation took 57 seconds, then the ballot was ejected again. After the second or third attempt to print, the BMD screen went to all white and the BMD did not recover, respond to any touch input, or poll worker code input to the scanner. The BMD had to be restarted by holding the power button in for more than 10 seconds to cause a forced power off, then the BMD was restarted normally and was able to resume normal operation.

Two of the BMDs were fed an additional 150 ballots, after the initial 100, to test the 250 ballot maximum capacity of the ballot box. During this portion of the test, one of the BMDs experienced 3 ballot box jams.

When a ballot box jam occurs when the ballot is being cast, that ballot is not included in the cast ballot count. As such, there were 253 ballots in the ballot

box before the BMD stopped accepting ballots and indicated that the ballot box was full and needed to be emptied. The close poll report indicated that only 250 ballots were cast.

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Excerpt from January 24, 2020, letter from Secretary of State Alex Padilla to Registrar:<sup>19</sup>

**BALLOT JAMS/MISFEEDS:**

- Improve the ballot marking device paper handling and remediate the current jamming and misfeed rate of the ballot marking device of 0.0096% to an acceptable rate of no more than 0.002% as prescribed in the California Voting System Standards.
- Written notice to voters, in all required languages, in advance of the voting period and at all vote centers in a manner that complies with California law on how to properly feed ballots.
- Training to all poll workers on proper insertion of ballots into the ballot marking device for ballot marking and casting and how to properly clear and log ballot jams and paper misfeeds.

**BALLOT BOX SECURITY:**

- In addition to the serialized ties used to seal the ballot box on the ballot marking devices, Los Angeles County shall use the Secretary of State approved tamper evident adhesive seals on the seam where the ballot box meets the printer cover on the ballot marking devices.
- Verification of the seals is subject to the same chain of custody documentation process and procedure requirements for all other tamper evident materials.

**USB AND ROOT ACCESS FOR WORKSTATIONS:**

- Los Angeles County shall immediately use physical USB port covers covered by a Secretary of State prescribed tamper evident seal.
- Within five months from the date of this conditional approval, Los Angeles County shall make programming changes within the system to restrict USB access.

**“MORE” BUTTON:**

- Within five months from this conditional approval, Los Angeles County shall provide a plan to the Secretary of State for reviewing the functionality and usability of the system as it pertains to the current use of the "More" button on the ballot marking device including engagement with stakeholders, disability rights advocates and recognized election material design and usability experts.

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<sup>19</sup> <https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/vendors/LAC/vsap20-cert.pdf> (accessed 3/11/20)

#### **4. State of California Conditional Approval of VSAP**

The State issued conditional approval of VSAP January 24, 2020<sup>20</sup>. This document contains 35 conditions, three of which must be completed by March 3, 2020.

These are the State conditions:

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<sup>20</sup> *ibid*

# State of California



SECRETARY OF STATE

## CONDITIONAL APPROVAL OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY'S Voting Solutions for All People (VSAP) 2.0 VOTING SYSTEM

*Whereas*, pursuant to Elections Code section 19202, no voting system, in whole or in part, may be used unless it has received the approval of the Secretary of State; and

*Whereas*, Los Angeles County submitted an application for the VSAP 2.0 voting system, which is comprised of Tally 2.1.2.27, Ballot Marking Device (BMD) A0.2, FormatOS Version 0.19.0, BMD BASI Version 0.19.0, BMD BESI Version 0.19.0, BMD Manager (BMG) Version 0.19.0, VSAP Ballot Layout (VBL) 1.0-8ddf61d, Enterprise Signing Authority (ESA) and the IBML ImageTrac 6400 High Speed Scanner, submitted on or about November 6, 2018; and

*Whereas*, a series of tests of the voting system were conducted by the Secretary of State's office and the state approved testing consultant, against the California Voting System Standards, and California law; and

*Whereas*, the voting system executed all test cases, scenarios, and scripts developed by the Secretary of State's office; and

*Whereas*, the request for approval of the voting system as described above was considered at a public hearing held January 10, 2020, in Sacramento, California; and

*Whereas*, written public comment was taken through January 20, 2020; and

*Whereas*, upon implementation of the conditions set forth below, the voting system satisfies the accuracy, accessibility, usability, and security standards set forth in the California Voting System Standards and California law.



**Therefore, I, Alex Padilla, Secretary of State for the State of California, find and determine, pursuant to Division 19 of the Elections Code, as follows:**

For the reasons set forth above, Los Angeles County's VSAP 2.0 voting system is hereby conditionally approved.

Use of Los Angeles County's VSAP 2.0 voting system must comply with all California Election Code and California Code of Regulation requirements and is also subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Los Angeles County shall make available in each vote center a sufficient number of blank write-in paper ballots for any voter that requests to cast a hand-marked paper ballot. The paper write-in ballots shall, at a minimum, contain all elements consistent with the Federal Voting Assistance Program's federal write-in absentee ballot and comply with state law. Any write-in ballot cast at a vote center shall be secured in a ballot secrecy envelope identifying the ballot style or precinct, placed in a secure ballot box and shall be processed as a regular ballot during the canvass period.
2. Los Angeles County is prohibited from installing any software applications or utilities on any component of the voting system that have not been identified and approved by the Secretary of State.
3. Within five business days of this conditional approval, Los Angeles County shall provide to the Secretary of State the final version of its Use Procedures, entitled "Voting Solutions for All People Use Procedures." Within five business days of receipt, the Secretary of State shall review and either approve or return the Use Procedures to Los Angeles County for further revision and resubmittal within two business days. Compliance with the Use Procedures by Los Angeles County is a condition of the approval of this voting system. Compliance with all requirements set forth in the final Use Procedures is mandatory, whether or not a particular requirement is identified in this approval document.
4. The system shall be utilized in a configuration of parallel central election management systems separated by an "air-gap" where a permanent central system established to be running unaltered, certified software and firmware is used solely to define elections and program voting equipment. The system shall be formatted and reinstalled from the certified software after every election.
5. No substitution or modification of the voting system shall be made with respect to any component of the voting system, including the Use Procedures, until the Secretary of State has been notified in writing and has determined that the proposed change or modification does not impair the accuracy or efficiency of the voting system sufficient to require a re-examination and approval.
6. Los Angeles County shall deposit an exact copy of the trusted build files to a State of California approved escrow facility within 10 business days of this certification. These build files along with

the source code and all associated software and firmware shall be escrowed in a California approved source code escrow facility, pursuant to California Elections Code section 19212. Pursuant to California Code of Regulations section 20641, within five business days, Los Angeles County shall certify to the Secretary of State that it has placed the software in escrow.

7. Immediately after any repair or modification of any voting system component that requires opening the housing, the integrity of the firmware and/or software for that component must be verified using an automated mechanism, or all software must be reinstalled by the jurisdiction using the approved firmware and/or software version supplied directly by the Secretary of State before the equipment can be put back into service.
8. The voting system contains no external connections of any type, this includes but is not limited to wireless and modem transmissions, to any device utilized for communication by or with any component of the voting system. No component of the voting system or any device with network connectivity to the voting system, may be connected to the Internet, directly or indirectly, at any time.
9. Upon request, members of the public must be permitted to observe and inspect, without physical contact, the integrity of all externally visible security seals used to secure voting equipment in a time and manner that does not interfere with the conduct of the election or the privacy of any voter.
10. Los Angeles County shall preserve the audit logs of each ballot marking device used in an election, for 22 months after the election.
11. Election workers in a vote center shall not participate in any post-election manual count auditing of results from the vote center in which they were an election worker, except for permanent Los Angeles County employees.
12. Los Angeles County shall develop appropriate security procedures for use when representatives of qualified political parties and bona fide associations of citizens and media associations, pursuant to their rights under Elections Code section 15004, check and review the preparation and operation of vote tabulating devices and attend any or all phases of the election. The security procedures must permit representatives to observe at a legible distance the contents of the display on the vote tabulating computer or device. This requirement may be satisfied by positioning an additional display monitor or monitors in a manner that allows the representatives to read the contents.
13. With respect to any part or component of the above described voting system for which the chain of custody has been compromised, the security or information has been breached or attempted to be breached, or experiences a fatal error from which it cannot recover gracefully (i.e., the error is not handled through the device's internal error handling procedures with or without user input, such that the device must be rebooted or the device reboots itself to restore operation), the following actions shall be taken:

- a. The Los Angeles County Registrar of Voters shall be notified immediately of any suspected or documented occurrence;
  - b. The Secretary of State shall be notified immediately upon validation of such an occurrence by the Registrar of Voters;
  - c. If the occurrence is validated, the equipment shall immediately be removed from service and replaced if possible;
  - d. If the device is a ballot marking device:
    - i. Any voted ballots contained within the device, at the time of occurrence, shall be removed and secured.
      - 1. A record of the number of voted ballots removed and secured shall be created and maintained as part of the official canvass; and
      - 2. A report of a 100% manual count of those ballots removed and secured shall be maintained as part of the official canvass.
  - e. If the device is a scanner or tabulator, the results from ballots scanned or tabulated on the device shall be cleared from any accumulated results and the ballots rescanned on a different device. In addition, the ballot counts from the device shall be saved as part of the election record and retained for the full election retention period.
  - f. An image of all device software and firmware shall be stored on write-once media and retained securely for the full election retention period; and
  - g. All device software and firmware shall be reinstalled from a read-only version of the approved firmware and software supplied directly by the Secretary of State before the equipment is placed back into service.
14. The Secretary of State reserves the right, with reasonable notice to Los Angeles County, to modify the Use Procedures used with the voting system and to impose additional requirements with respect to the use of the system if the Secretary of State determines that such modifications or additions are necessary to enhance the accuracy, reliability or security of any of the voting system. Such modifications or additions shall be deemed to be incorporated herein as if set forth in full.
15. The Secretary of State reserves the right to monitor activities before, during and after the election at any vote center, warehouse, satellite location, central tabulation location, or the registrar of voters' office, and may, at his or her discretion, test the voting equipment.
16. Voting systems certified for use in California shall comply with all applicable state and federal requirements, including, but not limited to, those voting system requirements as set forth in the California Elections Code and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 and those requirements incorporated by reference in the Help America Vote Act of 2002. Further, voting systems shall also comply with all state and federal voting system guidelines, standards, regulations and requirements that derive authority from or are promulgated pursuant to and in furtherance of the

California Elections Code, the Voting Rights Act, and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 or other applicable state or federal law when appropriate.

17. Voting system manufacturers or their agents shall assume full responsibility for any representation they make that a voting system complies with all applicable state and federal requirements, including, but not limited to, those voting system requirements as set forth in the California Elections Code, the Voting Rights Act, and the Help America Vote Act of 2002. In the event such representation is determined to be false or misleading, voting system manufacturers or their agents shall be responsible for the cost of any upgrade, retrofit or replacement of any voting system or its component parts found to be necessary for certification or otherwise not in compliance.
18. The VSAP 2.0 voting system is for the exclusive use of Los Angeles County at this time.
19. Prior to the disposal or sale of this voting system or portion thereof, all equipment shall be cleared with a minimum of a two-pass wipe so that no software, firmware or data remains on the equipment. At the time of disposal or sale, the equipment shall be returned solely to a non-functioning piece of hardware and the following documented for each:
  - a. Whether the equipment is void of all software, firmware and data;
  - b. The hardware model name;
  - c. The hardware model number;
  - d. The hardware serial number; and
  - e. The persons and entity, if any, that voided the equipment of the software, firmware, and data.
20. Voting systems certified for use that utilize a barcode or QR code for tabulation shall be subject to the following:
  - a. Jurisdictions shall develop procedures and conduct training for poll workers, prior to every election, regarding voter verification of barcodes or QR codes used for tabulation.
  - b. In conducting pre-election testing pursuant to Elections Code section 15000, the jurisdiction shall validate the logic and accuracy of the barcodes or QR codes used for tabulation.
  - c. In conducting a one percent manual tally pursuant to Elections Code section 15360 or a risk limiting audit pursuant to Elections Code section 15367, the jurisdiction shall perform a further review of any ballot examined pursuant to those sections that contains a barcode or QR code used for tabulation. The further review shall verify that the information contained in the QR code or barcode matches the voter verified, human readable text.
21. Los Angeles County shall submit in writing prior to each election, an attestation and verified HASH, identical to the Secretary of State's trusted build SHA-2 512-bit HASH.

22. Any VSAP 2.0 ballot marking device deployed by Los Angeles County shall carry a maintenance schedule under the printer cover.
23. In addition to the serialized ties used to seal the ballot box on the ballot marking devices, Los Angeles County shall use the Secretary of State approved tamper evident adhesive seals on the seam where the ballot box meets the printer cover on the ballot marking devices. Verification of the seals is subject to the same chain of custody documentation process and procedure requirements for all other tamper evident materials.
24. Los Angeles County shall use the Secretary of State approved serialized tamper evident, adhesive seals on the ballot transfer container closing seam. The serialized, adhesive seals shall be used in conjunction with the seal transfer log. Verification of the seals is subject to the same chain of custody documentation process and procedure requirements as all other tamper evident materials.
25. In addition to Los Angeles County's established password policy and security protocols for the workstations and servers, Los Angeles County shall:
  - a. Limit access to passwords used in the VSAP 2.0 environment to employees based on documented job necessity;
  - b. Use the Secretary of State approved serialized tamper evident, adhesive seals over the cover seam of the workstations and servers;
  - c. Add locks to the lock tabs on workstations and servers; and
  - d. Use physical USB port covers covered by a Secretary of State approved serialized tamper evident, adhesive seal.
26. Within five months from the date of this conditional approval, Los Angeles County shall make and submit programming changes to the Secretary of State for testing and review in order to be in place for the November 3, 2020 General Election that:
  - a. Improve the ballot marking device paper handling and remediate the current jamming and misfeed rate of the ballot marking device of 0.0096% to an acceptable rate of no more than 0.002% as prescribed in the California Voting System Standards;
  - b. Remediate the items determined not to impact the integrity, accuracy, or efficiency of the system, that are classified as low severity in the Secretary of State's Consultant Source Code Report;
  - c. Clearly align the voting system audit log descriptions with the on-screen event descriptions; and
  - d. Restrict USB access on the workstations and servers.
27. The "System Audio Sounds" functionality shall not be enabled.

28. For the March 3, 2020 Presidential Primary Election, Los Angeles County shall submit a report to the Secretary of State within 30 days from the close of canvass which identifies any occurrence of a white screen event and shall include a copy of all logs, including chain of custody documentation for the subject device(s).
29. Los Angeles County shall submit an attestation to the Secretary of State prior to each election confirming that the VBL ballot files were successfully validated against ECBMS (election preparation) data prior to ballot printing and ballot marking device loading.
30. By June 30, 2021, Los Angeles County shall provide documentation to the Secretary of State that demonstrates that Los Angeles County is either:
  - a. Using only validated FIPS 140-2 cryptographic modules in VSAP 2.0;
  - b. All cryptographic modules that are used in VSAP 2.0 are FIPS 140-2 validated; or
  - c. The VSAP 2.0 cryptographic modules meet or exceed standards consistent with FIPS 140-2.
31. Within six months from the date of this conditional approval, Los Angeles County shall submit to the Secretary of State a detailed plan to encrypt the VSAP 2.0 components including but not limited to all server and workstation hardware. If Los Angeles County cannot successfully implement full disk encryption without documented impact to the system's accuracy, efficiency, or performance, the Secretary of State reserves the right to require Los Angeles County to undergo an external independent security audit at Los Angeles County's expense, but procured by the Secretary of State.
32. Los Angeles County shall proof all audio and language files during logic and accuracy testing and submit an attestation to the Secretary of State upon completion of logic accuracy testing and prior to any election that all required languages are valid, complete and present in the ballot marking devices.
33. Within five months from the date of this conditional approval, Los Angeles County shall provide a plan to the Secretary of State for reviewing the functionality and usability of the system as it pertains to the current use of the "More" button on the ballot marking device including engagement with stakeholders, disability rights advocates and recognized election material design and usability experts.
34. For the March 3, 2020 Presidential Primary Election and any election held prior to modifications or updates required by this conditional approval, Los Angeles County shall provide:
  - a. Written notice to voters, in all applicable California Elections Code Section 14201 languages, in advance of the voting period and at all vote centers in a manner that complies with California law on:

- i. How to properly feed ballots into the ballot marking devices;
  - ii. Use of the "More" button to review all actions before making selections when using the ballot marking devices; and
  - iii. Verifying selections on the ballot marking device, after printing the ballot and before casting their ballot.
- b. Training to all poll workers on:
- i. Proper insertion of ballots into the ballot marking device for ballot marking and casting;
  - ii. How to properly clear and log ballot jams and paper misfeeds;
  - iii. Orienting voters on the use of the "More" button to review all options before making selections when using the ballot marking devices; and
  - iv. Informing voters about verifying selections on the ballot marking device, after printing the ballot and before casting their ballot.
- c. A sufficient quantity of back-up ballot marking devices and mobile support technicians to support vote center activity.

35. For the March 3, 2020 Presidential Primary, Los Angeles County shall provide a report to the Secretary of State within 30 days from the close of canvass, which identifies:

- a. A copy of the content of training and the number of poll workers trained;
- b. A copy of any notice provided to voters as described in condition 34 above;
- c. A summary of the total number of ballots cast using ballot marking devices;
- d. A summary of the total of all errors, ballot jams and misfeeds;
- e. An inventory of devices that experienced errors, ballot jams or misfeeds including the serial number and whether the device was taken out of service; and
- f. A copy of all logs, including chain of custody logs documenting any and all errors, ballot jams and misfeeds.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand and affix the Great Seal of the State of California, this 24th day of January 2020.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'Alex Padilla'.

ALEX PADILLA  
Secretary of State

## **5. State of California Conditional Approval of the ISB**

The Committee observed in visits to Vote Centers during the Presidential Primary Election that voters were using the ISB. The Committee observed that the general reaction to the ISB was positive.

The State issued conditional approval of the ISB January 29, 2020. This document contains 16 conditions.



These are the State Conditions:



SECRETARY OF STATE

**CONDITIONAL APPROVAL OF  
Los Angeles County's Interactive Sample Ballot (ISB) 1.2  
REMOTE ACCESSIBLE VOTE BY MAIL SYSTEM**

**Whereas**, Elections Code sections 3016.5(a) and 3116.5(a) require a county elections official to permit a voter with a disability or a military or overseas voter to cast his or her ballot using a certified remote accessible vote by mail system; and

**Whereas**, pursuant to California Elections Code section 19281, no remote accessible vote by mail system, in whole or in part, may be used unless it has received the approval of the Secretary of State; and

**Whereas**, a remote accessible vote by mail system, in whole or in part, may be used for the sole purpose of marking an electronic vote by mail ballot remotely, outside a polling location, for a voter with a disability or a military or overseas voter who is required to print the paper cast record to be submitted to the county elections official; and

**Whereas**, Los Angeles County submitted an application for certification of the Interactive Sample Ballot (ISB) 1.2 remote accessible vote by mail system on or about February 5, 2019; and

**Whereas**, during a series of tests conducted by the Secretary of State's office, the remote accessible vote by mail system performed in a manner consistent with California law; and

**Whereas**, the remote accessible vote by mail system was able to successfully and accurately execute all test cases, scenarios, and scripts developed by the Secretary of State's office; and

**Whereas**, the request for approval of the remote accessible vote by mail system as described above was considered at a public hearing held January 10, 2020, in Sacramento, California; and

**Whereas**, written public comment was considered for the request for approval of the remote accessible vote by mail system as described above through January 20, 2020.

**Therefore, I, Alex Padilla, Secretary of State for the State of California, find and determine, pursuant to Division 19 of the Elections Code, as follows:**

For the reasons set forth above, Los Angeles County's ISB 1.2 remote accessible vote by mail system is hereby conditionally approved.

Use of Los Angeles County's ISB 1.2 remote accessible vote by mail system is subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Los Angeles County shall allow voters using the system to return the paper cast record in an envelope of the voter's choosing or in an accessible "two-hole punched signature guide" envelope supplied by the jurisdiction, however the voter must sign the sealed envelope as required by law.
2. Los Angeles County shall configure the following attestation language within the remote accessible vote by mail system landing page in substantially the following form:

Under California law, only voters in the military, overseas voters, and voters with disabilities are eligible to use this accessible vote by mail system.

- I am either a voter with a disability or a military or overseas voter, and therefore I am eligible to use this accessible vote by mail system.
- I understand that my selections marked by this system and submitted to [insert local election jurisdiction name] will be transferred onto a ballot by an election official to be tabulated.
- I understand that my selections marked by this system must be printed by me and submitted to [insert local election jurisdiction name], no later than 8:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time on Election Day.

I certify that all of the above are true.

3. Los Angeles County shall only make the system available within the allowed voting period for any election, including any early voting and vote by mail periods.
4. Los Angeles County shall make available a dedicated accessible toll free telephone line and/or email box for technical assistance to voters using the system. The accessible toll free telephone line and/or email box must be available and regularly monitored while the system is available for use, including early voting and vote by mail periods.
5. Within five business days of this conditional approval, Los Angeles County shall provide for publication on the Secretary of State's website its final Use Procedures, entitled "Los Angeles County ISB 1.2 Use Procedures," which the Secretary of State hereby approves. Compliance with the Use Procedures by the county is a condition of the approval of this remote accessible vote by mail system. Compliance with all requirements set forth in the Use Procedures is mandatory, whether or not a particular requirement is identified in this approval document.
6. ISB 1.2 is for the exclusive use of Los Angeles County.
7. Within five business days of this conditional approval, Los Angeles County shall produce accessible instructions in compliance with all state and federal language accessibility requirements, including but not limited to, a closed-captioned video for voters using the system. Such information shall also include standard instructions for voters to verify that they have the minimum system requirements to use ISB 1.2.
8. Pursuant to Elections Code section 19290(a), if a remote accessible vote by mail system has been certified or conditionally approved by the Secretary of State, the county shall notify the Secretary of State in writing of any defect, fault, or failure of the hardware, software, or firmware of the system or a part of the system within 30 calendar days after the county or jurisdiction learns of the defect, fault, or failure.
9. Los Angeles County shall provide a report to the Secretary of State, within 30 calendar days of certifying the election results, listing the number of voters that used the system and all technical issues reported (if any), along with any mitigations.
10. Pursuant to Elections Code section 19291, no substitution or modification of the remote accessible vote by mail system shall be made with respect to any component of the remote accessible vote by

mail system, including the Use Procedures, until the Secretary of State has been notified in writing and has determined that the proposed change or modification does not impair the accuracy or efficiency of the remote accessible vote by mail system sufficient to require a re-examination and approval. This includes, but is not limited to, the hosting environment, which shall be kept current with security and anti-malware updates applicable to each component of the environment.

11. Pursuant to Elections Code section 19295, the remote accessible vote by mail system shall not have the capability, including optional capability, to allow a remote server to mark a voter's selections transmitted to the server from the voter's computer via the internet. The remote accessible vote by mail system shall not have the capability, including optional capability, to store any voter identifiable selections on any remote server, and shall not have the capability, including optional capability, to tabulate votes. All systems and transmission of data shall be configured, maintained and monitored to protect the system in a manner commensurate with the risk that would result from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of such information.
12. The Secretary of State reserves the right, with reasonable notice to the county, to modify the Use Procedures and this certification to impose additional requirements with respect to the use of the system if the Secretary of State determines that such modifications or additions are necessary to enhance the accessibility, accuracy, reliability or security of the remote accessible vote by mail system. Such modifications or additions shall be deemed to be incorporated herein as if set forth in full.
13. Los Angeles County shall notify the Secretary of State immediately upon discovery of a breach or attempted breach in the security or information relating to the remote accessible vote by mail system.
14. The Secretary of State reserves the right to monitor activities before, during and after the election at any registrar of voters' office or county hosted entity, and may, at his or her discretion, test and perform security scans or audits of the remote accessible vote by mail system.
15. Remote accessible vote by mail systems certified for use in California shall comply with all applicable state and federal requirements, including, but not limited to, those remote accessible vote by mail system requirements as set forth in the California Elections Code. Further, remote accessible vote by mail systems shall also comply with

all state and federal voting technology guidelines, standards, regulations and requirements that derive authority from or are promulgated pursuant to and in furtherance of the California Elections Code or other applicable state or federal law when appropriate, including but not limited to Section 508 of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

16. Remote accessible vote by mail system manufacturers or their agents shall assume full responsibility for any representation they make that a remote accessible vote by mail system complies with all applicable state and federal requirements, including, but not limited to, those remote accessible vote by mail system requirements as set forth in the California Elections Code. In the event such representation is determined to be false or misleading, remote accessible vote by mail system manufacturers or their agents shall be responsible for the cost of any upgrade, retrofit or replacement of any remote accessible vote by mail system or its components found to be necessary for certification or otherwise not in compliance.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand  
and affix the Great Seal of the State of California,  
this January 29, 2020.



ALEX PADILLA  
Secretary of State

**6. Presidential Primary February 22 Through March 3, 2020**

The Committee observed 22 Vote Centers during the Presidential Primary Election. Numerous failings were notated, in particular the bottleneck during voter check-in at the e-Polls.

Results are outlined in the following chart:

JURY FINDINGS OF PRIMARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION FEBRUARY 22, 2020 THROUGH MARCH 3, 2020											
LOCATION	WORKERS	PASSCODE TO BOOT BMD	IT AVAIL	BALLOTS	BACK-UP BALLOTS	SUPPLIES	Curbside VOTING	BMD SETUP	BMD AVAILABLE	SIGMAGE OUTSIDE	OBSERVATIONS
San Gabriel Community Center	11	NO	NO	YES	Unable to Determine	Unable to Determine	NO	NO	10	NO	Passcode could not be loaded. On hold with IT for 15 minutes, cut off twice. Student worker turned away a voter because system was down. No large visible signage outside.
San Gabriel Library	15	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	5	10	YES	No passcode to start BMDs. Backup ballots not available. VSAP lockers opened when workers arrived. No electrical connections to plug five machines into the wall.
Rosemead Community Center	9	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	5	15	YES	No passcodes. Difficulty in contacting IT. Router missing from empty case. No back up ballots. Majority of voting supplies missing, including ballots, provisional ballots, and security envelopes. Only five of 15 BMDs set up. <b>Voters turned away.</b>
Centro Estrella East Los Angeles	3	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	10	YES	No passcodes. Vote Center dark. Majority of workers did not show up for work, some left and three stayed behind. <b>Center closed to voting.</b>
East Los Angeles Service Center	7	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	5	10	YES	Half (5) BMDs non-operational. No power strips to connect power to BMDs. Slow to start. Many workers did not show up for work. When Jury asked questions, lead stated, "I am not allowed to answer questions."
Century 21 Montebello	8	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	3	10	YES	Location was upstairs and down a long hallway. Only room for three BMDs to be set up, the other seven still in boxes. Very energetic workers led by the most knowledgeable County lead worker Jury encountered.
Laborer's Union Mission Hills	15	Unable to Determine	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	30	40	YES	<b>No ballots.</b> Sent a worker to pick up from another location. Voters sent elsewhere to vote. At time of Jury visit, shuttle waiting with several IT technicians sitting inside. Generational and language mix of energetic staff excited to work.

JURY FINDINGS OF PRIMARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION FEBRUARY 22, 2020 THROUGH MARCH 3, 2020											
LOCATION	WORKERS	PASSCODE TO BOOT BMD	IT AVAIL	BALLOTS	BACK-UP BALLOTS	SUPPLIES	Curbside VOTING	BMD SETUP	BMD AVAILABLE	SIGNAGE OUTSIDE	OBSERVATIONS
Sepulveda Recreation Center	20	NO	NO	YES	Unable to Determine	Unable to Determine	NO	25	25	LATE	One staffer said, "Dean Logan gets an F." Staff chaotic, confused and extremely upset. Staff arrived early to find that Vote Center location was changed within park complex. Upon arrival, poll workers stated that they were given conflicting information by maintenance and park staff. Poll workers located and assembled BMDs using manuals. All other materials, including e-Polls, were locked in a storage pod with unavailable keys. Staff repeatedly called Registrar, and expressed frustration that even after calling they did not receive the requested support. Generational and language mix of energetic staff excited to work. <b>Three voters sent away.</b>
East Valley Adult Center Van Nuys	19	Unable to Determine	NO	YES	Unable to Determine	Unable to Determine	NO	10	10	YES	No e-Poll available. <b>Voters sent to Sherman Oaks Galleria Vote Center.</b> Parking inadequate for voters because park activity takes up most of the spots. Generational and language mix of energetic staff excited to work.
St Charles North Hollywood	12	DELAYED	NO	YES	Unable to Determine	Unable to Determine	NO	5	10	YES	Passcode issue delayed opening by 10 minutes. One BMD jam. Difficulty finding supplies. No guide for printer. Generational and language mix of energetic staff excited to work.
Sherman Oaks Galleria, Sherman Oaks	5	YES	NO	YES	Unable to Determine	Unable to Determine	NO	5	6	YES	BMDs not set up. Workers had to set up. One BMD not working. Five voters not in system. No IT available, or county workers on site. Generational and language mix of energetic staff excited to work.



JURY FINDINGS OF PRIMARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION FEBRUARY 22, 2020 THROUGH MARCH 3, 2020											
LOCATION	WORKERS	PASSCODE TO BOOT BMD	IT AVAIL	BALLOTS	BACK-UP BALLOTS	SUPPLIES	Curbside VOTING	BMD SETUP	BMD AVAILABLE	SIGMAGE OUTSIDE	OBSERVATIONS
Hall of Administration	10	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	No Curbside Voting available. Lead said Curbside Voting unsafe in Downtown LA due to heavy traffic and no parking. Voting signs not very visible and hard to see by motorists. Security guards directing voters. Lead added more voting signs on Hill Street. The e-Poll systems worked with no issues. About 10 ISB used by voters without problems when downloaded to the BMD machines. Some paper jams quickly fixed.
Union Station	9	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES		Vote Center in Metro Building difficult to find. Not enough signs directing voters to center. No Curbside voting. Three BMDs jammed and not working. IT available on site. Steady voters, but not busy. Lead said that security guards watch machines once Vote Center closed.
Japanese American National Museum	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	This is one of the four-day Vote Centers, so it was not open when the Jury visited on February 28th. Vote Center opened on February 29th.
Castelar Elementary School	5	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	Poll worker out front directing voters. Usual school security procedures were not observed. Children playing very close to the Vote Center. BMDs had to be moved because children were playing with them. Unclear if any child voted. Vote Center shared space with student cafeteria separated only by portable screen.
Alpine Recreation Center	3	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	Not busy. Only one voter voting. Drop off boxes for mail-in ballots available. One paper jam. Two BMDs not working.

JURY FINDINGS OF PRIMARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION FEBRUARY 22, 2020 THROUGH MARCH 3, 2020											
LOCATION	WORKERS	PASSCODE TO BOOT BMD	IT AVAIL	BALLOTS	BACK-UP BALLOTS	SUPPLIES	Curbside VOTING	BMD SETUP	BMD AVAILABLE	SIGNAGE OUTSIDE	OBSERVATIONS
First Chinese Baptist Church	4	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	Vote Center in the church library at the far end of the complex. Handicap and Curbside Voting inaccessible. Workers unable to reach Registrar, waited 40 minutes on helpline before getting disconnected. Poll workers eventually resolved the problem themselves. Needed better signage directing voters to proper site. Wrong address listed in County booklet.
Washington Irving Library	5	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	15	YES	Not enough staff. More than 60 voters waiting in increasing line at Vote Center. Voters impatient because of long wait. One out of three e-Polls operating. IT was at site repairing e-Polls. No phone number on Curbside Voting sign.
42nd Street Elementary School	12	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	15	YES	Vote Center very well organized, staffed and run. Knowledgeable and cheerful staff involved with greeting, guiding, and assisting voters through the voting process. Curbside Voting space cleverly protected using traffic cones. Drop box easily located. Voters had to walk through school while children present.
Atwater Avenue School	8	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	30	YES	Very busy Vote Center. Seventy voters waiting in increasing lines. Eight out of 30 BMDs not working. Two of eight e-Polls not working. Short staffed. Curbside Voting sign with phone number listed. Drop box available, but not easily located. Confused voters unnecessarily standing in voting line to drop off mail-in ballot. Not well organized.

**JURY FINDINGS OF PRIMARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION FEBRUARY 22, 2020 THROUGH MARCH 3, 2020**

LOCATION	WORKERS	PASSCODE TO BOOT BMD	IT AVAIL	BALLOTS	BACK-UP BALLOTS	SUPPLIES	Curbside VOTING	BMD SETUP	BMD AVAILABLE	SIGNAGE OUTSIDE	OBSERVATIONS
Loreto Elementary School	9	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	25	YES	Short staffed, and situation worsened by poll worker no show, and moving of staff to another location. Many staff started at 6 a.m. and unable to eat till 3:30 p.m. Of 25 BMDs, 19 worked. Some jammed. One of eight e-Polls not working. Curbside Voting available with phone number listed. School was out for the day and staff available to assist. Drop box easily located. Voters unhappy at the redesign of the ballot with Presidential Primary Candidate names at the end.
Boyle Heights City Hall	7	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	25	YES	Short staffed. Very poor lighting at Vote Center and not enough parking. Very large crowd of 80 voters waiting, with line constantly growing. Alternate nearby Vote Center information posted, but few chose to leave. Non-English speaking voters walking around the BMD area, confused. No voter privacy at BMD. Instance of a voter voting while companion standing there chatting. Confused voters could not locate the Mail-in Drop Off box and had no assistance. Lead swamped, busy working the e-Polls with no time to supervise. Five BMDs not operating. e-Poll machines very slow and poll workers had problems finding voter names which in one instance led to debate over issuing provisional ballot. Voters unhappy at the redesign of the ballot with Primary Presidential Candidate names at the end.

JURY REVISITED FOUR SITES ON MARCH 3, 2020 AND OBSERVED THE FOLLOWING:												
LOCATION	WORKERS	PASSCODE	IT AVAIL	BALLOTS	BACK-UP BALLOTS	SUPPLIES	Curbside VOTING	BMD SETUP	BMD AVAILABLE	SIGNAGE OUTSIDE	OBSERVATIONS	
San Gabriel Community Center	13	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	10	YES	This site had five e-Polls. Electrical issues. BMDs running smoothly. Steady flow of voters. Positive feedback from public to staff. Curbside voting utilized ISB (Interactive Sample Ballot). Staff confident in handling paper jams. One BMD not operational.	
San Gabriel Library	Unable to Determine	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	5	YES	Vote Center on second floor, quite busy with 40 voters waiting. Staff well organized. Staff assigned voters numbers to register and then wait aside till BMD became available. Curbside Voting sign present, but covered and without telephone number to call worker to curbside. One of five BMDs not working. Electrical limitations restricted them to five BMDs. Observer from the Elections Oversight Office present during Jury visit.	
Rosemead Community Center	13	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	25	YES	Two BMDs not working. All five e-Polls working. Vote Center was well organized and run. Steady flow of voters with no one waiting.	
Centro Estrella East Los Angeles	4	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	5	YES	Two e-Polls. Knowledgeable and organized staff. According to staff, no problems arose in the voting process.	

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- 12.1 The Committee recommends that all schools that are designated as a Vote Center must have a separate secure area with a separate entrance so that the public does not come in contact with the children.
- 12.2 The Committee recommends that the Registrar submit to the Board, with a copy to the Committee, a written document outlining the specifics of the security and chain-of-custody protocols of the ballots and the entire VSAP system at each Vote Center.
- 12.3 The Committee recommends that the Registrar submit a specific written plan that guarantees the resolution of all 51 conditions issued by the State. (See Conditional Certifications, Secretary of State.) This plan shall be submitted to the Board and to the Committee for their review within 90 days of receipt of this report.
- 12.4 The Committee recommends that, at the end of an election period, each poll worker complete a survey about their experience with the processes that are in place for staffing, training, equipment, supplies, security, and voter interaction. Surveys shall be sent to the Board for action two weeks.
- 12.5 The Committee recommends that the Registrar increase County lead staff at Large Vote Centers from one employee to two. Insufficient lead staff substantially decreases efficiency of voting process.
- 12.6 The Committee recommends that the Registrar require one IT tech stationed at each Vote Center location on Election Day. If possible, an IT tech would be assigned the entire November General Election period at Large Vote Centers.
- 12.7 The Committee recommends, that in addition to the mail-in option, the Registrar have an alternate means of voting throughout the County for the next three general elections. The VSAP must be deemed secure and operating properly, at that time, for the County to continue using it.
- 12.8 The Committee recommends that the Registrar clearly identify where the drop-off locations are for mail-in ballots. Signage at Vote Centers did not indicate a drop-box location for completed ballot, nor a sign that those with completed ballots were not required to stand in line.
- 12.9 The Committee recommends that Curbside Voting and a reserved handicap parking space be clearly identified at each Vote Center, with signage indicating the phone number to call. In addition, instructions on Curbside Voting must be clearly explained in election materials prior to the election period.

- 12.10 The Committee recommends that on the weekend before Election Day, and on Election Day, transportation throughout the County be free to the voting public so that those individuals without transportation can make it to a Vote Center. This is critical to voter participation.
- 12.11 The Committee recommends that at each Large Vote Center there be adequate and sufficient e-Polls in order to prevent bottleneck/congestion/chaos at check in.
- 12.12 The Committee recommends that all workers assigned to use the e-Poll have basic electronic skills which will enable the worker to quickly and effectively locate the name of the voter.

### **REQUIRED RESPONSES**

California Penal Code Sections 933(c) and 933.05 require a written response to all recommendations contained in this report. Responses shall be made no later than ninety (90) days after the Civil Grand Jury publishes its report and files it with the Clerk of the Court. Responses shall be made in accord with Penal Code Sections 933.05 (a) and (b).

Presiding Judge  
Los Angeles County Superior Court  
Clara Shortridge Foltz Criminal Justice Center  
210 West Temple Street, Eleventh Floor-Room 11-506  
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Responses are required from:

<b>Responding Agency</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors	12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 12.8, 12.9, 12.10, 12.11, 12.12
County Registrar Recorder, Los Angeles County Registrar	12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 12.8, 12.9, 12.10, 12.11, 12.12
Senior Staff, Los Angeles County Registrar Recorder	12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 12.8, 12.9, 12.10, 12.11, 12.12
Sachi Hamai, CEO, Los Angeles County	12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 12.8, 12.9, 12.10, 12.11, 12.12
Los Angeles County Office of Education	12.1
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority	12.10

**COMMITTEE MEMBERS**

Jean Holden, Co-Chair  
 Marina LaGarde, Co-Chair  
 Judith Whitman, Co-Chair  
 Nirja Kapoor  
 Mike Padilla  
 Heather Preimesberger