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BRIDGING THE INFORMATION DISCONNECT IN NATIONAL BIAS CRIME REPORTING
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BRIDGING THE INFORMATION
DISCONNECT IN NATIONAL BIAS
CRIME REPORTING
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
By:
Jack McDevitt
Shea Cronin
Jennifer Balboni
Amy Farrell
Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research
Institute on Race and Justice
Northeastern University
James Nolan
West Virginia University
Joan Weiss
Justice Research and Statistics Association
Sponsored by:
Bureau of Justice Statistics
United States Department of Justice
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Background
Understanding the level of bias motivated crime is critical for both national and local law
enforcement to effectively respond to and prevent bias motivated incidents. With the passage of the
Hate Crime Statistics Act in 1990, the Attorney General charged the FBI to establish a national bias
crime data collection program to improve our understanding of the scope and character of bias
crime. Under this program, local, county and state law enforcement agencies participate by
submitting incident level bias crime data to the FBI either through quarterly summary reports or
through National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS). Although many local law
enforcement agencies have participated in the data collection program for over a decade, variation
in the accuracy with which these agencies classify and report bias crime incidents limits our
understanding of bias crime nationally.
Spurred by the concern of advocacy groups and a common understanding that national bias
crime statistics underreported the actual level of bias crimes reported to police, in 1999 the Bureau
of Justice Statistics commissioned a study to evaluate the national data collection program. The
study, conducted by researchers from both the Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research (CCJPR)
at Northeastern University and the Justice Research and Statistics Association (JRSA), identified a
significant gap in bias crime reporting. Responding to a national survey, local law enforcement
agencies indicated a greater number of bias crime incidents were reported to police than was
captured in the annual Uniform Crime Report for the same year. The authors of this study
concluded that, —between 5,000 and 6,000 additional agencies may have encountered bias crime that
were not reported to the national program.“
1
Based on the realization that national bias crime data may be inaccurate for many local
jurisdictions, the Bureau of Justice Statistics sponsored the present study to describe existing local
bias crime reporting practices and identify common challenges to accurate reporting. Using a case
study methodology, this report intensively examines the reporting practices of eight local law
enforcement agencies throughout the country. Researchers examined both structural and contextual
forces that may affect the completeness and accuracy of bias crime reporting. The conclusions
drawn in this report can aid local law enforcement in developing successful bias crime reporting
strategies and ultimately increase the accuracy and uniformity in national bias crime statistics.
1
Jack McDevtt, Jennifer Balboni, Susan Bennett, Joan Weiss, Stan Orchowsky and Lisa Walbolt (2000). Improving the
Quality and Accuracy of Bias Crime Statistics Nationally: An Assessment of the First Ten Years of Bias Crime Data
Collection. Final Report Submitted to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, DC.
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Methodology
Local police departments were solicited to participate in the present study based on a set of
criteria including, regional balance, department size, crime reporting method (NIBRS versus
Summary Reporting System) and bias crime reporting history. Eight local police departments
agreed to participate in the study. These departments included two from each region of the country
(North, South, Midwest, West); three agencies who reported using NIBRS and five agencies who
used the Summary Reporting System; and most were large departments (serving populations greater
than 100,000) and two were smaller departments (serving populations between 50,000 and
100,000).
The research team conducted site visits at each of the participating departments with two
research objectives: review of police incident report records and conduct a qualitative investigation
of the department‘s reporting process. First, researchers reviewed the participating agencies
incident reports to estimate the extent of classification errors that might occur in these several
departments. In one part of the records review, a random sample of simple and aggravated assault
incident reports was drawn from each department‘s internal records. Using a systematic coding
scheme developed by the authors, these incident reports were then reviewed to establish whether or
not the officer‘s classification of the offender‘s motivation fit the narrative description of the
incident. When the officer labeled an incident as non-bias motivated, but the narrative described an
apparent bias motivation, the researchers determined the incident to be misclassified. In another
part of the records review researchers sought to identify false-positives by reviewing the population
(a sample in one department) of crimes that departments identified as bias motivated.
Qualitative focus groups and interviews of personnel directly or indirectly involved in the
reporting process comprised the second part of the methodology employed at each site visit. These
interviews and focus groups sought to gather information from personnel throughout the crime
reporting process. At each site staff conducted interviews and/or focus groups with patrol officers,
front line supervisors, detectives, records unit personnel and managers, information technology
specialists and the chief of police (or another member of the command) staff. The interview or
focus group protocol sought to identify the roles and responsibilities of different personnel in the
reporting process, their opinions about the concept of bias crime in general and bias crime reporting,
and to illuminate some of the challenges they face in identifying and reporting bias crimes
accurately.
The findings based on both the records review and qualitative investigation are discussed
below. After presenting the results of the records review analysis, we separately address both
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infrastructure issues (reporting process design and characteristics) and contextual issues
(organizational culture) that emerged during the qualitative investigation.
Records Review Analysis
This study is one of the first to measure the quality of national bias crime figures by
assessing the potential level of misclassification of bias motivation in each of the host departments.
To accomplish this, the research team attempted to review a sample of ”assault‘ incident reports to
determine who often departments undercounted bias crimes.
2
Local departments had classified
these incidents as assaults without bias motivation. As outlined in the methodology section of this
paper in detail, a sample of assault incident reports from the year 2000 was provided to the research
team by each department. Members of the research team then read each incident report and based
on information from the pre-coded section of the report and the narrative description (when
available) coded several characteristics of the incident, including: 1) the offenders‘ motivation, 2)
the presence of racial/group differences between offender and victim, 3) whether the incident was a
domestic violence incident, 4) assault type (aggravated or simple) and 5) whether the report was
indicated as bias motivated.
The offender‘s motivation was coded according to a typology created by the research team.
This typology consisted of the discrete categories of bias, ambiguous, non-bias, unknown, and
victim initiated bias motivations. The research team was able to identify potential undercounting of
bias crimes in most of the participating jurisdictions œ jurisdictions had records of assaults with
recognizable bias motivation characteristics that were not classified as bias motivated. In
examining the sample of valid assault incident reports, we found that the observed percent
undercount in each jurisdiction ranged from a low of zero to a high of 5.83 percent when using both
”bias‘ and ”ambiguous‘ motivated incident to determine undercounts. When using the more
conservative measure of only ”bias‘ motivated incidents, the range varies from no observable
undercount (in three jurisdictions) to 2.24 percent undercount error. While the observed percentage
may seem low, estimating the undercount of the full population of assaults would substantively
change the overall number of bias crime officially reported by some of these departments.
In addition, the research team reviewed reports of all incidents
3
that each department
categorized as bias crime to determine the extent of potential over-counting of bias crimes. While
2
In some departments the ”sample‘ was close to the whole universe of assaults; our goal was to review between 250 and
500 cases in each department.
3
In one department a sample of bias crimes was reviewed; in all other departments all bias crimes for one or more years
was reviewed.
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assault record review focused on one crime type, in this phase of the review we examined all known
incidents of bias crime. First, we reviewed the records to determine whether the incident described
an actual crime and whether the type of bias described in the report fit one of the FBI‘s bias crime
type categories. Second, in an attempt to determine whether or not the incident was motivated by
something other than bias, we reviewed the incident reports for the presence or absence of two
pieces of information: 1) explicit evidence of bias (e.g.: documented racial symbols or language)
and 2) prior provocation or other reasons that triggered the incident. In all departments, we found
that over-counts of bias motivated incidents were rare. Most incidents of bias were indeed crimes
and fit one of the FBI categories of bias. Additionally, all bias incidents reports contained either
explicit bias evidence or had no other provoking event; and a vast majority both contained bias
evidence and had no other provoking event.
Infrastructure Analysis
One of the primary goals of the present study was to understand the bias crime reporting
infrastructures of local police departments in order to assess how certain reporting infrastructures
present barriers to or promote the accuracy of bias crime statistics. To accomplish this, we outlined
the bias crime reporting processes as a whole and then examined the characteristics of two key
decision points within the reporting process.
Bias Crime Reporting Process Types
Through interviews and review of policy directives we outlined the steps in the reporting
process for each department. This outline tracked the reporting of bias crime from the patrol officer
response to submission of bias crime statistics to the FBI or state agency. In all of the participating
departments, the responding patrol officer was responsible for making the initial classification of
the incident‘s motivation (bias or non-bias motivated) and documenting this on the incident report
in some way. After this common starting point, however, we found that subsequent steps in the
reporting process differed across departments. Three types of bias crime reporting processes were
identified in the participating departments:
1. Integrated without Additional Review: Bias crime incident reports are processed along the same steps
as all other crime incident reports. Records units handle the bias crime reporting as part of these units‘
overall crime reporting responsibilities. This unit is not explicitly instructed to check the accuracy of the
bias crime classification in any way.
2. Integrated with Additional Review: Bias crime incident reports are still processed along the same steps
as all other crime incident reports. Records unit personnel aggregate bias crime statistics as part of the
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regular crime reporting duties. However, in contrast with the first type, the department designates some
personnel the responsibility of conducting an additional review of those incidents initially classified as bias
motivated to determine the accuracy of this classification.
3. Separate with Additional Review: Bias crime statistics outside the normal crime reporting process. Here,
local departments establish or include units/personnel in the bias crime reporting process that are not typically
included in the normal crime reporting process. These units or personnel are then responsible for aggregating
and reporting bias crime statistics to the state agency or FBI. This unit or personnel is also responsible for
conducting an additional review of those incidents initially classified as bias motivated to determine the accuracy
of this classification.
We considered the relative value of each reporting process type based on the extent to which they
maximize two important goals of crime reporting: efficient processing of incident reports and the
validity of bias crime classifications. Efficient processing refers to the goal of insuring that all
incident reports classified as bias motivated are included in the official statistics. Validity means
that the classification of the offender‘s bias appropriately fits the official definition, meaning that
the offender‘s motivation was, at least in part, bias against some group. The Integrated without
Additional Review process maximizes only the efficiency of the process. In contrast, the Separate
with Additional Review process maximizes only the validity of the bias classification by insuring
that all bias reports included in the statistics get an additional level of review. Finally, the
Integrated with Additional Review process incorporates both of these advantages, and thus,
maximizes both process efficiency and classification validity.
Key Decision Making Points
The FBI previously recommended that local police agencies adopt a two-tier reporting
model to best report bias crimes.
4
In this model, patrol officers œ the first tier œ are given the
responsibility to initially classify suspected bias crime incidents and a designated specialist or unit œ
the second tier œ is responsible for reviewing the bias classification before they are submitted to the
official statistics. These steps in the bias crime reporting process comprise the two most important
decision making points and their implementation is believed to be advantageous to accurately
tracking bias crimes. While most departments in the present study had some form of a two-tier
reporting model, we found a high degree of variation in the way the participating departments
implemented this model.
First, we found that important differences exist in the responsibilities assigned to patrol
officers for bias crime reporting. In one department, patrol officers were encouraged to apply a
very broad, more inclusive definition of bias crime when making their initial motivation
4
Federal Bureau of Investigation (1996). Training Guide for Hate Crime Data Collection. Washington DC: U.S.
Department of Justice.
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classification. This department expected patrol officers to send all incidents with any evidence
suggesting bias motivation to a centralized unit for review. In all other departments, the patrol
officer was instructed to make more specific judgments about the incident‘s motivation. While this
judgment might be reviewed later in the reporting process, the officer had the responsibility of
labeling an incident as bias motivated or non-bias motivated. The weakness of this situation is that
once a patrol officer determines an incident to be non-bias motivated, the designated specialist can
never review this incident. —Gray area“ or ambiguous incidents, where officers express the most
difficulty making a bias determination, may then be missed. This weakness is overcome somewhat
when officers apply a broader definition, as in the first example, because a greater number of
incident reports will be identified for review by the specialist and therefore minimizing the extent of
classification errors.
The next important point in a bias crime process is the second level review. Although all
but one of the participating departments had some designated to conduct an additional review, the
characteristics of this second tier step differed dramatically across departments. First, departments
assigned bias review duties to several different types of personnel including criminal detectives,
intelligence unit detectives and records unit personnel. Second, in some departments the designated
reviewer was responsible for conducting an investigation of all bias crimes, while in others the
review was made solely on the information contained in the patrol officers incident report. Third, in
only one department was the review step specialized œ that the unit‘s only responsibility was
handling bias crimes. The second level review added the most value to the reporting process when
trained detectives œ who could develop experience, expertise and routine œ made final bias
motivation classification decisions after conducting a complete investigation of the incident.
Contextual Analysis
Any comprehensive discussion about bias crime reporting must deal with the department
culture around the issue of bias crime and how individual officers view their role in enforcing bias
crime legislation. While choosing appropriate reporting infrastructures is an important starting
point for accurate bias crime reporting, the effectiveness of such efforts may be undermined by a
department culture that is resistant to the concept of bias crime.
In the present study, departments varied greatly in regards to the departmental culture
around the topic of bias crime. We assessed department culture according to the organizational
commitment to and the general sensitivity of its personnel towards bias crime. Organizational
commitment consists of the department‘s leadership perspective towards bias crime, the amount of
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resources allocated for bias crime and bias crime reporting, symbolic commitment and the degree to
which the department reaches out to the community. Focus group and interview data were used to
assess general sensitivity œ the common perspective of personnel within the department around the
issue of bias crime.
Several departments exhibited a relatively negative or resistant overall department culture
towards bias crime. There was limited organizational commitment in these departments: leadership
explicitly disagreed with policing bias crimes; few resources were allocated; no real system of
accountability or rewards was evident; and community outreach was not integrated into the police
strategy. In addition, common responses from personnel suggested a level of resistance to dealing
with bias motivation. For example, in one department, which assigned the responsibility of tracking
and reporting bias incident to an intelligence unit, barely any incidents had been reported to the
national program over the past several years. Despite this lack of any measurable output, the
department‘s leadership had not taken any steps to review or change this unit‘s practices; this
omission of accountability sent a clear message to department personnel that reporting bias crimes
was not a priority. Therefore, a negative or resistant overall culture towards bias crime does not
support or encourage officers to formally identify the existence of bias crime, despite the presence
of a formal policy or reporting mechanism.
Other departments in the present study displayed evidence of positive or acceptance
departmental cultures towards dealing with bias crime. Here, the organization was committed to
providing unique police services for bias crime: leadership expressed an opinion that bias crime was
a priority; specific resources were set up for responding to bias crimes; there was evidence that
officers were held accountable for their noncompliance or rewarded for their adherence to the
department‘s policy; and community outreach was an explicit piece of the department‘s overall
strategy. Similarly, patrol officers and other personnel communicated an orientation of acceptance
towards bias crime policy. For example, in one department the bias crime responsibilities were
centralized in a full detective unit, located physically and administratively in the chief‘s office, and
a recent head of the unit was promoted to the command staff based in part on his record running the
bias crime unit. In sum, departments with a positive or acceptant culture towards dealing with bias
motivation implemented the department‘s bias crime policy in a way that would encourage officers
to fully carry out their bias crime response and reporting duties.
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Discussion: A Typology of Bias Crime Reporting Errors
Earlier studies found a disconnect in bias crime reporting œ between the level of bias crime
officially documented by police departments and the actual number of bias incidents in the
community to which departments responded. Based on different reporting infrastructures and
contextual forces, we identified three important types of reporting errors that can negatively impair
the accuracy and validity of bias crime statistics. The first, Recognition Errors, occur when officers
fail to collect information, using investigation techniques, about indicators of bias motivation.
Second, by making an inaccurate judgment about the bias motivation, officers can make
Classification Errors. Finally, despite appropriate recognition and classification, a department can
be unsuccessful in transferring incident reports or crime data through the correct reporting channels
by making Process Errors. Although identifying these error types is important to help reduce
disconnect, a full examination of the challenges to successful tracking of bias crimes must also
consider the inherent situational factors of bias crime incidents.
In the following discussion, we explain a typology of potential bias crime incidents that law
enforcement encounter based on two situational factors: underlying crime severity and ambiguity of
motivation. By developing this typology of potential bias crime incidents, we can better understand
how certain reporting errors are associated with particular types of incidents. Moreover, any
infrastructure or cultural changes adopted by departments attempting to improve their bias crime
reporting would be more effective if developed with an understanding of the challenges presented
by situational factors.
When examining potential bias crime incidents, we can conceptualize them according to two
important concepts: (1) the relative severity of the underlying crime and (2) the relative extent of
bias motivation found in the incident. Relative severity of the underlying (or ”parallel‘) crime refers
to how severe one crime type is compared to another. While it is difficult to construct an absolute
hierarchy of crime severity, there can be reasonable agreement that some crimes œ holding all other
factors equal œ are more serious than others. The second concept, relative extent of bias motivation,
describes the level of ambiguity an officer perceives to be involved in a potential bias crime. Some
potential bias crimes are clear, subject to little interpretation. These crimes have a number of clear
bias indicators, such as derogatory language or symbols of bias, and most importantly lack other
explanations or motivations. Conversely, some bias crimes are more ambiguous. While crimes that
are more ambiguous may have fewer bias indicators, the ambiguity presents itself mainly because
there may be alternative motivations based on some prior provocation or dispute.
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By combining the two concepts œ relative seriousness of the underlying crime and the
relative extent of bias motivation œ four typologies of potential bias crimes emerge: (1) serious
crimes with a clear bias motivation, (2) serious crimes with ambiguous motivations, (3) less serious
crimes with a clear bias motivation and (4) less serious crimes with ambiguous bias motivations.
Using the same factual situation, with minor modifications, we can establish examples that illustrate
each of the four types of potential bias crimes:
ß
Serious and Clear Incident (Type I): A man assaults a black male with a deadly weapon, while yelling
—Ni**er get out of our town“ and other racially derogatory comments. No provocation for the
incident existed.
ß
Serious and Ambiguous Incident (Type II): A man assaults a black man with a deadly weapon, while
yelling, —Ni**er, get out of town“ and other racially derogatory comments. Earlier that week the
offender and victim were involved in a dispute over property lines.
ß
Less Serious and Clear Incident (Type III): A man graffiti‘s a black man‘s house, writing —Ni**er, get
out of town“ and other racially derogatory signs. No provocation for the incident existed.
ß
Less Serious and Ambiguous Incident (Type IV): A man graffiti‘s a black man‘s house, writing
—Ni**er, get out of town“ and other racially derogatory signs. Earlier that week the offender and
victim were involved in a dispute over property lines.
Table 1 provides the matrix of potential types of bias crime incidents produced by the two concepts.
Each of these four types presents unique challenges for law enforcement officials. First, less
severe crimes often pose problem in recognition. Officers typically pay less attention to less severe
crimes, thereby conducting more cursory investigations into the causes or motives less thoroughly.
This is problematic for bias crime reporting because accurate reporting necessitates a consideration
of motive for all crimes and information is needed to make determinations. Second, crimes with
ambiguous motivation pose problems primarily in the classification step. Many bias indicators may
be recognized here, yet the police personnel making the classification decision may inappropriately
think that the facts suggest the offender‘s motivation was not bias or not sufficiently applicable to
the definition of bias crime. Finally, all types of crimes are susceptible to process errors in that they
may not be appropriately passed from one point to the next in the bias crime reporting process.
Even those incidents where information about bias indicators is collected (recognition) and
classification decisions are made accurately may fall out of reporting systems for a variety of
reasons. This problem extends beyond bias crime reporting and may be found in all types of crime
reporting. Improving the accuracy and completeness of bias crime statistics can only be
accomplished when departments fully understand the types of reporting errors that department
personnel make and the situations in which such errors are most likely.
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Conclusions
ß
This study is one of the first to address empirically the quality of national bias crime figures by
assessing the potential level of misclassification of bias motivation in eight police departments.
Through this process we identified potential undercounting of bias crimes in most of the
participating departments. While the observed level misclassification was low in the sample
assault reports drawn from each department, estimating the undercount of the full population of
assaults would substantively change the picture of bias crime officially reported by some of
these departments.
ß
Departments in the present study had different infrastructures for tracking and reporting bias
crimes. Three types of bias crime reporting processes were identified in the participating
departments: 1) integrated without additional review, 2) integrated with additional review and 3)
separate without additional review. Integrating the bias crime reporting process and providing
procedures for additional review emerged as a promising practice for reporting bias crimes.
ß
While most of the departments had some designated procedure for additional review similar to
the FBI recommended two-tier reporting model, a closer examination revealed dramatic
differences in the specific characteristics of each department‘s application of the two-tier model.
We found the best practice for tracking bias crimes was when patrol officers (first tier) were
instructed to identify all potential bias crimes using a broad definition of bias motivation and a
trained specialist detective (second tier) made the final decision about the incident‘s bias
motivation.
ß
Beyond establishing appropriate reporting infrastructures, department culture plays an important
role in inhibiting or promoting accurate bias crime identification and reporting. In the present
study, departments varied along a continuum from positive or acceptant cultures to negative or
resistant cultures based on the organization‘s commitment to enforcing bias crime (e.g.
leadership role, resource allocation, accountability systems, etc.) and the personnel level of
general sensitivity towards the topic of bias crime.
ß
Leadership plays an important role in setting the priorities of the department. It is notable that
the leadership of some departments we studied expressed explicit opinions resistant to
identifying bias motivation, despite the fact that their departments are considered participants in
the national data collection program.
Recommendations
The following recommendations are derived from our research findings. The research revealed a
variety of infrastructure and contextual issues that can lead to information disconnect in bias crime
reporting. To improve the overall accuracy of bias crime reporting in local jurisdictions across the
United States, we present several Infrastructure, Contextual, and Extra-departmental
recommendations.
I
NFRASTRUCTURE
R
ECOMMENDATIONS
Law enforcement agencies across the country should implement a two-tier model for bias crime
reporting similar to the model originally suggested by the FBI. The overall goal of this model
process is to shift the bulk of bias crime enforcement and reporting responsibilities from patrol
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officer or general detective to a specialized, designated bias crime detective. For most law
enforcement agencies the implementation of this model would involve two changes in responsibility
and function for their personnel:
First, each law enforcement agency should designate a detective (or detectives, depending
on the size of the agency) as the bias crime investigator. This detective would be
responsible for investigating and reviewing all potential bias crime incidents reported to the
department and determining the existence of bias motivation. In most agencies this
additional responsibility will be a small demand on a single officer‘s time and can be
accomplished by officers with multiple other responsibilities. In all agencies this detective
should receive special training on bias crime.
Second, departments should change the role of first responding officers to identify all
potential bias crimes and to alert the designated bias crime investigator of those incidents.
Responding officers should be instructed to forward a broader, more inclusive set of
incidents œ those with any reasonable indication of bias motivation œ to the department‘s
designated bias crime detective for follow-up.
The FBI or other agencies such as the Federal Law Enforcement Training Council or the Regional
Community Policing Institutes should develop and implement a training curriculum that offers
guidance to law enforcement agencies across the country in the reasons for implementing this
change in responsibility and function along with a model for implementing this change. In addition,
the existing bias crime training programs of the FBI should be expanded slightly to accommodate
the additional demand for bias crime training that will come as a result of the designation of bias
crime investigators by local law enforcement agencies. In realization that there may be limited
resources for this training, the Justice Department should also develop a training program that could
be web based or provided in hard copy to each law enforcement agency across the United States.
The training should include a description of community outreach efforts that the bias crime
investigator could initiate to increase the likelihood that bias crime victims will come forward and
report incidents to the local law enforcement authorities. Our research revealed that most
departments lacked any substantive outreach efforts to members of certain communities,
specifically members of the Arab, Muslim and Middle-Eastern communities who may be targets of
future bias crimes. In addition, law enforcement‘s traditionally weak ties with these communities
may inhibit on-going terrorism intelligence investigations. Reaching out to these communities
around the issue of bias crime is one way to build these ties and perhaps ultimately improve national
intelligence efforts.
Law enforcement agencies should be encouraged to implement a unified crime reporting process
that includes bias crime reporting. By including bias crime reporting as part of the normal reporting
process there is less likelihood that bias motivated crimes will be overlooked or missed as cases are
passed from one unit of the organization to another. Submitting bias crime statistics through the
National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS; or similar automated incident based reporting
systems) is a positive example of how local agencies can unify bias crime reporting within the
general crime reporting process.
Departments should be encouraged to conduct periodic audits of their incident files or incident
database to determine if all cases where indicators of bias are present have been referred to the bias
crime investigator. In addition once a year when the FBI releases the annual Hate Crime Statistics
report, the locally designated bias crime investigator should reconcile the national statistics with
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their own local bias crime statistics. A simple procedure for conducting this audit should be
included in the training curriculum.
C
ONTEXTUAL
R
ECOMMENDATIONS
Local law enforcement leaders should be encouraged to take a leadership role in establishing that
the identification, investigation, and accurate reporting of all bias crimes is a priority for their
agency. For bias crimes to be accurately identified and reported there must be a visible commitment
from the leadership of the organization. The relative rarity and the political overtones of these
crimes can make the some officers confused about how they should respond to potential bias
crimes. An unambiguous message from the leadership of an organization that bias crimes are and
should be handled in the same way as other serious crimes will go a long way to eliminating that
confusion.
Law enforcement officials can demonstrate their commitment to the identification and accurate
reporting of in a variety of ways. By assigning an officer to be the bias crime investigator, the
leaders can take a major step in reinforcing their commitment. Second by arranging for training for
officers as well as investigators, law enforcement leaders can signal that bias crimes are serious and
should be handled as a priority crime. Finally by supporting and rewarding the actions of officers
who identify bias crimes and officers who investigate and clear bias crimes, law enforcement
managers can maintain an environment where bias crimes will continue to be seen as one of the
priority areas of the Department.
E
XTRA
D
EPARTMENTAL
R
ECOMMENDATIONS
The FBI with the help of the Bureau of Justice Statistics should identify an annual Top Ten High
Priority list of those Agencies where targeted efforts should be directed to improve their bias crime
reporting. This research indicated that there is broad variation in the structure and context of bias
crime reporting systems across law enforcement agencies throughout the United States. As an
initial step in improving the national bias crime statistics we suggest that the FBI in conjunction
with BJS develop a list of high priority agencies where efforts should be directed to improve their
bias crime reporting. This list would not be punitive but would target a small number of agencies
for additional training and support from the FBI, FLETC, or other similar agencies.
National policing groups and accreditation organizations, such as International Association of
Chiefs of Police, the National Black Law Enforcement Executives and The Police Executive
Research Forum should consider adopting the recommendations presented here. National policing
organizations are an invaluable resource for advancing the professional standards of policing. By
adopting these recommendations they will help set a national standard for bias crime services and
reporting. This uniformity in infrastructure and culture will drive more accurate bias crime
statistics, making these statistics a better resource.
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Tab
l
e 1:
Typ
e
s o
f
P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
Bi
as M
o
t
i
vat
ed
In
ci
d
e
n
t
s a
n
d
Asso
ci
a
t
ed
Erro
rs
E
X
T
E
NT
OF
B
I
AS
M
O
T
I
V
A
T
I
ON
Cl
ear
A
m
biguous
/
Mult
i
p
le
Seri
ous
S
eri
ou
s
-
Cl
ear
Bi
as
I
n
ci
d
e
n
t
In
c
i
de
n
t
E
x
a
m
pl
e
:
A
m
a
n
a
s
s
a
u
l
t
s
a
bl
a
c
k
m
a
l
e
w
i
t
h
a
de
a
d
l
y
w
e
a
pon
,
w
h
i
l
e
y
e
l
l
i
n
g —
N
i
*
*
e
r,
g
e
t
out
of
ou
r
t
o
w
n
“
a
n
d ot
he
r ra
c
i
a
l
l
y
de
roga
t
o
ry
c
o
m
m
e
n
t
s
.
N
o
provoc
a
t
i
o
n
f
o
r t
h
e
i
n
c
i
de
n
t
e
x
i
s
t
e
d.
P
r
o
ces
s
E
rrors
T
h
e
pri
m
a
r
y
s
ourc
e
of e
rror for s
e
ri
ous
i
n
c
i
de
nt
s
w
i
t
h
c
l
e
a
r
bi
a
s
m
o
t
i
va
t
i
o
n
i
s
P
r
oc
e
s
s
E
rrors
.
P
r
oc
e
s
s
e
rrors
a
r
e
e
rrors
t
h
a
t
oc
c
u
r i
n
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
rri
n
g
bi
a
s
c
r
i
m
e
i
n
form
a
t
i
on
be
t
w
e
e
n
a
c
t
o
rs
.
F
o
r e
x
a
m
pl
e
,
a
n
off
i
c
e
r m
a
y f
a
i
l
t
o
s
u
b
m
i
t
a
n
i
n
c
i
de
nt
re
port
t
o
t
h
e
a
ppropri
a
t
e
u
n
i
t
,
t
e
c
h
n
i
c
a
l
probl
e
m
s
m
a
y
oc
c
u
r w
i
t
h
c
r
i
m
e
da
t
a
or
a
re
c
o
rds
pe
rs
on
ne
l
ne
g
l
e
c
t
t
o
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
a
s
t
a
t
e
re
port
i
n
g
form
.
Serious
-
A
m
biguous
B
i
as
I
n
cident
In
c
i
de
n
t
E
x
a
m
pl
e
:
A
m
a
n
a
s
s
a
u
l
t
s
a
bl
a
c
k m
a
n
w
i
t
h
a
de
a
d
l
y
w
e
a
pon,
w
h
i
l
e
y
e
l
l
i
n
g,
—
N
i
*
*
e
r,
g
e
t
out
o
f
t
o
w
n
“
a
n
d ot
he
r ra
c
i
a
l
l
y
de
rog
a
t
o
r
y
c
o
m
m
e
n
t
s
.
E
a
r
l
ie
r
t
h
a
t
w
eek
th
e
o
f
f
e
n
d
er
an
d
v
i
c
tim
w
e
r
e
in
v
o
lv
ed
i
n
a
d
i
s
p
u
t
e
o
v
e
r
prope
rt
y
l
i
ne
s
.
Cl
as
s
i
f
i
cat
i
on
E
rrors
C
l
as
s
i
f
i
ca
ti
o
n
Er
r
o
r
s
ar
e
m
a
i
n
l
y
a
s
s
o
ci
at
ed
w
i
t
h
i
n
c
i
d
e
n
t
s
t
h
a
t
ar
e
r
e
la
ti
v
e
l
y
s
e
ri
ou
s
c
r
i
m
e
s
w
i
t
h
a
m
bi
gu
o
u
s
bi
a
s
m
o
t
i
va
t
i
o
n
.
C
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
on E
rrors
oc
c
u
r
of
fi
c
e
rs
e
rrone
ous
l
y
m
a
ke
a
n
of
fi
c
i
a
l
de
t
e
rm
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
,
onc
e
p
r
ov
i
d
e
d
w
i
t
h
a
s
e
t
of
fa
c
t
s
a
bout
t
h
e
i
n
c
i
de
n
t
.
F
o
r e
x
a
m
pl
e
,
a
n
off
i
c
e
r m
a
y fe
e
l
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
rol
e
of
bi
a
s
w
a
s
t
oo
i
n
s
i
gn
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
or t
h
a
t
t
h
e
r
e
w
a
s
not
s
u
ff
i
c
i
e
n
t
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
of
bi
a
s
t
o
w
a
r
r
a
n
t
a b
i
a
s
c
r
i
m
e cl
as
s
i
f
i
ca
t
i
o
n
RELA
TIVE
SEV
ERI
TYO
FPA
RALL
ELCR
IME
LessS
eriou
s
L
e
ss
S
e
r
i
o
u
s – Cl
ear
B
i
as I
n
ci
d
e
n
t
s
In
c
i
de
n
t
E
x
a
m
pl
e
:
A
m
a
n gra
f
f
i
t
i
‘s
a
bl
a
c
k
m
a
n‘s
h
ous
e
,
w
r
i
t
i
ng —
N
i
*
*e
r,
ge
t
ou
t
of t
o
w
n
“
a
nd ot
h
e
r ra
c
i
a
l
l
y
de
roga
t
o
ry
s
i
g
n
s
.
N
o
provo
c
a
t
i
on for t
h
e
i
n
c
i
de
nt
e
x
i
s
t
e
d.
R
e
c
ogn
it
ion
E
r
r
o
rs
R
e
c
ogni
t
i
on
E
rrors
a
r
e
pri
m
a
r
i
l
y
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
i
n
c
i
de
nt
s
t
h
a
t
i
nvol
v
e
r
e
la
ti
v
e
ly
le
s
s
s
e
r
i
o
u
s
p
a
r
a
ll
el
cr
im
es
w
ith
c
l
e
a
r
b
i
a
s
m
o
ti
v
a
tio
n
s
.
R
e
c
ogni
t
i
on re
fe
rs
t
o
t
h
e
off
i
c
e
r‘s
a
b
i
l
i
t
y t
o
unde
rs
t
a
nd bi
a
s
i
n
di
c
a
t
o
rs
,
t
h
e
de
c
i
s
i
on
t
o
i
nqui
re
a
bou
t
t
h
e
r
o
l
e
of bi
a
s
m
o
t
i
v
a
t
i
on i
n
a
n
i
n
c
i
de
nt
,
for
i
n
s
t
an
c
e
.
Ex
am
p
l
e
s
o
f
th
is
ty
p
e
o
f
er
r
o
r
in
cl
u
d
e
f
a
i
lin
g
t
o
a
s
k
th
e v
i
c
tim
a
bout
bi
a
s
,
n
o
t
be
l
i
e
v
i
n
g
t
h
e
vi
c
t
i
m
‘
s
c
l
a
i
m
s
of
bi
a
s
or
not
un
de
rs
t
a
n
d
i
n
g
t
h
e
s
i
gni
f
i
c
a
nc
e
of bi
a
s
i
n
di
c
a
t
o
rs
.
L
e
s
s
Serious
œ
Am
biguous
B
i
as
I
n
cident
In
c
i
de
n
t
E
x
a
m
pl
e
:
A
m
a
n g
r
a
ffi
t
i
‘
s
a
bl
a
c
k
m
a
n‘s
h
ous
e
,
w
r
i
t
i
n
g
—
N
i
*
*
e
r,
ge
t
ou
t
of
t
o
w
n
“
a
nd ot
he
r ra
c
i
a
l
l
y
de
rog
a
t
o
r
y
s
i
gns
.
E
a
rl
i
e
r t
h
a
t
w
e
e
k
t
h
e
of
fe
n
d
e
r
a
n
d v
i
c
t
i
m
w
e
re
i
n
vol
v
e
d
i
n
a
di
s
put
e
ov
e
r
prope
rt
y
l
i
ne
s
.
Al
l
Error Typ
e
s
In
c
i
de
n
t
s
t
h
a
t
a
r
e
re
l
a
t
i
v
e
l
y
l
e
s
s
s
e
ri
ous
pa
ra
l
l
e
l
c
r
i
m
e
s
w
i
t
h
a
m
bi
gu
ous
bi
a
s
m
o
t
i
v
a
t
i
ons
a
r
e
s
u
bj
e
c
t
t
o
a
l
l
t
h
re
e
t
y
pe
s
of
e
rrors
.
O
ffi
c
e
rs
m
a
y
fa
i
l
t
o
r
e
co
g
n
i
z
e
a
n
d
id
e
n
t
i
f
y
th
em
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
th
ey
ar
e
l
e
s
s
s
e
r
i
o
u
s
o
r
n
o
t
cl
as
s
i
f
y
th
em
a
ppropri
a
t
e
l
y
be
c
a
us
e
of t
h
e
a
m
bi
gui
t
i
e
s
pre
s
e
n
t
i
n
t
h
e
m
o
t
i
va
t
i
o
n
.
P
r
oc
e
s
s
E
rrors
m
a
y
a
l
s
o
pre
v
e
n
t
t
h
e
s
e
t
y
pe
s
of
i
n
c
i
de
nt
s
f
r
o
m
be
i
n
g i
n
c
l
ude
d i
n
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
b
i
as
cr
i
m
e s
t
at
is
ti
cs
.