

Support for Far-Right Anti-Immigration Political Parties in Advanced Industrial
States: Insiders, Outsiders and Economic Disaffection

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Abstract

This article examines the connection between economic disaffection and support for far-right anti-immigration political parties in Western European countries. The article adjudicates empirically between two explanations for this connection. On the one hand, the "ethnic competition hypothesis" contends that economically dissatisfied segments of the population tend to vote for far-right anti-immigration parties because these segments of the population have to compete with recent immigrants for scarce resources. On the other hand, theories of economic voting contend that economically dissatisfied segments of the population gravitate to far-right parties because of their "outsider" or opposition status, rather than just because of their anti-immigration positions. The analysis exploits the cross-time and cross-national breadth of the European Social Survey. The results of the analysis indicate that the "political outsider" hypothesis outperforms the ethnic competition hypothesis as an explanation for the empirical connection between economic disaffection and support for far-right parties.

Observers note striking similarities between new far-right political parties across advanced industrial states (Ignazi 1992; Kitschelt 1995; Betz 1994; 1998; Knigge 1998; Schain, Zolberg & Hossay 2002; Rydgren 2005; Ivarsflaten 2005). Most achieved electoral success after 1985. The party platforms are similarly eurosceptic, populist and anti-immigration. Many also advocate lower taxes, strict crime control and tougher penalties for criminal offences (Ignazi 1992: 23-24; Betz 1994: 4; Kitschelt 1995: ch.2; Betz 1998: 4-6; Immerfall 1998: 250). And typically, each draws their support disproportionately from younger voters, men, blue-collar workers, and from those with lower levels of formal education and higher levels of economic and political disaffection (Lubbers, Gusberts & Scheepers 2002: 347, 364; Ivarsflaten 2005: 470-471, 474-478).¹

Identifying structural characteristics common to far-right parties is one thing. Pinpointing precisely how these structural forces explain the success of these parties has been more elusive. Some argue that advanced capitalist postindustrial structures and a comprehensive welfare state jointly play key roles in the emergence of radical right parties (Kitschelt 1995: 90, 275). The dynamics of those key roles, however, remain underspecified. Others find that higher levels of immigration increase support for far-right parties (Knigge 1998: 267). But these accounts, others object, do not explain why far-right political parties have been more successful in societies with lower levels of immigration, such as Denmark and Norway, than in countries with higher levels of immigration such as Sweden, Germany, and, until recently, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (Svasand 1998: 91). Yet others speculate that it is economic performance, or the interaction between immigration and economic performance that matters (Betz 1994: 104). The empirical findings on that front, however, turn out to be quite mixed;

there is even evidence that higher periods of unemployment accompany lower levels of support for new right parties (Knigge 1998: 267; Lubbers & Scheepers 2000: 77; 2005).

The goal of the following analysis is to evaluate these possibilities empirically and to ascertain more precisely the reasons for “new-right”, “radical right” and “extreme right” parties. The particular focus is on the interaction between economic disaffection and support for far-right, anti-immigration parties (FRAIPs), an umbrella label that we adopt to include those political parties that have been characterized as “new radical right” (Kitschelt 1995: 19-20), “ethnocentric nationalist” (Lucardie 1998: 111) and “anti-immigrant” (Van der Brug & Fennema 2003: 55). The focus on economic satisfaction provides a platform for testing two plausible answers to an important question: if economic disaffection is related to levels of electoral support for far-right anti-immigration parties, how do these effects work?

At least two potential explanations need to be evaluated systematically. One, the “ethnic competition hypothesis”, is rooted in realistic conflict theory (Sherif 1966; Taylor & Moghaddam 1994: ch.3; Lubbers & Scheepers 2000: 65-67; Lubbers, Gusberts & Scheepers 2002: 349; McClaren 2003: 915-916). People compete for scarce resources and this increases inter-group conflict, and so Lubbers and Scheepers reason that, “[i]n circumstances of scarcity, an extreme right-wing party may become a more attractive voting option” (2000: 66). The expectation from this account is that economic disaffection and higher levels of immigration jointly work to drive economically vulnerable segments of populations to support political parties with far-right anti-immigration appeals. These subsets of the population may well possess latent opposition to immigration when immigration levels are low and/or economic performance is robust;

these attitudes become more salient, however, when levels of immigration are higher and when the economy is performing poorly.²

A second possible explanation draws on theories of economic voting (Lewis-Beck 1988; Anderson 2000; Carlsen 2000; Chappell Jr. & Veiga 2000). According to this line of reasoning, voters punish incumbent political parties for poor economic performance, and they reward incumbents for robust economic performance. One implication of this theory is what we call the “political outsider hypothesis”: political parties on the outside of government, the position that most FRAIPs occupy, benefit from the outsider’s alibi. Outsider opposition parties can skirt responsibility for economic downturns and gain an electoral advantage over unpopular incumbents during bad economic times. As Anderson (1996) has argued, “if the classic reward-punishment theory of government popularity holds for opposition parties...[t]he opposition is rewarded when the government is punished” (499). Thus it is certainly plausible that economically dissatisfied segments of the population gravitate to FRAIPs because of their “outsider” or opposition status, rather than just because of their anti-immigration positions. The over-representation of the economically dissatisfied among the ranks of FRAIPs may have more to do with the strategic exploitation of incumbent unpopularity rather than with any special connection between economic insecurity and the salience of anti-immigrant sentiments.

Until quite recently, empirically distinguishing between these rival explanations for the high levels of economic disaffection among FRAIP supporters would not have been possible because FRAIPs were exclusively opposition parties. That changed in 1999 when the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) formed a governing coalition with the Christian Democrats (ÖVP). Despite the ensuing controversy that this coalition

generated throughout Europe, the electoral success of the far-right in Austria turned out to be a harbinger of things to come elsewhere. Subsequently, the far-right List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) joined a governing coalition in the Netherlands in 2002, and the far-right Swiss People's Party (SVP) became a full-fledged member of the Swiss Federal Council in 2003. In short, relatively recent variations on a key independent variable, proximity to power, now make it possible to examine empirically the causes of the connection between economic disaffection and support for FRAIPs.

The analysis is organized into four sections. The investigation begins by classifying and summarizing the electoral performance of far-right anti-immigration political parties in legislative elections in Western European countries over a 26 year period.³ The next section lays the methodological foundation for testing a series of hypotheses that stem from ethnic competition hypotheses and theories of economic voting. The third empirical section tests alternative hypotheses concerning the linkages between individual-level economic preferences and support for far-right anti-immigrant parties. The results of these analyses, which indicate that electoral context matters, are discussed in the concluding section. It turns out that there are appreciable differences in the patterns of support for incumbent political parties, on the one hand, and opposition parties on the other. These differences have had the effect of exaggerating the connection between economic disaffection and support for far-right parties.

I. The Rise of Far-Right Anti-Immigration Parties

The classification system for identifying far-right anti-immigration parties (FRAIPs) proceeds in three stages. The first step relies on a review of the general

literature to identify which parties have taken strong anti-immigration positions and records when they did so. The second step involves checking the initial screening, where possible, using the expert survey data gathered by Lubbers (2004) and Benoit and Laver (2006). Both steps produced quite consistent categorizations, but we also include anti-immigration parties that scored 8.5 or higher on Lubbers' (2004) immigration restriction scale, and 17.0 or higher on Benoit and Laver's (2006) scale. This triangulation of strategies seems to produce a reasonably comprehensive list of FRAIPs in 12 Western European countries. These cases and their electoral performance in national legislative elections between 1980 and 2006 are summarized in Table 1. According to these data, significant far right anti-immigration parties emerged on the electoral landscape in each of these 12 countries; they took at least a 5% share of the vote in 39 of the 87 legislative elections held between 1980 and 2006.

Table 1 about here

From an overview of these cases it is possible to discern at least three different historical trajectories. Some, such as the National Democratic Party of Germany, have consistent and longstanding records as far-right anti-immigration parties. Others, such as List Pim Fortuyn and the Danish People's Party, emerged relatively recently as FRAIPs. Yet others, such as the Freedom Party of Austria, the Alternative Democratic Reform Party in Luxembourg, and the Progress parties in Denmark and Norway transformed into FRAIPs.

Timing is also relevant: there is plausible evidence of cross-national demonstration effects (Betz 1994: 5; Swyngedouw 1998: 67; Rydgren 2005). Many see

LePen's Front Nationale as the prototypical FRAIP (Kitschelt 1995: 91; Rydgren 2005: 432). Although founded in 1972, the Front did not achieve its electoral breakthrough until 1986 when it received 9.7 percent of the vote in the French Parliamentary elections. The Front Nationale survived the Megret-led splinter faction that broke away in the late 1990's; it rode its restrictive immigration agenda aimed at protecting French culture from Arab and Muslim immigrants (Mayer 1998: 16) to more than 9 percent of the popular vote in five consecutive elections between 1986 and 2002.

The Belgian Vlaams Bloc (VB) looked to the success of LePen's Front Nationale in 1983 after which it similarly placed an aggressive anti-immigration platform at the centre of its campaign. The VB's "immigrants out" campaign explicitly coupled the immigration issue to rising levels of unemployment and crime (Swyngedouw 1998, 67-68). The counterpart Belgian FRAIP in Wallonia, the Front Nationale, formed in 1982, fell short of the electoral success of the VB in Flanders, but the platform was similar in important respects.

The Lega Nord in Italy was formed later still, in 1991, and it exploited the anti-immigration niche that the neo-fascist MSI refused to advance (Kitschelt 1995; Ignazi 2003; Klingemann et al. 2006). Ignazi (2003: 9) indicates that Lega voters, between 1996 and 1998, exhibited incredibly high levels of xenophobia, outlooks that Kitschelt (1995: 74) notes were somewhat more muted among Lega voters earlier in the decade.

Luxembourg experienced a quite different evolutionary partisan trajectory. The far-right and anti-immigration Alternative Democratic Reform Party (ADR) began as a single issue Action Committee for Pension Justice in 1987, but changed its name, broadened its platform, and made substantial vote gains in the 1994, 1999, and 2004 elections.⁴

The pattern was more mixed in Scandinavian countries. In Norway, the anti-immigration electoral niche was filled by the transformation of the Progress Party in the mid 1980's (Bjørklund & Andersen 2002). The same pattern applied to the Progress Party in Denmark, until turmoil within the party led its leader, Pia Kjaersgard, to break away and found the Danish People's Party in 1995 (Bjørklund & Andersen 2002). The transformation of the Finnish Rural Party into the True Finns presented Finnish voters with an anti-immigrant far-right alternative at about the same time.⁵ In Sweden, New Democracy, and later, Sweden Democrats, contested elections in the 1990's, but only the more moderate New Democracy achieved any kind of electoral success and for only one election at that.⁶

The Swiss and Austrian cases provide yet more evidence of FRAIPs emerging from the transformation of existing party systems. The longstanding Austrian Freedom Party (FPO) shifted to become a populist anti-statist party in the mid 1980's (Kitschelt 1995) and shifted yet again into an anti-immigration party in the 1990's (Betz 1994; Riedlsperger 1998: 34; McGann and Kitschelt 2005: 151). Leader Joerg Haider pushed for an anti-immigration policy referendum in 1991-1992 and, in response to this rightward turn, the liberal faction of the FPO left to form the "Liberal Forum" in 1993 (McGann & Kitschelt 2005: 151). In the case of Switzerland it was the long-established Swiss People's Party (SVP) that moved to capture anti-immigration sentiments in the mid 1990's (McGann and Kitschelt 1995: 153; Skenderovic 2007: 166). To be sure, such other formations as the far right National Action/Swiss Democrats and the Swiss Automobilists' Party/Freedom Party took a combined 8.4% of the popular vote in 1991, but they lost much of that electoral base to the SVP in 1999 and 2003 (Skenderovic 2007: 167).

Electorates in the Netherlands and Germany mostly avoided far-right anti-immigration parties in national legislative elections throughout the 1990s. In the Netherlands, that changed when List Pim Fortuyn attracted about 17 percent of the vote in 2002, but the party's support fell to 6 percent in the legislative elections the following year.

This set of FRAIPs is not exhaustive, but other partisan fragments, typically, capture minuscule levels of popular support.⁷ The significant point is that within this set of cases there is a sufficiently large and varied cluster to allow us to explore systematically the questions: under what circumstances are FRAIPs likely to benefit from economic disaffection? And when do they not?

II. Hypotheses and Method: Ethnic Competition and Political Outsiders

At its core, the ethnic competition hypothesis posits a connection between higher levels of economic disaffection and support for anti-immigration agendas. More formally, the first expectation, H_1 , is that citizens who are economically dissatisfied are more likely to vote for far-right anti-immigration parties. From this standpoint, FRAIPs benefit from economic disaffection by virtue of their anti-immigration policies.

The expectations are somewhat different when it comes to the theory of economic voting, the “political outsider hypothesis.” To be sure, the outsider hypothesis allows for the possibility of a connection between higher levels of economic disaffection and support for FRAIPs. According to the political outsider hypothesis, however, the connection stems from the parties' status as opposition parties rather than from their anti-immigration agendas. Thus, H_2 contends that economic disaffection is associated with

FRAIP support when they are outside of government, but not when they are inside of government. According to this hypothesis, the connection between economic disaffection and support for FRAIPs is conditional on their proximity to executive power.

These hypotheses are tested using individual-level survey evidence from the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a useful dataset for testing these hypotheses for several reasons. The biennial survey, which began in 2002, measures directly the economic satisfaction and vote-choice of respondents. Taken together, there are large enough samples of far-right supporters to examine empirically the connection between economic disaffection and support for far-right parties across three time-periods in seven countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland.

The cross-national and cross-time coverage captures significant variations on the proximity of FRAIPs to executive power, the key conditioning variable in the analysis. In France and Belgium, for example, the FRAIPs are perennial outsiders. These parties have never participated as formal members of a governing coalition, and they have never propped up a minority coalition by serving as a consistent source of support in their respective legislatures. The story is quite different in Austria, where the FPO was a member of the governing coalition between 1999 and 2005. And the story is different still in Denmark, where a minority conservative coalition has depended since 2001 on support from the Danish People's Party in the Folketing.

In addition to these cross-national variations, the ESS also allows us to capture cross-time variation within countries. In the Netherlands, List Pim Fortuyn contested a national election as a newcomer in 2002, but the party became a member of the governing coalition after receiving 17 percent of the national vote in that election. In

Switzerland, the Swiss People's Party was a "junior member" of cabinet until 2003, but it has been a full-fledged member of cabinet ever since. And in Norway, the Progress Party was an outsider in 2001 election, but it propped up the minority conservative government after the 2001 election, before returning to its status as an outsider opposition party after the 2005 election. The relevant methodological point is that in these cases the cross-time coverage of the ESS coincides with a transformation of FRAIPs from relative outsiders to full-fledged insiders.

Taken together, these characteristics of the ESS make it possible to discern whether FRAIPs benefit from economic disaffection because of their anti-immigration agendas, regardless of their proximity to executive power, or because of their outsider opposition status, regardless of their anti-immigration agendas. The research strategy is comparative, rather than statistical, because there are a small enough number of cases that they can be analyzed together. Given the hypotheses under investigation, it does not make sense to follow a summary approach that may mask results from the individual cases.⁸

Before proceeding to the results, there is a methodological challenge that requires explicit attention. The vote question in the ESS asks respondents how they actually voted in the "last election" rather than how they would vote if an election was held in the near future. This poses two methodological challenges. First, the timing of national elections does not correspond with the implementation of ESS surveys. As a result, the vote-choice question in the ESS often asks in successive waves of the survey about how respondents voted in a single national election. At issue is the question of whether the vote-choice reported by these respondents should be taken as indicating their current

preference rather than their past preference. Here, we take the response at face value, namely, as indicating past vote-choice.

The second challenge is that the question wording of the dependent variable is in the past tense, and the question wording of the key independent variable, economic satisfaction, is in the present tense. More particularly, the ESS asks respondents what they think about the current state of the economy. Those answers are compared to the vote choice of respondents in the previous national election. This is not an ideal strategy for exploiting the economic voting model.⁹

This tense discrepancy opens a wedge between the economic voting model and the partisan endogeneity model in terms of how we should treat the key conditioning variable, the positioning of parties vis-à-vis the government. The economic voting model is primarily concerned with knowing the insider-outsider status of the party at the time of the previous election. The partisan endogeneity model, by contrast, is primarily concerned with the current insider-outsider status of parties, because it is the current positioning of a respondent's favourite party that is likely to explain assessments of the current state of the economy.

Two strategies are adopted to address these challenges. The main analysis treats reported vote-choice and the proximity of party to government as they existed at the time of the previous election. And current economic assessments are interpreted as proxies for past economic assessments. The secondary analysis, however, replicates that analysis but makes an adjustment, namely, the retrospective vote choice response is substituted with a responses to the ESS question that asks about current party loyalty. Thus, the secondary analysis compares the current position of parties with the current economic assessments and party loyalties of respondents. The results of the primary and secondary analyses are

then compared. The results indicate that both approaches reach substantively identical conclusions with one exception: the relationship between current economic disaffection and current party loyalty tracks more closely the current position of the parties vis-à-vis executive power, whereas the relationship between current economic disaffection and past vote choice appears to track more closely the positions of the parties as they existed in the previous election. The substantial critical consequence in this instance, however, is that the results from both analyses support precisely the same conclusions. It is to these results that the discussion now turns.

III. Results

A. Economic Disaffection and Anti-Immigrant Parties

Figure 1 plots the effects of economic disaffection on levels of support for different types of political parties.¹⁰ The political parties are classified into 11 groups: Communist, Socialist, Green, Social-Democrat, Centre, Liberal, Christian-Democrat, Conservative, Far Right, Protest, and Other. That classification strategy considers party names, their membership in European Parliamentary groups, and their policy positioning in Benoit and Laver's (2006) survey of experts. The x-axis represents level of economic satisfaction and the y-axis represents the probability of a voting for the separate party types that are indicated by each of the lines of the graph. Thus, a downward sloping trend line indicates that that type of party performs better among economically dissatisfied segments of the population. And an upward sloping trend line indicates the opposite.¹¹

Figure 1 about here

The first finding in Figure 1 is that there are appreciable differences between party families in the extent to which they benefit, or lose, from economic disaffection. Notice how the trend lines slope steeply in different directions as the level of economic disaffection moves along the x-axis from its lowest to its highest value. The most dramatic trend lines, clearly, are for Social Democrats, Liberals, and Christian Democrats. In the case of Social Democratic parties, the downward sloping trend indicates that these parties perform substantially better among economically dissatisfied segments of the population. Indeed, when economic satisfaction is at its lowest value, the probability of voting for a Social Democratic party is nearly 40 percent. When economic satisfaction is at its highest value, by contrast, that probability falls a full 23 percentage points to just a 16 percent probability of Social Democrat support.

Second, the situation is quite the reverse for Liberal and Christian Democratic parties. Notice how Liberal and Christian Democratic parties are among the least frequently supported parties for citizens with low levels of economic satisfaction (at 1% and 2%, respectively), but they are the most strongly supported parties by citizens with high levels of economic satisfaction (at 33% and 28%, respectively). In both cases, these two conservative political parties perform far better among citizens who are satisfied with the current state of the economy.

The third noteworthy finding is that although the trend lines are not as steep for the other parties, the effects of economic satisfaction are in many cases no less consequential. Communist parties, for example, receive nearly all of their support from economically dissatisfied segments of the population. The probability of voting for a communist party is nearly 12 percent when economic satisfaction is at its lowest level,

and it is virtually 0 percent when economic satisfaction is at its highest level. Green and far-right parties follow a similar trajectory. As economic satisfaction moves from its lowest to its highest level, green support declines from nine percent to three percent, and far-right support declines from 12 percent to less than five percent. In effect, communists lose 100 percent of their vote share as economic satisfaction increases; the greens lose two-thirds of theirs; and far-right parties lose well over half.

From the standpoint of H_1 , then, it is clearly safe to say that far-right parties benefit from economic disaffection. Indeed, far-right parties receive more than two and half times as much support from economically dissatisfied segments of the population as they receive from citizens who are economically satisfied. Even so, the bigger picture highlights an important caveat to H_1 . Far-right parties are not alone as benefactors of economic disaffection. Indeed, they benefit far less in absolute terms than Social Democratic parties, and they benefit far less in relative terms than Communist and Green parties. These findings do not rule out the possibility that FRAIPs benefit from economic disaffection because of their anti-immigration positions, but they nonetheless indicate that the data need to be explored more closely to examine the potential influence of other factors, not least of all the possibility that party proximity to political power might matter.

B. Economic Disaffection and Anti-Immigrant Parties

The reward-punishment model of economic voting posits that government parties lose from economic disaffection. Opposition parties, therefore, stand to benefit from it. The individual-level evidence from the European Social Survey supports strongly this line of reasoning. Political parties that are involved directly in government gain considerably as economic satisfaction increases. Indeed, as economic satisfaction

moves from its lowest to its highest value, the probability of supporting an “insider” government party increases from 27.5 percent to more than 70 percent, and the probability of supporting an “outsider” opposition party declines from 73.5 percent to just over 29 percent.¹² In short, there is more than a 40 point spread in support for insider and outsider parties between those who are economically satisfied and those who are not.

The results in Figure 2 indicate that far-right parties are not immune to this trend. For this stage of the analysis, the party families are further subdivided into those that were members of the cabinet in the lead-up to the previous election (insiders), and those that were not (outsiders). The multinomial probit results that are summarized in Figure 2 compare the effects of economic disaffection on the probability of voting for insider and outsider far-right parties. The trend lines represent the change in the levels of support that accompany a move from the lowest to the highest value of economic satisfaction.

The first finding in Figure 2 to note is that the trend lines for these two groups run in opposing directions. The level of support for far-right parties that are insiders is effectively unchanged as economic disaffection moves from its lowest to its highest value. For far-right parties that are outsiders, by contrast, their support declines considerably, from nine percent to two percent, or seven percentage points, as economic satisfaction increases. Clearly, far-right parties benefit from economic disaffection when they are outsider opposition parties, but they do not benefit from economic satisfaction when they are insider government parties. In this respect, H_2 is confirmed.

Figure 2 about here

Indeed, a closer inspection of the results reveals that the pattern of support for Far-right parties is comparable to the pattern of support for other kinds of political parties. Protest parties (+3%), greens (+6%), conservatives (+8%), communists (+12%), and social democrats (+29%) all benefit from economic disaffection when they are outsider opposition parties. Liberals (-25%) and christian democrats (-18%), by contrast, pay a heavy price for economic disaffection when they are insiders. Other parties, including social democrats (-6%), socialists (-1%), green (0%) and centre parties (4%) seem to be able to skirt responsibility for negative economic perceptions even when they are insiders. In this respect, far-right parties are not unique in reaping the electoral rewards that come from economic disaffection when they are outsiders. And they are not unique in avoiding culpability for the economy when they are insiders.

IV. Concluding Discussion

This analysis began with the observation that most investigators are in agreement on one point: structural factors seem to be related to support for far-right anti-immigration parties. But there is substantial disagreement when it comes to explaining just how these structural factors, particularly economic vulnerability, contribute to that support.

The preceding analysis drew on ESS data to systematically evaluate the merits of these alternative specifications and the findings introduce both clarity on some issues and important nuances on others. The clear conclusion that emerges from these analyses is that the political outsider explanation outperforms the ethnic competition hypothesis

when it comes to predicting the electoral success of FRAIPs. The context of partisan competition clearly matters. Comparing FRAIPs with other types of parties produces very different conclusions than would be drawn from examining FRAIPs' supporters in isolation. Certainly, economic disaffection matters to the electoral support for FRAIPs. The significant point, however, is that this connection does not stem from an inherent link between economic insecurity and anti-immigrant animosity. Rather, economic disaffection drives voters away from incumbents, and economically dissatisfied voters who are also hostile to immigrants gravitate to outsider FRAIPs rather than pro-immigration opposition alternatives.

Notes

¹ Indeed, the disproportionate support of these groups for far-right anti-immigration parties has been used as a test to determine whether or not a political party fits the profile of a radical right party (Kitschelt 1995, 75-76; McGann and Kitschelt 2005, 154-157).

² Certainly, many of the groups found to be overrepresented among the support bases of far-right anti-immigration parties are precisely those groups that are most likely to compete with immigrants for scarce resources: jobs, housing and, in the case of small-business owners, profits. But the overrepresentation of these groups among far-right supporters is neither universal nor overwhelming (Kitschelt 1995, 77; Ivarsflaten 2005, 476).

³ National legislative elections (lower house, party-list and first-choice, if applicable) held between 1980 and 2006.

⁴ The movement of the ADR in Luxembourg into a far-right anti-immigration party is captured by Lubbers (2004), Benoit and Laver (2006) and Klingemann et al. (2006). In Lubbers' (2004) survey of elite opinion in 2000, the ADR scored 6.6 on the anti-immigration issue: a score that is lower than most conservative political parties in other countries, let alone far-right anti-immigration parties. Nonetheless, there were only two expert respondents in Lubbers' survey from Luxembourg, and their opinions differed considerably—one of the respondents scored the ADR at 4.2 (or low), while the other scored them at 9.0 (very high). Their disagreement may stem from the fact that the timing of the survey approximately coincides with the party's progression from a pension protest party into a far-right anti-immigration party. Indeed, as Klingemann et al.'s (2006) content analysis of the ADR's election platforms reveals, the ADR was more

positive than negative about multiculturalism in the 1994 election (per607-per608 = +1.04), but exclusively negative about multiculturalism in the 1999 election (-2.73). By 2004, the ADR scored very high on the immigration issue (17.5) in Benoit and Laver's (2006) elite survey, and the standard deviation between respondents was considerably lower (1.04).

⁵ Kitschelt (1995) considered the Finnish Rural Party, reformed as the True Finns party after the 1995 election, as a "borderline case" (57) for inclusion as a New Radical Right Party. Others disagree (Norris 2005). We count the True Finns, but not the Finnish Rural Party, as a far-right anti-immigration party. The party took up the far-right, anti-immigration agenda when it transformed from the agrarian Finnish Rural Party into the True Finns in 1995: it now promotes populism, rallies against the existing party system, opposes European integration, supports a law and order agenda, and, most important, lists opposition to "incontrollable immigration" as second only to European integration as the mainstay of its platform (True Finns 2007). The True Finns did not score particularly high on the immigration scale in Lubber's (2004) expert survey on party positioning in 2000 (7.4). But they scored very high (18.8) in Benoit and Laver's (2006) study of party positioning in 2004. This transition from a rural-agrarian into a far-right anti-immigration party is also detected by Klingemann et. al's (2006) content analysis of the party's platforms (see variable per608 for Finland).

⁶ On New Democracy's comparative moderation on the immigration issue, Pierre and Widfeldt (1992) note that "[t]he issue of immigration of refugees also became increasingly salient during the 1980s. The 1991 campaign, however, was the first occasion ever in which a major party had made this issue their own, *for while not*

employing a racist rhetoric, New Democracy did criticize government policy on immigration and asylum, claiming among other things that the proportion of non-European immigrants was too high” (524: emphasis added). See also, Svasand (1998, 84).

⁷ There is also evidence that some long-standing parties in other countries, such as the People’s Parties in Portugal and Spain, may be moving towards FRAIP status. Following Kitschelt (1995) and others (Lubbers 2004; Benoit & Laver 2006), the People’s Party of Portugal is not classified as a far-right anti-immigration party. Despite some anecdotal evidence that the party may have moved in this direction in recent years—at least as a marginal case, particularly under the leadership of Paulo Portas in the late 1990s—the party’s score in Benoit and Laver’s 2006 survey was not particularly high on the immigration issue (15.3). The People’s Party in Spain scored higher on the immigration issue in Benoit and Laver’s study of 2004 elite opinion (16.6/20) than in Lubber’s equivalent study in 2000 (6.9/10). This movement is not detected in Klingemann et. al’s (2006) content analysis of the party’s official platforms in the 1993, 1996 and 2000 elections. Following Kitschelt (1995) and others (Lubbers et al. 2002, 357; Ivarsflaten 2006, 3; Davis 1998, 157), we do not consider the PP in Spain as a far-right anti-immigration party.

⁸ The core objective here is to adjudicate between two rival explanations for the observed connection between economic disaffection and support for far-right parties, not to predict vote choice. Thus, the research strategy does not involve specifying detailed multivariate regression models. And the paper does not address the question of whether economic disaffection is an exogenous predictor or an endogenous consequence of

support for far-right parties. The answer to this question is important in its own right, but it does bear on the argument under consideration in this paper.

⁹ Current economic assessments, of course, cannot affect past vote choice. But the discrepancy is not problematic from the standpoint of the partisanship model. A party loyalty would explain the previous vote-decision, and a partisan should be happier with the economy if his or her favourite party is in power and more critical of the economy if his or her favourite party is in opposition. Opposition parties, presumably, emit more negative cues about the state of the economy than do the governing parties.

¹⁰ See Appendix for the classification of the full list of parties used in this analysis.

¹¹ The results in the figures are based on multinomial probit estimates. The dependent variable is vote-choice, organized by party type, and the independent variable is level of economic satisfaction. The data are weighted to offset the uneven probabilities of selection that arise, first, from survey design effects, and, second, from discrepancies between the sizes of national populations and the sizes of national samples.

¹² An “insider party” refers to party with members in cabinet at the time of the most recent election; except in Switzerland where it refers to a party with a full two members in cabinet. An “outsider party” refers to a party with no members in cabinet at the time of the most recent election. As it turns out, there do not appear to be any observable differences between parties, on the one hand, that are outside of cabinet and tend to support the government, and those, on the other hand, that are outside of cabinet and tend to oppose the government. The important line of division appears to separate the parties on the inside of cabinet from those on the outside. Thus, the estimates are

derived from binary probit regression. The dependent variable is whether the party is an “insider” party or not, and the independent variable is level of economic satisfaction.

Appendix: Parties and Party Categories

<u>Communist</u>	Country	<u>Christian Democratic</u>	
Lutte Ouvriere (LO)	France	Austrian People's Party (OVP)	Austria
Parti Communiste (PCF)	France	Christian Democratic & Flemish (CD&V)	Belgium
<u>Socialist</u>		Kristendemokraterne (KD/KrF)	Denmark
Socialist Left Party (SV)	Norway	Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)	Netherlands
Socialist Party (SP)	Netherlands	Christian Union	Netherlands
Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF)	Denmark	Christian Democratic Party (KrF)	Norway
<u>Green</u>		Christian Democrats (CVP)	Switzerland
Grüne (Gru)	Austria	Evangelical People's Party (EVP)	Switzerland
Agalev (Gro!)	Belgium	<u>Conservative</u>	
Ecolo (Eco)	Belgium	Det Konservative Folkeparti (K)	Denmark
Les Verts (V)	France	Democratie Liberale	France
Green Left (GL)	Netherlands	Rassemblement pour la Peuple Francaise (RPF)	France
Green Party (GPS)	Switzerland	Union pour la Majorite Presidentielle (UMP)	France
<u>Social Democratic</u>		Conservative Party (H)	Norway
Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPO)	Austria	<u>Far-Right</u>	
SP.A Spirit (SPSp)	Belgium	Austrian Freedom Party (FPO)	Austria
Socialist Party (PS)	Belgium	Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZO)	Austria
Social Demokratiet (SD)	Denmark	Vlaams Bloc (VB)	Belgium
Parti Socialiste (PS)	France	Dansk Folkeparti (DF)	Denmark
Labour Party (PvdA)	Netherlands	Front Nationale (FN)	France
Labour Party (DNA)	Norway	Mouvement pour la France (MPF)	France
Social Democrats (SPS)	Switzerland	List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)	Netherlands
<u>Centre</u>		Progress Party (FrP)	Norway
Centrum Demokraterne (CD)	Denmark	Swiss People's Party (SVP)	Switzerland
Union pour la Democratie Francaise (UDF)	France	<u>Other/Protest</u>	
Centre Party (Sp)	Norway	Chasse, Peche, Nature et Tradition (CPNT)	France
<u>Liberal</u>			
Flemish Liberals & Democrats/Vivant (VLD)	Belgium		
Mouvement Reformateur (PRL/FDF/MR)	Belgium		
Det Radikale Venstre (RV)	Denmark		
Venstre (V)	Denmark		
Party for Freedom & Democracy (VVD)	Netherlands		
Democrat66 (D66)	Netherlands		
Venstre (V)	Norway		
Free Democratic Party (FDP)	Switzerland		
Liberal Party (LPS)	Switzerland		

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Table 1: Electoral Performance of Far-Right Anti-Immigration Parties in 12 Western European Countries, 1980-2006


Elections Contested (>.5%) by Far-Right Anti-Immigration Parties within Period of Data Coverage (#)	List of Far-Right Anti-Immigration Parties	Electoral Performance (as Far-Right Anti-Immigration Party in Bold)												Placement of Party on Immigration Issue in Expert Surveys		
		Year	Year	Year	Year	Year	Year	Year	Year	Year	Year	Peak	Avg.	Avg. as F-R A-I-P	Lubbers 2000	Benoit & Laver 2006
6	Austria	1983	1986	1990	1994	1995	1999	2002	2006	--						
	Freedom Party (FPO)	5.0%	9.7%	16.6%	22.5%	21.9%	26.9%	10.0%	11.0%	--	26.9%	15.5%	18.2%	9.1	18.5	
7	Belgium	1981	1985	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	--							
	Flemish Bloc (VB)	1.1%	1.4%	1.9%	6.6%	7.8%	9.9%	11.7%	--	--	11.7%	5.8%	5.8%	9.8	19.8	
	Front Nationale (FN)	--	--	--	1.0%	2.3%	1.5%	2.0%	--	--	2.3%	1.7%	1.7%	9.8	19.2	
7	Denmark	1981	1984	1987	1988	1990	1994	1998	2001	2005						
	Progress Party (FRP)	8.9%	3.6%	4.8%	9.0%	6.4%	6.4%	2.4%	0.5%	--	9.0%	5.3%	4.9%	9.2	19.3	
	Danish People's Party (DF)	--	--	--	--	--	--	7.4%	12.4%	13.3%	13.3%	11.0%	11.0%	9.7	19.4	
3	Finland	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2006	--	--						
	Rural Party/True Finns (PS)	9.7%	6.3%	4.8%	1.3%	1.0%	1.6%	4.1%	--	--	9.7%	4.1%	2.2%	7.3	18.8	
5	France	1981	1986	1988	1993	1997	2002	--	--	--						
	Front Nationale (FN)	0.0%	9.7%	9.6%	12.3%	14.9%	11.1%	--	--	--	14.9%	9.6%	9.6%	9.6	19.3	
4	Germany	1980	1983	1987	1990	1994	1998	2002	2005	--						
	National Democratic Party (NDP)	0.2%	0.2%	0.6%	0.4%	--	--	--	--	--	0.6%	0.4%	0.4%	n/a	19.8	
	German People's Union (DVU)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	9.8	19	
	Republicans (REP)	--	--	--	--	1.9%	1.8%	0.6%	0.1%	--	1.9%	1.1%	1.1%	9.4	19.4	
5	Italy	1983	1987	1992	1994	1996	2001	2006	--	--						
	Lega Nord (LN)	--	--	8.7%	8.4%	10.0%	3.9%	4.6%	--	--	10.0%	7.1%	7.1%	9	19.3	
	Social Movement-Tricolore Flame (MS-FT)	--	--	--	--	1.0%	0.4%	0.6%	--	--	1.0%	0.7%	0.7%	9.1	17.9	
3	Luxembourg	1984	1989	1994	1999	2004	--	--	--	--						
	National Movement (NB)	--	2.3%	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2.3%	2.3%	2.3%	n/a	n/a	
	Alternative Democratic Reform Party (ADR)	--	--	9.0%	10.4%	10.0%	--	--	--	--	10.4%	9.8%	10.2%	6.6	17.5	
7	Netherlands	1981	1982	1986	1989	1994	1998	2002	2003	2006						
	Centre Party/Centre Democrats (CP/CD)	--	0.8%	0.4%	0.9%	2.5%	0.6%	--	--	--	2.5%	1.0%	1.0%	9.7	n/a	
	List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)	--	--	--	--	--	--	17.0%	5.6%	0.0%	17.0%	11.3%	11.3%	n/a	18.3	
	Party for Freedom (PPV)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5.9%	5.9%	5.9%	5.9%	n/a	n/a	

Table 1 (continued)

5	Norway	1981	1985	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005	--	--					
	Progress Party (FrP)	4.5%	3.7%	13.0%	6.3%	15.3%	14.6%	22.1%	--	--	22.1%	11.4%	14.3%	9.2	19.1
4	Sweden	1982	1985	1988	1991	1994	1998	2002	2006	--					
	New Democracy (NyD)	--	--	--	6.7%	1.2%	--	--	--	--	6.7%	4.0%	4.0%	9.3	
	Sweden Democrats (SD)	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.4%	2.9%	--	2.9%	2.2%	2.2%	9.7	
6	Switzerland	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	--	--	--					
	Swiss People's Party (SVP)	11.1%	11.0%	11.9%	14.9%	22.5%	26.7%	--	--	--	26.7%	16.4%	21.4%	9.1	18.8
	National Action (NA)/Swiss Democrats (SD)	3.4%	3.0%	3.3%	3.1%	1.8%	0.9%	--	--	--	3.4%	2.6%	2.6%	9.7	
	Swiss Motorists Party (APS)/Freedom Party (FPS)	--	2.6%	5.1%	4.0%	0.9%	0.2%	--	--	--	5.1%	2.6%	2.6%	9.5	19.7
62 Elections Contested by FRAIPs (> .5%)	23 Far-Right Anti-Immigration Parties												Average Expert Survey Score on Immigration:	9.2	19.0

Data Sources: EJPR Political Data Yearbooks and National Election Statistics


Figure 1: The Effects of Economic Satisfaction on the Probability of Party Support, by Party Family



Notes: (1) Multinomial probit estimates, n = 24421.

Source: European Social Survey 2002, 2004, and 2006

Figure 2: The Effects of Economic Satisfaction on the Probability of Far-Right Support, by Relationship to Executive Power



Notes: (1) Multinomial probit estimates, n = 24421.

Source: European Social Survey 2002, 2004, and 2006