That's Just Your Interpretation
That's Just Copan's Untenable Interpretations: A Critique of Paul Copan's That's Just Your Interpretation
by Paul Jacobsen
by Paul Jacobsen
Note: Somebody (not me, I promise) linked this article in the Philowiki. (http://www.philowiki.com/wiki/index.php/Book_Debate_Guide:_That's_Just_Your_Interpretation) Since that hopefully means I will get some more readership of this article, I recently had this article re-proofed and a few arguments revised for clarity.
Paul Copan's That's Just Your Interpretation asks the question, "What is reality?" from a Christian perspective. As it so happens, I find such questions interesting to contemplate. Therefore, I was interested in how Copan might approach these questions from a Christian perspective. Though occasionally I found some of the ideas he presented to be valid, or at least plausible, most of his ideas I found to be simply untenable.
In some parts, Copan raises points that seem valid and logical. Therefore, I conclude that Copan does, indeed, have a reasonable grasp of logic principles. And yet, all too often, he presents arguments that, in my view, are just flat-out preposterous. I found it frustrating to read the sections that in my view displayed poor logic, considering that Copan clearly has a good understanding of logic. I'm at a loss to understand why, but it seems that many perfectly intelligent and logical thinkers often throw logic out the door when it comes to their faith.
I've written a moderately well-known critique of Lee Strobel's The Case for Faith. How I came to know about Copan's book is that one Christian wrote a defense of Strobel's book, and used Copan's book for source material in a few places. Copan covers some of the same topics that Strobel does, but also many topics he does not. Where the topics of the books overlap, they generally come to similar conclusions. But Copan brings a somewhat different perspective and style to the table. I do think that many Christians would find these books complementary. Therefore, I encourage readers of this critique to also read my critique of Strobel's book.
By the way, many readers of my critique of Strobel's book assume that I expected to find it poor, and intended to tear it down. That is flatly not true. I considered myself a Christian, albeit a weak one, when I read it. I really hoped Strobel had found good answers; I just felt forced to conclude he did not. But I must confess that by the time I read Copan's book, I no longer held out any significant hope of finding good answers. I admit that I had the bias of not expecting to be swayed by Copan's arguments. However, I did do the best I could to put aside my bias and evaluate his arguments on their own merits. I can't say that I did so perfectly. But then, I don't think anybody can. All I can say to the reader is, feel free to read Copan's book, and my counter-arguments, and decide for yourself which is better.
I must confess to being an "amateur." I have no formal study in the topics of theology or philosophy, aside from one freshman-level course. I am a computer programmer by trade, and consider logical thinking to be one of my strong points. My critique of Copan's book is based purely on whether or not his arguments impress me as being logical and consistent. It is, of course, up to the reader to judge whether I have presented my arguments logically and consistently or not.
Copan's book had 21 chapters, each one generally fairly short. On some topics I have a lot to say; on others, not so much. In the following critique, I list each chapter by title, and my commentary on that chapter.
Chapter 1: It's All Relative
The theme of this chapter is repeated many times throughout the book. Copan rails against "relativism" and says it is self-contradictory--a claim that "everything is relative" is itself a claim of absolute truth. Therefore, to deny truth and reality affirms some form of truth and reality. I can agree that there is some valid logic to this line of argument by Copan. And to some degree, I do agree with Copan. For example, I believe that either I am typing on my computer, or I am not. The statement "I am typing on my computer at this moment" is either true, or false. But a big question that Copan never seems to address is, how do you determine what is reality? How do I determine for certain whether I am typing on my computer or not?
In this chapter (and again in Chapter 4), Copan makes references to a couple of popular movies, The Matrix and The Truman Show. It so happens that, as a child, I regularly fantasized that my life was scripted, like in The Truman Show. Because of this childhood fantasy of mine, I am an enthusiastic fan of the movie. After mentioning these movies, Copan says that they "raise interesting questions about reality." And then Copan drops the ball and drops the discussion. Dang! Just when he was starting to say something interesting! Seriously, I can't help but think that the reason he dropped the discussion is because to continue it further would have led to conclusions that would be contrary to the conclusions he wanted to make. How can we know for certain that we do not exist in The Matrix? How do we know for certain that our lives aren't scripted like in The Truman Show? My conclusion is that we don't and can't know for certain.
How do we know that God didn't create the universe five minutes ago, complete with memories? How could we disprove it? Basically, I believe that we cannot know anything with absolute certainty, but certain possibilities are sufficiently unlikely that it is not worth considering the possibility of them being true. There is a concept known as Occam's Razor that is often paraphrased something like, "All other things being equal, the simpler solution is preferred." I can't know for certain that God didn't create the universe five minutes ago complete with memories, but it is an excessively complex answer to the explanation of our current reality.
Though I disagree with Copan on whether or not we can really know for certain what reality is, based on Occam's Razor, I think we can determine what reality "probably" is. Also, I believe that humans have a desire to understand truth, and to try to best determine what truth and reality is. I'm not sure if Copan would say I'm close to agreeing with him or not. But, I think there is some degree of agreement between us here. He seems to say that truth and reality can be determined absolutely, while I say that it can be determined within a reasonable doubt. I suppose that is as close to agreement as we are going to get.
Chapter 2: That's Just Your Interpretation
This chapter seems to have at least two different things in mind, but was unclear. Is Copan talking about interpretation of the Bible? Secular laws? Morals? He does not make it clear exactly what we are trying to "interpret."
Copan says that when someone says, "Hey, that's just your interpretation," a response might be, "Do you mean that your interpretation should be preferred over mine? If so, I'd like to know why you have chosen your interpretation over mine." Again, what are we interpreting? If the people in question are Christians, and they are talking about what a particular Bible verse means, I suppose that would be a valid approach. But, if we are talking about laws and rights in society, I'm not sure that is a valid approach. If someone has a question about what a law means, perhaps a discussion with a lawyer or other professional might be a better plan. And if we are talking about morals, well, I'm not ready to broach that subject yet. So, I'll just leave that topic for now. The bottom line for me is that what exactly Copan is trying to say or to interpret is far from clear. And I don't believe that his proposed methodology is valid for all possible contexts of interpretation.
Chapter 3: That's Just Your Reality
It is true that a lot of people say things along the lines of, "You create your own reality." And there are, indeed, some people who believe this quite literally; they believe that all sensory data is imaginary. There is no "real" reality. But I'm pretty sure this is a very rare point of view. Rather, I think that most people who say, "You create your own reality," mean this in a much less literal way. Somebody could look at the 9/11 tragedy and focus on the loss of lives. Somebody else could look at the same event and see how fortunate it was that most people got out of the buildings. People have the ability to choose what parts of reality to focus on more. The person who looks at the loss of lives in the 9/11 tragedy could conclude, "Reality is unfair." The person who looks at the number of people that survived 9/11 could conclude, "Reality is miraculous." This is what I think most people who say, "You create your own reality," really mean. Copan's arguments in this chapter deal with the extreme position that there literally is no genuine reality. I can agree with Copan in that I believe this extreme position to be rather bizarre. But I believe that the more figurative meaning of, "You create your own reality," is quite valid, and Copan didn't actually address this.
Chapter 4: Reality is Shaped by Forces Beyond Our Control
Copan does, of course, recognize that many things are, indeed, beyond our control. The point of this chapter is more about whether or not we can make an objective assessment of our reality. Copan makes a particular point over and over and over again. He says that anyone who says that objective reality is impossible is contradicting him or herself, because they are making the claim that it is objectively true that objective reality is impossible. And I concede some logic to this argument. But, I believe that it is simply a fact that some things are a mix of subjective and objective, and that they are not always separable.
Here is an example. Are Fords better than Chevys? Most of us would say that is a subjective call. For one person, a Ford may be better, but for another, a Chevy may be better. But a Ford fan might get out statistics on reliability, horsepower, and maintenance and try to make a claim that Fords are objectively better than Chevys. But, it is not likely that in every objective category, Fords are always better than Chevys. Perhaps one brand has better reliability statistics, while the other has better safety statistics. So, which is better? It is subjective, isn't it?
Now, let’s consider the question, are Fords better than Yugos? Most people would say that Yugos perform so poorly, in so many of the objective categories, that it is fair to say that Fords are, indeed, objectively better than Yugos. Of course, there is probably somebody, somewhere, who would object. Somebody must like Yugos, and say that they like Yugos better than Fords. But that person would be the rare person. Most people would say that whether Fords are better than Chevys is subjective, but that Fords are better than Yugos is objective. The point being, many things have objective and subjective components, and completely separating them is not always possible.
Copan claims that when people say something like, "We are nothing more than the product of our genes and our environment," they don't really believe it. Well, I do say it, and I do believe it. I must confess that I don't happen to like it--but I do believe it. I, therefore, must concede that Copan is right, in that I have to agree that both our views are the products of our genes and our environment. If I say that I think my views are correct and his aren't, am I saying that somehow my genes or environment are "better" than his? And this is the best answer I have, which I admit might not be completely compelling. But here it goes. I believe that we each have differing degrees of intelligence, and differing degrees of experience. For that reason, some of us are better able to discern truth from fiction in some areas, but perhaps not others. If I am correct, and I have deduced more correctly than Mr. Copan has in regards to these subjects that I am writing about, it is still quite likely that there are other subjects that he is better able to evaluate than I am. Further, the sphere of human knowledge grows via peer review. It may be true that he will never be convinced that I am more right, and that I may never be convinced that he is more right. I may claim that my view is more right, but my claiming it does not make it so. But perhaps, with both of our opinions available for review, who is more right between us can be deduced over time.
Chapter 5: Everything is One with the Divine
Chapter 6: Why Not Believe in Reincarnation
In these chapters, Copan discounts some religious beliefs that differ from his own. I don't believe them either. So, more-or-less, I agree with Copan on these topics. Not exactly, of course, but I see no point in elaborating any further.
Chapter 7: If God Made the Universe, Who Made God?
This is a brief rendition of the Cosmological Argument. I have a separate paper on this, so I shall not go into too much detail here. But one thing I'd like to point out is that Copan makes an oft-stated claim that Big Bang cosmology "greatly resembles the account in Genesis 1:1." Really? Genesis 1 has God creating the stars after the Earth. Doesn't look like a great resemblance to me. For more information, please follow this link to my paper on this topic.
In short, the title of this chapter is quite appropriate. The title recognizes that there must be something that exists without any explanation. Either the natural universe(s) exist without explanation, or God exists without explanation. Copan, and other theists that use this line of argument, try to explain why the universe can't exist without explanation, but God can. But, these are always "ad-hoc" arguments, arguments formulated with the pre-determined conclusion that it must be God that exists without explanation. If you aren't already convinced that this is true, the arguments fall flat. The bottom line is, we know that the universe exists, but we don't know that God exists. Trying to use an unknown to explain a known can't possibly work.
Chapter 8: If God Knows What We're Going to Do, We Don't Have Free Will
The main thrust of this chapter is his argument that God knowing what will happen is not the same thing as making it happen. If it were possible for humans to know the future, and somebody a hundred years ago knew that today I'd be typing this, that person's knowledge didn't cause me to do today's typing. I believe that I can accept this line of argument, at least up to a point.
Of course, I know that bringing up Hitler is a cliché, but I guess he makes as good an example as any, so here it goes. If God knew that Hitler was going to kill millions of people, and had the power to stop him, but didn't, isn't God at least partly responsible? If I was a German in WWII and had the power to stop Hitler, but didn't, wouldn't I deserve some blame? Some say that God has decided not to interfere in people's free will, even if that means things like the holocaust will happen. But then, what is the point of prayer? If God won't interfere, then why pray? Anybody who had prayed for an end for WWII obviously prayed in vain, as God wouldn't do anything. The fact that the allies won was just good fortune for the allies; God apparently had nothing to do with it.
Copan goes on to argue that God knows not only everything that happens in this world and universe, but also everything that happens in all possible worlds and universes. And, therefore, God chose to manifest the world in which the maximum number of people are saved, and the minimum number are lost. My first question is, where the heck in the Bible does it say this? This seems to be completely "made-up stuff"--made up to try to gloss over glaring deficiencies of ordinary Christian theology.
So, Copan seems to be saying that of all possible worlds, we live in the "best" one, where "best" is defined as maximum people saved and minimum people lost. If this is, indeed, the "best" possible world (in our terms here) that means that God Himself could not create a "better" world than this one! Mr. Copan, are you really saying that God is incapable of making a better world than this one? One would think that omnipotence would not be so limited! A world ten times bigger, with ten times the population, should, in theory, generate more people saved, right?
In fact, doesn't this demonstrate a logical inconsistency with the concept of omnipotence? On one hand, it would seem that God should be capable of manifesting the best possible world, as Copan claims. On the other hand, no matter what universe God created, shouldn't infinite power be capable of creating a better one? Isn't this an impossible-to-solve inconsistency with the concept of "omnipotence"?
Now, for argument's sake, let’s suppose that God were to come down and give a new revelation, in which He announces, "Oh, heck, I just chose to manifest a world at random, I never considered whether this world would have a maximum number of people saved or not." What would that say about God? That would say that He really isn't all that concerned with how many people get saved, would it not? Would you want to worship this God if He said that? And yet, can you honestly believe that this world is, indeed, the "best" possible world?
Copan goes on to claim that since this is the best possible world, then anybody lost in this world would have been lost in all possible worlds. He says such people suffer from "transworld depravity." I understand this is a concept originated by Alvin Plantinga. I have not read Plantinga's works, so I'm just going by what Copan says on the subject. And again, I must ask the question, where is this "transworld depravity" in the Bible? Again, it just looks to me to be "made-up stuff."
I have some more to say on this concept of transworld depravity, but before I do so, I want to add some context. In doing so, I’m going to go on a bit of a detour, but I will return to the topic at hand eventually. The context I want to explore is the question, just what exactly is God trying to accomplish? What is He trying to do with His plan for salvation? Christians seem to state God’s goals in two conflicting ways. Though they don’t generally phrase these two ideas the way I’m about to, the two ideas seem to be implied in Christian writings/apologetics:
In some parts, Copan raises points that seem valid and logical. Therefore, I conclude that Copan does, indeed, have a reasonable grasp of logic principles. And yet, all too often, he presents arguments that, in my view, are just flat-out preposterous. I found it frustrating to read the sections that in my view displayed poor logic, considering that Copan clearly has a good understanding of logic. I'm at a loss to understand why, but it seems that many perfectly intelligent and logical thinkers often throw logic out the door when it comes to their faith.
I've written a moderately well-known critique of Lee Strobel's The Case for Faith. How I came to know about Copan's book is that one Christian wrote a defense of Strobel's book, and used Copan's book for source material in a few places. Copan covers some of the same topics that Strobel does, but also many topics he does not. Where the topics of the books overlap, they generally come to similar conclusions. But Copan brings a somewhat different perspective and style to the table. I do think that many Christians would find these books complementary. Therefore, I encourage readers of this critique to also read my critique of Strobel's book.
By the way, many readers of my critique of Strobel's book assume that I expected to find it poor, and intended to tear it down. That is flatly not true. I considered myself a Christian, albeit a weak one, when I read it. I really hoped Strobel had found good answers; I just felt forced to conclude he did not. But I must confess that by the time I read Copan's book, I no longer held out any significant hope of finding good answers. I admit that I had the bias of not expecting to be swayed by Copan's arguments. However, I did do the best I could to put aside my bias and evaluate his arguments on their own merits. I can't say that I did so perfectly. But then, I don't think anybody can. All I can say to the reader is, feel free to read Copan's book, and my counter-arguments, and decide for yourself which is better.
I must confess to being an "amateur." I have no formal study in the topics of theology or philosophy, aside from one freshman-level course. I am a computer programmer by trade, and consider logical thinking to be one of my strong points. My critique of Copan's book is based purely on whether or not his arguments impress me as being logical and consistent. It is, of course, up to the reader to judge whether I have presented my arguments logically and consistently or not.
Copan's book had 21 chapters, each one generally fairly short. On some topics I have a lot to say; on others, not so much. In the following critique, I list each chapter by title, and my commentary on that chapter.
Chapter 1: It's All Relative
The theme of this chapter is repeated many times throughout the book. Copan rails against "relativism" and says it is self-contradictory--a claim that "everything is relative" is itself a claim of absolute truth. Therefore, to deny truth and reality affirms some form of truth and reality. I can agree that there is some valid logic to this line of argument by Copan. And to some degree, I do agree with Copan. For example, I believe that either I am typing on my computer, or I am not. The statement "I am typing on my computer at this moment" is either true, or false. But a big question that Copan never seems to address is, how do you determine what is reality? How do I determine for certain whether I am typing on my computer or not?
In this chapter (and again in Chapter 4), Copan makes references to a couple of popular movies, The Matrix and The Truman Show. It so happens that, as a child, I regularly fantasized that my life was scripted, like in The Truman Show. Because of this childhood fantasy of mine, I am an enthusiastic fan of the movie. After mentioning these movies, Copan says that they "raise interesting questions about reality." And then Copan drops the ball and drops the discussion. Dang! Just when he was starting to say something interesting! Seriously, I can't help but think that the reason he dropped the discussion is because to continue it further would have led to conclusions that would be contrary to the conclusions he wanted to make. How can we know for certain that we do not exist in The Matrix? How do we know for certain that our lives aren't scripted like in The Truman Show? My conclusion is that we don't and can't know for certain.
How do we know that God didn't create the universe five minutes ago, complete with memories? How could we disprove it? Basically, I believe that we cannot know anything with absolute certainty, but certain possibilities are sufficiently unlikely that it is not worth considering the possibility of them being true. There is a concept known as Occam's Razor that is often paraphrased something like, "All other things being equal, the simpler solution is preferred." I can't know for certain that God didn't create the universe five minutes ago complete with memories, but it is an excessively complex answer to the explanation of our current reality.
Though I disagree with Copan on whether or not we can really know for certain what reality is, based on Occam's Razor, I think we can determine what reality "probably" is. Also, I believe that humans have a desire to understand truth, and to try to best determine what truth and reality is. I'm not sure if Copan would say I'm close to agreeing with him or not. But, I think there is some degree of agreement between us here. He seems to say that truth and reality can be determined absolutely, while I say that it can be determined within a reasonable doubt. I suppose that is as close to agreement as we are going to get.
Chapter 2: That's Just Your Interpretation
This chapter seems to have at least two different things in mind, but was unclear. Is Copan talking about interpretation of the Bible? Secular laws? Morals? He does not make it clear exactly what we are trying to "interpret."
Copan says that when someone says, "Hey, that's just your interpretation," a response might be, "Do you mean that your interpretation should be preferred over mine? If so, I'd like to know why you have chosen your interpretation over mine." Again, what are we interpreting? If the people in question are Christians, and they are talking about what a particular Bible verse means, I suppose that would be a valid approach. But, if we are talking about laws and rights in society, I'm not sure that is a valid approach. If someone has a question about what a law means, perhaps a discussion with a lawyer or other professional might be a better plan. And if we are talking about morals, well, I'm not ready to broach that subject yet. So, I'll just leave that topic for now. The bottom line for me is that what exactly Copan is trying to say or to interpret is far from clear. And I don't believe that his proposed methodology is valid for all possible contexts of interpretation.
Chapter 3: That's Just Your Reality
It is true that a lot of people say things along the lines of, "You create your own reality." And there are, indeed, some people who believe this quite literally; they believe that all sensory data is imaginary. There is no "real" reality. But I'm pretty sure this is a very rare point of view. Rather, I think that most people who say, "You create your own reality," mean this in a much less literal way. Somebody could look at the 9/11 tragedy and focus on the loss of lives. Somebody else could look at the same event and see how fortunate it was that most people got out of the buildings. People have the ability to choose what parts of reality to focus on more. The person who looks at the loss of lives in the 9/11 tragedy could conclude, "Reality is unfair." The person who looks at the number of people that survived 9/11 could conclude, "Reality is miraculous." This is what I think most people who say, "You create your own reality," really mean. Copan's arguments in this chapter deal with the extreme position that there literally is no genuine reality. I can agree with Copan in that I believe this extreme position to be rather bizarre. But I believe that the more figurative meaning of, "You create your own reality," is quite valid, and Copan didn't actually address this.
Chapter 4: Reality is Shaped by Forces Beyond Our Control
Copan does, of course, recognize that many things are, indeed, beyond our control. The point of this chapter is more about whether or not we can make an objective assessment of our reality. Copan makes a particular point over and over and over again. He says that anyone who says that objective reality is impossible is contradicting him or herself, because they are making the claim that it is objectively true that objective reality is impossible. And I concede some logic to this argument. But, I believe that it is simply a fact that some things are a mix of subjective and objective, and that they are not always separable.
Here is an example. Are Fords better than Chevys? Most of us would say that is a subjective call. For one person, a Ford may be better, but for another, a Chevy may be better. But a Ford fan might get out statistics on reliability, horsepower, and maintenance and try to make a claim that Fords are objectively better than Chevys. But, it is not likely that in every objective category, Fords are always better than Chevys. Perhaps one brand has better reliability statistics, while the other has better safety statistics. So, which is better? It is subjective, isn't it?
Now, let’s consider the question, are Fords better than Yugos? Most people would say that Yugos perform so poorly, in so many of the objective categories, that it is fair to say that Fords are, indeed, objectively better than Yugos. Of course, there is probably somebody, somewhere, who would object. Somebody must like Yugos, and say that they like Yugos better than Fords. But that person would be the rare person. Most people would say that whether Fords are better than Chevys is subjective, but that Fords are better than Yugos is objective. The point being, many things have objective and subjective components, and completely separating them is not always possible.
Copan claims that when people say something like, "We are nothing more than the product of our genes and our environment," they don't really believe it. Well, I do say it, and I do believe it. I must confess that I don't happen to like it--but I do believe it. I, therefore, must concede that Copan is right, in that I have to agree that both our views are the products of our genes and our environment. If I say that I think my views are correct and his aren't, am I saying that somehow my genes or environment are "better" than his? And this is the best answer I have, which I admit might not be completely compelling. But here it goes. I believe that we each have differing degrees of intelligence, and differing degrees of experience. For that reason, some of us are better able to discern truth from fiction in some areas, but perhaps not others. If I am correct, and I have deduced more correctly than Mr. Copan has in regards to these subjects that I am writing about, it is still quite likely that there are other subjects that he is better able to evaluate than I am. Further, the sphere of human knowledge grows via peer review. It may be true that he will never be convinced that I am more right, and that I may never be convinced that he is more right. I may claim that my view is more right, but my claiming it does not make it so. But perhaps, with both of our opinions available for review, who is more right between us can be deduced over time.
Chapter 5: Everything is One with the Divine
Chapter 6: Why Not Believe in Reincarnation
In these chapters, Copan discounts some religious beliefs that differ from his own. I don't believe them either. So, more-or-less, I agree with Copan on these topics. Not exactly, of course, but I see no point in elaborating any further.
Chapter 7: If God Made the Universe, Who Made God?
This is a brief rendition of the Cosmological Argument. I have a separate paper on this, so I shall not go into too much detail here. But one thing I'd like to point out is that Copan makes an oft-stated claim that Big Bang cosmology "greatly resembles the account in Genesis 1:1." Really? Genesis 1 has God creating the stars after the Earth. Doesn't look like a great resemblance to me. For more information, please follow this link to my paper on this topic.
In short, the title of this chapter is quite appropriate. The title recognizes that there must be something that exists without any explanation. Either the natural universe(s) exist without explanation, or God exists without explanation. Copan, and other theists that use this line of argument, try to explain why the universe can't exist without explanation, but God can. But, these are always "ad-hoc" arguments, arguments formulated with the pre-determined conclusion that it must be God that exists without explanation. If you aren't already convinced that this is true, the arguments fall flat. The bottom line is, we know that the universe exists, but we don't know that God exists. Trying to use an unknown to explain a known can't possibly work.
Chapter 8: If God Knows What We're Going to Do, We Don't Have Free Will
The main thrust of this chapter is his argument that God knowing what will happen is not the same thing as making it happen. If it were possible for humans to know the future, and somebody a hundred years ago knew that today I'd be typing this, that person's knowledge didn't cause me to do today's typing. I believe that I can accept this line of argument, at least up to a point.
Of course, I know that bringing up Hitler is a cliché, but I guess he makes as good an example as any, so here it goes. If God knew that Hitler was going to kill millions of people, and had the power to stop him, but didn't, isn't God at least partly responsible? If I was a German in WWII and had the power to stop Hitler, but didn't, wouldn't I deserve some blame? Some say that God has decided not to interfere in people's free will, even if that means things like the holocaust will happen. But then, what is the point of prayer? If God won't interfere, then why pray? Anybody who had prayed for an end for WWII obviously prayed in vain, as God wouldn't do anything. The fact that the allies won was just good fortune for the allies; God apparently had nothing to do with it.
Copan goes on to argue that God knows not only everything that happens in this world and universe, but also everything that happens in all possible worlds and universes. And, therefore, God chose to manifest the world in which the maximum number of people are saved, and the minimum number are lost. My first question is, where the heck in the Bible does it say this? This seems to be completely "made-up stuff"--made up to try to gloss over glaring deficiencies of ordinary Christian theology.
So, Copan seems to be saying that of all possible worlds, we live in the "best" one, where "best" is defined as maximum people saved and minimum people lost. If this is, indeed, the "best" possible world (in our terms here) that means that God Himself could not create a "better" world than this one! Mr. Copan, are you really saying that God is incapable of making a better world than this one? One would think that omnipotence would not be so limited! A world ten times bigger, with ten times the population, should, in theory, generate more people saved, right?
In fact, doesn't this demonstrate a logical inconsistency with the concept of omnipotence? On one hand, it would seem that God should be capable of manifesting the best possible world, as Copan claims. On the other hand, no matter what universe God created, shouldn't infinite power be capable of creating a better one? Isn't this an impossible-to-solve inconsistency with the concept of "omnipotence"?
Now, for argument's sake, let’s suppose that God were to come down and give a new revelation, in which He announces, "Oh, heck, I just chose to manifest a world at random, I never considered whether this world would have a maximum number of people saved or not." What would that say about God? That would say that He really isn't all that concerned with how many people get saved, would it not? Would you want to worship this God if He said that? And yet, can you honestly believe that this world is, indeed, the "best" possible world?
Copan goes on to claim that since this is the best possible world, then anybody lost in this world would have been lost in all possible worlds. He says such people suffer from "transworld depravity." I understand this is a concept originated by Alvin Plantinga. I have not read Plantinga's works, so I'm just going by what Copan says on the subject. And again, I must ask the question, where is this "transworld depravity" in the Bible? Again, it just looks to me to be "made-up stuff."
I have some more to say on this concept of transworld depravity, but before I do so, I want to add some context. In doing so, I’m going to go on a bit of a detour, but I will return to the topic at hand eventually. The context I want to explore is the question, just what exactly is God trying to accomplish? What is He trying to do with His plan for salvation? Christians seem to state God’s goals in two conflicting ways. Though they don’t generally phrase these two ideas the way I’m about to, the two ideas seem to be implied in Christian writings/apologetics:
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1. God wants to separate people who are “right” for heaven from those who are “wrong” for heaven. There are intrinsic differences between the two groups of people. These differences are eternal, which is why you spend eternity either in heaven or hell.
2. God wants people to freely choose Him. There is no intrinsic difference between those who do so and those who don’t. Just some people do, and some people don’t. Those who choose God go to heaven and those who don’t, go to hell. |
I will refer to these two salvation concepts as Goal 1 and Goal 2 for the rest of this chapter, and will also occasionally refer to them in subsequent chapters. I claim that these two possible goals of God exist in Christian apologetics. And I claim they are mutually incompatible. That they are incompatible seems self-evident; either there are intrinsic differences between those who go to heaven and those who go to hell, or there aren’t.
So, where do I get evidence that these two conflicting concepts (goals) are present in Christian apologetics? Well, for one, this "transworld depravity" concept that Copan raises seems to be an argument for Goal 1. Also, I’ve read C. S. Lewis’ The Great Divorce. Although the story is allegorical, there is one quote from the book that I believe is to be taken literally: “There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, 'Thy will be done,' and those to whom God says, in the end, 'Thy will be done.'" Copan himself quoted this exact same line from The Great Divorce in a later chapter. The point of The Great Divorce, though allegorical, seems to be a contention that there are real, intrinsic differences between the saved and the unsaved. So Lewis seems to be arguing for Goal 1.
On the other hand, most apologetics that I've read seem to argue for Goal 2. In Copan's Chapter 11 (on hell), he argues that faith is a choice--either you choose to want to be with God, or you choose to not want to be with God. So, in that chapter, Copan seems to argue Goal 2. Also, I've been to church many times, in Methodist, Catholic, and Lutheran services. My impression of the teachings in these churches has always been Goal 2. They usually say that everybody is a sinner, nobody "deserves" heaven, and God gives salvation freely to anybody who asks for it.
Okay, so now that I’ve shown that both of these concepts seem to be expressed in Christian apologetics--and even both in this same book by Copan--which is really God’s goal? Both possible goals seem rather problematic, which I shall attempt to show by the following scenario. Say some man spends his entire life as an atheist. He goes to the doctor, and is told that he has cancer and has about six months to live. He reevaluates his life, and converts to Christianity. I suppose I must first ask, is this scenario even possible? Had this man died the day he went to the doctor, he would have gone to hell. And if the saved and unsaved are intrinsically different from each other, how could he have changed? So it would seem that if there are intrinsic differences between the saved and unsaved, this scenario should be impossible. But I think Christians believe this kind of event happens all the time, and that those who use such an event to choose God are fortunate indeed.
Therefore, this scenario illustrates two points. One, this seems to rule out the possibility that people who go to hell are intrinsically different than those who go to heaven (Goal 1 seems ruled out.) But it also seems to add an important corollary to Goal 2. People who chose to be on “God’s side” may well have made the opposite choice had their life experiences been somewhat different, or vice-versa--as in my example of the guy who gets cancer and is given six months to live. So Goal 2 looks very random; your soul’s eternal destination is ultimately decided by random events in your life. So I’m saying that God’s potential Goal 2 includes what I’m calling Corollary A: who is saved and who is unsaved is random.
I know a Christian would challenge the claim that your soul’s eternal destination is ultimately decided by random events. They would say that, no, it is the choices you make, based on the random events in your life, that determine your fate. But in my example of the guy who reevaluates his life when told that he has cancer, it is the exact same guy who was an atheist before. But one random path leads him to make the choice for God, and another random path doesn’t. The point being, I think that the choices we make really are very heavily dependent on the events in our life. Can any Christian honestly say that had events in their life been different, there is no chance that today they would be atheist? So I stand by my claim that if God’s plan is Goal 2, then Corollary A, that who goes to heaven and who goes to hell is random, must also be true.
I believe it is the fundamental problems inherent in each possible goal that causes Christians to have to switch back and forth between them. When speaking of heaven, Christians seem to gravitate towards Goal 2, saying that those who go to heaven merely made the choice to be with God. But when speaking of hell, they gravitate towards Goal 1, saying that there is something about those who go to hell, and that “something” will last for eternity.
Now, let’s return to Copan's idea of "transworld depravity." First off, as I noted above, Christian churches that I have attended have all said that everybody is a sinner, and that nobody is "better" than anybody else. Everybody is depraved, and everybody should have transworld depravity as I understand Christian teachings. But, okay, say that these churches that I have attended are incorrect, and that transworld depravity does exist for some people but not for everybody. If somebody is "depraved" in all possible worlds, where could the source of this depravity be except God Himself, who creates everything? If God created me, and I'm depraved, then God created me depraved, did He not? And regardless, why would He create me anyway, if I'm so depraved that I'd be depraved in all possible worlds? What's the point? Bottom line is, if some people suffer from transworld depravity, God must want transworld depravity or he wouldn't create such people.
I concede that I should read some of Plantinga's works to learn more about his concept of "transworld depravity." But, as far as I can tell from what Copan says, the idea seems to be rather untenable.
Chapter 9: If God Predestines Some to Be Saved, What Choice Do I Really Have?
Here, Copan agues against classical predestination, or Calvinism. He does agree that many intelligent people have argued forcefully for Calvinism. And he agrees that there is scripture that can be used to support such a position. Frankly, I'm not interested in debating that issue. But Copan's admission that good arguments in favor of Calvinism can be made begs the question, why is the Bible so difficult to understand that not even God's own followers can come to a consensus on what it means? One would think that God would want His own followers to know what He means, wouldn't you? In general, it seems that Christians can't seem to come to a consensus on just about any issue. The Secular Web has an interesting article on this issue. See: "Christian Salvation?"
The only other point I want to make here is, if God knows who will be saved and who won't for all time, why did He bother creating those who wouldn't? If I made some proverbial widgets, and I knew that some widgets wouldn't meet my needs, and I made them anyway, wouldn't I be a fool? So in a sense, despite Copan's arguing against predestination, he still affirms it in one sense. That seems to mean that, whether Copan agrees or not, some people are created to go to hell. God knew for all eternity who would reject Him, and yet He created them anyway. Why?
Chapter 10: The Coexistence of God and Evil Is a Logical Contradiction
Here Copan gives the usual Christian argument that God wanted to give people free will, and an unfortunate result is that some people use their free will to do evil. But he also says that among God's long-term goals is "the establishment of the new heavens and new Earth--evil will be completely overcome." This, of course, begs the question, can God completely overcome evil or not? If He can, then all of Copan's arguments as to why evil is an unfortunate result of free will seems to be a complete waste of time, and completely erroneous.
Christians don't seem to think that heaven has evil. And, at least until the fall, the Garden of Eden didn't have evil either, as far as I know. And Copan says that with the creation of the new heavens and new Earth, evil will be completely overcome. But this completely invalidates everything Copan says about evil being an unfortunate necessity. (To be fair, I note that Copan did, indeed, try to address this apparent contradiction in the next chapter. I will return to this topic next chapter.)
Copan also gives a common argument that if we simply recognize the existence of evil, then we must be recognizing some standard of good. And the only source of such a standard could be God. I'm not convinced that this is true. I believe that my understanding of pain and suffering is completely understandable from an evolutionary perspective. Pain hurts, so I try to avoid it. Also, I have the ability to recognize pain and suffering in other people. And I can reason that, if I was the other person, I would not like it. So it doesn't seem that I need a God to understand that unnecessary pain and suffering is undesirable.
Copan says that some atheists deny the existence of evil. Well, I do deny it as being some form of a force. With apologies to George Lucas, the "Dark Side of the Force" is just fiction. I also deny some sort of entity like Satan being the personification of evil. Satan and Darth Vader are fictional characters. But as far as "evil" as defined as unnecessary pain and suffering, I don't deny it.
Copan also spends some time discussing what God can and cannot do. For example, he says that God cannot do the logically impossible, like make square circles. But then he also says that perhaps some things are logically possible, but still not feasible. God creating a world with free will, but no evil, might be logically possible, but still not feasible. I never knew omnipotence could be so limited! Seriously, the concept of omnipotence seems like it should include the ability to do anything that is logically possible. If not, what the heck does omnipotence mean? If omnipotence is limited by the unfeasible, heck, I'm omnipotent! Why can't I flap my arms and fly to Pluto? Well, because it just isn't "feasible" for me to do so, silly. Copan seems to have reduced the concept of omnipotence to a completely meaningless term!
Chapter 11: Why Would a Good God Send People to Hell?
Copan argues that the fires of hell in the Bible are figurative; there is no burning or torturing in hell. Rather, the punishment of hell is simply being separated from God. Copan quotes C. S. Lewis, saying that the proverbial gates of hell are locked on the inside. He implies that the people in hell are there because they would rather be there than with God.
I'd like to revisit the analogy I raised in the discussion of Chapter 8, about the man who, diagnosed with cancer, reevaluates his life and becomes a Christian. If this scenario is possible, it shows that people can change their minds. But in Copan and Lewis' minds, they seem to believe that people would never change their mind about God for all eternity. I'm sorry, but this strikes me as, well, asinine. In any other human endeavor, the possibility of changing one’s mind is always considered possible. Yet Copan and Lewis believe people will--for all eternity--prefer to be in hell than with God. I find this just preposterous.
Copan notes that some critics and skeptics say that God is unfair for making us choose between heaven and hell while we don't fully understand the ramifications of such a choice. He disagrees, and says that it can be compared to marriage. People, when they first get married, rarely fully understand the ramifications of a life-long commitment. Yet, people do make such commitments and are still bound to honor them. Okay, let's explore the similarity to marriage. Is Copan saying--as Jesus and the Bible say--that once you are married, you must honor that commitment--period? Yet most churches today, while agreeing that divorce is generally undesirable, still concede that sometimes dissolution of a marriage is best and allow for divorce. Either the Bible is wrong, or the modern allowance of divorce is wrong. I don't know where Copan stands. But I think that any reasonable person who has seen bad marriages dissolve, and good marriages arise afterwards, would have to acknowledge that sometimes people do make mistakes, and that forcing them to live with the consequences does not do anybody any good. In other words, it seems clear to me that the Bible is wrong.
But people have a far better understanding of the commitment that's involved in marriage than they possibly can of heaven and hell. I've seen other people married. I've met my wife. I've never seen heaven or hell. Therefore, I believe that regardless of one's position on divorce, Copan's analogy to marriage is a poor one. In short, I agree with the skeptics that say that God forcing people to make an eternal choice about something they clearly cannot fully understand is just plain cruel.
Copan notes that many skeptics ask, "Why didn't God just make everybody the way they will be in heaven--without sin. If God can guarantee a sin-free existence for believers in the afterlife, why not make it so from the start?" Copan offers some alternatives as to how God might handle this question. I will list these three alternatives in brief:
So, where do I get evidence that these two conflicting concepts (goals) are present in Christian apologetics? Well, for one, this "transworld depravity" concept that Copan raises seems to be an argument for Goal 1. Also, I’ve read C. S. Lewis’ The Great Divorce. Although the story is allegorical, there is one quote from the book that I believe is to be taken literally: “There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, 'Thy will be done,' and those to whom God says, in the end, 'Thy will be done.'" Copan himself quoted this exact same line from The Great Divorce in a later chapter. The point of The Great Divorce, though allegorical, seems to be a contention that there are real, intrinsic differences between the saved and the unsaved. So Lewis seems to be arguing for Goal 1.
On the other hand, most apologetics that I've read seem to argue for Goal 2. In Copan's Chapter 11 (on hell), he argues that faith is a choice--either you choose to want to be with God, or you choose to not want to be with God. So, in that chapter, Copan seems to argue Goal 2. Also, I've been to church many times, in Methodist, Catholic, and Lutheran services. My impression of the teachings in these churches has always been Goal 2. They usually say that everybody is a sinner, nobody "deserves" heaven, and God gives salvation freely to anybody who asks for it.
Okay, so now that I’ve shown that both of these concepts seem to be expressed in Christian apologetics--and even both in this same book by Copan--which is really God’s goal? Both possible goals seem rather problematic, which I shall attempt to show by the following scenario. Say some man spends his entire life as an atheist. He goes to the doctor, and is told that he has cancer and has about six months to live. He reevaluates his life, and converts to Christianity. I suppose I must first ask, is this scenario even possible? Had this man died the day he went to the doctor, he would have gone to hell. And if the saved and unsaved are intrinsically different from each other, how could he have changed? So it would seem that if there are intrinsic differences between the saved and unsaved, this scenario should be impossible. But I think Christians believe this kind of event happens all the time, and that those who use such an event to choose God are fortunate indeed.
Therefore, this scenario illustrates two points. One, this seems to rule out the possibility that people who go to hell are intrinsically different than those who go to heaven (Goal 1 seems ruled out.) But it also seems to add an important corollary to Goal 2. People who chose to be on “God’s side” may well have made the opposite choice had their life experiences been somewhat different, or vice-versa--as in my example of the guy who gets cancer and is given six months to live. So Goal 2 looks very random; your soul’s eternal destination is ultimately decided by random events in your life. So I’m saying that God’s potential Goal 2 includes what I’m calling Corollary A: who is saved and who is unsaved is random.
I know a Christian would challenge the claim that your soul’s eternal destination is ultimately decided by random events. They would say that, no, it is the choices you make, based on the random events in your life, that determine your fate. But in my example of the guy who reevaluates his life when told that he has cancer, it is the exact same guy who was an atheist before. But one random path leads him to make the choice for God, and another random path doesn’t. The point being, I think that the choices we make really are very heavily dependent on the events in our life. Can any Christian honestly say that had events in their life been different, there is no chance that today they would be atheist? So I stand by my claim that if God’s plan is Goal 2, then Corollary A, that who goes to heaven and who goes to hell is random, must also be true.
I believe it is the fundamental problems inherent in each possible goal that causes Christians to have to switch back and forth between them. When speaking of heaven, Christians seem to gravitate towards Goal 2, saying that those who go to heaven merely made the choice to be with God. But when speaking of hell, they gravitate towards Goal 1, saying that there is something about those who go to hell, and that “something” will last for eternity.
Now, let’s return to Copan's idea of "transworld depravity." First off, as I noted above, Christian churches that I have attended have all said that everybody is a sinner, and that nobody is "better" than anybody else. Everybody is depraved, and everybody should have transworld depravity as I understand Christian teachings. But, okay, say that these churches that I have attended are incorrect, and that transworld depravity does exist for some people but not for everybody. If somebody is "depraved" in all possible worlds, where could the source of this depravity be except God Himself, who creates everything? If God created me, and I'm depraved, then God created me depraved, did He not? And regardless, why would He create me anyway, if I'm so depraved that I'd be depraved in all possible worlds? What's the point? Bottom line is, if some people suffer from transworld depravity, God must want transworld depravity or he wouldn't create such people.
I concede that I should read some of Plantinga's works to learn more about his concept of "transworld depravity." But, as far as I can tell from what Copan says, the idea seems to be rather untenable.
Chapter 9: If God Predestines Some to Be Saved, What Choice Do I Really Have?
Here, Copan agues against classical predestination, or Calvinism. He does agree that many intelligent people have argued forcefully for Calvinism. And he agrees that there is scripture that can be used to support such a position. Frankly, I'm not interested in debating that issue. But Copan's admission that good arguments in favor of Calvinism can be made begs the question, why is the Bible so difficult to understand that not even God's own followers can come to a consensus on what it means? One would think that God would want His own followers to know what He means, wouldn't you? In general, it seems that Christians can't seem to come to a consensus on just about any issue. The Secular Web has an interesting article on this issue. See: "Christian Salvation?"
The only other point I want to make here is, if God knows who will be saved and who won't for all time, why did He bother creating those who wouldn't? If I made some proverbial widgets, and I knew that some widgets wouldn't meet my needs, and I made them anyway, wouldn't I be a fool? So in a sense, despite Copan's arguing against predestination, he still affirms it in one sense. That seems to mean that, whether Copan agrees or not, some people are created to go to hell. God knew for all eternity who would reject Him, and yet He created them anyway. Why?
Chapter 10: The Coexistence of God and Evil Is a Logical Contradiction
Here Copan gives the usual Christian argument that God wanted to give people free will, and an unfortunate result is that some people use their free will to do evil. But he also says that among God's long-term goals is "the establishment of the new heavens and new Earth--evil will be completely overcome." This, of course, begs the question, can God completely overcome evil or not? If He can, then all of Copan's arguments as to why evil is an unfortunate result of free will seems to be a complete waste of time, and completely erroneous.
Christians don't seem to think that heaven has evil. And, at least until the fall, the Garden of Eden didn't have evil either, as far as I know. And Copan says that with the creation of the new heavens and new Earth, evil will be completely overcome. But this completely invalidates everything Copan says about evil being an unfortunate necessity. (To be fair, I note that Copan did, indeed, try to address this apparent contradiction in the next chapter. I will return to this topic next chapter.)
Copan also gives a common argument that if we simply recognize the existence of evil, then we must be recognizing some standard of good. And the only source of such a standard could be God. I'm not convinced that this is true. I believe that my understanding of pain and suffering is completely understandable from an evolutionary perspective. Pain hurts, so I try to avoid it. Also, I have the ability to recognize pain and suffering in other people. And I can reason that, if I was the other person, I would not like it. So it doesn't seem that I need a God to understand that unnecessary pain and suffering is undesirable.
Copan says that some atheists deny the existence of evil. Well, I do deny it as being some form of a force. With apologies to George Lucas, the "Dark Side of the Force" is just fiction. I also deny some sort of entity like Satan being the personification of evil. Satan and Darth Vader are fictional characters. But as far as "evil" as defined as unnecessary pain and suffering, I don't deny it.
Copan also spends some time discussing what God can and cannot do. For example, he says that God cannot do the logically impossible, like make square circles. But then he also says that perhaps some things are logically possible, but still not feasible. God creating a world with free will, but no evil, might be logically possible, but still not feasible. I never knew omnipotence could be so limited! Seriously, the concept of omnipotence seems like it should include the ability to do anything that is logically possible. If not, what the heck does omnipotence mean? If omnipotence is limited by the unfeasible, heck, I'm omnipotent! Why can't I flap my arms and fly to Pluto? Well, because it just isn't "feasible" for me to do so, silly. Copan seems to have reduced the concept of omnipotence to a completely meaningless term!
Chapter 11: Why Would a Good God Send People to Hell?
Copan argues that the fires of hell in the Bible are figurative; there is no burning or torturing in hell. Rather, the punishment of hell is simply being separated from God. Copan quotes C. S. Lewis, saying that the proverbial gates of hell are locked on the inside. He implies that the people in hell are there because they would rather be there than with God.
I'd like to revisit the analogy I raised in the discussion of Chapter 8, about the man who, diagnosed with cancer, reevaluates his life and becomes a Christian. If this scenario is possible, it shows that people can change their minds. But in Copan and Lewis' minds, they seem to believe that people would never change their mind about God for all eternity. I'm sorry, but this strikes me as, well, asinine. In any other human endeavor, the possibility of changing one’s mind is always considered possible. Yet Copan and Lewis believe people will--for all eternity--prefer to be in hell than with God. I find this just preposterous.
Copan notes that some critics and skeptics say that God is unfair for making us choose between heaven and hell while we don't fully understand the ramifications of such a choice. He disagrees, and says that it can be compared to marriage. People, when they first get married, rarely fully understand the ramifications of a life-long commitment. Yet, people do make such commitments and are still bound to honor them. Okay, let's explore the similarity to marriage. Is Copan saying--as Jesus and the Bible say--that once you are married, you must honor that commitment--period? Yet most churches today, while agreeing that divorce is generally undesirable, still concede that sometimes dissolution of a marriage is best and allow for divorce. Either the Bible is wrong, or the modern allowance of divorce is wrong. I don't know where Copan stands. But I think that any reasonable person who has seen bad marriages dissolve, and good marriages arise afterwards, would have to acknowledge that sometimes people do make mistakes, and that forcing them to live with the consequences does not do anybody any good. In other words, it seems clear to me that the Bible is wrong.
But people have a far better understanding of the commitment that's involved in marriage than they possibly can of heaven and hell. I've seen other people married. I've met my wife. I've never seen heaven or hell. Therefore, I believe that regardless of one's position on divorce, Copan's analogy to marriage is a poor one. In short, I agree with the skeptics that say that God forcing people to make an eternal choice about something they clearly cannot fully understand is just plain cruel.
Copan notes that many skeptics ask, "Why didn't God just make everybody the way they will be in heaven--without sin. If God can guarantee a sin-free existence for believers in the afterlife, why not make it so from the start?" Copan offers some alternatives as to how God might handle this question. I will list these three alternatives in brief:
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1. Once you make your decision for or against God, your choice is sealed and God takes away the free will to do evil.
2. God knows who will never sin and only saves those who will never sin. 3. God will make heaven so wonderful that nobody would even consider sinning. |
(Note: For interested readers, or for anyone who might suspect that I am summarizing Copan's alternatives unfairly, I have taken the liberty of quoting his alternatives in their entirety from pages 107-108. Follow this link.)
Copan ends his discussion of his alternatives by saying that they are "exploratory and suggestive." He says that these kinds of questions "remind us to be more tentative and suggestive rather than dogmatically definitive." If I explain why the “exploratory” answers are not satisfactory, I fear that Copan would say something like, “Well, don’t be dogmatic about it,” or, “Heaven’s not exactly like that, just kind of like that.” In other words, it seems that Copan wants to “plug the hole” of the problem of evil vs. free will in heaven by the “exploratory” answers, without having to deal with the nasty new holes these ideas entail. So, at the risk of being “dogmatic,” I’m afraid that I need to detail these nasty new holes.
In order to examine what I feel are substantial holes in Copan's "alternatives," I will return to the context I already explored some in Chapter 8. In that chapter, I noted that there seems to be two schools of thought as to God's goal for his salvation plan, which I'll repeat here:
Copan ends his discussion of his alternatives by saying that they are "exploratory and suggestive." He says that these kinds of questions "remind us to be more tentative and suggestive rather than dogmatically definitive." If I explain why the “exploratory” answers are not satisfactory, I fear that Copan would say something like, “Well, don’t be dogmatic about it,” or, “Heaven’s not exactly like that, just kind of like that.” In other words, it seems that Copan wants to “plug the hole” of the problem of evil vs. free will in heaven by the “exploratory” answers, without having to deal with the nasty new holes these ideas entail. So, at the risk of being “dogmatic,” I’m afraid that I need to detail these nasty new holes.
In order to examine what I feel are substantial holes in Copan's "alternatives," I will return to the context I already explored some in Chapter 8. In that chapter, I noted that there seems to be two schools of thought as to God's goal for his salvation plan, which I'll repeat here:
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1. God wants to separate people who are “right” for heaven and those who are “wrong” for heaven. There are intrinsic differences between the two groups of people. These differences are eternal, which is why you spend eternity either in heaven or hell.
2. God wants people to freely choose Him. There is no intrinsic difference between those who do so and those who don’t. Just some people do, and some people don’t. Those who choose God go to heaven, and those who don’t, go to hell. |
When I discussed these ideas before, I noted that both goals seem problematic. But, say that there is some explanation, and that one of those two possibilities is, in fact, God’s goal for salvation. Therefore, I want to discuss Copan's “exploratory” answers as to how the issue of free will and evil is resolved in heaven, in light of these possible goals. To keep my terminology straight, I have termed my two possibilities for God’s plan as Goal 1 and Goal 2. Copan’s exploratory answers are termed Alternatives 1, 2 and 3. I will now explore how Copan’s alternatives might fulfill God’s possible goals.
Copan’s Alternative 1 says that once you make your decision for or against God, your choice is “sealed” and the free will to do evil is taken away. Alternative 1 does to some degree work if God is working towards Goal 2. You make your choice, and then you live with that choice for all eternity. On the other hand, Alternative 1 seems to not be consistent with Goal 1. If there are intrinsic differences between those in heaven and hell, then God presumably wouldn’t need to take away free will. So, here I conclude that Alternative 1 is only compatible with Goal 2. But remember that Goal 2 means that who is saved and who isn’t is random. So this seems to make life a spiritual game of musical chairs, and if, at the moment you die, you are deemed on God’s side, then you go to heaven--otherwise you go to hell. So what was God’s purpose in making people make a choice, other than simply wanting to catch some people out of His favor?
Copan’s Alternative 2 says that God knows who will eventually sin, and who won’t, and the saved are those who won’t. This alternative seems to be completely inconsistent with God’s Goal 2. If there are no intrinsic differences between those who are saved and not saved, there seems to be no reason to believe that the saved would never sin. Now Alternative 2 does seem to be consistent if God’s plan is Goal 1--that is, if there are intrinsic differences between the saved and the unsaved, then maybe they would never sin for all eternity. But if God knows who will sin and who won’t, then why did He bother to create those who will sin? Doesn’t it seem like He must have wanted to create sinful people just so that he could send them to hell? And wait a minute…isn’t everybody a sinner, even the saved? Don’t even the saved occasionally succumb to temptation? Yet in this alternative, Copan has the saved never sinning for all eternity. How could this be possible?
Copan’s Alternative 3 says that God makes heaven so great that nobody would even want to sin; avoiding sin would be a “no-brainer.” My first question is, wouldn’t Eden have been like this? How could Adam and Eve have sinned? Secondly, if God is capable of making an environment--any environment--where avoiding sin is a “no-brainer,” why would He have ever created any environment where sinning is possible? The only conclusion that you can come to here is that if God is capable of creating an environment where nobody would want to sin, but He chose to create environments where people might want to sin, then God must want sin! God seems to have intentionally created Earth to be a place where sinning might happen, for the singular purpose of tripping some people up so that they could be sent to hell! Alternative 3 seems to be so problematic that it couldn’t possibly fulfill either Goal 1 or Goal 2.
Thus, I concede that Alternative 1 at least slightly works in the framework of Goal 2, and that Alternative 2 at least slightly works in the framework of Goal 1. But only slightly. In all three alternatives, and in the context of either salvation goal, God always looks like a villain who just wants to send some people to hell. I'm afraid I must conclude that Copan's "exploratory" answers are unsatisfactory in answering the question raised: how does God allow free will in heaven without allowing sin in heaven? But I suppose some readers may still not be convinced by my arguments so far. Say you still feel that one of these alternatives, or perhaps an unknown alternative, explains how God handles the question of evil vs. free will in heaven. But what about Satan and his fallen angels? If God has any method at all to avoid sin in heaven, then Satan and his dark angels couldn’t have fallen, could they? Doesn’t this prove that God has no method at all of preventing evil in heaven? Aren’t we fully back to square one on the question of evil vs. free will in heaven?
Copan presents a lot of the same ideas that Dr. Moreland does in his defense of hell in Lee Strobel's The Case for Faith. Therefore, I encourage readers here to also read my critique of Moreland. Please follow this link.
Chapter 12: Religion is Nothing More Than the Human Wish for a Father Figure
Following the previous chapter--that in my opinion was one of Copan's worst--is this chapter, which I think was one of his best. (Hey, I do try to be fair, believe it or not...) Even so, I have some disagreements with some of what he says here.
Copan notes that many skeptics claim that religion exists because "people desire some security or hope in an unstable and frightening world." Copan responds, “Is there really anything wrong with desiring security and hope? As an analogy, is there anything wrong with desiring food because it nourishes us?” I agree that this is a fair point.
Copan quotes from C. S. Lewis, who makes some similar claims. He claims that God (perhaps) designed us with a need for God. Therefore, the skeptic can be--in a way--correct; people do need the security of God. The general problem I have with this type of theology is that if God did design us with such a need, then His being so elusive seems cruel. It's like God is holding a bag of candy just out of reach of a child's hands. If He really wants us to want a relationship with Him, then His elusiveness doesn't seem to make sense.
Also, if God made us with a desire to have a relationship with Him, why are there so many religions? Copan briefly mentions this, but says he answers the question in his other book, True for You, but Not for Me. I have not yet read his other book, but I must confess skepticism that he could have answered this question adequately. If the One True God is the Judeo-Christian God, how could someone who was taught, say, Greek mythology, have had a relationship with Him? God created us with a need for Him, and yet most of the people who have ever lived never heard of Him? How does this make any sense?
Copan also notes that even if the reasons people believe in God are fallacious, that, by itself, does not disprove God. Strictly speaking, this is correct. On the other hand, if the reasons people believe in God don’t have an evidential, testable basis, then they aren't much good in validating His existence. People believing in God for fallacious arguments may not disprove God, but fallacious arguments aren't much good for proving He does exist.
Copan says that some skeptics argue that belief in God is rooted in some psychological need for a father figure. Copan says that doesn't make sense considering that most religions don't even have a "father-figure" type of deity. Okay, this may be true. But then, doesn't his argument here add strength to my claim that most people couldn't possibly have a "relationship" with God, if they don't even know who the One True God is? God created us with a need for Him, and then most religions teach about deities completely different than Him? How does this make any sense?
Chapter 13: How Can God be Three and One?
Chapter 14: Isn't the Idea of God Becoming a Man Incoherent?
In these chapters, Copan defends the concept of the Trinity, and the possibility of God becoming man. I don't have any conceptual disagreement with the idea of God, if He exists, having multiple presentations or natures. That's not to say that I actually believe it, I'm just saying that I don't have any conceptual disagreement. Therefore, I don't have anything else to say in response to these topics.
Chapter 15: If Jesus Is God, How Could He Really Be Tempted?
I found this chapter rather humorous. Copan says that because Jesus was God, it is true that He could not sin and could not fall to temptation. But, because Jesus voluntarily put aside his divinity to become man, he did not know that he could not fall to temptation. And therefore the temptation was real. This idea reminded me of the movie Liar, Liar, starring Jim Carey. The character he plays has a spell placed upon him that prevents him from lying, but he does not know or understand that he can't lie. He is frustrated when he finds out that he cannot lie. There is a scene when he simply wants to tell a very small lie; he wants to say that a blue pen is some color other than blue. With typical Carey-style antics, he struggles and fights and just can't say that the pen is anything but blue. So, when I read Copan's theory that Jesus simply didn't know that he couldn't sin, I imagined Jesus attempting to "sin" by saying that a blue pen is red, but just not being able to do it. Hilarious.
Besides, even if Jesus couldn't physically sin, isn't even thinking about sin a sin? I'm referring to the scripture about lusting being the same as committing adultery in your heart. So, if Jesus even thought about sinning, he sinned, right? So doesn't this flatly dispute Copan's theory here?
This theory seems to be "Textbook Example A" of an ad-hoc theory. An "ad-hoc" theory is a theory that is invented to explain away an apparent problem with another theory. But all this ad-hoc theory does is raise more problems. Well, at least this chapter was good for a good belly-laugh...
Chapter 16: The Genesis Creation Account Contradicts Science (Part 1)
When I read Chapter 11 on hell, I thought Copan had hit bottom--that he couldn't get much worse. But I was wrong. This chapter is astoundingly poor. I found myself annoyed with Copan for writing such nonsense.
Okay, so what got my ire up in this chapter? This chapter has two main points. One is to claim that whether the Earth is young or old is immaterial to God's glory. I guess this much I can accept as okay. But let’s continue. He does concede that at least most young-Earth arguments "appear to lack solid scientific support." But, Copan stops short of saying that young-Earth arguments are flat-out wrong. Given that the first part of the book was dedicated to railing against relativism, and insisting upon objective reality, I found his wishy-washy refusal to take a definite stand hypocritical. How can he insist on taking a stand for objective reality, and then say, "Well, um, this doesn't seem to be terribly convincing, but, um, let’s move along now and not worry about it too much"?
Now, is Genesis a historical account of what actually happened during creation, or is it a mythological story? Well, Copan says that we know that it is historical because the New Testament authors "assumed" Genesis to be historical. Well, there you have it, now don't you? Um, Mr. Copan, what exactly made the NT authors experts on what in the OT is "historical," and what is "mythological"? They "assumed" (Copan's word) that Genesis is historical, and that's that?
Copan goes on to discuss the style of writing in Genesis, and concludes, "It seems sensible to consider this passage something other than straightforward historical narrative, though it is historical." What kind of double-talk is this? If it seems "sensible" to consider it other than "straightforward historical narrative," it seems very sensible to consider it not historical at all!
Believe it or not, this chapter actually gets worse! The topic of animal death comes up. Many Christians believe that the Bible indicates that man and the animal kingdom were created herbivorous, and that the fall of man caused the change of creation. Copan disagrees with this theology. He says, "After the flood, Genesis 9:3 affirms that ‘every moving thing that is alive shall be food for you.’ (New American Standard Bible) … Animal death and the food chain are presupposed as part of God's creation--without apology or qualification... ‘Genesis… is not primarily interested in whether people were originally vegetarian but in the fact that God provided them with food.’"
I have a lot of problems with Copan's line of argument here. For one, he selectively quotes Genesis 9:3 NASB, only including part of it. Here is the complete verse:
Copan’s Alternative 1 says that once you make your decision for or against God, your choice is “sealed” and the free will to do evil is taken away. Alternative 1 does to some degree work if God is working towards Goal 2. You make your choice, and then you live with that choice for all eternity. On the other hand, Alternative 1 seems to not be consistent with Goal 1. If there are intrinsic differences between those in heaven and hell, then God presumably wouldn’t need to take away free will. So, here I conclude that Alternative 1 is only compatible with Goal 2. But remember that Goal 2 means that who is saved and who isn’t is random. So this seems to make life a spiritual game of musical chairs, and if, at the moment you die, you are deemed on God’s side, then you go to heaven--otherwise you go to hell. So what was God’s purpose in making people make a choice, other than simply wanting to catch some people out of His favor?
Copan’s Alternative 2 says that God knows who will eventually sin, and who won’t, and the saved are those who won’t. This alternative seems to be completely inconsistent with God’s Goal 2. If there are no intrinsic differences between those who are saved and not saved, there seems to be no reason to believe that the saved would never sin. Now Alternative 2 does seem to be consistent if God’s plan is Goal 1--that is, if there are intrinsic differences between the saved and the unsaved, then maybe they would never sin for all eternity. But if God knows who will sin and who won’t, then why did He bother to create those who will sin? Doesn’t it seem like He must have wanted to create sinful people just so that he could send them to hell? And wait a minute…isn’t everybody a sinner, even the saved? Don’t even the saved occasionally succumb to temptation? Yet in this alternative, Copan has the saved never sinning for all eternity. How could this be possible?
Copan’s Alternative 3 says that God makes heaven so great that nobody would even want to sin; avoiding sin would be a “no-brainer.” My first question is, wouldn’t Eden have been like this? How could Adam and Eve have sinned? Secondly, if God is capable of making an environment--any environment--where avoiding sin is a “no-brainer,” why would He have ever created any environment where sinning is possible? The only conclusion that you can come to here is that if God is capable of creating an environment where nobody would want to sin, but He chose to create environments where people might want to sin, then God must want sin! God seems to have intentionally created Earth to be a place where sinning might happen, for the singular purpose of tripping some people up so that they could be sent to hell! Alternative 3 seems to be so problematic that it couldn’t possibly fulfill either Goal 1 or Goal 2.
Thus, I concede that Alternative 1 at least slightly works in the framework of Goal 2, and that Alternative 2 at least slightly works in the framework of Goal 1. But only slightly. In all three alternatives, and in the context of either salvation goal, God always looks like a villain who just wants to send some people to hell. I'm afraid I must conclude that Copan's "exploratory" answers are unsatisfactory in answering the question raised: how does God allow free will in heaven without allowing sin in heaven? But I suppose some readers may still not be convinced by my arguments so far. Say you still feel that one of these alternatives, or perhaps an unknown alternative, explains how God handles the question of evil vs. free will in heaven. But what about Satan and his fallen angels? If God has any method at all to avoid sin in heaven, then Satan and his dark angels couldn’t have fallen, could they? Doesn’t this prove that God has no method at all of preventing evil in heaven? Aren’t we fully back to square one on the question of evil vs. free will in heaven?
Copan presents a lot of the same ideas that Dr. Moreland does in his defense of hell in Lee Strobel's The Case for Faith. Therefore, I encourage readers here to also read my critique of Moreland. Please follow this link.
Chapter 12: Religion is Nothing More Than the Human Wish for a Father Figure
Following the previous chapter--that in my opinion was one of Copan's worst--is this chapter, which I think was one of his best. (Hey, I do try to be fair, believe it or not...) Even so, I have some disagreements with some of what he says here.
Copan notes that many skeptics claim that religion exists because "people desire some security or hope in an unstable and frightening world." Copan responds, “Is there really anything wrong with desiring security and hope? As an analogy, is there anything wrong with desiring food because it nourishes us?” I agree that this is a fair point.
Copan quotes from C. S. Lewis, who makes some similar claims. He claims that God (perhaps) designed us with a need for God. Therefore, the skeptic can be--in a way--correct; people do need the security of God. The general problem I have with this type of theology is that if God did design us with such a need, then His being so elusive seems cruel. It's like God is holding a bag of candy just out of reach of a child's hands. If He really wants us to want a relationship with Him, then His elusiveness doesn't seem to make sense.
Also, if God made us with a desire to have a relationship with Him, why are there so many religions? Copan briefly mentions this, but says he answers the question in his other book, True for You, but Not for Me. I have not yet read his other book, but I must confess skepticism that he could have answered this question adequately. If the One True God is the Judeo-Christian God, how could someone who was taught, say, Greek mythology, have had a relationship with Him? God created us with a need for Him, and yet most of the people who have ever lived never heard of Him? How does this make any sense?
Copan also notes that even if the reasons people believe in God are fallacious, that, by itself, does not disprove God. Strictly speaking, this is correct. On the other hand, if the reasons people believe in God don’t have an evidential, testable basis, then they aren't much good in validating His existence. People believing in God for fallacious arguments may not disprove God, but fallacious arguments aren't much good for proving He does exist.
Copan says that some skeptics argue that belief in God is rooted in some psychological need for a father figure. Copan says that doesn't make sense considering that most religions don't even have a "father-figure" type of deity. Okay, this may be true. But then, doesn't his argument here add strength to my claim that most people couldn't possibly have a "relationship" with God, if they don't even know who the One True God is? God created us with a need for Him, and then most religions teach about deities completely different than Him? How does this make any sense?
Chapter 13: How Can God be Three and One?
Chapter 14: Isn't the Idea of God Becoming a Man Incoherent?
In these chapters, Copan defends the concept of the Trinity, and the possibility of God becoming man. I don't have any conceptual disagreement with the idea of God, if He exists, having multiple presentations or natures. That's not to say that I actually believe it, I'm just saying that I don't have any conceptual disagreement. Therefore, I don't have anything else to say in response to these topics.
Chapter 15: If Jesus Is God, How Could He Really Be Tempted?
I found this chapter rather humorous. Copan says that because Jesus was God, it is true that He could not sin and could not fall to temptation. But, because Jesus voluntarily put aside his divinity to become man, he did not know that he could not fall to temptation. And therefore the temptation was real. This idea reminded me of the movie Liar, Liar, starring Jim Carey. The character he plays has a spell placed upon him that prevents him from lying, but he does not know or understand that he can't lie. He is frustrated when he finds out that he cannot lie. There is a scene when he simply wants to tell a very small lie; he wants to say that a blue pen is some color other than blue. With typical Carey-style antics, he struggles and fights and just can't say that the pen is anything but blue. So, when I read Copan's theory that Jesus simply didn't know that he couldn't sin, I imagined Jesus attempting to "sin" by saying that a blue pen is red, but just not being able to do it. Hilarious.
Besides, even if Jesus couldn't physically sin, isn't even thinking about sin a sin? I'm referring to the scripture about lusting being the same as committing adultery in your heart. So, if Jesus even thought about sinning, he sinned, right? So doesn't this flatly dispute Copan's theory here?
This theory seems to be "Textbook Example A" of an ad-hoc theory. An "ad-hoc" theory is a theory that is invented to explain away an apparent problem with another theory. But all this ad-hoc theory does is raise more problems. Well, at least this chapter was good for a good belly-laugh...
Chapter 16: The Genesis Creation Account Contradicts Science (Part 1)
When I read Chapter 11 on hell, I thought Copan had hit bottom--that he couldn't get much worse. But I was wrong. This chapter is astoundingly poor. I found myself annoyed with Copan for writing such nonsense.
Okay, so what got my ire up in this chapter? This chapter has two main points. One is to claim that whether the Earth is young or old is immaterial to God's glory. I guess this much I can accept as okay. But let’s continue. He does concede that at least most young-Earth arguments "appear to lack solid scientific support." But, Copan stops short of saying that young-Earth arguments are flat-out wrong. Given that the first part of the book was dedicated to railing against relativism, and insisting upon objective reality, I found his wishy-washy refusal to take a definite stand hypocritical. How can he insist on taking a stand for objective reality, and then say, "Well, um, this doesn't seem to be terribly convincing, but, um, let’s move along now and not worry about it too much"?
Now, is Genesis a historical account of what actually happened during creation, or is it a mythological story? Well, Copan says that we know that it is historical because the New Testament authors "assumed" Genesis to be historical. Well, there you have it, now don't you? Um, Mr. Copan, what exactly made the NT authors experts on what in the OT is "historical," and what is "mythological"? They "assumed" (Copan's word) that Genesis is historical, and that's that?
Copan goes on to discuss the style of writing in Genesis, and concludes, "It seems sensible to consider this passage something other than straightforward historical narrative, though it is historical." What kind of double-talk is this? If it seems "sensible" to consider it other than "straightforward historical narrative," it seems very sensible to consider it not historical at all!
Believe it or not, this chapter actually gets worse! The topic of animal death comes up. Many Christians believe that the Bible indicates that man and the animal kingdom were created herbivorous, and that the fall of man caused the change of creation. Copan disagrees with this theology. He says, "After the flood, Genesis 9:3 affirms that ‘every moving thing that is alive shall be food for you.’ (New American Standard Bible) … Animal death and the food chain are presupposed as part of God's creation--without apology or qualification... ‘Genesis… is not primarily interested in whether people were originally vegetarian but in the fact that God provided them with food.’"
I have a lot of problems with Copan's line of argument here. For one, he selectively quotes Genesis 9:3 NASB, only including part of it. Here is the complete verse:
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"Every moving thing that is alive shall be food for you; I give all to you, as I gave the green plant." (Genesis 9:3 NASB)
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Now why, exactly, did Copan only quote part of the verse? Could it be because, had he quoted the entire verse, it would have shown that he is completely wrong? Nah, that couldn't be it, now could it? I happen to like the NIV version even better, so I'll quote it. Genesis 1:
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29 Then God said, "I give you every seed-bearing plant on the face of the whole Earth and every tree that has fruit with seed in it. They will be yours for food. 30 And to all the beasts of the Earth and all the birds of the air and all the creatures that move on the ground--everything that has the breath of life in it--I give every green plant for food." And it was so. (Genesis 1:29-30 NIV)
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Genesis 1 is very specific about “fruit with seed” and “green plant.” I can see no justification for Copan’s claims that it might not really mean just plants. And now Genesis 9:
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3 Everything that lives and moves will be food for you. Just as I gave you the green plants, I now give you everything. 4 "But you must not eat meat that has its lifeblood still in it." (Genesis 9:3-4 NIV)
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This reveals several things. First, this seems to be final confirmation that Genesis 1 does, indeed, mean only plants, not that there really was any room for doubt before. Second, it confirms that meat consumption is, indeed, new. Again, I find no justification for Copan’s claims of ambiguity. I believe we can safely throw out Copan’s theology here as complete garbage. But there is something else here--immediately after giving man the right to eat meat, God says to not eat meat with blood in it. Why, if God doesn’t care one whit about whether you eat animals or not, would He make this rule? Now, if in fact it is not really what God wanted, then perhaps this restriction makes sense. I’m going to quote from The Jewish Dietary Laws, Their Meaning for Our Time, Revised and Expanded Edition[1].
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Adam is forbidden meat; Noah is permitted it. Why? What took place between the time of Adam and Noah to bring about this change? The answer is simple: sin. The law for Adam and the law for Noah both represent man: Adam and the garden of Eden in his ideal state; Noah outside the garden of Eden in his real state. Adam was not satisfied to live in the paradisal society. He rebelled against God and turned away from him. He wanted the flesh of living creatures for his food and was prepared to kill to obtain it. And so it was with his descendants. Man ideally should not eat meat, for to eat meat a life must be taken, an animal must be put to death. But man will eat meat.
The permission to eat meat is thus seen to be a compromise, a divine concession to human weakness and human need. The Torah, as it were says: 'I would prefer that you abstain from eating meat altogether, that you subsist on that which springs forth from the Earth, for to eat meat the life of an animal must be taken, and that is a fearful act. But since you are not perfect.... since your desires cannot be stopped nor your nutritional requirements altered, they must at least be controlled; since you will eat meat and since, perhaps you need to eat meat, you may eat it, but with one restriction that you have reverence for the life you take. |
I admit to having an ulterior motive to this bringing up this line of thought, and that is I’m a vegetarian, and it really pisses me off that many theists justify the torture of animals in factory farms because their God said it is okay. I don’t really mind if someone wants to be a theist, but when they use their theism to justify such insane cruelty, I’ve got a problem with that. But to move on, the material quoted is further evidence for my contention that the Bible does, indeed, say that man and all the animal creatures were created herbivorous. A simple reading of Genesis shows that this is true, and Copan is just trying to weasel out of it. He even had to resort to quoting part of a verse in order to twist it to say exactly the opposite of what it actually says! Intellectual integrity, my eye...
But wait, there's even more nonsense to come! (Copan really pulled out the stops in this chapter!) Though he denies that animal death was caused by the fall, he says that the fall did bring in human death:
But wait, there's even more nonsense to come! (Copan really pulled out the stops in this chapter!) Though he denies that animal death was caused by the fall, he says that the fall did bring in human death:
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However, the fall of Adam did usher in human death, which Romans 5:12 affirms. And while the paleographical/geological evidence bears out that carnivorous animals--not to mention thorns and thistles or Earthquakes and hurricanes--existed before the fall, it was only after the fall that human beings became vulnerable to and endangered by them.
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So, an Earthquake comes along (prior to the fall) and Adam bounces around inside the fissure, whilst the cow next to him gets sliced into a bloody pulp? Everything except humans can die? But, when man falls, God chooses as punishment to make man exactly like the rest of the animal kingdom, as far as vulnerability to physical pain and injury? I’ve seen some rather jackass attempts at trying to reconcile reality with scripture, but this is one really takes the cake!
So, there you have it. This was one of the worst chapters of any book I've ever read.
Chapter 17: The Genesis Creation Account Contradicts Science (Part 2)
I'm not sure why this was a separate chapter from 16; it covers basically the same ground. However, this chapter does seem to more strongly assert an old-Earth view. Even so, he again falls short of saying for certain. He concludes, "Recent-Earth Creationism may be one permissible reading of Genesis, but it is not the only one." In other words, he still avoids saying for certain. Where's your "objective reality," Mr. Copan?
Copan also references Dr. Hugh Ross. I've also read some of Ross' books. Dr. Hugh Ross is a physicist who is a complete believer in the universe being 15 billion years old, Earth being 4.5 billion years old, and most other current scientific theories—except, of course, evolution. He is a “Progressive Creationist,” which means that he believes that God came around every few million years and created new life forms. His theories are probably the best attempt at reconciling the Big Bang and Genesis, that I know of, anyway. But to do so, he needs to contort Genesis, as shown by the young-Earth organization Answers in Genesis. Here is what they have to say about Dr. Ross’ theories:
So, there you have it. This was one of the worst chapters of any book I've ever read.
Chapter 17: The Genesis Creation Account Contradicts Science (Part 2)
I'm not sure why this was a separate chapter from 16; it covers basically the same ground. However, this chapter does seem to more strongly assert an old-Earth view. Even so, he again falls short of saying for certain. He concludes, "Recent-Earth Creationism may be one permissible reading of Genesis, but it is not the only one." In other words, he still avoids saying for certain. Where's your "objective reality," Mr. Copan?
Copan also references Dr. Hugh Ross. I've also read some of Ross' books. Dr. Hugh Ross is a physicist who is a complete believer in the universe being 15 billion years old, Earth being 4.5 billion years old, and most other current scientific theories—except, of course, evolution. He is a “Progressive Creationist,” which means that he believes that God came around every few million years and created new life forms. His theories are probably the best attempt at reconciling the Big Bang and Genesis, that I know of, anyway. But to do so, he needs to contort Genesis, as shown by the young-Earth organization Answers in Genesis. Here is what they have to say about Dr. Ross’ theories:
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http://www.trueorigins.org/hughross02.asp
Another major problem is that the ordering of the events of Genesis does not even agree with the pronouncements of modern science, with which day-age theorists are so eager to harmonize. To answer this difficulty, Ross appeals to overlapping days. For instance, the creation of plants was on the third day, before the creation of animals on days five and six. But the plants that are specifically mentioned as being created on day three are flowering plants, plants that according to most scientists appeared very recently. This would seem to place these plants during day six when creeping things were created. Ross explains this by claiming that it is the first appearance of plants that is important, hence their mention so early on day three. On the other hand, Ross claims that birds and fish are mentioned on day five, despite the fact that this makes no sense in terms of the usual order that modern science claims. Does Ross reject modern science on this? No, he argues that day five overlaps partly with days three and four, and probably six as well. It is interesting that the details of Ross’s teaching on this are not found in references 2-5. His latest book contains some details, but the greatest details are found in his audio tapes and pamphlets, which enjoy far less circulation and publicity than his books. Ross repeatedly shuffles the events of creation to claim that those events that occurred on different days did not, while those events that occurred on the same day actually happened at different times. Under such contrived rules of interpretation the motif of a six-day creation, if you will, begins to collapse. What would have happened to the ancient Hebrews if they would have applied this reasoning to their week (Exodus 20:8-11)? They could have concluded that if they rested during some of the first six days of the week, then they could have worked on the Sabbath. After all, the Lord had overlapped his actions during the days of the creation week, so why could not they? It is obvious that such an attitude would have been an affront to the Lord of Creation. In like fashion, so is Ross’s ‘overlapping days’ notion. * (see footnote) |
The point of my quoting from AIG is to show that reconciling Genesis with an old Earth is, indeed, problematic. Of course, Copan doesn't bother to tell his reader of some of these little "detail" problems with Ross' arguments.
Chapter 18: How Could a Loving God Command Genocide
Here Copan gives many of the standard arguments. He says that those people that God commanded to be killed were really bad people. My first question is, what did God do to help the Canaanites become a better society? The Bible seems to show God actively working to help the Israelites, but just ignoring everybody else until He is sufficiently pissed off at them that He decides to wipe them out. If this isn't an accurate portrayal, why didn't God tell us all the great things He did to try to help the Canaanites?
The next question is, why is an Almighty God so limited that He can't think of better solutions than genocide? One wouldn't think omnipotence would be so limited. How about a one-way force field in the Promised Land, that keeps out anybody God doesn't like, but doesn't impede his precious Israelites?
Or, if God really wanted the Canaanites dead, why didn't He do the dirty work Himself--have them all fall over dead? Here, we seem to have God--instead of helping the Canaanites--just leaving them to their own devices. And He leaves the situation like this until He is just too pissed off. Then, rather than solve His own problem, He has to order the Israelites to do His own dirty work of exterminating His own mistakes! Surely some of God's precious Israelites must have been killed in battle. If He's so enamored with them, why risk their lives?
As far as the children being killed, Copan says that it was actually good for the children--they would go to heaven because of the Age of Accountability. Lee Strobel also made use of this doctrine. In my critique of his book, I discussed it at some length. Since what I wrote in that critique I believe applies equally well to Copan, I have decided to simply quote myself on this topic:
Chapter 18: How Could a Loving God Command Genocide
Here Copan gives many of the standard arguments. He says that those people that God commanded to be killed were really bad people. My first question is, what did God do to help the Canaanites become a better society? The Bible seems to show God actively working to help the Israelites, but just ignoring everybody else until He is sufficiently pissed off at them that He decides to wipe them out. If this isn't an accurate portrayal, why didn't God tell us all the great things He did to try to help the Canaanites?
The next question is, why is an Almighty God so limited that He can't think of better solutions than genocide? One wouldn't think omnipotence would be so limited. How about a one-way force field in the Promised Land, that keeps out anybody God doesn't like, but doesn't impede his precious Israelites?
Or, if God really wanted the Canaanites dead, why didn't He do the dirty work Himself--have them all fall over dead? Here, we seem to have God--instead of helping the Canaanites--just leaving them to their own devices. And He leaves the situation like this until He is just too pissed off. Then, rather than solve His own problem, He has to order the Israelites to do His own dirty work of exterminating His own mistakes! Surely some of God's precious Israelites must have been killed in battle. If He's so enamored with them, why risk their lives?
As far as the children being killed, Copan says that it was actually good for the children--they would go to heaven because of the Age of Accountability. Lee Strobel also made use of this doctrine. In my critique of his book, I discussed it at some length. Since what I wrote in that critique I believe applies equally well to Copan, I have decided to simply quote myself on this topic:
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I have many questions about the "age of accountability" doctrine. First of all, when exactly does one reach the age of accountability? I've never heard a very satisfactory answer to this. The only answers I've heard say something like, "It differs for every individual and God knows when you are old enough to decide your fate." Let's take an average 18-year-old. Has the average 18-year-old passed the age of accountability? When I was in high school, I can remember knowing a lot of people who had strong religious conviction. I knew some strong Christians. I knew some strong atheists. Therefore, I think that probably Christians would say, yes, an average 18-year-old has passed the age of accountability. But now, for readers who are in their 30's or 40's or later, think back to when you were 18. Did you do some things that today you realize were just boneheaded? Were you really mature enough to make decisions that were to apply for all eternity? Does the day that one can say, "I am completely mature," ever really come? Isn't maturation a gradual, lifelong process? Isn't this entire concept of people one day being too immature and the next day--shazam!--being all grown up, ready to decide their eternal fate, anachronistic?
And, if killing a child can, in any circumstance, be better than letting the child live, what does that say about the value of life on Earth? Christians frequently claim that atheism degrades the value of human life. But isn't this theology doing exactly that? Isn't it saying that the children were better off having no life on Earth because they will have a better life in heaven? And if so, wouldn't this be true of everybody--wouldn't everybody be better off having no life on Earth and just having a life in heaven? So is it not true that Christianity in fact devalues life on Earth? I was glad to see Strobel ask, "If ultimately it was best for those children to die before the age of accountability because they would go to heaven, why can't the same be said about unborn children who are aborted today?" I was very happy to see the question asked, as I've asked it myself many times. Geisler's response is, "First, God doesn't command anyone today to have an abortion; in fact, it's contrary to the teachings of the bible. Remember, he's the only one who can decide to take a life, because he's the ultimate author of life. Second, today we don't have a culture that's as thoroughly corrupt as the Amalekite society. In that society, there was no hope; today, there is hope." I do not find Geisler's response satisfactory. Regardless of whether or not God commands abortion, according to Geisler's stated theology, aborted children do go to heaven. Period. Then how could it possibly be a "bad" thing for an abortion doctor to send children to heaven? If an abortion doctor could stand before God and say, "Everybody I aborted is in heaven, right? And if I didn't do it, some of them would be in hell, right? So, now explain to me exactly what it is that I did wrong?" How could God answer this doctor? And I have to ask one more question. Presumably, X percent of people go to heaven, and Y percent go to hell, where both X and Y are greater than 0 and less than 100. As long as Y is greater than 0, the moment a person reaches the age of accountability, they have just lost Y percent chance of going to heaven. Of what possible value is living beyond the age of accountability? Of what use is life on Earth, if all it means is just a possible chance to throw away salvation? In my own personal case, as can be seen, I find it impossible to have faith in a God who chooses such a bizarre method of choosing who goes to heaven and who goes to hell. But if it turns out, in fact, that these are God's rules--whether I like it or not--and God decides to send me to hell for not liking His rules, then clearly I would have been better off dying before I had the chance to conclude that His rules are inane. I'd like to bring up another example that is similar to the abortion issue. I happen to live in Houston, and grew up just two blocks from Andrea Yates, the Houston mother who drowned her five children. Her explanation for her actions was that she wanted to ensure that her children would go to heaven. Presumably, she wanted to kill them before they reached the age of accountability. I believe that she even said that she was willing to go to hell for her actions, that it was a price she was willing to pay. I'm reminded of the sacrifice of Jesus, who went to hell to save mankind from hell. So I ask Christians, did Ms. Yates send her children to heaven? And if so, why was what she did wrong? Several Christians have responded to my challenge in the previous paragraph by saying that the reason that what abortion doctors and Ms. Yates have done is wrong is because only God is allowed to take a life. Geisler also expressed a similar sentiment. He said, "People assume that what's wrong for us, is wrong for God [...] God is sovereign over all of life, and he has the right to take it if he wishes. In fact, we tend to forget that God takes the life of every human being. It's called death. The only question is when, and how, which we have to leave up to him." To this, I would repeat my earlier question: why can't God take out the bad guys Himself? Why does He have to order slaughter? |
In conclusion, I find the arguments in this chapter to be woefully inadequate to answer the questions raised.
Chapter 19: Doesn't the Bible Condone Slavery?
Here, Copan says that the slavery practiced at the time was not anywhere near the horrific practice in the U.S. South. For example, he claims that slaves had some level of rights, etc. Also, he says that since slavery was so widely practiced at the time, instantly eliminating it wasn't practical. I guess the only question I have here is, where was God when the practice of slavery was growing? Why didn't He do something to stop it then?
Chapter 20: The Gospels Contradict Each Other
Copan seems to not believe in Biblical Inerrancy. He says, "The Christian believes that the Bible, though divinely inspired, was also written by humans." And he also says, "Even if the New Testament writers actually contradict one another regarding secondary historical details, this does not undermine their general historical reliability." My first complaint would be that he seems to speak as if he is talking for all Christians, when, clearly, he is not. There are Christians who believe that the Bible is completely without error, by God's will. So I feel that it is erroneous of Copan to speak as if he is speaking for all Christians.
The next point is, if the Gospels are simply works written by men, and, therefore, might not be completely accurate, why is it so terrible of a skeptic to doubt that some of the events, like being raised from the dead, are true? The Bible shows that even people who were there, like Doubting Thomas, had doubts that Jesus was really raised from the dead. Yet there is something "wrong" with me for thinking, "Hey, if these works were written by men, maybe they aren't completely accurate?" This is absurd.
I'm not really qualified to rigorously defend Earl Doherty's theory that the Gospels were possibly originally intended as merely allegorical stories. But I can say that his theory makes sense to me, and seems to fit quite nicely with the ideas Copan expresses here. For example, Copan notes that each of the Gospel writers had different audiences, and, therefore, they may have taken some liberties with the exact wordings of Jesus in order to best address Jesus' ideas to their audience. Well, were they writing a history or a story? People writing histories shouldn't take liberties, should they? If you are writing a story, then, of course, you can take liberties. Copan seems to be doing a nice job of defending Doherty without my help.
Also, if you don't assume that the Gospels are supposed to be true, don't they sound like allegorical stories, like a C. S. Lewis story? The Gospels are told without a perspective. There is no indication of what witnesses saw what. Nor who was interviewed in the process of piecing together the events that were being reported. There is nothing along the lines of, "John was near Jesus and heard him say…" And, some of the events, such as what Jesus prayed when he was alone, should have had no witnesses at all. It really seems to me that if you look at the Gospels without assuming that they were intended to be taken factually, they do, indeed, seem to look more like fictional writings.
Some people have responded to my claims here about the style of writing in the Gospels by saying that I'm imposing modern ideas of historical presentation on them. They then claim that the people of the time didn't have the same kind of formality in historical presentations as we do today. So, the people of the time didn't have the same formal standards of history as we do today--but, I still have to believe that the Gospels are, in fact, historically accurate in the major points, such as Jesus being raised from the dead, or I'm some bad guy deserving to go to hell? I'm sorry, but that is just preposterous. It is just double-talk to make excuses for divergence of the Gospels, while insisting that they are to be taken as proof of supernatural events!
Chapter 21: Old Testament "Prophecies" are Taken out of Context in the New Testament
This chapter seems to be more-or-less a continuation of the previous chapter, continuing on with more double-talk. Copan says--in not quite so many words--but essentially says, "When things look like they are taken out of context, don't worry about it, that's just the way scripture was interpreted back then." Oh, that explains it. But it is still factual, and if I don't believe it I'm a bad guy?
I found it interesting that Copan notes that there were several modes of interpretation of Old Testament scriptures in use at the time: literal, midrash, pesher, and allegorical. I found this of interest because I first heard of the term "midrash" from Earl Doherty's book, The Jesus Puzzle. However, Doherty uses a different definition of midrash than Copan. Doherty defines midrash as being very similar to allegorical, taking themes from the Old Testament and casting them into what was for them a modern setting.
Again, I'm not an expert, but it seems that Copan inadvertently argues in favor of Doherty's theory. Doherty argues that the Gospels are likely midrash, simply stories written to bring OT themes to a new audience.
I'm no expert on the era--so I have to admit that I am not in a position to be able to rigorously defend Doherty's theories. All I can say is, at least to me, Copan's writings in these last two chapters seem to make much more sense in Doherty's framework than in Copan's own. I'm not willing to personally state certainty for or against Doherty's theory, but it sure seems to makes sense.
Conclusion:
My conclusion is short and simple: Copan's book had a few interesting points here and there, but, for the most part, it was not too impressive—and sometimes it was downright abysmal.
Footnote: I have had some e-mail discussions with Mr. Copan. He was cordial in his e-mails. He indicates that while he agrees with Ross on some subjects (such as Ross' basic claim that Genesis shouldn't be taken as meaning literal 24-hour days), he also disagrees with Ross's theology as articulated in his book Beyond the Cosmos (for a sample critique, see http://www.ldolphin.org/craig/). Where Answers in Genesis might disagree with Ross about his theology, Copan might also disagree. Even so, I feel it worth using the AiG information to help show that the Bible really does teach a young Earth, as AiG claims, and Ross and Copan deny.
References:
[1] Dresner, Samuel H.; Siegel, Seymour; Pollock, David M. The Jewish Dietary Laws, Their Meaning for Our Time, Revised and Expanded Edition. The Rabbinical Assembly, United Synagogue Commission on Jewish Education ISBN 0-8381-2105-5:
Chapter 19: Doesn't the Bible Condone Slavery?
Here, Copan says that the slavery practiced at the time was not anywhere near the horrific practice in the U.S. South. For example, he claims that slaves had some level of rights, etc. Also, he says that since slavery was so widely practiced at the time, instantly eliminating it wasn't practical. I guess the only question I have here is, where was God when the practice of slavery was growing? Why didn't He do something to stop it then?
Chapter 20: The Gospels Contradict Each Other
Copan seems to not believe in Biblical Inerrancy. He says, "The Christian believes that the Bible, though divinely inspired, was also written by humans." And he also says, "Even if the New Testament writers actually contradict one another regarding secondary historical details, this does not undermine their general historical reliability." My first complaint would be that he seems to speak as if he is talking for all Christians, when, clearly, he is not. There are Christians who believe that the Bible is completely without error, by God's will. So I feel that it is erroneous of Copan to speak as if he is speaking for all Christians.
The next point is, if the Gospels are simply works written by men, and, therefore, might not be completely accurate, why is it so terrible of a skeptic to doubt that some of the events, like being raised from the dead, are true? The Bible shows that even people who were there, like Doubting Thomas, had doubts that Jesus was really raised from the dead. Yet there is something "wrong" with me for thinking, "Hey, if these works were written by men, maybe they aren't completely accurate?" This is absurd.
I'm not really qualified to rigorously defend Earl Doherty's theory that the Gospels were possibly originally intended as merely allegorical stories. But I can say that his theory makes sense to me, and seems to fit quite nicely with the ideas Copan expresses here. For example, Copan notes that each of the Gospel writers had different audiences, and, therefore, they may have taken some liberties with the exact wordings of Jesus in order to best address Jesus' ideas to their audience. Well, were they writing a history or a story? People writing histories shouldn't take liberties, should they? If you are writing a story, then, of course, you can take liberties. Copan seems to be doing a nice job of defending Doherty without my help.
Also, if you don't assume that the Gospels are supposed to be true, don't they sound like allegorical stories, like a C. S. Lewis story? The Gospels are told without a perspective. There is no indication of what witnesses saw what. Nor who was interviewed in the process of piecing together the events that were being reported. There is nothing along the lines of, "John was near Jesus and heard him say…" And, some of the events, such as what Jesus prayed when he was alone, should have had no witnesses at all. It really seems to me that if you look at the Gospels without assuming that they were intended to be taken factually, they do, indeed, seem to look more like fictional writings.
Some people have responded to my claims here about the style of writing in the Gospels by saying that I'm imposing modern ideas of historical presentation on them. They then claim that the people of the time didn't have the same kind of formality in historical presentations as we do today. So, the people of the time didn't have the same formal standards of history as we do today--but, I still have to believe that the Gospels are, in fact, historically accurate in the major points, such as Jesus being raised from the dead, or I'm some bad guy deserving to go to hell? I'm sorry, but that is just preposterous. It is just double-talk to make excuses for divergence of the Gospels, while insisting that they are to be taken as proof of supernatural events!
Chapter 21: Old Testament "Prophecies" are Taken out of Context in the New Testament
This chapter seems to be more-or-less a continuation of the previous chapter, continuing on with more double-talk. Copan says--in not quite so many words--but essentially says, "When things look like they are taken out of context, don't worry about it, that's just the way scripture was interpreted back then." Oh, that explains it. But it is still factual, and if I don't believe it I'm a bad guy?
I found it interesting that Copan notes that there were several modes of interpretation of Old Testament scriptures in use at the time: literal, midrash, pesher, and allegorical. I found this of interest because I first heard of the term "midrash" from Earl Doherty's book, The Jesus Puzzle. However, Doherty uses a different definition of midrash than Copan. Doherty defines midrash as being very similar to allegorical, taking themes from the Old Testament and casting them into what was for them a modern setting.
Again, I'm not an expert, but it seems that Copan inadvertently argues in favor of Doherty's theory. Doherty argues that the Gospels are likely midrash, simply stories written to bring OT themes to a new audience.
I'm no expert on the era--so I have to admit that I am not in a position to be able to rigorously defend Doherty's theories. All I can say is, at least to me, Copan's writings in these last two chapters seem to make much more sense in Doherty's framework than in Copan's own. I'm not willing to personally state certainty for or against Doherty's theory, but it sure seems to makes sense.
Conclusion:
My conclusion is short and simple: Copan's book had a few interesting points here and there, but, for the most part, it was not too impressive—and sometimes it was downright abysmal.
Footnote: I have had some e-mail discussions with Mr. Copan. He was cordial in his e-mails. He indicates that while he agrees with Ross on some subjects (such as Ross' basic claim that Genesis shouldn't be taken as meaning literal 24-hour days), he also disagrees with Ross's theology as articulated in his book Beyond the Cosmos (for a sample critique, see http://www.ldolphin.org/craig/). Where Answers in Genesis might disagree with Ross about his theology, Copan might also disagree. Even so, I feel it worth using the AiG information to help show that the Bible really does teach a young Earth, as AiG claims, and Ross and Copan deny.
References:
[1] Dresner, Samuel H.; Siegel, Seymour; Pollock, David M. The Jewish Dietary Laws, Their Meaning for Our Time, Revised and Expanded Edition. The Rabbinical Assembly, United Synagogue Commission on Jewish Education ISBN 0-8381-2105-5:
