Janssen Debate - Round 2
Part 2: by Wes Janssen
Dear Paul,
Yes, I have seen your rebuttal. The problem for me consists in wanting to respond in a manner that is as gentle as is possible while pointing out that many of your arguments are somewhat reckless. Your assault on probability theory is passionate but wanting in terms of mathematics. I will say that there is no hope for your "1 in 1" chance of winning the lottery. More on that in a moment. The general tone of your rebuttal was coarse; you have chosen to employ slogans (your "astonishment index"), cliches ("lies, damn lies, and statistics"), straw men, labels, and thinly veiled insults ("virtually 100% of the time, an argument from probability is really an argument from ignorance"). Not that I have insurmountable difficulty in admitting my ignorance. In fact, I haven't seen very many arguments that were ignorance-free. I will try to comment here positively as I can.
Some of your comments indicate that you resist the idea that given language or terminology can be expected to have given definitions. But definitions are necessary if language is to be a useful tool. I will here use the term "by definition" to indicate that the language used has well defined meaning(s). If we recast terms to mean whatever we want them to mean, then all is poetry, at best, and discussions such as these become incoherent blustering. For example, "atheism" -- by definition -- means belief that God does not exist. I'm not making this up; "a-" is a prefix, in this case indicating that the word it begins is an antonym to that portion of the word that follows. Looking first at your question/statement, "How is God able to create universes? The theist has no answer", I will state that the only possible answer is this: by definition. The God of monotheism must have certain well-defined characteristics, without which the general concept of "God" becomes incoherent, not only to agnostics like yourself, but to theists as well. Among these characteristics, a coherent conception of God requires that he is -- by definition -- omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, pre-existent to space-time and matter, the First Cause, etc, etc. This definition has nothing to do with whether or not you believe that God exists. I don't need to believe that unicorns exists to accept that, by definition, unicorns have a single horn, even if only in children's stories (unicorns often show up in these discussions, so why not here?). Cynics like to recast 'God' as being something other than what he is by definition, but reaching for a convenient re-definition is what philosophers call a straw man and can be nothing more than an argument against one's own contrivance. Omnipotent -- by definition -- means all-powerful ('omni' - all, 'potent' - powerful), omniscient -- by definition -- means all-knowing. First Cause -- by definition -- refers to the ultimate cause of causality itself. Thus, BY DEFINITION, God is "able to create universes." Before you reach for your "red flag" I must point out that perhaps everything we "know" we know essentially by definition. How do we "know" that space-time is the type of continuum described by Einstein's general relativity? We "know" this only because of its coherence as a definition, after all we can't exactly test the theory in a region 20 billion light years distant (and even our local calculations are possible only by definition). If, in an attempt to refute the claims of general relativity, I put forward my own, less coherent, definition of it, then my rebuttal is mere 'straw,' a convenient deception. The integrity of definitions is of singular importance. As any student of philosophy can tell you, we must accept the existence of our very own minds, and of other minds, ultimately -- by definition. (This is a vast philosophical discussion we needn't consider here. If you're interested, Descartes is the obvious place to start.)
Looking now at your curious "astonishment index" and its appeal to infinite regress. God, again, by definition, is the most "astonishing" entity possible. God's works, by definition, must be astonishing, and yet less so than he himself. An appeal to infinite regress is logically dubious in that it is a dogmatic position that there can exist no ultimate explanation, thus it embraces ignorance in a manner that is not logically required. An ultimate Cause seems like a thoroughly reasonable expectation. Most western philosophers throughout history have thought it more reasonable than the doctrine of infinite regress. An appeal to infinite regress contains an awkward and difficult to defend understanding of "time". An appeal to infinite regress also seems to run contrary to the scientific principle of economy. As does the 'infinite universes' idea which seems to intrigue you. In your discussion of the possibility of other, perhaps even infinite, universes, you have grossly misstated the position of most theists. Yes, the 'infinite universes' idea has been offered as a supposed explanation for the fine-tuning of our universe. It is supposed to be an alternative explanation to Intelligent Design, but as an "explanation" it completely fails. Leibniz' question, "why is there something, rather than nothing," remains unanswered without a First Cause. You are quite wrong to state that theists have some kind of ideological/religious problem with this idea. It is quite impossible to see what about this idea could be any kind of threat to theism. The only universe we can consider scientifically, we now know to have been caused. We can offer no basis on which other universes could escape need of causation. If one universe prompts the implication of a First Cause, then infinite universes prompt infinite implications of a First Cause. An appeal to infinite universes must then be an appeal to infinite need of explanation. It sounds more like an argument for the existence of God than one against. I myself can say that I have heard clerics of various denominations speak of the possibility of other universes. It is not an idea that brings any discomfort to theism. I personally do object to the "infinite universes" proposal on strictly scientific grounds (as, I believe, do most theoretical physicists). Being an unnecessary appeal to infinite unknowables it is the ultimate violation of the principle of economy (Okkam's Razor, as it is often called).
Looking now at your construct of Probability Theory, your statement that "probability tells us nothing," and your "1 in 1" probability of winning the lottery. If "probability tells us nothing" I can assure you that this will come as a horrible surprise to casino operators in Las Vegas and Atlantic City who make a great deal of money on a certainty that probability does mean something very real. It will confound and embarrass mathematicians and operators of state-run lotteries, while placing many thousands of advertisers, scientists, and economic analysts in unemployment offices. Your version of a lottery (as you have stated it at least) conforms to the idea of a raffle, a game purposely designed to assure that there will be one and only one "winner". (If purchasing a million tickets brings you a "1 in 1" probability, then ticket numbers cannot be randomly generated, each number within the 1-1m set must be used once and only once.) If your construct of a "lottery" intends to refute purpose and design then it surely fails. Within your million-ticket raffle I can indeed calculate the probability of your winning without needing to know how many tickets you purchased. The mathematics is simple and applies without variation to all players (x over one million). By design, somebody is going to "win". Yes, if you purposely purchase all tickets it will be you. Note the words "design" and "purposely". It's kind of like the Huxley-Dawkins typing monkeys, an analogy employing design, will, and purpose is claimed to refute design, will, and purpose. There is no hope for positioning one's self to "win" the kind of chance game that lottery players actually play. It is with some irony that I read your words, "I think he is misusing math." When we consider the precision of the Big Bang, the precise values of nature's forces and particle properties, of the implications of Grand Unification Theory, of the parameters for nuclear synthesis within stars, the values demanded for the existence of carbon, for the properties of water, for the existence of life, and so forth, it is apparent that you are not merely arguing that it is inevitable that the lottery will be won, you are actually arguing that the same player will win over and over. Will win an inconceivably great number of times, and always against odds far, far greater than your raffle or any state lottery. And always you must argue that the deck was not stacked, so to speak, because you don't like questions as to who stacked the deck and why. If you win the California State Lottery this week and again next, will you receive your "winnings"? How about if you win a third time? An 78,947,632nd time? I very much doubt you will receive the second pay-out. You will not receive the third. No arbitrator, no judge, no jury will order your "winnings" paid. No one will disbelieve that the "deck was stacked." It will be all too obvious. Much of your rebuttal is actually a Mr. Crawford's comments on Michael Behe's book. I cannot so much speak to this because the quotations you cite are not within context. As one who reads a lot of science books, I will only say that the analogy cited (Irish Sweepstakes) is simply the kind of analogy that science writers often employ to help readers appreciate the nature of large numbers. To characterize the analogy as being misleading may itself be misleading.
As to Mr. Crawford's comments about the "Cambrian explosion" (something that I did mention), I again believe that it may be his comments that are misleading. The Cambrian stratum is said to contain the fossil history of something in the order of 20-32 million years (somewhere within a geological window of 40-80 million years). But the "explosion" in the Cambrian is reflected essentially in a division of the lower Cambrian called the Tommotian, a period of time said to be in the order of 5 million years, perhaps less. If, as I believe you (or actually Mr Crawford) indicate, Behe referred to this 'explosion' as having occurred over 10 million years, then I think that he has surely given Mr Crawford's position the benefit of the doubt, so to speak. Many, perhaps most, would find Mr Crawford's desire to extrapolate this interval to 20 million or even 250 million years to be misleading or worse. For my part (I didn't cite Behe), I simply characterized this explosion as "a tiny blip of 'evolutionary time'". I think it is a fair characterization. If we propose 'evolutionary time' as encompassing the past 4 billion years, as is generally done, then any and all of the values mentioned must be seen as "a tiny blip of 'evolutionary time'. All blustering and posturing aside, we're talking about thousandths of one percent:
5,000,000 is 0.00125 percent of 4,000,000,000.
10,000,000 is 0.0025 percent of 4,000,000,000.
20,000,000 is 0.0050 percent of 4,000,000,000.
30,000,000 is 0.0075 percent of 4,000,000,000.
250,000,000 is 0.0625 percent of 4,000,000,000.
You have chosen to label me a "Progressive Creationist". I'm not offended, perhaps this is a reasonable conclusion, but I'm not exactly comfortable with these kinds of labels. The label implies specific beliefs, some which I may not accept, some I may neither accept nor reject. I don't know what such labels bring with them in other people's minds. I would say that my understanding of Creation is very much Augustinian, that is, I have no problem admitting that I don't know what I obviously don't know. As a skeptic, a label which I accept (with some caution), I am distrustful of dogmatism. This has become far longer than I had hoped and so I'll only add this. You say, "My 'independence at all cost' motto seems justified." The following sentence reads, "The bottom line is no, I don't think I have any subconscious will to not believe in God." The two stark claims are not compatible. Christ said that a man cannot serve two masters. Individuals who must be "masters of their own universe" as you say, do indeed have a strong precommitment to a master other than God. You say, "I've spent a lot of time trying to believe in God." Perhaps you actually believe it, I'll assume that you do, but the claim sounds strangely disingenuous. An analogy occurs to me that might illustrate what I am trying to say:
I used to run marathons. Not to win of course, but to cover the distance in what I thought was a respectable time. Let's say I entered a race in which the entry form read something to the effect: "This race cannot be 'won' as you have previously conceived of 'winning.' It simply cannot be, no one is fast enough or strong enough or determined enough. The course will be different for each runner, and the finish line must be unknown to all runners. However, every runner can win and received an award far too excellent for the human mind to conceive. There is but one caveat, one codicil. You must enter the race and run it with full acknowledgement that any baggage you carry with you on the course will make staying in the race difficult and may render winning impossible. The more earnestly you grip any baggage, the more difficult the course must be. To the extent you are earnest, you must be earnest in abandoning your baggage."
I say to myself, "wow, this sounds like something I could do. Kind of adventurous even." So I enter and on race day show up ready to go. With my dog. I just love my dog. Weighs only about forty pounds. Well, maybe fifty. Not much more than that though. I'll just carry him if he's too into sniffing fire hydrants and whatnot. The race official who checks me in takes notice of the dog and attempts to instruct me that I am bringing precisely the type of baggage that will insure failure. I angrily reply, "my fondness for my dog is justified, who are you to tell me what to do with my dog? I'll do this my way, thank you." I grip the dog tightly and stubble off to certain defeat at my own hands. Later, somewhere far off the course, I find myself waiting near a fire hydrant. The race official approaches and offers to direct me back to the course and to take the dog off my hands as well. "No," I shoot back, "I tried for a long time to run that race. But the cards are stacked against me, I can't win, and when I loose you just want to kick me off the course and take my dog!" The official replies, "as you wish, master of your own universe," and I again find myself alone with that damn high-maintenance dog, dragging me toward some carrion and then a garbage can. "That race is so bogus," I shout, hoping the official will somehow hear me. "Probably is no finish line, probably no award either," I grumble. "Nope, no such thing."
You characterized my earlier correspondence as "garbage in, garbage out," and perhaps worse. I hope that what I have written here can be received with less anger.
Respectfully, Wes Janssen
Dear Paul,
Yes, I have seen your rebuttal. The problem for me consists in wanting to respond in a manner that is as gentle as is possible while pointing out that many of your arguments are somewhat reckless. Your assault on probability theory is passionate but wanting in terms of mathematics. I will say that there is no hope for your "1 in 1" chance of winning the lottery. More on that in a moment. The general tone of your rebuttal was coarse; you have chosen to employ slogans (your "astonishment index"), cliches ("lies, damn lies, and statistics"), straw men, labels, and thinly veiled insults ("virtually 100% of the time, an argument from probability is really an argument from ignorance"). Not that I have insurmountable difficulty in admitting my ignorance. In fact, I haven't seen very many arguments that were ignorance-free. I will try to comment here positively as I can.
Some of your comments indicate that you resist the idea that given language or terminology can be expected to have given definitions. But definitions are necessary if language is to be a useful tool. I will here use the term "by definition" to indicate that the language used has well defined meaning(s). If we recast terms to mean whatever we want them to mean, then all is poetry, at best, and discussions such as these become incoherent blustering. For example, "atheism" -- by definition -- means belief that God does not exist. I'm not making this up; "a-" is a prefix, in this case indicating that the word it begins is an antonym to that portion of the word that follows. Looking first at your question/statement, "How is God able to create universes? The theist has no answer", I will state that the only possible answer is this: by definition. The God of monotheism must have certain well-defined characteristics, without which the general concept of "God" becomes incoherent, not only to agnostics like yourself, but to theists as well. Among these characteristics, a coherent conception of God requires that he is -- by definition -- omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, pre-existent to space-time and matter, the First Cause, etc, etc. This definition has nothing to do with whether or not you believe that God exists. I don't need to believe that unicorns exists to accept that, by definition, unicorns have a single horn, even if only in children's stories (unicorns often show up in these discussions, so why not here?). Cynics like to recast 'God' as being something other than what he is by definition, but reaching for a convenient re-definition is what philosophers call a straw man and can be nothing more than an argument against one's own contrivance. Omnipotent -- by definition -- means all-powerful ('omni' - all, 'potent' - powerful), omniscient -- by definition -- means all-knowing. First Cause -- by definition -- refers to the ultimate cause of causality itself. Thus, BY DEFINITION, God is "able to create universes." Before you reach for your "red flag" I must point out that perhaps everything we "know" we know essentially by definition. How do we "know" that space-time is the type of continuum described by Einstein's general relativity? We "know" this only because of its coherence as a definition, after all we can't exactly test the theory in a region 20 billion light years distant (and even our local calculations are possible only by definition). If, in an attempt to refute the claims of general relativity, I put forward my own, less coherent, definition of it, then my rebuttal is mere 'straw,' a convenient deception. The integrity of definitions is of singular importance. As any student of philosophy can tell you, we must accept the existence of our very own minds, and of other minds, ultimately -- by definition. (This is a vast philosophical discussion we needn't consider here. If you're interested, Descartes is the obvious place to start.)
Looking now at your curious "astonishment index" and its appeal to infinite regress. God, again, by definition, is the most "astonishing" entity possible. God's works, by definition, must be astonishing, and yet less so than he himself. An appeal to infinite regress is logically dubious in that it is a dogmatic position that there can exist no ultimate explanation, thus it embraces ignorance in a manner that is not logically required. An ultimate Cause seems like a thoroughly reasonable expectation. Most western philosophers throughout history have thought it more reasonable than the doctrine of infinite regress. An appeal to infinite regress contains an awkward and difficult to defend understanding of "time". An appeal to infinite regress also seems to run contrary to the scientific principle of economy. As does the 'infinite universes' idea which seems to intrigue you. In your discussion of the possibility of other, perhaps even infinite, universes, you have grossly misstated the position of most theists. Yes, the 'infinite universes' idea has been offered as a supposed explanation for the fine-tuning of our universe. It is supposed to be an alternative explanation to Intelligent Design, but as an "explanation" it completely fails. Leibniz' question, "why is there something, rather than nothing," remains unanswered without a First Cause. You are quite wrong to state that theists have some kind of ideological/religious problem with this idea. It is quite impossible to see what about this idea could be any kind of threat to theism. The only universe we can consider scientifically, we now know to have been caused. We can offer no basis on which other universes could escape need of causation. If one universe prompts the implication of a First Cause, then infinite universes prompt infinite implications of a First Cause. An appeal to infinite universes must then be an appeal to infinite need of explanation. It sounds more like an argument for the existence of God than one against. I myself can say that I have heard clerics of various denominations speak of the possibility of other universes. It is not an idea that brings any discomfort to theism. I personally do object to the "infinite universes" proposal on strictly scientific grounds (as, I believe, do most theoretical physicists). Being an unnecessary appeal to infinite unknowables it is the ultimate violation of the principle of economy (Okkam's Razor, as it is often called).
Looking now at your construct of Probability Theory, your statement that "probability tells us nothing," and your "1 in 1" probability of winning the lottery. If "probability tells us nothing" I can assure you that this will come as a horrible surprise to casino operators in Las Vegas and Atlantic City who make a great deal of money on a certainty that probability does mean something very real. It will confound and embarrass mathematicians and operators of state-run lotteries, while placing many thousands of advertisers, scientists, and economic analysts in unemployment offices. Your version of a lottery (as you have stated it at least) conforms to the idea of a raffle, a game purposely designed to assure that there will be one and only one "winner". (If purchasing a million tickets brings you a "1 in 1" probability, then ticket numbers cannot be randomly generated, each number within the 1-1m set must be used once and only once.) If your construct of a "lottery" intends to refute purpose and design then it surely fails. Within your million-ticket raffle I can indeed calculate the probability of your winning without needing to know how many tickets you purchased. The mathematics is simple and applies without variation to all players (x over one million). By design, somebody is going to "win". Yes, if you purposely purchase all tickets it will be you. Note the words "design" and "purposely". It's kind of like the Huxley-Dawkins typing monkeys, an analogy employing design, will, and purpose is claimed to refute design, will, and purpose. There is no hope for positioning one's self to "win" the kind of chance game that lottery players actually play. It is with some irony that I read your words, "I think he is misusing math." When we consider the precision of the Big Bang, the precise values of nature's forces and particle properties, of the implications of Grand Unification Theory, of the parameters for nuclear synthesis within stars, the values demanded for the existence of carbon, for the properties of water, for the existence of life, and so forth, it is apparent that you are not merely arguing that it is inevitable that the lottery will be won, you are actually arguing that the same player will win over and over. Will win an inconceivably great number of times, and always against odds far, far greater than your raffle or any state lottery. And always you must argue that the deck was not stacked, so to speak, because you don't like questions as to who stacked the deck and why. If you win the California State Lottery this week and again next, will you receive your "winnings"? How about if you win a third time? An 78,947,632nd time? I very much doubt you will receive the second pay-out. You will not receive the third. No arbitrator, no judge, no jury will order your "winnings" paid. No one will disbelieve that the "deck was stacked." It will be all too obvious. Much of your rebuttal is actually a Mr. Crawford's comments on Michael Behe's book. I cannot so much speak to this because the quotations you cite are not within context. As one who reads a lot of science books, I will only say that the analogy cited (Irish Sweepstakes) is simply the kind of analogy that science writers often employ to help readers appreciate the nature of large numbers. To characterize the analogy as being misleading may itself be misleading.
As to Mr. Crawford's comments about the "Cambrian explosion" (something that I did mention), I again believe that it may be his comments that are misleading. The Cambrian stratum is said to contain the fossil history of something in the order of 20-32 million years (somewhere within a geological window of 40-80 million years). But the "explosion" in the Cambrian is reflected essentially in a division of the lower Cambrian called the Tommotian, a period of time said to be in the order of 5 million years, perhaps less. If, as I believe you (or actually Mr Crawford) indicate, Behe referred to this 'explosion' as having occurred over 10 million years, then I think that he has surely given Mr Crawford's position the benefit of the doubt, so to speak. Many, perhaps most, would find Mr Crawford's desire to extrapolate this interval to 20 million or even 250 million years to be misleading or worse. For my part (I didn't cite Behe), I simply characterized this explosion as "a tiny blip of 'evolutionary time'". I think it is a fair characterization. If we propose 'evolutionary time' as encompassing the past 4 billion years, as is generally done, then any and all of the values mentioned must be seen as "a tiny blip of 'evolutionary time'. All blustering and posturing aside, we're talking about thousandths of one percent:
5,000,000 is 0.00125 percent of 4,000,000,000.
10,000,000 is 0.0025 percent of 4,000,000,000.
20,000,000 is 0.0050 percent of 4,000,000,000.
30,000,000 is 0.0075 percent of 4,000,000,000.
250,000,000 is 0.0625 percent of 4,000,000,000.
You have chosen to label me a "Progressive Creationist". I'm not offended, perhaps this is a reasonable conclusion, but I'm not exactly comfortable with these kinds of labels. The label implies specific beliefs, some which I may not accept, some I may neither accept nor reject. I don't know what such labels bring with them in other people's minds. I would say that my understanding of Creation is very much Augustinian, that is, I have no problem admitting that I don't know what I obviously don't know. As a skeptic, a label which I accept (with some caution), I am distrustful of dogmatism. This has become far longer than I had hoped and so I'll only add this. You say, "My 'independence at all cost' motto seems justified." The following sentence reads, "The bottom line is no, I don't think I have any subconscious will to not believe in God." The two stark claims are not compatible. Christ said that a man cannot serve two masters. Individuals who must be "masters of their own universe" as you say, do indeed have a strong precommitment to a master other than God. You say, "I've spent a lot of time trying to believe in God." Perhaps you actually believe it, I'll assume that you do, but the claim sounds strangely disingenuous. An analogy occurs to me that might illustrate what I am trying to say:
I used to run marathons. Not to win of course, but to cover the distance in what I thought was a respectable time. Let's say I entered a race in which the entry form read something to the effect: "This race cannot be 'won' as you have previously conceived of 'winning.' It simply cannot be, no one is fast enough or strong enough or determined enough. The course will be different for each runner, and the finish line must be unknown to all runners. However, every runner can win and received an award far too excellent for the human mind to conceive. There is but one caveat, one codicil. You must enter the race and run it with full acknowledgement that any baggage you carry with you on the course will make staying in the race difficult and may render winning impossible. The more earnestly you grip any baggage, the more difficult the course must be. To the extent you are earnest, you must be earnest in abandoning your baggage."
I say to myself, "wow, this sounds like something I could do. Kind of adventurous even." So I enter and on race day show up ready to go. With my dog. I just love my dog. Weighs only about forty pounds. Well, maybe fifty. Not much more than that though. I'll just carry him if he's too into sniffing fire hydrants and whatnot. The race official who checks me in takes notice of the dog and attempts to instruct me that I am bringing precisely the type of baggage that will insure failure. I angrily reply, "my fondness for my dog is justified, who are you to tell me what to do with my dog? I'll do this my way, thank you." I grip the dog tightly and stubble off to certain defeat at my own hands. Later, somewhere far off the course, I find myself waiting near a fire hydrant. The race official approaches and offers to direct me back to the course and to take the dog off my hands as well. "No," I shoot back, "I tried for a long time to run that race. But the cards are stacked against me, I can't win, and when I loose you just want to kick me off the course and take my dog!" The official replies, "as you wish, master of your own universe," and I again find myself alone with that damn high-maintenance dog, dragging me toward some carrion and then a garbage can. "That race is so bogus," I shout, hoping the official will somehow hear me. "Probably is no finish line, probably no award either," I grumble. "Nope, no such thing."
You characterized my earlier correspondence as "garbage in, garbage out," and perhaps worse. I hope that what I have written here can be received with less anger.
Respectfully, Wes Janssen
Rebuttal 2: by Paul Jacobsen
First off, I can see from Mr. Janssen's rebuttal that he does indeed understand math better than I originally gave him credit. Mr. Janssen seemed to feel somewhat "attacked" in my last rebuttal. I admit that my style of writing can be coarse at times, but I think he took it a bit too personally. He seemed to feel I expressed "anger" and this is not at all accurate, I was never angry with him. Never-the-less, I apologize for my coarseness. I'll do better this time, I promise!
He spent a bit of time debating the meaning of the word atheism. I went to dictionary.com, and their definition is roughly the same as his. On the other hand, most people that call themselves atheists disagree. They say that the opposite of belief in God is simply the absence of belief in God. But this is what many people call agnosticism. That is one of the reasons I do not call myself an atheist as there is too much confusion as to what it means. I simply consider myself unconvinced of the existence of God, but stop short of saying for certain there is no God. So, I figure "skeptic" or "agnostic" are as good of terms as any to classify myself.
Speaking of classification, Mr. Janssen noted that I "labeled" him as being a "Progressive Creationist". He says he is not fond of such labeling. On one hand, I can agree, and one reason I don't "label" myself an atheist for it implies different things to different people. On the other hand, I think that people tend to be "classification engines," that classifications, even if not always exactly correct, help us to simplify complexity.
Mr. Janssen discusses the definition of God, such as being omnipotent and omniscient. There is a lot of debate as to whether such concepts are even logically consistent. For example, Christian apologist Paul Copan argues that God manifested the universe in which maximum number of people are saved and minimum people are lost. So, that means God created the "best" possible universe in these terms. On one hand, omnipotence should be able to do as Copan says--create the best possible universe. On the other hand, once God manifested any specific universe, shouldn't omnipotence be capable of creating a better one? And, shouldn't omnipotence be capable of creating a "best" universe where infinite people are saved and zero are lost? Though I can't say I have presented something rigorous enough to constitute a "proof", these ideas seem to me to indicate that true infinite power is an incoherent concept. Other authors have explored these ideas in greater detail.
Mr. Janssen made a reference to the principle of economy, and referred to it as "Okkam's Razor". I believe it is spelled "Occam's Razor," at least that is the way I've seen it spelled. (The only reason I point this out, is when I saw his spelling, my first thought was to make sure I haven't been misspelling it as I have referred to Occam's Razor myself.) And Janssen has a valid point. For one, multiple universes are so far unproven. But, Stephen Hawkins is doing some interesting work in this area. I'd recommend his current book, The Universe in a Nutshell. It is true that Occam's Razor says that generally speaking, the simpler solution is preferred. On the other hand, it doesn't say that a more complex answer is for certain wrong. If two possible solutions to a problem are proposed, one complex and one more straightforward, the simpler solution is preferred, but not guaranteed. And should more evidence on the side of the more complex answer arise, then Occam's Razor no longer applies. So, while Occam's Razor is a reasonable guideline, it is just that, a rule-of-thumb. Besides--is postulating a being of infinite power and infinite knowledge really any less of a violation of Occam's Razor than postulating infinite universes? I don't see how. Regardless, given some of the work that Hawkins is doing along these lines, I feel that it isn't completely erroneous to consider the idea of multiple or infinite universes. But the bottom line is I do concede it is only a theory.
However, even if Hawkins theories on this become accepted, I also concede that would not necessarily be detrimental to the theist position. A theist can contend that God created all the universes. So, we get back to (possibly) needing a First Cause, regardless of how many universes there are. The problem I have here is, say there is indeed some "First Cause" of some-sort--is this First Cause a Being? Does the First Cause have the attributes we associate with God--emotions, desires, etc.? My suspicion is that attributing these human attributes to the First Cause is a case of anthropomorphism. Earlier I noted that the very concept of infinite power seems incoherent. But even if I'm wrong, the idea of a being with infinite power and yet have emotions and desires also seems incoherent. Emotions are reactionary. How can a being that knows everything have a reaction? How can a being that knows everything ever be "surprised?" How can a being that knows everything think or learn? How can a being of infinite power and infinite knowledge have desire? These all seem incoherent. The bottom line is, I must confess, I don't know what is "out there" beyond the universe--if anything. In principle, it could be anything--granted, even including God. Its just that the idea of God, at least as most people present Him, seem to not be likely a coherent idea.
By the way, Janssen says, "the only universe we can consider scientifically, we now know to have been caused"--actually, we know it to have a beginning. That is not at all to say we know it to be caused. I know most theists insist these are synonymous. And, I understand they can seem like the are--but they are not. I have a separate paper on this which I would like to recommend to Janssen to read. Please follow this link to my Cosmological Argument paper. The short answer is, "causation" implies time and order. But, time only exists within a universe. So, our understanding of "causation" only applies within our universe. There is no mechanism for rules of causation to "jump" outside our universe.
In my "one in a million" lottery example, Janssen is correct to a degree. If I bought a million tickets, and each one was random, my probability would not be 1 in 1. When I wrote what I wrote, I did consider that my 1 in 1 probability presupposed I would intentionally pick every possible choice. But, if I picked each of the million tickets at random, I would get less than a 1 in 1 probability. To be honest, I did not give Janssen enough credit to know the difference. So, I must admit to being a bit surprised to having been "caught!" :-) But really, I also thought that being completely technically accurate might be "too much information." But, since I was "caught," I'll now be more technically accurate. I believe that if I randomly bought 1,000,000 tickets for a lottery with a probability of 1 in 1,000,000, my probability of winning should be 1 - (0.999999 ** 1000000). I think that is right. My Windows calculator couldn't handle the calculation, but I guess it would come out to roughly a 50% probability.
Also, as Janssen notes, in theory, I could buy billions of tickets, and never win. Its been years since I've taken calculus, but if I remember how limits of equations work, the limit of the function of the probability as number of tickets approaches infinity is 1. Then there is the concept of the expected outcome. If I bought a billion tickets randomly, my expected outcome would be that I would win a thousand times. That doesn't mean I would actually win a thousand times, that is just what would be expected on the average. Then you can put this on a bell curve and calculate the probability of my wins being, say, two standard deviations from the norm. Um, I think this is too much information. Did being technically accurate really affect my point? My point was, that if you don't know how many trials, then you don't know the probability. He said that I my arguments amounted to "blustering and posturing," but after his blustering and posturing, I don't see that he actually refuted--or even addressed--my point.
I said that "probability tells us nothing," to which Janssen replies, "if 'probability tells us nothing' I can assure you that this will come as a horrible surprise to casino operators in Las Vegas and Atlantic City who make a great deal of money on a certainty that probability does mean something very real." I feel that he is quoting me out of context. In my context, I was saying that probability tells us nothing if we have insufficient information to make a valid probability equation. And indeed, if you don't have enough information to make a calculation, then it does indeed tell us nothing. Also, a probability calculation can be 100% correct, yet 100% misleading. Janssen acted as apologist to Behe's probability analogy. I was not impressed. Behe was clearly trying to make the probability of what he was discussing look to be just utterly preposterous. It was a clear case of intent on Behe's part. Janssen's defense that Behe was just trying to help put perspective on large numbers is erroneous--Behe was obviously trying to put a blatantly misleading perspective on his large numbers.
Although Janssen does indeed understand math better than I initially thought, he did make a "schoolboy" error. (This is not an insult--anybody can make "schoolboy" errors occasionally. I simply mean that he made a mistake that once I point it out, he'll likely slap his own forehead or whatever he does when realizing an obvious error...) He was talking about how 5 million years compares to 4 billion years. He says:
"All blustering and posturing aside, we're talking about thousandths of one percent:
5,000,000 is 0.00125 percent of 4,000,000,000.
10,000,000 is 0.0025 percent of 4,000,000,000.
20,000,000 is 0.0050 percent of 4,000,000,000.
30,000,000 is 0.0075 percent of 4,000,000,000.
250,000,000 is 0.0625 percent of 4,000,000,000."
Um, let's carry that calculation out: 4,000,000,000 is 1 percent of 4,000,000,000. Huh??? No, its 100%. Percent is "parts-per-hundred." Why parts-per-hundred is such a ubiquitous unit, I don't know, but it is. Please go back and multiply your percents by 100.
Ergo, 5,000,000 is 0.125 percent of 4,000,000. Yeah, that's still a small fraction, but a tenth of a percent is still a lot more than a thousandth of a percent. I felt that when Janssen criticized my lottery example, he was jumping on a detail rather than the meaning. He might likewise complain here, so now I'll try to focus on the meaning. What might be the meaning of the Cambrian Explosion if the key section of it was only roughly 5 million years as Janssen contends? To be perfectly honest, one reason I relied so heavily on Crawford's critique of Behe is because chemistry and biology are not my fields, and Crawford seemed to know what he was talking about. But I have to confess that he could be completely wrong and I would be too ignorant to know it. So if I say anything at all here, I might only accomplish revealing my ignorance. It seems likely Crawford and Janssen both know more than I do about the Cambrian Explosion. So, can I say anything intelligent on it? Maybe not, but I'll try to make one point...
I quoted Crawford mentioning that part of the explanation of the Cambrian Explosion is thought to be the evolution of the hard exoskeletons. Like I said, I'm not an expert, but I've heard this information from multiple sources and not just from Crawford. Therefore, I suspect that it is probably indeed considered a significant event. I understand that there are two different implications of evolution of the exoskeleton. First, evolution prior to exoskeletons is harder to trace because fossilization was much more difficult without hard exoskeletons. Evolutionary "explosions" could have happened before, but we simply don't have a record. The other, perhaps more important thing about the development of the exoskeleton is that was a new "invention," which could be compared to the discovery and harnessing of electricity in man's technology evolution. We had a technology "explosion" in the past century because the necessary prerequisites such as electricity in most households came first. Designing TV's wasn't practical until after home electricity was commonplace. The way biological evolution works is, if there are a lot of available niches in the ecosystem to fill, then evolution proceeds relatively quickly. If there aren't many open niches, evolution tends to proceed relatively slowly. So, what happened, at least in part, is that there were oodles of niches in the ecosystem just waiting to be filled; waiting for hard exoskeletons to get "invented". Am I qualified to state this? No, I confess I'm just parroting what I have read. It does seem to be a reasonable theory though.
And what is Janssen's alternative? Actually, he has none. He simply says that it is okay with him to not know what he doesn't know. Which I can appreciate. I clearly don't know everything. Knowing one's own limitations is quite commendable. But, if he is to imply that my answer is a bad answer, then I feel he should have a better answer first! In short, my answer doesn't seem to me to be a bad answer at all, but even if it is a bad answer, it is still better than no answer. (Besides, my answer has .1 percent of the the age of the earth to work, not .001 percent. My answer's looking better all the time...)
This basically concludes the math/science section of my rebuttal. In short, I saw virtually no argument presented at all. He seemed to classify my first rebuttal as "blustering and posturing" yet I must confess that is all I see in his rebuttal. He made some complaints about my lack of technical accuracy in some areas, but didn't really address what I was trying to say. This is not to be taken as a personal insult, nor am I "angry" with Janssen. I'm just calling it like I see it.
So, now I'll move the discussion to some of the more personal aspects of faith. Which I must confess I took some of his comments a bit personally. Janssen quotes me saying, "my 'independence at all cost' motto seems justified" and also me saying, "the bottom line is no, I don't think I have any subconscious will to not believe in God." To which he replies, "The two stark claims are not compatible. Christ said that a man cannot serve two masters. Individuals who must be 'masters of their own universe' as you say, do indeed have a strong precommitment to a master other than God. You say, 'I've spent a lot of time trying to believe in God.' Perhaps you actually believe it, I'll assume that you do, but the claim sounds strangely disingenuous." Well, my first comment is that I find it "strangely disingenuous" for him to seem to think that he can really know much about me from reading a few paragraphs of my autobiography. The penchant of the theist to psychoanalyze the skeptic is rather presumptuous. But, I guess it is my own fault for posting such material on my site in the first place. Also, skeptics often psychoanalyze theists. So, perhaps it is fair-play. So, I guess its okay to go down that road some more.
My first comment is that I think I've mellowed some in my "independence at all cost" motto over the years. In my twenties, I felt that way strongly. Now, in my early forties, not so much. For example, back then, the idea of having to take antidepressant medication was strongly distasteful. Today, its no big deal. Also, in my complete autobiography, (which I have not posted publicly, but I have e-mailed to a few interested parties) I note that despite my "independence at all cost" motto, contradictorily, I also had a strong desire for love. Yes, contradictory, but true. I spent a lot of time going to shrinks over the years, so I've covered this ground many times. Basically, I considered my parents aloof, indifferent, and of no purpose other than to condemn mistakes--but anything good I might do would go unnoticed. Some have said I have projected this image of my parents onto God, where I see Him as not doing a damn thing, except send people to hell.
In an e-mail, Mr. Janssen said, "I cannot determine if your objections to Christianity are truly of an intellectual nature or if they essentially arise from a deep personal anger of some sort." Okay, so lets take the second option. Let's put me on the analyst's couch and theorize, "Paul's objections to Christianity are a misplacement of anger towards his parents upon God." Is this a crime? And, wouldn't God know this? If I'm angry at God for being aloof and punishing, isn't He proving me right? Isn't He aloof? And, if He sends me to hell for thinking He's aloof, isn't he punishing? If He doesn't want me to come to this conclusion, shouldn't He be actively trying to show me wrong? Instead, isn't He just proving me correct?
I suspect Janssen or perhaps other readers might respond something like, "see, you're just proving that you don't want to be with God, so He is going to give you what you want." Okay, so lets say that is true. Lets assume the following premises are true:
1. I'm angry at God for being aloof.
2. God will give me what I want, which is separation from Him.
3. This situation will continue for all eternity.
4. Everybody gets what they want.
Okay, if all these premises are true, what possible use could evangelism be? If everybody gets what they really want, then why bother sending me e-mails? You wouldn't want to talk somebody into something they don't want, do you? So, now I'll put Janssen on the analyst's couch. I don't think he could possibly really believe the premises above. If he really did, he would have utterly no reason to e-mail me. The only possible answer that I can think Janssen might respond with is that perhaps deep-down, I want to get over my anger. And, so he might say he is trying to help me reach that point of self-discovery. But wouldn't God know this? Shouldn't God be trying to help me reach this point of self-discovery? If God knows that I really want to get over my anger, by sends me to hell anyway, doesn't that disprove premise 4 above?
Also, regardless of the value of the other premises, isn't the idea of premise 3, that people would never change for all eternity, preposterous? After, say, a billion years in heaven, might some people say, "ya know, God, I'm getting kinda tired of hanging with you." And, people in hell, wouldn't they likely change their views over time? So, the idea of premise 3 alone seems preposterous.
Mr. Janssen concludes with an analogy of baggage. He says that some people can't seem to let go of their baggage. And that ultimately can cause people to loose the race. Why is God so preoccupied with making some people win and some people loose? Why doesn't He help people get rid of their baggage? I know Janssen's story was an analogy, but I think it actually fits Christianity more than He perhaps intended. His analogy shows Christianity to be a game, with winners and losers. Isn't an Almighty God "bigger" than this?
Now, I want to quote some scripture. All quotes NIV:
First off, I can see from Mr. Janssen's rebuttal that he does indeed understand math better than I originally gave him credit. Mr. Janssen seemed to feel somewhat "attacked" in my last rebuttal. I admit that my style of writing can be coarse at times, but I think he took it a bit too personally. He seemed to feel I expressed "anger" and this is not at all accurate, I was never angry with him. Never-the-less, I apologize for my coarseness. I'll do better this time, I promise!
He spent a bit of time debating the meaning of the word atheism. I went to dictionary.com, and their definition is roughly the same as his. On the other hand, most people that call themselves atheists disagree. They say that the opposite of belief in God is simply the absence of belief in God. But this is what many people call agnosticism. That is one of the reasons I do not call myself an atheist as there is too much confusion as to what it means. I simply consider myself unconvinced of the existence of God, but stop short of saying for certain there is no God. So, I figure "skeptic" or "agnostic" are as good of terms as any to classify myself.
Speaking of classification, Mr. Janssen noted that I "labeled" him as being a "Progressive Creationist". He says he is not fond of such labeling. On one hand, I can agree, and one reason I don't "label" myself an atheist for it implies different things to different people. On the other hand, I think that people tend to be "classification engines," that classifications, even if not always exactly correct, help us to simplify complexity.
Mr. Janssen discusses the definition of God, such as being omnipotent and omniscient. There is a lot of debate as to whether such concepts are even logically consistent. For example, Christian apologist Paul Copan argues that God manifested the universe in which maximum number of people are saved and minimum people are lost. So, that means God created the "best" possible universe in these terms. On one hand, omnipotence should be able to do as Copan says--create the best possible universe. On the other hand, once God manifested any specific universe, shouldn't omnipotence be capable of creating a better one? And, shouldn't omnipotence be capable of creating a "best" universe where infinite people are saved and zero are lost? Though I can't say I have presented something rigorous enough to constitute a "proof", these ideas seem to me to indicate that true infinite power is an incoherent concept. Other authors have explored these ideas in greater detail.
Mr. Janssen made a reference to the principle of economy, and referred to it as "Okkam's Razor". I believe it is spelled "Occam's Razor," at least that is the way I've seen it spelled. (The only reason I point this out, is when I saw his spelling, my first thought was to make sure I haven't been misspelling it as I have referred to Occam's Razor myself.) And Janssen has a valid point. For one, multiple universes are so far unproven. But, Stephen Hawkins is doing some interesting work in this area. I'd recommend his current book, The Universe in a Nutshell. It is true that Occam's Razor says that generally speaking, the simpler solution is preferred. On the other hand, it doesn't say that a more complex answer is for certain wrong. If two possible solutions to a problem are proposed, one complex and one more straightforward, the simpler solution is preferred, but not guaranteed. And should more evidence on the side of the more complex answer arise, then Occam's Razor no longer applies. So, while Occam's Razor is a reasonable guideline, it is just that, a rule-of-thumb. Besides--is postulating a being of infinite power and infinite knowledge really any less of a violation of Occam's Razor than postulating infinite universes? I don't see how. Regardless, given some of the work that Hawkins is doing along these lines, I feel that it isn't completely erroneous to consider the idea of multiple or infinite universes. But the bottom line is I do concede it is only a theory.
However, even if Hawkins theories on this become accepted, I also concede that would not necessarily be detrimental to the theist position. A theist can contend that God created all the universes. So, we get back to (possibly) needing a First Cause, regardless of how many universes there are. The problem I have here is, say there is indeed some "First Cause" of some-sort--is this First Cause a Being? Does the First Cause have the attributes we associate with God--emotions, desires, etc.? My suspicion is that attributing these human attributes to the First Cause is a case of anthropomorphism. Earlier I noted that the very concept of infinite power seems incoherent. But even if I'm wrong, the idea of a being with infinite power and yet have emotions and desires also seems incoherent. Emotions are reactionary. How can a being that knows everything have a reaction? How can a being that knows everything ever be "surprised?" How can a being that knows everything think or learn? How can a being of infinite power and infinite knowledge have desire? These all seem incoherent. The bottom line is, I must confess, I don't know what is "out there" beyond the universe--if anything. In principle, it could be anything--granted, even including God. Its just that the idea of God, at least as most people present Him, seem to not be likely a coherent idea.
By the way, Janssen says, "the only universe we can consider scientifically, we now know to have been caused"--actually, we know it to have a beginning. That is not at all to say we know it to be caused. I know most theists insist these are synonymous. And, I understand they can seem like the are--but they are not. I have a separate paper on this which I would like to recommend to Janssen to read. Please follow this link to my Cosmological Argument paper. The short answer is, "causation" implies time and order. But, time only exists within a universe. So, our understanding of "causation" only applies within our universe. There is no mechanism for rules of causation to "jump" outside our universe.
In my "one in a million" lottery example, Janssen is correct to a degree. If I bought a million tickets, and each one was random, my probability would not be 1 in 1. When I wrote what I wrote, I did consider that my 1 in 1 probability presupposed I would intentionally pick every possible choice. But, if I picked each of the million tickets at random, I would get less than a 1 in 1 probability. To be honest, I did not give Janssen enough credit to know the difference. So, I must admit to being a bit surprised to having been "caught!" :-) But really, I also thought that being completely technically accurate might be "too much information." But, since I was "caught," I'll now be more technically accurate. I believe that if I randomly bought 1,000,000 tickets for a lottery with a probability of 1 in 1,000,000, my probability of winning should be 1 - (0.999999 ** 1000000). I think that is right. My Windows calculator couldn't handle the calculation, but I guess it would come out to roughly a 50% probability.
Also, as Janssen notes, in theory, I could buy billions of tickets, and never win. Its been years since I've taken calculus, but if I remember how limits of equations work, the limit of the function of the probability as number of tickets approaches infinity is 1. Then there is the concept of the expected outcome. If I bought a billion tickets randomly, my expected outcome would be that I would win a thousand times. That doesn't mean I would actually win a thousand times, that is just what would be expected on the average. Then you can put this on a bell curve and calculate the probability of my wins being, say, two standard deviations from the norm. Um, I think this is too much information. Did being technically accurate really affect my point? My point was, that if you don't know how many trials, then you don't know the probability. He said that I my arguments amounted to "blustering and posturing," but after his blustering and posturing, I don't see that he actually refuted--or even addressed--my point.
I said that "probability tells us nothing," to which Janssen replies, "if 'probability tells us nothing' I can assure you that this will come as a horrible surprise to casino operators in Las Vegas and Atlantic City who make a great deal of money on a certainty that probability does mean something very real." I feel that he is quoting me out of context. In my context, I was saying that probability tells us nothing if we have insufficient information to make a valid probability equation. And indeed, if you don't have enough information to make a calculation, then it does indeed tell us nothing. Also, a probability calculation can be 100% correct, yet 100% misleading. Janssen acted as apologist to Behe's probability analogy. I was not impressed. Behe was clearly trying to make the probability of what he was discussing look to be just utterly preposterous. It was a clear case of intent on Behe's part. Janssen's defense that Behe was just trying to help put perspective on large numbers is erroneous--Behe was obviously trying to put a blatantly misleading perspective on his large numbers.
Although Janssen does indeed understand math better than I initially thought, he did make a "schoolboy" error. (This is not an insult--anybody can make "schoolboy" errors occasionally. I simply mean that he made a mistake that once I point it out, he'll likely slap his own forehead or whatever he does when realizing an obvious error...) He was talking about how 5 million years compares to 4 billion years. He says:
"All blustering and posturing aside, we're talking about thousandths of one percent:
5,000,000 is 0.00125 percent of 4,000,000,000.
10,000,000 is 0.0025 percent of 4,000,000,000.
20,000,000 is 0.0050 percent of 4,000,000,000.
30,000,000 is 0.0075 percent of 4,000,000,000.
250,000,000 is 0.0625 percent of 4,000,000,000."
Um, let's carry that calculation out: 4,000,000,000 is 1 percent of 4,000,000,000. Huh??? No, its 100%. Percent is "parts-per-hundred." Why parts-per-hundred is such a ubiquitous unit, I don't know, but it is. Please go back and multiply your percents by 100.
Ergo, 5,000,000 is 0.125 percent of 4,000,000. Yeah, that's still a small fraction, but a tenth of a percent is still a lot more than a thousandth of a percent. I felt that when Janssen criticized my lottery example, he was jumping on a detail rather than the meaning. He might likewise complain here, so now I'll try to focus on the meaning. What might be the meaning of the Cambrian Explosion if the key section of it was only roughly 5 million years as Janssen contends? To be perfectly honest, one reason I relied so heavily on Crawford's critique of Behe is because chemistry and biology are not my fields, and Crawford seemed to know what he was talking about. But I have to confess that he could be completely wrong and I would be too ignorant to know it. So if I say anything at all here, I might only accomplish revealing my ignorance. It seems likely Crawford and Janssen both know more than I do about the Cambrian Explosion. So, can I say anything intelligent on it? Maybe not, but I'll try to make one point...
I quoted Crawford mentioning that part of the explanation of the Cambrian Explosion is thought to be the evolution of the hard exoskeletons. Like I said, I'm not an expert, but I've heard this information from multiple sources and not just from Crawford. Therefore, I suspect that it is probably indeed considered a significant event. I understand that there are two different implications of evolution of the exoskeleton. First, evolution prior to exoskeletons is harder to trace because fossilization was much more difficult without hard exoskeletons. Evolutionary "explosions" could have happened before, but we simply don't have a record. The other, perhaps more important thing about the development of the exoskeleton is that was a new "invention," which could be compared to the discovery and harnessing of electricity in man's technology evolution. We had a technology "explosion" in the past century because the necessary prerequisites such as electricity in most households came first. Designing TV's wasn't practical until after home electricity was commonplace. The way biological evolution works is, if there are a lot of available niches in the ecosystem to fill, then evolution proceeds relatively quickly. If there aren't many open niches, evolution tends to proceed relatively slowly. So, what happened, at least in part, is that there were oodles of niches in the ecosystem just waiting to be filled; waiting for hard exoskeletons to get "invented". Am I qualified to state this? No, I confess I'm just parroting what I have read. It does seem to be a reasonable theory though.
And what is Janssen's alternative? Actually, he has none. He simply says that it is okay with him to not know what he doesn't know. Which I can appreciate. I clearly don't know everything. Knowing one's own limitations is quite commendable. But, if he is to imply that my answer is a bad answer, then I feel he should have a better answer first! In short, my answer doesn't seem to me to be a bad answer at all, but even if it is a bad answer, it is still better than no answer. (Besides, my answer has .1 percent of the the age of the earth to work, not .001 percent. My answer's looking better all the time...)
This basically concludes the math/science section of my rebuttal. In short, I saw virtually no argument presented at all. He seemed to classify my first rebuttal as "blustering and posturing" yet I must confess that is all I see in his rebuttal. He made some complaints about my lack of technical accuracy in some areas, but didn't really address what I was trying to say. This is not to be taken as a personal insult, nor am I "angry" with Janssen. I'm just calling it like I see it.
So, now I'll move the discussion to some of the more personal aspects of faith. Which I must confess I took some of his comments a bit personally. Janssen quotes me saying, "my 'independence at all cost' motto seems justified" and also me saying, "the bottom line is no, I don't think I have any subconscious will to not believe in God." To which he replies, "The two stark claims are not compatible. Christ said that a man cannot serve two masters. Individuals who must be 'masters of their own universe' as you say, do indeed have a strong precommitment to a master other than God. You say, 'I've spent a lot of time trying to believe in God.' Perhaps you actually believe it, I'll assume that you do, but the claim sounds strangely disingenuous." Well, my first comment is that I find it "strangely disingenuous" for him to seem to think that he can really know much about me from reading a few paragraphs of my autobiography. The penchant of the theist to psychoanalyze the skeptic is rather presumptuous. But, I guess it is my own fault for posting such material on my site in the first place. Also, skeptics often psychoanalyze theists. So, perhaps it is fair-play. So, I guess its okay to go down that road some more.
My first comment is that I think I've mellowed some in my "independence at all cost" motto over the years. In my twenties, I felt that way strongly. Now, in my early forties, not so much. For example, back then, the idea of having to take antidepressant medication was strongly distasteful. Today, its no big deal. Also, in my complete autobiography, (which I have not posted publicly, but I have e-mailed to a few interested parties) I note that despite my "independence at all cost" motto, contradictorily, I also had a strong desire for love. Yes, contradictory, but true. I spent a lot of time going to shrinks over the years, so I've covered this ground many times. Basically, I considered my parents aloof, indifferent, and of no purpose other than to condemn mistakes--but anything good I might do would go unnoticed. Some have said I have projected this image of my parents onto God, where I see Him as not doing a damn thing, except send people to hell.
In an e-mail, Mr. Janssen said, "I cannot determine if your objections to Christianity are truly of an intellectual nature or if they essentially arise from a deep personal anger of some sort." Okay, so lets take the second option. Let's put me on the analyst's couch and theorize, "Paul's objections to Christianity are a misplacement of anger towards his parents upon God." Is this a crime? And, wouldn't God know this? If I'm angry at God for being aloof and punishing, isn't He proving me right? Isn't He aloof? And, if He sends me to hell for thinking He's aloof, isn't he punishing? If He doesn't want me to come to this conclusion, shouldn't He be actively trying to show me wrong? Instead, isn't He just proving me correct?
I suspect Janssen or perhaps other readers might respond something like, "see, you're just proving that you don't want to be with God, so He is going to give you what you want." Okay, so lets say that is true. Lets assume the following premises are true:
1. I'm angry at God for being aloof.
2. God will give me what I want, which is separation from Him.
3. This situation will continue for all eternity.
4. Everybody gets what they want.
Okay, if all these premises are true, what possible use could evangelism be? If everybody gets what they really want, then why bother sending me e-mails? You wouldn't want to talk somebody into something they don't want, do you? So, now I'll put Janssen on the analyst's couch. I don't think he could possibly really believe the premises above. If he really did, he would have utterly no reason to e-mail me. The only possible answer that I can think Janssen might respond with is that perhaps deep-down, I want to get over my anger. And, so he might say he is trying to help me reach that point of self-discovery. But wouldn't God know this? Shouldn't God be trying to help me reach this point of self-discovery? If God knows that I really want to get over my anger, by sends me to hell anyway, doesn't that disprove premise 4 above?
Also, regardless of the value of the other premises, isn't the idea of premise 3, that people would never change for all eternity, preposterous? After, say, a billion years in heaven, might some people say, "ya know, God, I'm getting kinda tired of hanging with you." And, people in hell, wouldn't they likely change their views over time? So, the idea of premise 3 alone seems preposterous.
Mr. Janssen concludes with an analogy of baggage. He says that some people can't seem to let go of their baggage. And that ultimately can cause people to loose the race. Why is God so preoccupied with making some people win and some people loose? Why doesn't He help people get rid of their baggage? I know Janssen's story was an analogy, but I think it actually fits Christianity more than He perhaps intended. His analogy shows Christianity to be a game, with winners and losers. Isn't an Almighty God "bigger" than this?
Now, I want to quote some scripture. All quotes NIV:
"Therefore I tell you, do not worry about your life, what you will eat or drink; or about your body, what you will wear. Is not life more important than food, and the body more important than clothes? Look at the birds of the air; they do not sow or reap or store away in barns, and yet your heavenly Father feeds them. Are you not much more valuable than they?" [Matt 6:25-26]
Then Jesus said to his disciples: "Therefore I tell you, do not worry about your life, what you will eat; or about your body, what you will wear. Life is more than food, and the body more than clothes. Consider the ravens: They do not sow or reap, they have no storeroom or barn; yet God feeds them. And how much more valuable you are than birds! [...] And do not set your heart on what you will eat or drink; do not worry about it. For the pagan world runs after all such things, and your Father knows that you need them. But seek his kingdom, and these things will be given to you as well. Do not be afraid, little flock, for your Father has been pleased to give you the kingdom. Sell your possessions and give to the poor. Provide purses for yourselves that will not wear out, a treasure in heaven that will not be exhausted, where no thief comes near and no moth destroys." [Luke 12:22-24, 29-33] In the same way, any of you who does not give up everything he has cannot be my disciple. [Luke 14:33] Jesus answered, "If you want to be perfect, go, sell your possessions and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven. Then come, follow me." When the young man heard this, he went away sad, because he had great wealth. Then Jesus said to his disciples, "I tell you the truth, it is hard for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven. Again I tell you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God." [Matt 19:21-24] But if we have food and clothing, we will be content with that. [1 Tim 6:8] Give to the one who asks you, and do not turn away from the one who wants to borrow from you. [Matt 5:42] If someone strikes you on one cheek, turn to him the other also. If someone takes your cloak, do not stop him from taking your tunic. Give to everyone who asks you, and if anyone takes what belongs to you, do not demand it back. [Luke 6:29-30] |
Basically, Jesus called for his followers an extremely sacrificial life. Except for maybe a few street-corner preachers, I've seen very few Christians that does what the verses say: be happy with one day's food and one day's clothing at a time--and have no "storeroom or barn." Why do Christians own cars? Have 401k retirement plans? More than one coat in their closet? Generally, I've found Christians to explain this away as in a number of ways. They may say Jesus was using hyperbole. Or perhaps Jesus meant for only his 12 disciples to do this. Or maybe, he has different callings for different followers. Or maybe these teachings were for people that have a strong love of material good or money. Or maybe today's society is different. Or, maybe we live longer and now we need to prepare for our futures. In other words, its okay for Christians to ignore whatever teachings they feel like ignoring, but then they still call on skeptics to rid themselves of all their baggage. What is wrong with this picture? If Christ didn't mean what He said, then why did he say them? Of if things are different today, why hasn't he released a new edition of the Bible? When Christians literally live by Christ's words, then maybe I'll give some consideration to their challenge for me to do so.
By the way, this is not to be taken as anger--really. Its true that I think his arguments, and the claims of Christianity in general, are illogical, and I can be blunt when I point out the fallacies. But I know he is a good guy and means well. I just don't think his point of view can be rationally defended.
By the way, this is not to be taken as anger--really. Its true that I think his arguments, and the claims of Christianity in general, are illogical, and I can be blunt when I point out the fallacies. But I know he is a good guy and means well. I just don't think his point of view can be rationally defended.