

THE GREAT TAKEOVER



MAPPING OF MULTISTAKEHOLDERISM IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

RESEARCH BY:
MARY ANN MANAHAN AND MADHURESH KUMAR

The Great Takeover: Mapping of Multistakeholderism in Global Governance

Amsterdam, December 2021

ISBN - 9789070563844

Editors: Brid Brennan and Gonzalo Berrón (TNI), Martin Drago and Leticia Paranhos (FOEI)

Research: Mary Ann Manahan and Madhuresh Kumar

Cover, Design & Graphs: Brenda Van Niekerk

Copy editing: Christopher Simon

Published by: **People's Working Group on Multistakeholderism** and its members.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Baba Aye, Stephan Backes, Kirtana Chandrasekaran, Nicoletta Denticio, Charlotte Dreger, Harris Gleckman, Anita Gurumurthy, Shalmali Guttal, Sofia Monsalve, Vernor Munoz, Shayda Naficy, Ashka Naik, Andressa Pellanda, Thomas Schwarz, Juliana Senna, and Parminder Singh.

About the Researchers:

Mary Ann Manahan is a Filipina feminist activist researcher and doctoral assistant with the Conflict Research Group of the Department of Conflict and Development Studies at Ghent University. Prior to her academic stint, Mary Ann worked as senior program officer with Asia-based activist and advocacy NGO, Focus on the Global South and as coordinator of the IFI Advisory Board of the US-based charity foundation Global Greengrants Fund. Mary Ann holds an undergraduate degree in sociology from the University of the Philippines-Diliman and a Master's degree in globalization and development from the Institute of Development Policy and Management at the University of Antwerp. She is a co-coordinator of the Beyond Development Global Working Group, and has longstanding collaborations with Transnational Institute.

Madhuresh Kumar, an Indian activist-researcher currently based in Paris, is Project Director of the Global Gas Hub, engaged at urgent and rapid delivery of a global phase-out of fossil gas. Before joining the Hub, for more than a decade, he was a National Convener of [National Alliance of People's Movements](#) (NAPM India) responsible for political strategy development; alliance building and networking; campaigns and policy advocacy around communities' control over land, water, forest and minerals etc. He has been involved in researching movement dynamics, alternatives to development, anti-globalisation struggles, the World Social Forum process, participated in several events of the WSF and was an active member of the WSF India Organising Committee. He is also an Atlantic Fellow for Social and Economic Equity at the London School of Economics and Resistance Studies Fellow at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. kmadhuresh@gmail.com

<http://www.tni.org/copyright>: Contents of the report may be quoted or reproduced for non-commercial purposes, provided that the source of information is properly cited. We would appreciate receiving a copy or link of the text in which this document is used or cited.

For further information contact: cpteam@tni.org

The Great Takeover

Mapping of Multistakeholderism in Global Governance

*Edited by Brid Brennan and Gonzalo Berrón (TNI), Martin
Drago and Leticia Paranhos (FOEI)*

Research by Mary Ann Manahan and Madhuresh Kumar



The following social movements, networks and organizations are members of the **People's Working Group on Multistakeholderism (PWGM)**: Corporate Accountability (CA), FIAN International, Focus on the Global South, Friends of the Earth International (FOEI), Geneva Global Health Hub (G2H2), Global Campaign for Education, IT for Change, People's Health Movement (PHM), Public Services International (PSI), Society for International Development (SID), Transnational Institute (TNI).

Table of Contents

Foreword.....	1
The Great Takeover: An Introduction of the Multi-Sectoral Mapping of Multistakeholderism in Global Governance	3
Chapter I.....	60
Education, a Big Business for Businesses: Multistakeholderism in the Global Education Governance	
Chapter II	79
Commodifying and Selling Nature to Save It: Multistakeholderism in Global Environmental Governance	
Chapter III.....	115
The Ebbing Influence of WHO: Rise of Multistakeholderism	
Chapter IV	138
Unaccountable and Hegemonic, the Big Tech Threat: Mapping Multistakeholderism in the Global Internet Governance	
Chapter V.....	161
Probing Multistakeholderism in Global Food and Agriculture Governance	
Annex Database	182

Foreword

The “*Great Takeover: Mapping of multistakeholderism in global governance*” represents an important moment on the road to exposing this trend, raised on the international agenda by a group of social movements, networks and organizations who started to walk the journey together a few years ago. The journey has resulted in a deeper analysis of how corporate capture is achieving dominance in world affairs.

All of us experienced in our areas of work and activism the over-whelming influence of corporate power and capture of the decision making processes at the multilateral institutions: “*revolving doors*”, “*normative entrepreneurship*”, unregulated lobby, conditional funding, and “philanthropy” among others. Finally, there emerges a clear strategy of creating a brand-new parallel set of institutions where the corporations sit with voice and vote to decide on key areas and issues of global policies that impact the planet and most importantly, its people.

The deepening of this “multistakeholder” trend was based on a rhetoric of new funding, better efficiency and dynamism, more consensus and “participation” but ended in legitimating false solutions and further bolstering the profit of corporate economic actors.

From health, to food and agriculture, from education to internet, from environment to public services and human rights, we have understood that decisions made in these MSI mechanisms as well as in captured multilateral institutions have direct impact on people’s health, children’s education, digital rights, access to basic public services and human rights in the territories, including the right to a healthy environment. For us, the experience of this sharing and common analysis provided the certainty that the “systemic” phenomenon of “multistakeholderization” of global governance is taking place. This systemic multistakeholderism is in fact *taking over* the governance of the world by dislocating the locus of the decisions from the multilateral system into these mixed mechanisms where the private sector rules, with the support of some states, international institutions and big philanthropists. We decided then that a map of this complex new global governance was needed to better understand its nature and drivers and confirm its “systemic” character.

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.

This text is a first approach to five sectors: environment, education, health, food & agriculture and internet. It is built in a dialogical way between Mary Ann Manahan and Madhuresh Kumar - the researchers - and the members of the “*People’s Working Group on Multistakeholderism*” who in working together have adopted this name before launching this common contribution to the analysis and awareness raising on the issue.

This dialogue implies that the *mapping* is alive, and reveals both the static structures but also the political dynamics driving the various scenarios played out in the different sectors. The data gives testimony to what the actual impacts are on the ground. That is what you will find in this volume - after a conceptual and analytical introduction that provides also the key methodological decisions made by the researchers, the sectoral chapters bring two dimensions: a thorough analysis of the sector as well as the tables relating to each sector, listing and describing the multistakeholder initiatives (the mapping itself) and placed in the Annex.

We hope the information and analysis this brings will contribute to a common understanding of what is at stake in global governance and how a public, more democratic and genuine participatory multilateral system is urgently needed.

In 2018, Harris Gleckman called our attention to the *partnership agreement* between António Guterres, the United Nations Secretary General, and the World Economic Forum (WEF). We mobilized then more than 250 organizations to denounce what looked like the opening of an avenue for corporate capture of the UN. In September 2021 the document “*Our Common Agenda*”, also from the UN Secretary General, sets the roadmap of the Multilateral system for the coming years and shows how this partnership with the corporate private sector is presented as the only way out of the multiple crises the world faces. From the impacts on the lives of peoples, it is clear that instead of being a solution multistakeholder mechanisms accelerate the route towards a more undemocratic, unsustainable and unequal world.

The journey in this volume presents demanding challenges. We invite you to join us in this effort to unveil the Takeover of our common future by the actors of global corporate power.

The Editors

The Great Takeover: An Introduction of the Multi-Sectoral Mapping of Multistakeholderism in Global Governance

By: Mary Ann Manahan and Madhuresh Kumar

Introduction

Multistakeholderism, or multistakeholder governance, has its roots in organisational management theories that depict how a central institution (government, business, etc.) should structurally engage with other public institutions (electorate, shareholders, etc.). It departed from its origins when it undertook more public concerns and public policy issues such as climate change, internet governance and sustainable development, among others. The rise of multistakeholderism largely coincided with the mainstreaming of neoliberalism. Post 1980s, we witnessed several developments that contributed to its embeddedness at the global-governance level.

First, since the Reagan-Thatcher years, multilateralism¹ dramatically retreated in terms of addressing policy and knowledge failures connected to globalisation, such as the negative social and ecological consequences brought by the World Bank's imposition of structural adjustment programs. Second, the structural weaknesses are hurled against multilateralism and multilateral arrangements such as their inadequacy to provide and guide states to operational frame-works that deal with persistent and vexing crises of human rights abuses, global health pandemics, civil war, poverty and in-equality as well as their focus on relying on states to make and imple-ment decisions, especially in the context of geopolitical struggles among powerful nations vs. the rest. These criticisms have led to a crisis of legitimacy and relevance of

¹ Multilateralism has been defined in different ways throughout the years. At the risk of simplification, we take on the definition of global governance of the many in which states are the main decision-makers and implementors, and the UN system is its main articulation or embodiment.

multilateralism, which opened spaces and opportunities for non-state actors such as transnational corporations (TNCs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) to stake their claims as relevant, political actors in solving serious global problems, some of which are created by the TNCs in the first place. Of course, TNCs and CSOs have different rationales, motivations and demands for challenging multilateralism. In the case of CSOs, there has been a general call for democratisation of these multilateral spaces to involve the voices of affected communities, NGOs and other CSOs that have a lot to say about global issues.

On the other hand, the corporate private sector aims to push for its private interests and get preferential access as the key strategic partner of multilateral bodies such as the UN system. Indeed, we witnessed an increased role of the corporate private sector through the modality of private-public partnerships² and it was galvanised by the UN Global Compact, the world's largest corporate 'sustainability' initiative in 2000.

Third, the crisis of the UN system, marked by dwindling re-sources coming from its wealthier members, particularly the US, and leading progressively to its capture by transnational corporations (TNCs) and venture philanthropy under the former UN Secretaries-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan.³ With time, the creation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 2015 Paris Agreement, which incorporated multistakeholder partnerships as a cornerstone of their implementation and realisation, further entrenched multistakeholder-erism within the UN system. Finally, the centrality of the role of the World Economic Forum (WEF), which started with a comprehensive and detailed set of general and thematic proposals for the redesigning of global governance since World War II, contained in their Global Redesign Initiative a 600-page report that was the result of a one and -a-half-year process of

² Nora McKeon (2017) Are Equity and Sustainability a Likely Outcome When Foxes and Chickens Share the Same Coop? Critiquing the Concept of Multistakeholder Governance of Food Security, *Globalizations*, 14:3, 379-398, DOI: [10.1080/14747731.2017.1286168](https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2017.1286168)

³ Michele, L., Prato, S., Rundall, P. Valente, F., Nalubanga, B. Immink M., Cano M. Dadhich, JP., and Gupta, A. (2019). When the SUN Casts a Shadow: The human rights risks of multi-stakeholder partnerships: the case of Scaling up Nutrition (SUN). Heidelberg: FIAN International. Access at https://www.fian.org/files/files/WhenTheSunCastsAShadow_En.pdf

stakeholder engagement it facilitated.⁴ On June 13, 2019, the United Nations and WEF signed the Strategic Partnership Framework under the guise of ‘deepening institutional arrangements to accelerate the implementation of the SDGs’. This recent development furthers the corporate capture of global governance, which has been heavily criticised by various social movements, NGOs and individuals.⁵

However, a historical analysis⁶ indicates that multistakeholder processes can be traced back to the earliest forms of public deliberation over public policy. They can be, under the right conditions, a model for democratic governance, in as much as inclusion of various stakeholders aims to attract input from the sector or groups who will be affected by a particular policy. At the same time, when applied to the modern international context—that is, an ecosystem defined by sovereign nation-states—it is quite unusual. Governments, once elected or legitimised, are accustomed to governing linearly, top-down, or coming to agreement with other governments regarding the terms of some form of shared rulemaking (trade agreements, for example). Thus, while multistakeholder processes have been used throughout history under the umbrella of a sovereign authority, which retained ultimate authority, their use among sovereigns to govern shared resources is a relatively new phenomenon.

Effective multistakeholder processes require the following conditions, which (as discussed below) are rarely found in current multistakeholder initiatives or processes:

- complex problem or problems in question cannot be solved by any single actor involved (or a need for coordinated action across political boundaries)
- problem or problems are clearly defined and bounded
- explicitly defined set of stakeholders with common but often conflicting vested interests

⁴ For a comprehensive critique of the document, visit the Center for Governance and Sustainability’s guide at <https://www.umb.edu/gri>.

⁵ <https://www.escr-net.org/news/2019/corporate-capture-global-governance-wef-un-partnership-threatens-un-system>

⁶ See the Annex of [this submission](http://www.apig.ch/CWG-Internet%202017-2ter.pdf) by Richard Hill to an ITU group: <http://www.apig.ch/CWG-Internet%202017-2ter.pdf>

- each stakeholder has sufficient power to at least partially subvert the effectiveness of an outcome contrary to its interests
- a negotiated, agreed-upon and mutually understood process and time frame
- stakeholders engage in a learning process (and are not merely negotiating based on fixed positions)
- stakeholders are equally committed to sharing relevant information related to addressing shared challenges
- stakeholders engage in good-faith negotiations, committing to honesty and fairness in the deliberative process and remain accountable⁷

Contemporary multistakeholderism in global governance is far from the ideal scenario depicted above. The increased roles of corporations, especially TNCs, and mega-philanthropies in these governance spaces have succeeded in presenting false, market-based solutions to global problems, prescribing similar solutions at the national level. On one hand, the immediate and long-term consequences consist of undermining and marginalisation of institutions or functions of existing governance bodies such as the UN system and governmental regulatory authorities.⁸ On the other, the bolstering of corporate influence and power as lead actors in multistakeholder processes, initiatives, arrangements and mechanism and for a shorthand we refer to them as MSIs⁹, which operate with little oversight and regulation. We emphasise that we did not explicitly refer to MSIs as institutions because doing so renders acceptance that they are formalised and institutionalised in global governance, which are being staunchly challenged and resisted by various social movements and civil society groups monitoring multistakeholderism.

The breakthrough and increasing role of MSIs in global governance present us with numerous challenges and questions. For example, each

⁷ This whole section and the previous one was suggested by Richard Hill.

⁸ See <https://www.civicus.org/index.php/re-imagining-democracy/overviews/3377-multistakeholderism-a-new-way-for-corporations-and-their-new-partners-to-try-to-govern-the-world>

⁹ We have used multistakeholderism, multistakeholder initiatives, multistakeholder groups or governance interchangeably.

participating actor has different competing interests and motives; can these be balanced? Can the market-oriented goals of the pharmaceutical industry, internet corporations, multinational agri-business corporations and investment funds be balanced and reconciled with the developmental goals of elected governments to eliminate hunger, poverty and provide basic health and education facilities? Can private corporations and investment funds that are only accountable to their shareholders be made accountable to the global public? With a severe lack of public funding to achieve human rights and universal access to health, energy, food, land, healthy environment and internet, can resources from the private sector be mobilised for the common good without their penchant for political and societal power? Besides these questions, there are also more fundamental issues. Is the term 'stakeholder' not trying to conceal the immense differences in interests, role, power and legitimacy that exist among the various actors invited to join such initiatives as if they were equal 'stakeholders'? Crucially, no distinction is made between 'rights holders' and especially communities most affected by environmental destruction and human rights violations, who have a legitimate right to participate in decisions which concern them / affect their lives; private corporations, which pursue economic interests and are accountable only to their shareholders; and governments ('duty bearers') who have been elected by their people to represent them, and have an obligation to act in the public interest.¹⁰

Working conceptual framework and research methods

It is within the above backdrop and questions that the multisectoral mapping of MSIs was conducted. It sought to paint a critical picture of multistakeholder governance as a relatively new and evolving system of governance that has emerged to fill a perceived political vacuum and gap in tackling critical global challenges such as climate change, sustainable development, agriculture and food, internet governance, global health and human security, among others. The mapping adopts the definition of multistakeholderism set out by Dr. Harris Gleckman, a senior fellow at the Center for Governance and Sustainability at the University of

¹⁰ On the emergence and evolution of the stakeholder terminology see the pioneer work of Judith Richter http://www.gifa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/JRichter_2017_Comment_WHO_dCnGPW_11_14_FINAL.pdf

Massachusetts Boston and Director of Benchmark Environmental Consulting. He describes multistakeholderism as:

a new emerging global governance system that seeks to ‘bring together global actors that have a potential “stake” in an issue and ask them to collaboratively sort out a solution.’ It diverges from the international governance system, multilateralism, established at the end of World War I or World War II in which ‘governments, as representative of their citizens’, take the final decisions on global issues and direct international organizations to implement these decisions’.

In multistakeholderism, ‘stakeholders’ become the central actors without any clear procedure to designate ‘stakeholders’ there are countless possible stakeholder categories and each of these categories can be disaggregated or aggregated, depending on decisions by the specific multistakeholder convenor.”

For this study, we catalogued 103 MSIs based on the following criteria:

- global MSIs that focus on any of the five sectors/themes covered by the study, which are food and agriculture, health systems, internet and data governance, climate and environment, and education which were formed between 2000-2021;
- MSIs that involve two or more categories of actors engaged in global governance processes regarded as public in nature and imbued with public interest goals;
- MSIs that are self-identified as multistakeholder initiatives and/or suggested by our key informants as MSIs.

We have used terms such as multistakeholderism, multistakeholder initiatives and multistakeholder governance interchangeably. We included multistakeholder governance to depict that: 1) the cases we identified operate through a mix of formal and informal rules, norms and enforcement that undergird their goals, strategies, activities and internal relations; 2) the MSIs create systems of governing that enforce views and discourses peddled by more powerful categories of ‘stakeholders’.

Further, our research builds on on-going critical work around the World Economic Forum's (WEF) strong emphasis on corporate-led multistakeholderism (or what it calls stakeholder capitalism) as the answer to the problem of the multiple crises, especially post-2008. This therefore forms one of our major research assumptions or the hypothesis that there is a growing role and dominance of corporate actors in various multistakeholder initiatives, at the centre of which is the WEF. But we also expanded our assumption/hypothesis to cover the roles and involvement of the UN and other important actors that participate in the MSIs such as international NGOs, Northern governments and their aid agencies, private foundations/ philanthropies, IFIs and affected communities. Finally, we analyse the data from a critical lens and tradition of activism that political imperatives and goals guide this research to contribute to collective action.

The findings of this study are based on qualitative and quantitative mapping of multistakeholderism, particularly MSIs, in global governance mechanisms within five sectors— food, agriculture and land, global health, environment, internet and data and education.¹¹ The qualitative methods comprised of scoping interviews with key informants¹², critical discourse analysis and literature review and fact-checking of information gathered. The quantitative method covers the building of a database containing 21 data entry points, which pertain to crucial information about the MSIs: date of formation, history, description, objectives, sector, theme tackled, governing structure, influential actors, the role of the corporate sector, the role of UN bodies, sources of financing, domicile, categories of approved stakeholders, links to annual report, reference to international human rights law or standards (if any), issues and controversies surrounding the MSIs, additional information, sources and weblinks¹³.

We have divided the paper into three parts. The first contains the critical interpretive analyses underscoring converging trends, common threads and criticisms of MSIs emanating from the mapping data but

¹¹ The sectors were decided as priorities by TNI and the authors. Other sectors/themes such as trade and finance, migration, military, and security were originally part of the sectors to be surveyed.

¹² The key informants are experts who critically engage with and know about a specific MSI and/or the MSIs, thematically. We have to admit that we did not actively reach out to those who are engaged in an MSI.

¹³ A detailed research methodology is outlined in Annex 2, and the coding sheet for more information.

also various secondary literature. The second section outlines important features, mainly descriptive, of the 103 MSIs we surveyed. The final part offers some concluding remarks and recommendations for further research and political action.


Continuity and change within the Global Governance Agenda¹⁴

The cross-sectoral mapping of the MSIs, their strategies, governance structures and public policy impacts, juxtaposed with critiques of various social movements, confirms the proposition that trans-national corporations and mega-philanthropies have hijacked global governance. This is in line with the rise of corporate power and continued overreliance on market reforms in the post-Washington Consensus era. The mapping has identified the centrality of the WEF as the main actor driving the privatisation of global governance as well as the instrumentalisation of global targets such as the MDGs and SDGs in providing fodder for the multistakeholderism train to accelerate. Further, we have identified worrying patterns of revolving doors and close partnerships between the UN, corporations and corporate philanthropies that also act as epistemic communities behind the MSIs. At the core of the MSIs' strategies is convenorship—a powerful way of designating approved categories of stakeholders, deciding who gets to participate and be in the room, and which voices are heard and muted. This poses problems in terms of democratic governance deficit, accountability and public policy interests. Finally, we noticed tropes of colonialism that reinforce ideas about how MSIs not only reinforce colonial legacies but also become tools for neo-colonialism, as many TNCs do not act entirely independently but are politically aligned and agents of powerful countries' interests.

¹⁴This study, although multisectoral or cross-sectoral is a limited one. It does not look at the involvement of BRICS and Arab countries in the MSIs, although some of them engaged in MSIs. There is much interest in the relationship of Klaus Schwab with the Chinese Communist Party and the former's role in introducing China to the market economy and the WTO. While they do participate in multistakeholderism, there are also observations from human rights experts such as Sofia Monsalve, secretary general of FIAN International that China and Russia do not like multistakeholderism and prefer the state-centric multilateralism. This is again beyond the scope of the mapping.

WEF at front and centre of privatising global governance

The dominance of the corporate sector and mega-philanthropies in the MSIs has facilitated the privatisation of global governance (see Figure 1), clearly marked by a capitalist discourse or, in the words of WEF founder and director Klaus Schwab, ‘stakeholder capitalism’. The WEF’s influence can be traced to the rollout of the Global Redesign Initiative in 2009/2010, which contained the infamous quote of the three co-chairs: *“The time has come for a new stakeholder paradigm of international governance analogous to that embodied in the stakeholder theory of corporate governance on which the World Economic Forum itself was founded.”*¹⁵



Since then, the WEF, through various initiatives, has been pushing for its model of multistakeholder capitalism in which corporations seek

¹⁵ https://www.umb.edu/gri/an_overview_of_wefs_perspective#fn-4-a

‘long-term value creation’ through the consideration of the needs of all their stakeholders as well as the larger society. WEF has shown fantastic ability to keep regurgitating their unabashed advocacy of capitalism and the free market through various initiatives over the years such as the Global Competitiveness Report (2004), the idea of a Corporate Global Citizenship, the Great Transformation (2012) and Creating a Shared Future in a Fractured World (2018). Its most recent advocacy is encapsulated in the Great Reset Initiative (2020), aimed at creating a post-pandemic future and recovery that pushes for more strengthening of corporate power and privatisation of governance, under the guise of building a better society, while simultaneously espousing that the pandemic has exposed the failures of the capitalism. That’s the Davos (double) speak.¹⁶

Our research shows that many of the MSIs were either directly conceived, proposed, convened, launched or incubated at the World Economic Forum or through processes initiated at the Davos gathering. These annual gatherings in January have become as important as UN-led processes such as the UN General Assembly, COP Climate Summit, World Summit on the Information Society and World Health Assembly, among others, since Davos gathers a diverse range of political and economic elite but almost zero presence of representatives from marginalised sectors. The significant challenge to this process has not been launched, except for anti-globalisation protests in 2001 and the initial years of the World Social Forum, which showed promises of peoples’ strategies and visions for another world.

In the name of implementing the SDGs

Most of the MSIs claim to anchor their work on achieving the SDGs and have rationalised their existence to contribute to its realisation. These global developmental goals were the outcomes of several global summits and national processes across the five sectors we covered and beyond. It seems like a classic case of which came first: the chicken or the egg, or more concretely, which came first, the MSIs or the SDGs? While the database does not cover in-depth information on the links between the MSIs and the SDGs, the timeline discussed below and in Figures 1 and 2 shows that several MSIs were formed before or immediately after the launch of the SDGs. Other MSIs have aligned their work and agenda to fulfill a specific sustainable development goal, and this is evident on their

¹⁶ <https://theintercept.com/2020/12/08/great-reset-conspiracy/>

websites and in their brochures. In essence, many MSIs show their allegiance to the SDGs and swear by it, which links to our point about ‘discourse evangelism’ (see next point).

The SDGs are result of a long process of negotiations, balancing interests, which have been criticised by various camps—activists, progressive NGOs, social movements, and critical scholars— for instituting multistakeholder partnerships as a systemic implementation mechanism as well for their inadequacy in advancing radical agendas for socio-economic and ecological transformations. Further, MSIs tend to cherry-pick SDG targets that they will focus on. For instance, in the field of internet and data governance, 33 per cent of MSIs focus on cybersecurity and terrorism, yet none of these MSIs have tackled how social media has become a tool for mass disinformation, hate speech, racial and religious discrimination and propaganda by right-wing and terrorist groups. This mismatch does not align with addressing four of the 17 goals and achievement of 38 targets devoted to internet and communications technology, which cover a wide range of themes. However, the emphasis on terrorism and cybersecurity is an agenda pushed by nation-states, particularly the US, New Zealand and France, that gets carried forward, but not the themes of concern to civil society, be they fake news, mass disinformation, gendered and caste violence and various forms of discrimination on the internet.

Finally, as we will point out in the next section, many MSIs, in the guise of fulfilling the SDGs, promote market reforms and ideas that further perpetuate existing social and economic inequalities.

Common strategy: convening and ‘discourse evangelism’

A central strategy employed by MSIs, especially those led by corporations, is combining convenorship with knowledge production through research or via the creation of global frameworks that contain their ideas and visions of how to govern the world and solve its most urgent problems. Through this strategy, lead organisations from the corporate sector connect with big international NGOs, the academic and research community and UN agencies to create a synergistic relationship of reinforcing and disseminating their narratives and solutions to a global issue they deem as ungoverned or inadequately addressed.

To provide an illustrative example, the Natural Capital Coalition has used this strategy to advance the idea of ‘natural capital’ since the Rio+20 Summit in 2012 and as part of their commitment to the SDGs. Originally named The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) for Business Coalition, the Natural Capital Coalition brings together more than 300 governmental, business and conservation organisations along with UN agencies to support the development of methods for natural capital valuation in business. Its point of departure is that the future of business and capitalist development must consider the preservation of ‘natural capital’ rather than its depletion. The coalition calls for the partnering of conservationists with corporations in ‘a science-based effort to integrate the value of nature’s benefits into their operations and cultures’¹⁷. This is a shift from mainstream conservationists’ ideas to pursue biodiversity for biodiversity’s sake to how conservation becomes vital in fostering capitalist growth. The coalition then created the Natural Capital Protocol in 2016, a standardised global framework geared towards helping businesses understand their dependence on ecosystem flows and incorporate natural capital into their decision-making. The protocol complements other national-level accounting frameworks such as the UN System of Environmental Economic Accounting (UNSEEA), implemented by governments through the World Bank-led Wealth Accounting and Valuation of Ecosystem Services (WAVES) global partnerships.

Building epistemic communities through networks and ‘ecologies’ of MSIs

In relation to the above point, the strategy of combining convening and partnerships with other stakeholders engenders well-connected, self-referential networks or epistemic communities. Epistemic community¹⁸ refers to a network of diverse academic, political and professional experts who are unified by a shared set of normative and principled beliefs and common policy enterprise, which means that they help policymakers to define the problems they face, identify various (policy)

¹⁷ See Kareiva, et. al. (2012). Conservation in the Anthropocene: Beyond Solitude and Fragility, <https://thebreakthrough.org/journal/issue-2/conservation-in-the-anthropocene>

¹⁸ According to Clunne, A. (2013), “the concept of epistemic community was first introduced by John Ruggie and then refined by Peter M. Haas”, who both studied the roles played by actors and contribution to state policy and intergovernmental cooperation. See <https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemic-community> (Accessed, 25 May 2021).

solutions and assess the outcomes.¹⁹ They are often seen to have ‘recogni(z)ed expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’.²⁰

Epistemic communities in multistakeholder governance represent an alliance among crucial personalities, corporations, certain civil society organisations, UN agencies, Northern governments, aid agencies, philanthropies and international financial institutions.²¹ In the sphere of global environmental governance, for instance, MSIs such as the Natural Capital Coalition, Capitals Coalition, Natural Climate Solutions Alliance and Nature for Climate, to name a few, have massive influence in the framing of the problem and solutions to the global problems we collectively confront.

This includes introducing concepts such as ‘nature-based solutions or natural climate solutions’, which contain proposals that corporations and governments can become carbon neutral through investing in nature via market-based instruments such as cap-and-trade, REDD+ as well as natural capital accounting and payment for ecosystem services (PES). At the core of the proposed solutions is the idea that to solve the interlocking crises of climate, environment and planetary boundaries, ‘*It is all about getting the prices right. If nature does not have a price, human beings are not incentivised to take care of it.*’ That through these modalities, the ‘triple bottom line’ imperatives of profit, people and planet are addressed—a win-win-win formula. The nature-based solutions (NBS), such as selling biodiversity for climate offsets and expansion of protected areas (30 per cent of land and 30 per cent of oceans), are also being pushed inside the Convention on Biological Diversity by many states, including its host, China, international conservation NGOs and corporations with the hope that it will be centrally integrated in the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework, and eventually adopted in the Conference of Parties (COP26).

¹⁹ Haas, Peter M. (Winter 1992). "Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination". International Organization. *Cambridge Journals*. 46 (1): 1- 35. doi:10.1017/S0020818300001442. JSTOR 2706951.

²⁰ Ibid., p.3.

²¹ Another example according to Harris Gleckman the ISEAL, the ‘trade association’ of standard setting MSIs that focus a great deal of their work on building epistemic communities across these ‘MSIs’

The World Rainforest Movement, an international initiative to strengthen the global movement in defence of the forest and forest-dependent peoples, has documented nature-based disposessions in the form of land grabbing, enclosures and displacements²². Further, the concept is so ambiguous that anything and everything falls under it. Market-based instruments, especially those proposed since the Kyoto Protocol in 1995, can be used to justify initiatives that harm local communities under the guise of decarbonising the economy.

However, we need to make some qualifiers, too. Since we did not cover the role of states, especially developing countries such as BRICS and Arab countries that also participate in some of the MSIs (as well as challenge them), it is an important aspect to consider when interpreting the epistemic communities as a form (or not) of Western imperialism or colonialism in new clothes. For example, the internet governance MSI, Electronic World Trade Platform (eWTP), initiated by Chinese businessman and owner of Alibaba, Jack Ma, is in Hang-zhou, China. The MSI is a private sector-led and multi-stakeholder initiative that seeks to incubate eTrade rules and foster a more effective and efficient policy and business environment for cross-border electronic trade (including both B2B and B2C) development. With the Chinese government's protracted carving up of Jack Ma, Inc. through various regulatory measures, which Beijing has likened to putting a 'bridle on the horse',²³ it is not clear how this move that reduced the Ma's empire by half will impact the future of the eWTP. It is therefore most likely that relationships and partnerships forged through MSIs have alienated some state actors, which means that epistemic communities are contested, and perhaps more complex than what we are painting here. We will make this point again in the recommendations for further research.

²² <https://wrm.org.uy/articles-from-the-wrm-bulletin/viewpoint/nature-is-not-a-solution/>

²³ <https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgecalhoun/2021/06/07/the-sad-end-of-jack-ma-inc/?sh=7143907b123a>

Revolving doors between the UN, TNCs, and corporate philanthropies

Another critical component of the epistemic community is the revolving door that allows key people, so-called experts within this community, to move seamlessly from one MSI to the next.

An illustrative example is the case of former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown. The appointment of Brown as the UN Special Envoy for Global Education by Ban Ki-Moon in July 2012 has completely reshaped the role of the UN institutions from a leading role to a strategic partner. Brown is the go-to expert in several MSIs, such as the 2015 Education Commission, Education Cannot Wait Fund, Global Business Coalition for Education and International Commission on Financing Global Education Opportunity. He serves as Chair of the Global Strategic Infrastructure Initiative of the World Economic Forum. He also sits on the Board of the Kofi Annan Foundation, Graça Machel Trust and others, which are all important actors within the global governance space. Together, Brown and his wife, Sarah Brown, have played a significant role in establishing the Global Business Education Council, which aims to mobilise and leverage the resources of the corporate sector for investment in education. Therefore, it is no surprise that business and industry have achieved an almost equal stake as the UN institutions within the 12education-related MSIs we have analysed within one decade.

The movement of the likes of Gordon Brown from one MSI to the next has created webs or ecologies of MSIs with similar sets of actors—individuals and organisations—that spout similar narratives and solutions. These actors also facilitate the linking of compartmentalised issues or sectors discussed separately within the UN multilateral-governance system. For example, the WEF and World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) convene and host at least ten MSIs in the agriculture and climate-environment sectors, and interestingly have created the nexus between these two broad themes. They are leading actors in the following MSIs: Tropical Forests Alliance, Natural Capitals Coalition, Capitals Coalition, Natural Climate Solutions Alliance, Global Commons Alliance, UN Food Systems Summit 2021²⁴,

²⁴ The UNFSSS is what we call a grey area, as it is not completely a multilateral meeting but also not entirely an international business conference. It is somewhat a hybrid, blended multistakeholder arrangement.

EAT Lancet Commission on Sustainable Healthy Systems, New Vision for Agriculture, Global Council on Food Security and Nature for Climate. The concept around nature-based solutions is being linked to the concept of food systems, all within the framework of how corporations can adjust their business models to take them into account and not challenge the very capitalist development, which has caused the various crises in the first place.

The strategies used by corporations contribute to the strengthening of their power and influence not only in the sectoral MSIs but also in global governance. By power, we point to what Clapp & Fuchs (2009) argues are the multidimensional pillars on which corporate power rests: '*instrumental* as the means by which corporations wield direct influence on outcomes of policy processes through actions such as lobbying or funding political campaigns, drawing on their financial, human, and organisational resources and their access to influential figures; *structural* as the weight of corporations' material position in the global economy and their resulting ability to reward or punish countries for their policy choices; and *discursive power* as the role corporations play in framing issues and the use they make of narratives and norms that enhance their legitimacy'.²⁵ Multistakeholderism brings all these dimensions together.

Between perpetuating colonial legacies and neo-colonialism

As we have witnessed the steady rise of corporate power, which is at the heart of contemporary capitalism, we have also observed tropes that perpetuate colonial constructs. This is evident in the sectors of climate and environment and agriculture, in which TNCs led by the WEF are advancing a new sustainability buzzword--nature-based solutions--which are not only replete with capitalist logic (i.e., achieving ecological sustainability via markets) but are also imbued with colonial and cultural domination. Take the case of the eco-labels given by the Marine Stewardship Council, Forest Stewardship Council and Aquaculture Stewardship Council. Originally initiated by the WWF, these sustainability labels reinforce the idea that there are oceans and forests that need to be 'protected' from 'evil and un-civilised' humans, a moralising and paternalistic narrative reminiscent of how colonial

²⁵ Italics ours for emphasis; Clapp & Fuchs, 2009 as mentioned in McKeon, 2017, p.2.

powers justified their colonial conquests. This narrative can also be found in the debates around the 30x30 plan (reserve 30 per cent of the earth for conservation by 2030) encapsulated in the Post-2020 Biodiversity Framework.

Transnational conservation organisations that are active in multi-stakeholder groups advance the proposal in alliance with trans-national corporations by evoking renewed calls for fortress conservation or the creation of protected areas and natural parks, but also with capitalist logic such as global tourism. Tropes on the protection of forests as the 'last frontier' invoke colonial constructs of *Manifest Destiny* (*white man's burden*) and romanticised constructs about nature and wilderness captured by *Terra Nullius* (*of vast uninhabited lands*) doctrine. Efforts to include Indigenous peoples as 'natural partners' in conservation are imbued with common tropes of blaming the Indigenous peoples for environmental degradation (who have lost their cultural values and traditional practices of relating with nature and forests), and therefore, the solution is to restore their traditional roles through education performed by non-Indigenous, often Western conservationists.²⁶

At the same time, the dominance of corporate philanthropies such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), and their role in reshaping global health governance, for example, reeks of neo-colonialism. As we have noted in the section below, the foundation has invested its resources, influence and connections in multiple MSIs and the organisations involved in them, which create a situation that not only allows them to flex their muscles and power but also develop a relationship of dependence, subservience and a high degree of political control over the multilateral institutions (e.g., the World Health Organisation/WHO) and developing states involved in the MSIs, mimicking the relationship of traditional colonialism. (*See section on Public policy and public interests*)

Problems with stakeholder representation and 'participation'

While the approved category of stakeholders includes 'civil society organisations', which sometimes are flexibly interpreted to include

²⁶ June Mary Rubis & Noah Theriault (2020) Concealing protocols: conservation, Indigenous survivance, and the dilemmas of visibility, *Social & Cultural Geography*, 21:7, 962-984, DOI: [10.1080/14649365.2019.1574882](https://doi.org/10.1080/14649365.2019.1574882)

affected communities such as Indigenous peoples, farmers and women, in practice, civil society here mostly means big international NGOs (BINGOs) such as WWF International, Save the Children, Amref Health Africa, ICRC, TheirWorld, Internet Society, World Wide Web Foundation and The Nature Conservancy, among others (we have outlined this in the data findings below). They have a place in the governing bodies of MSIs as well as receive invites to participate in high-level meetings and dialogues. They also develop partnerships with corporations, such as in the case of WWF that launched multiple roundtables on sustainable agriculture in the early 2000s. These BINGOs are seen as (or will bring) the voices of ‘affected communities’. According to Gleckman (2018), the flexibility in the scope of a category of stakeholder creates internal confusion and has broader implications in terms of the MSI’s legitimacy. It is worth quoting him extensively here:

‘The flexibility in the coverage of a category can lead to internal confusions inside a given MSG (multistakeholder governance) group and significant misconceptions outside the group. Internally, some stakeholders may look at others and assume they cover a wider range of communities and stakeholders than is perceived by the actual participant, who may have a very different understanding about their own role in the process. Individuals and organisations outside the MSG group may look at the legitimacy of the undertaking with a high degree of suspicion if they don’t see what they take to be their constituent category being explicitly engaged in the process. This winnowing process, while it has some clear organisational and efficiency benefits, may well open the MSG group to critiques about fairness and legitimacy, hampering its own consensus-building process.’²⁷

Indeed, we have identified only ten organisations that belong to affected communities—farmers, Indigenous peoples, women and workers (see Table 1). In addition, only several professional groups such as the unions of students, associations and health workers are involved in some of the MSIs, too. The main question that warrants further inquiry is how are these categories of stakeholders chosen out of the thousands of organisations that work on the five themes/issues that we covered? To offer a short response, we link the question to the power of the

²⁷ <https://www.civicus.org/index.php/re-imagining-democracy/overviews/3377-multistakeholderism-a-new-way-for-corporations-and-their-new-partners-to-try-to-govern-the-world>

convenors who get to decide which stakeholders they want to invite in the MSIs they convene and facilitate and, more likely than not, they invite organisations— whether state, civil society or corporations—that are close or closer to the ideologies and visions that they want to advance.

Table 1. Identified Organisations/Individuals that MSIs claim to represent affected communities and trade unions

Name	MSI	Sectoral Representation
Association of Women and People of Chad	Tropical Forest Alliance	Affected communities
Daniel Maldonado/Agromonte	Florverde Sustainable Flowers	Affected communities
First Nations Women Advocating for Responsible Mining	Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance	Affected communities
Indonesia’s Palm Oil Smallholder Union	Tropical Forest Alliance	Affected communities
Coordinator of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin	Equitable Origin	Affected communities
Mining Affected Communities United in Action	Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance	Affected communities
World Farmers Alliance	Global Alliance for Climate Smart Agriculture	Affected communities
Associated Labor Unions–Trade Union Congress of the Philippines	Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials	Trade Unions

IndustriALL Global Union	Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance	Trade Unions
United Steelworkers Canada	Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance	Trade Unions

Related to the issue of stakeholder representation are participation and consent. Actors that participate in these MSIs implicitly or explicitly give their consent to be led by convenors of MSIs. While each actor has its own interests, motivation and agenda for participating, they become part of the development of a socio-political group that coheres around particular sets of ideas and discourses, which then crafts a ‘framework for action’.

However, there is some variance in terms of the involvement and influence of ‘civil society’ in the MSIs. For example, initial efforts involving non-state actors in education governance within multilateral forums came from international NGOs, which lobbied together to demand specific changes at the 2000 World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal. The prominent one being the Global Campaign for Education, born in 1999 at a meeting hosted by ActionAid, Oxfam International, Education International (the international federation of teachers’ unions) and the Global March against Child Labour (a grassroots movement formed in 1998 that links education with eradicating child labour).²⁸ From its early founding by a small cluster of international non-governmental organisations, the GCE has grown enormously. GCE remains an influential force within global education governance, and its constituents are part of several MSIs.

The new generation of MSIs, what we call paradigmatic/campaign-oriented (*see section on Evolution*), especially in the area of internet governance, has brought in many other actors, including businesses, philanthropies, IT corporations, etc. Similarly, civil society or small tech companies and collectives within the internet community have played a significant role in developing community standards and guidelines and often pushed the boundaries of innovation, as in the case of the free software movement. In fact, today's big corporations were once small

²⁸ Verger, Antoni, and Mario Novelli (eds.). *Campaigning for “Education for All”*. 2012. Sense Publishers: Rotterdam.

start-ups that started with big ideas and ideals and as champions of freedom, liberty, transparency and solidarity, but their growth and scale have become a threat for the broader internet community. The tussle within internet governance between ‘radical’ civil society actors, corporations and governments continues, which led to the premature death of the NetMundial Initiative in 2016 within two years of its launch.

In sum, in some sectors, we see that civil society challenges and remains an influential player. Still, primarily, their role is either being taken over or co-opted, as has been the charge against the GCE and some of its constituents. Co-optation remains a threat since they are dependent on governments and foundations for monetary support, which may likely compromise their stand within the governing or advisory bodies of the MSIs.

Public policy and public interest concerns: zeroing in on account-ability and democratic deficit

Locating the accountability of these MSIs is a near-impossible task. The key question remains—to whom are these MSIs accountable? To their donors, who also sit in their governing bodies? To the states that they want to influence? To the UN system, which acts in an inside-outside capacity? Or to the shareholders of the corporations that lead most of these MSIs? While the database does not cover the mechanisms that would help connect the dots in terms of MSI accountability, the issue of upward accountability, which initially refers to how NGOs are accountable to their donors rather than to the constituents or marginalised sectors that they profess to serve, offers some leads. We can apply this concept by using the example of the involvement of mega-philanthropies such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) as donors and key decision makers inside the MSIs.

BMGF is unabashedly proud of what it calls catalytic philanthropy, which is summed up in this sentence:

‘With much of what we do, our goal is to provide seed funding for various ideas. Some will fail. The ones that prove out can get further support from other backers. We fill the function that the government cannot—making a lot of risky bets with the expectation that at least a few of them will show some success. At that point, governments can

*invest in innovations that have some track record, a much more comfortable role for them.*²⁹

The foundation has invested its clout, connections and financial resources in more than 15 per cent of the MSIs we surveyed: Scaling Up Nutrition Initiative; Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition; Initiative for Smallholder Financing; COVAX; GAVI; World Health Summit; UHC 2030; RBM Partnership to end Malaria; Partnership for Maternal, NewBorn and Child Health; Health Systems Governance Collaborative; Health Data Collaborative; Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents; and Global Fund to fight Aids, TB and Malaria (GFATM). In addition, Microsoft has a significant presence on the internet and in data governance MSIs. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the BMGF's involvement in health has changed the world of global health governance. The most recent development is the possibility of BMGF becoming the single biggest donor to the WHO, if and when the United States withdraws from the UN body.

This raises a few concerns, which include the i) influence of a private foundation over the global health agenda and priorities even though it cannot formally set them the way that a member state does; ii) accountability and transparency of BMGF; iii) overall accountability in global health; and iv) issues of neo-colonialism/imperialism. Unlike member states, which can be called out by its citizens and civil society organisations when their policies are problematic, BMGF is ultimately accountable to its trustees and nobody else. So, when an 'idea it seeds or funds' fails, there are no mechanisms to call them out, especially if those failed ideas are advanced and implemented by a multistake-holder group. Further, the billions of dollars of grants they provide to MSIs and organisations that are best positioned to raise critical voices have 'created a blinding halo effect' around the private foundation's work.³⁰

Another major concern among MSI critics and watchdogs is the democratic deficit that is almost an intrinsic feature; for instance, Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL), which originated as an initiative created by former UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-Moon in

²⁹ Gates, B. (2014) Catalytic Philanthropy: Innovating where markets won't and governments can't, Accessible at <https://www.gatesnotes.com/About-Bill-Gates/Catalytic-Philanthropy-Innovating-Where-Markets-Wont>

³⁰ Levine, M. (2020). Is the Gates Foundation out of control?, See <https://nonprofitquarterly.org/is-the-gates-foundation-out-of-control/>

September 2011. He formed the initiative in the context of a resolution that declared 2012 as the International Year of Sustainable Energy for All, which signaled the centrality of renewable energy as an alternative to fossil fuels in ending poverty and addressing climate change. As part of the initiative, Ban Ki-Moon called for collaborative actions around three objectives to be achieved by 2030: ensure universal access to modern energy services; double the rate of improvement of energy efficiency; and double the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix. He then appointed Kandeh Yumkella as his Special Representative for Sustainable Energy for All and its first CEO. It has transitioned into an independent organisation that maintains close ties with the UN via relationship agreements and its CEO as the UN's Secretary-General Special Representative for Sustainable Energy for All and one of the Co-Chairs of the UN Energy.

The main problems connected with SE4ALL are that i) while it was initiated under the UNSG's office, there was no resolution from the General Assembly or UN Framework Convention on Climate Change or intergovernmental debate, ii) the MSI has reinterpreted the three objectives above by arguing that 'certain areas of the sustainable energy transition demand more urgent, focused action' and its 'work involves engaging stakeholders—business, government, consumers and NGOs—to ensure they are committed to these areas'³¹, however, no intergovernmental body oversees its autonomous actions and reinterpretations, and iii) its transition to an independent organisation whose legal status is protected under an Austrian law of Quasi-International Organization (QuIO) was more or less prompted by the demands of some government members of the UN General Assembly to be involved.

Pushback against MSIs

In several arenas, opposing and critical forces are actively challenging these multistakeholder governance institutions' legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness. The most recent is that the Civil Society and Indigenous Peoples' Mechanism for relations with the Committee on Food Security (CSM-CFS) has called for a boycott of the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit unless it shifts radically away from corporate interests³² and for re-grounding the Summit in individual and collective

³¹ <https://www.seforall.org/what-we-do>

³² <http://www.csm4cfs.org/letter-csm-coordination-committee-cfs-chair/>

human rights and knowledge, as well as real solutions such as agroecology and food sovereignty as practiced by the peasants, pastoralists, rural women, Indigenous peoples and others who are most affected. The CSM-CFS sent two letters, one focused on Dr. Agnes Kalibata, president of the controversial Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA as a Special Envoy to the UNFSS21 and another zeroed in on governance problems and multistakeholderism.³³ The second letter, which was addressed to the chair of the CFS, Thai Ambassador Thanawat Tiensin, has been signed by more than 185 organisations. It also calls for the defence of democratic public institutions and inclusive multilateralism, which deserve an extensive quote:

‘The UN Secretary-General should publicly commit to ensuring that the FSS and its outcomes will strengthen human rights-based governance of food systems on all levels, which assigns clear responsibilities and obligations to states as duty bearers, the people as rights holders, including Indigenous Peoples, and a dramatically reduced role to the private and corporate sector, in accordance with its function as the third party under international human rights law.

In this context, the UN Secretary-General and Member States should also underline the importance of a democratic multilateral system, including the CFS and the Rome-based Agencies for the governance of food. The FSS must strengthen, and in no way undermine, weaken or substitute the CFS or its components, particularly the independence of the High-Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) and the autonomy of civil society and Indigenous Peoples’ participation in this foremost inclusive intergovernmental and international global platform for food security and nutrition.’³⁴

Beyond the letters, the CSM-CFS has also launched and organised a counter-summit and mobilisation against the UN Food Systems Pre-Summit on 25–28 July 2021, in Rome and online. Under the banner of People’s Autonomous Response to the UN Food Systems Summit³⁵, it has gathered social movements and civil society organisations around

³³ Also see this letter signed by La Via Campesina alongside IUF, WFFP, IITC, Greenpeace, Amnesty International and more than 550 organizations. See https://www.foodsovereignty.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/EN_Edited_draft-letter-UN-food-systems-summit_070220.pdf

³⁴ <https://www.csm4cfs.org/letter-csm-coordination-committee-cfs-chair/>

³⁵ <https://www.foodsystems4people.org/about-2/>

the world to collectively rise up against the corporate food system, call on the UN to not pursue the agenda of corporate front groups, and instead, transform the food systems through real solutions such as agroecology and food sovereignty. These calls are echoed by former and current UN Special Rapporteurs on the Right to Food who are also unhappy and worried by the UNFSS21, which they deem as highly problematic because ‘issues of power, participation, and account-ability (i.e. how and by whom will the outcomes be delivered) remain unresolved’ and instead, calls for three overlapping radical changes:

- i) ‘that the right to food must be central to all aspects of the Summit, with attention on holding those with power account-able;
- ii) agroecology should be recognized as a paradigm (if not the paradigm) for transforming food systems, alongside action-able recommendations to support agroecological transition; and
- iii) the CFS should be designated as the home of the Summit outcomes, and the place where it is discussed and implemented, using its inclusive participation mechanisms’.³⁶

Database: Key Features and insights


This section contains eight key features and trends culled from the database. The features are mainly descriptive analyses of the data around the timeline/formation of the MSIs, sectoral and sub-sectoral characteristics, typologies, influential stakeholders, role of the private sector, the role of the UN system organisations, funders and headquarters or domiciles.

SDGs as the context and imperative for MSIs

We catalogued 103 global multistakeholder institutions that were formed between January 2000 to January 2021. Thirty-nine per cent or 40 MSIs were established during the first decade of the twenty-first century when the Millennium Development Goals (2000) and UN Global Compact (2000) were launched. During the second decade, 52 per cent (or 53 MSIs) were created, and another two this January 2021. Ten

³⁶ <http://www.ipsnews.net/2021/03/un-food-systems-summit-not-respond-urgency-reform/>

timebound MSIs were established for a specific mandate, then folded after they reached their goals or funding ended or were wrapped up due to other reasons. (See Figure 2). While we cannot compare the data from the 1990s,³⁷ since it is beyond the scope of the mapping exercise, what we can observe is that more MSIs were launched during the second decade of the new century, after the launch of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which has adopted ‘multistakeholder partnerships’ as an integral component of its implementation and mentioning it as a systemic issue under Goal 17 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).³⁸



One MSI was reformed during this period: AgriProFocus, which was established in 2005 as a multistakeholder initiative to promote agriculture in Dutch development policy and bring together organisations working to enhance the role and plight of organised producers in the developing countries. In 2021, it transitioned to the Netherlands Food Partnership initiated from the Dutch Ministerial Level as an ‘ideas accelerator’ and multistakeholder collaboration between relevant Dutch organisations and international partners to achieve urgent changes that contribute to sustainable food systems and nutrition security as a

³⁷ We argued in the introduction that the MSIs are a relatively recent phenomenon and an innovation of the post-Washington Consensus. It is probable that if we cover MSIs in the 1990s, there will be fewer in the sectors of health, agriculture and food, climate, and none in education.

³⁸ Specifically, check points 17.6 and 17.7 of the SDG document, which states the role of multi-stakeholder partnerships: “Enhance the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in all countries, in particular developing countries”; and “Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships” (UNGA, 2015, p.27/35). Accessed at https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E (May 10, 2021)

contribution to the realisation of the second target of the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.

However, when we look at the timeline, that is, year-on-year formation of the MSIs, two interesting observations can be made:

- There are two prominent peaks, meaning the years when most MSIs were formed: 2006 and 2009.
- That post-2013, we see a steady increase in the number of MSIs created each year.

For the first observation, we can offer a conjecture that the increase in 2006 relates to the 2005 World Summit held between 14-16 September 2005, a follow-up summit meeting to the UN 2000 Millennium Summit that engendered the MDGs. Billed as the 'largest gathering of world leaders in history' when 170 leaders were present, a primary outcome of the Summit was a commitment to spend billions of dollars for the achievement of the MDGs. The 2009 rise of new MSIs was a reaction to tackling the multiple crises of finance, food and climate of 2007/2008. The post-2013 increase, as mentioned before, firstly, can be connected to the emphasis of the SDGs for multistakeholderism as a mechanism for the realisation of the 17 goals, compared to eight goals in MDGs, that expanded the number of themes and topics. Secondly, the increase is aligned with the Global Redesign Initiative of the World Economic Forum that contains a comprehensive set of proposals for re-engineering global governance, particularly issues they deem ungoverned by state-led multi-lateralism.

Finally, when we examine the timeline of MSI formation by sector (see Table 2), we spot two patterns:

- There is an exponential growth of MSIs from the first to the second decade of the new century for the sectors of education (900 per cent increase), global health (50 per cent increase), and internet data and governance (250 per cent).
- The reverse is happening for agriculture, land, food and nutrition, and climate and the environment. Both sectors have seen a decrease of MSIs in the same period by -47.1 per cent and -18.2 per cent, respectively.

Table 2. Timeline of MSI formation by sector

Year	Internet & data governance	Agriculture, Land, Food & Nutrition	Climate & Environment	Education	Global Health	Multiple Sectors (but the entry point is Climate & Environment)	Grand Total
2000-2010	4	17	11	1	6	1	40
2011-2021	14	9	9	10	9	2	53
Timebound	3	1	3	1	2	0	10
Total	21	27	23	12	17	3	103

While it can be argued that counting MSIs may not be informative because there are too many variables that can explain their ebb and flow (plus taking into account the limits of the mapping), we still maintain that it is a good exercise to show the timeline per sector because it reveals the intensified interests of global actors, particularly the corporate sector in the field of education, global health, and internet and data governance. Since 2010, big tech companies such as Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Google and Facebook have become the world's most giant corporations and have a presence in multiple sectors beyond ICT. They have organised initiatives related to data security, safety, surveillance, terrorism, the Internet of Things, Artificial Intelligence and others. Further, the reduction in the numbers of MSIs in the agriculture and climate and environment sectors may likely relate to the 'sustainable roundtables' that were organised in the early 2000s, and those processes generated multiple socio-environmental-setting MSIs. Post-2010, fewer environmental and social standard-setting MSIs were formed, but a new typology of multistakeholder institutions is being established along with policy- and project-oriented ones. This new typology also reflects the changing nature and transformation of MSIs as they try to adapt to new and emerging global issues and challenges.

Absence of rights-based themes in MSIs

Out of the 103 MSIs we mapped, 26 per cent are focused on agriculture, land, food and nutrition, while 22 per cent are tackling climate and environmental issues, and 20 per cent are focused on internet and data

governance. About 17 per cent of the MSIs have been organised around global health, and 12 per cent are oriented towards global education. We identified three multi-sectoral MSIs, which are catalogued under the database of climate and environment because the ‘planetary crisis’ is their entry point.

In terms of sub-themes, each sector focuses on a whole gamut of issues that the initiators/convensors of the MSIs perceive as gaps, ‘burning’ issues of the day or un-governed tasks in global governance. Table 3 shows the diversity of themes ranging from sustainability to financial inclusion, renewable energy and vaccinations. It must be noted here that we adopted a mixed approach in coming up with the sub-themes: i) adopt the self-defined categories of MSIs such as sustainable agriculture, sustainable ocean/investment, natural capital, etc.; and ii) re-categorised sub-themes to convey meanings to the reader, for example finance and infectious diseases, and natural capital under multiple sectors to denote that an MSI focuses on natural capital but its activities are geared beyond the climate and environmental sector and includes agriculture, transportation, energy, water, etc. The details of the categorisation are outlined in the accompanying coding sheet of this paper.

Table 3. Distribution of MSIs by sector and sub-themes

Sector/Sub-Themes	Count of MSIs
Agriculture, land, food, nutrition	27
Sustainable agriculture	12
Food security and nutrition	5
Land governance	3
Food systems	2
Sustainable ocean/investment	2
Financial Inclusion	1
Fisheries	1
Right to food and nutrition	1

Climate, Environment, Energy, Extractives	23
Forests	7
Extractives	6
Renewable Energy	5
Natural Climate Solutions	2
Climate Finance	1
Natural Capital	1
Security and Human Rights	1
Education	12
Primary Education (and other issues)	3
Digital	2
Education Finance	1
Education for All	1
Employment, Capacity Building	1
Higher Education	1
ICT	1
Investment	1
Right to Education/human rights	1
Global Health	17
Right to Health/ Human rights	4
Finance and infectious diseases	3
COVID/Vaccines	2
Vaccination for infectious diseases	2
Data & universal healthcare	2
Health Professionals	2

Medicines	1
Security	1
Internet and Data Governance	21
Cyber Security, terrorism, development	7
Human Rights	3
Access & development	3
Artificial Intelligence & technology	2
Public policy and cooperation	2
Open Source	1
Public policy and cooperation	1
Jurisdiction & legal interoperability	1
Trade and e-commerce	1
Multiple sectors	3
Commons	1
Natural Capital	1
Renewable Energy	1

Despite the diversity of themes tackled, what the data reveals is that only ten per cent of the MSIs focus on human rights—the right to food, health, education, access to the internet and a healthy environment. Within these MSIs, the rights-based approach to global governance often comes in conflict with neoliberal frameworks that advance the corporate sector as the engine of development and economic growth. At the same time, state actors and the UN bodies seek to stabilise and further entrench their roles through the introduction and legitimisation of multistakeholderism as new institutions and forms of governmentality.

The Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) ‘Movement’ is a case-in-point. According to FIAN International (2020), the SUN’s broad objective is framed in the human rights language, but in practice its recommendations and

interventions advance a narrow and technical interpretation of the proximate causes of malnutrition, which not only promote risks but also fail to address structural factors. The same is true for Alliance for Affordable Internet, which aims to provide affordable access to the internet in the least-developed countries. Still, its recommendations have focused primarily on neoliberal reforms in those countries, and access only secondarily. The reforms include opening up the telecom sector to private corporations and using market access as a gateway to instituting other reforms.

Further, two themes appear common across the five sectors: (human) security/securityisation, and investment and financing. The concept of 'human security' and its active promotion by a wide range of UN institutions began at the 2005 World Summit, where world leaders defined it as 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. The implication was expanding human security beyond the military-political paradigm and therefore covering social, environmental, energy and health issues. For example, the Food and Agriculture Organization has actively promoted food security, the United Nations Environment Programme, environmental security and the International Energy Agency, advising its member countries on energy security. This trend within the UN system traveled into MSIs, with the emergence of initiatives such as the Global Health Security Agenda formed in 2014 as a group of 69 countries, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and private sector companies coming together to achieve the vision of a world safe and secure from global health threats posed by infectious diseases. In internet and data governance, the Geneva Dialogue on Responsible Behaviour in Cyberspace was convened in 2018 by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs to map the roles and responsibilities of actors – states, the business sector, civil society, and the academic and tech communities – in contributing to greater security and stability in cyberspace in the context of international peace and security.

On the themes of investment and financing, two patterns arise from the database: i) each sector has one to three MSIs devoted solely to tackling financing, whether it is about climate finance, education finance, financial inclusion for smallholders or financing for infectious diseases; ii) around 15 per cent of the MSIs discuss the issue, primarily from the angle of how to raise the needed resources for supporting the implementation of proposed projects and interventions emerging from that MSI at scale. Scale here is reduced to a technical intervention that

entails project expansion without changing assumptions regardless of the different contexts where those projects will be implemented.

In some instances, the MSIs have created a funding mechanism whose key mandate is to raise monies from both private and public sources. An example is GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance, which is a multistakeholder, public-private global health partnership created to increase access to immunisation in developing countries. With an observer status at the World Health Assembly, GAVI brings together developing countries and donor governments, the World Health Organization, UNICEF, the World Bank, the vaccine industry in both industrialised and developing countries, research and technical agencies, civil society and philanthropies such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. In 2006, the International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) was established to raise funds for GAVI and help reduce what it calls 'vaccine-preventable deaths and illness' among children in developing countries. Its donors - the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Australia, Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, South Africa, and Brazil - have collectively pledged more than US\$6.5 billion over 10-20 years. With the World Bank acting as a treasury manager, the financing facility then issues 'Vaccine Bonds' in the capital markets that convert the long-term government pledges into immediately available cash resources.³⁹ It claims that it has raised US\$6 billion from institutional and individual investors from 2016-2018, 20 per cent of which were disbursed to fund vaccines for 73 developing countries.

Similarly, a new financing engine, the International Finance Facility for Education (IFFEd), housed at the World Bank, was established in 2020 to further complement the existing grant instruments like the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) and Education Cannot Wait (ECW) funds. It is specifically designed to tackle the education crisis in lower-middle-income countries (LMICs), home to 80 per cent of the world's children.

One may say that these financing facilities are needed given that education or health remains a lower-priority area at the global governance level. However, given the ideological commitment of the IFIs and businesses to market reforms, several concerns have been raised that the IFFEd might add to the debt burdens of the countries given the practice of the World Bank to tie its grants and loans with con-

³⁹ https://iffim.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/IFFIm_2019_Brochure.pdf

ditionalities. Thus, the risks outweigh the potential benefits of such financing schemes.

Evolution from project and policy to paradigmatic interventions

We have identified six typologies among the MSIs surveyed: policy-oriented, project-oriented, combination (with/without financing), paradigmatic/campaign-oriented, standard-setting (environmental and social, and high-impact) and grey area. Grey area means MSIs that are in the process of metamorphosis and hybridisation; that is, they may be currently multilateral bodies in the process of being transformed into MSIs or that they are already a mixture of both. According to Sofia Monsalve, secretary-general of FIAN International, ‘the weirdest case of metamorphosis so far is UN Nutrition⁴⁰, the merger of the UN Network for the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement and the UN System Standing Committee on Nutrition (UNSCN) to form UN Nutrition that was formally announced at the ECOSOC Management Segment in July 2020. So, was SUN elevated to a UN body? *De facto* yes, *de jure*, they will hide behind this “UN Network” for SUN. Just unbelievable.⁴¹

The differentiation of types of MSIs stems from the varied functions and purposes that they claim to play. These typologies build on the work of multistakeholderism expert, Dr. Harris Gleckman, of the Center for Governance and Sustainability at the University of Massachusetts Boston. According to him, *environmental and social standard setting* focus on introducing ethical, social, environmental or developmental products or processes into international trade, while the primary goal of *high-impact standard setting* is ‘to convene the leading firms in a given market for new and high-impact technologies to build a consensus on how these new technologies can function across national boundaries without the engagement of the ISO, while providing a platform in which to reconcile the views of social justice civil society organisations as well as academic and government bodies on the best route forward’.⁴² The former relates to sustainable MSIs in the agriculture and environment sectors, while the latter refers to internet and data governance. *Policy-*

⁴⁰ See <https://www.unnutrition.org/>

⁴¹ Comments by Sofia Monsalve on the first draft, personal communication, June 28, 2021.

⁴² Gleckman, Harris. (2018). Multistakeholder Governance and Democracy: A Global Challenge. 10.4324/9781315144740, p.22.

oriented MSIs aim to set global policy goals, and *project-oriented* ones to implement specific projects. There are combination MSIs, which meld two or more purposes, and some have built-in financing, and others do not.

We expanded on Gleckman's definitions to include a new category, which does not fit any previous typologies. *Paradigmatic/campaign-oriented* MSIs seek to advance a paradigm/ ideology/ concept that attempts to re-engineer global governance and act as campaigning vehicles. This category has a qualitative difference with policy-oriented MSIs because they not only aim to change policies but also change the conversation, rules of the game and current 'system' of multilateral governance. It includes several of WEF's Shaping the Future Platforms, with the relevant sectors in the mapping exercise we have included in the database.⁴³

These 'new' generation MSIs are quite aggressive and ambitious in the scope and breadth of issues they tackle. An example is the Global Commons Alliance (GCA) that promotes the 'global commons' and planetary-crisis paradigm introduced by Swedish scientist Johan Rockstrom of the Stockholm Resilience Centre. Rockstrom is internationally recognised on global sustainability issues and one of the leaders of the GCA. Launched in June 2019, the Global Commons Alliance claims to be 'an unprecedented partnership of more than 50 of the world's most forward-looking organisations in the fields of philanthropy, science, environment, business, cities, and advocacy'⁴⁴ that seeks to transform the global economy, while maintaining the resilience and stability of the Earth's natural systems. It also aims to create the most powerful network to scale science-based action that protects the people and the planet. Its four components are the Earth Commission (scientific arm), Science-Based Target Network (targeting cities to adopt global commons metrics/targets), Earth HQ (media arm) and Systems Change Lab (advocacy/networking/campaigning arm) that act as 'hubs and accelerator of ideas'. The alliance has its origins in the 2016 dialogue convened by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), in partnership with the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), the Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC), the World Resources Institute (WRI) and the World Economic

⁴³ See <https://www.weforum.org/platforms>


⁴⁴ <https://globalcommonsalliance.org/partners/>

Forum (WEF) Environmental Systems Initiative to discuss the state of play.

The GCA's push for combining the 'global commons' idea with the planetary boundaries is in line with the Great Reset roll-out of the WEF in January 2021, particularly with creating a 'stakeholder economy' and building in a more 'resilient, equitable, and sustainable' way anchored on environmental, social and governance metrics that can incorporate more green public infrastructure⁴⁵ Further, the science-business-civil society close connections are reflected by who sits in its governing board—top executives from the WEF, World Resources Institute, WWF International, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Japan-based Center for Global Commons (former head of GEF), two observers from the WBCSD and a High-Level Champion for Climate Action-COP 26. It has its coordination and communications teams that act as a secretariat for the whole network. The paradigmatic/campaign-orient-ed MSIs, in other words, are concretising new metrics that harmonise profit, planet, and growth goals and are rolling out a roadmap for a 'sustainable' future in which the corporate sector (and not states) are the main movers and shakers.

In terms of distribution, Figure 3 shows that 20 per cent of the MSIs are combination MSIs (without financing), 18 per cent are environmental and social standard ones, 17 per cent each are high-impact standard and policy-oriented and 15 per cent are a combination with financing. The new category, paradigmatic/campaign, comprise ten per cent of the total MSIs we surveyed. While the least number of MSIs in terms of typology is project-oriented with three per cent and grey area with one per cent. However, it must be noted that in the combination category—both with and without financing— more than one-third of them have components of policy and/or project, and 16 per cent of them have paradigmatic/campaign orientation. Again, the caveat here is that these fractional values must be seen within the overall sample size of 103 surveyed MSIs and therefore, remain descriptive.

⁴⁵ <https://www.weforum.org/great-reset/>




If we further examine the typologies of MSIs and the decades when they were launched, the database points to the following patterns:

- more environmental & social standard mechanisms were launched from 2000–2010;
- more high-impact standard (related to internet and data governance) MSIs were established between 2011 and 2020;
- the same number of combination MSIs (without financing) and project-oriented MSIs were launched in the first and second decades of the twenty-first century;
- more combination MSIs that have components of financing/resource mobilisations, paradigmatic/campaign-oriented and policy-oriented ones were formed in 2011–2020;
- most timebound MSIs are policy-oriented and high-impact standard-focused.

Who governs the MSIs?

We identified 14 categories of stakeholders, namely UN bodies and other multilateral intergovernmental organisations, Northern donors and governments, regional institutions, international NGOs, national NGOs, affected communities, trade unions, business/in-dustry, international financial institutions and development finance institutions, philanthropies, academic and research institutions, Southern governments/developing countries and others. In most MSIs, non-governmental organisations and governmental actors are lumped together as ‘civil society’ and ‘governments’. What we did is to disaggregate further the actors within ‘civil society’ and ‘governments’ that get invited and participate in the governing structures of MSIs to show a more textured analysis. Further, as mentioned in our methodology found in Annex 2, as researchers and coders, we made a judgment call on identifying the influential actors within the MSIs’ governance structure and verified them with existing literature and reports. In certain cases where there are large governing bodies of more than 20 actors, making it difficult to ascertain who the dominant actors are, we identified the chair and vice-chair as influential actors. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation-supported MSIs, which often have large governing bodies, are an exception since we received additional information from civil society experts who closely monitor these MSIs.

There are 434 distinct actors identified in the database. The top 12 most ubiquitous and influential ‘stakeholders’ are the World Bank, which is active in the governing bodies of 27 MSIs. The WHO and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) come second as occupying power seats in 16 MSIs. At the same time, the top executives of WEF/WBCSD sit on the boards of 14 MSIs. UNESCO is in 12 MSIs, while USAID, UNICEF, tech giant Microsoft, and WWF are all key players in ten MSIs. The Swiss and Norwegian governments, through their aid agencies, are key decision-makers in eight MSIs (See Figure 4). Interestingly, the same top tier of ‘stakeholders’ are funders of these MSIs, which reinforce the notion that those who hold the ‘power of the purse’ have more influence over the strategic directions of the MSIs.



In terms of the distribution of categories of stakeholders (see Figure 1), the corporate sector or business and industry dominate the decision-making bodies of the 103 MSIs. They comprise 33 per cent of the total actors identified in the database. They are followed by academic and research institutions that make up 15 per cent of the total actors present in the governing bodies of MSIs, while inter-national NGOs trail behind with 12 per cent. The UN bodies, other MSIs, experts, and consultants and Northern donors collectively make up 27 percent of the total actors who are decision-makers in the MSIs. What is noticeable from the data is that there are only 16 philanthropies that sit in the governing structures of MSIs, and yet certain mega-philanthropists such as the BMFG hold sway in these multistakeholder institutions and, at the same time, advance their views about solving global problems.

Further, there are only 13 Southern governments, namely Colombia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Malaysia, Nepal, Rwanda, the Republic of Sey-chelles, Sierra Leone, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates and developing countries from the G20, which includes Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey.⁴⁶ These countries have interests mostly in internet and data governance, agricultural exports and renewable energy. Only a handful of representatives from affected communities and trade unions sit on the decision-making bodies of MSIs. For instance, Table 1 summarises the ten organisations representing affected communities and trade unions,

⁴⁶ The Group of 20 countries is comprised of 19 developed and developing countries and the European Union that ‘works together’ to address issues related to the global economy such as international financial stability, climate change and sustainable development. The 19 countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

which are part of only seven MSIs' governing structures. These MSIs are primarily environmental and social standard-setting MSIs such as the Roundtable for Sustainable Biomaterials, Equitable Origin, Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance and Floraverde Sustainable Flowers. Only two are policy-oriented, the FAO-initiated Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agri-culture and the Tropical Forest Alliance hosted by the WEF.

The stakeholder analysis within internet governance further presents an interesting trend. Compared to the other sectors, the top three influential stakeholders are industry/business, academic/research institutions and international NGOs. The involvement of international NGOs has resulted from the pushback for greater participation for civil society and sharing of power. However, most of these actors are in the United States. Further, we note that MSIs often use civil society actors and organisations within their governance actors to derive political legitimacy from their presence. The stark absence of South-ern governments and affected communities on the governance mechanisms of many of the MSIs points to the skewed nature of the power balance and the continued dominance of a handful of actors since the inception of the internet. MSIs have failed to make any changes or disrupt the existing power balance. (*See details within the internet and data governance MSIs analysis.*)

What are the broader implications of these findings? One, the ubiquity of the corporate sector, selected academic and research institutions and certain international NGOs in multistakeholder institutions point to a growing tripartite alliance that seeks to gain influence and power. In many MSIs, the collaboration strengthens their discursive power in framing issues and solutions to problems that may consequently render political legitimacy and clout.

At the same time, the involvement and active participation of intergovernmental bodies within the UN system legitimises multi-stakeholder governance. Indeed, since 2002, the UN General Assembly has adopted resolutions that contribute to the further entrenchment and evolution of the concept and practice of multistakeholderism in global governance. The most recent is UN Resolution 73/254, titled 'Towards global partnerships: a principle-based approach to enhanced cooperation between the United Nations and all relevant partner', adopted in 2018 by the General Assembly, which emphasised the importance of multistakeholder 'partnerships in "mobilising and sharing knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, complementing the efforts of Governments and supporting the achievement of the Sustainable

Development Goals, in particular in developing countries” (p.3). According to the same resolution, these partnerships must have ‘common purpose’ and ‘mutual benefit and respect’ as voluntary partnerships. On top of this, Northern donors, governments, IFIs and philanthropies are willing to bankroll and support MSIs. The result is a powerful combination of political, social and economic capital working together to make multistakeholder governance work.

Two, questions around ‘stakeholder representation’ and democratic deficit abound— who gets to sit at the table, who gets excluded, which voices are muted, and whose agenda dominates? How are ‘stakeholders’ identified in the first place? For example, in global health governance, the WHO remains an important actor, but the IFIs/DFIs, corporate philanthropies and Northern governments represented by their development aid agencies have the dominant role in shaping the overall health agenda. Only eight per cent of international NGOs are involved in the MSIs; some find a place in the governing boards, but at least in the health sector, they are not initiators or convenors. Southern governments, especially in the least-developing countries and affected communities do not often have a prominent role (as in convening, funding, leadership) in the global health MSIs. They are often invited as stakeholders or partners in implementing pre-conceived projects and policies on the ground that already come with a cocktail of strategies, formulae for success, targets and tools for evaluation. It remains true too that in the era of global governance marked by networks and linkages across sectors and compared to the well-resourced businesses and foundations, affected communities and civil society from low- and middle-income countries often find it hard to deploy resources to conduct multisite advocacy and ensure participation in these MSIs.

Since representations in MSIs are not democratically elected, based on the data we can infer that ‘like-minded’ groups get a seat at the table, which makes it possible to reach consensus easily. It makes MSIs dangerous if they are seen as alternatives to traditional state-led multilateral responses to global issues.

While our study does not look into the dynamics of the internal governance of MSIs, we observe three rudimentary features: i) the internal governance structures of MSIs are varied and multi-tiered depending on how big or small it is as well as how expansive their operations are; ii) apart from the existence of some form of governing or operational board, there is often an additional structure called an

‘advisory board’ that provides strategic or financial advice to the governing board. A lot of corporations and technical experts are invited and pulled into this ‘advisory board’; iii) the secretariat plays an important role, especially in the day-to-day operations of the MSIs; and iv) funders often sit on the governing and/or advisory boards and are part of the deal. With the latter, when a funder plays multiple roles, such as in the case of the BMGF in the global health MSIs, and the WB-initiated MSIs, such as the defunct Global Partnership for Ocean, they shape the agenda and more.

Corporate Sector: convener, initiator and leader

We have identified 41 unique combinations of roles that corporations play in an MSI: as leaders, initiator/convener, host, funder, advisor, strategic partner, implementer, target/clientele, members and observers. The corporate sector often combines two or more of these roles when they participate in an MSI. However, based on the data, in 75 per cent of the MSIs, the most common roles they perform are *initiating/convener and leadership*. As initiator/convener, they perform gatekeeping functions and guardians of legitimacy and provide leadership in selecting what they deem as apt multistakeholder categories⁴⁷. This point links to previous sections that, in most cases, the initiators/convener choose like-minded and cooperative individuals and organisations that will make things happen rather than offer opposing voices and derail the MSI. In all the sectors, the corporate sector has convened MSIs; they have developed a parallel system alongside what they view as a political vacuum and failure of the state-led multilateral system in addressing global challenges and interlocking crises.

Further, leadership also takes the form of setting the agenda, framing issues, providing solutions, standard-setting and policy advice, especially in the absence of global governance mechanisms. For instance, most of the internet and data governance MSIs are led by Big Tech. Based on the cases we curated, the private sector has determined the rules of cyberspace governance, but there are counter-movements to subject corporations to democratic norms and accountability via multilateralism, and these actors are, of course, resisting such moves.

⁴⁷ <https://www.civicus.org/index.php/re-imagining-democracy/overviews/3377-multistakeholderism-a-new-way-for-corporations-and-their-new-partners-to-try-to-govern-the-world>

In 52 per cent of the MSIs, the private sector has played the role of *strategic partnership*. It translates to the provision of technical assistance, innovation, investment and implementation. Or in other words, as strategic partners, they act as a key collaborator, second-rate partner and support group in the brokering and flourishing of MSIs. For example, in the education sector, one of the foci of MSIs is the progressive realisation of the SDG goal on putting every child in school, particularly in primary education. It has led to programs that prioritise enrolment over the quality of education and associated infrastructure. The private sector has been recognised by education stakeholders as sources of innovation and investment, and therefore a strategic partner in these MSIs. In the context of COVID-19, when the shift to online education has been burgeoning, more internet companies and big tech are being tapped to participate in MSIs.

A case in point is the Global Education Initiative (GEI), conceived and launched at the Governors' Meeting for Information, Technology, and Telecommunications held during the 2003 World Economic Forum Annual Meeting. John Chambers, Chief Executive Officer of Cisco, and other CEOs present proposed creating a collaborative partnership between business and government to transform education. It started as a country initiative with programmes in Jordan, India, Egypt and Palestine, and later joined hands with UNESCO in 2006 to make it a global programme.⁴⁸ It is important because GEI was one of the early generations of MSIs, which advocated for a shift from the public-private partnership (PPP) model to the next generation of multistakeholder and development partnerships.

Similarly, in the global health sector, strategic partnership with the private sector comes mainly in the form of public-private partnerships (or public-civil society-corporate partnerships). The Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents (GFF) is a multistakeholder global partnership housed at the World Bank, which focuses and scales up 'evidence-driven investments' to enhance reproductive, newborn, maternal, adolescent and child health and nutrition in 36 low- and middle-income countries. Launched in 2015, the GFF deploys targeted strengthening of primary health care systems as a core strategy to achieve Universal Health Coverage and SDG. The private sector supports GFF's work at the country level through the Investors Group, which convenes

⁴⁸ <https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-education-initiative-retrospective-partnerships-education-development-2003-2011>

several times a year. The support is mainly in terms of financing and technical assistance to developing and implementing national health plans that scale up access to affordable, quality care for women, children and adolescents.

UN System Organisations: active facilitators of multistakeholderism

We have mapped 31 distinct combinations of roles played by the UN bodies that complement the above function of the corporations. Two main patterns emerge (see Figure 5):

- The most dominant role played by the UN is that of a strategic partner, specifically in 27 MSIs in which this was their sole role.
- In 31 per cent of the MSIs (32 in total), the UN played other multiple roles as funders, initiators/convenors, hosts, advisors, implementers and lead institutions (except strategic partner), meaning the UN system organisations were key players in these spaces.



NB: Figure 5 represents the simultaneous multiple roles played by UN bodies. We did not deliberately parse or separate the roles because one MSI usually has more than one UN body that is involved in the MSI or is the target of the MSI.

As mentioned above, strategic partners act as collaborators and support groups and in the case of the UN bodies, they are often invited into MSIs to provide the political clout needed to legitimise and boost the MSI's credibility. The strategic partnership between corporate-led MSI convenors and the UN traces its roots to the Global Compact Initiative called by former UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Kofi Annan in response to widespread concerns about the negative socio-ecological impacts and human rights violations of corporate practices, and more recently, the signed Strategic Partnership Framework between the WEF and the UN that seeks to create closer coordination and institutionalised relations around the implementation of the SDGs. This has been challenged by more than 400 civil society organisations calling on the current UNSG Antonio Guterres to rescind the UN-WED strategic partnership agreement as it fundamentally runs counter to the UN Charter and grants preferential access to TNCs to the UN system, which will not only weaken the multilateral body but also signal approval of the core activities of TNCs that have caused and worsened the multiple crises we collectively face today.⁴⁹

The broader implication and significance of these findings are that (i) in a post-Washington Consensus world from the 1990s onwards, the UN has been facilitating rather than challenging and subverting the rise of multistakeholderism. It is very much part of the ecosystem of actors that legitimises this type of global governance; and ii) multistakeholderism is an integral component of the UN system organisational praxis as a global governance institution, which paradoxically undermines the possibility of democratic multilateral governance, and even its existence. The UN Food Systems Summit 2021 (UNFSS21) elaborates on this paradox. Antonio Guterres, the current UN Secretary-General (UNSG), announced the holding of the UNFSS21 on World Food Day in 2019 giving the World Economic Forum a central role in the summit's organisation⁵⁰. The Summit is envisioned to launch 'bold new actions' to deliver progress on all 17 SDGs, each of which relies to some degree on healthier, more sustainable and equitable food systems. It works on the concept of 'food systems', which refers to the constellation of all activities related to food and the health of the food systems—environment, people's health, economies and culture. The UNSG

⁴⁹ <https://www.cognitofirms.com/MultistakeholderismActionGroup/CorporateCaptureOfGlobalGovernanceTheWorldEconomicForumWEFUNPartnershipAgreementIsADangerousThreatToUN>

⁵⁰ <http://www.ipsnews.net/author/michael-fakhri-hilal-elver-olivier-de-schutter/>

assigned the president of AGRA, which has been criticised for peddling Green Revolution technologies and advancing the corporate agriculture agenda. A supporting structure was then set up, which includes a multistakeholder Advisory Committee led by the UN Deputy Secretary-General who provides strategic guidance and feedback on the Summit's overall development and implementation; an independent scientific group comprised of academics and scientists; a system-wide UN Task Force and a Champions Network consisting of institutions and networks from civil society and the private sector. The secretariat is hosted within the UN system.

In an open collective letter⁵¹ addressed to the UNSG and published in 2020, more than 550 farmers' organisations, civil society and human rights groups raised concerns over the appointment of Dr Kalibata, whose organisation is widely criticised in Africa as towing the corporate agricultural agenda, and that corporate lobbies defending big agri-food interests are influencing the UNFSS preparations, making the process opaque and exclusionary. Further, social movements such as La Via Campesina and organisations belonging to the CSM-CFS challenged the organisation of the Summit, highlighting criticisms such as the 'undue corporate influence in the Summit preparation; the missing human rights grounding; the lack of emphasis on the true extent of the transformation that the corporate food systems need to undergo to re-align with the utmost imperatives of people, peoples and planet; the threat of democratic public institutions and inclusive multilateralism being undermined by multistakeholderism⁵²'. Other criticisms include giving a more prominent role to philanthropies rather than social movements, and that the framework of food systems is skewed towards industrial agriculture. They have instead launched and organised a People's Autonomous Response to the UN Food Systems Summit because they 'cannot jump onto a train that is heading in the wrong direction'.⁵³

The UNFSS21 also provides a new precedent as a blended 'institution' because it does not fit neatly between the dichotomy of multilateralism and multistakeholderism. However, with the UNSG's stamp of approval, the Summit is undermining efforts by the reformed UN Committee on

51 https://www.foodsovereignty.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/EN_Edited_draft-letter-UN-food-systems-summit_070220.pdf

52 <https://www.csm4cfs.org/letter-csm-coordination-committee-cfs-chair/>

53 <https://www.foodsystems4people.org/about-2/>

Food Security (CFS), which is the primary multilateral body within the UN system dealing with food issues. The critique of the CSM-CFS to the UNFSSS21 centres on the roiling contestation over the future and fate of global food governance: that the Summit embodies what Harriet Friedmann calls the corporate-environmental food regime⁵⁴, whereas the food sovereignty movement has attempted to converge with the climate and environmental justice, health justice and other movements to defend food as a human right and not a commodity, and to advance people's self-determination or sovereignty over their food systems. The reforms within the CFS pushed by civil society groups were considered as achievements in democratising UN bodies. This achievement is under threat and in danger of being destroyed from within by the Food Systems Summit.⁵⁵

While the UN system is promoting and facilitating multistakeholderism, the demand for multilateralism has not reduced. For example, to challenge the dominance of the big tech companies within internet MSIs, an alternative to the multistakeholder model being pushed by many, including Global South countries, is establishing a multilateral UN body devoted to internet governance. Since much of the development, standards and guidelines of the internet and its wider usage for the common public, trade and commerce were guided by the United States, the UN was a late entrant in internet governance. The spread of the internet and the dominant power of the US in cyberspace have meant that other countries want the UN to play a more significant role in its governance. Currently, the role of the UN organisations within the MSIs is that of strategic partners (20 out of the 21 MSIs catalogued), which brings political legitimacy to them. They also fund MSIs and play the roles of hosts or convenors, but the leadership remains with the private corporations, the US and its allies.

Power of the Purse

We have catalogued 153 unique funders that provide financial support to the 103 MSIs, and 54 per cent of them come from the business /industry

⁵⁴ See From Colonialism to Green Capitalism: Social Movements and the Emergence of Food Regimes," in Frederick h. Buttel and Philip d. McMichael, eds. *New Directions in the Sociology of International Development. Research in Rural Sociology and Development*, 11. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005, p. 227-64.

⁵⁵ This section has been raised and is a paraphrased version of the comments by Sofia Monsalve who gave valuable inside information about the struggles and contestations within the UN CFS and the UNFSSS21.

and philanthropic sectors. Nineteen funders come from Northern governments and their aid agencies, comprising 12 per cent of the total identified funders. (See Figure 6). This trend is mirrored by the data on the top-tier funders who have funded the most significant number of MSIs.





Figure 7 indicates that 42 per cent of the MSIs are funded by the G7 countries—US, UK, France, Japan, Italy, Germany and Canada, mainly through their foreign ministries and aid agencies. Then, 16 per cent of

MSIs are funded through self-generated incomes such as membership dues and certification fees from corporations, which is mostly the case for environmental and social standard ones. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation funds 13 MSIs, while the European Commission and European Union and the World Bank Group have both funded 11 MSIs each. This is an interesting finding when juxtaposed with the omnipresence of the World Bank in the governing bodies of 27 MSIs. The Government of Norway, through its foreign affairs ministry and aid agency, NORAD, has funded eight MSIs, while WHO and the Swedish government have funded six MSIs each. The other top funders who have supported three to four MSIs are UNESCO, the Government of Denmark, the Government of Australia, the OECD, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Government of Austria and the Government of Switzerland.

There are two implications of these findings, especially in terms of global governance:

- The involvement of mega-philanthropies such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation has redefined global governance in unprecedented ways, as they embark on what Bill Gates called in his 2008 World Economic Forum speech, 'creative capitalism, as an approach where governments, businesses, and non-profits work together to stretch the reach of market forces so that more people can make a profit, or gain recognition, doing work that eases the world's inequities'⁵⁶. 'Creative capitalism' allows these philanthropies to operate outside existing government and philanthropic systems, with little oversight and accountability.
- The heavy participation as decision-makers and funders by G7 countries, the EU/EC, other wealthy Northern governments and multilateral development banks such as the World Bank group create a combination of political and economic capital that contributes to the growing domination of multi-stakeholder governance. By throwing their massive support behind MSIs, these actors galvanise the principle and praxis that if multiple types of actors provide enough input to a global

⁵⁶ <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/ideas/speeches/2008/01/bill-gates-2008-world-economic-forum>

issue, the subsequent consensual decision gains more legitimacy and, therefore, a more viable alternative to intergovernmental responses. The caveat is that consensual decisions are made mainly by ‘like-minded’ groups and individuals, muting or excluding critical voices.

Axis of Power Remains in the North

Four out of every ten MSIs are domiciled in Geneva or Washington, DC. With the inclusion of New York, Rome and Paris, two-thirds of the MSIs have established their headquarters in only five cities. These cities play host to the WEF, various UN bodies, and the World Bank Group, the main decision-makers, and players in the surveyed MSIs. We have used cities rather than countries to convey a message that MSI headquarters are often located in a capital rather than in the periphery of a country. Locations are either politically chosen for their nearness to a multilateral body or the economic interests of the host country. In other cases, locations are chosen by the founders of the MSIs.




Figure 8 also shows that only seven MSIs have set up shop in the Global South, which mainly deals with an agricultural product's environmental and social standard setting. This includes the Global Shea Alliance in Accra, Ghana; the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; the Sustainable Rice Platform in Bangkok, Thailand; the Fisheries Transparency Initiative in Mahi, the Republic of Seychelles and the Alliance for Responsible Mining Assurance (ARMA) in Envigado, Colombia. For the first four standard-setting MSIs, the host countries are known exporters of the agricultural products that are the subject of environmental and social standards and regulations by these MSIs while the last one was chosen based on the promising results achieved by the Oro Verde Initiative in Colombia, which is a local strategy for biodiversity conservation. ARMA focuses on small and artisanal mining and is set up by an international group of community-based mining organisations, environmentalists, business representatives and certification specialists from Colombia, Ecuador, the United States, the Philippines, Holland, Mongolia, Peru, Sri Lanka and the United Kingdom.

Having these MSIs operate from Europe and the US makes them strategically closer to multilateral bodies and they recreate this North-South divide and power imbalances in global governance. In comparison, the Conference of Parties, thematic summits and some other multilateral forums meetings regularly rotate from country to country, which builds not only the capacities and infrastructure of hosting countries but also develops a collective sense of ownership of global processes.

Concluding Remarks

Using a cross-sectoral approach, we have attempted to paint an analytical and descriptive picture of multistakeholderism in the agriculture, global health, education, internet governance and climate and environment sectors. The picture is a worrying one marked by increasing power of corporations and a handful of mega-philanthropies with the aid of willing collaborators such as the UN, big international NGOs and academic and research institutions. While the study does not investigate the impacts of MSIs, especially on the purported solutions they propose, it is important to note that this is a field that urgently requires more research in the immediate future. Rather than repeating what we have mentioned above, we enumerate below a few recommendations from the members of the People's

Working Group on Multistakeholderism that serve as guideposts for political actions and future research:

For advocacy/shared agenda

- Support the demands of the tax justice movement to appropriately tax financial flows and TNCs, close down tax havens, regulate the shadow banking systems and cancel the debt of Global South countries that will allow and enable the generation of sufficient public resources to fund public multilateral institutions.
- Support the calls of global justice movements for an internationally legally binding treaty to regulate the activities of TNCs and to create a robust system of liability and accountability of corporations, which can curb the power of TNCs.
- Build and strengthen the cross-sectoral alliance and collective work in challenging multistakeholder governance, with possible calls for building an autonomous space outside as well as calls for democratisation of the UN system.
- Collectively create spaces to discuss alternatives to multistakeholder governance. It is certainly not the traditional UN multilateral system of the twentieth century. What does democratic multilateralism mean and look like in practice? How to birth such democratic multilateralism?



For further research

- Document the actual impacts and results of MSIs to examine their self-claimed effectivity over public multilateral institutions.
- Critically examine the internal governance of MSIs, including possible power struggles, and contestations. This may require a comparative study of sample MSIs in each sector.

- A closer look at the perceptions and roles of Chinese, Russian and Arab states on MSIs, with the assumption that MSIs may not be all about Western neo-colonialism.
- Understand the link between MSIs and asset management companies' funds such as Black Rock, et al., which, for instance, is active in the EAT-Lancet Commission on Sustainable Healthy Food Systems.
- Zooming in on interrelated MSIs that show the growing sectoral/thematic nexus, such as the case of the Natural Capital Coalition, Global Commons Alliance, Nature for Climate and Natural Climate Solutions Alliance. The in-depth research can take the form of comparative case studies or actor-network research, which maps the actors and relationships of stakeholders.
- An in-depth look at digitalisation across the sectors.
- Role of specific funders and the monies involved in funding the MSIs: how do they profit?

The resistance and pushback against MSIs' redefining and reshaping of the global governance agenda and practice are already underway, especially within sectors. There is, however, an urgent need to strengthen cross-sectoral alliances and reach out to more movements to derail and stop the corporate-led multistakeholderism train that is undermining hard-won rights and redesigning our future without us. A public interest-driven multilateralism that is democratic and accountable is warranted, and this requires collectively aspiring and working for the possibility of a new form of multilateralism.###

Graphs and Tables



Research methodology

The study was commissioned by the Transnational Institute (TNI) and Friends of the Earth International (FOEI) in collaboration with the People's Working Group on Multistakeholderism (PWGM), a collaborative space of more than 20 organisations that are working on the issue at the sectoral or thematic level. These organisations have developed expertise at the sectoral/thematic level. But there is a demand to understand the extent and shape of the MSI influence and power from a cross-sectoral approach, which consequently can foment a multi-sectoral response, common strategizing and collective engagement. Equally important was to consider the recent plethora of multistakeholder groups launched in the context of the corona crisis (e.g., COVAX), roiling interlocking crises of food and climate change (UN Food Systems Summit 2021) and moves by the WEF to position itself as

the global leader in managing the impacts of these crises via its 2021 Global Reset Initiative.

Given the political imperative, we undertook a mapping exercise that combined qualitative and quantitative methods. The mapping covers five sectors: food, agriculture and land, global health, environment, internet and data, and education, which were predetermined based on an initial consultation with TNI, FOEI and the PWGM. The mixed-method approach was the best way to critically map MSIs and generate important graphs and figures about their main features from a cross-sectoral lens on the one hand. On the other, the mixed method allows for the construction of grounded analysis of the data, validated and verified by relevant literature and critical scholarship and those who are deeply involved in monitoring the MSIs in the sectors/themes.

The qualitative methods comprised scoping interviews with key informants per sector/theme, critical discourse analysis and literature review and fact-checking of information gathered. The key informants are experts from the participating organisations of the Working Group but also scholars and activists recommended by the Working Group members. The list of names are identified below. The scoping interviews with the sectoral experts provided a good strategic direction and landscape on what MSIs exist and where we should look for additional information. The sectoral experts also verified and validated the MSIs we listed, which is an essential part of the research process to ensure the correctness of the MSI we catalogued.

The quantitative method covers the building of a database using MS Excel and the generation of graphs, tables and figures using its functions. The database contains 21 data entry points, which pertain to crucial information about the MSI: date of formation, history, description, objectives, sector, theme tackled, governing structure, influential actors, the role of the corporate sector, the role of UN bodies, sources of financing, domicile, categories of approved stakeholders, links to annual reports, reference to international human rights law or standards (if any), issues and controversies surrounding the MSIs, additional information, sources and weblinks. We have developed a separate Coding Sheet with inputs from members of the PWGM. On the Coding Sheet, we have come up with our own categorisation of the roles of the corporate sector and UN bodies based on our analysis and in consultation with TNI. The database only covers global MSIs and not national and regional ones (save for one on the internet and data

governance sector due to its political significance). We also did not include accountability mechanisms as these are difficult to ascertain and track in the MSI websites and available public information.

A total of six databases—five sectoral and an overall/comprehensive database were generated. The databases that we created also built on existing databases such as the standard-setting MSIs produced by the MSI Integrity as well as expository papers by multistakeholder governance experts like Harris Gleckman and Nora McKeon and in-depth case studies written by working group members such as FIAN International, IT for Change, Focus on the Global South, PSI International and ETC Group, to name a few.

Based on these databases, interviews and critical discourse analyses of the literature, we wrote sector stand-alone reports and a general introduction containing the key features and interpretive analyses of the thematic/sectoral MSIs. Our idea is that each of the sectoral reports can be read separately or in combination with others. The general introduction provides a cross-sectoral analysis that is at the core of this research project. The study was designed in the spirit of a collaborative process, which meant that throughout the mapping exercise, analysis and writing, we have regularly consulted with TNI, FOEI and PWGM for direction and substantive inputs, which we then incorporated in various drafts and the final report.

Key informants and experts: Andressa Pellanda, Anita Gurumurthy, Brid Brennan, Gonzalo Berron, Harris Gleckman, Kirtana Chandrasekaran, Leticia Paranhos Menna de Oliveira, Parminder Singh, Richard Hill, Shalmali Guttal, Solia Monsalve, Sulakshana Nandi, Susana Barria, Vernon Muñoz Villalobos.

Chapter I

Education, a Big Business for Businesses: Multistakeholderism in the Global Education Governance

*Madhuresh Kumar and Mary Ann Manahan*⁵⁷

The universal right to education was accepted as part of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) in 1948. It was further enshrined in multiple constitutions and charters, including the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). Education and health have been the two key global development agendas towards poverty alleviation for UN and International Financial Institutions (IFIs).⁵⁸ Even though the responsibility to provide universal education to its population remains that of the individual nation-states, it has remained a global concern. It thus has figured prominently in global governance agendas for a long time.

⁵⁷ Authors of this paper would like to thank Andressa Pellanda, general coordinator for the right to education in Brazil for giving us a broad introduction to the sector and then providing help in developing this analysis. Vernor Munoz, former UN special rapporteur on the right to education was also generous in providing his comments on the draft text which has further enriched the critique. Lastly, Bird Brennan and Gonzalo Berron have been extremely helpful in coordinating the overall process of writing.

⁵⁸ The World Bank's role in education since the 60s has been a remarkable one - from no mandate to becoming one of the key drivers and funders of reforms and governance. See more details of its journey since the 60s till the launch of SDGs:

Karen Mundy, Antoni Verger, The World Bank and the global governance of education in a changing world order, *International Journal of Educational Development*, Volume 40, 2015, Pages 9-18, ISSN 0738-0593, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2014.11.021>.

The late 1980s was a turning point when four major international organisations – UNICEF, UNESCO, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme – began to work together towards hosting the World Conference on Education for All (WCEFA) in 1990 in Jomtien, Thailand. The WCEFA ‘harnessed together a relatively uncoordinated group of education specialists across these agencies in an effort to expose the deterioration of worldwide access to education in the poorest of developing countries. It reaffirmed the importance of education as a priority for development, with the goals of universal access to primary education by the year 2000 and the reduction of adult illiteracy, particularly female illiteracy, by half. Following Jomtien, an interagency Education for All (EFA) commission was established ‘charged with formulating a decade of EFA activities and overseeing the realisation of central WCEFA goals.’⁵⁹ EFA also mobilised national aid agencies such as Department for International Development (DFID), Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and others who supported education and development programmes in LDCs and developing countries.

However, from the 1990s onward in the post-cold war era, every reform in the global context (and global education policy is no exception) was guided by the market reforms and economic logic emanating from the Washington Consensus.⁶⁰ It was followed by the inclusion of achieving universal primary education by 2015 in Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and then ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promotion of life-long learning opportunities for all as part of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2016. These goals have remained far-from-achieved precisely because of the neo-liberal policies, and continued patriarchal and colonialist frameworks, which have further accentuated society's inequalities and have had disastrous impacts.

The initial efforts at involving non-state actors in education governance within the multilateral forums came from the international NGOs, which lobbied together to demand specific changes at the World

⁵⁹ Mundy, Karen, and Lynn Murphy. ‘Transnational Advocacy, Global Civil Society? Emerging Evidence from the Field of Education.’ *Comparative Education Review*, vol. 45, no. 1, 2001, pp. 85–126. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/447646. Accessed 18 May 2021.

⁶⁰ Serra, Narcís and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.). *The Washington Consensus Reconsidered – Towards a New Global Governance*. 2008. OUP: New York.

Education Forum 2000 in Dakar. The prominent one being the Global Campaign for Education (GCE), born in 1999 at a meeting hosted by ActionAid, Oxfam International, Education International (the international federation of teachers' unions) and the Global March against Child Labour (a grassroots movement formed in 1998 that links education with eradicating child labour).⁶¹ From its early founding by a small cluster of international non-governmental organisations, the GCE has grown enormously. Today it has affiliated members in over 93 countries, including the participation of major international and regional non-governmental organisations, Education International ; 15 regional networks (including ANCEFA in Africa, CLADE in Latin America and the Caribbean and ASPBAE in South-East Asia⁶²), and 120 national coalitions.⁶³ GCE remains an influential force within global education governance, and its constituents are part of several MSIs.

There is a renewed interest in the education sector given it's a multi-billion-dollar industry with untapped potential that is regulated and guarded by monitoring reports (UNESCO's Annual Global Monitoring Report), rankings (the Times Higher Education World University Rankings), international assessments (the Programme for International Student Assessment; Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies; and Progress in International Reading Literacy Study), and trends reports (from the World Bank, the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, and the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]).⁶⁴ The new generation of MSIs has brought in a considerable number of other actors, including businesses, philanthropies, information technology (IT) corporations, etc., making

⁶¹ Verger, Antoni and Mario Novelli (eds.). *Campaigning for "Education for All"*. 2012. Sense Publishers: Rotterdam.

⁶² African Campaign Network for Education for All (ANSEFA), Latin American Campaign for the Right to Education (CLADE) and Asia South Pacific Association for Basic and Adult Education (ASPBAE) are the regional campaign networks all part of GCE.

⁶³ <https://campaignforeducation.org/en/who-we-are/members/#1531399520679-c683819d-3fab>

⁶⁴ Jules, T.D. (2018), "Educational Regime Complexity: Nested Governance and Multistakeholderism in the Fourth Industrial Revolution", Wiseman, A.W. (Ed.) *Annual Review of Comparative and International Education 2017 (International Perspectives on Education and Society, Vol. 34)*, Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 139-158. <https://doi.org/10.1108/S1479-36792018000034014>

the governance of global education extremely complex and guided by commercial interests.

SDGs drivers of multistakeholderism

For the purpose of this paper, we surveyed twelve multistakeholder initiatives/institutions/groups in the education sector.⁶⁵ *Table 1* shows that ten MSIs were launched from 2011–2020, of which eight were launched in the second half of the decade, post the announcement of the SDGs. However, compared to the other sectors surveyed, we believe that education is not a key area of focus for multistakeholderism. It has remained neglected as a development agenda and only gained momentum after SDGs.⁶⁶

Table 1. The decade of launching of education –MSIs

Decade	Frequency
2000–2010	2
2011–2020	10
Total	12

More exciting findings are illustrated in *Figure 1* and *Table 2*, which look at the evolution of the themes tackled by these MSIs when they were formed: 1) that the right to education is only tackled during the beginning of the twenty-first century; 2) that during the second half of the last decade, primary education (combined with other themes) and digital/ICT took centre stage; 3) other MSIs tackled ‘education for all’, higher education, and financing/investment. The significance of these findings from the data relates to the dynamics of global governance

⁶⁵ We have used multistakeholder institutions, initiatives and groups interchangeably for the purpose of the study. They are all manifest and contribute to multistakeholderism as a governance mechanism.

⁶⁶ Vernor Munoz, former UN special rapporteur on the right to education (2004–2010) says for business seekers education is the new market’s golden territory, where everything is consumable, including learning. See more:

<https://campaignforeducation.org/en/2020/12/07/how-the-west-was-won-what-corporates-who-care-for-education-should-do/>

discourses in the education sector and the shifting of framing of development targets in the education sector from the MDGs to the SDGs. Or in other words, they echo new discourses and foci discussed in the UN multilateral bodies and CEO-led platforms such as the World Economic Forum, which has produced and is advancing its narrative around bridging the gap in financing for education/SDG4.⁶⁷

Another factor is the rise of internet corporations, increased use of digital tools for education purposes and new philanthropies, which all promote themselves as the harbingers of innovation and disruption.⁶⁸ Multistakeholderism is promoting these ideas and giving them a platform. Every crisis is seen as an opportunity for making more reforms and experimentation; for example, the Covid-19 pandemic. The Global Education Coalition, Save Our Future and the International Finance Facility for Education were launched especially in 2020 as platforms for collaboration and exchange to protect the right to education, support distance learning and mobilise resources during the unprecedented disruption caused by Covid-19. It remains to be seen if these MSIs will achieve something different from the previous ones.

Table 2. Year of Launch viz. Themes Tackled

Year of Launch viz. Themes Tackled	Frequency
2002	1
Right to Education	1
2012	2
Higher Education	1
Investment	1
2015	1
Education Finance	1

⁶⁷ See <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/06/making-generation-education-a-reality/>

⁶⁸ Edwards Jr. D.B., Moschetti M.C. (2019). Global Education Policy, Innovation, and Social Reproduction, in M. Peters, & R. Heraud (eds.) *Encyclopedia of Educational Innovation*. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2262-4_111-1


2016	2
Education for All	1
Primary Education, Conflict and Humanitarian Crises	1
2018	1
Employment, Capacity Building	1
2019	1
Primary Education, Disability	1
2020	3
Digital	2
Primary Education	1
2003-11	1
ICT	1
Grand Total	12

Primary education and higher education as main foci of MSIs

Figure 1 shows that half of the education MSIs take up primary education (combined with other themes such as disability, conflict) and higher education as their central concerns. This is followed by the MSIs that focus on education financing and investment, education for all, digital/ICT, employment, capacity building and the right to education.

These findings imply that the MSIs tackle education from a compartmentalised manner rather than in a holistic approach to education and learning. It has been argued that the policy recommendations are geared towards standardisation, competition and skilling rather than learning and human development. The MSIs that tackle higher education are also spaces where the privatisation agenda by corporations and IFIs are pushed. This is evident not only in the curriculum and pedagogy but also in the increased emphasis on

corporate-style management of schools and education systems, all in the name of achieving greater efficiency, affordability, self-financing and marketability.⁶⁹



Majority of the education MSIs combine two or more typologies

Education has primarily been in the public domain with the active participation of the private sector in providing education services. However, the realm of policymaking has been dominated by the State, and that was reflected at the global level too in multilateral forums. In the post-1990s, with the emergence of the Washington Consensus and the global governance agenda, the World Bank and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) started pushing for public-private partnerships. They pushed for involvement of the private sector and encouraged civil society participation as part of a strategy of promoting participatory decision-making processes. The private sector position

⁶⁹ See the innovations suggested by the GPE and the World Bank Group for the countries <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/education/brief/the-global-partnership-for-education-and-the-world-bank-group-the-facts>

was further cemented within global education policy through the Global Education Initiative (GEI) of the World Economic Forum.

Table 3. Typology

Typology	Frequency
Policy; Financing Facility	1
Policy	2
Policy, Project, Financing Facility	3
Policy; Project; Paradigmatic/Campaign	2
Policy; Project; Financing Facility Paradigmatic/Campaign	1
Project, Campaign	1
Project; Paradigmatic/Campaign, Financing Facility	1
Project; Paradigmatic/Campaign	1
Grand Total	12

The idea for the GEI was conceived and launched at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2003 during the Governors Meeting for Information Technology and Telecommunications. John Chambers, Chief Executive Officer of Cisco, and many other CEOs present proposed creating a collaborative partnership between business and government to transform education. It started as a country initiative with programmes in Jordan, India, Egypt and Palestine, and later joined hands with UNESCO in 2006 to make it a global programme.⁷⁰ This is important because GEI was one of the early generations of the multistakeholder initiatives, making the idea attractive and developing its mechanism. It advocated for a shift from the public-private partnership (PPP) model to the next generation of MSIs and development partnerships. Gordon Brown seems to use it to its fullest

⁷⁰ <https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-education-initiative-retrospective-partnerships-education-development-2003-2011>


through his roles at the UN, WEF, foundations and association with industries.

Thus, we see that the education MSIs, like those in the internet and health sector, combine two or more typologies. Our database indicates that half of the MSIs, for example, also mobilise resources for their activities and projects. At the same time, five of them act as campaign vehicles, accelerate ideas and frameworks around 'education for all' or achieving SDG4, promote and design policies targeting policy and decision-makers and/or implement projects.

Stark absence of LDCs and CSOs in governance

It is not surprising given the rise of the MSIs in the last decade that along with the UN bodies, businesses/industry and Northern donor governments take up much of the space in the education MSIs surveyed. They comprise 47 per cent of the total actors we mapped out. The database demonstrates the apparent involvement of big tech, internet, and telecommunication companies such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Ericsson, Verizon, Orange, Lenovo and Intel Corporation, as well as European mainstream media such as the BBC and France24.

The groups of approved stakeholders active in these spaces include international NGOs (mostly based in high-income countries), corporate philanthropies and IFIs such as the World Bank group and other multilateral development banks. In some cases, affected communities and impacted groups such as teachers' and students' associations are also present. However, while recognised as an approved stakeholder and/or target of these MSIs, there are very few countries from the low- and middle-income group that actively engage in policy making within the education sector at the global level, though it is the country governments which are implementing most of the programmes.



UN and businesses competing for influence

Table 4. Key Influential ‘Stakeholders’


Key Influential ‘Stakeholders’	Frequency
UN bodies	17
Northern donor govts	2
Regional bodies	1
International NGOs	4
Business/Industry	17
IFIs/ Development Finance	5
Philanthropies	4
Investors/Banks	1
Governments (excluding donors)	1
Grand Total	52

Traditionally, education has remained within the domain of the multilateral forums, with UN institutions being the lead actor, but with the appointment of former British Prime Minister

Gordon Brown as the UN Special Envoy for Global Education by Ban Ki-Moon in July 2012, its position has significantly changed. His imprint is visible in several MSIs, such as the 2015 Education Commission, Education Cannot Wait Fund, Global Business Coalition for Education and the International Commission on Financing Global Education Opportunity, amongst others. He also serves as Chair of the Global Strategic Infrastructure Initiative of the World Economic Forum. He sits on the board of the Kofi Annan Foundation, Graça Machel Trust and others – all important actors within the global governance space. Together, he and his wife, Sarah Brown, have played a significant role in establishing the Global Business Education Council to mobilise and leverage the resources of the industry and businesses. It's no surprise that within one decade, business and industry have achieved a stake almost equal to the UN institutions within the 12 MSIs analysed here (*see table 4 & figure 3*).

Businesses and the private sector, along with corporate philanthropies, occupy positions of power in the governing bodies and other committees of these MSIs. In terms of powerful individual institutions and individuals, UNESCO, World Bank, Gordon Brown (as special envoy), and UNICEF lead the pack. Corporations occupying decision-making posts in the MSIs include giant oil company Chevron, Indian conglomerate Tata & Sons, global fashion brand Gucci, ICT company Accenture, computer giants Intel Corporation and Lenovo and banking TNC Western Union, among others. These actors have definitely had a hand in the evolving sub-themes addressed by MSIs, which include digital/ICT, finance and investment.


IFIs such as the World Bank and ADB, and corporate foundations such as Atlassian Foundation, that represent multiple TNCs from big tech to oil and banking, comprise another set of influential actors. Compared to the other sectors we have studied, CSOs (Civil Society Organisations) are an important actor within the MSIs, but as members and implementers and, occasionally, in leadership positions.



What's noticeable is that low- and middle-income country governments are less represented in these MSIs, but find influence and representation through the UN bodies and funding, which comes primarily from the high-income country government development and partnership agencies. Unfortunately, with the UN assuming the role of facilitator of multistakeholder processes, the voice and interest of these countries remain less represented.

Private sector gearing for leadership and legitimacy

With increased market reforms and privatisation of the education sector worldwide, there has been a rise in the influence of the corporations within the governance, as has been observed through the segregation of the data within the MSIs. The data shows that the private sector plays nine different kinds of functions in the multistakeholder forums (see *Figure 3*). This corroborates the power and influence that businesses and industry play in these MSIs. The leadership, when combined with the roles of hosting, initiating /convening and funding the private sector, has an even higher degree of influence. Their involvement in the MSIs is an investment to leverage influence not only in the field of education but beyond.



For example, the Global Business Coalition for Education (GBCE), provides advisory services leveraging private sector funds and has also succeeded in mobilising resources. Still, it also acts as a tool for political influence within the UN bodies and other places where they have found a place on the Board. This works to push the agenda of the business investment within global education, creates a market for the corporations and provides deployment of the corporate social-responsibility funds. Their involvement in ‘humanitarian’ and ‘development’ work also serves to whitewash their corporate crimes. This is reflected in the fact that 20 out of 28 members of GBCE are mentioned in serious cases of tax avoidance, tax evasion or other types of legal questioning, and at least one name came up in the infamous Panama Papers database.⁷¹

⁷¹ See more: <https://campaignforeducation.org/en/2020/12/07/how-the-west-was-won-what-corporates-who-care-for-education-should-do/>

Table 5. Role of UN Bodies

Role of the UN System Organisations	Frequency
Initiator/Convenor, Host, Leadership, Member, Funder	2
Initiator/Convenor, Host, Leadership, Member, Funder, Strategic Partner	4
Initiator/Convenor, Host, Leadership, Member, Funder, Strategic Partner, Implementer	4
Initiator/Convenor, Host, Leadership, Member, Strategic Partner	1
No Information	1
Total	12

Debilitating influence of the UN

As mentioned above, UN organisations, along with the World Bank and OECD countries, have been the force behind the ‘education for all’ agenda for a long time, and continue to do so even now, as they remain active in all of the 12 MSIs we surveyed. They play more comprehensive roles, that is, four to six kinds of roles in each of these MSIs as an initiator/convenor, host, leadership (in decision-making boards and governance structures), member, funders and/or strategic implementer. In short, the UN bodies have rallied their political, social and economic capital behind these education MSIs.

However, under pressure due to declining financial contributions and increased multistakeholderism within UN systems, they seem to be ceding their dominant space to businesses and industry.

Still, how the UN bodies behave in these MSIs are qualitatively different from the agriculture, land, food and nutrition MSIs, where the UN bodies have chosen to play one to three roles, either as initiator/convenor, leadership or strategic partner, but never a comprehensive one. This remains so because there is a larger financing deficit, and compared to climate change and global health, education is not the most critical global governance agenda.

Buying influence, innovative financing mechanisms

The 2015 International Commission on Financing Global Education Opportunity, also known as the Education Commission under the Chairmanship of UN Special Envoy Gordon Brown, in its 2016 report – *The Learning Generation: Investing in Education for a changing world* – put forward an action plan to deliver and finance an expansion of educational opportunity for more than 260 million children and youth who are not in school today.⁷² This led to a significant number of policy developments, campaigns, financing mechanisms and so on. The commission identified an \$8.5 billion funding gap needed to reach 75 million children and youth. This led to the establishment of the Education Cannot Wait Fund (ECW) during the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 by international humanitarian and development aid actors, along with public and private donors, to help reposition education as a priority on the humanitarian agenda. The fund housed at UNICEF is headed by the High-Level Steering Group chaired by Special Envoy Gordon Brown.

Table 6. Top Thirteen Funders of MSIs in the Education Sector (representing 38% of the total number of funders)

Top Thirteen Funders of MSIs in the Education Sector (representing 38% of the total number of funders)
UNESCO
World Bank
DFID/UK Government
USAID
NORAD/Norwegian Government
Netherlands
Canadian Government

⁷² See detailed report and other information on the education commission here <https://educationcommission.org/>

Government of the Netherlands
Governments from low- and middle-income countries (project countries)
Lego Foundation
Intel Corporation
Atlassian Foundation
European Union

But the already decreasing support to the UN over the years and more specifically to health and education has not resulted in untied funding, which can support low-income country government efforts. The funding and resource mobilisation concerns remain, and a new financing engine, the International Finance Facility for Education (IFFEd), housed at the World Bank, was established in 2020 to further complement the existing grant instruments like the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) and the Education Cannot Wait (ECW) fund. It is specifically designed to tackle the education crisis in lower-middle-income countries (LMICs), home to 80 per cent of the world's children.⁷³

One may argue that these financing facilities are needed since education remains a lower-priority area at the global governance level. Still, given the ideological commitment of the IFIs and businesses to market reforms, several concerns have been raised that the IFFEd might add to the debt crisis of the countries, given the conditions which the MDBs will impose, since the returns on social investments like education are not immediate and, as a result, tied loans for education, even at less than the commercial rates, are not attractive to target lower- and middle-income group countries.⁷⁴

When we examined the top funders of MSIs in the education sector, 13 actors stood out: UNESCO (top funder), the World Bank, Northern donor governments like the UK, the US, Germany, Norway, Canada and the Netherlands, and corporate philanthropic foundations such as the Lego


⁷³ See details of the IFFEd <https://educationcommission.org/international-finance-facility-education/>

⁷⁴ See <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/international-finance-facility-education-wrong-answer-right-question>

Foundation and Atlassian Foundation (see Table 6). Also, big-tech giant Intel Corporation is an active funder along with the European Union. In addition, few countries from the Global South/middle- and low-income countries are present. The majority of these top funders are high-income countries, followed by UNESCO, corporate foundations and the World Bank.

This finding is further corroborated by Figure 5, which demonstrates that 23 Northern donor governments are supporting the 12 education MSIs. They are followed by business and industry, corporate foundations/ philanthropies, UN bodies and IFIs.


The power of the purse always has an impact on the strategic direction, discourse and nature of activities and focus that these MSIs tackle. This has been evident in the reforms which have been ushered in in the low-income and developing countries where, in the name of increased efficiency and resource utilisation, increased privatisation of higher education, and standardisation of the curricula has been pushed. Several state-run primary schools have been shut or asked to partner with the businesses and NGOs where teachers have no job security, and para-teachers have been employed.



Hegemonic knowledge centres and their influence

While analysing the domiciles of the MSIs in the current database, we see the same trend evident in other sectors. Eight out of the 12 MSIs are headquartered in New York City and Washington, DC, where UN Headquarters and the World Bank are located, respectively. Two MSIs

are domiciled in Paris, France, where UNESCO is, and one in Cologny, Switzerland. This ensures the continued dominance of the Northern and developed world over global education policy development and, in turn, shapes the knowledge production process of the world. The project of domination and supremacy of the Western knowledge system is thus directed through past and present governance mechanisms, which has proved disastrous over the years, with none of the development goals met and a large population living below the poverty line and in impoverished conditions.



Conclusion

In conclusion, one notes the following emerging trends:

1. The reforms started within global education policy and governance since the 1990s continue despite the changing nature of the stakeholders and their growing influence within.
2. The arrival of businesses and corporate philanthropies have further marginalised the civil society voices or the stakes of the developing countries and their people.
3. Multilateralism is under attack, and UN systems, to survive, adapt themselves by making space for the influential non-state actors at the cost of the sovereignty of the less-powerful and poorer nations.

4. The changes in the governance mechanisms and reforms processes are now being portrayed as innovations in the field of education. Still, the truth is they help perpetuate the status quo and are only deepening the inequities in society rather than mitigating them.
5. The birth of several financing mechanisms to tide over the financial deficit faced by multilateral institutions is adding to the debt burden of developing countries in the name of development aid because the market and neo-liberal logic drive them.

Chapter II

Commodifying and Selling Nature to Save It⁷⁵: Multistakeholderism in Global Environmental Governance⁷⁶

By: Mary Ann Manahan

Introduction

Global environmental and climate governance entails processes and mechanisms through which various actors govern and regulate the environment. They involve a variety of actors and institutions such as states, corporations, non-governmental organizations, and local communities, modes of governing such as actor networks and policy platforms, and policy tools such as taxation, regulation, information provision, and voluntary approaches.⁷⁷ Since the 1970s, global attention for biodiversity, protection of species, cross-border pollution, the ozone layer, nuclear disasters, the greenhouse effect and tropical forest degradation have increased tremendously. The prevailing model for global governance since the dawn of nation-states has been multilateralism, wherein governments are the sole-decision makers, and their interlocutors are other governments.

Multilateralism as embodied by the United Nations (UN) system has produced several high-level summits and follow-up meetings that sought to tackle the burgeoning and alarming environmental problems

⁷⁵ This is a famous line attributed to critical scholar Kathleen McAfee who wrote a seminal piece of the same name: McAfee, K. (1999) 'Selling Nature to save It? Biodiversity and Green Developmentalism', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 17(2), pp. 133–154. doi: [10.1068/d170133](https://doi.org/10.1068/d170133).

⁷⁶ Note: In the run up to and at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change COP26 summit in 2021 there have been a proliferation of additional MSIs around climate, net zero, carbon markets and nature based solutions. This chapter does not cover these initiatives fully and we plan subsequent additional research that delves deeper into the MSIs that have emerged in the nexus of the climate and biodiversity crises in recent years.

⁷⁷ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315386445_Environmental_Governance

and facilitate collective and concerted action/s from member states. Two notable ones put the concept of ‘sustainable development’ on the map: the 1987 ‘Our Common Future’ report penned by the Brundtland Commission under the helm of Gro Harlem Brundtland, and the 1992 Earth Summit, which engendered Agenda 21, and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Sustainable development was defined in the Brundtland report as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’⁷⁸.

While the concept has been largely debated for its ambiguity, at the core of it is the certainty that economic development and protection of nature can go together and that there is no inevitable conflict between the two. It further galvanized the links or nexus between development and environmental sustainability, that is, the environment constrains development and that development impacts on the environment, which was also encapsulated in the World Bank’s 1992 World Development Report. It was, therefore, not a coincidence that the Earth Summit’s main purpose was to produce a blueprint to ‘rethink economic growth, advance social equity, and ensure environmental protection’⁷⁹. Twenty years later, at the Rio+20 Summit, the same developmental goals of profit, people and planet were renewed by UN member states, but this time reinforcing and advocating for a ‘mutually reinforcing... relationship of economic growth, nature protection and social equity objectives’ (Wilshusen, 2014: 19) under a new frame—the ‘green economy’, at the heart of which is a continuation of the dominant logic of neoliberal capitalism.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ <https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/sustainability#:~:text=In%201987%2C%20the%20United%20Nations,development%20needs%2C%20but%20with%20the>

⁷⁹ <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/rio20/about>

⁸⁰ I adopted US economist David Kotz’s and Indian economist Prahbat Patnaik’s definitions of neoliberal capitalism to denote the phase of capitalism in which market forces and relations operate relatively freely and play the predominant role in the economy as well as the absence and removal of restrictions on the global flows of commodities and capital. Defining features, according to Kotz and Patnaik, include the emergence and hegemony of international finance capital, integration of big capitals in countries and the adoption of a common set of neoliberal policies across countries. For more information, see <https://www.networkideas.org/news-analysis/2017/10/neo-liberal-capitalism-and-its-crisis/> and <https://www.harvardmagazine.com/2015/01/rough-road-for-capitalism>.

Under this new framing, global environmental and climate governance, and conservation goals of saving nature and biodiversity can only be achieved through the re-valuing and incorporation of peoples and ecologies into (financial and global) market terms (Buscher, et. al., 2012; Dressler, et al., 2016). This meant re-fashioning environmental governance efforts and actions by states, the private sector, and civil society towards more devolved market-oriented and based approaches such as alternative fuel or low-carbon economies, new green technologies, natural capital accounting and payment for ecosystem services, to name a few (Dressler, et al., 2016). The re-orientation to market-based approaches is deemed as the alternative response to lacking and fraught-laden state-led conservation and environmental protection policies and initiatives such as the creation of protected areas and parks (also known as fortress conservation), tree planting, water and air pollution regulation, logging bans, etc.

The United National Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity are the main two established UN bodies governing global climate and environmental policy coming into force in 1994 and 1993 respectively. While the United Nations system remains as the main multilateral body and platform for discussions and action around sustainable development, climate and environmental issues, it also enabled and produced multistakeholder initiatives and mechanisms aimed at ostensibly filling the political gap between espoused policies/principles and concrete programs. These MSIs have been largely dominated by corporate-led institutions such as the World Economic Forum and World Business Council on Sustainable Development, and big international environmental and transnational conservation NGOs such as IUCN, The Nature Conservation, and World Wildlife Fund for Nature, among others. The mushrooming of MSIs and the consequential shift from multilateralism to multistakeholderism in global environmental governance can be attributed to several intersecting dynamics— the failure of political leadership, vision and commitment, as well as lost opportunities, especially since the 1992 Earth Summit, the burgeoning crisis of multilateral institutions, inadequacy of financing for the environment and climate and the urgency of responding to the planetary crisis.

The above global developments comprise a brief and incomplete background for the mapping of multistakeholder initiatives and mechanisms in the environment and climate sectors. In this chapter, I sketch out the main descriptive and interpretive analyses of the 26

catalogued MSIs. As a component of the multisectoral mapping, a few caveats need to be spelled out. One, the mapping exercise is an incomplete list. It is most likely that several MSIs were missed. Two, only global MSIs were covered from the start of the 2000s. The reason behind this is both practical and political. Practical: to narrow down the scope of the exercise. Political: to emphasize that a concerted call from UN member states and non-state actors for the development and strengthening of MSIs to promote good practices, access to environmentally sound technologies and capacity development as well as operationalisation of the green economy at the local, sub-regional and national levels took off and now, intensifying in the twenty-first century.

In short, this chapter aims to underscore the key characteristics of the MSIs involved in global environment governance as well as identify converging trends and common threads that underpin the narratives and strategies they deploy on the global stage. Rather than starting with the database, the interpretive or analytical part will be outlined first, followed by the descriptive section that unpacks the numbers. The idea is to offer some critical frames as important accompanying tools in reading the findings from the database. These critical frames also stem from the slogans, objectives and agenda of the surveyed MSIs. After these parts, a brief conclusion reiterates key findings and analyses made by social movements, environmental justice organisations and activists.

Converging trends, common threads

The web of planetary crises serves as context for multistakeholder initiatives and mechanisms to intensify and advance their objectives, priorities and solutions to solve the multiple environmental and climate crises. The signaling of crises is what Marxist geographer David Harvey refers to as the third pillar that drives 'accumulation by dispossession', or concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the few and those already with capital by robbing the public of their resources (Harvey, 2004; Fairhead, et al., 2012). According to Harvey (2004), this is a new form of imperialism that characterises the neoliberal capitalist model of development since the 1970s. Extending his analysis to the current context means two things: one, (re)valuation of nature as capital, an economic asset which fundamentally puts a price on *all* the dimensions, services and functions of nature (e.g. ecosystem services, water purification by pristine watersheds or carbon sequestration of forests and oceans) (Buscher, et al., 2012; UNEP, 2011; NCD, 2012); and two:

drawing in nature into financialised markets (financialisation) and in effect, simultaneously locking them into the boom and bust of the financial world as well as distancing or dislocating them from their places of origins, histories, relations with people and communities that rely on them (Fairhead, et al., 2012; Clapp, 2014). But there is also a third more recent development that the World Economic Forum (WEF) and World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) have put forward in their new report *The Future of Nature and Business*: a new sustainability buzzword, ‘nature-positive solutions’, with corporations and industry as the central actors in the realisation of such solutions.

Against this backdrop, I have identified five common threads that undergird the slogans, objectives and agenda of environment and climate governance-focussed MSIs: i) nature as an accumulation strategy, ii) the dawn of new sustainability buzzwords, iii) perpetuating colonial legacies, iv) close collaboration among selected scientists, transnational conservation NGOs, UN agencies and businesses, and v) democratic governance deficit.

Nature as capital and accumulation strategy

Since the UN Conference on Sustainable Development Rio +20, the ‘green economy’ as the solution to the triple challenges of people, planet and profit has taken centre stage in global public policy spaces, with various articulations and re-inventions. The UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) defines the green economy as ‘one that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities’ (UNEP, 2011: 2). Its promotion by multiple development actors, especially by the UNEP, has engendered other corporate-led initiatives such as the Natural Capital Declaration, which emphasises the role of the corporate and financial sectors in solving the deepening ecological and climate crises (e.g. creation of green markets and species trading/banking) (NCD, 2012), and The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), which seeks to develop models to monetise, marketise and commodify nature and the services it provides (Buscher and Fletcher, 2015; TEEB, 2016). The Natural Declaration of Capital, which was signed by top CEOs, and various global corporations with the support of UNEP during the Rio+20 Summit in 2012, contend that:

'Natural Capital comprises Earth's natural assets (soil, air, water, flora and fauna), and the ecosystem services resulting from them, which make human life possible. Ecosystem goods and services from Natural Capital are worth trillions of US dollars per year and constitute food, fiber, water, health, energy, climate security and other essential services for everyone. Neither these services, nor the stock of Natural Capital that provides them, are adequately valued compared to social and financial capital. Despite being fundamental to our wellbeing, their daily use remains almost undetected within our economic system. Using Natural Capital this way is not sustainable. The private sector, governments, all of us, must increasingly understand and account for our use of Natural Capital and recognize the true cost of economic growth and sustaining human wellbeing today and into the future'. (Natural Capital Declaration, 2012: 1)

This declaration is significant as it signals the corporate and financial sector's 'commitment' to work towards integrating *Natural Capital* considerations into their visions, strategies, operations, products and services. It also ushers in the capitalist invasion into nature that estimates 17 ecosystem services and 16 biomes in economic terms; that is, they are valued to be in the range of at least \$16-54 trillion (Constanza, et al., 1997).

The Natural Capital Coalition, a global MSIM, grew out of such initiatives. Originally established in 2012 as the TEEB For Business Coalition and hosted by London-based Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), the Natural Capital Coalition is a global multistakeholder, open-source platform that seeks to mainstream the development of methods for natural capital valuation in business. Along with the WBCSD, it co-created the Natural Capital Protocol, a standardised global framework for including natural capital in decision making focussed on businesses. It has recently worked on creating regional platforms with a focus on Brazil, Colombia, West Africa, Australia, South Africa, the US, the United Arab Emirates, Spain and Scotland. These regional platforms bring together various players at the national, sub-national, local and regional levels to advance natural capital thinking and approach. Headed by Mark Gough⁸¹, the Natural Capital Coalition's governance structure remains unclear (at least from their website), but it is made up of almost 300 organisations (and engages many thousands more) categorised into seven broad

⁸¹ <https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/profile/mark-gough/>

stakeholder groups: business, finance, conservation and civil society, government and policy, science and academia, standard setters and disclosure and membership organisations. Some of the corporations involved are food and beverage companies like Coca-Cola, giant retailer Walmart, water MNCs Suez and Thames Water, oil and power companies such as Shell, Total and Indian TNC Tata; IFIs and development finance such as the World Bank, International Finance Corporation, and the European Investment Bank; transnational conservation organisations such as IUCN, WWF and Conservation International; research institutes such as World Resources Institute and CIFOR; US- and UK-based universities; tons of auditing firms; UN agencies such as UNEP; investment funds and commercial banks; philanthropies such as the Rockefeller Foundation; and existing standard-setting MSIs such as Climate Disclosures Standards Board, Gold Standard and Global Reporting Initiative.

What is also certain is that the MSIM deploys multistakeholderism in many of their projects, one of which is TEEBAgriFood, which advocates for the Evaluation Framework and Operational Guidelines for Businesses⁸² through training, convening roundtables, joint research, etc. This is part of a global UNEP project generously supported by the EU, with the ‘overall goal of building resilience, mainstreaming best practice, protecting biodiversity and contributing to a more sustainable agriculture and food sector in seven EU partner countries: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand⁸³.’ In the project, they not only engage with multiple ‘stakeholders’ but also encourage the application of the Evaluation Framework as a new approach to assess eco-agri-food systems through the measurement and valuation of ecosystem services as inputs to food systems as well as linking them with food and population health.

The political, policy and practical implications of valuing nature as capital and an accumulation strategy are far-reaching and alarming. First, it emphasises that nature can only be saved if we put a price tag on it, which implies that a major solution to the web of crises is the creation of new markets such as the Ecosystems Marketplace and carbon markets (e.g., cap-and-trade, REDD+, Clean Development Mechanism). Second,

⁸² <http://teebweb.org/our-work/agrifood/understanding-teebagrifood/evaluation-framework/>

⁸³ <http://teebweb.org/our-work/agrifood/country-implementation/eupi2019/business-engagement/>

it requires new modalities, global rules and infrastructures of decision-making that facilitate the involvement of various development actors to push for its mainstreaming at multiple governance levels. The creation of new 'standardised' protocols such as the Natural Capital Protocol is but one example. Third, this transformation of nature extends to changes in social relations, especially between human-nature relations. For instance, payment for ecosystem services (PES) espoused by TEEB, the Natural Capital Coalition, and the Capitals Coalition (another MSIs created with the consolidation of the 'capital' approach), has transformed Indigenous peoples and forest-based communities into ecosystem service sellers and providers, and the urban residents, industries/corporations, etc., as users and buyers of the ecosystem services, reducing rural-urban relations into money/financial transactions.

Indeed, this capitalist intrusion into nature does not only re-value nature and ecosystems into market and economic terms, but it also induces global collective actions such as MSIs that reproduce the same discourse. This has repercussions in terms of policy changes at the national and local levels as well as in reshaping the realities of people's lives and local communities that are dependent on and are a host to nature (e.g., a forest and Indigenous community prospected and/or coerced for a Reducing Emissions from Forest Degradation and Deforestation [REDD+]⁸⁴ in the Global South).

New sustainability buzzwords: natural climate solutions and nature-positive future

The natural capital agenda is accompanied by other sustainability buzzwords, namely natural climate solutions and now, nature-positive/forest-positive future. The natural climate solutions have been put forward as an idea by scholars and conservations that meant 'working with nature to do what it is already doing for millions of years: sequester and store carbon' encapsulated in the latest propaganda video

⁸⁴ REDD+ encourages developing and developed countries to contribute to mitigation actions in the forest sector by undertaking any of the following activities: a) reducing emissions from deforestation; b) reducing emissions from forest degradation; c) conservation of forest carbon stocks; d) sustainable management of forests and e) enhancement of forest carbon stocks (UN-REDD, 2010).

of the WBCSD⁸⁵. These solutions encompass conservation, restoration and land-based mitigation that increase carbon storage and/or prevent greenhouse gas emissions in forests, landscapes and wetlands across the world. In the WBCSD video, major emitters, and polluters such as Shell unabashedly call for businesses to stand together to unlock the potential of natural climate solutions in addressing the climate crisis. Along with the WEF, the business council has formed two MSIs, the Natural Climate Solutions Alliance (NCSA) and Nature for Climate (Nature4Climate), whose primary objectives are to increase investments and influence policymakers to induce actions focused on natural climate solutions, particularly in the agriculture and forestry sectors. Specifically, Nature4Climate is an initiative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), WBCSD, Conservation International, The Nature Conservancy, Woods Hole Research Center and World Resources Institute established in 2018. The multistakeholder initiative aims to increase investments and actions on natural climate solutions in support of the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement through working and partnering with global policymakers, national and sub-national governments and private sector organisations. This is the first coordinated effort and campaigning vehicle to focus on a whole range of land-based resources—forests, farms, grasslands and wetlands. Similarly, the NCSA, a CEO-led initiative, was created in 2019 to complement the Nature4Climate’s work by focusing on identifying opportunities and barriers to investments into carbon credits in new, and existing financial markets that have the potential to mobilise finance for NCS at a necessary scale. The Alliance also serves as a platform for knowledge sharing and technical capacity building on unlocking the potential of natural climate solutions.

Further, these paradigmatic/campaign-oriented MSIs are promoting the term *nature-positive future* as another sustainability buzzword that involves practical roadmaps and new metrics that harmonise profit, planet and growth goals. The roadmaps place nature at the centre of business decision making, which pushes companies to re-calibrate their strategies, processes and operations ‘to produce positive outcomes for nature and contribute to human well-being’.⁸⁶ The rationale behind this, according to the New Nature Economy Report series penned by the

⁸⁵ <https://www.wbcsd.org/Programs/Climate-and-Energy/Climate/Natural-Climate-Solutions>

⁸⁶ http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_Future_Of_Nature_And_Business_2020.pdf

WEF's Nature Action Agenda, is that there are emerging opportunities for corporations to engage in nature-positive business models and they encompass '15 transitions in the three socio-economic systems [which] could deliver \$10.1 trillion of annual business opportunities and 395 million jobs by 2030'.⁸⁷ The three systems that require fundamental transformations include food, land and ocean use; infrastructure and the built environment; and energy and extractives. The WEF lists 'innovative technology-driven' business models such as alternative proteins to food waste-saving technologies, and more nascent corporate practices of land restoration and sustainable fisheries. The bottom line here is that the WEF is emphasising a narrative that huge profits can be made amidst the crisis of 'planetary boundaries' if corporations are willing to shift their operations and transition to not only sustainable but nature-positive practices.

What are the main problems with these new sustainability frames? One, euphemisms such as 'nature-positive future' and 'natural climate solutions' (also, 'nature-based solutions') are the latest conservation hype being used to push for forest offsets such as REDD+ monoculture tree plantations as well as techno fixes such as climate smart agriculture in many countries in the Global South. They also serve as distractions at the global climate ((UN Framework Convention on Climate Change COP26) and biodiversity talks (UN Convention on Biodiversity COP16) that gloss over the need to eliminate the use of fossil fuels in favour of a zero emissions target (carbon neutrality) and 30x30 plan (reserving 30 per cent of the earth's land for conservation by 2030). Two, the overreliance on markets to finance nature-based solutions re-emphasise the carbon offsets, the commodification of nature and land use conversions, which have devastating social and ecological impacts. Carbon offset projects have often induced massive land grabbing, displacements and dispossessions, human rights abuses against Indigenous and forest-based communities, carbon cowboy speculations and land conflicts.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ The Future of Nature and Business is published by the World Economic Forum in collaboration with AlphaBeta and launched in 2020, p. 9.

⁸⁸ See <http://www.carbontradedwatch.org/pubs/cns.pdf>, https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/kbzn9w/carbon-colonialism-the-new-scramble-for-africa, and <https://foe.org/news/2014-12-new-report-on-human-rights-violations-linked-to-redd/> as examples.

Powerful alliances and partnerships

Multistakeholder initiatives and mechanisms deploy multiple strategies in advancing their agenda and objectives. The go-to strategy is convenorship, which allows lead organisations such as the WEF and WBCSD to promote their visions of redesigning the world as well as build alliances and close ties with selected actors such as transnational conservation NGOs, academe and research institutions, and UN bodies. An example is the Natural Capital Coalition and Capitals Coalition that call for partnerships between conservationists and corporations in ‘a science-based effort to integrate the value of nature’s benefits into their operations and cultures’ (Kareiva, et. al, 2012).

There is a qualitative shift from mainstream conservationists’ ideas to pursue biodiversity for biodiversity’s sake to instrumentalising conservation as a vital component in fostering capitalist growth (Buscher and Fletcher, 2020). The shift is important to highlight because it signifies some changes in transnational conservation NGOs’ discourses that facilitated their faith in partnering with capitalist organisations. Transnational conservation organisations such as the WWF, The Nature Conservancy and Conservation International that often get invited to and/or initiate multistakeholder mechanisms share a common belief that the loss of biodiversity as a global problem needs to, and can be, solved through land and forest protection, specifically the establishment of protected areas and natural parks, without people. But in recent years, these organisations have embraced critiques on the social impacts of conservation such as local people’s displacement, loss of livelihood, human rights violations, etc., by admitting that they need to address human development and income improvements, too (Kareiva, et. al, 2012). In an almost bizarre coincidence, their campaigns that spout slogans such as, ‘*nature doesn’t need people but people need nature*’ have been echoed by Nature for Climate, with its spin that ‘we need nature now’.⁸⁹ Who influenced whom is unclear from the surveyed MSIs; but what is certain, however, is that the changes in the transnational conservation groups, and capitalist organisations’ discourses, allowed for close collaborations that undergird overlapping interests and perspectives on the planetary crises and the kind of actions that need to happen.

⁸⁹ https://4fqbik2blqkb1nrebde8yxqj-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Introduction_Available-now_NCS.pdf

The powerful partnerships have massive influence on the framing of the problem and solutions to the global problems we collectively confront. As mentioned previously, new euphemisms such as ‘nature-based solutions or natural climate solutions’ have found their way into the UN Food Systems Summit, which multiple social movements and progressive organisations have boycotted due to clear corporate-influence takeover of the agenda and direction of the summit. Nature-based solutions contain recommendations that corporations and governments can become carbon-neutral through investing in nature via market-based instruments such as cap-and-trade, REDD+ as well as natural-capital accounting and payment-for-ecosystem services (PES). At the core of the proposed solutions is the idea that to solve the interlocking crises of climate, environment and planetary boundaries, *‘It is all about getting the prices right. If nature does not have a price, human beings are not incentivised to take care of it.’* Through these modalities, the ‘triple bottom line’ imperatives of profit, people and planet are addressed—a win-win-win formula.

The cover decision from the UNFCCC COP26 gives a clear green light to using nature-based solutions (NBS) for climate mitigation, which will in turn impact discussions at the CBD COP in 2022 and beyond.

Also in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the concept of ‘nature-based solutions’ is being heavily promoted, mostly linked to the plan of 30x30. The latter refers to the aim to preserve 30 per cent of the land in protected areas by 2030. Some even add a third ‘x30’, thereby indicating it should capture 30 per cent of required carbon mitigation. There is a ‘High Ambition Coalition’ promoting the idea of 30x30.

The concept of nature-based solutions implies that these lands can be used for climate and biodiversity offsetting, as well as other non-environmentally friendly projects such as huge-scale monoculture tree plantations. Both concepts are highly promoted by transnational conservation NGOs and corporations with the hope that it will be centrally integrated in the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework.

The NBS concept is so ambiguous that everything and anything can fall under it. Market-based instruments, particularly the new voluntary carbon markets⁹⁰, can be used to justify initiatives that harm local communities under the guise of decarbonising the economy. The World

⁹⁰ <https://www.iif.com/tsvcm>

Rainforest Movement (WRM)⁹¹ has reframed NBS as ‘nature-based dispossessions’, as a result of the land grabbing, enclosures and displacements⁹² they documented.

Another component of the emerging powerful alliances for multistakeholderism is linking with key research institutions that provide the scientific clout— so-called science-based targets—that make ideas such as natural capital, nature-based solutions, natural climate solutions and a nature-positive future believable and credible. A case in point is the Global Commons Alliance (GCA), a global multistakeholder group that brings together scientific, business, government and nongovernmental organisations to transform the global economy, and maintain the resilience and stability of Earth’s natural systems. It is governed by a leadership comprised of top executives from the WEF, World Resources Institute (WRI), WWF International, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Center for Global Commons (former head of Global Environmental Facility, two observers from the WBCSD and a High-Level Champion for Climate Action-COP 26. It has its own coordination and communications teams that act as secretariat for the whole network. In 2016, a dialogue was convened by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), in partnership with the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), SRC, WRI and WEF Environmental Systems Initiative to discuss the state of play. Since its origins, a considerable number of well-known research and academic institutions have formed the core group that bestows legitimacy into the multi-stakeholder group.

In a similar vein, UN bodies give political clout to MSIs. The Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) was launched as an autonomous entity after the 2015 Paris Agreement to help achieve market transformations in renewable energy using private funding and was heavily backed by the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO). UNIDO also sits on the governing board along with General Electric, the Austrian Federal Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism, First Energy Asia, The Energy and Resources Institute, European Commission- Directorate Research and Innovation, Baker and

⁹¹ an international initiative to strengthen the global movement in defence of the forest and forest-dependent peoples,

⁹² <https://wrm.org.uy/articles-from-the-wrm-bulletin/viewpoint/nature-is-not-a-solution/>

McKenzie, and GEI China. Other examples in which a UN agency has endorsed or facilitated the establishment of a multistakeholder mechanism include Sustainable Energy for All, Forest for Life Partnership, Diamond Development Initiative and EITI, among others. This supports the statement that was made in the introduction of multisectoral mapping of multistakeholderism, that rather than challenging or undermining multistakeholderism in global governance, the UN system has supported and enabled them, which paradoxically has undermined multilateralism.

Perpetuating colonial legacies

In environment and climate governance, the proposed concept of nature-based solutions is not only replete with capitalist logic but they are also imbued with colonial and cultural domination. Take the case of the eco-labels given by the Marine Stewardship Council, Forest Stewardship Council and Aquaculture Stewardship Council. Originally initiated by the WWF, these sustainability labels reinforce the idea that oceans and forests are out there that need to be ‘protected’ from ‘evil and greedy’ humans, a moralising and paternalistic narrative reminiscent of how colonial powers justified their colonial conquests. This narrative can also be found in the debates around the 30x30 plan (reserve 30 per cent of the earth for conservation by 2030) encapsulated in the Post-2020 Biodiversity Framework.

Transnational conservation organisations that are active in multi-stakeholder groups advance the proposal in alliance with transnational corporations by evoking renewed calls for fortress conservation or the creation of protected areas and natural parks, but also with capitalist logic such as global tourism. Tropes on the protection of forests as the ‘last frontier’ invoke colonial constructs of *Manifest Destiny* (*white man’s burden*) and romanticised constructs about nature and wilderness captured by *Terra Nullius* (*of vast uninhabited lands*) doctrine. Efforts to include Indigenous peoples as ‘natural partners’ in conservation are imbued with common tropes of blaming environmental degradation on Indigenous peoples, who have lost their cultural values and traditional practices of relating with nature and forests, and, therefore, the solution is to restore their traditional roles through education performed by non-Indigenous (often Western) conservationists (Rubis and Theriault 2019).

Democratic governance deficit

A major criticism of multistakeholderism in global governance is democratic deficit. The key point to make is that often multistakeholderism can reshape and redefine intergovernmental goals while claiming to implement an intergovernmental statement. For instance, Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) originated as an initiative created by former UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-Moon in September 2011. He formed the initiative in the context of a resolution that declared 2012 as the International Year of Sustainable Energy for All, which signalled the centrality of renewable energy as an alternative to fossil fuels in ending poverty and addressing climate change. As part of the initiative, Ban Ki-Moon called for collaborative actions around three objectives to be achieved by 2030: ensure universal access to modern energy services; double the rate of improvement of energy efficiency; and double the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix. He then appointed Kandeh Yumkella as his Special Representative for Sustainable Energy for All and its first CEO. It has transitioned into an independent organization that maintains close ties with the UN via relationship agreements and its CEO as the UN's Secretary General Special Representative for Sustainable Energy for All and one of the Co-Chairs of UN Energy.

The main problems connected with SE4ALL are that i) while it was initiated under the UNSG's office, there was no resolution from the General Assembly or UN Framework Convention on Climate Change or intergovernmental debate, ii) the MSI has reinterpreted the three objectives above by arguing that 'certain areas of the sustainable energy transition demand more urgent, focused action' and its 'work involves engaging stakeholders—business, government, consumers and NGOs—to ensure they are committed to these areas'⁹³ however, no intergovernmental body oversees its autonomous actions, and iii) its transition to an independent organisation whose legal status is protected under an Austrian law of Quasi-International Organization (QuIO) was more or less prompted by the demands of some government members of the UN General Assembly to be involved.

Another aspect of undemocratic governance has to do with problematic issues of memberships who are often called as stakeholder representatives. In the case of the Task Force on Climate-Related

⁹³ <https://www.seforall.org/what-we-do>

Financial Disclosures, which was an initiative called for by the Group of 20 countries (see below for more details), the so-called representatives are in practice ‘designees’ that hold certain functions such as convenorship or gatekeeping. All global decision makers and stakeholders come from the corporate and finance sectors under the helm of Bloomberg President, Michael Bloomberg, who is one of the top-ten richest men in the world. Some of its key stakeholders include BNP Paribas Asset Management, JP Morgan Chase & Co, UBS Asset Management, Generation Investment Management, BlackRock, Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Principles for Responsible Investment, Barclays, Aviva Investors and Swiss Credit. Based on the information available about the task force, politically weaker members of society such as social movements and marginalised groups affected by climate change are largely excluded in decision-making structures. And despite their recommendations having impacts beyond the corporate sector, national governments, the UNFCCC COP, civil society focused on climate change and customers of insurance, banking, and investment services do not have a say in the recommendations that the Task Force makes.

Unpacking the numbers: key features and insights from the database

In mapping multistakeholderism in environmental and climate governance, I have identified key features spanning the timelines, themes tackled, and political significance, typologies, influential stakeholders, role of the corporate sector, role of the UN and sources of funding. These features reflect important insights that describe common patterns and main observations from the database.

Timeline of MSIs creation, themes tackled and their political significance

Among the 26 MSIs catalogued⁹⁴, 12 of them were formed during the first decade of the 2000s, while eleven were formed from 2011-2020.


⁹⁴ This number of course dwarfs the total number of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) covering protocols, treaties, and agreements on managing and regulating the environment enacted since the 19th century. Prof. Ronald Mitchell of the University of Oregon and his colleagues mapped **over 1,300 multilateral agreements, 2,200 bilateral agreements, and 250 others via the**

Three MSIs are time-bound, which means that they were created for a specific mandate and time period, and when the mandate had been achieved or money had run out, the MSIs were folded. Interestingly, these time-bound MSIs were all focused on forests and tackled forest management, fire prevention and carbon financing.

When examining the year-on-year creation of global environment and climate-focused MSIs, two ‘peaks’ and a plateau as shown in Figure 1 stand out. The former is comprised of two periods when multiple MSIs were formed. In 2006, four MSIs—all focused on regulating the extractive industry by instituting third-party verification and certification, setting standards and guidelines, and/or improving workers’ conditions that are aimed at improving the industry’s social and environmental performance— were created. These include the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance, Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol, Fair Stone and Development Diamond Initiative. The latter emerged from the Kimberly Process, which was established in 2003 under the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/56 to remove conflict diamonds or ‘rough diamonds used to finance wars against governments’⁹⁵ from the global supply chain and trade. The other ‘peak’ period covers the establishment of three new-generation MSIs—the Global Commons Alliance, Natural Capital Solutions Alliance and Forest for Life Partnerships—in 2019. They are relatively new-generation because their objectives and activities encompass and go beyond policy, projects, and environment and social standard setting. (See discussion below on the typologies of MSIs).

International Environmental Agreement Database Project. See <https://iea.uoregon.edu/> for more information.

⁹⁵ <https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/what-kp>



The political significance of the trends around the MSI's timeline formation is made more apparent when combined with data in relation to the themes, discourse imperatives and narratives that they espouse. From 2000-2010, the majority of the MSIs largely focused on managing forest use, regulating mineral, oil, and gas as well as newly emerging biofuel industries, and securitising the environment. All these topics have advanced a framing that the environment, biodiversity and nature are extremely and existentially threatened, and the threat to [their] existence is declared as urgent so that political debates can be justifiably bypassed (Mitchell, 2016). The broad consequences involve recasting interventions as technical rather than political, and therefore, prioritising the construction of social and environmental standards that rely on corporate social responsibility and voluntary compliance of companies as well as government observance whose extractivist and neoliberal developmentalist policies have caused environmental degradation in the first place. For example, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) formed in 2002 is considered as a multistakeholder global standard to promote open and accountable management of oil, gas, and mineral resources in 55 implementing countries and supported by a coalition of governments, civil society and businesses⁹⁶. The EITI requires information disclosure on licensing extraction, revenue generation, contribution to the economy, etc., along the extractive industry value chain, which it hopes can foster good public and corporate governance, extractive industry reforms and accountability. However, its claims of success have been criticised by both activists and academia for its voluntary and non-binding nature,

⁹⁶ <https://eiti.org/>

which limits its reach and effectiveness, and the inadequacy of its transparency standards in exacting government and corporate accountability (Van Alstine and Andrews; Jordan, 2014).

From 2011 to 2020, new(er) themes were covered by MSIs, such as climate finance, natural capital, natural climate solutions, commons and renewable energy. These MSIs were formed during a period of intense multilateral discussions and negotiations on climate change and sustainability on the global stage, on one hand. On the other, there has been an increased global awareness around the necessity and political imperative of squarely addressing the planetary boundaries and the effects of the ‘Anthropocene’ as the new unofficial geological period has been coined to mark the undeniable impacts of human activities on the Earth’s climate and ecosystems.⁹⁷ Historically marginalised communities such as Indigenous peoples, peasants and communities of colour in the Global South and North have called for climate justice, stressing that climate change is an ethical and political issue rather than just merely an environmental issue and that they often face its worst consequences. Climate change for them has not only disproportionately impacted their communities but also exacerbates existing inequalities and vulnerabilities.

Beyond the timeline, overall, close to three-fourths of the 26 MSIs tackled the themes of forests (27 per cent), extractives (23 per cent) and renewable energy (23 per cent). This finding may likely be related to the focus or ‘niche topics’ of the actors involved in these MSIs. For instance, the Tropical Forest Alliance (TFA) is multistakeholder partnership platform initiated to support the implementation of private-sector commitments to remove deforestation from palm oil, beef, soy and pulp/paper supply chains. Hosted by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Geneva, Switzerland, its 170+ alliance partners include companies, government entities, NGOs, selected Indigenous peoples and local communities working together to identify ‘forest frontier’ challenges and solutions through mainstreaming and the Forest-Positive jurisdictional landscape concept and Forest-Positive Future, and to amplify demand-side management in major economies such as the

⁹⁷ The Anthropocene discourse is a contested issue, and the strands of the debates will not be tackled in this paper. But for a good introduction about the Anthropocene, see HAMILTON, C., BONNEUIL, C., & GEMENNE, F. (2015). *The anthropocene and the global environmental crisis: rethinking modernity in a new epoch*. <http://site.ebrary.com/id/11055878>.

European Union, the US and China.⁹⁸ According to the WEF, forest-positive, which is inspired by ‘carbon-positive’ (meaning that a company sequesters more carbon than it emits through its activities), entails ‘leveraging forest-nature-based solutions to address sustainable development and climate change challenges’⁹⁹. What it means in practice is still largely vague, but the WWF, which is part of the steering committee of TFA, offered three action points that according to them will create a forest-positive future. First is for numerous companies to concertedly commit to reduce their impacts on forests through zero-deforestation targets and respecting the rights of forest communities via the Forest Stewardship Council Certification, a market-based certification standard that was created in 1993 and used as a transnational environmental policy. Second is to formulate science-based targets for assessing and regulating forest footprints (akin to the concept of carbon footprint). And finally, creating a wide socio-political infrastructure that goes beyond nation-state and landscape jurisdictions involving various public, corporate and non-profit actors.¹⁰⁰

In other words, forest-positive future is akin to the ideas of carbon offsets, in which a company quantifies its forest footprint in its operations and pledges or sponsors forest conservation elsewhere. WWF, for example, praised Apple’s forest-positive commitment in conserving close to 130,000 hectares in China and 15,000 hectares in the eastern United States¹⁰¹, which was greater than its annual use of virgin paper/fibre used in its product packaging in 2016. It must be noted here that Apple funded the WWF’s project in China, and therefore the positive appraisal of Apple’s actions was expected. But this also highlights an important aspect from the database; i.e., transnational conservation and environment NGOs have no qualms about working with the corporate sector, and vice versa. This is in fact one of the core pillars of multistakeholderism in the climate and environmental sectors. (See *Influential stakeholders*)

⁹⁸ <https://www.tropicalforestalliance.org/en/>

⁹⁹ <https://www.tropicalforestalliance.org/en/collective-action-agenda/collective-action-agenda-3/>

¹⁰⁰ <https://www.worldwildlife.org/blogs/sustainability-works/posts/creating-a-for est-positive-future>

¹⁰¹ <https://www.greenbiz.com/article/why-apple-buying-and-protecting-forests>

The forest-positive, carbon-positive and nature-positive discourses espoused by the WEF/ WBCSD and transnational conservation and environmental NGOs are not only problematic in theory and practice but they are also ideologically linked with colonial constructs. I will delve further into the problems surrounding these concepts in the section on *Common threads and trends*.

Typologies of MSIs

Building on the work of Dr. Harris Gleckman, senior fellow at the Center for Governance and Sustainability at the University of Massachusetts Boston and Transnational Institute, five typologies of climate and environment-focused MSIs have been identified. First are environmental and social standard-setting MSIs whose primary focus is to introduce ethical, social, environmental and developmental products or processes into international trade and corporate practices. Eight, or 30.8 per cent, of the total MSIs (not including the combination MSIs with this component) belong to this category and comprise the greatest number among the surveyed initiatives. Some examples include the sustainability roundtables such as Fair Stone, Hydropower Sustainability, Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials, and International Sustainability and Carbon Certification. Common among these MSIs are the development of certification and logo licensing or 'eco-labels', which are often considered as 'gold' industry standards but have been contested due to multifarious issues such as weak standards, corruption and legitimating harmful environmental corporate practices. A case in point is the Aquaculture Stewardship Council's (ASC) eco-label licensing in the fisheries sector. Originally initiated by the WWF in 2010, the MSIM has been criticized by activists and scholars for its impartial assessment of the sustainability of fishing practices, especially towards its largest clients such as Tassal, Australia's foremost producer of farmed salmon¹⁰². In July 2018, the Tasmanian fishing, community and environmental groups filed a complaint with ASC for Tassal's breach of ASC standards in its Okehampton Bay operations on the Tasmanian east coast¹⁰³. According to the groups, Tassal attempted to secure a green tick from ASC despite the lack of a social license to operate in the area. The Australian company has a partnership agreement with ASC and WWF

¹⁰² Bleakley, P. Big Fish, Small Pond: NGO–Corporate Partnerships and Corruption of the Environmental Certification Process in Tasmanian Aquaculture. *Crit Crim* 28, 389–405 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-019-09454-8>

¹⁰³ https://www.et.org.au/peak_environment_group_accuses_tassal

Australia in which the latter provides advice to guide the company's sustainability strategy and commitments to ASC standards.¹⁰⁴

The involvement of WWF in many environmental and social standard-setting MSIs is hardly surprising. As early as the late 1980s, WWF had incorporated the strategy of cultivating consumer power through ecolabels in its plan of actions.¹⁰⁵ From the 1990s to the early 2000s, it organized and led various roundtable initiatives that convened world experts on different 'commodities' and from these roundtables, several initiatives were born. These initiatives had purported goals of seeking more sustainable solutions for farmers/producers, the environment and each sector's future.

The next typology is policy-oriented MSIs that seek to set and change global climate and environmental policies. There are seven MSIs, or 27 per cent of the total surveyed initiatives, that belong to this category. An example here is the newly formed Forest for Life Partnership (FLP), which aims to 'halt and reverse forest degradation across one billion hectares of the most intact forests worldwide'¹⁰⁶ to achieve global climate, biodiversity and sustainable development targets. In 2019 (and in parallel to the UN Secretary-General's Climate Action Summit), five international organizations— the Global Wildlife Conservation, Rainforest Foundation Norway, UN Development Programme (UNDP), Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) and World Resources Institute (WRI) convened the partnership to advance 'forest-centred nature-based solutions' to climate change and other development challenges. It has vowed to work with policymakers to make the protection of the world's least-disturbed forests a priority for national governments in meeting global climate, biodiversity and sustainable development targets, as well as to mobilise new finances to support conservation actions. By focusing on key forest hotspots, that is., the Amazon, the Congo Basin, New Guinea, Mesoamerica, Madagascar, and South and Southeast Asia, the FLP has also committed to engage Indigenous

¹⁰⁴ <https://www.wwf.org.au/get-involved/partnerships/who-we-partner-with/tassal#gs.6rmxrv>

¹⁰⁵ Frans Van Waarden, 2012. "Governing Global Commons: Public Private Protection of Fish and Forests," *Chapters*, in: Axel Marx & Miet Maertens & Johan Swinnen & Jan Wouters (ed.), *Private Standards and Global Governance*, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.

¹⁰⁶ <https://sdg.iisd.org/news/five-organizations-launch-partnership-to-protect-intact-forests/#:~:text=The%20Forest%20for%20Life%20Partnership,biodiversity%20and%20sustainable%20development%20targets>

peoples in the management and conservation of forests. This is just one example in which transnational conservation and environmental NGOs are involved in policy-oriented MSIs. If WWF has largely focused on environment and social standard-setting MSIs, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), World Resources Institute (WRI) and Conservation International are some of the NGOs that prioritise work around setting global environmental and climate policies.

A third and new typology of MSIs is what is called paradigmatic /campaign-oriented, and seeks to advance a paradigm/ ideology /concept to redefine or reshape global climate and environmental governance, and/or act as campaigning vehicles. This category has a qualitative difference from the earlier policy-oriented MSIs because they aim to change the conversation, change policies and change the 'system' all at the same time. There are six MSIs (or 23 per cent of the total surveyed initiatives) belonging to this typology. These 'new-generation' MSIs are ambitious in the scope and breadth of issues they tackle. An example is the Global Commons Alliance (GCA), which promotes the 'global commons' and planetary-crisis paradigm introduced by Rockstrom (see section on *Powerful alliances and partnerships*). Launched in June 2019, the Global Commons Alliance claims to be 'an unprecedented partnership of more than 50 of the world's most forward-looking organisations in the fields of philanthropy, science, environment, business, cities and advocacy'¹⁰⁷ that seeks to transform the global economy while maintaining the resilience and stability of the Earth's natural systems. It also aims to create the most powerful network to scale science-based action that protects the people and the planet. Its four components are the Earth Commission (scientific arm), Science-Based Target Network (targeting cities to adopt global commons metrics/targets), Earth HQ (media arm) and Systems Change Lab (advocacy/networking /campaigning arm) that act as hubs and as an accelerator of ideas.

The alliance has its origins in the 2016 dialogue convened by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the IUCN, in partnership with the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), the Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC), the World Resources Institute (WRI) and the World Economic Forum (WEF) Environmental Systems Initiative to discuss the state of play. At the core of the GCA's discourse

¹⁰⁷ <https://globalcommonsalliance.org/partners/>

is combining the global commons idea with planetary boundaries. The former is linked with Nobel Prize-winner for Economics, Elinor Ostrom's concept of the commons but extends it to define global, supranational and international domains as common-pool resources (e.g. high seas, outer space and the atmosphere). The latter is a term proposed by Rockström, Will Steffen of the Australian National University, and colleagues who argue that Earth system processes contain environmental boundaries, and the key challenge then is to define what they call a 'safe operating space for humanity'. It reinforces the Anthropocene and further advances the idea that 'transgressing one or more planetary boundaries may be deleterious or even catastrophic due to the risk of crossing thresholds that will trigger non-linear, abrupt environmental change within continental-scale to planetary-scale systems'.¹⁰⁸

The GCA's discourses are aligned with the Great Reset roll out of the WEF in January 2021, particularly with creating a 'stakeholder economy' and building in a more 'resilient, equitable and sustainable' way anchored on environmental, social and governance metrics that can incorporate more green public infrastructure¹⁰⁹. Further, the science-business-civil society close connections are reflected by who sits on its governing board—top executives from the WEF, World Resources Institute, WWF International, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Japan-based Centre for Global Commons (former head of Global Environmental Fund), two observers from the WBCSD and a High-Level Champion for Climate Action-COP 26.


The fourth typology involves project-oriented MSIs whose primary work revolves around the implementation of specific projects. Excluding those that combine one or more typologies, only one MSIM implements projects, which is the World Bank (WB)-administered Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). The FCPF is a global partnership of governments, businesses, civil society and Indigenous peoples focused on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, forest carbon-stock conservation, the sustainable management of forests, and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries, activities commonly referred to as REDD+. Created in 2008, it has piloted

¹⁰⁸ [Rockström, J; et al. \(2009\), "Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity", *Ecology and Society*, 14 \(2\): 32, p. 1, doi:10.5751/ES-03180-140232](#)

¹⁰⁹ <https://www.weforum.org/great-reset/>

an emissions reduction performance-based payment system generated from REDD+ activities, provided technical and financial assistance and claimed to build recipient-country capacities for benefitting from REDD+ activities. At the heart of the activities of FCPF is the promotion and testing of REDD+ readiness projects in 47 developing countries that are host to the world's remaining tropical forests.

Finally, the last typology covers combination MSIs, which involve two or more typologies. Among the total surveyed initiatives, four MSIs (or 15.4 per cent) belong to this category, one of which has a financing component. These MSIs are Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, Alliance for Responsible Mining, Diamond Development Initiative and Equitable Origin. Figure 2 offers a snapshot of the typologies.



Influential ‘stakeholders’


With its roots in corporate management science and practice, stakeholders in the MSIs parlance refer to organizations and individuals that have a ‘stake’ or an interest in the discussion to address a specific policy challenge or goal. But ‘stakeholders’ and ‘stake’, especially at the global level, are imbued with unresolved and contested political and control issues that are often masked or side-stepped in the attempt to reach action-driven consensus. The crucial point to make is not all *stakeholders* hold an equal position and not all *stakes* get to define the agenda, plans and actions of an MSI. The influential stakeholders are, therefore, those representing different institutions—government, international institutions, industry, civil society, academia, technical

experts— that hold key positions in the MSIs' governing bodies and tend to dominate the agenda.

The difficulty here is determining the dominant actors in large governing bodies that involve ten or more members. In such cases, two rules based on assumptions were loosely applied: i) the chair and vice-chair are assumed to be dominant; and ii) if funders sit on the board, even without key positions, they hold sway in decision-making, that is,, the 'power of the purse'. It must also be stressed that some MSIs have vague information about their governing histories and structures, which made the identification of influential stakeholders not only a difficult task but also an incomplete undertaking.

Among the ascertained actors and as illustrated in Figure 3, the WWF and WEF/WBCSD hold key positions in six MSIs. They overlap in three MSIs—the Tropical Forest Alliance, Global Commons Alliance and Capitals Coalition. They are followed by the World Bank and the World Resources Institute that lead or convene four MSIs. Then, the IUCN, Food and Agriculture Organization and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) hold key positions in three MSIs' governing structures, hile the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), ERM Foundation, the Convention on Biological Diversity and USAID are part of governing bodies of two MSIs. The involvement of several UN bodies reinforces the study's general finding that they actively support and incubate multistakeholder initiatives and mechanisms in parallel with and to complement multistakeholder processes. (See role of UN below). An interesting finding, too, is the involvement of ERM Foundation, which is a philanthropic organization that 'invests in organi[z]ations and programs that create impact at the intersection of biodiversity, climate action, and investing in women and young people as agents of change'¹¹⁰. While the institution claims to be supporting smaller NGOs and social enterprises, their focus on the green economy aligns with their involvement in the Natural Climate Solutions Alliance and Capitals Coalition.


¹¹⁰ <https://www.erm.com/erm-foundation/>



While the top-tier, most influential stakeholders are a combination of transnational conservation NGOs, business leaders, UN bodies and Northern donors, business and industry still dominate the governing structures of the 26 MSIs. (See Figure 4). Around 45 *distinct* corporations involved in consumer goods, manufacturing, extractives and energy populate the MSIs' boardrooms. This comprises more than one-third of the total distinct 'stakeholders' identified. The Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) exemplifies the dominance of corporations in decision-making structures. REEEP was launched after the Paris Agreement to help achieve changes in the renewable energy market using private funding mechanisms. As an autonomous entity backed by UNIDO, its governing structure has two levels: 1) the Meeting of Members (MoM) that is considered as the assembly of all REEEP Members, and 2) the Governing Board, which convenes the MoM and the Advisory Board, comprised of key members/experts. The Meeting of Members is convened once every two years and is the main body that approves accounts, strategies, and elects the Governing Board. The Governing Board is largely a management and operations board with three overlapping functions: strategic— development and oversight of the strategic direction, priorities, targets and timeframes; fiduciary— financial and accounting oversight; and operational guidance of the International Secretariat. These two bodies are somewhat complemented by an Advisory Board that is supposed 'to provide high-level advice and strategic guidance'¹¹¹. Its Governing Board consists of General Electric, the Austrian Federal Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism, First Energy Asia, The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI),

¹¹¹ <https://www.reeep.org/leadership>

UNIDO, European Commission- Directorate Research and Innovation, Baker and McKenzie, and GEI China, while the Advisory Board is largely comprised of energy, investments and futures companies such as Enel, Glennmont Partners, Southbridge Investments and Finite Carbon.



Northern donors and governments (16), UN bodies/intergovernmental organisations (14) and international NGOs (13) trail behind business and industry and altogether make up almost one-third (32 per cent) of the total distinct number of stakeholders identified in the database. The other one-third are a mix of academic/research institutions, affected communities, Southern governments, IFI/s or DFIs, trade unions, investors and banks, regional bodies, philanthropies, national NGOs and others (e.g., consultants, technical experts).

Role of the corporate private sector

Building on the ubiquity of corporations in the boardrooms of MSIs, it is therefore not a surprise that they largely play a *leadership* role. Leadership roles encompass assuming power and responsibility in setting the boundaries and strategic direction of the MSIs, which include agendas and ‘stakes’ that get to be represented or not. It is obviously vested with important decision-making powers and considerable influence not only during formal moments such as the general assembly or board meetings but also in the day-to-day operations and management of the MSIs. In terms of data, in seven out of ten MSIs we


surveyed in the private sector, particularly the WEF/WBCSD, plays a leadership role.

A corollary role, which we have distinguished separately but is also imbued with leadership functions, is convenorship. The reason for identifying this as a distinct role is to stress the power of a convenor in designating and approving stakeholder categories as well as in setting out designation procedures. Out of the 26 MSIs catalogued, the private sector acts as a convenor in 27 per cent of them. However, what is noticeable from the data as shown in Figure 4 is that the private sector plays multiple roles in two-thirds of the multistakeholder initiatives and mechanisms.

An iconic example is the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), which was created in 2015 upon the request of G20¹¹² Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to coordinate disclosures among companies impacted by climate change. One of its goals is encouraging companies to invest sustainably that can facilitate a climate resilient economy. Despite the initiation of the G20, its global decision makers are all from the corporate sector—

banks (Aggrego Consultores), stock exchange (Singapore Exchange), manufacturing (Unilever), and insurance companies (Athora Germany) headed by its chair, Michael Bloomberg, the ninth-richest person in the world according to Forbes' 2019 ranking, and championed by former Bank of England Governor-turned-UN-Special Envoy on Climate Action and Finance, Mark Carney.

¹¹² The Group of 20 countries is comprised of 19 developed and developing countries and the European Union that 'work together' to address issues related to the global economy such as international financial stability, climate change, and sustainable development. The 19 countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.




Role of the UN: leadership and strategic partner

The UN bodies play five roles in the MSIs: as leaders, initiators / convenors, strategic partners, target institutions and funders. The leadership and convenorship roles have been elaborated in the section on influential stakeholders. As target institutions, the UN bodies become the object of policy changes or actions espoused by the MSIs and as funders they provide financial support for the operations and activities of the multistakeholder body. As strategic partners, the UN agencies act as a key collaborator in the brokering, designing and facilitating of MSIs. Multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) have been given a central role by the UN in realisation of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), creating its own online platform, Partnership for SDGs, which catalogues all voluntary initiatives and MSPs that support the SDGs.¹¹³

Thus, Figure 6 stresses an unsurprising finding that the UN has played a strategic partner role in six out of ten MSIs focused on the environment and climate change. At the same time, in four out of ten MSIs, the UN bodies have acted as leaders and convenors/initiators. Of prominence in this role are the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNDP, UNEP and the Convention of Biological Diversity. Further, like the agriculture-focused MSIs, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) has/had acted as either the brains behind or incubator of MSIs that later spun off into an independent entity. In the agriculture MSIs, it is the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit whose agenda and organisation was highly dominated by corporations. In the environment and climate MSIs, two examples

¹¹³ <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnerships/about>

stood out: Sustainable Energy for All, which is an initiative started by former UNSG Ban Ki Moon in 2011, and the Forests for Life Partnership, which was established during the current UNSG Antonio Guterres' Climate Action Summit in 2019.



The different roles played by the UN system organisations including its Secretary-General point to a discomfoting paradox: that while the UN's traditional collaborative infrastructures, effectiveness and legitimacy are under fire and threat, it provides the enabling spaces and political backing for multistakeholderism to flourish, which in one way or another, facilitates the complementation or coherence of roles, agenda, priorities and actions on climate change and environmental sustainability.

Sources of funding

Environmental and climate MSIs have been largely funded by Northern governments represented by their international aid / development agencies and philanthropies. Among the funders, GIZ and other German aid agencies, USAID and the World Bank lead the pack, financially incentivising five MSIs. They are followed by the UK government funding four MSIs, and then the EU or European Commission, Austrian, Norwegian and Swedish governments supporting three MSIs. About three MSIs are financed by their self-generated incomes, which include certification and consultancy fees. These MSIs are obviously standard-setting ones.

Other actors that fund two MSIs include philanthropies such as Climate Works Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, Northern governments of Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands as well as the FAO and WEF/WBCSD. Table 1 summarises the top funders/actors of the sector.

Table 1. Top Funders of Environment and Climate MSIs

Funders/Sources of Funding	Number of MSIs funded	Percentage
Government of Germany/GIZ and aid agencies	5	19.23
Government of the United States (USAID, Labor, etc.)	5	19.23
World Bank	5	19.23
Government of the UK (DFID; etc.)	4	15.38
EU/European Commission	3	11.54
Government of Austria and its aid agencies	3	11.54
Government of Norway/Ministry of Foreign Affairs	3	11.54
Government of Sweden (SIDA)	3	11.54
Self-generated income (fees, selling of services)	3	11.54
Climate Works Foundation	2	7.69
Ford Foundation	2	7.69
Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation	2	7.69
Government of Australia (Foreign Affairs and Trade; etc.)	2	7.69
Government of Canada	2	7.69
Government of the Netherlands	2	7.69

WEF/WBCSD	2	7.69
FAO	2	7.69

If we look at the overall categories of funders as illustrated in Figure 7, the top two donors, which comprise more than one-fifth of the total number of funders, are philanthropies and Northern aid agencies. This finding mirrors not only observations above but also the general finding of the multisectoral mapping exercise (See introduction). The only obvious difference is the names of philanthropies that invest in the environment and climate-focused MSIs. For example, the top three philanthropies consist of the Ford Foundation, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation and Climate Works Foundation, all of which are US-based charitable foundations but with different niches and foci of investments. The first two are well-known family foundations with endowments, both belonging to the wealthiest foundations. The Ford Foundation, which was formed in 1936 by Edsel Ford, the son of US industrialist Henry Ford, reported a total net asset of more than US\$15.76 billion and a total of US\$916.55 million grants approved in 2020¹¹⁴. They have invested in the Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM) and EITI, which is aligned with their program on natural resources and climate change. The ARM aims to promote responsible standards and criteria focused on artisanal and small-scale mining. This initiative drew inspiration from the promising results achieved by the Oro Verde initiative, a local strategy for biodiversity conservation in Colombia.

For its part, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, which was established by tech giant Intel co-founder, Gordon Moore, and his wife, Betty, in September 2000, aims to support environmental conservation, scientific discovery, patient care improvements and preservation of the special character of the Bay Area.¹¹⁵ With a total net asset of \$7.11 billion¹¹⁶, it has approved grants worth \$4.76 billion, 43.3 per cent of which (or \$1.97 billion) went to environmental conservation initiatives

¹¹⁴ <https://www.fordfoundation.org/media/6438/2020-audited-financial-statements-and-footnotes.pdf>

¹¹⁵ <https://www.moore.org/about/founders-intent>

¹¹⁶ This is for the end of fiscal year 2019. The foundation's audited financial report for 2020 is not yet available online. <https://www.moore.org/docs/default-source/our-finances/audited-financial-statements/2019-2018-financial-statements>. But it gives you an idea of its net assets.


in 2020.¹¹⁷ Two MSIs that the foundation has invested in include the Global Commons Alliance and the Natural Capitals Coalition, both of which tackle environmental and biodiversity conservation through market-based approaches. In the next section, these two MSIs are critically examined.

Finally, the Climate Works Foundation is the newer kid on the block. Composed of researchers, climate science and public policy experts, strategists and grantmakers, the foundation was formed in 2008 with a mission to end the climate crisis through ‘amplifying the power of philanthropy’¹¹⁸. It entails supporting initiatives that scale-up climate solutions such as developing strategies to align maritime shipping with the 2060 net-zero emission commitment in China.¹¹⁹ Compared to the wealthier foundations, Climate Works has disclosed its net asset totalling \$168.75 million, with \$58.435 million worth of approved grants in 2019. But it is no less ambitious in supporting MSIs that it views as scaling-up climate solutions such as the Global Commons Alliance, and the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials. The latter is a global, multi-stakeholder organisation that seeks to develop a new world bioeconomy through the promotion of ethical and socio-environmental standards focused on the sustainable production and conversion of biomass.

¹¹⁷ <https://www.moore.org/about/our-grantmaking>

¹¹⁸ <https://www.climateworks.org/about-us/>

¹¹⁹ See 2020 Annual Report, *Converging crises, Converging Solutions*, https://www.climateworks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CWF_Annual_Report_2020.pdf



Conclusion

The growing prominence of multistakeholderism in environmental and climate governance reflects the general shifts at the global level marked by increasing roles of the corporate sector, an enabling UN system and emerging powerful alliances of transnational conservation organisations, scientists and corporations. The continued overreliance on market-based solutions has created new euphemisms of nature-based solutions and nature-positive future, at the core of which are capitalist logic of commodifying and selling nature to save it and colonial constructs of protecting uninhabited wilderness.

Multiple criticisms coming from different social and Indigenous movements and progressive NGOs stress that such solutions do not question the fundamental structures that induce the climate crises and environmental sustainability in the first place—capitalist and extractivist development—and that calls for carbon-neutral and nature-based solutions transfer the responsibilities to Indigenous peoples and local communities. Nature-based solutions are but another form of greenwashing for corporations to argue for continuing their dirty and extractivist operations while pledging to commit to restore forests and landscapes elsewhere—the fallacy of *equivalency*. Further movements for alternatives, especially led by Indigenous peoples, have shown that multiple world-making projects

are existing and underway, which include sustaining territories of life.¹²⁰

Multilateral spaces for governing the climate and environment must listen and take the cue from these movements and progressive organisations rather than make space for multistakeholder groups and mechanisms. If they fail to do so, real solutions to the planetary crises will again be sidestepped, if not silenced altogether.

¹²⁰ <https://report.territoriesoflife.org/>

Chapter III

The Ebbing Influence of WHO: Rise of Multistakeholderism

Madhuresh Kumar¹²¹

As the world grapples with the raging Covid-19 pandemic, there has been a massive uproar over patents, intellectual property and mass vaccination for everyone. The pandemic has shown the deep power imbalances and economic inequalities the world over and the skewed nature of global governance mechanisms. The current debate over the patents for vaccines shows who holds the key to global public health; it's the high-income countries, including the European Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as the pharmaceutical companies. They together hold the key to quick access to vaccines for everyone, not the World Health Organisation (WHO) or other UN agencies.¹²²

Public health's transnational and global nature requires greater collaboration among nation-states, strengthening multilateral institutions, especially the WHO, and greater participation of the international civil society and affected communities. However, in the name of the 'WHO reforms', there has been continuing pressure to transform the WHO from an intergovernmental body, where member states have sovereignty, to a 'multi-stakeholder public-private partnership' model where transnational corporations and philanthropic foundations are able to take (what they see as) their rightful seat at the table.¹²³ Our study of several multistakeholder initiatives

¹²¹ Author of this paper would like to thank Sulakshna Nandi and Susana Barria of People's Health Movement for their extensive help and guidelines in developing this analysis. Global Health Watch published by People's Health Movement has also helped shape my understanding of the complex terrain of global health governance.

¹²² Chowdhury, Anis and Jomo Kwame Sundaram. "Intellectual property monopolies block vaccine access". December 14, 2020. Available at <https://www.ksjomo.org/post/intellectual-property-monopolies-block-vaccine-access>

¹²³ See detailed discussion on the WHO reforms covered in the Global Health Watch published by People's Health Movement.

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.

/institutions (MSIs) or groups (MSIs) in the past two decades associated with the governance of global health precisely shows that the pharmaceutical companies, private philanthropies, the World Bank group and Northern donor governments have far greater influence than the developing countries, multilateral UN institutions and elected governments.

It precisely raises these questions: who are these private global corporations and philanthropies accountable to? Can they be held accountable? Can the agenda and priority setting be made more democratic and in the larger global interest?

Background

Global health governance could be divided into three dimensions: firstly, *global health governance*, referring mainly to institutions and processes of governance with an explicit health mandate, such as the World Health Organization and others; secondly, *global governance for health*, referring mainly to institutions and processes of global governance with a direct and indirect health impact, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Human Rights Council (HRC), International Labour Organisation (ILO), etc.; and lastly, *governance for global health* referring to institutions and mechanisms established at the national and regional level to contribute to global health governance and/or to governance for global health – such as national global health strategies or regional strategies for global health.¹²⁴

Compared to the other sectors studied as part of the project on multistakeholderism in global governance, the health sector has been witnessing multistakeholder processes for much longer. There are many collaborative initiatives hosted within the WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, the World Bank, etc., or existing as independent entities founded before 2000, which is beyond the scope of this study.

The study analyses 18 MSIs with specific global health governance mandates set up after 2000, which cuts across all three dimensions mentioned above and contributes to policy development, project implementation, financing of global health programmes, etc. It includes UN-initiated and hosted processes such as UHC 2030 and UNIATF;

¹²⁴ Kickbusch, Ilona, and Martina Marianna Cassar Szabo. "A new governance space for health." *Global health action* vol. 7 23507. 13 Feb. 2014, doi:10.3402/gha.v7.23507

private sector- and academic institutions-led World Health Summit; private sector, corporate philanthropy and Northern governments-led GAVI, CEPI, COVAX and ACT-A; financing facilities such as GFATM, GFF and P4H; or issue-specific MSIs like Global Health Workforce Network, Health Data collaborative, etc. The database also includes Global Health Workforce Alliance paving the way for Global Health Workforce Network in 2016 and IMPACT – two MSIs that are now not operational. IMPACT (International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce), initiated in 2006 following the WHO Rome declaration, was abandoned in 2011 after being mired in the debate surrounding the definition of these terms 'counterfeit', 'intellectual property', production of generic medicines and access to high-priced drugs in third world countries.¹²⁵

Table 1: Multistakeholder Initiatives/Groups surveyed for the paper

Name of Multistakeholder Initiative/institute/group	Year of launch
GAVI, The Vaccine Alliance	2000
The Global Fund - GFATM	2002
Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (PMNCH)	2005
P4H Network for health financing and social health protection (P4H)	2007
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) 2030	2007
World Health Summit	2009
United Nations Interagency Task Force on the Prevention and Control of NCDs (UNIATF)	2013
Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)	2014
Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents (GFF)	2015

¹²⁵ Mara, Kaitlin, “Proposals at WHO Would Boost Drug Safety, Replace Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce”. Intellectual Property Watch. May 18, 2010. Available at <https://www.ip-watch.org/2010/05/18/proposals-at-who-would-boost-drug-safety-replace-anti-counterfeiting-taskforce/>

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.

Global Health Workforce Network	2016
Health Data Collaborative (HDC)	2016
Health Systems Governance Collaborative	2016
CEPI - Coalitions for Epidemic Preparedness Innovation	2017
ACT-A (Access to Covid-19 Tools Accelerator)	2020
COVAX (COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access)	2020
IMPACT (International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce)	2006 - 11
Global Health Workforce Alliance	2006 - 16

Past two decades, the golden era and emerging complexities

Multilateral and multistakeholder organisations and initiatives engaged at the global health governance stage play several roles, setting rules, standards, guidelines, funding and implementing, and often act as convening, facilitating and networking hubs for all the actors. These forums are also responsible for integrating health as a subject within other global organisations and processes such as WTO, World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), UN General Assembly, World Bank Institutions, Rio+20, World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), G8, G20 and others. These initiatives carry forward the mandates emanating from the global summits, like Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), World Health Summit, etc., and responding to the calls from the UN General Assembly, G8, G20 summits, etc.

In the current study, we have gathered data and information for the 17 MSIs launched post-2000. Both decades have an equal number of MSIs launched, with maximum concentration being when the MDGs and SDGs were established (see *Figure 1*). In 2020, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, two very specific MSIs, Covax and ACT-A, were launched to address different aspects of the pandemic and develop a coordinated response.


The first decade of the century was referred to as the 'golden era' of global health due to the explosion of actors in the global health arena, along with dramatic increases in funding for global health initiatives on a range of issues.¹²⁶ However, the second decade did not see the same optimism and political support, reflected in the decreased multilateral funding for the global health programmes. The situation got further complicated due to increased commercial interests with the implosion of the global pandemic flu, the rise of surveillance technology and power of global corporations.¹²⁷ The challenges thus facing the ever-expanding global public health domain are therefore less of a technical nature – in many areas, we already have the knowledge and the technologies – but require political will and the willingness of states and other actors to prioritise health.¹²⁸ The geopolitical concerns have also complicated this further, as has been witnessed in the several debates around international health regulations and varied national responses to the current pandemic.

¹²⁶ Morrison JS. The end of the golden era of global health? Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2012. Available from: http://csis.org/pub_lication/end-golden-era-global-health

¹²⁷ Prior to COVID several other global outbreaks have occurred in the last decades, SARS 2003, H5N1 2008, H1N1 2009, Ebola 2013 among others.

¹²⁸ See Ilona Kickbusch & Martina Marianna Cassar Szabo. 'A new governance space for health'. Published on 13 Feb 2014. Available at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/gha.v7.23507>

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.




Disease eradication prioritised over global health equity

As mentioned above, global health governance is only a sub-domain of the larger global economic and political governance. Right to health has been an emerging area with a greater focus within the SDGs as part of goal three. The continuously widening global health inequalities require that the effort should be on addressing the social and economic determinants of health, with governance facilitating health to work with non-health sectors. Our study found that there is a diversity within the sub-sector and themes being addressed by the MSIs, but they lack the comprehensiveness required to bridge global health inequality. The focus has been more on the specific diseases and programmes linked to deeper commercial interests than on strengthening the country's public health systems and ensuring universal coverage. There has been a negligible focus on non-communicable diseases (NCDs), compared to the financing and attention Malaria, TB and AIDS received through the establishment of UNAIDS, GAVI, GFATM, GFF etc. (see Figure 2). Even though the NCDs today are a significant cause of concern the world over and are afflicting everyone, funding them is against business interests and hence not a subject of the MSIs. Thus, the conflict of interest with the businesses and private sector ensures that NCDs are not the top priority within the WHO. This has been ensured through the structural

integration of the non-state actors within various committees and consultative frameworks.

This is visible in the decreased funding by the rich countries to the WHO towards their assessed contributions and increased project funding. The business interests have also been supported and protected by the policy reforms being pushed by the World Bank through the development aid for health through country partnerships to the low- and middle-income countries.

Given the increased importance of information technology and data in every sector, governance in health has also witnessed the involvement of internet corporations such as Microsoft, Google, etc. Two specific MSIs, Health Data Collaborative and Health Systems Governance Collaborative, were launched in 2016.



Going beyond, agenda-setting in global health governance

Multistakeholderism has taken roots in global health governance. Just like in other sectors in global governance, MSI/Gs are assuming several kinds of roles in the name of crisis within global governance and its implications for solving global problems. The roles today being played are beyond standard-setting and guideline development and are aimed

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.

at system-wide reforms through convening, facilitation, policy prescriptions bypassing national sovereignty and accountability standards to which multilateral forums are subjected too (see Table 2 and Figure 3). Participation of UN-system organisations and national governments brings political legitimacy, but their influence is not the same.

An analysis of the typology of MSIs under study suggests that very few are specifically for policy development or project implementation. Most of the MSIs are varied in nature and often combine activities from policy development, project implementation, targeted campaigning, convening and resource mobilisation. The rise of the MSIs has been in line with the overall demand for the global health governance agenda reforms and facilitating 'non-state actors' participation.

The Global Fund and Gavi were founded to enable the mobilisation of resources for fighting TB, malaria and AIDS and increase the vaccination programme. However, it remains doubtful if they simplify the global health governance agenda or make it more complex and unaccountable. This has been visible in the functioning of the COVAX facility, the most recent financing facility created to address the Covid-19 pandemic. It has perpetuated global health inequity and proved to be a roadblock to global vaccination rather than a facilitator.¹²⁹

Table 2: Typology of the MSIs

Typology of MSIs	Count of Typology
Policy; Paradigmatic / Campaign	1
Policy, Project, Paradigmatic / Campaign	1
Project	1
Policy; Project; Paradigmatic / Campaign	1
Policy	2

¹²⁹ See Harris Gleckman, January 2021, COVAX: A global multistakeholder group that poses political and health risks to developing countries and multilateralism. Available at <https://longreads.tni.org/covax>


Project; Paradigmatic / Campaign	2
Policy; Project	3
Policy; Project; Paradigmatic / Campaign; Financing Facility	6
Grand Total	17

Even though each of the MSIs performs multiple roles, further data segregation shows that their project and policy impact is almost equal. Lack of financing is one of the significant issues in global health governance. However, very few MSIs are there to address the role of resource mobilisation for strengthening the national health systems, a role left to the member states at the bottom of the pyramid. This is in contrast to the resources available for specific diseases, vaccination, etc.; the funding and development aid from the World Bank are often tied to market reforms.

The policy and project development MSIs play a dominant role in agenda setting, governance structures, decision making, and resource allocation. This means that there is a global push on the projects and policy development in health matters, but there are not enough resources to implement the plans in the countries. This leads to skewed allotment of resources and priority setting; for example, post setting up of the Global Fund and GAVI, monetary resources were made available for the specific diseases but no help was given for the country's overall health systems.

The impact of the agenda setting guided by the multistakeholder bodies (dominated by the corporations, corporate philanthropies, and the World Bank group) is that the emphasis is on the availability of the health services rather than access to decent public health as a right, leading to the development of the private health sector and the deepening of the health inequities.

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.



Resource Crunch in WHO and the rising influence of BMGF

Out of 17 MSIs, there are six designed to finance health projects and policies, which are GAVI, GFATM, GFF, CEPI, ACT-A and COVAX. Further analysis of the overall funding of the MSIs shows that UN organisations and, more specifically, the World Health Organisation, play a considerable role in overall global health governance. Still, their role in the financing of MSIs is not significant. The WHO has faced a severe resource crunch for its core support and functions.

The WHO receives its funding from two primary sources: the member states paying their assessed contributions (countries' membership dues) totalling less than 20 per cent, and voluntary contributions from the member states and other United Nations organisations, intergovernmental organisations, philanthropic foundations, the private sector and other sources cover the rest. However, the WHO has very little control over the funding and its allocation to the important areas. Except for a meagre four per cent of the total assessed contributions, all the funds from assessed or voluntary contributions are tightly earmarked for specific programmes and/or geographical locations by the member states or other actors donating those resources,

and they must be spent within a specified timeframe. Thus, the governance agenda's priority and focus are set up by the influential private donors or the Northern countries.¹³⁰

It is for this reason the WHO has been calling for an increase in flexible funding arrangements and contributions. These help the organisation allocate less priority funding, such as advancing gender equity and human rights in health, catalysing the fight against non-communicable disease and improving countries' health systems in developing and developing countries.

Our mapping shows that two dominant actors control the finances within global health governance: the Northern donor governments, which also dominate the international financial institutions / development financial institutions, a significant contributor to the financing; and secondly, the corporate philanthropies and industry together. G-8 countries, through their foreign-development aid organisations and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), play a significant role in the funding of the MSIs. In fact, since the foundation of the BMGF in 2000, global health governance has been transformed completely. The BMGF has been involved in financing and supporting every kind of actor engaged in global health governance, including the WHO, UN organisations, development financing institutions, NGOs, academic and research institutions, developing country governments, and so on. They have their imprint on every aspect of health governance.


The role played by the BMGF in this century is similar to the impact the Rockefeller Foundation had on agenda-setting in the twentieth century. Anne-Emanuelle Birn, in a significant study, argues that the Gates Foundation's pervasive influence is of grave concern both to democratic global health governance and to scientific independence - and urges scientists to play a role in contesting and identifying alternatives to global health philanthro-capitalism. If the BMGF has not achieved everything that Rockefeller Foundation (RF) achieved in the twentieth century, then it's not far from it. She further writes that the principles that were largely invented by the RF and that permeated to the country systems and the international health field as a whole, have left behind a powerful, if problematic, legacy for global health. These include:

¹³⁰ See <https://who.foundation/cms/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/WHO-Foundation-CEO-Anil-Soni-Press-Release.pdf>

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.

1. Agenda setting from above: international health initiatives are donor-driven, with the agenda of cooperation formulated and overseen by the international agency, whether through direct in-country activities or the awarding of grants;
2. Budget incentives: activities are only partially funded by donor agencies; matching fund mechanisms require recipient entities to commit substantial financial, human and material resources to the cooperative endeavor;
3. A techno-biological paradigm: activities are structured in disease-control terms based upon: a) biological and individual behavioral understandings of disease etiology; and b) technical tools applied to a wide range of settings;
4. A priori parameters of success: activities are bound geographically, through time constraints, by disease and intervention, and/or according to clear exit strategies, in order to demonstrate efficiency and ensure visible, positive outcomes;
5. Consensus via transnational professionals: activities depend on professionals trained abroad (often alongside donor agency staff) who are involved in international networks, easing the domestic translation of donor initiatives and approaches; and
6. Adaptation to local conditions: activities are afforded limited flexibility, based on the local cultural and moral economy and political context.¹³¹

¹³¹ Anne-Emanuelle Birn, 2014. 'Philanthrocapitalism, past and present: The Rockefeller Foundation, the Gates Foundation, and the setting(s) of the international/ global health agenda'. Available at https://mednat.news/vaccini/Alliance-Rockefeller-and-Gates_Vaccines-forAll_Nov2014.pdf?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=pmd_52d95527b46e85ea27564574c05a2434af02104a-1628412778-0-ggNtZGzNAiKjcnBszQe6



Despite failures, the continuing relevance of WHO

There has been a consistent rise of multistakeholderism within global health governance, where the WHO now stands amongst a growing number of public and private actors, initiatives and international partnerships in health, including the GFATM, GAVI, UNAIDS and especially BMGF. However, the World Health Organisation still remains one of the central organisations in global health governance. It is visible in the role the WHO plays within the various MSIs; from being a host, initiator and leader to the funders of different MSIs, it remains a significant player.

WHO is involved in a whopping 111 partnerships and collaborations on various dimensions of health and beyond, which includes climate change, nutrition, air pollution, cities, hunger, poverty, education, governance, etc. Of these initiatives the WHO is a member in 57 organisations, leader or co-leader in 41, observer in nine and co-

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.

sponsor or advisor in four. The WHO is part of several UN organisations and their initiated programmes and partnerships.¹³²

While it may be seen as the leading global health organisation, it does not have the most significant impact on global health governance. The transnational corporations, philanthropic organisations and other global institutions – notably the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – have a growing influence on population health that outweighs the WHO's. Furthermore, some of these institutions, the Bank in particular, now operate in direct competition with the WHO as the leading influence on health sector policy. The rise of neoliberal economics and the accompanying attacks on multilateralism led by the US, private corporations and philanthropies have created a new, challenging context for WHO's work. The organisation, starved of resources and sometimes poorly led and managed, fails to find an adequate response.¹³³ The WHO's capacity to intervene on issues related to international health and accomplish its basic norm-setting function has been seriously eroded over the years. The legitimacy of the WHO in affairs related to international health stands compromised and it has been criticised severely in recent years for effectively responding to global health emergencies.¹³⁴

However, the centrality of the WHO also puts it at the heart of the contestation in the global power struggle. The direct financial contribution to the WHO from the States have been declining over the years, and the tied-project funding has been on the rise. As a result, it has forced the WHO to seek contributions and collaboration from corporate philanthropies and industry/businesses. This impacts the overall policy development and project implementation on the one hand and the goal and agenda-setting on the other. However, given the political legitimacy and multilateral nature of the WHO, it continues to

¹³² WHO. Information on Partnerships and Collaborations up to May 2019. Available at https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/documents/partnerships/partnerships-collaborative-arrangements-with-who-involvement.pdf?sfvrsn=e8856ac4_6

¹³³ People's Health Movement in Global Health Watch wrote this in 2005–06 but it has only become more complicated since then with the rise of corporations and philanthropies such as BMGF. <https://www.ghwatch.org/sites/www.ghwatch.org/files/E1.pdf>

¹³⁴ Global Health Watch Five, 2018. <https://phmovement.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/D1.pdf>


command strategic positioning in governance matters and plays a significant role.

The role the WHO has played in global health governance has been shaped by its internal leadership, complex systemic structure and funding, and several external forces. The demand for the democratisation within and increased influence of the low- and middle-income countries and civil society within the WHO governance mechanism today is far more complicated as in the context of the rising power of the private players than it was at the beginning of the twenty-first century. There is tension within the WHO due to the corporate influence, its linkages with the big pharmaceutical, food and data corporations, and corporate philanthropies, but the reforms as suggested and being undertaken either through the framework for non-state actor engagement, funding mechanisms or through internal restructuring, the autonomy of the regional offices, etc., are not sufficient to bring back the lost glory.

Still, the People's Health Movement in the annual report retains its faith in the WHO as an inter-governmental organisation necessary in global health governance and argues that it would be a severe mistake to write it off as an institutional failure. It has played a vital role in global health and has the potential to continue to play a powerful and positive role. It is vital for civil society to engage with the WHO (at all levels); as an arena of struggle, as an agent of change and as an authoritative voice.¹³⁵

¹³⁵ Global Health Watch Four, 2014. https://www.ghwatch.org/sites/www.ghwatch.org/files/D1_1.pdf

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.



Private sector at the high table of global health governance

'Efforts to prevent non-communicable diseases go against the business interests of powerful economic operators. It is not just Big Tobacco anymore. Public health must also contend with Big Food, Big Soda, and Big Alcohol. All of these industries fear regulation and protect themselves by using tactics which include front groups, lobbies, promises of self-regulation, lawsuits, and industry-funded research that "confuses the evidence and keeps the public in doubt". They also include gifts, grants, and contributions to worthy causes that cast these industries as respectable corporate citizens in the eyes of politicians and the public. They include arguments that place the responsibility for harm to health on individuals, and portray government actions as interference in personal liberties and free choice. This is formidable opposition. Market power readily translates into political power. Few Governments prioritise health over big business. As we learned from experience with the tobacco industry, a powerful corporation can sell the public just about anything.'

Dr. Margaret Chan, Director-General of the World Health Organization, address¹³⁶ to the 8th Global Conference on Health Promotion¹³⁷, Helsinki, Finland, 10 June 2013.¹³⁸

The above statement sums up the role of the private sector within the MSIs. Our analysis shows that compared to the UN system organisations, the private sector, primarily pharmaceutical corporations and corporate philanthropies, especially the BMGF, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Clinton Health Initiative, play a significant role in financing, implementation, leadership and the initiation role of several of the MSIs. The money has been able to buy them space at every important decision-making table.

This influence has been bought through money and has also been legitimised systematically. The Framework for Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA), passed by the WHA in 2016, has been characterised as ‘opening the floodgates to corporate influence on global and national decision-making processes in public health matters’. A civil society statement in 2016 raised the following concerns regarding how FENSA is poised to modify the governance of WHO:

‘FENSA, in its overarching section, puts private sector entities on an equal footing with other NSAs [non-state actors], failing to recognise their fundamentally different nature and roles. It uses the principle of “inclusiveness” for all five “types of interactions” (resources, participation, evidence, advocacy and technical collaboration) to all NSAs. When applied to major transnational corporations, their business associations and philanthropic foundations, this categorisation of interactions, combined with an alleged right to inclusiveness, will once and for all legitimise the framing of public health problems and solutions in favour of the interests and agendas of those actors.’¹³⁹

¹³⁶ http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2013/health_promotion_20130610/en/index.html


¹³⁷ <http://www.who.int/healthpromotion/conferences/8gchp/en/>

¹³⁸ See “Global Efforts to Promote Health Face Serious Challenges from ‘Big Business’ – UN Official”. Available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/06/441852-global-efforts-promote-health-face-serious-challenges-big-business-un-official>

¹³⁹ Civil Society Statement on NEFSA 2016. <https://www.ghwatch.org/sites/www.ghwatch.org/files/Civil%20Society%20Statement%2060.pdf>

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.


Global Health Watch, in its fifth edition, further adds that FENSA proposes technical collaboration with the private sector, including capacity building, with no adequate safeguards. It removes the existing minimum restrictions on accepting financial resources from the private sector to fund salaries of WHO staff if the WHO relies on funds from the private sector for any operational expenses, it risks showing favouritism towards those sectors in its standard-setting, expert advisory and other public health functions.¹⁴⁰ So, the private sector is now an equal actor in decision making and every other aspect, with overlapping conflict of interest, without any account-ability whatsoever.



Further segregation of lead actors within the MSIs we studied confirms our earlier finding that UN institutions continue to play a central role. Still, the IFIs/DFIs, corporate philanthropies and the Northern governments have the most dominant role in shaping the overall health agenda. Involvement of international NGOs remains a meagre eight per cent and they are never in the initiator or convener role. In some MSIs, they do find a place on the governing boards, though. The Southern governments, LDCs or developing countries and affected communities are not very prominent in these institutions. Their influence, if any, comes through their participation in the UN organisations, that being the multilateral

¹⁴⁰ Global Health Watch Five 2018. <https://phmovement.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/D1.pdf>

forum. Still, as mentioned above, the multilateral forums are being undercut by the rise of MSIs.



It is significant to note that UN bodies (WHO and UNICEF) play an important role in the MSIs, but the BMGF has a massive imprint in many structures. GAVI is a body dominated by the BMGF too. Together they shape the health agenda and, through their control of the monetary resources, can have a significant impact. The World Bank Group is also an important factor. Given its emphasis on neoliberal reforms, it has contributed to the role of the private sector and privatisation within the health sector. However, what stands out is the complete absence of affected communities and civil society from these forums. Some MSIs have a space for the CSOs as a strategic partner or an advisory status. Still, in the era of global and networked governance with linkages across sectors, affected communities and civil society often find it hard to deploy resources to conduct multisite advocacy and ensure participation, compared to the resources commanded by the industry and foundations.

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.

Table 5: Top Ten Influential Actors within MSIs


Top Ten Influential Actors within MSIs	Frequency
WHO (UN Bodies)	16
BMGF Philanthropies (corporate)	13
World Bank (International Financial Institutions/DFIs)	12
UNICEF (UN bodies)	7
GAVI (Others)	6
Global Fund (International Financial Institutions/DFIs)	4
G 8 (Northern donor govts)	4
Governments	4
Wellcome Trust (Philanthropies (Corporate))	3
UNFPA (UN Bodies)	3

Centred around Geneva

Global Health Watch, in its first report in 2005, said that despite the WHO being an inter-governmental organisation where 192 countries are represented at the World Health Assembly and with presence in 140 countries, it remains an organisation dominated by white men and very few women in the top leadership positions. One of the suggestions for reforms was to recruit more diverse staff from different backgrounds and cultures, including more women, more people from the Global South, more people who are not doctors, and more people with experience in a variety of settings in developing countries' intersectoral action and project management. They also argued for representation of

broader groups of interests, including civil society, especially from the Global South and processes that ensure a wide range of voices is heard and heeded.¹⁴¹ More than a decade later, the situation has not changed at the WHO. Unfortunately, the situation is the same within the other UN agencies, private corporations and the foundations.

The same trend is visible in most of these MSIs. The location of these MSIs plays a significant role in representativeness within the decision-making structures and governance. Except for Global Health Security Agenda, most of the MSIs are headquartered in Geneva and Washington, DC. In a world where travel and means of communication are far advanced, one may think that this makes not much difference. Still, the reality is that their locations impact the work culture, priorities, staff representation, diversity and, most crucially, agenda setting for global health governance. This shows the inequality within the global governance and the global power balance, visible in every global governance agenda.



¹⁴¹ Global health Watch One, 20015. <https://www.ghwatch.org/sites/www.ghwatch.org/files/A.pdf>

Concluding Remarks

Global Health Watch, the publication of the People's Health Movement, in its five editions, have constantly brought and suggested measures for comprehensive reforms within global health governance to make it more democratic, decentralised and publicly owned through multi-lateral institutions towards the achievement of health for all. They require detailed debate, discussion and implementation for the future of humanity. Based on the study of the database, I offer here some of my observations.

1. The World Health Organisation remains the key multilateral forum within global health governance, but not necessarily the most influential organisation. The rise of MSIs has been at the cost of the diminishing importance of the WHO.
2. The influence of the private sector and philanthropies have increased in global health governance. This has come in various forms: project funding, the appointment of consultants, participation in multi-stakeholder initiatives and decision-making bodies, push for health sector reforms within the member states, financing of research and knowledge-generation activities, etc.
3. This rising influence of the private sector with the IFIs and DFIs push for neo-liberal reforms is reflected within the Universal Health Coverage 2030 programme agenda setting. The vocabulary suggests that there should be a purchaser-provider split. Governments must play the stewardship role through 'purchasing' from and regulating the private sector rather than providing health services. This drives the health sector reforms within the countries, especially LMICs, for example, Ayushman Bharat- Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PMJAY) in India, pushing for health insurance programmes provided through the private sector and less on the strengthening of the public sector health care.

4. Private foundations and businesses have also captured the research space where they specifically fund research aligned to their idea of governance and reforms. They also exercise considerable intellectual influence through consulting, co-editing, or ghost-writing public policies for the UN institutions and other committees instituted for a specific purpose, such as a collaborative learning network for UHC.
5. One of the big 'successes' of the multistakeholder initiatives has been that the pharmaceutical industry has become powerful and has managed to whitewash itself through these mechanisms, most specifically through GAVI.
6. The for-profit private sector has also received greater legitimacy through the work done by private foundations and NGOs, academic and research institutions funded by them, which have created ideological ground and influence for their legitimacy.

All this is significantly undermining the global health agenda and the multilateral agenda's mandate without any accountability, and is dangerous for the sovereignty of the people and nations.

Chapter IV

Unaccountable and Hegemonic, the Big Tech Threat: Mapping Multistakeholderism in the Global Internet Governance¹⁴²

Madhuresh Kumar and Mary Ann Manahan

The Internet has changed the world, and the world of the internet has changed too. From its early days of evolution as community-owned and managed, it has become an unwieldy behemoth without sufficient regulation at the global level.¹⁴³ It has embarked on a dangerous endeavour of multistakeholderism dominated by big tech and their associates.¹⁴⁴ Democratically elected governments are finding it hard to

¹⁴² Authors of this paper would like to thank Parminder Singh and Anita Gurumurthy of IT for Change for their extensive help and guidelines in developing this analysis. Richard Hill was generous in providing comments on the draft text and also provided relevant references for the work cited and arguments in the paper.

¹⁴³ See for example these book reviews:

<http://www.newsclick.in/international/review-schiller-dan-2014-digital-depression-information-technology-and-economic-crisis>

<http://boundary2.org/2015/04/08/the-internet-vs-democracy/>

<http://www.boundary2.org/2018/10/richard-hill-too-big-to-be-review-of-wu-the-curse-of-bigness-antitrust-in-the-new-gilded-age/>

<http://www.boundary2.org/2021/04/richard-hill-the-curse-of-concentration-review-of-cory-doctorow-how-to-destroy-surveillance-capitalism/>

<http://www.boundary2.org/2021/06/richard-hill-in-everything-freedom-for-whom-review-of-laura-denardis-the-internet-in-everything-freedom-and-security-in-a-world-with-no-off-switch/>

¹⁴⁴ See for example:

exercise any control and regulation over them. It is reflected in the overall clout these big internet corporations have and their valuation today. They are digital empires, where they are setting the standards, guidelines, defining policies and laying down the rules of the game. They are dictating terms not only to governments but to everyone around.

The multistakeholder model of governance is being pushed as *the* model of governance, which will engage every stakeholder on an equal footing towards providing solutions to global problems. This is backed by the governments in the developed world, financial institutions and internet corporations. The multistakeholder governance model dominates the discussion within internet governance in the name of democracy, freedom and the participatory governance model, and is being advocated as a model to be followed within global governance.

To imagine that big tech, government, civil society and academia all have the same public interest in mind or that they are all equal is misguided and dangerous. Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft are giant corporations with unparalleled power and massive financial interests and stakes in every conversation concerning digital, entirely unaccountable to anyone except their shareholders. The push and demand for a UN organisation to deal with global internet governance have met with stiff resistance from these multinational corporations, which have a lot to lose in this process.

Steady Growth of MSIs

Table 1: Internet and Data Governance MSIs by the decade of their formation

Year	Number of MSIs
<p>http://www.boundary2.org/2021/03/multistakeholder-internet-governance-still-doesnt-live-up-to-its-pr-review-of-palladino-and-santaniello-legitimacy-power-and-inequalities-in-the-multistakeholder-internet-governance/</p> <p>http://boundary2.org/2015/04/29/dissecting-the-internet-freedom-agenda/</p>	

Unaccountable and Hegemonic, the Big Tech Threat

2000-2010	4
2011-2020	14
Timebound	3
Total	21

The multistakeholderism in internet governance has been at the core of the growth of the internet. The current database mapped 21 internet- and data governance-related multistakeholder groups (MSIs) and multistakeholder initiatives (MSIs) in the twenty-first century. Out of them, two-thirds originated between 2011-2020, compared to four formed from 2000-2010. The remaining three MSIs were timebound; one of them, the NETmundial Initiative, was abandoned midway due to controversies surrounding it and opposition from civil society organisations. Even within the second decade, 11 out of 17 were launched in the second half between 2015-20 (See Table 1).

There are two reasons for this sudden spurt in the number of MSIs in the second decade, compared to that in the first decade. One reason is that given the infancy of the ICT sector at the beginning of the century, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) included just eight goals and minimal reference to technology, broadband or ICT. Compared to that, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are considerably more detailed and cover 17 goals, with more than 150 targets. Overall, ICT specific targets are included in four of the 17 goals. However, there are no fewer than 38 other targets whose achievement will depend upon universal and affordable access to ICT and Broadband.¹⁴⁵

Secondly, since 2010, internet corporations like Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Google and Facebook have become the world's biggest

¹⁴⁵ See details of the Sustainable Development Goals here <https://sdgs.un.org>. Also see, Parinder Jeet Singh, Draft paper, January 2021, 'Evolution of Global Digital Governance: A Southern View'

corporations and have a presence in multiple sectors beyond ICT.¹⁴⁶ This has necessitated initiatives related to human rights, security, safety, data, surveillance, terrorism, health, the Internet of Things, artificial intelligence and others.

Diversified Concerns of Internet Governance

In terms of sub-themes, one-third of the MSIs focus on cybersecurity and terrorism. There are three MSIs that tackle access (in the context of development), public policy and cooperation and human rights. Other sub-themes covered by the rest of the MSIs span technology, open-source/commons, artificial intelligence, trade and e-commerce, jurisdiction and interoperability (See Figure 1).

Table 2: Internet & Data Governance MSIs by Sub-themes

Sub-themes	Frequency	Percentage
Access	3	14%
Artificial Intelligence	1	5%
Cybersecurity & Terrorism	7	33%
Human Rights	3	14%
Jurisdiction & legal interoperability	1	5%
Open Source, Commons	1	5%
Public policy and cooperation	3	14%
Technology	1	5%
Trade and e-commerce	1	5%

¹⁴⁶ Four of these are in top 15 as per their market valuation and Facebook being at 33th place in Global Forbes Ranking of the businesses in 2021, See here <https://www.forbes.com/lists/global2000/#14813bd85aco>

Total	21	100%
--------------	-----------	-------------


In the last decade, it became clear that social media has achieved the potential of becoming a mass weapon of disinformation and propaganda and is being used by various groups and propagandists (some not legitimate or even illegal) to further their goals. However, the absence of MSIs specifically targeting mass disinformation, hate speech and racial and religious discrimination has been glaring, despite a significant number of MSIs addressing the issue of terrorism such as Christchurch Call, Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism or Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace. These were specifically launched to mobilise the government, industry, CSOs, and academic and research institutions to make the web safe (*See Figure 1 below*).

Similarly, with the rise of e-commerce and several controversies around them concerning data privacy, the equitable distribution of the value-added of data aggregation and monetisation, labour practices, tax avoidance, legal control, abuse of dominant market power and others, one would assume that there would be more MSIs concerning trade and e-commerce. Still, with the exception of the Electronic World Trade Platform floated by Alibaba, there is none. This is primarily to lobby for the competitive interests of Alibaba at the WTO against their rivals.

The rise of the internet corporations Microsoft and Apple has been primarily driven by proprietary software and vigorous defence of intellectual property. It is to counter this that there is a global movement of free and anti-proprietary software.¹⁴⁷ However, except one MSI, Digital Public Goods, no other promotes or works for the open-source or commons.

¹⁴⁷ See the Free Software Foundation details here: <https://www.fsf.org>

The rise of Google, Facebook, Twitter and others has been primarily driven by proprietary exploitation of aggregated data (the new oil)¹⁴⁸. However, no MSI appears to address this fundamental issue.



The digital divide between the developed, developing and the less-developed world is a big concern within the SDGs. Rightly so, the theme of access to the internet is the second highest within the MSIs, but these MSIs promote proprietary software.

Michael Gurstein, community informatics expert, a proponent of open government data and internet governance, says that the Alliance for Affordable Internet, an MSI, was more about encouraging less-developed countries (LDCs) to adopt neoliberal policies than actually getting 'affordable access'. Quoting their documentation, he adds they advocate a set of 'guiding principles' for adoption as policy and regulatory practice by the LDCs. He argues that all rest on neoliberal assumptions rather than allowing them to be tested alongside other ways of looking at things. Whilst these guidelines include an evidence-based approach, Gurstein argues that if all the research is carried out on

¹⁴⁸ <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/oct/04/shoshana-zuboff-surveillance-capitalism-assault-human-autonomy-digital-privacy>

neoliberal assumptions, the results will be highly pre-determined by the input principles.¹⁴⁹


Similarly, the Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development, an MSI led by UNESCO and ITU, two UN organisations, brings together a select group of top CEOs and industry leaders, senior policy-makers and government representatives, international agencies, academia and organisations concerned with development. It boasts of its key strengths in forging consensus between its business partners and policy members in developing a joint approach promoting broadband for public benefit whilst satisfying minimum commercial incentives. However, it's believed that most of the industry partners who are its members often push their interests through influential policy recommendations.

Given the breadth and impact of the internet on human civilisation, the emerging Internet of Things¹⁵⁰, disruptions within the polity, society and economy, and increasing surveillance and the rise of digital and data capitalism (which is having major effects on all economic sectors and walks of life), the absence of MSIs or the global forums to deal with many of these issues are a cause of concern. In that respect, the absence of themes not being addressed by the MSIs are starker than what they seem to manage.

¹⁴⁹ See: <https://gurstein.wordpress.com/2016/03/20/a4ai-who-could-oppose-a-more-affordable-internet-the-alliance-for-an-affordable-internet-a4ai-and-the-neo-liberal-stealth-campaign-to-control-the-internet-throughout-the-developing-world-and-make/>

¹⁵⁰ Which a respected technologist refers to as Internet of Trash, see: <https://blog.apnic.net/2021/02/03/the-internet-of-trash/>

Self-made regulatory mechanisms and guidelines at the cost of community standards



The majority of the MSIs have multiple orientations, which entail that each MSI focuses on a combination of policy, high-impact standards, projects, and/or paradigmatic/campaign. A closer look at the data also reveals that high-impact standard-setting and policy account for most MSIs by typology: 20 MSIs are policy-oriented, while 18 MSIs are high-impact standards-setting ones (See Figure 2).

Table 3. Internet MSIs by typology

Typology	Frequency
High-impact Standard; Policy	11
High-impact Standard; Policy; Paradigmatic/Campaign	1
High-impact Standard; Policy; Project; Paradigmatic/Campaign	4
High-impact Standard; Policy; Project	1
Policy	1

Policy, Project	1
Policy; Paradigmatic/Campaign	1
High-impact Standard	1
TOTAL	21

Within internet governance, a greater emphasis has been on the self-regulation and evolution of the community standards. It has been possible because of the nature of the growth of the internet and communications medium in the last five decades. In this last decade, the sudden expansion and reach of the internet has necessitated the urgency of standards and guidelines. In some ways, it explains 11 out of 21 MSIs with a mandate for high-impact standard and policy recommendations.

Those dealing with policy matters often focus on public policy issues related to sustainability, cooperation, security and inclusion. The MSIs focused on high-impact standards convene big tech companies and leading cybersecurity firms to build consensus on how the new and high-impact technologies can function across national borders. Additionally, they provide a platform to reconcile the views of human rights organisations, NGOs, academic and research institutions, and governments on the best way forward. Furthermore, six MSIs act as campaign vehicles, with purported advocacy objectives, often tied to specific policy and governance issues.

Corporations, top influencers within the governance space

Among the 164 (unique) influential actors or ‘stakeholders’ that were mapped, Microsoft (nine MSIs) and Facebook (eight MSIs), occupy the most significant number of their governing bodies. *Figure 3* illustrates that the Swiss Federal Government, Google, UNESCO, the European Commission/European Union, Diplo Foundation (a non-profit created by the Swiss and Maltese governments), the International Telecommunication Union, the French government and The Internet

Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) are part of the top tier of approved stakeholders that occupy critical seats of power within the Internet MSIs.

Corollary to this finding, the business and industry sector populate the governing bodies of MSIs. Specifically, 28 per cent of the 164 distinct 'stakeholders' are from business and industry. The following sets of approved stakeholders that are invited in the governing bodies are: i) academic and research institutions, comprising 20 per cent of the total stakeholders mapped, such as The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and the East-West Centre, both well-known for their work on (cyber)security, anti-terrorism and securitisation; ii) international NGOs, comprising 15 per cent of the total stakeholders; iv) UN bodies and intergovernmental organisations such as UNESCO, ITU and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, which consist of ten per cent of the total stakeholders; and v) Northern donors and governments such as Switzerland, France, Japan and the US, which represent seven per cent of the total stakeholders (*See Figure 3*).

The corporations that are deeply engaged and active in these MSIs are big tech, including GAFAM¹⁵¹, IBM, Intel and CISCO; telecommunications companies such as Orange, Huawei, Ericsson, AT&T and Vodafone; e-commerce giants like Alibaba and GoDaddy; and cybersecurity providers such as NameShield.

The segregation of the stakeholder of the 21 MSIs further reaffirms our assertion that big-tech corporations dominate the various aspects of the internet and data governance. These subject matters concern massive commercial gains. There is a direct conflict of interest.

The history of transnational corporations shows that, in accordance with the laws under which they are incorporated, they must maximize profits and shareholder value; as a result, they often practice predatory capitalism. at substantial societal and political costs, not just for developing countries, but also for the majority of people in developed countries. In such a scenario, the lack of independent global internet

¹⁵¹ Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft

governance mechanisms means that such dominant transnational corporations set the rules, standards and guidelines by and for themselves, without much control from either elected governments or civil society.



Dominance of the US in governing structures

Segregation of the stakeholders' data within the MSIs shows that the top three categories dominating their governance mechanisms, such as governing boards, secretariats, etc., are business/industry, academic/research institutions and international NGOs, followed by the UN bodies and intergovernmental bodies, and Northern governments.

The existing literature on internet governance points out that though MSIs are being promoted as the model of governance, the dominant actor remains the United States and the US-based corporations whose interests align with each other. It helps their continued dominance, sets the agenda and maintains power dominance rather than disrupt it.


It is visible from the multinational corporations that dominate the governance space; most of them are based in the USA (see Figure 3 above). Several influential academic / research institutes are funded by the same private corporations and the US government. These include the

Berkman Klein Centre, the Brookings Institution, Carnegie Mellon University, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the EastWest Institute, Human Rights Institute, and the UC Berkeley School of Law, amongst many others. Similarly, several other influential academic and research centres are based in Europe, with Switzerland and France being another centre of influence.

MSIs use civil society actors and organisations within their governance actors and derive political legitimacy from their presence. International NGOs do occupy a prominent place within many of the MSIs, but the dominance of the USA and private corporations continues there too. Article 19, Human Rights Watch, the Association for Progressive Communication, the World Wide Web Foundation, the Internet Society, the Committee to Protect Journalists and many other influential international NGOs are based in the US and get their resources from various sources including the US Department of State, corporate foundations, membership fees and the private sector.

The stark absence of the Southern¹⁵² governments and civil-society actors on the governance mechanisms of many of the MSIs point to the skewed nature of the power balance and the continued dominance of the dominant actors since the inception of the internet. MSIs have failed to make any changes or disrupt the existing power balance.

¹⁵² Also referred to as Third World



Private sector leading from the front

Further segregation of data shows that the corporate and private sector play multiple roles in these MSIs —as a strategic partner, funder, member, initiator/convenor, host, leader, observer and supporter. In the 18 MSIs, the primary role played by the private sector is that of strategic partner/critical implementation role, while in 14 MSIs they provide leadership in the form of convening, hosting and advisory capacities. In ten MSIs, they also act as funders. Irrespective of who initiates the MSI for a sub-theme within internet governance, the private sector can't be ignored, and that's one reason that even in MSIs convened by the UN or governments, the private sector is always included as a strategic partner and are seen as necessary for implementing the policy, projects or standards being set. The MSIs dedicated to access, containing terrorism, protecting human rights, etc., all have the private sector at their core. National governments (at best) play the role of policy making and set up regulatory frameworks, but have very little in the way of implementing the policies and frameworks technically and financially. Northern¹⁵³ governments can at times exercise some restraint and regulation on the

¹⁵³ Also referred to as Developed, in particular the members of the OECD

private corporations, but it's next to impossible for the governments in the South.

Table 4. Roles Played by the Corporate Private Sector

Roles Played by Private Sector Within the MSIs	Count of MSIs
Member; Strategic Partner	3
Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder	2
Member; Funder; Strategic Partner	2
Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner	2
Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Strategic Partner	2
Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner	1
Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Implementer	1
Leadership; Member; Strategic Partner	1
Strategic Partner	1
Member; Observer; Strategic Partner	1
Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner	1
Leadership; Member; Funder; Observer; Strategic Partner;	1
Strategic Partner; Others - Supporter	1
Leadership; Member; Funder	1

Strategic Partner	
Leadership; Member; Funder; Observer; Strategic Partner	1
Grand Total	21

The rise of the platform and gig economies and their increasing dominance mean more problems in regulations. There are numerous litigations and recorded violations of law and sovereignty of the people and nation by giant corporations like Google, Amazon, Uber, Airbnb, Lyft and others. Their monopolistic approach is further splintering the global internet and undermining the economic and social benefits of the online world¹⁵⁴. Platforms also wield their enormous power to challenge attempts at individual governments' action. The Australian media regulator's requirement that digital platforms pay for Australian media content, for example, led to the threat by Facebook to stop Australians from sharing news on its platforms.¹⁵⁵

Similarly, in response to Ireland's Data Protection Commission's insistence that Facebook stop transferring user data to the United States, Facebook threatened to cut Europe off from Facebook's services.¹⁵⁶ Addressing this structural vulnerability in our international system requires a new governance approach. The days of relying on digital platform self-regulation and fragmented government actions must come to an end if we are to preserve the economic and social benefits that emerge from the connecting power of the internet.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ See for example: <https://blog.apnic.net/2021/06/07/opinion-is-big-necessarily-bad/>

¹⁵⁵ <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-01/facebook-threatens-to-cut-off-australians-from-sharing-news>

¹⁵⁶ <https://www.dropbox.com/s/yngcdv99irbm5sr/Facebook%20DPC%20filing%20Sept%202020-rotated.pdf?dl=0>

¹⁵⁷ <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/age-connection-disconnected-digital-governance-isnt-working>

UN, Strategic partner in multistakeholderism

An alternative being pushed by many, including the countries from the South, to the multistakeholder model is establishing a multilateral UN body. Since much of the development, standards, guidelines and development of the internet and its wider usage for the common public, trade and commerce were guided by the United States and its neo-liberal stance, the UN was a late entrant in internet governance (indeed, the US deliberately prevented the ITU from being involved in internet governance). The spread of the internet and the dominant power of the US in cyberspace meant that other countries wanted the UN to play a more significant role in its governance. In the early years of the twenty-first century, the blueprints of a new information society were emerging, and a proposal for harnessing the full potential of ICT for human development was being proposed at the G8 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit Meeting in 2000. To this end, it was agreed to establish a Digital Opportunity Taskforce (DOT Force) to integrate UN efforts into a broader international approach.

By 2001, the DOT Force successfully fulfilled its mandate as set out in the Okinawa Charter on the Global Information Society and adopted by G8 Leaders.¹⁵⁸ This had an impact on the further initiatives by UNDP and other UN bodies.

However, it remains the fact that the UN was late on the scene, and it was not going to be easy to establish a multilateral governance model in the world dominated by markets and neo-liberal policies in a hyper-globalised world, compared to the post-world war era. In this context, the World Summit on Information Society was convened in 2003 and 2005 by the International Telecommunications Union, with the goal of addressing the digital divide. However, developed countries were unwilling to make meaningful financial contributions to that end, so the Summit addressed internet governance issues. While the US and its allies were at first enthusiastic for the WSIS as carrying forward their information-society agenda globally, as the process unfolded, they felt

¹⁵⁸ <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.197.3299&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

that they would have been better off without the WSIS. As a result, the preference has been for governing digital technologies in distributed plurilateral and private realms, as advanced quite aggressively by the post-WSIS doctrine of multi-stakeholder governance and anti-multilateral-ism evident in the NETmundial Initiative launched in 2014, which proved to be stillborn and shut shop in 2016.¹⁵⁹

Internet governance was one of the most controversial issues at the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and the subsequent WSIS+10 review by the General Assembly in the wake of adopting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. Cognizant that any internet-governance approach should be inclusive and responsive, the WSIS mandated the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene the Global Internet Governance Forum (IGF) for multistakeholder policy dialogue. Thus, the convening of the IGF was announced by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 18 July 2006. Since its establishment in 2006, it has gained global prominence among stakeholders as an open, inclusive and transparent forum for dialogue and collaboration (but many governments are sceptical, because IGF does not have any mechanisms for making meaningful recommendations, much less decisions). The IGF mandate was renewed for five years in 2010 (2011–2015) and again in 2015 during the WSIS+10 review for another ten years (2016–2025).¹⁶⁰

However, in line with the increased multistakeholderism within the UN-led processes, the UN has been promoting multistakeholderism, but with a focus on increasing the role of private companies. For example, the High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation established by the UN Secretary-General in July 2018 to identify good examples and propose modalities for working cooperatively across sectors, disciplines and borders to address challenges in the digital age was co-chaired by Melinda Gates and Jack Ma.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ see, Parinder Jeet Singh, Draft paper, January 2021, 'Evolution of Global Digital Governance: A Southern View'

¹⁶⁰ <https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/content/igf-2020-outputs>

¹⁶¹ <https://digitalcooperation.org>

Thus, the UN continues to play an essential role within global internet governance, not guided by the spirit of multilateralism but that of a strategic partner bringing political legitimacy to the multistakeholderism dominated by private companies. Our database shows that the UN is a strategic partner in 20 out of the 21 MSIs covered. They fund MSIs and play host and/or function as convenors, but the leadership remains with the private corporations and the US and its allies.

Table 5. Different roles of UN Bodies


Roles of UN Bodies	Number of MSIs
Strategic Partner	4
Member; Strategic Partner	3
Observer; Strategic Partner	2
Member; Funder; Strategic Partner	2
Initiator/Convenor; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner	2
Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner	1
Strategic Partner	1
Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner	1
Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder	1
Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Observer; Strategic Partner	1

Strategic Partner; Others - Supporter	1
Leadership; Member; Strategic Partner	1
Member	1
Grand Total	21

Paying for influence


But who funds the Internet MSIs? There are 73 funders that are actively providing financial and resource support. Almost a quarter of them are Northern governments and donors led by the Swiss and French governments. Corporations, especially big techs such as Microsoft and Facebook, comprise 16 per cent, while corporate philanthropies (with technology and communication interests) such as Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Microsoft) and Carlos Slim Foundation (Telmex and America Movil) contribute 15 per cent.

Further disaggregation of the data shows that the Northern governments lead in the funding of the MSIs because a third of the MSIs relate to cyberspace safety and terrorism, which has been a major cause of concern for these governments. As mentioned above, the themes of trade and commerce, IP, surveillance, disinformation and other key issues remain outside the ambit of many MSIs due to dominant commercial and geopolitical interests. This means that the US is not directly involved in the funding of many of the MSIs, but their dominance is exercised through academic/research institutions, International Finance Institutions (IFIs), NGOs and others.



Distantly located from majority

Finally, in terms of the location of the headquarters of the internet MSIs, the data mirror the general finding that the majority of them are in the Global North. Specifically, six out of ten MSIs are located either in Geneva, Washington, DC or Paris, where the UN and other intergovernmental bodies are. Only one is located in Kigali, Rwanda, where a continent-focused MSI, the Smart Africa Alliance, has established its headquarters. The MSI's location plays a dominant role in the continuity of the established power and hierarchy and denies the demand of the larger community for cultural diversity and knowledge sharing, which could challenge the current dominant paradigm, build an information society reflective of the diversity and finally bridge the existing digital divide.



Too important to be left to corporations and states

In conclusion, given that global internet governance is partially monarchic (US-dominated) and partially oligarchic (dominated by a handful of private corporations), it is too important and vital to be controlled by the states or corporations alone. The original anarchic nature, decentralisation and dynamism of the internet meant that it left enough space for non-state actors to create and innovate. However, the rise of dominant companies, the increased power of surveillance, digital capitalism and authoritarian tendencies means that it has now become a potent weapon and threat for democracies and freedom of the people¹⁶². Unfortunately, the danger is everywhere because the temptations of surveillance and global control are not limited to non-democratic societies alone but to democracies that are equally susceptible to those temptations, as revealed by the Snowden revelations and Wikileaks.

¹⁶² See: <http://boundary2.org/2015/04/08/the-internet-vs-democracy/> <https://blog.apnic.net/2021/06/07/opinion-is-big-necessarily-bad/>

Unfortunately, the UN has failed to stand up to these rising threats, despite its emphasis on promoting more multilateralism for practical digital cooperation and seeing multistakeholderism only as a complementary force, which could provide space for the unrepresented.¹⁶³ However, the democratisation of global internet governance will continue to remain challenging for the times to come, even though new shifts are happening. But these shifts cannot result from some arcane, opaque MSIs or government regulation (such as that being proposed in free trade agreements). Instead, it must be the subject of an informed, transparent and inclusive global debate and legitimate international decision making.¹⁶⁴ This is easier said than done in today's world, where there are too many competing interests, and an ill-placed confidence in laissez-faire capitalism (also referred to as neo-liberalism).

¹⁶³ <https://digitalcooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/HLP-on-Digital-Cooperation-Report-Executive-Summary-ENG.pdf>

¹⁶⁴ <https://itforchange.net/digital-new-deal/2020/10/30/a-new-convention-for-data-and-cyberspace/>

Chapter V

Probing Multistakeholderism in Global Food and Agriculture Governance

By: Mary Ann Manahan

Multistakeholderism as a governance model in the food and agriculture sectors developed and evolved in the context of the crisis of state-centered multilateralism. The traditional state-centred multilateralism that is represented by the United Nations (UN) has been plagued by questions of relevance raised by its powerful members (e.g., the US), budgetary cuts and the growth of private-sector participation in the UN system in the late 1990s/early 2000s (Michele, et al., 2019). This growth of private-sector participation in multilateralism has led to increased public-private partnerships (PPPs). Fomented by trade regimes and international financial institutions' (IFIs') structural adjustment programs, PPPs in the sector became a mechanism for the advancement of a corporate food regime led by agribusiness transnationals (McMichael, 2013).

This sectoral chapter focuses on mapping multistakeholder initiatives that address global food and agriculture governance at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It also builds on previous mapping exercises and reports that underscore the prominence and greater political influence by corporations and philanthropies at the global scene. But it also departs from them by critically surveying what types of multistakeholder initiatives (MSIs) are out there and documenting their focus, nature/types, sources of financing and approved categories of stakeholders that participate in them. The first part of the chapter discusses key features of MSIs in the sector. The second section focuses on four critical common issues that undergird multistakeholderism in global food and agriculture governance, and the last section provides a short guidepost for further research. For a complete detail of the methodology used, see section above.

Key features: a descriptive analysis of the MSIs

Regulating social and ethical standards: pushing for eco-labels and the sustainability narrative

Twenty-seven (27) MSIs were mapped, out of which 60 per cent started in the 2010s, and the remaining 30 per cent from 2011 onwards. One MSI—the AgriProFocus and the Food & Business Knowledge Platform—transitioned into the Netherlands Food Partnership (NFP) initiated at the Dutch Ministerial level. The Global Partnership for Ocean, hosted by the World Bank, convened 21 global experts from 16 countries that focused on prioritising and implementing sustainable ocean investment, ceased its operations in 2015 without explanations.

A majority of MSIs in the sector are (i) environmental and social-standard setting, and (ii) policy-oriented MSIs. Examples of the former are Equitable Fair Trade, UTZ Certified, Roundtable on Responsible Soy and Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, which introduced ethical, social, environmental, or developmental products or processes into international trade. For the latter, an example is the Global Alliance for Climate Smart Agriculture, a voluntary and action-oriented multistakeholder platform on Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) that aims to scale up CSA practices in order address climate change-induced challenges to agriculture and food security.

These MSIs focus on multiple themes but common among them is an emphasis on sustainable agriculture. Sustainability has its roots in the 1987 Brundtland Commission Report that argues for the balancing of triple development goals of people, planet and profit. The most common articulation of sustainability among MSIs is the promotion of sustainability standards or eco-labels that focus on the ethical buying of agricultural products and logo licensing and certification. For the MSIs, the aim is to adopt strong standards and regulations that enhance agricultural resources and fisheries stocks, ensure corporate profits and mitigate environmental degradation.

In terms of figures, 44 per cent of the MSIs focus on sustainable agriculture, while 18.5 per cent focus on food security and nutrition; 11 per cent on land governance, seven per cent on food systems and the rest on fisheries, financial inclusion, right to food and nutrition and investments. They also address global food and agriculture issues, which the conveners and

‘approved stakeholders’ perceive as un-attended or un-governed by the traditional multilateral governance system led by the UN.

Dominance of the corporate sector as influential stakeholders

In the MSIs surveyed, the corporate private sector—businesses, companies and industry players along the global-supply value chain—has played leadership roles, particularly acting as chairs and vice-chairs of their decision-making bodies and governing institutions. The private sector has also initiated and convened MSIs such as the New Vision for Agriculture, the Global Council for Food Security, two sustainable agriculture roundtables (i.e. on sustainable palm oil and soy), and the Initiative for Smallholder Agriculture, a private-public advisory group committed to transforming rural economies by delivering partnerships and investment structures that promote financial inclusion for rural enterprises and smallholder farmers.

Table 1: Private sector role per sub-theme category

Private sector role per sub-theme category	Frequency / Count of MSIs
Financial Inclusion	1
Leadership	1
Fisheries	1
Leadership; Implementation partners	1
Food security and nutrition	5
Advisory group	1
Leadership; Host; Initiator/Convenor	1
Leadership; Strategic partner	1
Strategic partner	1


Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.

Strategic partner; Initiator/convenor; Host	1
Food systems	2
Leadership	1
Leadership; Strategic Partner; Others	1
Land governance	3
Leadership	1
Others- targets of policy	2
Right to food and nutrition	1
Leadership; Member; Funder	1
Sustainable agriculture	12
Initiator/Convenor; Leadership	2
Initiator/Convenor; Member	1
Leadership	4
Leadership; Members	3
Leadership; Others- partners	1
Leadership; Strategic partner; Member	1
Sustainable ocean	1
Initiator/Convenor; Leadership; Member	1
Sustainable ocean investment	1
Member; Strategic Partner	1

Grand Total**27**

Influential stakeholders are organisations and individuals that hold strategic positions in the MSIs' governance structure either as board officers or as key advisors that define the direction and set the agenda. In total, 124 unique individuals and unique institutions (meaning non-repeating) are involved in agriculture and food-related MSIs. Four out of ten unique individuals and institutions come from the corporate sector and occupy strategic policy and decision-making positions in the MSIs' governing bodies. Two out of ten unique individuals and institutions represent the category of 'others', that is, consulting firms, experts in the relevant field, other MSIs (e.g. Consultative Group to Assist the Poor) and top management of the secretariat that coordinates the daily work and activities of each MSI. While not significant in terms of numbers, academic and research institutions such as the Stockholm Research Center and the Alexander von Humboldt Institute also hold strategic positions in the MSIs' governing bodies. Interestingly, food and agriculture-related UN agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Food Programme (WFP), which are considered as the beacons of global multilateralism, also occupy positions of power in several MSIs. One explanation points to the recent emphasis on multistakeholder partnerships within the UN system. A recent articulation is the World Economic Forum (WEF)-UN partnership, in which senior UN leaders are invited at the international level by the WEF to participate and interact with other invited non-state actors such as international NGOs and academic institutions to solve a global problem that is traditionally tackled by member states within the UN system. Such partnerships also open the floodgates to other vested interests such as corporate philanthropies, and in the sector of food and agriculture, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Syngenta Foundation have become prominent figures.

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.



It is unsurprising therefore that UN bodies such as the FAO, UNEP and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) serve as strategic key partners in almost half of the MSIs. But examining their role from a sub-theme angle, they perform different roles. For the themes around fisheries, sustainable ocean and sustainable agriculture, which are tackled by multiple environmental and social standard setting-oriented MSIs, the UN system organisations act as strategic partners. While on topics of food security and nutrition, land governance and food systems, the UN has initiated and convened, hosted and provided leadership in these MSIs, which are mostly policy-oriented platforms.

In terms of specific institutions, the tandem of the WEF and World Business Council on Sustainable Development lead the pack of influential actors—as chairpersons or members of the governing bodies of five MSIs. These are the Eat-Lancet Commission on Sustainable Healthy Food Systems, UN Food Systems Summit, New Vision for Agriculture, Global Council on Food Security and the Florverde Sustainable Flowers, which regulates and sets the standards for the sustainable and ethical farming and global trading of flowers.

The US government, via its ‘aid alter-ego’ USAID, on the other hand, is present in the governing boards of four MSIs: Initiative for Smallholder Finance, Global Shea Alliance, Scaling Up Nutrition ‘Movement’ and the UN Food Systems Summit. The World Bank holds seats in the governing structures of four MSIs. The other institutional actors that occupy seats

of powers in agriculture-related MSIs are (i) international/regional NGOs such as the Alliance for a Green revolution in Africa (AGRA), which is a self-identified NGO in Africa but represents agri-business interests, and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF); (ii) European bilateral aid agencies and governments: the Government of the Netherlands and the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ); (iii) transnational food agribusiness such as MONDELEZ International and Olam International; (iv) UN agencies such as the FAO, UNEP and IFAD; (v) corporate philanthropy, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and (vi) other MSIs such as the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor.

Unfortunately, the mapping reveals that Southern governments are only approved and invited stakeholders in barely half of the MSIs surveyed; while affected communities, which are often the subject and targets of the global food and agricultural policies, are only present in 11 MSIs. It must be noted that these affected communities are represented by national federations or international organisations that speak on behalf of those communities. Such representation requires further scrutiny on who they represent, why and how they are chosen, whether democratically or arbitrarily.

Power of the purse

While philanthropies and Northern donor agencies/governments are not as prominent compared to business/industry actors, they are, however, the major funders of MSIs in the agriculture and food sectors (see Figure 2). It means that Northern donors and philanthropies have funded the most number of surveyed MSIs. Each MSI often has multiple funders. For instance, out of the 68 funders mapped that are financing the 27 MSIs, 15 are philanthropies (corporate, family, others), 13 are Northern donor agencies, seven are UN bodies, and six are business and industry. This mirrors the overall observation that Northern donor agencies and philanthropies are MSIs' major sources of financial support.


For example, the Government of the Netherlands has supported the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) 'Movement', WEF-led New Vision for Agriculture (NVA), and Netherlands Food Partnership. The USAID on the other hand has contributed to the initiatives and activities of the SUN Movement, Initiative for Smallholder Finance, Global Shea Alliance and New Vision for Agriculture. The Swiss Development and Cooperation Agency and Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) have

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.

both supported NVA, SUN, Land Matrix Initiative (LMI) and the International Land Coalition (ILC). The German government, through GIZ and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), has supported the SUN, LMI, ILC and Better Cotton Initiative.

Among the philanthropies, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) has funded the SUN, Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) and Initiative for Smallholder Financing. BMGF occupies key leadership and advisory positions in these MSIs, which raises questions of conflicts of interest. Finally, there are five MSIs - all environment and social standard setting ones - that generate their revenues internally through certification fees, membership dues, consultancies and conference fees.

One limitation of the study, however, is that the actual monies invested in the MSIs were not covered. The category of 'others' included accounting organisations, think tanks and international trade organisations. As an indicator of power, information about the investments made by philanthropies and Northern donor agencies into these MSIs could have shed more light about their influence. What also made it difficult to provide nuanced data is that many MSIs do not disclose the sources of their funding on their websites.



Centres of power

The MSIs surveyed have a global presence, but are mostly coordinated out of key cities in the Global North. Four out of ten MSIs are

headquartered in the Global North, specifically in Geneva, Washington, DC, Rome and New York City, where UN bodies or major multilateral bodies are located. The choice of where to centrally locate an MSI's secretariat or where to legally register it depends on the nature of the MSI work, the (sub)theme it is working on, and the vested interest of its host organisation. For instance, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) is coordinated out of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where both government and industry have a strong 'stake' in palm oil; while the Global Council for Food Security is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, where the WEF is located.

An interesting finding is that four MSIs operate from the Global South—the Global Shea Alliance in Accra, the RSPO in Kuala Lumpur, the Sustainable Rice Platform in Bangkok and the Fisheries Transparency Initiative in the Republic of Seychelles (see Table 2). This might likely be explained by the fact that their host countries are also known major exporters of the agricultural products that are the subject of environmental and social standards and regulations by these MSIs.

Table 2. Headquarters Agriculture and Food-related MSIs

Name of MSIs	Domicile
Scaling Up Nutrition 'Movement'	Geneva, Switzerland
Bonsucro	London, UK
Equitable Food Initiative	Washington DC, USA
Florverde Sustainable Flowers* (renamed as such in 2011)	No information
Global Coffee Platform (renamed in 2016)	Bonn, Germany
Roundtable on Responsible Soy	Zurich, Switzerland
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil	Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.

UTZ Certified* (merged with the Rainforest Alliance in 2018)	Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Aquaculture Sustainability Council	Utrecht, the Netherlands
Land Portal Foundation	Groningen, The Netherlands
Land Matrix Initiative (LMI)	No information
International Land Coalition	Rome, Italy
Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI)	Mahe, Seychelles
UN Food Systems Summit (UNFSS21)	New York, US
Global Alliance for Climate Smart Agriculture	Rome, Italy
Initiative for Smallholder Finance (ISF)	Washington, DC, USA
World Cocoa Foundation (WCF)	Washington, DC, USA
Better Cotton Initiative (BCI)	Geneva, Switzerland; London, UK
Netherlands Food Partnership (NFP) (succeeded the AgriProFocus and the Food & Business Knowledge Platform)	Utrecht, Netherlands
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN)	Geneva, Switzerland
Global Shea Alliance (GSA)	Accra, Ghana
New Vision for Agriculture (NVA)	Geneva, Switzerland
Sustainable Rice Platform (SRP)	Bangkok, Thailand
International Seafood Sustainability Foundation	Washington, DC, USA

Global Partnership for Ocean (ceased operations in 2015)	Washington, DC, USA
EAT-Lancet Commission on Sustainable Healthy Food Systems (<i>*organized into three legal entities: the non-profit EAT Foundation and two limited companies, EAT Stockholm Food Forum AB in Sweden and EAT Stockholm Food Forum AS in Norway</i>)	Oslo, Norway
Global Council on Food Security	Geneva, Switzerland

The broader significance of this finding, however, is that it is emphasizing the top-down global governance of food and agriculture, which has massive implications on the lives of millions of people, especially smallholder producers such as peasants, fisherfolks, rural women, pastoralists and Indigenous peoples in the Global South. In other words, the latter's fate, future, and lives are decided in board rooms located in the Global North, signaling another dimension of power asymmetries and lack of democratic governance of these multistakeholder initiatives.

Interpretive analyses

The descriptive features above highlight four troubling developments and concerns in multistakeholderism as a global governance model and mechanism for tackling agriculture and problems.

1. Disregard of stakeholder power asymmetries and exclusion of affected communities

MSIs do not account for the differences of interest, capacities, power, rights and obligations of the different stakeholders that are coming together. This contradicts human rights-based multilateralism, where governments (duty bearers) make decisions on global issues on behalf of their citizens (rights holders) which translate to obligations and commitments that states and international organizations are expected to implement, including the regulation of business activities and ensuring accountability of enterprises when they cause harm.

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.

Furthermore, the approved and/or invited stakeholders that are categorised as either affected communities or civil society require scrutiny. A case in point is the Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), which is an organisation that tackles agricultural products in Africa. In various MSIs where they participate, they are categorised as civil society or affected communities. But AGRA's representation has been questioned on several occasions. Funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation, AGRA claims to support local farm owners and labor by improving agricultural products. However, many African civil-society organisations have criticised AGRA for claiming to speak on behalf of the Africans but without African voices, and that they foist quick-fix tech solutions on complex and historically fraught social issues. With the latter, smallholders, rural women and pastoralists in the region fear that these technologies create dependencies with big corporations such as Monsanto and Cargill, and that in the process, they will lose their control over their seeds and local food systems (Moore and Mittal, 2012). A recent academic study revealed that AGRA has failed its own targets. Despite raising more than \$1 billion since 2006 on promises to alleviate hunger or lift up small farmers, and billions in subsidies from African governments to do so, hunger has risen by 30 per cent in AGRA countries (Wise, 2020).

By this nature, participation of vulnerable populations and countries from the Global South are in danger. The research has shown that corporations and big international NGOs are central to the MSIs in the absence of affected communities, showing a clear pattern of particular interests and voices setting the agendas.

2. Failure to anchor and/or integrate the human rights approach in MSIs

This finding is hardly a surprise for two reasons. First, the WEF's Global Redesign Initiative, a multistakeholder dialogue on the future of international cooperation set up amid the 2008 financial crisis, considerably contributed to the governance of tenuous policy areas being increasingly transferred from multilateral intergovernmental spaces to multistakeholder ones led and/or convened by the corporate private sector (FIAN, 2019). Second, these MSIs tend to prioritise market interests over human rights, which concretely meant de-linking food and nutrition challenges from structural factors in favor of interventions that will maintain the corporate sector's dominance in the global food economy, particularly in the provision of production inputs,

trade in agricultural commodities and food processing, and food retailing (McKeon, 2017).

Among the MSIs mapped, only one, the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement, specifically mentioned the right to food and nutrition as an ‘underpinning’ discourse, and even this MSI is replete with controversies and contradictions in terms of how they interpret a rights-based approach to solving the global nutrition challenge. What has become increasingly clear from the data is that the majority of the MSIs deliberately neglect to integrate the human rights approach in agriculture, land, food and nutrition processes and policies. Instead of this, they promote this shift to liberal pluralism, which is a model based on the assumption that the common or public good will surface from the process of balancing and negotiating different interests of different parties (McKeon, 2017). This semblance of liberal pluralism can be seen from the discourse of participation, consensus-building and inclusion that many MSIs and their websites profess to advance. However, no meaningful participation of rights holders (e.g., affected communities) is taking place in most of the MSIs, which would be central to a human rights approach (as detailed above).

The majority of MSIs also frame their vision, mission and objectives in the language of efficiency, market competition and productivity over the legal obligations of human rights standards by duty-bearers, and visions and imperatives over justice and equity (McKeon, 2017). A case in point is the WEF-convened Global Council on Food Security, which claims to be an *‘interdisciplinary knowledge network dedicated to promoting innovative thinking to shape a more resilient, inclusive and sustainable future in the area of food security’*¹⁶⁵. This MSI is led by 28 global companies that collaborate with 14 governments, and a wide range of international academic and research institutions, civil society and big farmers’ organisations. Its primary aim is to achieve its vision through targeted investment, greater private-public partnerships, improved efficiency and balancing growth with sustainability imperatives. It puts primacy on the role that the private sector can play in realising sustainable agriculture through multistakeholderism.

¹⁶⁵ <https://www.weforum.org/communities/global-future-councils>

3. Corporate sector as the dominant influential actor in public decision making on food systems

The data clearly demonstrates that business and industry players that have interests in agriculture, food, land and nutrition play an influential role as leaders and conveners/initiators of MSIs. The World Economic Forum (WEF) and World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) figure prominently among the corporate actors. This finding is in-line with the WEF's Global Redesign Initiative launched in November 2010, which contains a comprehensive set of proposals for reshaping global governance since the formation of the United Nations in 1945 (Center for Governance and Sustainability, 2010). Among the theme-specific policy options, the New Vision for Agriculture (NVA) came to the fore, which assisted agricultural transitions in 21 countries. Designed by powerful agricultural transnational corporations (TNCs) and as part of the fourth industrial revolution, the transitions involved the re-engineering of the global food system based on '12 transforming technologies' that use next-generation biotechnologies, precision farming, blockchain and the 'Internet of Things' to manufacture genetically modified foods (Pimbert and Anderson, 2018¹⁶⁶).

The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) is another prominent actor. Its involvement in food-related global governance has recently come under fire as its president, Dr Agnes Kalibata, was appointed by Mr Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary-General (UNSG), as a Special Envoy for the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit. In an open letter to the UNSG, more than 300 farmers' organisations, civil society and human rights groups raised concerns over Dr Kalibata's appointment, which is inconsistent with the purported goals of the summit to address growing hunger and diet-related diseases via a food-systems approach. The inconsistency is anchored on conflicts of interest as AGRA is known to promote agribusiness interests, which have also been accused of causing hunger and diet-related diseases. To quote an extensive paragraph from the letter, this inconsistency is further captured by the following:

'The appointment of the President of AGRA as your Special Envoy contradicts the innovative spirit of the Summit since AGRA is an alliance that promotes the interests of agribusiness. The role of

¹⁶⁶ <https://theconversation.com/the-battle-for-the-future-of-farming-what-you-need-to-know-106805>

agribusiness in shaping food systems has been challenged by large sectors of the population across the world and in a steadily increasing body of research: TNCs and investors profiting from industrial agriculture, fishing and livestock-keeping are responsible for destroying ecosystems; grabbing lands; water and natural resources; undermining the livelihoods of Indigenous Peoples, rural communities; perpetuating exploitative working conditions; creating health problems; and a significant proportion of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Further, agribusinesses focus primarily on productivity and yields, whereas the notion of food systems makes visible the multi-dimensionality of food, much of which is related to public purpose objectives that cannot be met through corporate interests.’ (Collective Letter, 2020)¹⁶⁷

Further, under the banner of the People’s Autonomous Response to the UN Food Systems Summit,¹⁶⁸ social movements and civil society organisations around the world have collectively risen up against corporate take-over of the UN Food Systems, and called on the UN to not pursue the agenda of corporate front groups, and instead, transform the food systems through real solutions such as agroecology and food sovereignty. The central argument pushed by the coalition is that transnational agribusiness companies have contributed to the intensifying global hunger crisis, widespread environmental degradation and diet-related diseases and by giving them the driver’s seat in steering the summit’s agenda will only promote solutions that line corporate pockets.¹⁶⁹

Apart from AGRA, big international environmental NGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) have been active decision-makers in at least three agriculture-related MSIs. The involvement of WWF in many MSIs is not at all surprising. In 2005, it organised and led a roundtable to which it convened world ‘experts’ on different agricultural products. Many environmental and social standard-setting MSIs were born out of this roundtable, all imbued with sustainability goals for the people, planet and future of the industry. The Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) is one of them, initially supported by multiple

¹⁶⁷ https://www.foodsovereignty.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/EN_Edited_draft-letter-UN-food-systems-summit_070220-4.pdf

¹⁶⁸ <https://www.foodsystems4people.org/about-2/>

¹⁶⁹ <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/un-food-systems-summit-corporate-capture-by-sofia-monsalve-2021-09>

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.

‘stakeholders’ such as Adidas, Gap Inc., H&M, International Federation of Agricultural Producers, International Finance Corporation, IKEA, Organic Exchange, Oxfam, PAN UK and WWF. It claims *‘to transform cotton production from the ground up¹⁷⁰’* and to support farmers’ resilience. It also asserts to have improved farmers’ livelihoods through sustainable agricultural practices. Funded by the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark DANIDA, the Swedish Gaming Authority, GIZ and Laudes Foundation, the initiative has been criticised for its inadequacy in addressing decent work and forced-labor issues despite being one of its core objectives (BCI Task Force on Forced Labor and Decent Work, 2020).

The brand of ‘sustainability’ advanced by WWF covers promoting eco-labels and heavy reliance on partnerships with the corporate sector, which have been heavily criticised for corruption, greenwashing and low standards of certification, among others. Specifically, the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), which has become a gold standard for eco-certified, sustainable fisheries recognised by decision-makers, has been accused for its *‘weak standards and overly-lenient third-party certifiers’* (Le Manach, et al., 2020). With an estimated 15 per cent of the global fish catch being certified by MSC, the problematic standard-setting ultimately benefits industrial and commercial fisheries, which are well-documented to be more damaging to the environment (ibid.). The controversy reinforces questions and criticisms about the legitimacy and usefulness of multistakeholderism vis-à-vis its purported goals, and that in the end, it only benefits the corporate sector.

In other words, corporations exercise their structural influence by shaping the regulatory framework, which ultimately benefits them (Lang, et al, 2009 in McKeon, 2017).

4. Rise of a new generation of MSIs

MSIs are also evolving. For example, there is a new generation of MSIs that advances (new/old) paradigms and ideas about governing the global food and agriculture system. To expound on this point, we take the case of the EAT-Lancet Commission on Sustainable Healthy Food Systems (EAT-Lancet). It claims to be a *‘science-based global platform for food system transformation through sound science, impatient disruption &*

¹⁷⁰ <https://bettercotton.org/bcis-first-10-years-transforming-cotton-growing-and-improving-farmers-lives-from-the-ground-up/>

novel partnerships [...] across science, policy, business, and civil society to achieve five urgent and radical transformations by 2050’.)¹⁷¹ The five ‘transformations’ consist of i) shifting the world to healthy, tasty, sustainable plant-based diets; ii) realigning the food system priorities for people and planet; iii) producing more of the right food, from less; iv) safeguarding land and oceans; and v) radically reducing food losses and waste. Specifically, the EAT-Lancet Commission created a guideline for a ‘planetary healthy diet’ (broadly meaning: less meat, more beans) that it claims will advance a food system that nutritiously feeds the world’s ten billion people in 2050 and reduce environmental degradation at the same time. Anchored on the ‘planetary boundaries’ paradigm pushed by environmental scientists Johan Rockstrom and Will Steffen, the EAT-Lancet diet interestingly brings to light the interconnected issues of food systems, income, nutrition, and ‘planetary health’, which older generations of MSIs have treated as compartmentalised issues. However, it drew flak from various camps, including the meat industry, which will bear the brunt of the dietary shift if adopted widely by different states. The critics’ concerns center on affordability (especially for those living below the poverty line), inaccessibility/practicality and inadequacy to address local contexts and cultures (Green, 2019¹⁷²).

The close partnership between EAT-Lancet and WEF is pushing for the planetary healthy diet narrative, an optimal diet for people and planet that cuts back on red meat in favour of more fruits and vegetables. The underlying argument is that industrial meat is bad for the environment as it has been documented as causing massive deforestation and forest fires and produces carbon emissions comparable to fossil fuels.¹⁷³ The WEF uses the planetary healthy diet developed by EAT-Lancet for The Great Reset Initiative, which the former argues provides new business opportunities. Furthermore, the close relationship between them can be traced back to the creation of EAT-Lancet. The founder of EAT-Lancet, Gunhild Stordalen, was appointed as Young Global Leader by the WEF in 2015, when EAT-Lancet was still an initiative within the Stordalen Foundation portfolio in 2013, and before it was established

¹⁷¹ <https://eatforum.org/about/>

¹⁷² <https://www.devex.com/news/the-eat-lancet-diet-is-unaffordable-but-who-is-to-blame-96124#:~:text=While%20they%20might%20have%20some,are%20paid%20for%20their%20work>

¹⁷³ https://www.bing.com/search?q=environmental+problems+with+red+meat&_cvid=9bdec258174d3cbaf197f4314910b1&aqs=edge..69j57.9105joj4&FORM=ANAB01&PC=U531

Erro! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.

independently in 2016 by the Stockholm Resilience Center (SRC) and the Wellcome Trust. The Wellcome Trust is a 'Health & Health Care' partner of the WEF. Ms Stordalen has been appointed as the focal person in charge of Action Track 2, 'Shift to Sustainable Consumption Patterns' of the 2021 UN Food System Summit, with the WHO at her disposal as the 'anchoring agency'. International NGOs such as the World Resources Institute and Greenpeace International are part of EAT-Lancet's Board of Trustees, while the WWF is a member of what it calls 'Action Stakeholders'. In addition, more than one-fourth of its funding comes from companies and businesses that are diversifying to plant-based products such as the Nordic Choice Hotels, Aviva, Nofima, BAMA, Nestlé, Fazer, Seafood Innovation Cluster, Food Industry Asia (FIA), Oatly, Bayer, City Finansiering, Deloitte, Google, Novo Nordisk, Umoe and Eurofins.

The emerging ecosystem of players and epistemic communities between sciences, business, certain transnational conservation NGOs and governments are also the same players that are heavily invested and involved in the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit (UNFSS 2021). This summit is another new MSI that does not fit the old mould of multistakeholderism. In an email exchange with MSI expert Dr Harris Gleckman, he commented that,

'What is clear is that UN Food System Summit is not a multilateral meeting. As FIAN and those working around the CFS point out all the Rome based food and agriculture organizations were not part of the decision to have this event. It is also not just an international business conference. It is one of these blended multistakeholder arrangements. As I understand it, WEF is taking the organizing lead and the Office of the UN Secretary General (UNSG) is extending legitimacy to the effort. It clearly flows from the Strategic Partnership agreement between WEF and the office of the SG. One of the reasons it is not a global multilateral conference is that the UN General Assembly (UNGA) nor the FAO governing body has authorized the event; it is just the SG's office.' (Email exchange, 2021).

La Via Campesina, FIAN and more than 700 organizations have raised alarm bells on the Summit, arguing that *'instead of being grounded in human rights, the UNFSS is a multistakeholder forum in which all actors, whether governments, individuals, regional/international agencies, or business /corporation representatives are portrayed as equal participants. But stake-holders are not necessarily rights-holders: people's and communities' rights and sovereignty*

should not be confused with private-sector business interests. While majority of the world's food is produced by small-scale producers and workers, this individuated multistakeholder process gives outsized power to a few powerful corporations that control food, agricultural and capital markets'. (Political declaration, 2021).¹⁷⁴ At the core of their concerns is that the Summit is undermining decades-long processes and efforts to democ-ratise multilateral food governance by NGOs and social movements.

Conclusion and recommendations for further research

This chapter underscores the growing involvement of corporations in shaping the global food and agricultural system that not only undermines hardwon human rights but also excludes the voices of the majority of small food producers and marginalised communities around the world. The mapping reveals some important features about the MSIs involved in the food and agriculture sectors but more must be done in terms of uncovering their impacts and making links between and among the actors involved.

In-depth research is needed to investigate the following:

- Accountability mechanisms (or lack of them) within MSIs. The database provides only cursory data on the governing structures within them but not on specific accountability mechanisms;
- Mapping the ecosystem of actors that work together, partner with each other and link issues together starting with the WEF and EAT-Lancet but branching out from there. This mapping can uncover formulaic strategies, common discourse and shared agendas that impact global governance of agriculture, food, land and nutrition systems.

¹⁷⁴ <https://www.csm4cfs.org/no-to-corporate-food-systems-yes-to-food-sovereignty/>

Error! Use a guia Página Inicial para aplicar Heading 1 ao texto que deverá aparecer aqui.

- Analysis of actual impact of MSIs: What actions are announced, what actions are really done? Who is benefitting? Who is harmed?
- What is the impact of MSIs in re-designing existing institutions such as CFS, FAO and IFAD?

References

McKeon, N. (2017) Are Equity and Sustainability a Likely Outcome When Foxes and Chickens Share the Same Coop? Critiquing the Concept of Multistakeholder Governance of Food Security, *Globalizations*, 14:3, 379–398, DOI: [10.1080/14747731.2017.1286168](https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2017.1286168)

McMichael, Philip (2013). *Food Regimes and Agrarian Questions*. Halifax & Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing.

Michele, L., Prato, S., Rundall, P. Valente, F., Nalubanga, B. Immink M., Cano M. Dadhich, JP., and Gupta, A. (2019). *When the SUN Casts a Shadow: The human rights risks of multi-stakeholder partnerships: the case of Scaling up Nutrition (SUN)*. Heidelberg: FIAN International. Access at

https://www.fian.org/files/files/WhenTheSunCastsAShadow_En.pdf

Wise, Timothy (2020): *Failing Africa's Farmers: An Impact Assessment of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa*. GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER NO. 20-01.

https://sites.tufts.edu/gdae/files/2020/07/20-01_Wise_FailureToYield.pdf

Political declaration (2021): *No to corporate food systems! Yes to food sovereignty!*

<https://www.csm4cfs.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Declaration-EN-2.pdf>

Annex Database

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Education cannot wait fund (ECWF) Year: 2016 Domicile: New York, NY, USA Typology: Policy; Financing Facility Website: educationcannotwait.org</p>	<p>The ECW was established during the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 by international humanitarian and development aid actors, along with public and private donors, to help reposition education as a priority on the humanitarian agenda, usher in a more collaborative approach among actors on the ground and foster additional funding to ensure that every crisis-affected child and young person is in school and learning.</p> <p>The 2015 Oslo Summit on Education for Development urged governments, non-</p>	<p>To inspire political commitment so that education is viewed by both governments and funders as a top priority during crises.</p> <p>To generate additional funding to help close the \$8.5 billion funding gap needed to reach 75 million children and youth.</p> <p>To plan and respond collaboratively, with a particular emphasis on supporting programmes that enable humanitarian and development actors to work together on shared objectives.</p> <p>To strengthen capacity to respond to</p>	<p>UN bodies (UNICEF, UNESCO, UNHCR); UN Special Envoy for Global Education; Global Partnership for Education); Northern donor govts (United Kingdom, United States, Norway, Canada); Governments (Lebanon, Tanzania), Regional Bodies (EU); International NGOs (Save the Children); Business/Industry (Deutsche Postcode Lotterie, Novamedia); International Financial Institutions/DFIs ; Philanthropies (Dubai Cares);</p>	<p>High-Level Steering Group; Executive Committee, Secretariat</p> <p>Education Cannot Wait is hosted by UNICEF. The Fund is administered under UNICEF’s financial, human resources and administrative rules and regulations, while operations are run by the Fund’s own independent governance structure. The High-Level Steering Group provides strategic guidance to the Fund’s operations. Convened at the ministerial level, it is chaired by the UN Special Envoy for Global Education, Rt Hon Gordon</p>	<p>Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Northern donor govts (United Kingdom, United States, Norway, Canada, Australia, Germany, Netherlands); Regional Bodies (EU); Business/Industry (Porticus, Verizon); Philanthropies Corporate (Dubai Cares, Lego Foundation, TheirWorld);</p>

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>governmental organisations (NGOs), foundations, the private sector, academia and the civil society to mobilise collective action and more funding for education in emergencies. Two months later at the UN Sustainable Development Summit, Member States reiterated their commitment to SDG 4 – Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education for all children and youth.</p> <p>The following year, under the UN Secretary-General's leadership and through a series of reforms to humanitarian funding known as the Grand</p>	<p>crises, nationally and globally, including the ability to coordinate emergency support.</p> <p>To improve accountability by developing and sharing knowledge, including collection of more robust data in order to make better-informed investment decisions, and knowledge of what works and does not.</p>		<p>Brown, and is comprised of partner organisations, including heads of UN agencies and multilateral aid agencies, CEOs of civil society organisations and foundations, and private sector representatives. These constituencies are represented in the Fund's Executive Committee which oversees operations. Education Cannot Wait's day-to-day activities are carried out by a Secretariat under the direction of the Education Cannot Wait Director Yasmine Sherif.</p>			

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>Bargain, the World Humanitarian Summit called for a new way to address emergencies and protracted crises through better collaboration and coordination between humanitarian and development actors, increased and more flexible funding, less bureaucracy, national ownership and a more holistic approach that addresses both immediate and long-term needs, leaving no one behind. Education Cannot Wait was launched during the Summit as a response to that.</p>						
<p>Education Commission Year: 2015 Domicile: New York, NY, USA Typology: Policy</p>		<p>To create a 'Learning Generation' by transforming education systems so that</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National</p>	<p>Chairperson; Commissioners (Member of Commission); Secretariat Working Groups;</p>	<p>Leadership; Member; Strategic Partner; Advisory Group; Working Group</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder</p>	<p>No information but given that it was convened by the UNESCO and is chaired by the UN Special Envoy</p>

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
Website: educationcommission.org/		all children can be in school and learning within a generation.	NGOs; Impact Groups; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions (https://educationcommission.org/about/research-agenda-partners/); UN bodies; Implementation partners; Engagement with the global stakeholders in various categories are mentioned here https://educationcommission.org/global-engagement/	Expert Panels; Advisory Groups The UN Special Envoy for Global Education, Gordon Brown, serves as the Chair of the Commission. Commissioners include members of business, former head of states, Ministers, Nobel Laureates, artists, philanthropies etc. And has a Secretariat headed by Commission Director.			for Global Education, it was assumed that it was funded and hosted at UNESCO.
Generation Unlimited Year: 2018 Domicile: New York, NY, USA Typology: Policy, Financing Facility, Project, Paradigmatic/Campaign Website:	Generation Unlimited (GenU) is a global multi-sector partnership to meet the urgent need for expanded education, training and	To provide youth with the education, training and employment to achieve their full potential through mobilising investments and skills.	Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies (African Union Commission, EU); International NGOs; National NGOs; Business/Industr	Leadership Council; Board of Directors; Secretariat Global Leadership Council and Board of Trustees (members from	Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner, implementing partner	Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder;	Information on key funders is not available. However, their annual report mentions specific collaborating groups for their country programmes,

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
generationunlimited.org	<p>employment opportunities for young people, aged 10 to 24, on an unprecedented scale.</p> <p>Launched at the 73rd United Nations General Assembly, in September 2018, Generation Unlimited has generated interest from government and leaders from industry and other key sectors committed to cohere efforts around young people for large-scale impact.</p>		<p>y (Unilever, SAP); International Financial Institutions/DFIs ; Philanthropies (Dubai Cares, Microsoft Philanthropies, CIFF, Ikea Foundation); Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies; Implementation partners; see the full list here https://www.generationunlimited.org/who-we-are</p>	<p>UN, Governments, World Bank, Private Sector, Philanthropies, CSOs) supported by International Secretariat. The Leaders Group is co-chaired by the UN Secretary-General, the President of Rwanda, and the President of Trinidad & Tobago, and the GenU Board is co-chaired by the Executive Director of UNICEF and the Chairman of PwC.</p>			<p>which include UNICEF, UNDP, World Bank, Governments, Private Sector, Philanthropies and international and national NGOs. However, specific amounts of resources mobilised are hard to find.</p>
<p>Global Business Coalition for Education Year: 2012 Domicile: New York, NY, USA Typology: Project, Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: gbc-education.org</p>	<p>The Global Business Coalition for Education calls itself a movement of businesses committed to ending the global education crisis and unleashing the potential of</p>	<p>To bring together the expertise and resources of the business community with the campaign for global education and Sustainable Development Goal 4.</p>	<p>Primary stakeholders are Businesses / Industry. See the memberships here https://gbc-education.org/member-companies/</p> <p>However, their work is achieved</p>	<p>The Advisory Board is comprised of leaders from business, philanthropy, education, and civil society to provide expert advice and guidance. The Executive Board</p>	<p>Founders/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Observer; Strategic Partner; Client</p>	<p>UN Systems are not involved however, the office of the UN Special Envoy for the Global Education Gordon Education and his wife Sarah Brown are initiators of this</p>	<p>Industry and Philanthropies (Atlassian Foundation) which include its founding members These companies include Accenture, Grupo Carso, Chevron Corporation,</p>

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>the next generation. It serve as the business community's social impact advisor, combining the expertise of education and business to develop customised programs and identify investments, partnerships, and opportunities that will have the greatest impact.</p> <p>Established as an initiative of the global children's charity Theirworld in 2012, the Global Business Coalition for Education draws its members from next generation business leaders who understand the power and potential of</p>		<p>through collaborations with Governments, International NGOs; National NGOs; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs ; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies; Implementation partners; Others</p>	<p>drawing upon members primarily from businesses/ industry is charged with overseeing the Global Business Coalition for Education's work, ensuring it maintains its focus on outcomes and results for youth across the globe. Full list of members are here https://gbc-education.org/our-board/</p>		<p>platform and UN groups are an active partner in its functioning.</p> <p>Global Business Coalition for Education also has positions at various UN campaigns Advisory and Executive Boards.</p> <p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Dangote Industries, Discovery Communications , Inc., Econet Wireless Group, GUCCL, Hess Corporation, Intel Corporation, Lenovo Group Limited, McKinsey & Co, Inc., Pearson plc, Reed Smith LLP, Tata Sons Limited and Western Union.</p>

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	leveraging their knowledge, resources, and scale in coordination with peers, government, international organisations, and NGOs.						
<p>Global Education Coalition Year: 2020 Domicile: Paris, France Typology: Facility, Project, Paradigmatic/Campaign Financing: Website: gloaleducationcoalition.unesco.org</p>	<p>The Global Education Coalition is a platform for collaboration and exchange to protect the right to education during the unprecedented disruption caused by Covid-19 and beyond. It brings together more than 150 members from the UN family, civil society, academia and the private sector to ensure that learning never stops. Coalition members rally around three flagships, namely connectivity,</p>	<p>To maintaining educational equity and inclusion as governments seek to provision teaching and learning opportunities to students through alternative means during periods of school closures.</p>	<p>United Nations agencies, international organisations, civil society representatives Members (Teach for All, TheirWorld, Save the Children, Khan Academy and ors.); private sector (Tencent, Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Ericsson, Verizon, Orange, and many other private sector payers from ICT involved in this); Media (BBC, RFI, France24)</p>	<p>Secretariat</p>	<p>Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Implementer</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Implementer</p>	<p>Global Partnership for Education (UNICEF, UNESCO, and the World Bank) In addition to this along with the UNESCO and other UN agencies country programmes have partnered with the global funds and business / industry to provide in-kind or monetary assistance including funds from the foundations/Philanthropies. Details are provide in the six monthly report here</p>

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	teachers and gender.						https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000374364
<p>Global Education Initiative of the WEF Year: 2003-2011 Domicile: Cologne, Switzerland Typology: Policy, Project, Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: weforum.org/reports/global-education-initiative-retrospective-partnerships-education-development-2003-2011</p>	<p>Conceived in 2003 with a mission to help make national education systems more relevant, sustainable and scalable, the Global Education Initiative (GEI) launched initiatives in Jordan, Rajasthan (India), Egypt and the Palestinian Territories, forged new partnerships and structures with multilateral organisations and released a groundbreaking report on entrepreneurship education.</p> <p>The idea for the GEI was conceived and</p>	<p>To identify, test and apply principles and models for successful educational partnerships involving the private sector, civil society, international organisations, donors and governments.</p> <p>To promote the value of multistakeholder partnerships and the benefits of private sector involvement in these partnerships.</p> <p>To enhance the capacities of key stakeholders to establish and implement their own effective MSPE models.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; Teachers Bodies; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; UN bodies; Implementation partners; Others</p>	<p>Programme Management Office / Programme Secretariat at WEF; Each of the country initiatives had their own executive committee.</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Implementer</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Implementer</p>	<p>Country / State Governments, Northern gov'ts/donors (USAID), Business / Industry (Intel Corporation, CISCO), Philanthropy / Foundations (Educate Girls Globally, USA) and others</p>

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>launched at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2003 during the Governors Meeting for Information Technology and Telecommunications. John Chambers, Chief Executive Officer of Cisco, along with many other CEOs present, proposed creating a collaborative partnership between business and government to transform education. It started as a country initiative with Jordan, India, Egypt and Palestine programmes and then joined hands with UNESCO in 2006 to make it a global programme.</p>	<p>To contribute to a greater global understanding and coordination of MSPE initiatives.</p>					

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Global Partnership for Education (GPE) Year: 2002 Domicile: Washington, DC, USA Typology: Policy, Financing Facility, Project Website: globalpartnership.org</p>	<p>Global Partnership for Education mobilises finances, investments and brings together lower-income countries, donors, international organizations, civil society, including youth and teacher organizations, the private sector and private foundations to transform education systems so that all girls and boys, especially those who are marginalized by poverty, displacement or disability, can get a quality education.</p> <p>Launched in 2002, the Global Partnership for Education was originally known as the Education</p>	<p>To mobilise partnerships and investments that transform education systems in developing countries, leaving no one behind.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America); Regional Bodies (European Union); International NGOs (Global Campaign for Education, Education International); Youth Advocates; Business/Industry (Global Business Council for Education); International Financial Institutions/DFIs (World Bank,</p>	<p>Board of Directors (Members from each constituency Developing Country Partner, Donor Country Partner, CSOs, Private Sector, Philanthropies, Multilateral Agencies); Five working committees support the Board in fulfilling its functions in a strategic, transparent, and efficient manner; 1) Coordinating Committee; 2) Finance and Risk Committee; 3) Governance and Ethics Committee; 4) Grants and Performance Committee; 5) Strategy and Impact Committee</p>	<p>Leadership; Funder; Strategic Partner; implementation</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Implementer</p>	<p>Northern donor govts (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America); Regional Bodies (European Union); International NGOs (Global Campaign for Education, Education International); Youth Advocates; Business/Industry (Global Business Council for Education); International Financial Institutions/DFIs (World Bank,</p>

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>for All – Fast Track Initiative. It was launched to accelerate progress towards the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education by 2015.</p> <p>In 2013, Alice Albright joined as Chief Executive Officer and Julia Gillard, former Australian Prime Minister, was appointed Chair of GPE's Board. She led a successful second replenishment of GPE's resources for 2015–2018, bringing in \$28.5 billion in new commitments from developing countries and donor partners. Additionally, in 2016, Rihanna became GPE's first Global</p>		<p>Africa Development Bank, Asia Development Bank); Philanthropies (Children's Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF), Comic Relief, Dubai Cares, Conrad Hilton Foundation, Open Society Foundations, Porticus, and the Rockefeller Foundation); Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies (UNICEF, UNESCO, UNHCR); Implementation partners; Others</p>				<p>Africa Development Bank, Asia Development Bank); Philanthropies (Children's Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF), Comic Relief, Dubai Cares, Conrad Hilton Foundation, Open Society Foundations, Porticus, and the Rockefeller Foundation); Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies (UNICEF, UNESCO, UNHCR)</p>

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>Ambassador. In this role Rihanna has encouraged world leaders and policymakers to boost their support for global education and education in emergencies through GPE.</p> <p>Since its inception, GPE has grown from partnering with 7 developing countries in 2002 to close to 70 countries in 2019.</p>						
<p>HESI Year: 2012 Domicile: New York, NY, USA Typology: Policy, Project, Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdaction/hesi</p>	<p>The Higher Education Sustainability Initiative (HESI) is a partnership between United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UNESCO, United Nations Environment, UN Global Compact's Principles for</p>	<p>To teach sustainable development across all disciplines of study,</p> <p>To encourage research and dissemination of sustainable development knowledge,</p> <p>To green campuses and</p>	<p>UN Agencies, Universities, Professional associations; Students Organisations (French Student Network for Sustainable Development, OIKOS, Students' European Network for Sustainable Development, World Student</p>	<p>Secretariat</p>	<p>Initiator; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Implementer</p>	<p>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) UNESCO United Nations Environment UN Global Compact's Principles for Responsible Management Education (PRME) United Nations</p>

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>Responsible Management Education (PRME) initiative, United Nations University (UNU), UN-HABITAT, UNCTAD and UNITAR, and was created in 2012 in the run-up to the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20).</p> <p>The HESI for Rio+20 was initiated in 2012 by a group of UN partners (the Executive Coordinator of Rio+20, UN DESA, UNEP, UNESCO, UN Global Compact, UN Global Compact's Principles for Responsible Management Education (PRME) and UNU) as an</p>	<p>support local sustainability efforts, and</p> <p>To engage and share information with international networks.</p>	<p>Community for Sustainable Development)</p>				<p>University (UNU) UN-HABITAT UNCTAD UNITAR</p>

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	unprompted initiative for Higher Education Institutions (HEI) in the run-up to the Rio+20 Conference.						
Inclusive Education Initiative Year: 2019 Domicile: Washington, DC, USA Typology: Policy, Financing Facility, Project Website: worldbank.org/en/topic/socialsustainability/brief/inclusive-education-initiative-transforming-education-for-children-with-disabilities worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2020/04/23/one-year-anniversary-of-the-inclusive-education-initiative	The Inclusive Education Initiative (IEI) was launched in 2019 by the World Bank with support from the United Kingdom's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) to provide technical expertise and resources to help countries foster more inclusive educational systems, with a view to achieving SDG 4 with a specific focus on the children with disabilities.	To provide technical expertise and resources to help countries foster more inclusive educational systems, with a view to achieve SDG 4.	Northern donor govts (DFID, NORAD); Governments of the project country, International Financial Institutions/DFIs (World Bank); UN bodies; Implementation partners	World Bank is the host of the programme. No specific information.	No information	No information	World Bank with the support of UK's DFID and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>International Finance Facility for Education Year: 2020 Domicile: Washington, DC, USA Typology: Policy, Financing Facility, Project Website: educationcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/200918-IFFEd-Prospectus2020-Final.pdf</p>	<p>The International Finance Facility for Education (IFFEd) is a new financing engine for global education, further complementing the existing grant instruments like the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) and Education Cannot Wait (ECW) fund. It is specifically designed to tackle the education crisis in lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) which are home to 80 per cent of the world's children.</p> <p>Education Commission first recommended the International Finance Facility for Education (IFFEd) in its</p>	<p>To increase funding for the primary education in the lower- and middle-income countries.</p>	<p>International Financial Institutions/DFIs (World Bank, etc); Northern donor govts (OECD, G8 and other countries); Country Governments; Investors/Banks; UN bodies; and International NGOs; National NGOs; Business/Industry; Academic/Research Institutions as Implementation partners</p>	<p>Evolving, World Bank serves as the trustee of the IFFEd Trust Fund.</p>	<p>Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner, implementing partner</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>MDBs (World Bank), IGOs (EU, OECD); Northern Donor Governments (UK, Netherlands); Governments of Low- and Middle-Income Countries</p>

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	September 2016 report, The Learning Generation.						
<p>Save our Future Year: 2020 Domicile: No information Typology: Project, Campaign Website: saveourfuture.world/pt/</p>	<p>Save Our Future is a global campaign which seeks to ensure that: all children and youth continue to learn during lockdowns through inclusive distance learning; every child and youth is supported to return to school when it's safe to do so; and governments and donors invest in education now so we can build better, more inclusive, and resilient education systems for the future.</p>	<p>All children and youth continue to learn during lockdowns through inclusive distance learning.</p>	<p>United Nations agencies, IGOs, international organisations, philanthropies, private sector, civil society representatives</p>	<p>No specific information but this is what its annual report says : Save Our Future is led by a core hub of the Association for the Development of Education in Africa, the Asian Development Bank, BRAC, Education Above All, Education Cannot Wait, the Education Commission, the Education Outcomes Fund, the Global Partnership for Education, Save the Children, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF, the World Bank, and the World Food Programme in partnership with over 600</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner;</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Atlassian Foundation and the LEGO Foundation, UNESCO</p>

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
				organisations and youth.			
<p>The SDG-Education 2030 Steering Committee Year: 2016 Domicile: Paris, France Typology: Policy Website: sdg4education2030.org/sdg-education-2030-steering-committee-resources</p>	<p>The SDG-Education 2030 Steering Committee is the global multi-stakeholder mechanism for education in the 2030 Agenda. Hosted by UNESCO, it is mandated to provide strategic guidance to Member States and the education community, make recommendations for catalytic action, advocate for adequate financing, and monitor progress toward education targets through the UNESCO Institute for Statistics and the Global Education Monitoring report.</p>	<p>Its primary objective is to harmonize and strengthen support to Member States and their partners to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 4 (SDG 4) and the education-related targets of the global agenda.</p>	<p>The Steering Committee is composed of 44 members representing a majority from Member States, the World Education Forum 2015 convening agencies (UNESCO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UN Women, the World Bank and ILO), the Global Partnership for Education, the OECD, regional organisations, teacher organisations, civil society networks (Arab Campaign for Education for All, Education International, Global Campaign for Education), in addition to representatives</p>	<p>Steering Committee, Working Groups, Secretariat</p>	<p>Leadership, Member Represented in the Steering Committee through the UN Global Compact</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>UNESCO</p>

EDUCATION

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	Established in 2016, the Steering Committee is a platform that provides a forum to ensure more coordinated support for the realisation of education targets and commitments.		from the private sector, foundations, youth and student organisations.				

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Sustainable Energy for All Year: 2011 Domicile: Vienna, Austria Typology: Policy Website: seforall.org/</p>	<p>In September 2011, then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced at the UN General Assembly a new initiative called on Sustainable Energy for All. This was in the context of a resolution that declared 2012 the International Year of Sustainable Energy for All, sending a clear signal about the centrality of energy in ending poverty and addressing climate change. As part of the initiative, the Secretary-General called for action around three objectives to be achieved by 2030: ensure universal access to modern energy services; double the rate of improvement of</p>	<p>Under its new business plan, SEforALL aims to strengthen global agenda-setting while expanding its activities to an engagement model that prioritises data-driven decision-making, partnerships with high-impact countries and implementation on the ground. SEforALL focuses on driving impact in key areas, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Securing and tracking new commitments from countries and companies through 'energy compacts' to meet SDG7 and energy transitions. • Accelerating the adoption of best-in-class integrated energy plans and 	<p>Business/Industry; Philanthropies; Northern donor govts; Governments; Others-social enterprise; IFIs/Development Finance; UN bodies; International NGOs; Philanthropies</p>	<p>Its governance structure consists of an Administrative Board, a Funders' Council, and is defined by bylaws and statutes incorporated in Vienna, Austria (quasi-international organisation). It retains a special Relationship Agreement with the United Nations. The Administrative Board is the principal governing body that oversees SEforALL's organisational strategy and governance, and ensuring its effective and efficient operations. Currently, the Board is comprised of four reps from the corporate</p>	<p>Leadership: The private sector-comprised of big energy corporations and banks comprise the majority of the Admin Board, which is the principal governing body of the SEE4ALL. It maintains a special relationship with the UN and is privy to many initiatives of the UN Energy, with its CEO as Co-Chair.</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Strategic Partner; Leadership</p>	<p>It has a separate Funders' Council that advises the CEO and Admin Board but also acts as funding partners. The Funders' Council is currently chaired by the representative from the United Kingdom's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). Its members are:</p> <p>Austrian Development Agency; Bloomberg Philanthropies; Charles Stewart Mott Foundation; ClimateWorks Foundation Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office of the United Kingdom; IKEA Foundation; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>energy efficiency; double the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix. To advance substantive work on the initiative, in 2012 the Secretary-General announced Kandeh Yumkella as his Special Representative for Sustainable Energy for All and the first CEO of the initiative. It is now an independent organisation that maintains close ties with the UN via relationship agreements and its CEO as the UN's Secretary-General Special Representative for Sustainable Energy for All and Co-Chair of UN Energy.</p> <p>It is an international</p>	<p>policy and regulatory frameworks to guide efforts and drive investment in the sustainable energy sector.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensuring that scaled-up and appropriate finance is flowing towards sustainable energy and energy access, including continuing to track and report on finance flows annually through the Energizing Finance research series. Supporting a significant increase in the pace of new energy connections, including implementing a new results-based financing facility in partnership with donors, and supporting 		<p>sector, with Enel (Chair) and Shell representatives; three from philanthropies/charities including the UN Foundation as vice chair; one from a profit-oriented social enterprise, and one from the government of Mexico.</p> <p>In the past, as the initiative continued to grow and evolve, additional governance mechanisms were established, including an advisory board co-chaired by the Secretary-General and World Bank President Jim Yong Kim. An executive committee was also established for operational guidance, headed up by Bank of</p>			<p>Iceland; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark; Rockefeller Foundation; Shell Foundation; Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation; Wallace Global Fund; Kigali Cooling Efficiency Program (Philanthropies); Transforming Energy Access (UK Aid)</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>organisation that works in partnership with the United Nations and leaders in government, the private sector, financial institutions, civil society and philanthropies to drive faster action towards the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG7) – access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all by 2030 – in line with the Paris Agreement on climate. SEforALL works to ensure a clean energy transition that leaves no one behind and brings new opportunities for everyone to fulfil their potential.</p> <p>It works towards</p>	<p>sustainable energy for healthcare facilities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainstreaming inclusive and gender-sensitive action on energy, including supporting more women entering and advancing in the sustainable energy sector. 		<p>America’s then Chairman Chad Holliday.</p>			

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>three ambitious objectives by 2030 (SDGs):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ensuring universal access to modern energy services doubling the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix doubling the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency 						
<p>Natural Capital Coalition Year: 2012 Domicile: London, UK Typology: Paradigmatic/ Campaign Website: naturalcapitalcoalition.org/the-coalition/</p>	<p>The Natural Capital Coalition is a global, multi-stakeholder, open-source platform to support the development of methods for natural capital valuation in business. It created the Natural Capital Protocol, a standardised global framework for including natural capital in</p>	<p>Its aim is to achieve a shift in corporate behaviour to preserve and enhance, rather than deplete the earth's natural capital (treating nature, its ecosystems and services as capital/ natural capital accounting). It also aims to promote an integrated capitals approach that links natural</p>	<p>Business, finance, conservation and civil society, government and policy, science and academia, standard setters & disclosure and membership organisations. The Natural Capital Coalition is an international collaboration that unites leading initiatives and organisations under a common</p>	<p>The Natural Capital Coalition is headed by Mark Gough as its ED and hosted by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales in London. It is not clear on their website what the governance structure is and who are part of the advisory board. But the Capitals Coalition, which the NCC is part</p>	<p>Leadership; Initiator/Convener: WBCSD is co-developing the Natural Capital Protocol. Different roles of the private sector -- as members, contributors (in terms of financing), and anchor of different projects under the Natural Capital Coalition's umbrella. One of its projects in the agriculture and</p>	<p>Strategic Partner (FAO with UCN, CISE, EY, IERS, Trucost, True Price developed the sector guide for food and beverage)</p>	<p>Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs - UK IFC The Rockefeller Foundation Mava-Foundation for Nature Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture,</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>decision making focused on businesses. It has recently worked on creating regional platforms with focus on Brazil, Colombia, West Africa, Australia, South Africa, US, UAE, Spain and Scotland. These regional platforms act as platforms to bring various players at the national, sub-national, local and regional levels to advance natural capital thinking and approach. Apart from providing policy advise, the Coalition works to 'transform the system' by changing the math (in terms of valuation of nature), changing the conversation and changing the rules of the</p>	<p>capital with social and economic, human capital.</p>	<p>vision of a world that conserves and enhances natural capital. The Coalition is made up of almost 300 organisations (and engages many thousands more) which together represent all parts of society. These organisations fall into seven broad stakeholder groups or 'worlds': business, finance, conservation and civil society, government and policy, science and academia, standard setters, and disclosure and membership organisations. Some of the corporations involved are food and beverage companies like Coca-cola, giant retailer Walmart,</p>	<p>of, have an 30-member advisory panel comprised of business, finance, policy, science, and academia, standard setting, membership organisations and civil society.</p>	<p>food sector is the TEEBAgriFood which entails a multi-pronged strategy to advocate for the Evaluation Framework & Operational Guidelines for Businesses via training, convening roundtables, etc. This is part of a new project generously supported by the EU, according to its website "the Capitals Coalition will work with businesses as part of this global UNEP project, with the overall goal of building resilience, mainstreaming best practice, protecting biodiversity and contributing to a more sustainable agriculture and food sector in</p>		<p>Nature and Food Quality of the Netherlands Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs UNEP</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>game. Its projects also employ multistakeholderism, with specific focus on Africa, AgriFood, Business for Nature, Data Information Flow, Capital Assessments, Financial Accounting and creating a massive coalition for capital (recently launched the Capitals Coalition by joining forces with the Social and Economic Capital Coalition).</p> <p>Originally established in 2012 as the TEEB For Business Coalition and hosted by ICAEW, the Natural Capital Coalition quickly became the global leader in</p>		<p>water MNC Suez and Thames Water, oil and power companies such as Shell, Total and Indian TNC Tata; IFIs and development finance such as the WB Group-- IFC and WB, European Union, EIB, international conservation organisations such as IUCN, WWF, Conservation International, World Resources Institute, CIFOR; US and UK-based universities; tons of auditing firms; UN agencies such as UNEP, investment funds and commercial banks; philanthropies such as the Rockefeller Foundation; and existing standard setting MSIs such as Climate</p>		<p>seven EU partner countries: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand."</p>		

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	mainstreaming natural capital approaches in the private sector, and released the internationally recognised Natural Capital Protocol in 2016.		Disclosures Standards Board, Gold Standard, Global Reporting Initiative.				
REEEP - Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership Year: 2015 Domicile: Vienna, Austria Typology: Policy, Project, Financing Facility Website: reeep.org/	REEEP develops innovative, efficient financing mechanisms to advance market readiness for clean energy services in low- and middle-income countries. REEEP invests primarily in disruptive approaches led by small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) players in low- and middle-income countries, facilitating market- and community-led energy transitions. Market readiness	Overall aim is to facilitate market transformation for renewable energy. Specifically, to demonstrate how countries can, effectively and efficiently, advance market readiness for clean energy, energy efficiency and energy access, for the benefit of the most vulnerable populations; contributes to global efforts under the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to advance energy access; combat	Governments; Business/Industry; International NGOs; Philanthropies; Others-IGOs; Academic/Research Institutions; Business/Industry	The Meeting of Members (MoM) is the assembly of all REEEP Members according to the Austrian Association Act (Vereinsgesetz 2002). The Meeting of Members is convened by the Governing Board and held at least once every two years. It is chaired by the Chair of the Governing Board or another Board member. The MoM approves the accounts, acknowledges the four-year strategy, and elects the	Initiator/Convenor; Leadership: General Electric, GEI China, and Baker McKenzie are part of the governing body	Leadership; Strategic Partner	Funded by governments, multilateral & international organisations: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade-Australia, Austrian Federal Ministry for Sustainability and Tourism-Austria, Blue Moon Fund, Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN), European Commission, GIZ - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry-

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>means: Households and productive users have access to affordable Clean Energy Services; This access is provided largely by the market, by a range of Clean Energy Service providers which are profitable; affordable finance is available for Clean Energy Service providers and end users; Relevant market information is available, and awareness, stakeholder networks and capacity are in place; Policies help create a vibrant business ecosystem and provide the right incentives for innovation, competition and market growth while safeguarding consumer rights.</p>	<p>climate change and improve resiliency; reduce damage to the environment; improve livelihoods and facilitate economic growth.</p>		<p>Governing Board. The Advisory Board provides high-level advice and strategic guidance.</p>			<p>Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Norway, OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), The Rockefeller Foundation, United States Agency for International Development (USAID)</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>It was launched after the Paris Agreement to help achieve market transformations/ change in renewable energy using private funding mechanism and an autonomous entity with the backing of UNIDO.</p>						
<p>Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosures Year: 2015 Domicile: Basel, Switzerland Typology: Policy Website: fsb-tcdf.org/about/</p>	<p>An industry-led task force that was established in December of 2015 with the goal of developing a set of voluntary climate-related financial risk disclosures which can be adopted by companies so that those companies can inform investors and other members of the public about the risks they face related to climate</p>	<p>Seeks to develop guidelines and recommendations for voluntary climate-related financial disclosures that are consistent, comparable, reliable, clear, and efficient, and provide decision-useful information to lenders, insurers, and investors across industries.</p>	<p>31 members Users and preparers of disclosures, representing a broad swath of the G20, as well as numerous sectors and industries</p>	<p>Global decision makers: Chair : Michael Bloomberg (ninth richest person in the world in 2019 according to Forbes); Four Vice-Chairs : one from the banking community (Aggrego Consultores), one from a stock exchange (Singapore Exchange), one manufacturing firm (Uniliver), one from the insurance world</p>	<p>Leadership; Initiator/Convener: 1)Global decision makers are all from the corporate sector - banks, stock exchange, manufacturing and insurance; 2) key stakeholders or member 'data users': BNP Paribas Asset Management; JP Morgan Chase & Co, UBS Asset Management; Generation Investment Management;</p>	<p>Strategic Partner (Mark Carney/ UN Special Envoy on Climate Action and Finance, who also sits in the Board of Trustees of the WEF)</p>	<p>Not clear on their website</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>change.</p> <p>Upon the request of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) formed the TCFD in 2015 as a means to coordinate disclosures among companies impacted by climate change. The TCFD made its first recommendation in 2017 and has currently 31 members. Investors, lenders, insurers and other participants in the market will have a more complete picture when assessing the value of those companies and the risks they face. A goal of the TCFD is to encourage</p>			<p>(Athora Germany); International Secretariat led by Bloomberg LP</p>	<p>BlackRock; Canada Pension Plan Investment Board; PGGM, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China; Principles for Responsible Investment; Barclays; Aviva Investors; Swiss Credit; data preparers – 8 companies, and others – 6 companies</p>		

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	sustainable investments so as to build an economy which is resilient in the face of climate-related uncertainties.						
<p>Alliance for Responsible Mining Year: 2004 Domicile: Envigado, Colombia Typology: Policy, Project, Environmental and Social Standard Website: responsiblemine.org/en</p>	<p>The Alliance for Responsible Mining is a global leading expert on responsible artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM). It continues to expand our network and have both projects and important new agreements in Africa and Asia to assist miners in benefitting from better conditions and access to fair markets. It works collaboratively with the whole supply chain: miners, legislators, industry bodies and buyers. Its stakeholder</p>	<p>It works to transform the sector through a holistic strategy and a wide range of services for miners, the gold industry, public entities and other actors working in the sector. Its vision is for artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) to become a formalised, organised and profitable activity that uses efficient technologies, and is socially and environmentally responsible.</p>	<p>Industry (2), Civil Society (5)</p>	<p>The maximum authority is the Board of Director's, which guides and manages the organisation and is responsible for defining the direction of the Foundation, in line with the interests of its various allies and actors in the supply chain. Its chair is headed by a scientist/mining engineer and the Board comprises of academic, business, trainers, and NGOs.</p>	<p>Leadership; Strategic Partners</p>	<p>Funder; Strategic Partner (UNIDO)</p>	<p>Bilat and Multilateral: Fondo Sueco-Noruego de Cooperacion con la Sociedad Civil Colombiana, USAID, US Department of Labor, European Partnership for Responsible Minerals, BID/FOMIN, SIDA; Private companies: Chopard, Microsoft, Fairmined; NGOs and Foundations: Pact, Resolve, Fundacion Mi Sangre, Fundacion Ayuda, Ford Foundation, Lundin Foundation, Fondo para La Accion Ambiente</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>alliance is the largest in the field and represents the diverse perspectives of different groups, with a shared agenda.</p> <p>Started in 2004, in Quito, Ecuador, at the headquarters of Rainforest Rescue International (FURARE) by an international group of community-based mining organisations, environmentalists, business representatives and certification specialists from Colombia, Ecuador, the United States, the Philippines, Holland, Mongolia, Peru, Sri Lanka and the United Kingdom. Shortly after the office was set up</p>						<p>y La Ninez, Corporacion Transparencia por Colombia, Foundation Ensemble; Universities: Colorado School of Mines, Polytechnic University of Catalonia</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>in Envisado, Colombia; where we continue to have our headquarters.</p> <p>The Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM) was launched by a network of independent organisations with the aim of promoting responsible standards and criteria for artisanal and small-scale mining. We began our work with various organisations from different countries, drawing inspiration from the promising results achieved by the Oro Verde initiative in Colombia, a local strategy for conservation of the biodiversity of the Chocó</p>						

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	Department of Colombia.						
<p>Better Biomass Year: 2011 Domicile: Delft, Netherlands Typology: Environmental and Social Standard Website: betterbiomass.com</p>	<p>The Better Biomass certificate (NEN 8080) is used by organisations to demonstrate that the biomass they produce, process, trade or use meets well established international sustainability criteria.</p> <p>Established in 2011 and has developed two standards NTA 8080-1 and NTA 8080-2 designed by a working group under the responsibility of the NEN policy committee 'Energy resources,</p>	<p>A voluntary scheme to demonstrate compliance with the mandatory sustainability criteria for biofuels and bioliquids as laid down in the Renewable Energy Directive since 2012 and recognised by the Dutch Commission.</p>	<p>Corporations (energy), government, social enterprise, certification boards, conservation organisations</p>	<p>Follows governing structure of the NEN Foundation</p>	<p>Members; Clientele; Strategic Partners</p>	<p>No information</p>	<p>Not clear on their website</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	distribution and fuels'						
<p>Diamond Development Initiative Year: 2006 Domicile: Ottawa, Canada Typology: Policy, Project, Environmental and Social Standard Website: resolve.ngo/ddi.htm</p>	<p>DDI is a development-focused, conflict prevention initiative that brings together NGOs, governments and the private sector in a concerted effort to help formalise and improve social and economic conditions in the artisanal diamond mining sector. Although it is completely independent, DDI works with and through the Kimberley Process, which it complements and parallels.</p> <p>It emerged from the Kimberley Process to strengthen the developmental impacts associated with</p>	<p>Through education and policy dialogue, DDI seeks to promote better understanding of the issues relating to the artisanal diamond mining sector. Working directly with governments of artisanal and alluvial diamond-producing countries throughout the design and implementation of projects focused on artisanal miners, DDI seeks to provide concrete solutions that are especially relevant to this sector.</p>	<p>Industry (5), Civil Society (7)</p>	<p>Board of Directors involve business, civil society, international development, human rights organizations, and academia</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Leadership</p>	<p>No information</p>	<p>Commercial banks, Canadian government, BHP Billiton, De Beers, Tiffany & Co., Cartier, GIZ, Government of Angola, World Bank</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>artisanal diamond mining in Africa (Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy, Summit Declaration – 7 June 2007). Is considered a charitable organisation under Canadian laws.</p>						
<p>Equitable Origin Year: 2009 Domicile: Massachusetts, US Typology: Policy, Environmental and Social Standard Website: equitableorigin.org/</p>	<p>Equitable Origin created the world's first 'stakeholder'-led, independent, voluntary standards system for energy development. It works with communities, companies and governments to promote social and environmental best practices, transparency and accountability in natural resource development.</p> <p>It was born in</p>	<p>Its mission is to protect people and the environment by ensuring that energy development is conducted under the highest social and environmental standards.</p>	<p>Industry (4), Civil Society (5)</p>	<p>Advisory Council and 9 voting members of the Board of Directors are two key governing structure comprised of individual experts from the academe, business/industry, philanthropies, practitioners/consultants, former government ministers, legal community, non-profit/civil society, and Indigenous communities</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Leadership</p>	<p>No information</p>	<p>Private donations; grants from foundations; Self-generated revenues</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>2009 out of personal experience with oil and gas development and Indigenous communities in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Following extensive engagement with affected communities and other stakeholders in energy development throughout the Amazon Basin, Equitable Origin expanded to other regions, issuing the world's first independent certification of a responsibly-operated oil production site in 2014. Equitable Origin is currently active throughout North and South America, with staff in Ecuador,</p>						

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	the United States, Mexico, and Colombia.						
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Year: 2002 Domicile: Oslo, Norway Typology: Environmental and Social Standard Website: eiti.org/	EITI is a global standard to promote open and accountable management of oil, gas and mineral resources. As a multi-stakeholder organisation, the EITI builds trust between governments, companies and civil society. The EITI requires the disclosure of information along the extractive industry value chain, from licensing to extraction, to how revenue makes its way through to government, to how it contributes to the economy and	It seeks to strengthen government and company systems, inform public debate, and enhance trust. In each of the 55 implementing country it is supported by a coalition of governments, companies and civil society working together.	Government (9), Industry (6), Civil Society (5)	The EITI Board is the EITI's main governing body, which decides on priorities for the organisation and evaluates countries' performance in reaching the requirements of the EITI Standard. It consists of 20 members representing implementing countries, supporting countries, civil society organisations, industry and institutional investors. Each Board member, except the Board Chair, is invited to have an alternate, who is welcome to observe Board meetings and	Leadership; Strategic Partners; Targets	Strategic Partner	World Bank's EGPS Multi-Donor Facility (IFIs/Development Finance); Implementing Partners; Business/Industry (Oil & Gas); Business/Industry (Mineral and mining companies); Business/Industry (Non-extractive companies); Investors/Banks; Government of Australia; Government of Belgium; Government of Canada; Government of Denmark; European Commission; Government of Finland; Ford Foundation; Government of France;

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	wider society. In doing so, the EITI strengthens public and corporate governance, promotes transparent and accountable natural resource management, and provides data that informs debate and reform in the extractive sector.			deputise for the member. It meets two to four times a year. It also takes decisions via Board circulars on a more frequent basis. The current Chair of the EITI Board is Rt Hon. Helen Clark.; Apart from the Board, EITI's daily activities are managed by an International Secretariat.; While its Board Committees advise the Board of Directors on specific issues related to implementation, validation, policy and management.			Government of Germany; Government of the Netherlands; Government of Norway; Government of Sweden ; Government of Switzerland (SECO); Government of the UK (DFID); Government of the United States (USAID); Global conference side-events
Fair Stone Year: 2006 Domicile: Teck, Germany Typology: Environmental and Social Standard	The international Social Standard for natural stone imports from developing and emerging markets.	To improve the working conditions in quarries and factories for natural stones in emerging economies.	Government (1), Business/Industry (2), Others-international organizations (1)	Since 2004, the members decide on strategic issues, while the eight-person Board of Directors, comprised of	Strategic Partners; Leadership	Strategic Partner (UN Global Compact)	Not clear on their website but probably from fees from the certification process

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Website: en.fairstone.org</p>	<p>Founded in 2006, Fair Stone was a Multi-Stakeholder Initiative (MSI) right from the beginning. A group of dedicated professionals, mostly with long-term experiences in their fields, developed the project with the aim to improve the working conditions in China. None of these MSI members has any commercial interest in the natural stone business.</p>			<p>founding members and professionals with long-term experiences in their own fields, decide on pending applications for certifications.</p>			
<p>Hydropower Sustainability/ Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol Year: 2006 Domicile: No information Typology: Environmental and Social</p>	<p>The Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol is a tool that promotes and guides more sustainable hydropower projects. The Protocol offers a way to assess the performance of a</p>	<p>It supports national and regional stakeholders in improving ownership of good practice through a structured process of training, assisted assessments,</p>	<p>Governments; Business/Industry; International NGOs; Academe/Research Institutions; Northern donor governments; IFIs/Development Finance; Others-consultants</p>	<p>Governed by the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Council, a multi-stakeholder group of representatives from energy companies, government agencies,</p>	<p>Leadership; Strategic Partner; Member</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor (World Commission on Dams); Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Self-generated revenues (membership fees/revenue from events and sponsorship)</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Standard Website: hydrosustainability.org</p>	<p>hydropower project across more than 20 sustainability topics.</p> <p>It is the culmination of a long process of debate and dialogue in response to the World Commission on Dams final report in 2000. This led in 2004 to IHA developing Sustainability Guidelines for the sector, with the intention that they provided practical and realistically implementable guidance. By 2006, IHA had developed an initial sustainability assessment protocol, intended to provide a uniform method</p>	<p>engagement and reflection. The Hydropower Sustainability Tools have been applied on more than 35 hydropower projects around the world.</p>		<p>financial institutions and social and environmental NGOs.</p>			

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>of assessing sustainability on hydro projects worldwide. Recognizing the value of this first version, WWF and The Nature Conservancy approached IHA with a view to further refining the tool. IHA agreed that the Protocol would benefit from a more inclusive process that would encompass sustainability perspectives from all hydropower stakeholders, and it was decided to bring together a group, the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum to achieve this.</p>						
<p>International Sustainability and Carbon Certification Year: 2010</p>	<p>The International Sustainability and Carbon Certification is a</p>	<p>As a no-deforestation standard with a strong commitment to</p>	<p>130 members from 3 sectors: Biomass Producers and Processors;</p>	<p>The ISCC Association (ISCC e.V.) is the legally registered body responsible</p>	<p>Leadership; Member</p>	<p>Strategic Partner (UN Global Compact)</p>	<p>Government of Germany (Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Domicile: Cologne, Germany Typology: Environmental and Social Standard Website: iscc-system.org</p>	<p>globally leading certification system covering the entire supply chain and all kinds of biobased feedstocks and renewables. Independent third-party certification ensures compliance with high ecological and social sustainability requirements, greenhouse gas emissions savings and traceability throughout the supply chain. ISCC can be applied in various markets including the bioenergy sector the food and feed market and the chemical market.</p> <p>It has been developed through an open multi-stakeholder process and is</p>	<p>protect forests, high-carbon stock lands and biodiversity, ISCC strives for a world where biomass and other raw materials are produced in an environmentally, socially and economically sustainable manner.</p>	<p>Trade, Logistics and other System Users; NGOs, Social Sector, Science and Research, Public Sector</p>	<p>for governing ISCC, for guiding the strategic decisions taken by ISCC and for unifying and representing ISCC's stakeholders. Members can participate in the organisation and have a voting right. The General Assembly is the annual meeting of the members held by the ISCC Association, where members of the ISCC Association elect the ISCC Board and discuss and decide on strategically important matters. The ISCC Board represents three different stakeholder groups.</p>			<p>Forestry, through the Agency for Renewable Resources)</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	governed by an association with more than 130 members, including research institutes and NGOs.						
<p>Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance Year: 2006 Domicile: Washington, DC, US Typology: Environmental and Social Standard Website: responsiblemining.net/</p>	<p>The initiative offers independent third-party verification and certification against a comprehensive standard for all mined materials that provides 'one-stop coverage' of the full range of issues related to the impacts of industrial-scale mines. IRMA's approach to responsible mining is to certify social and environmental performance at mine sites globally using an internationally recognized standard that has been developed</p>	<p>To establish a multi-stakeholder and independently verified responsible mining assurance system that improves social and environmental performance.</p>	<p>Business/Industry, International NGOs, Affected communities, Trade Unions, Investors/Banks</p>	<p>It claims that its governance is 'equitable and shared by civil society, communities, and organized labor alongside the private sector'. What this means in practice is that IRMA has a decision-making process that strives for consensus, and where consensus cannot be achieved we then vote. However, topics may not pass if one of the stakeholder groups is fundamentally opposed. In those cases, the topic must continue to be</p>	<p>Leadership</p>	<p>Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Not clear on their website</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>in consultation with a wide range of stakeholders.</p> <p>IRMA was founded in 2006 by a coalition of nongovernment organisations, businesses purchasing minerals and metals for resale in other products, affected communities, mining companies and labor unions.</p>			<p>discussed so a resolution may be found. How voting happens, who has a vote, and what weight a vote carries, is key in multi-stakeholder leadership. This equitable governance model is one of the reasons more than 60 civil society organisations have stepped forward to publicly state their expectation that mines should engage in IRMA.</p>			
<p>Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials Year: 2007 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Environmental and Social Standard Website: rsb.org/</p>	<p>The Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials is a global, multi-stakeholder independent organisation that drives the development of a new world bioeconomy through sustainability solutions,</p>	<p>To 'provide and promote the global standard for socially, environmentally and economically sustainable production and conversion of biomass; provide a global platform for multi-stakeholder dialogue and</p>	<p>Business/industry, rights-based civil society, government, academia, environmental NGOs, and multi-lateral organisations</p>	<p>The Assembly of Delegates is the highest decision making body of the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials.</p> <p>Each chamber elects up to three Delegates, thus giving each chamber the same weight and</p>	<p>Leadership: Industry/businesses populate the Assembly of Delegates chambers' representatives- 11 out of 15, two of which are elected representatives for the UN, governments and research. In the</p>	<p>Strategic Partner (UNCTAD)</p>	<p>The biggest single share of revenue came from Boeing Programme Corporate Citizenship (Business/Industry) with Packard Foundation (Philanthropies) and Climate Works Foundation</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>certification, innovation and collaborative partnerships.</p> <p>Established in 2007, it provided credible tools and solutions for sustainability that mitigate business risk, contribute to achieving the UN's Sustainable Development Goals and have the world's most trusted, peer-reviewed, global certification standard for sustainable biomaterials, biofuels and biomass production.</p>	<p>consensus building; ensure that users and producers have access to credible, practical and affordable certification; support continuous improvement through application of the standard.¹</p>		<p>influence in decision making. Chamber Delegates represent their chamber at assembly meetings and there they engage with the Delegates of other chambers to deliberate on issues of governance and standard development – and in some cases to vote. The Assembly approves modifications to the RSB Standard and appoints the Board of Directors to run the affairs of/ manage the RSB.</p>	<p>Board of Directors, 3 are from the industry/businesses out of 6.</p>		<p>(Philanthropies) also significantly contributing to RSB budget. 30 per cent of revenue in 2019 was self-generated income (fees, certifications, selling of services)</p>
<p>Tropical Forest Alliance (TFA) Year: 2012 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Paradigmatic/Campaign Website:</p>	<p>The TFA is a multistakeholder partnership platform initiated to support the implementation of private-sector commitments to remove</p>	<p>1)To bring together different actors and to identify key forest frontier challenges and solutions.; 2)To mainstream the Forest-Positive</p>	<p>170+ partners: Government agencies, Northern donors, Affected communities; International NGOs, Industry/Business, UN Bodies</p>	<p>Governed by a Steering Committee composed of a subset of its official Partners (20 reps). Its operations are supported by a Secretariat</p>	<p>Leadership; Host</p>	<p>Strategic Partner (UNEP; UNDP)</p>	<p>Governments of the Netherlands, Norway; Germany; United Kingdom, Gordon; Betty Moore Foundation.</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>tropicalforestalliance.org</p>	<p>deforestation from palm oil, beef, soy and pulp/paper supply chains. Hosted by the World Economic Forum, its 170+ alliance partners include companies, government entities, civil society, Indigenous peoples, local communities and international organisations, working together through Forest-Positive Collective Action to advance the world's transition to deforestation-free commodity supply chains.</p> <p>The Tropical Forest Alliance was founded in 2012 at Rio+20 after the Consumer Goods Forum (CGF) committed to</p>	<p>jurisdictional landscape concept; 3)To amplifying demand-side engagement in major economies such as the US, the European Union and China.</p>		<p>(hosted by the World Economic Forum) and its four regional teams: Latin America (Brazil, Peru and Colombia), Southeast Asia (Jakarta, Indonesia), Asia (Beijing, China) and West Africa (Côte d'Ivoire</p>			

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	zero net deforestation by 2020 for palm oil, soy, beef, and paper and pulp supply chains in 2010. The CGF partnered with the US government to create the public-private alliance with the mission of mobilising all actors to collaborate in reducing commodity-driven tropical deforestation.						
<p>Global Commons Alliance Year: 2019 Domicile: No information Typology: Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: globalcommonsalliance.org/</p>	<p>The Global Commons Alliance is an unprecedented partnership of more than 50 of the world's most forward-looking organisations in the fields of philanthropy, science, environment, business, cities and advocacy. This new 21st century platform</p>	<p>To create the most powerful network to scale science-based action to protect people and planet. Its mission is to empower citizens, cities, companies and countries to become stewards of our global commons. Its plan seeks to reverse negative</p>	<p>Business/industry, government, academia/scientists, environmental NGOs, and multilateral organisations</p>	<p>Governed by a leadership comprised of top executives from the World Economic Forum, World Resources Institute, WWF International, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Center for Global Commons (former head of</p>	<p>Leadership</p>	<p>Target institution</p>	<p>Global Environment Facility; Oak Foundation; MAVA Foundation; IKEA Foundation; Porticus; ClimateWorks; Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation; Good Energies Foundation</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>brings together scientific, business, government and nongovernmental organizations to transform the global economy, and to maintain the resilience and stability of Earth's natural systems. Its four components - Earth Commission, Science-Based Target Network, Earth HQ and Systems Lab complement each other's work.</p> <p>Builds on the research work of the Stockholm Resilience Center that produced two important documents on the global commons - Planetary Boundaries & Global Commons in the Anthropocene as</p>	<p>trends in climate, biodiversity, oceans, and other ecosystems, moving us toward a sustainable global economy - and a future that benefits human well-being and the natural world.</p>		<p>GEF); and two observers from the WBCSD and a High Level Champion for Climate Action - COP 26. It has its own coordination and communications teams that act as secretariat for the whole network.</p>			

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>well as the work of Elinor Ostrom. In 2016, a Dialogue was convened by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), in partnership with the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), the Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC), the World Resources Institute (WRI) and the World Economic Forum (WEF) Environmental Systems Initiative to discuss the state of play. In June 2019, the Global Commons Alliance was launched at the EcoProsperity event in Singapore. Two</p>						

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>of its sub-component work: Earth Commission, the scientific arm of the Global Commons Alliance, and the Science Based Targets Network, which provides a platform for cities and businesses to adopt targets for all global commons, were launched. Naoko Ishii is a key initiator of the alliance.</p>						
<p>Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Year: 2000 Domicile: Ontario, Canada Typology: Environmental and Social Standard Website: voluntaryprinciples.org/</p>	<p>The Voluntary Principles Initiative is a membership-based global multi-stakeholder platform dedicated to sharing best practices and mutually supporting the implementation of the Voluntary Principles. Composed of</p>	<p>To strengthen the capacities of members to engage/adopt the Voluntary Principles on specific issues of risk assessment, , Company's short and long-term operations, and Companies and private security.</p>	<p>Business/ industry, government, and NGO</p>	<p>A Steering Committee, formed by participants of all three pillars, is responsible for the Initiative's executive decisions. The Annual Plenary meeting, attended by all members, is the main decision-making body of the Voluntary Principles</p>	<p>Leadership</p>	<p>Strategic Partner (UN Global Compact)</p>	<p>UK Government; US Government; International Finance Corporation</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>governments, key international non-governmental organizations, and companies in the industries of extracting, harvesting, developing natural resources, or energy that aim to strengthen their capacity to address complex security and human rights issues in business operations around the world.</p> <p>The Voluntary Principles for Security and Human Rights were unveiled in December 2000 by the US State Department and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, after a yearlong process involving</p>			<p>Initiative. The day-to-day administration of the Initiative is conducted by a Secretariat based in Ottawa, Canada. The Voluntary Principles Association, domiciled in the Netherlands, is the entity that addresses the financial and administrative needs of the initiative.</p>			

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>government officials, oil and mining companies, and NGOs. The Principles provide guidance to companies operating in zones of conflict or fragile states so that they can ensure that security forces – public or private – protecting the companies’ facilities and premises operate in a way that protects the company’s assets while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. Such an initiative was necessary because of widespread international concern over the way security forces operated while protecting oil and mining installations in</p>						

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	many parts of the world.						
<p>Collaborative Partnership on Forests Year: 2001 Domicile: New York, USA Typology: Policy Website: cpfweb.org/en/</p>	<p>The Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) is an informal, voluntary arrangement among 15 international organisations and secretariats with substantial programmes on forests. These agencies share their experiences and build on them to produce new benefits for their respective constituencies. They collaborate to streamline and align their work and to find ways of improving forest management and conservation and the production</p>	<p>The mission of the CPF is to promote sustainable management of all types of forests, and to strengthen long-term political commitment to this end. CPF's two objectives are to support the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) and its member countries; to enhance cooperation and coordination among its members on forest issues; and promote the implementation of the UN Forest Instrument and the United</p>	<p>UN Bodies; International NGOs; International Financial Institutions/Development Finance</p>	<p>FAO serves as the chair and the UN Forum on Forests as its secretariat</p>	<p>Target</p>	<p>Leadership</p>	<p>Northern donor governments; World Bank; International NGOs; Green Climate Fund; African Development Bank; UN Bodies</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>and trade of forest products. They also form strategic partnerships with each other for shared expertise and pooling of resources.</p> <p>It is an interagency partnership on forests that was established in April 2001. It is modeled on the high-level, informal Interagency Task Force on Forests that supported the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (1995-1997) and the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (1997-2000). The CPF is comprised of 13 international forest-related organizations, institutions and</p>	<p>Nations Strategic Plan for Forests as well as the contribution of forests and trees to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and other major forest-related agreements.</p>					

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	convention secretariats.						
<p>Forest Law Enforcement and Governance Process Year: 2001 Domicile: No information Typology: Project Website: euflegt.efi.int/wh-at-is-flegt-social.shorthand.com/IUCN_forests/nylAKD7RYe/forest-law-enforcement-and-governance-fleg</p>	<p>The FLEG process is a worldwide movement, having emerged in different parts of the world (Asia, Europe, Africa, Russia and North Asia), including East Asia. It is a process that aim to harness national efforts, and enhancement of international collaboration and to address violations of forest laws and the commission of forest crimes.</p> <p>It emerged from a series of multi-stakeholder consultations in 2001 prior to the World Summit on Sustainable Development</p>	<p>In general, it aims to promote greater protection and sustainable management of the world's remaining forests. In particular, it aims to eradicate illegal logging and associated illegal trade and corruption.</p>	<p>EU, WB, ASEAN, Northern donor governments, Governments; International NGOs</p>	<p>No global governance structure but are implemented/adopted by different countries and regional blocs such as ASEAN, EU, and partnerships between international conservation NGOs such as WWF, IUCN, and IFIs and regional actors such as WB, EU and others that have work in Eastern Europe and Russia. Active projects in East Asia, Europe and North America.</p>	<p>Target</p>	<p>No information</p>	<p>Projects are financed by WB; EU</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>(WSSD) Ministerial preparatory meetings in Bali, Indonesia. The Summit generated the Bali Action Plan, And since then, various countries and international and regional blocs have come up with their own action plans around FLEG.</p>						
<p>Voluntary guidelines for responsible management of planted forests Year: 2006-2007 Domicile: Rome, Italy Typology: Policy Website: fao.org/3/ai390e/ai390e04.htm; sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/26034FAO_Committee_on_Forestry.pdf;</p>	<p>A two-year multi-stakeholder process to prepare the Voluntary Guidelines for Responsible Management of Planted Forests (formerly known as the Planted Forests Code) to balance social, cultural, environmental and economic dimensions in planted forest development and their contribution</p>	<p>To develop a non-legally binding planted forests voluntary guidelines (formerly known as the planted forests code); and To link international, national and local enabling environments</p>	<p>UN Bodies (FAO, ITTO); Academic/Research Institutions (CIFOR, University of Oxford); International NGOs (WWF, FPP, IUCN, IIEF); Business/Industry (ICFPA – BRACELPA, AFPA, CEPI, JPA/JOPP, CORMA, SFOA); Governments of Selected Countries (NZ, South. Africa, India, China, Vietnam, Iran);</p>	<p>Convened by the FAO. FAO Committee on Forestry (COFO) provided a mandate to proceed towards implementation through collaborating partners.</p>	<p>Others-participants: Private sector associations engaged in timber export-import were actively part of the 2-year process: CFPA – BRACELPA, AFPA, CEPI, JPA/JOPP, CORMA, SFOA</p>	<p>Leadership; Initiator/Convener</p>	<p>FAO (UN Bodies)</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>towards sustainable livelihoods and land use. The Voluntary Guidelines include guiding principles for policy, legal, regulatory and other enabling conditions, and thus provide a framework for responsible planning, management and monitoring of planted forests.</p> <p>Convened by the FAO, the Voluntary Guidelines were derived through a two year process involving specialists from Governments, the private sector (both corporate and smallholder), non-governmental (social and environmental) and</p>		Trade Unions (International Fed. of Building & Wood Workers)				

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>intergovernmental organisations, academics, and other civil society groups that gave of their time and expertise to explore the correct balance. The Voluntary Guidelines were discussed at the Regional Forestry Commissions throughout 2006, as well as at private sector and civil society meetings addressing intensively managed planted forests and sustainable forest management. Based on recommendations and suggestions from these meetings, the Voluntary Guidelines were commended by the Eighteenth Session of the</p>						

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>Committee on Forestry (COFO) in March 2007. The Voluntary Guidelines are a non-legally binding instrument tailored primarily to governments and investors (public and private sector), policy makers and planners. The scope includes both the planted forest component of semi-natural forests and plantation forests, as well as the full spectrum of planning, management and monitoring activities for both productive and protective functions. A process led by FAO and collaborating partners has been initiated to strengthen</p>						

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	institutional capacity to translate the Voluntary Guidelines into effective policies and implementation actions at the field level.						
<p>Voluntary guidelines for fire management Year: 2006–2007 Domicile: Rome, Italy Typology: Policy Website: not available</p>	<p>The Voluntary Guidelines is a non-legally binding framework of guiding principles and internationally accepted strategic actions to address the cultural, social, environmental and economic dimensions for all levels of fire management. Fire management in this context includes the monitoring, early warning, prevention, preparedness, suppression and restoration and the vegetation</p>	<p>To address the social, cultural, environmental, as well as economic dimensions of fire management in integrated approaches in the wider mosaic of land uses in the landscape; To encourage key stakeholder participation in policy dialogue, strategic planning and actions across sectors.</p>	<p>IGOs, NGOs, Academics, IFIs with key involvement of UNISDR • US Forest Service • Global Fire Monitoring Center • The World Bank • The Nature Conservancy • Government of Spain • Australasian Fire Authorities Council</p>	<p>Convened by the FAO</p>	<p>Others-participants</p>	<p>Leadership; Initiator/Convenor</p>	<p>FAO and member states</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>types include forests, woodlands, shrublands, rangelands, grasslands, agricultural lands and the vegetation types in the rural-urban interface.</p> <p>FAO coordinated a two year multi-stakeholder process through technical and expert consultations and six Regional Forestry Commissions during 2006 to prepare a set of principles and strategic actions as part of a global strategy for international cooperation in fire management. Their development followed on from recommendations of the International</p>						

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>Wildland Fire Summit, held in Sydney, Australia, in October 2003; the Ministerial Meeting on Sustainable Forest Management, held in March 2005, and the Committee on Forestry Session in March 2005.</p>						
<p>Nature for Climate Year: 2018 Domicile: Washington, DC, US Typology: Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Nature4Climate nature4climate.org/about/partners-and-supporters</p>	<p>Nature4Climate is the world's first coordinated effort to address the totality of natural climate solutions – across forests, farms, grasslands and wetlands. Nature4Climate is a new campaigning vehicle which is supported by a multi-stakeholder coalition. Its purpose is to use strategic communications to drive action on</p>	<p>To increase investment and action on natural climate solutions in support of the 2015 Paris climate agreement and to address the huge, untapped potential of land sector to rapidly and economically reduce greenhouse gas emissions.</p>	<p>IGOs (4), International Conservation NGOs (9), foundations (1), business/industry (1), research (1)</p>	<p>The steering group is made up of individuals from development, indigenous and conservation organisations, currently from CBD, CI, TNC, UNDP, WHRC, WRI and WWF.</p>	<p>Members; Strategic Partners (WBCSD)</p>	<p>Leadership; Initiator/Convener</p>	<p>Not clear on their website but it has foundations as partners: Good Energies Foundation; VKRF; Doris Duke Charitable Foundation; The Miriam Harvey Catalyst Funds for Global Lands and People</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>natural climate solutions (as a science-backed concept). N4C brings voices from governments, IGOs, NGOs, and business – underpinned by a steering group with communications and advocacy representation currently from CBD, CI, TNC, the UNDP, WHRC, WRI and WWF.</p> <p>Established in 2018, Nature4Climate is an initiative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and five world-leading not-for-profits (Conservation International, The Nature Conservancy, Woods Hole Research Center, World Business</p>						

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>Council for Sustainable Development and World Resources Institute). Nature4Climate will work over the next five years with national and subnational governments, and business groups at the global and national levels, to increase policy action and investment on natural climate solutions. N4C works in partnership with international policymakers, national governments and private sector organisations to catalyse action on natural climate solutions.</p>						
<p>Natural Climate Solutions Alliance Year: 2019 Domicile:</p>	<p>The NCS Alliance brings together public and private stakeholders to</p>	<p>To scale up affordable natural climate mitigation solutions for</p>	<p>Business, International Conservation NGOs</p>	<p>Its not clear on the website but Convened by the World Economic Forum and the</p>	<p>Leadership; Initiator/Convenor</p>	<p>Target institution; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>WBCSD; WEF; Philanthropies</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/29770/NCSA.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y weforum.org/natural-climate-solutions-alliance/our-approaches</p>	<p>identify opportunities and barriers to investment into carbon credits in new, and existing markets, to increase financing for natural climate solutions. The Alliance also serves as a forum for knowledge sharing and technical capacity building to ensure natural climate solutions reach their full potential in reducing GHG emissions, abating climate change.</p> <p>In 2019, the Natural Climate Solutions (NCS) Alliance was established. It is a CEO-led group of stakeholders committed to applying a set of principles to our sphere of influence to</p>	<p>achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change. These include: reforestation protection and conservation, livestock, animal and land management, and coastal wetland and peatland restoration, among a wide array of cost-effective solutions.</p>		<p>World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD).</p>			

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>deliver NCS with integrity at scale. It is convened by the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD) with the support and advice of Nature4Climate.</p>						
<p>Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Year: 2007-2020 Domicile: Washington, DC, US Typology: Project Website: climatefundsupdate.org weforum.org/natural-climate-solutions-alliance forestcarbonpartnership.org/</p>	<p>The FCPF is a global partnership of governments, businesses, civil society, and Indigenous Peoples focused on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, forest carbon stock conservation, the sustainable management of forests, and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries,</p>	<p>To provide financial and technical assistance to assist eligible REDD Countries to achieve emission reductions from deforestation and/or forest degradation and build recipient country capacity for benefitting from possible future systems with positive incentives for REDD; To pilot an emissions reduction performance-based payment</p>	<p>Governments; Northern donor governments; Business/Industry; International NGOs; National NGOs; Affected communities (Indigenous peoples)</p>	<p>Administered and created by the World Bank. There are two key groups within its governance structure (comprised of 6 committees): 1) The Participants Assembly which provides oversight and guidance to the Participants Committee. Primarily a forum for information exchange and knowledge sharing, it is attended by</p>	<p>Observers; Participants</p>	<p>Strategic Partner (UNDP)</p>	<p>World Bank; Inter-American Development Bank; UNDP</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>activities commonly referred to as REDD+.</p> <p>A programme created by the World Bank, discussions, initial discussions in 2006, concept note dated 16 March 2007 and it was launched in the same year. The FCPF became operational on 25 June 2008 upon the operational date of the Readiness Fund.</p>	<p>system generated from REDD activities, to ensure equitable benefit sharing and promote future large scale positive incentives for REDD; To test ways within the REDD approach to conserve biodiversity and sustain or enhance livelihoods of local communities; and To disseminate the knowledge gained through the development and implementation of the FCPF and related programmes.</p>		<p>participants from the Carbon Fund, eligible REDD countries and donor countries. To overturn decisions of the Participants Committee, a minimum of two-thirds majority from REDD Country Participants and two-thirds collective majority from Donor Participants and Carbon Fund Participants is required.; and 2) Participants Committee, which is the managerial body responsible for overseeing and facilitating operations of the FCPF. The Committee consists of 28 members (14 REDD Country Participants and 14 members</p>			

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
				collectively from Donor Participants and Carbon Fund Participants) and each member is entitled to one vote. Decisions are made by consensus but should efforts to reach consensus fail, a two thirds majority of members present and voting will suffice.			
<p>Forests for Life Partnership Year: 2019 Domicile: No information Typology: Policy Website: globalwildlife.org/project/forests-for-life</p>	<p>Forests for Life is a partnership that supports forest-centred, nature-based solutions to climate change and other development challenges. To do so, the partnership will work with policymakers to make the protection of the world's least-disturbed forests a priority for national governments in</p>	<p>The Forest for Life Partnership aims to 'halt and reverse forest degradation across one billion hectares of the most intact forests worldwide' to achieve global climate, biodiversity and sustainable-development targets.</p>	<p>UN Bodies; Philanthropies; International NGOs; Academic/Research Institutions</p>	<p>Not clear on their websites</p>	<p>No information</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Leadership</p>	<p>No information</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>meeting global climate, biodiversity and sustainable development targets, and mobilise new finances to support action to preserve the benefits from these forests, alongside their efforts to conserve forests that are highly threatened.</p> <p>In 2019, in parallel to the UN Secretary-General's Climate Action Summit, five organisations – Global Wildlife Conservation, Rainforest Foundation Norway, UN Development Programme (UNDP), Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) and World Resources Institute (WRI) –</p>						

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>launched the 'Forests for Life Partnership' in recognition of forests as a nature-based solution to climate change and biodiversity protection. The Partnership will focus on the Amazon, Congo Basin, New Guinea and the northern boreal zone as well as smaller, intact forests across Mesoamerica, Madagascar, and South and Southeast Asia. Efforts will include engaging Indigenous peoples in the management and conservation of forests and promoting policies to protect forests from degradation and fragmentation.</p>						

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Capitals Coalition Year: 2020 Domicile: s-Gravenhage, The Netherlands Typology: Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: capitalscoalition.org/</p>	<p>The Capitals Coalition (the Coalition) is a global collaboration transforming the way decisions are made by including the value provided by nature, people and society.</p> <p>The Coalition unites the Natural Capital Coalition and the Social & Human Capital Coalition to accelerate momentum, leverage success, connect powerful and engaged communities, and identify the areas, projects and partnerships where it can collectively deliver benefits for nature, people and the economy.</p> <p>Launched on January 2020 in Davos during the</p>	<p>To promote a systemic approach and integrated system: 'capitals approach' -- natural, social & economic that will measure the progress progress against the Sustainable Development Goals, climate and biodiversity targets; To provide decision makers with a lens to identify these connections between natural, economic & social, to contextualise non-financial information for organisations; To understand where there are synergies, trade-offs and opportunities to generate value for multiple stakeholders.; To bring to scale, package the</p>	<p>Anthesis, ABN AMRO, Business for Nature, Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB), Center for Safety & Health Sustainability, Economics For The Environment Consultancy (eftec), ERM, Green Economy Coalition, Global Green Growth Initiative, IDEEA Group, Impact Management Project (IMP), Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Kering, Little Blue Research, L'Oréal, Natural Capital Project, Netherlands Water Partnership, Novartis, Olam, PwC,</p>	<p>The Capitals Coalition has a two-tier governance system with the Management Board responsible for the governance and running of the day to day activities, and the Supervisory Board responsible for oversight and strategic direction.</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Leadership</p>	<p>Strategic Partner (UNEP); Leadership (ILO)</p>	<p>No information</p>

ENVIRONMENT

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>WEF week, the Capitals Coalition is a collaboration of over 350 of the world's leading organisations from business, accountancy, science and academia, membership organisations, standard setting, finance, policy and civil society, who have united in a pre-competitive space because they believe that the Coalition is a vehicle that can drive the global conversation and deliver desperately needed systemic change by bringing nature and people into the heart of decision making.</p>	<p>harmonised existing approaches to capitals thinking and practice for use by businesses and governments; To provide a pre-competitive space for multi-stakeholder collaboration.</p>	<p>Shitt, S&P Global, SustainValue, UN World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP WCMC), value balancing alliance (VBA), Wellbeing Economy Alliance, World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), WWF International, CE BDS; Academic/Research Institutions</p>				

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>GAVI, The Vaccine Alliance Year: 2000 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Project, Policy, Paradigmatic/Campaign, Financing Facility Website: gavi.org</p>	<p>GAVI, officially Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (previously the GAVI Alliance, and before that the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization) is a public-private global health partnership with the goal of increasing access to immunisation in poor countries.</p> <p>GAVI brings together developing country and donor governments, the World Health Organization, UNICEF, the World Bank, the vaccine industry in both industrialised and developing countries, research and technical agencies, civil society, the Bill &</p>	<p>To save lives, reduce poverty and protect the world against the threat of epidemics.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies (EU, Africa Union and others); Business/Industry (Developing Countries Vaccine Manufacturing Network (DCVMN); International Financial Institutions/DFIs (World Bank Group); CSOs (Global Financing Facility Civil Society Hub, USA, Save the Children) Philanthropies (BMGF, and others); Academic/Research Institutions ; UN bodies (WHO and others)</p> <p>Gavi has separate platforms for collaboration with CSOs (http://www.gavi-cso.org/)</p>	<p>Board of Directors; Secretariat</p> <p>The Gavi Board is responsible for strategic direction and policy-making, oversees the operations of the Vaccine Alliance and monitors programme implementation. The Board is comprised of 18 'representative' seats, nine seats for independent or 'unaffiliated' individuals and one seat for Gavi's CEO. Board has members from donor countries, developing countries, vaccine manufacturers from developing and developed countries and CSOs.</p> <p>UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Impelementer</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Impelementer</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate) Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), Gamers Without Borders, Soccer Aid; Business/Industries (Mastercard, Reed Hastings and Patty Quillin, TikTok, Transferwise); Northern donor govts (G8 Countries, Bhutan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Monaco and ors.); UN Bodies (WHO); Regional Bodies (OECD, EU); IFI/DFI-financed (World Bank Group); Investment Funds/Banks (The International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIM))</p>

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>Melinda Gates Foundation and other private philanthropists. GAVI has observer status at the World Health Assembly.</p> <p>By the late 1990s, the progress of international immunisation programmes was stalling. Nearly 30 million children in developing countries were not fully immunised against deadly diseases, and many others went without any immunisation at all.</p> <p>At the heart of the challenge was an acute market failure; powerful new vaccines were becoming available, but developing countries simply</p>			<p>and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation hold permanent seats on the Board. Constituency representatives serve on a time-limited basis.</p>			

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Fundors
	<p>could not afford most vaccines.</p> <p>In response, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and a group of founding partners brought to life an elegant solution to encourage manufacturers to lower vaccine prices for the poorest countries in return for long-term, high-volume and predictable demand from those countries.</p> <p>In 2000, that breakthrough idea became the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation – today Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.</p>						

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>GFATM Year: 2002 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Project, Policy, Paradigmatic/Campaign, Financing Facility Website: theglobalfund.org</p>	<p>The Global Fund is a partnership designed to accelerate the end of AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria as epidemics. As an international organisation, the Global Fund mobilises and invests more than \$4 billion a year to support programmes run by local experts in more than 100 countries. In partnership with governments, civil society, technical agencies, the private sector and people affected by the diseases, it is challenging barriers and embracing innovation.</p> <p>The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was created in 2002</p>	<p>To invest the world's money to defeat AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria epidemics.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts (G8 countries); Governments, Regional Bodies (EU); International NGOs; National NGOs; Affected communities; Business/Industry (Microsoft, Coca-Cola, Google etc); International Financial Institutions/DFIs (World Bank and others); Philanthropies (BMGF, CIFF, Rockefeller Foundation, Goodbye Malaria etc); Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies (WHO, UNICEF); Implementation partners (local organisations, CSOs, INGOs etc); Others (Faith-based organisations)</p>	<p>Governing Board; Country Coordinating Mechanism; Local Fund Agent; Office of the Inspector General; Principal Recipient; Staff; Technical Review Panel</p>	<p>Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Implementer</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Implementer</p>	<p>Northern donor govts (G8 countries); Governments; Regional Bodies (EU); Business/Industry (Microsoft, Coca-Cola, Google etc); International Financial Institutions/DFIs (World Bank and others); Philanthropies (Corporate) (BMGF, CIFF, Rockefeller Foundation, Goodbye Malaria etc); Investors/Banks; UN bodies (WHO, UNICEF)</p>

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>to raise, manage and invest the world's money to respond to three of the deadliest infectious diseases the world has ever known. The idea was discussed at a G8 summit in Okinawa, Japan, in 2000. The real commitment began to coalesce at the African Union summit in April 2001, continued at the United Nations General Assembly Special Session in June of that year, and was finally endorsed by the G8 at their summit in Genoa, Italy, in July 2001. A Transitional Working Group was established to determine the principles and working modalities of the new</p>						

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	organisation, and the Global Fund came into being in January 2002.						
<p>Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (PMNCH) Year: 2005 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Project, Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: who.int/pmnch/about/en/</p>	<p>PMNCH is the world's largest alliance for women's, children's and adolescents' health (WCAH), bringing together over 1,000 partner organisations across 192 countries. It provides a multistakeholder platform allowing these diverse organisations to align objectives, strategies and resources, and to amplify evidence for action to support the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including through</p>	<p>Addressing preventable maternal and child mortality, including newborn deaths and stillbirths, with a particular focus on humanitarian and fragile settings; addressing morbidity and mortality relating to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), as well as the politicization of SRHR and threats to rights and adolescent health and well-being.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Affected communities / Impacted Groups; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies; Implementation partners; Others</p>	<p>PMNHC Board; Partner's Forum; Steering Committee; Secretariat</p>	<p>Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Implementer</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate); Philanthropies (family); IFI/DFI-financed; Companies (business and corporate sector associations); Investment Funds/Banks; Northern donor govts; UN bodies</p>

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Fundors
	<p>universal health coverage and primary health care.</p> <p>PMNCH was launched in September 2005, when 50 organisations belonging to the Partnership for Safe Motherhood and Newborn Health, the Healthy Newborn Partnership and the Child Survival Partnership joined forces. The founding organisations agreed that by working together under one partnership they could do more to accelerate action by partners and countries to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 4 (reduce child mortality) and 5</p>						

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	(improve maternal health).						
<p>P4H Network for health financing and social health protection (P4H) Year: 2007 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland; Washington, DC, USA Typology: Policy, Paradigm Website: p4h.world/en</p>	<p>P4H is a global network dedicated to health financing and social health protection for universal health coverage through insight and knowledge brokerage, collaborative technical expertise; and policy dialogue.</p> <p>Since its inception in 2007, the P4H network has promoted active exchanges and collaborations between the various health financing stakeholders at national and global level to progress towards the MDG targets.</p>	<p>Efficient, equitable and sustainable health financing to put Universal Health Coverage (UHC) in the center of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International Financial Institutions/DFIs ; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies</p>	<p>No Information</p>	<p>No Information</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder</p>	<p>IFI/DFI-financed; Investment Funds/Banks; Northern donor govts; UN bodies</p>

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>UHC 2030 Year: 2007 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland; Washington, DC, USA Typology: Project, Policy, Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: csemonline.net</p>	<p>UHC2030 is the global movement to strengthen health systems for universal health coverage.</p> <p>UHC2030 is a multi-stakeholder platform that promotes collaborative working at global and country levels on health systems strengthening. It advocates increased political commitment to UHC and facilitates accountability and knowledge sharing.</p> <p>It started out as IHP+, an international partnership that aimed to improve effective development cooperation in health to help meet the</p>	<p>Strengthen health systems for UHC</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Affected communities / Impacted Groups; Professional Bodies; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>	<p>Steering Committee; UHC Movement Political Advisory Panel; Technical working groups; Civil Society Engagement Mechanism; Private Sector constituency; Related Initiatives Secretariat</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Implementer</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>IFI/DFI-financed; Northern donor govts; UN bodies</p>

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>Millennium Development Goals in 2007.</p> <p>In 2016, IHP+ transformed into UHC2030 to respond to the health-related Sustainable Development Goals and expanded its scope to include health systems strengthening to achieve universal health coverage.</p>						
<p>World Health Summit Year: 2009 Domicile: Berlin, Germany Typology: Policy, Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: endmalaria.org</p>	<p>The World Health Summit is one of the world's leading strategic forums for global health.</p> <p>Every October, the World Health Summit draws international experts from academia, politics, the private sector and civil society to Berlin. During the three-day summit, stakeholders and</p>	<p>To improve health worldwide. To bring together stakeholders from all sectors. To facilitate constructive exchange in an environment of academic freedom. To strengthen international cooperation. To find answers to major health challenges. To set health agendas.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>	<p>President; WHS foundation Board; Scientific Committee; Ambassadors; Members; Secretariat</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Leadership; Member; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate); Self-generated revenue (certification fees, membership fees, selling of services, subsidies); IFI/DFI-financed; Companies (business and corporate sector associations); Northern donor govts</p>

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>decision-makers from 100 countries and every field in healthcare work together to find solutions to global health challenges and set the agenda for a healthier future.</p> <p>The World Health Summit was founded in 2009 on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of Berlin's Charité Hospital and is traditionally held under the patronage of the German Chancellor, the President of the Republic of France, the President of the European Commission, and the Director-General of the World Health Organization.</p>						

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>In addition to the World Health Summit in Berlin, there are annual Regional Meetings and regular Expert Meetings around the world. These meetings are organised by the M8 Alliance, the academic backbone of the World Health Summit.</p>						
<p>United Nations Interagency Task Force on the Prevention and Control of NCDs (UNIATF) Year: 2013 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Project, Policy Website: who.int/pmnch/en/</p>	<p>The Task Force supports governments to meet high-level commitments made at the United Nations General Assembly and the World Health Assembly, including the WHO Global NCD Action Plan 2013–2030. The Task Force was established by the UN Secretary-General in June 2013 and placed under WHO's</p>	<p>To bring the United Nations system and other inter-governmental organisations together to support governments meet the NCD-related SDG targets, including mental health.</p>	<p>Membership of the Task Force will be open to United Nations system agencies, funds and programmes, international financial institutions, development banks and other key intergovernmental organisations and treaty secretariats.</p>	<p>Governing Board; Secretariat</p>	<p>Advisory Group; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>WHO (UN Bodies)</p>

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	leadership. It reports each year to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.						
<p>Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) Year: 2014 Domicile: Not fixed; keeps moving with the Country Chair of the GHSA Typology: Policy Website: ghsagenda.org</p>	<p>The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) is a group of 69 countries, international organisations and non-government organisations, and private sector companies that have come together to achieve the vision of a world safe and secure from global health threats posed by infectious diseases.</p> <p>It was launched in February 2014, in response to the global threat that infectious diseases constitute in our increasingly interconnected</p>	<p>Enhance country capacities to prevent, detect and respond to infectious diseases; emphasise global health security as a national leader-level priority and galvanise high-level commitments to global health security; promote multi-sectoral engagement and collaboration; focus on common, measurable targets</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>	<p>Steering Committee; Secretariat; Working Groups The GHSA is governed by a Steering Group comprised of approximately 15 countries, international organisations, and/or non-governmental stakeholders. Permanent Steering Group Members (2019 – 2023) Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Korea, Senegal, Thailand, the United States, GHSA Consortium (GHSAC), Private Sector Round Table (PSRT)</p>	<p>Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner;</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner;</p>	<p>IFI/DFI-financed; Companies (business and corporate sector associations); Investment Funds/Banks; Northern donor govts; UN bodies; Governments</p>

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>world. In the past, outbreaks such as SARS (2002), H1N1 influenza (2009), MERS-CoV (2012), H7N9 influenza (2013) and Ebola (2014) have had devastating human, security and economic impacts at the country, regional and global levels.</p> <p>The G7 endorsed the GHSA in June 2014, and Finland and Indonesia hosted commitment development meetings to spur action in May and August.</p>			<p>Rotating Steering Group Members (2019 – 2020) Argentina, Australia, Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, the World Bank Permanent Advisors : WHO, FAO and OIE, hold the role of Permanent Advisor. Time-limited Task Forces / MSI forums</p>			
<p>Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents (GFF) Year: 2015 Domicile: Washington, DC, USA Typology:</p>	<p>The Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents (GFF) is a multi-stakeholder global partnership housed at the World Bank. It is</p>	<p>To support low and lower-middle income countries with catalytic financing and technical assistance to develop and implement prioritised</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Affected communities; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs</p>	<p>Board of Directors; Secretariat</p>	<p>Conveners, Leadership, Member, Funder, Implementer</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate) (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; the Susan T. Buffett Foundation, Laerdal Global Health; MSD for Mothers and the Rockefeller Foundation);</p>

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Project, Policy, Paradigmatic/Campaign, Financing Facility Website: globalfinancingfacility.org</p>	<p>squarely focused on prioritising and scaling up evidence-driven investments to improve reproductive, maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health and nutrition through targeted strengthening of primary health care systems – to save lives and as a critical first step toward accelerating progress on Universal Health Coverage (UHC) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).</p> <p>Launched in July 2015, the GFF supports 36 low- and lower-middle income countries with catalytic financing and technical assistance to</p>	<p>national health plans to scale up access to affordable, quality care for women, children and adolescents</p>	<p>; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions</p>				<p>Self-generated revenue (certification fees, membership fees, selling of services, subsidies); IFI/DFI-financed (World Bank); Business/Industry (business and corporate sector associations); Others (GAVI, Global Fund, GFF); Northern donor govts (European Commission, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, and the United Kingdom); Governments (Governments of Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire) UN bodies (WHO)</p>

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	develop and implement prioritised national health plans to scale up access to affordable, quality care for women, children and adolescents.						
Global Health Workforce Network Year: 2016 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Project, Policy Website: who.int/hrh/network/en	The Global Health Workforce Network was established in 2016, following a request by select Member States and building on a proposal by the Board of the Global Health Workforce Alliance. It succeeded the Alliance. The Network operates within WHO as a global mechanism for stakeholder consultation, dialogue and coordination on comprehensive and coherent health workforce policies in	<p>Engagement - To inform and maintain high-level political engagement in support of the implementation of the Global Strategy.</p> <p>Dialogue - To provide forum for multi-sector and multi stakeholder agenda setting, best practice sharing and harmonisation and alignment of international support to human resources for health (HRH).</p> <p>Effective implementation - To foster global</p>	Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Affected communities; Trade Unions; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies; Implementation partners; Others - Professional associations	Core Team; Thematic Hub; Strategic Advisory group; Secretariat	Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder	Leadership; Member; Strategic Partner; Implementers	UN Bodies (WHO)

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>support of the implementation of the Global Strategy on Human Resources for Health and the recommendations the Commission.</p> <p>(See Global Health Workforce Alliance)</p>	<p>monitoring and mutual accountability on international HRH goals, targets and commitments.</p>					
<p>Health Data Collaborative (HDC) Year: 2016 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Project, Policy, Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: healthdatacollaborative.org</p>	<p>HDC is a collaborative platform that leverages and aligns technical and financial resources (at all levels) to country-owned strategies and plans for collecting, storing, analysing and using data to improve health outcomes, with specific focus on SDG targets and communities that are left behind.</p>	<p>To strengthen country capacity to plan, implement, monitor and review progress and standardised processes for data collection, availability, analysis and use to achieve national health related targets (and therefore eventual SDG health targets);</p> <p>To improve efficiency and alignment of technical and financial</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>	<p>Broad Global Partners Group; Constituency-based Stakeholder Representative Group; Secretariat; Multi-agency Working Groups (WGs). More details accessible here</p> <p>https://www.healthdatacollaborative.org/fileadmin/uploads/hdc/Documents/2020/1_1_SESSION_1_HDC_Governance_document_FIN_ALdraft.pdf</p>	<p>Member, Advisory Group</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate); IFI/DFI-financed; Investment Funds/Banks; Northern donor govts; UN bodies</p>

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>The Health Data Collaborative (HDC) was launched in March 2016 following a 2015 high-level summit on Measurement and Accountability for Results in Health, endorsement in a 2015 Roadmap for Health Measurement and Accountability and a 5-Point Call to action.</p>	<p>investments in health data systems through collective actions;</p> <p>To increase the impact of global public goods and tools on country health data systems through increased sharing, learning and country engagement.</p>					
<p>Health Systems Governance Collaborative Year: 2016 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Project Website: hsgovcollab.org/en</p>	<p>The Collaborative is a group of practitioners, policy makers, academics, civil society representatives, agencies, decision-makers and other committed citizens seeking to connect and engage about important health systems</p>	<p>To focus on 'actionable governance', governance that addresses real challenges in health systems with a focus on the Universal Health Coverage.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Business/Industry; Academic/Research Institutions; UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>	<p>Not clear and still evolving. A Secretariat is hosted within the WHO and initial funding was provided by BMGF.</p>	<p>Member and implementer</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate) Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation</p>

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>governance issues.</p> <p>The Collaborative fosters creative and safe spaces to address the health systems governance challenges (such as corruption, power inequities, lack of capacities, gross mismanagement, poor distribution of knowledge and resources and unequal access to health) and promote real impact on the ground.</p> <p>Following a series of international consultations throughout 2016 and in early 2017 on the importance of governance to achieving UHC, a special meeting was convened by</p>						

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	WHO in Brussels on 24 March 2017, devoted to creating the Constitutive Forum of the Collaborative and discussing the Collaborative's workplan 2017-2019. Since then the plan has developed and for now focuses on the governance capacities of the Ministry of Health and Governance frameworks and measures of governance in health systems.						
<p>CEPI Year: 2017 Domicile: Washington, DC, USA; Oslo, Norway; London, UK. Typology: Project, Policy, Paradigmatic/Campaign, Financing Facility Website: cepi.net</p>	CEPI is a global partnership between public, private, philanthropic and civil society organisations, which is working together to accelerate the development of vaccines against emerging infectious	To accelerate the development of vaccines against emerging infectious diseases and enable equitable access to these vaccines for people during outbreaks.	Northern donor govts; Governments; Regional Bodies; International NGOs; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies Corporate; Academic/Research Institutions;	The primary governing body is the Board, which has 12 voting members (four investors and eight independent members representing competencies including industry, global health, science,	Initiator/Convener; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Implementer	Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Implementer	Northern donor govts; Governments; Regional Bodies; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies Corporate; Academic/Research Institutions; UN bodies

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>diseases and enable equitable access to these vaccines for people during outbreaks.</p> <p>CEPI was founded in 2017 at World Economic Forum annual meeting in Davos by the governments of Norway and India, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Wellcome, and the World Economic Forum.</p>		<p>UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>	<p>resource mobilisation, finance) and five observers. All investors are invited to join our Investors Council, which nominates Investor representatives to the Board and has some rights including approval any single investments over \$100 million.</p> <p>Two additional bodies support and guide CEPI's work: the Scientific Advisory Committee is the principal scientific advisory group to the Board and Secretariat and the Joint Coordination Group works with critical external stakeholders to advance CEPI's</p>			

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
				portfolio of vaccines.			
<p>ACT - A Year: 2020 Domicile: Global but mostly North Typology: Project, Policy, Paradigmatic/Campaign, Financing Facility Website: who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator</p>	<p>The Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, is a global collaboration to accelerate development, production and equitable access to COVID-19 tests, treatments and vaccines.</p> <p>Launched at the end of April 2020, at an event co-hosted by the Director-General of the World Health Organization, the President of France, the President of the European Commission, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT)</p>	<p>To speed up an end to the pandemic by supporting the development and equitable distribution of the tests, treatments and vaccines the world needs to reduce mortality and severe disease, restoring full societal and economic activity globally in the near term, and facilitating high-level control of Covid-19 disease in the medium term.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments; Regional Bodies; International NGOs; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies Corporate; Academic/Research Institutions; UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>	<p>The ACT-Accelerator is co-convened by leading global health organisations through adherence to a single framework for collaboration. The framework, consisting of three pillars supported by a Health Systems Connector and a country Allocation & Access workstream, facilitates joint problem-solving and knowledge sharing. Each ACT-Accelerator Pillar is managed by two to three partner agencies working together. 1. The Vaccines Pillar – also known as</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Implementer</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner;</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies Corporate; Academic/Research Institutions; UN bodies</p>

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>Accelerator brings together governments, scientists, businesses, civil society, and philanthropists and global health organisations (the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, CEPI, FIND, Gavi, The Global Fund, Unitaid, Wellcome, the WHO, and the World Bank).</p>			<p>COVAX – is co-convened by the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, and the World Health Organization (WHO), with UNICEF as a key delivery partner.</p> <p>2. The Diagnostics Pillar is co-convened by the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND) and the Global Fund, with WHO leading on regulatory policy, product procurement and allocation, and country access and support, while supporting R&D efforts.</p> <p>3. The Therapeutics Pillar is co-convened by Unitaid and the Wellcome Trust,</p>			

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
				<p>with WHO leading the policy and regulatory work, and the Global Fund leading work on procurement and deployment. 4. The Health Systems Connector (HSC) is co-convened by the Global Fund, the World Bank and WHO, with support from The Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents (GFF). 5. The Access & Allocation workstream is led by WHO and directs ACT-Accelerator's work on global equitable access and allocation. Civil Society and community engagement is integrated across all the pillars.</p>			

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>COVAX Year: 2020 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Project, Policy, Paradigmatic/Campaign, Financing Facility Website: gavi.org/covax-facility</p>	<p>COVAX is one of three pillars of the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, which was launched in April 2020 by the World Health Organization (WHO), the European Commission and France in response to this pandemic. Bringing together governments, global health organisations, manufacturers, scientists, private sector, civil society and philanthropy, with the aim of providing innovative and equitable access to COVID-19 diagnostics, treatments and vaccines. COVAX is co-led by Gavi, the Coalition for Epidemic</p>	<p>To accelerate the development and manufacture of COVID-19 vaccines, and to guarantee fair and equitable access for every country in the world.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments; Regional Bodies (EU, Africa Union and others); Business/Industry (Vaccine manufactures); International Financial Institutions/DFIs (World Bank Group); Philanthropies (BMGF, and others); Academic/Research Institutions (CEPI and others); UN bodies (WHO and others)</p>	<p>Coordination Committee Mechanism; Working Groups; Secretariat</p> <p>The CCM is the high-level body that meets to coordinate efforts across the different elements of COVAX, the vaccines pillar of the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator. The CCM is chaired by the Board Chairs of CEPI and Gavi, and includes the institutional leads of all three organisations, providing a link to the established governance of each organisation. It meets to help coordinate, guide and resolve issues across COVAX.</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Implementer</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner;</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate) (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), Gamers Without Borders, Soccer Aid); Business/Industries (Mastercard, Reed Hastings and Patty Quillin, TikTok, Transferwise); Northern donor govts (G8 Countries, Bhutan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Monaco and others.); UN Bodies (WHO); Regional Bodies (OECD, EU); IFI/DFI-financed (World Bank Group)</p>

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and WHO.			In addition three separate workstreams have been developed where members of the industry, philanthropy, government, foundations and all are represented and have say in policy, fund allocation and so on. Full details are here: https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/covax/COVAX_the-Vaccines-Pillar-of-the-Access-to-COVID-19-Tools-ACT-Accelerator.pdf			
IMPACT (International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce) Year: 2006-2011 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Policy	IMPACT was a partnership of all the major anti-counterfeiting players, including: international organisations, non-governmental organisations,	To fight a thriving multimillion-dollar illegal trade in counterfeit drugs, vaccines and other medical products.	Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; Trade Unions / Professional Bodies; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs	General Assembly/Assembly of Delegates; Secretariat; Working Groups	Member; Strategic Partner; Implementer	Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder	Northern donor govts; Governments; UN bodies; Others

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Website: who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/impact-faqwa.pdf wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/enforcement/en/third_global_congress/third_global_congress_ref_z.pdf apps.who.int/gb/SF/</p>	<p>enforcement agencies, pharmaceutical manufacturers associations and drug and regulatory authorities to stop the counterfeiting of medicines.</p> <p>WHO organised an international conference in Rome, 16–18 February 2006, which was attended by representatives of 57 national medicines regulatory authorities, seven international organisations, and 12 international associations of patients, health professionals, pharmaceutical manufacturers and wholesalers. The Declaration of Rome was adopted by all</p>		<p>; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>				

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>160 participants and stated that WHO should take the lead in establishing a taskforce, the purpose of which would be to lead international collaboration on combating counterfeit medicines. The task force was named the International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT) and defined as a voluntary coalition of stakeholders that coordinates international activities aimed at combating counterfeit medical products for the purpose of protecting public health.</p>						

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Global Health Workforce Alliance Year: 2006–2016 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Project, Policy Website: who.int/workforcealliance/en/</p>	<p>The Global Health Workforce Alliance (The Alliance) was created in 2006 as a common platform for action to address the crisis. The Alliance is a partnership of national governments, civil society, international agencies, finance institutions, researchers, educators and professional associations dedicated to identifying, implementing and advocating for solutions. Since its inception in 2006, the Alliance has acted as a global convener mobilising worldwide attention to the human resources for health (HRH)</p>	<p>Access for all to a skilled, motivated and supported health worker.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Affected communities; Trade Unions; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies; Implementation partners; Others - Professional associations</p> <p>Full list of members can be accessed here: https://www.who.int/workforcealliance/members_list/en/</p>	<p>Board of Directors; Secretariat; Task Force; Working Groups</p> <p>Governance is overseen by a Board with a broad representation of stakeholders. The Secretariat, administered by WHO, as hosting partner, has a small core group of professionals driving and coordinating the implementation of 'The Alliance Strategic Plan' and the 'Kampala Declaration and Agenda of Action'. The Secretariat reports directly to the Board for programmatic results and to WHO for administration of personnel and financial matters.</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Implementers</p>	<p>Leadership; Member; Strategic Partner; Implementers</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments; Regional Bodies; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; UN bodies; Implementation partners; Self-generated revenue (Doctors Association)</p> <p>Full list of partners / funders can be accessed here: https://www.who.int/workforcealliance/members_partners/partners/en/</p>

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>crisis and generating political will and action for positive change.</p> <p>The report of the Joint Learning Initiative (JLI) on Human Resources for Health (HRH), supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, launched in 2002, brought together 100 health professionals and experts from academia, countries and international agencies to examine the problem in greater depth, was published in 2004, and succeeded in shining the torch on the crisis. This was concurrent with the series of High-Level Fora on Health MDGs</p>						

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>which provided further impetus. There were three consecutive annual World Health Assembly resolutions calling for international action to resolve the crisis.</p> <p>The decision to create a new global partnership - the Alliance - to address the health workforce crisis was taken during a Consultation held in Oslo in February 2005, where a special technical working group was formed. Soon after, WHO former Director-General Dr Lee Jong-wook appointed Dr Francis Omaswa, from Uganda, as Special Advisor to the Director-General on HRH</p>						

HEALTH

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	and invited him to come to WHO headquarters in Geneva to set up the Alliance. The Alliance was officially launched on 25 May 2006, during the 59th World Health Assembly in Geneva.						

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Alliance for Affordable Internet Year: 2013 Domicile: Washington, DC, USA Typology: High-impact Standard, Policy, Project, Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: a4ai.org</p>	<p>The Alliance for Affordable Internet (A4AI), hosted by the World Wide Web Foundation, is an initiative to make the Internet more affordable to people around the world. It was created with the goal of obtaining global broadband internet access priced at less than 5 per cent of average per capita income globally; the target of the UN Broadband Commission. It cites the lack of investment in infrastructure, competition in the market and inefficient taxation, amongst other policy and regulatory obstacles, as being major constraints to reducing prices.</p>	<p>To reduce broadband prices and enable the billions still offline around the world to afford Internet access.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>	<p>Advisory Council; Secretariat</p> <p>The Advisory Council is the non-fiduciary governing body of A4AI. Led by the A4AI Honorary Chair, the 12 voting members of the Advisory Council come equally from the private, public, and civil society sectors, and provide oversight, strategic direction, and high-level decision making for the Alliance.</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Member</p>	<p>Self-generated revenue (certification fees, membership fees, selling of services, subsidies); IFI/DFI-financed; Companies (business and corporate sector associations); Investment Funds/Banks; Northern gov'ts/donors</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	The initiative was officially launched on October 7, 2013, at the 'Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisation Forum' in Abuja, Nigeria.						
<p>Broadband Commission for sustainable development Year: 2010 Domicile: Paris, France; Geneva, Switzerland Typology: High-impact Standard, Policy, Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: broadbandcommission.org</p>	<p>Broadband Commission for Digital Development was established with the aim of boosting the importance of broadband on the international policy agenda, and expanding broadband access in every country as key to accelerating progress towards national and international development targets. It defines practical ways in which countries — at all stages of development — can achieve this, in cooperation with the private</p>	<p>To engage in high-level advocacy to promote broadband in developing countries and underserved communities.</p> <p>To advocate for higher priority to be given to the development of broadband infrastructure and services.</p> <p>To ensure that the benefits of this technology is realised in all countries.</p> <p>That governments and industry need to work together,</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies</p>	<p>Co-chairs; Commissioners/Members</p>	<p>Leadership; Member; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate); Companies (business and corporate sector associations); UN bodies</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>sector. Following adoption of the UN's Sustainable Development Goals in September 2015, the Commission works to showcase and document the power of ICT and broadband-based technologies for sustainable development. It brings together a high-powered community, including top CEO and industry leaders, senior policy-makers and government representatives, international agencies, academia and organizations concerned with development. The Commission embraces a range of different perspectives in a multi-stakeholder approach to</p>	<p>hand-in-hand, to devise strategies for driving the roll-out of these networks much more proactively.</p>					

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>promoting the roll-out of broadband, as well as providing a fresh approach to UN and business engagement.</p> <p>The Commission was established in 2010 by ITU and UNESCO in response to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's call to step-up UN efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In September 2015 the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as the international policy framework for socio-economic development and poverty reduction. While the MDGs</p>						

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>included just eight goals, and very little reference to technology, broadband or ICT, proposed SDGs are considerably more detailed, and cover 17 goals, with more than 150 targets. Overall, ICT specific targets are included in four of the 17 goals, however, there are no fewer than 38 other targets whose achievement will depend upon universal and affordable access to ICT and Broadband. Amongst the related science and technology targets are references to the internet, infrastructure, innovation, information access, increased</p>						

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	efficiency, early warning, disaster risk management, knowledge sharing and data.						
<p>Christchurch Call Year: 2019 Domicile: Christchurch , New Zealand Typology: Policy, Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: christchurchcall.com</p>	<p>The Christchurch Call is a commitment by governments and tech companies to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online. It rests on the conviction that a free, open and secure internet offers extraordinary benefits to society. Respect for freedom of expression is fundamental. However, no one has the right to create and share terrorist and violent extremist content online.</p> <p>On 15 March 2019, people</p>	<p>To bring together a wide range of actors with influence including governments, civil society and online service providers, such as social media companies, to build free, open and secure internet and to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Business/Industry; Academic/Research Institutions; UN bodies</p>	<p>Advisory Network; Secretariat</p>	<p>Member; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Member; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Northern gov'ts/donors</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>looked on in horror as, for 17 minutes, a terrorist attack against two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, was live streamed. 51 people were killed and 50 injured and the live stream was viewed some 4,000 times before being removed. Two months later to the day, on 15 May 2019, New Zealand Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, and French President, Emmanuel Macron, brought together Heads of State and Government and leaders from the tech sector to adopt the Christchurch Call.</p>						

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Contract for the Web Year: 2018 Domicile: Washington, DC, USA Typology: Standards Website: contractfortheweb.org</p>	<p>The Contract for the Web is a global action plan to address threats to an open web and to keep it safe and empowering for everyone. It guides the digital policy agendas of governments and the decisions of companies as they build tomorrow's web technologies. It sets standards, rooted in human rights, for the development and implementation of new technologies, and the policies and laws needed to support them. It brings together the core parties shaping the future of the web — governments, companies and civic groups — around a shared set of</p>	<p>To make sure our online world is safe, empowering and genuinely for everyone.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Business/Industry; Academic/Research Institutions; Implementation partners</p>	<p>Core Group; Working Group; Secretariat</p> <p>The process is being guided by a core group of 10 which meets regularly to coordinate and plan for the contract's success.</p> <p>Governments: France, Germany; Civil Society: Wikimedia, Avaaz, CIPESA, Web Foundation, The NewNow; Companies: Pango (formerly known as AnchorFree), Google, Microsoft.</p> <p>Five working groups formed to turn these principles into concrete commitments included in the final Contract: 1) Access, 2) Openness, 3)</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner; Implementer</p>	<p>Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate); Self-generated revenue (certification fees, membership fees, selling of services, subsidies); IFI/DFI-financed; Companies (business and corporate sector associations); Investment Funds/Banks; Northern gov'ts/donors</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>commitments that are rooted in human rights, setting out concrete actions they and individual web users must take to build a web that works for all humanity.</p> <p>In November 2018, Sir Tim Berners-Lee announced a project to build a new Contract for the Web that would bring governments, companies and citizens together around a shared set of commitments to build a better web. In January 2019, over 80 signatories to the contract principles debated and negotiated the full details and commitments to be outlined in the full Contract.</p>			<p>Privacy & Data Rights, 4) Positive Tech 5) Public Action Representation of the working group : 35 per cent of working group members come from the private sector, 50 per cent from CSOs, and the remaining 15 per cent from government; 30 per cent come from the Global South.</p>			

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	That process was informed by a public consultation with input from more than 600 people, including policy experts. In July 2019, it published the first draft text of the Contract for the Web.						
<p>Digital Public Goods Year: 2019 Domicile: No information Typology: High-impact Standard, Policy Website: digitalpublicgoods.net</p>	The Digital Public Goods Alliance is a multi-stakeholder initiative to accelerate the attainment of the sustainable development goals in low- and middle-income countries by facilitating the discovery, development, use of, and investment in digital public goods. It defines digital public goods as: 'open source software, open data, open AI models, open	To identify and source open-source solutions that contribute to an equitable world through the creation of a shared standard for DPGs and a fair, open registry.	Northern donor govts; Governments; International NGOs; Business/Industry; Academic/Research Institutions; UN bodies	<p>Secretariat</p> <p>The Secretariat of the Digital Public Goods Alliance is co-hosted by UNICEF and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) and governed by an Interim Strategy Group consisting of: The Government of Sierra Leone; The Government of Norway; iSPIRT; and UNICEF.</p>	Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Strategic Partner	Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Observer; Strategic Partner	Northern gov'ts/donors; UN bodies; Governments

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>standards and open content that adhere to privacy and other applicable laws and best practices, do no harm, and help attain the SDGs'.</p> <p>Incubated by Norway and The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the DPGA relies on engagement and leadership from key pathfinder countries, private sector technology experts, government and philanthropic donors, implementing organisations and innovation groups across the UN system.</p>						
<p>Electronic World Trade Platform (EWTP) Year: 2019 Domicile: Hangzhou, China Typology: High-</p>	<p>Electronic World Trade Platform (EWTP) is a private sector-led and multi-stakeholder initiative, for</p>	<p>To promote public-private cooperation to improve the business environment and incubate future</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Business/Industry; Investors/Banks; UN bodies;</p>	<p>No Information</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder</p>	<p>Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Companies (business and corporate sector associations)</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>impact Standard, Policy Website: digitalpublicgoods.net</p>	<p>public-private cooperation to incubate eTrade rules and foster a more effective and efficient policy and business environment for cross border electronic trade (including both B2B and B2C) development.</p> <p>The eWTP initiative was proposed in 2016 by Jack Ma, founder of the e-commerce powerhouse Alibaba.</p> <p>It aims to promote public-private dialogue to improve the policy and business environment to enable small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to participate in cross-border electronic trade.</p>	<p>rules for cross border eTrade in some key areas, including simplification of regulations and standards, and harmonisation of taxation.</p> <p>To cooperate with international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) in order to prioritize eTrade development needs and enhance eTrade articles in the WTO's Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA).</p> <p>To incubate e-Trade rules and foster a more effective and efficient policy and business environment for cross border electronic trade</p>	<p>Implementation partners</p>				

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
		(e)Trade development.					
<p>Geneva Dialogue on Responsible Behaviour in Cyberspace Year: 2018 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: High-impact Standard, Policy Website: genevadialogue.ch</p>	<p>The Geneva Dialogue on Responsible Behaviour in Cyberspace aims to map the roles and responsibilities of actors – states, the business sector, civil society, and the academic and tech communities – in contributing to greater security and stability in cyberspace in the context of international peace and security; identify good practices and possible gaps in existing efforts; and, ideally put forward recommendation</p>	<p>To convene global business sector actors to discuss responsible behaviour in cyberspace.</p> <p>To assist the business sector to develop its capacities to understand, follow, and meaningfully contribute to international policy and diplomatic processes</p> <p>To facilitate dialogue among global businesses towards shaping principles and an action plan contributing to the global efforts at the UN and elsewhere.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; International NGOs; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs ; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies</p>	<p>Partners; Secretariat</p>	<p>Member; Observer; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Northern gov'ts/donors</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>s for overcoming such gaps. It was established by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.</p> <p>This forum is building on the work done by its predecessors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cybersecurity Tech Accord. 2018. Microsoft. The need for a Digital Geneva Convention. 2017. Microsoft. Charter of Trust for a Secure Digital World. 2018. Siemens. Digital Security & Due Process: Modernizing Cross-Border Government Access Standards for the Cloud Era. 2017. Google. IoT Cybersecurity Alliance. 2017. AT&T, IBM, Nokia, Palo Alto Networks, Symantec and TruSonic 						

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace. 2018. Government of France and Microsoft.</p> <p>Manifesto for a New Digital Deal. 2018. Telefonica.</p> <p>Digital Peace Now Campaign. 2018. Microsoft.</p> <p>Position Paper on Cybersecurity. 2019. Huawei.</p> <p>Global Transparency Initiative. 2018. Kaspersky.</p>						
<p>Geneva Internet Platform</p> <p>Year: 2014</p> <p>Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland</p> <p>Typology: Policy</p> <p>Website: giplatform.org</p>	<p>The Geneva Internet Platform (GIP), provides a neutral and inclusive space for digital policy debates, recognised by the majority of global actors as a platform where different views can be voiced. It serves permanent missions based in Geneva with</p>	<p>To provide a neutral and inclusive space for policy discussions</p> <p>To undertake digital policy monitoring and analysis</p> <p>To provide capacity development</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; Business/Industry; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; UN bodies</p>	<p>Steering Committee; Secretariat</p>	<p>Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Northern gov'ts/donors</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>tailored briefings and briefings on developments in Geneva IG politics. The GIP also works to strengthen the participation of small and developing countries (including those which - due to limited resources - have no permanent representations in the city) in Geneva-based digital policy processes, and supports the digital policy initiatives of Geneva-based institutions. The support includes tailored individual consultations, and online meetings to maximise resource use. The GIP facilitates research for an evidence-based,</p>						

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>multidisciplinary digital policy approach beyond existing policy silos, and provides tools and methods for in situ and online engagements that can be used in other policy spaces in International Geneva and worldwide.</p> <p>Geneva is one of the main hubs where digital policies are debated, evaluated and adopted. It is a hub where innovations are fostered, where policies are debated, where leaders, experts and decision-makers meet regularly - and a place where solutions are born and implemented.</p> <p>More than 50 per</p>						

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>cent of digital policy issues are addressed in Geneva. However, many developing countries don't have enough resources to engage in these discussions and deliberations GIP was created to fill this vacuum.</p>						
<p>Global Commission on Stability in Cyberspace Year: 2017-2019 Domicile: The Hague, The Netherlands Typology: High-impact Standard, Policy Website: cyberstability.org</p>	<p>The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) was set up to promote mutual awareness and understanding among the various cyberspace communities working on issues related to international cybersecurity. It was tasked with holding dialogues on international security with the new communities</p>	<p>To develop proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies</p>	<p>Co-chairs; Advisory Group; Commissioners; Secretariat</p>	<p>Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate); Companies (business and corporate sector associations); Northern gov'ts/donors; UN bodies</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	created by cyberspace and contribute to supporting policy and norms coherence related to the security and stability in and of cyberspace.						
<p>Global Conference on Cyberspace Year: 2011 Domicile: No fixed location Typology: High-impact Standard, Policy Website: No fixed web link</p>	<p>Global Conference on Cyber Space (GCCS) is a prestigious global event where international leaders, policymakers, industry experts, think tanks, cyber wizards, etc., gather to deliberate on issues and challenges for optimally using cyber space. GCCS was launched with a view to establish internationally agreed 'rules of the road' for behaviour in cyberspace, and create a more</p>	<p>The goal of GCCS 2017 is to promote an inclusive Cyber Space with focus on policies and frameworks for inclusivity, sustainability, development, security, safety and freedom, technology and partnerships for upholding digital democracy, maximising collaboration for strengthening security and safety and advocating dialogue for digital diplomacy.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies</p>	<p>Advisory Body; Secretariat</p>	<p>Leadership; Member; Funder; Observer; Strategic Partner;</p>	<p>Leadership; Member; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate); Self-generated revenue (certification fees, membership fees, selling of services, subsidies); IFI/DFI-financed; Companies (business and corporate sector associations); Northern gov'ts/donors</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>focused and inclusive dialogue between all those with a stake in the internet (governments, civil society and industry) on how to implement them. the 'London Process', ad hoc multi-stakeholder conferences held so far in London (2011), Budapest (2012), Seoul (2013), The Hague (2015) and New Delhi (2017). The Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, established after the 2015 Conference, is a platform for identifying best practices and providing support to states, the private sector and organisations in developing cybersecurity</p>						

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>frameworks, policies and skills.</p> <p>The first edition of GCCS was held in London in 2011. The conference witnessed a participation of 700 global delegates and helped in setting up rules and guidelines for the subsequent editions. The second conference was held in 2012 in Budapest with focus on relationship between internet rights and internet security which was attended by 700 delegates from nearly 60 countries. The third edition of GCCS was held in 2013 in Seoul focusing on Open and Secure Cyberspace with</p>						

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>participation from 1600 delegates. The fourth version - GCCS 2015 was held in The Hague, Netherlands. Nearly 1800 members from about 100 countries participated in this conference and over 60 countries participated with delegations led at Ministerial level. The scale and importance of GCCS has grown significantly over successive conferences. An institutional mechanism GFCE (Global Forum on Cyber Expertise) was set up to enhance Capacity Building.</p>						

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Global Forum on Cyber Expertise Year: 2015 Domicile: The Hague, The Netherlands Typology: Policy, Project Website: thegfce.org</p>	<p>The GFCE is a multi-stakeholder community of more than 115 members and partners from all regions of the world, aiming to strengthen cyber capacity and expertise globally. It endeavours to be a pragmatic, action-orientated and flexible platform for international collaboration, reducing overlap and duplication of efforts in the cyber capacity building ecosystem to ensure an open, free, peaceful and secure digital world.</p> <p>The GFCE was established during the 2015 Global Conference on Cyber Space in the Hague to</p>	<p>The current focus of the GFCE is three-fold: coordinating regional and global cyber capacity projects and initiatives; sharing knowledge and expertise by recommending tools and publications; and matching individual needs for cyber capacities to offers of support from the community as a clearing house function.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs ; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>	<p>Governing Board; Advisory Board; Working Groups; Secretariat</p>	<p>Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Member; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate); IFI/DFI-financed; Companies (business and corporate sector associations); Northern gov'ts/donors; Governments</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>strengthen cyber capacity building and coordinate existing international efforts more effectively. It was launched by the Dutch Government along with 41 ministers and other high-level representatives from business and international organisations.</p> <p>In its formative years, the GFCE was focused on building a strong network and raising awareness to existing global capacity building projects and programs. During this time, the GFCE structured its work around practical initiatives that were developed under the GFCE umbrella.</p>						

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>In 2017, at the Global Conference on Cyber Space in New Delhi, the GFCE positioned itself as the coordinating platform for cyber capacity building by developing the Global Agenda for Cyber Capacity Building. After a year of conducting extensive consultations and research, the entire GFCE unanimously endorsed the Delhi Communique, which prioritises 11 topics under five broad themes on cyber capacity building.</p>						

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism Year: 2017 Domicile: Washington, DC, USA Typology: High-impact Standard, Policy, Project Website: gifct.org</p>	<p>The Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism brings together the technology industry, government, civil society, and academia to foster collaboration and information-sharing to counter terrorist and violent extremist activity online.</p> <p>Founded by Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube in 2017, the Forum was designed to foster technical collaboration among member companies, advance relevant research, and share knowledge with smaller platforms. Since 2017, GIFCT's membership has expanded beyond</p>	<p>To empower a broad range of technology companies, independently and collectively, with processes and tools to prevent and respond to abuse of their platforms by terrorists and violent extremists.</p> <p>To enable multi-stakeholder engagement around terrorist and violent extremist misuse of the Internet and encourage stakeholders to meet key commitments consistent with the GIFCT mission.</p> <p>To promote civil dialogue online and empower efforts to direct positive alternatives to the messages of terrorists and violent</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Business/Industry; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>	<p>Advisory Committee; Operating Board; Secretariat</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Observer; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate); Companies (business and corporate sector associations)</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>the founding companies to include over a dozen diverse platforms committed to cross-industry efforts to counter the spread of terrorist and violent extremist content online.</p> <p>These efforts have evolved in conjunction with the Christchurch Call to Action, a nine-point plan that governments, tech platforms, and civil society organizations committed to after the March 2019 mosque shootings in Christchurch, New Zealand and viral spread of the perpetrator's live-streamed video of the attack.</p>	<p>extremists. To advance broad understanding of terrorist and violent extremist operations and their evolution, including the intersection of online and offline activities.</p>					

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Global Network Initiatives Year: 2008 Domicile: Washington, DC, USA Typology: High-impact Standard, Policy Website: globalnetworkinitiative.org</p>	<p>The Global Network Initiative (GNI) is a multistakeholder platform which recognises that the complex and evolving challenge of protecting digital rights globally requires a concerted and combined effort, drawing on the perspectives, leverage, credibility and expertise of many different stakeholders. GNI members work together in two mutually supporting ways. The GNI Principles ('the Principles') and Implementation Guidelines provide an evolving framework for responsible company decision making in support of</p>	<p>The mission of the Global Network Initiative is to protect and advance freedom of expression and privacy rights in the ICT industry by setting a global standard for responsible company decision making and serving as a multistakeholder voice in the face of government restrictions and demands. GNI implements its mission through four strategic pillars.</p>	<p>International NGOs; National NGOs Business/Industry; Philanthropies; (Academic/Research Institutions); Investors/Banks; Implementation partners</p>	<p>Governing Board; Members; Secretariat</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder</p>	<p>Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate); Self-generated revenue (certification fees, membership fees, selling of services, subsidies); IFI/DFI-financed; Companies (business and corporate sector associations); Investment Funds/Banks; Northern gov'ts/donors</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>freedom of expression and privacy rights. As company participation expands, the GNI Principles are taking root as global standard for human rights in the ICT sector. Every two years, GNI company members participate in an independent assessment to determine their progress in implementing the GNI Principles.</p>						
<p>Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence Year: 2020 Domicile: Paris, France Typology: High-impact Standard, Policy Website: gpai.ai</p>	<p>The Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence or GPAI (Gee-Pay) is an international and multistakeholder initiative to guide the responsible development and use of artificial intelligence consistent with human rights,</p>	<p>To bridge the gap between theory and practice on AI by supporting cutting-edge research and applied activities on AI-related priorities.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs ; Academic/Research Institutions; UN bodies</p>	<p>Council; Steering Committee; Working Groups; Secretariat</p>	<p>Member; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Observer; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>IFI/DFI-financed; Northern govts/donors</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>fundamental freedoms and shared democratic values, as reflected in the OECD Recommendation on AI.</p> <p>Launched in June 2020, GPAI is the fruition of an idea developed within the G7, under the Canadian and French presidencies.</p> <p>GPAI's 15 founding members are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. They were joined by Brazil,</p>						

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	the Netherlands, Poland and Spain in December 2020.						
<p>High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation Year: 2018-2019 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland; New York, NY, USA Typology: High-impact Standard, Policy Website: digitalcooperation.org</p>	<p>The High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation was convened by the UN Secretary-General to advance global multi-stakeholder dialogue on how we can work better together to realize the potential of digital technologies for advancing human well-being while mitigating the risks.</p> <p>Its final report, 'The Age of Digital Interdependence', makes five sets of recommendations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Build an 	<p>To broaden public debate on digital cooperation frameworks and support UN Member States in their consultations on these issues.</p> <p>Their report is expected to: 1) raise awareness about the transformative impact of digital technologies across society and the economy, 2) identify policy, research and information gaps as well as ways to improve interdisciplinary action on digital technologies, and 3) present concrete proposals to</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>	<p>Co-Chairs; Members; Secretariat</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate); Northern govts/donors; Governments; UN bodies</p> <p>Its work is funded through voluntary contributions of governments and foundations committed to promoting digital cooperation. Donors include the Bosch Foundation, China, Denmark, the Ford Foundation, Global Challenges Foundation, Norway, Qatar, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates and the United Nations Foundation.</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>inclusive digital economy and society</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Develop human and institutional capacity - Protect human rights and human agency - Promote digital trust, security and stability - Foster global digital cooperation <p>The High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation was established by the UN Secretary-General in July 2018 to identify good examples and propose modalities for working cooperatively across sectors, disciplines and borders to address challenges in the digital age.</p> <p>The Panel will conduct a broad</p>	<p>strengthen cooperation in the digital space in an effective and inclusive manner.</p>					

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	engagement and consultation process, resulting in a final report with actionable recommendations in 2019.						
<p>Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network Year: 2011 Domicile: Paris, France Typology: High-impact Standard, Policy, Project, Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: internetjurisdiction.net</p>	<p>The Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network is the multistakeholder organisation addressing the tension between the cross-border Internet and national jurisdictions. Its Secretariat facilitates a global policy process engaging over 400 key entities from governments, the world's largest internet companies, technical operators, civil society groups, academia and</p>	<p>To jointly develop policy standards and operational solutions to pressing legal challenges at the intersection of the global digital economy, human rights and security.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>	<p>Governing Board; Steering Committee; Secretariat</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate); Self-generated revenue (certification fees, membership fees, selling of services, subsidies); IFI/DFI-financed; Companies (business and corporate sector associations); Investment Funds/Banks; Northern gov'ts/donors; UN bodies</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>international organisations from over 70 countries.</p> <p>In 2011 a series of consultations with global key actors showed the need for a new type of issue-based cooperation process that gathers governments, internet companies, technical operators, civil society, academia and international organisations to advance legal interoperability in cyberspace. At the United Nations Internet Governance Forum in Nairobi, Kenya, Executive Director Bertrand de La Chapelle and Deputy Executive Director Paul</p>						

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	Fehlingeris, two co-founders, managed to secure seed funding and set up the Internet & Jurisdiction Policy Network (initially called the 'Internet & Jurisdiction Project') in 2012.						
<p>Internet Governance Forum Year: 2006 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: High-impact Standard, Policy, Project, Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: intgovforum.org</p>	<p>The Internet Governance Forum (IGF) serves to bring people together from various stakeholder groups as equals, in discussions on public policy issues relating to the Internet. While there is no negotiated outcome, the IGF informs and inspires those with policy-making power in both the public and private sectors. At their annual meeting delegates discuss, exchange</p>	<p>Discuss public policy issues related to key elements of Internet governance in order to foster the sustainability, robustness, security, stability and development of the Internet; - Facilitate discourse between bodies dealing with different cross-cutting international public policies regarding the Internet and discuss issues that do not fall within the scope</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Trade Unions; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies; Implementation partners; Others</p>	<p>Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG); Chair of the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG); Secretariat</p>	<p>Leadership; Member; Funder Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate); IFI/DFI-financed; Companies (business and corporate sector associations); Northern govts/donors; Governments; UN bodies; Others</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>information and share good practices with each other. The IGF facilitates a common understanding of how to maximize Internet opportunities and address risks and challenges that arise.</p> <p>Internet governance was one of the most controversial issues at the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and at the subsequent WSIS+10 review by the General Assembly in the wake of the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. Cognizant of the fact that any Internet governance approach should</p>	<p>of any existing body;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interface with appropriate inter-governmental organisations and other institutions on matters under their purview; - Facilitate the exchange of information and best practices, and in this regard make full use of the expertise of the academic, scientific and technical communities; - Advise all stakeholders in proposing ways and means to accelerate the availability and affordability of the Internet in the developing world; - Strengthen and enhance the engagement of stakeholders in existing and/or 					

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>be inclusive and responsive, the WSIS mandated the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene the Global Internet Governance Forum (IGF) for multistakeholder policy dialogue. The convening of the IGF was announced by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 18 July 2006. Since its establishment in 2006, it has gained global prominence among stakeholders as an open, inclusive, and transparent forum for dialogue and collaboration. The IGF mandate was renewed for 5 years in 2010 (2011-2015) and again in 2015 during the</p>	<p>future Internet-governance mechanisms, particularly those from developing countries;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Identify emerging issues, bring them to the attention of the relevant bodies and the general public, and, where appropriate, make recommendation s; - Contribute to capacity building for Internet governance in developing countries, drawing fully on local sources of knowledge and expertise; - Promote and assess, on an ongoing basis, the embodiment of WSIS principles in Internet governance processes; 					

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	WSIS+10 review for another 10 years (2016-2025).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discuss, inter alia, issues relating to critical Internet resources; - Help to find solutions to the issues arising from the use and misuse of the Internet, of particular concern to everyday users; - Publish its proceedings 					
<p>Internet Rights and Principles Coalition Year: 2008 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: High-impact Standard, Policy Website: internetrighsanprinciples.org</p>	<p>The Internet Rights and Principles Dynamic Coalition is working to uphold human rights on the internet and to root internet governance processes and systems in human rights standards. It sets out to promote, and provide a space for multi-stakeholder dialogue and collaboration. It also aim to be an</p>	<p>More specifically, the coalition aims to:</p> <p>Raise awareness of fundamental human rights and what they mean on the Internet. Discuss and anchor global public policy principles to preserve the openness of the internet and ensure that its continued evolution is framed by the public interest,</p>	<p>Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Trade Unions; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>	<p>Co-Chairs; Steering Committee</p>	<p>Member; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Not known</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>umbrella platform for facilitating collaboration on human rights issues in the Internet Governance Forum process. Members of the coalition work individually and in partnership to promote processes and instruments to frame and enforce rights on the internet.</p> <p>The Internet Rights and Principles Dynamic Coalition was formed during the Hyderabad IGF in 2008, following a decision to merge the Internet Bill of Rights and Framework of Principles for the Internet coalitions and joined later by</p>	<p>through open and extensive stakeholder involvement. Encourage all stakeholders to address issues of human and civil rights in policy-making, contributing to a people-centric discourse and policy formulation in the Internet Governance space. Identify ways in which human rights can be applied to the internet and other ICT technologies, and evaluate the applicability of existing formal and informal guidelines and regulatory frameworks. Identify measures for the protection and enforcement of human rights on the Internet,</p>					

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	the Freedom of Expression Coalition.	while pushing for people-centric issues and public interest based internet governance policy making. Describe the duties and responsibilities of internet users and other stakeholders which, together with their rights, will serve to preserve and promote the public interest on the internet.					
<p>NETmundial Initiative Year: 2014-2016 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: High-impact Standard, Policy Website: netmundial.br</p>	<p>The NETmundial Initiative was launched with a goal to consolidate principles of Internet governance and the proposal for a roadmap for future development of this ecosystem. It represented the beginning of a process for the construction of such policies in</p>	<p>To consolidate principles of internet governance and the proposal for a roadmap for future development of this ecosystem.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National Business/Industry; Academic/Research Institutions; UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>	<p>High-Level Multistakeholder Committee; Secretariat</p>	<p>Leadership; Member; Funder; Observer; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Member; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Northern govts/donors; Governments</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>the global context, following a model of participatory plurality.</p> <p>The NETmundial meeting held in São Paulo, Brazil, in April 2014 saw 1,480 people from 97 countries come together to discuss internet governance issues in light of mass surveillance by the US government revealed by Edward Snowden. Attendees came from a wide range of sectors: government, private sector, civil society, technical community, and academia. Its concluding, non-binding Multistakeholder Statement</p>						

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>contained a shared set of Principles and a Roadmap to guide the evolution of Internet cooperation and governance. Months later, DNS oversee the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br), and the World Economic Forum (WEF) funded an 'initiative' named after the conference with the goal of working together to apply the NETmundial Principles to address Internet issues in concrete ways.</p> <p>The NMI was launched in on 6 November 2014</p>						

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	as an 'open source platform' and a 'shared public resource' that would provide help to any 'calls for assistance on non-technical issues'						
<p>Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace Year: 2018 Domicile: Paris, France Typology: High-impact Standard, Policy Website: pariscall.international</p>	<p>The Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace is a call to come together to face the new threats endangering citizens and infrastructure. It is based around nine common principles to secure cyberspace, which act as as many areas for discussion and action. It invites all cyberspace actors to work together and encourage States to cooperate with private sector partners, the world of research and civil society.</p>	<p>To create an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful cyberspace</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs ; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>	<p>Secretariat</p>	<p>Strategic Partner; Others - Supporter</p>	<p>Strategic Partner; Others - Supporter</p>	<p>Northern govts/donors</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Smart Africa Alliance Year: 2013 Domicile: Kigali, Rwanda Typology: High-impact Standard, Policy, Project, Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: smartafrica.org</p>	<p>The Smart Africa Alliance is a framework for implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the SMART Africa Manifesto designed to make it actionable. It is a partnership bringing together all African countries adhering to the Manifesto represented by the AU, the ITU, World Bank, AfDB, ECA, the GSMA, ICANN and the Private Sector.</p> <p>The Transform Africa Summit held in Kigali, Rwanda, on 28–31 October 2013, culminated in the adoption of the Smart Africa Manifesto document by seven African Heads of States (Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, South</p>	<p>To accelerate sustainable socioeconomic development on the African continent, ushering it into a knowledge economy through affordable access to Broadband and usage of Information and Communications Technologies.</p>	<p>Northern donor govts; Governments, Regional Bodies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Trade Unions; Business/Industry; International Financial Institutions/DFIs; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks; UN bodies; Implementation partners</p>	<p>Board; Steering Committee; Secretariat</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Leadership; Member; Funder; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate); IFI/DFI-financed; Companies (business and corporate sector associations); Investment Funds/Banks; Northern govts/donors; Governments; UN bodies</p>

INTERNET AND DATA

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>Sudan, Mali, Gabon, Burkina Faso) in which they committed to provide leadership in accelerating socio-economic development through ICTs.</p> <p>On 30-31 January 2014, The SMART Africa Manifesto was endorsed by all Heads of State and Government of the African Union at the 22nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Addis Ababa. This development placed the Manifesto at the heart of the ICT agenda in Africa beyond just the seven original signatories at the Summit to all the 53 African countries.</p>						

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Scaling Up Nutrition 'Movement' Year: 2010 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: scalingupnutrition.org</p>	<p>A global multi-stakeholder initiative that was launched in 2010 during the World Bank and IMF Spring Meetings. Self-described as a 'government-led movement', its goal and mission is to end malnutrition in all its forms by 2030.</p> <p>Its history is tied to the developments in the UN and the reforms of the CFS, WHO and World Council on Food and Nutrition, as well as the increasing involvement of the private sector, backed by the World Bank and IMF. The recent evolution of global</p>	<p>To expand and sustain an enabling political environment; to prioritise and institutionalise effective actions that contribute to good nutrition; To implement effective actions aligned with Common Results; To effectively use, and significantly increase, financial resources for nutrition.</p> <p>The promotion of collaboration between all actors and the establishment of multi-stakeholder platforms at country level forms the basis of SUN's strategy.</p>	<p>Gov't; UN bodies; Northern gov'ts/donors; Business/Industry; International NGOs; National NGOs; Academic/Research Institutions; Philanthropies (corporate); Philanthropies (other); Others-journalists; Others-parliamentarians</p>	<p>Lead Group (Leadership Council): oversight, policy and strategic direction body that's responsible for its progress towards achieving its strategic objectives; Secretariat: responsible for coordinating the activities, plans, programs, actions; SUN's Stewardship Arrangement (Others-implementing partners): includes an Executive Committee to oversee the development and implementation of SUN's strategy; SUN Countries</p>	<p>Leadership; Member; Funder</p>	<p>Leadership; Funder; Strategic Partner (UN Network for SUN)</p>	<p>Philanthropies (corporate); Northern gov'ts/donors; UN bodies; Philanthropies (other)</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>nutrition governance confirms the unfolding dynamics, well-articulated within WEF's Global Redesign Initiative, of progressively transferring governance of "conflicted policy areas" from multilateral intergovernmental spaces to multi-stakeholder ones, which are strongly influenced, if not led by private sector agendas and interests. Many would argue that this places market interests over human rights and exposes marked deficits of public participation and</p>	<p>According to SUN's Theory of Change, this collaboration will lead to behaviour change in the respective actors, the 'scale-up' and alignment of actions and resources on nutrition and ultimately the improvement of nutrition status.</p>		<p>(General Assembly)</p>			

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	democratic accountability, given the active exclusion of dissenting voices and the bypassing of existing intergovernmental food and nutrition policy spaces, such as the CFS, the World Health Assembly and the FAO Conference.						
Bonsucro Year: 2008 Domicile: London, UK Typology: Environmental & Social Standard Website: bonsucro.com	A global multi-stakeholder, non-profit organisation that exists to promote sustainable sugarcane production, processing and trade around the world. Bonsucro supports a community of over 250 members in over 50 countries, from all elements of the	Bonsucro's mission is to ensure that responsible sugarcane production creates lasting value for the people, communities, businesses, economies and eco-systems in all cane-growing origins.	Business/ Industry; International NGOs; National NGOs; Others-big growers.	Bonsucro is formally governed by a Board of Directors comprised of seven members. The Board is ultimately responsible for all actions and activity of Bonsucro, although for practical purposes it delegates day-to-day	Members Leadership	Strategic partner (UN Global Compact)	No information

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>sugarcane supply chain, including, farmers, millers, traders, buyers and support organisations.</p> <p>Launched in 2008, the BSI initiative was built initially to focus on creating a global, objective performance standard for everything that mattered about producing sugarcane and its primary derived products. In 2011, it launched certification under a new brand name of Bonsucro and for the next four years it demonstrated the ability to manage and maintain both the framework</p>			<p>responsibility of managing the organisation to the CEO and Secretariat team. It also has the power to convene committees to support it in its work and to which it can delegate responsibility for certain activities. Currently it delegates responsibility (through clearly defined terms of reference): to the Finance & Risk Committee (FRC), for financial oversight, to the Governance & Nominations Committee (GNC), for governance oversight, to the Technical Advisory Board</p>			

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>behind the Standard as well as a credible third party certification. From 2016 onwards, the initiative has been repositioning itself into a global sugarcane platform as a response to stakeholders and significant shifts in industry and development thinking (role of certification and standards organisations).</p>			<p>(TAB), for the technical aspects of the Standard and verification processes.</p>			
<p>Equitable Food Initiative Year: 2015 Domicile: Washington DC, USA Typology: Environmental & Social Standard Website: equitablefood.org</p>	<p>A global multi-stakeholder approach that brings together growers, farmworkers, retailers and consumers to transform agriculture and improve the lives of farmworkers.</p>	<p>To transform relationships across the produce industry, recognising the role farm workers play in the supply chain. The EFI Standards have been crafted to</p>	<p>National NGOs; Business/ Industry; Affected Communities; Academic/ Research Institutions; Others</p>	<p>Executive Board (Board of Directors); and EFI Standards Committee (Others), which develops and oversee the EFI Standards</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Member</p>	<p>No information</p>	<p>Philanthropies (family); Philanthropies (corporate); Philanthropies (others); Business/ Industry; National NGO</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
g	<p>In 2008, under the leadership and vision of Costco Wholesale, United Farm Workers and Oxfam America, a group of experts and industry leaders in agriculture came together to explore the possibility of new ways to offer products with fair working conditions for farmworkers and increased food safety. Oxfam America facilitated a series of exploratory discussions with this group over the next three years and was later incubated under Oxfam America from</p>	<p>improve labor practices, environmental stewardship and food safety for the benefit of workers, agricultural communities, businesses and consumers.</p>					

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	2011-2015 before becoming an independent non-profit social enterprise in 2015.						
<p>Florverde Sustainable Flowers* (renamed in 2011) Year: 2002 Domicile: No information Typology: Website: florverde.org</p>	<p>In 1996, the Association of Colombian Flower Exporters (Asocolflores) created a code of conduct for the flower sector, which led to the creation of the Florverde® standards in 2002. During 2011, Florverde® underwent a strategic review and was renamed Florverde® Sustainable Flowers. The new name and identity 'reflects the desire to better communicate the benefits and positive impact of the standards,</p>	<p>To develop, promote, and implement responsible codes of conduct, standards and sustainable agricultural practices.</p>	<p>Business/ Industry; Academe/ Research Institutions; International NGOs, and Affected communities</p>	<p>The Advisory Council (Leadership Council) evaluates and validates priorities to Florverde Sustainable Flowers certification, evaluates Florverde Sustainable Flowers Technical and Administrative Secretariat's functions and follows up certification scheme's objectives accomplishment, while the Secretariat is responsible for reviewing and</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Leadership</p>	<p>No information</p>	<p>No information</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>but also as a way to reflect changes in the standards and its supporting structure – with greater transparency and improved impact assessment'.</p> <p>It is an independent social and environmental standard for the flower sector that is backed by a strong team of agronomists, social workers and other professionals. Although Florverde® Sustainable Flowers being responsible for setting the standard and obtaining stakeholder approval, the certification</p>			<p>updating the standard under the guidance of an advisory council.</p>			

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	itself is awarded by third-party certification bodies, such as Icontec and NaturaCert. The certification process includes reviewing farm documentation, inspecting farms, interviewing workers and reviewing lab tests results.						
Global Coffee Platform (renamed in 2016) Year: 2003 Domicile: Bonn, Germany Typology: Environmental & Social Standard Website: globalcoffeeplatform.org	A multi-stakeholder sustainable coffee platform that unites stakeholders in a non-competitive approach working towards a thriving, sustainable sector. The GCP sets into action the global agenda made through the public-private	To enhance farmers' prosperity with profitability of coffee production, improved livelihoods and well-being and conservation of nature.	Business/ Industry; Academe/ Research Institutions; International NGOs and Affected communities	Board of Directors: guides the strategic direction of the organisation and oversees and endorses the annual work plans and budgets.	Leadership; Initiator/ Convenor	Strategic partner (COSA-UNCTAD)	Self-generated revenue

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>initiative, Vision 2020, to ultimately improve the livelihoods of coffee farming communities and the natural environment of coffee production areas.</p> <p>By combining and building on the achievements of the 4C Association's expansive membership and the Sustainable Coffee Program's programmatic activities, and the rich connections of the International Coffee Organization (ICO) representing its producing and consuming country government</p>						

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	members, the Global Coffee Platform was formed in March 2016.						
<p>Roundtable on Responsible Soy Year: 2006 Domicile: Zurich, Switzerland Typology: Environmental & Social Standard Website: responsiblesoy.org</p>	<p>A global platform for multi-stakeholder dialogue on responsible soy; develops, implements and verifies a global certification standard.</p> <p>Building on the discussions of 2004 Responsible Soy Global Forum, the Round Table on Responsible Soy Association was founded in 2006 in Zürich, Switzerland, as a non-profit organisation promoting the growth of production, trade and use of responsible soy.</p>	<p>To encourage current and future soybean production in a responsible manner to reduce social and environmental impacts while maintaining or improving the economic status for the producer.</p>	<p>Business/ Industry; National NGOs; International NGOs; Investors/ Banks; Gov'ts</p>	<p>Three governing bodies: General Assembly/Assembly of Delegates: highest decision making level. It includes all participating and observer members, although only participating members have voting rights. Executive Board/Board of Directors: the resolution-making body of RTRS with powers as delegated by the General Assembly Meeting or the RTRS Statutes.; and Secretariat: responsible for executing the</p>	<p>Leadership</p>	<p>Strategic Partner (UNDP)</p>	<p>Self-generated revenue</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>It works through cooperation with those in, and related to, the soy value chain, from production to consumption. It does this through: a global platform for multi-stakeholder dialogue on responsible soy and the development, implementation and verification of a global certification standard.</p>			<p>decisions made by Executive Board.</p>			
<p>Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil Year: 2004 Domicile: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Typology: Environmental & Social Standard Website: rspo.org</p>	<p>A global, multi-stakeholder initiative on sustainable palm oil with a vision to transform the markets by making sustainable palm oil the norm.</p> <p>In 2001, WWF explores the</p>	<p>To advance the production, procurement, finance and use of sustainable palm oil products; To develop, implement, verify, assure and periodically review credible global standards</p>	<p>Business/Industry; International NGOs; National NGOs; Academic/Research Institutions; Investors/Banks</p>	<p>Managed by a Board of Governors comprised of 16 members, designated by the General Assembly for two years. To ensure an efficient and progressive management, the Board of</p>	<p>Leadership</p>	<p>Strategic Partners (UNDP; UNEP)</p>	<p>Self-generated revenue</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>possibilities for a Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and the year after, an informal co-operation among Aarhus United UK Ltd, Migros, Malaysian Palm Oil Association and Unilever, together with WWF, was formed. At its inaugural meeting in Malaysia, 200 participants from 16 countries adopted the Statement of Intent (SOI), a non-legally binding expression of support for the Roundtable process. In April 2004, RSPO was formally established under Article 60</p>	<p>for the entire supply chain of sustainable palm oil; To monitor and evaluate the economic, environmental and social impacts of the uptake of sustainable palm oil in the market; To engage and commit all stakeholders throughout the supply chain, including governments and consumers.</p>		<p>Governors is supported by four Standing Committees (Others). Each Standing Committee is comprised of members from the Board of Governors (including Alternate Board of Governors) as well as RSPO members. The Board of Governors is also supported by Advisors.</p>			

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>of the Swiss Civil Code.</p> <p>By 31 August 2004, 47 organisations signed the SOI declaring their intention to participate in the RSPO. To date, there are 4,000 members from across the world.</p>						
<p>UTZ Certified* (merged with the Rainforest Alliance in 2018) Year: 2002 Domicile: Amsterdam, The Netherlands Typology: Environmental & Social Standard Website: utz.org</p>	<p>UTZ certification shows consumers that products have been sourced, from farm to shop shelf, in a sustainable manner.</p>	<p>To create a world where sustainable farming is the norm. Sustainable farming helps farmers, workers and their families to fulfill their ambitions and contributes to safeguard the world's resources, now and in the future.</p>	<p>Philanthropies (others); International NGOs; Business/Industry; Others-environmentalists/activists</p>	<p>Managed by the Leadership Team (Leadership Council) and 19-member Board of Directors of Rainforest Alliance and an Advisory group (called Ambassadors Circle): provides advice, expands networks and supports its work.</p>	<p>Leadership; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Key partner (UNEP)</p>	<p>Self-generated revenue; Others-government contracts; Others-donations; Philanthropies (corporate); Philanthropies (others); Others-special events</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Committee on World Food Security - CFS (reformed in 2009) Year: 1974 Domicile: Rome, Italy Typology: Policy Website: fao.org/cfs</p>	<p>Foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental platform for all stakeholders to work together to ensure food security and nutrition for all.</p> <p>It was established in 1974 as an intergovernmental body to serve as a forum in the United Nations System for review and follow-up of policies concerning world food security including production and physical and economic access to food. The UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) was reformed in 2009 in the</p>	<p>To coordinate a global approach to food security; To promote policy convergence; To support and advise countries and regions; To coordinate at national and regional levels; To promote accountability and share best practices, and to develop a global strategic framework for food security and nutrition.</p>	<p>Gov't; International NGOs; Affected communities; Academic/ Research Institutions; UN bodies; Business/Industry; Philanthropies (corporate)</p>	<p>Plenary (General Assembly): central body for decision-making, debate, coordination, lesson-learning and convergence by all stakeholders; CFS Bureau (Board of Directors) and Advisory Group: the Bureau is the executive arm of the CFS . It is made up of a Chairperson and 12 member countries. The Advisory group is made up of representatives from the five different categories of CFS Participants.; High Level Panel of Experts (Others): provides the science-policy interface of the</p>	<p>Advisory group</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host</p>	<p>UN bodies; Northern gov'ts/donors; Philanthropies (corporate); Others- EU</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>context of the world food crisis (2007/2008). Among the core functions identified for the reformed CFS were the improvement of coordination between governments and other actors considered relevant for food security, as well as the promotion of policy convergence and coordination through the development of international guidelines and strategies on food security and nutrition, informed by country and regional experiences.</p>			<p>CFS and independent, evidence-based analysis and advice at the request of CFS.; Secretariat: support team for the three other bodies.</p>			

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Land Portal Foundation Year: 2009 Domicile: Groningen, The Netherlands Typology: Policy Website: landcoalition.org</p>	<p>A not-for-profit organisation that creates online resource for information, data and knowledge exchange on land governance issues.</p> <p>It was set up in 2009 as a partnership project dedicated to supporting the efforts of the rural poor to gain equitable access to land by addressing the fragmentation of information resources on land. In 2014, the Land Portal became an independent non-profit.</p>	<p>To create a better information ecosystem for land governance through a platform based on cutting-edge open data technologies through various partnerships and initiatives.</p>	<p>Northern gov't/donors; UN bodies; Academic/Research institutions; Business/Industry; Others-experts & consultants</p>	<p>Core team (Secretariat): comprised of coordinator and staff; Local Knowledge Engagement Network (Others-partners); Board of Directors: oversees the Land Portal and comprised of leading experts in land, property rights and information management, who volunteer their time to support the work of the foundation; Policy Advisory Group (Advisory group): composed of representatives of donors and founding organisations, provides continuity and</p>	<p>Leadership</p>	<p>Advisor</p>	<p>Northern gov't/donors; Investors/Banks; UN bodies; Others-international networks; Others-accounting organisation; Others-think tank</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
				stability to our organisation; Technical Advisory Group (Advisory Group), comprising leading experts from diverse fields.			
<p>Land Matrix Initiative (LMI) Year: 2009 Domicile: No information Typology: Policy Website: landmatrix.org</p>	<p>An independent global land monitoring initiative made up of a number of global and regional partners from Northern academic/research institutions, Southern civil society and regional alliances, Northern donors and multistakeholder group.</p> <p>Originally established in 2009 to address the lack of robust data on large-</p>	<p>To stimulate inclusive debate on the trends and impacts of LSLAs; to contribute to evidence-based decision-making and monitoring of impacts of LSLAs; To support greater public involvement in critical decisions that affect the lives of land-use; To contribute to the growing movement towards open data; and</p>	<p>Northern gov't/donors; Academic/Research institutions; Others- MSG; National NGOs; Others- regional alliance</p>	<p>Steering committee (SC): comprised of five global organisations and four regional focal points (RFPs); Decentralised coordination team (Others): implement the decisions taken by the SC and support the RFPs.</p>	<p>Others- targets of policy</p>	<p>Leadership (IFAD hosts/co-chairs ILC)</p>	<p>Northern gov't/donors</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>scale land acquisitions (LSLAs), the first version of the Land Matrix database was launched in April 2012 and provided a systematic overview of large-scale agricultural investments. Today, the public database covers 85 countries with four Regional Focal Points (RFPs) in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, together with its National Land Observatories (NLOs) in Argentina, Cameroon, Philippines, Senegal and Uganda, capture country-specific data, providing a</p>						

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	critical regional lens.						
<p>International Land Coalition Year: 2003 Domicile: Rome, Italy Typology: Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: landcoalition.org</p>	<p>A global alliance of civil society and intergovernmental organisations working together to promote secure and equitable access to and control over land for poor women and men through advocacy, dialogue, knowledge-sharing and capacity-building</p> <p>It is the successor of the Popular Coalition to Eradicate Hunger and Poverty, which was born out of the 1995 Conference on</p>	<p>To connect members to each other and to change makers beyond the Coalition, creating opportunities for dialogue, mutual learning and joint action; to mobilise members by facilitating informed and effective action, through accessible and usable knowledge and tools, and by creating opportunities for innovation, piloting and scaling up; and to influence key decision makers, including</p>	<p>UN bodies; Northern gov't/donors; Academic/Research Institutions; National NGOs; International NGOs; Affected communities; Others- regional alliances; Others- global alliances; IFIs/DFI</p>	<p>Global Assembly of Members (General Assembly): highest policy making body; Coalition Council (Board of Directors): responsible for the overall responsibilities of governance between meetings of the Assembly. The Council consists of representatives from 16 members and meets twice each year. Chaired by IFAD; Regional Committees composed of the elected Council Members from the region, the</p>	<p>Others- targets of policy</p>	<p>Leadership (IFAD; FAO; UNEP); Host; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Northern gov't/donors; Others- regional bodies; UN bodies; IFI/DFI</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>Hunger and Poverty in Brussels. Since 2003, the alliance has grown to 250 organisation members with strategic focus on land access issues.</p>	<p>governments, their partners and corporate actors and investors to engage with civil society actors as legitimate and necessary interlocutors and partners in achieving land governance for and with people.</p>		<p>host of the Regional Coordination Unit and any other member as elected by regional assemblies; Management Team (Secretariat) acting as the lead of the global secretariat.</p>			
<p>Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI) Year: 2017 Domicile: Mahe, Seychelles Typology: Environmental & Social Standard Website: fisheriestransparency.org</p>	<p>A global partnership that seeks to increase transparency and participation for a more sustainable management of marine fisheries.</p> <p>From 2015-2017, an international advisory group discussed the FiTI standards based on the FiTI principles that stress the importance of transparency and</p>	<p>To provide governments, large-scale and small-scale fishers, and civil society with a comprehensive and credible way to achieve and maintain high levels of transparency on the management of the marine fisheries sector and the activities of fishers and fishing companies.</p>	<p>Gov't; International NGOs; Business/Industry; Philanthropies (corporate)</p>	<p>Members' Meeting (General Assembly): global highest body that elects the international board and raises relevant issues; International Board (Board of Directors): global supervisory body of the initiative and accountable to the FiTI Members' Meeting; International Secretariat: day-to-day</p>	<p>Leadership; Implementation partners</p>	<p>Strategic Partners (FAO)</p>	<p>Gov'ts; Northern gov'ts/donors; IFI/DFI; Philanthropies (family)</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	participation in responsible and sustainable fisheries governance. In 2017, the report containing the standards were publicly released.			operations and accountable to the International Board.			
<p>UN Food Systems Summit (UNFSS21) Year: 2021 Domicile: New York, US Typology: Grey Area Website: un.org/sites/un2.un.org</p>	<p>The Summit will launch bold new actions to deliver progress on all 17 SDGs, each of which relies to some degree on healthier, more sustainable and equitable food systems. The Summit works on the concept of 'food systems', which it refers to as the constellation of all activities related to food, and the health of the food systems-- environment, people's health, economies and</p>	<p>To deliver on the following outcomes: generate significant action and measurable progress towards the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; raise awareness and elevate public discussion about how reforming our food systems can help us all to achieve the SDGs by implementing reforms that are good for people and planet; develop principles to guide</p>	<p>Gov't; International NGOs; Regional Bodies; National NGOs; Business/Industry; IFIs/DFIs; UN Bodies; Affected communities; Philanthropies; Academic/Research Institutions</p>	<p>Secretariat hosted within the UN system; Special Envoy; Support structures: multistakeholder Advisory Committee led by UN DSG that provides strategic guidance and feedback on the Summit's overall development and implementation; independent Scientific Group (Others); a system-wide UN Task Force (Others); Champions Network</p>	<p>Leadership</p>	<p>Initiator/Convenor; Host; Leadership</p>	<p>UN bodies; Gov'ts</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>culture.</p> <p>Announced in October 2019 by the UN Secretary-General and as a response to the request of the World Economic Forum, the UNFSS21 has the stated aims of maximising the benefits of a food systems approach across the entire 2030 Agenda, meeting the challenges of climate change, making food systems inclusive and supporting sustainable peace.</p>	<p>governments and other stakeholders looking to leverage their food systems to support the SDGs; and create a system of follow-up and review to ensure that the Summit's outcomes continue to drive new actions and progress.</p>					
<p>Global Alliance for Climate Smart Agriculture Year: 2014 Domicile: Rome, Italy</p>	<p>An inclusive, voluntary and action-oriented multi-stakeholder platform on Climate-Smart</p>	<p>To scale up CSA practices to address the challenges facing food security and agriculture under</p>	<p>Gov't; UN bodies; International NGOs; National Bodies; Business/Industry; Affected</p>	<p>The Strategic Committee (Leadership Council) serves as a representative body of Alliance</p>	<p>Members; Leadership</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Host</p>	<p>UN bodies</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Typology: Policy, Project Website: fao.org/gacsa/en/</p>	<p>Agriculture (CSA). The concept of Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) was originally developed by FAO and officially presented and at the Hague Conference on Agriculture, Food Security and Climate Change in 2010, through the paper 'Climate-Smart Agriculture: Policies, Practices and Financing for Food Security, Adaptation and Mitigation'. It was launched on 23 September 2014 during the Climate Summit, and the Alliance held its first meeting the following day in</p>	<p>a changing climate.</p>	<p>Communities; Academic/Research Institutions; Others- regional alliances</p>	<p>members and the decision authority for approving an annual Program of Work and a budget for the Facilitation Unit (Secretariat); Annual Forum (General Assembly): body for open dialogue, build consensus, set priorities and approve the overall direction, strategy and Programme of Work of the Alliance; Action Groups (Others) supporting the work of the Alliance and reports to the SC.</p>			

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	New York City, US.						
<p>Initiative for Smallholder Finance (ISF) Year: 2013 Domicile: Washington DC, USA Typology: Policy, Project, Financing Facility Website: isfadvisors.org</p>	<p>A private-public advisory group committed to transforming rural economies by delivering partnerships and investment structures that promote financial inclusion for rural enterprises and smallholder farmers.</p> <p>Launched in 2013, it is housed at the Global Development Incubator, an incubator for transformational development ventures. Its main activities are practical research and active</p>	<p>By combining industry-leading research with hands-on technical expertise, ISF aims to develop practical, profitable, and sustainable financial solutions geared towards the development of financial services for smallholder farmer market</p>	<p>Northern gov'ts/donors; Philanthropies (corporate); Philanthropies (family); Philanthropies (others); IFI/DFI; Others- MSG</p>	<p>Advisory Group consists of leading funders and practitioners in the rural financial inclusion space; ISF Team (Secretariat): day-to-day activities and rolling out of programs and plans.</p>	<p>Leadership</p>	<p>No information</p>	<p>No information</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	engagement with financial service providers, policy makers, and funders to enable approaches at scale.						
<p>World Cocoa Foundation (WCF) Year: 2000 Domicile: Washington DC, USA Typology: Environmental & Social Standard Website: worldcocoafoundation.org</p>	<p>A non-profit international membership organisation whose vision is a sustainable and thriving cocoa sector – where farmers prosper, cocoa-growing communities are empowered, human rights are respected and the environment is conserved. It is founded by Hershey Company and is led by key corporations in the cocoa industry.</p> <p>The World Cocoa Foundation was incorporated in</p>	<p>To advance a thriving and sustainable cocoa sector, where farmers prosper, communities are empowered, and the planet is healthy via increasing farmer income, combating child and forced labor and ending deforestation in the cocoa supply chain.</p>	<p>Business/Industry; Affected communities; Gov't</p>	<p>Board of Directors: comprised of 15 reps from key chocolate-producing manufacturers and retailers; Team (Others) led by Richard Scobey that implements the vision, mission, goals and activities of the WCF.</p>	<p>Leadership</p>	<p>No information</p>	<p>Business/Industry; IFI/DFI</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>2000 when the board of directors and president of the U.S. Chocolate Manufacturers Association (CMA) and its separate not-for-profit research arm known as the American Cocoa Research Institute (ACRI) acknowledged that a new model of collaboration was needed to assure a sustainable future for cocoa and the farmers whose livelihoods depend on the crop.</p> <p>https://www.worldcocoafoundation.org/about-wcf/history/</p>						

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) Year: 2009 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland; London, UK Typology: Environmental & Social Standard Website: bettercotton.org</p>	<p>A global not-for-profit organisation and the largest cotton sustainability programme in the world covering 21 countries. BCI exists to make global cotton production better for the people who produce it, better for the environment it grows in and better for the sector's future.</p> <p>Born out of a roundtable led by WWF in 2005, the BCI was established as an independent organisation in 2009 initially supported by a collective of major organisations including adidas,</p>	<p>To transform cotton production from the ground up; to support farmers' resilience to unpredictable climate conditions and be able to make a decent living from farming by producing Better Cotton; To achieve meaningful impact, this means reaching the farmers who need the most support, helping them to access vital training, inputs, services and finance, and building their capacity to adopt sustainable agricultural practices.</p>	<p>Business/Industry; National NGOs; International NGOs; Investors/Banks</p>	<p>General Assembly: consisting of all BCI Members as the ultimate authority of BCI and elects a Council to represent it; Council (Board of Directors): elected board whose role it is to ensure that BCI has a clear strategic direction and adequate policy to successfully fulfil its mission; Each membership category has three seats, for a total of 12 seats; Secretariat: led by management and staff from around the world to carry out day-to-day operations.</p>	<p>Leadership</p>	<p>Implementing partner/agency (UNIDO); Strategic Partner (UN Global Compact; UN Climate Change Commission)</p>	<p>Northern gov'ts/donors; Philanthropies (family)</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>Gap Inc., H&M, ICCO, IFAP, IFC, IKEA, Organic Exchange, Oxfam, PAN UK and WWF. https://bettercotton.org/about-bci/bci-history/</p>						
<p>Netherlands Food Partnership - NFP (merging of the AgriProFocus and the Food & Business Knowledge Platform in 2021) Year: 2005 Domicile: Utrecht, Netherlands Typology: Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: agriprofocus.com</p>	<p>An 'ideas accelerator' multistakeholder collaboration between relevant Dutch organisations and international partners to achieve urgent changes that contribute to sustainable food systems and nutrition security and reach SDG2 by 2030.</p> <p>AgriProFocus was established in 2005 as a multi-stakeholder initiative to</p>	<p>To support coalitions of relevant Dutch and international actors that have transformative plans which contribute to improved food security, healthy diets and promote sustainable agriculture via need assessments, design of theories of change, access to local networks, the development and implementation of strategies and action plans; To</p>	<p>Gov't; Business/Industry; Others-development aid organisation; Research/Academic Institution; Others-MSG; Others-employers' association</p>	<p>No information</p>	<p>Strategic partner</p>	<p>No information</p>	<p>Northern gov't/donors</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>promote agriculture in Dutch development policy and to organise a network approach to link and learn between stakeholders. In its origin AgriProFocus was a Netherlands-based initiative bringing together organisations working to enhance the role and plight of organised producers in developing countries. In 2021, it transitioned to NFP initiated from the Dutch Ministerial Level and operational starting January 1, 2021.</p>	<p>collect, connect and combine knowledge of all involved stakeholders and coalitions; To create experimental space to create new approaches and solutions; To organise reflections and learning; To give visibility to solutions.</p>					

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	https://agriprofocus.com/intro						
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) Year: 2002 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Policy, Project, Financing Facility Website: gainhealth.org	A Swiss-based foundation launched at the United Nations in 2002 to tackle the human suffering caused by malnutrition and works with governments, businesses and civil society to find ways to change and improve how businesses and governments shape food systems for improved nutrition.	To transform food systems so that they deliver more nutritious foods for all people, especially the most vulnerable.	Gov't; Business/Industry; Northern donors/gov't; Academics/Research Institutions; International NGOs; National NGOs; Affected Communities; Investors/Banks; Others-legal groups	Board of Directors: highest decision making body; Partnership Council (Advisory Group): advisory body to the GAIN Board and Strategic Management Team, providing guidance and recommendations on GAIN's strategic and investment priorities. The Council is also a platform to support innovation and to mobilise new partnerships aimed at ending malnutrition; Secretariat	Leadership; Strategic partner	Strategic partner; Leadership	Northern gov't/donors; Philanthropies (corporate); Philanthropies (other); Business/Industry

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
<p>Global Shea Alliance (GSA) Year: 2011 Domicile: Accra, Ghana Typology: Environmental & Social Standard, Policy, Project Website: globalshea.com</p>	<p>A non-profit industry association that promotes industry sustainability, quality practices and standards and demand for shea in food and cosmetics via public-private partnerships.</p> <p>Established in 2011, the Global Shea Alliance is a non-profit industry association with headquarters in Accra, Ghana. The GSA currently has 350 members from 25 different countries. Members include women's groups, small businesses, suppliers, international food and cosmetic brands,</p>	<p>To help build a more competitive, sustainable and profitable shea industry by establishing shea kernel quality standards and the promotion of shea butter as a high quality ingredient; To improve the livelihoods of rural African women and their communities; To empower women through training sessions.</p>	<p>Affected communities; Business/Industry; National NGOs; International NGOs; Others-development aid organisations; Investors/Banks; Trade Unions</p>	<p>Headed by an Executive Committee elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term. The Secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Alliance and reports to the Executive Committee.; The Advisory Committee provides strategic advice comprised of EIF, USAID.</p>	<p>Leadership; Strategic partner; Member</p>	<p>Strategic partner (UNIDO, FAO, UNDP)</p>	<p>Northern gov't/donors; Business/Industry; Philanthropies (other); Others-international trade organisation; Regional Bodies</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	retailers and non-profit organisations						
<p>New Vision for Agriculture (NVA) Year: 2009 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Policy Website: weforum.org</p>	<p>A World Economic Forum initiative led by 32 global partner companies that addresses the major challenges of global food and agricultural sustainability. The initiative serves as a platform to build collaboration among stakeholders to achieve a vision of agriculture driven by market-based, multistakeholder approach that can achieve food security, environmental sustainability and economic opportunity. It has 16 country-level</p>	<p>To develop a shared agenda for action and to enhance multistakeholder collaboration in order to achieve sustainable agricultural growth through market-based solutions; To increase production by 20 per cent while decreasing emissions by 20 per cent and reducing the prevalence of rural poverty by 20 per cent each decade; To support countries in realizing their agriculture-sector goals by aligning investments, programmes and</p>	<p>Business/Industry; Gov't; International NGOs; National NGOs; Others-regional associations; Others-growers; Academic/research institutions; Northern gov't/donors; Regional Bodies</p>	<p>Project Board (Others): led by 32 Partner companies, IFIs/DFIs, Investors/Banks of the World Economic Forum (see Notes) in coordination with governments, civil society, international organisations, farmers associations, research institutions and many other stakeholders.; Project Advisor (Advisory Group): McKinsey & Company</p>	<p>Leadership; Host; Initiator/Convener</p>	<p>Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Northern gov't/donors</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>multistakeholder PPPs, two multistakeholder regional PPPs and a private-public dialogue at the global level</p> <p>Launched in 2009, this project is part of the World Economic Forum's Shaping the Future of Global Public Goods Platform. The initiative has started four major public-private partnerships, including country-level initiatives in Mexico, Vietnam, Indonesia and India, as well as the regional partnership platform Grow Africa which includes seven African</p>	<p>innovations around shared priorities for agricultural growth.</p>					

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	countries. At the global level, the initiative enables public-private dialogue with the G20 and B20 Food Security Task Force, as well as through informal networks such as the Global Agenda Council on Food Security.						
Sustainable Rice Platform (SRP) Year: 2009 Domicile: Bangkok, Thailand Typology: Environmental & Social Standard, Policy, Project Website: sustainablerice.org	A multi-stakeholder alliance with over 100 institutional members from public, private, research, civil society and the financial sector. The SRP initiative was originally co-convened by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), the United Nations	To transform the global rice sector by improving smallholder livelihoods, reducing the social, environmental and climate footprint of rice production; and by offering the global rice market an assured supply of sustainably produced rice.	Business/Industry; Gov't; International NGOs; National NGOs; Others- regional associations; Others- growers; Academic/ research institutions ; Northern gov't/donors; Regional Bodies; Others-MSG	General Assembly: annual meeting to discuss the affairs of the SRP; Board of Directors: oversight and advisory body on the strategy and annual working plans and ensures that the Platform achieves its objectives; Technical Committees (Others): tasked to help shape the	Leadership; Member	Initiator/Convenor; Strategic Partner	UN bodies; Northern gov'ts/donors;

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>Environment Programme (UNEP) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH (GIZ) and is now an independent member association.</p>			<p>goals, tools and activities of the SRP; Secretariat: overall coordination body that provides support to the Board, Technical Committees and Task Forces.</p>			
<p>International Seafood Sustainability Foundation Year: 2009 Domicile: Washington DC, USA Typology: Environmental & Social Standard, Policy, Project Website: iss-foundation.org</p>	<p>In 2009, acclaimed scientists, leaders in industry and environmental champions launched the International Seafood Sustainability Foundation (ISSF) based on shared concerns about the future of global tuna fisheries and a desire to do something about it – together.</p> <p>It is a global,</p>	<p>To Improve the sustainability of global tuna stocks by developing and implementing verifiable, science-based practices, commitments and international management measures that result in tuna fisheries meeting the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) standard 1 without conditions, and become the</p>	<p>Academic/Research Institutions; Business/Industry; Philanthropies; International NGOs; National NGOs; Others-regional associations</p>	<p>Board of Directors: strategic direction; Scientific Advisory Committee (Advisory Group): advises on the science-based analysis of issues; Environmental Stakeholder Committee: represented by environmental and conservation civil society groups; ISSF Staff (Secretariat):</p>	<p>Initiator/Convener; Leadership; Member;</p>	<p>Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Business/Industry; Members</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>multistakeholder , non-profit partnership among the tuna industry, scientists and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). Its mission is to undertake science-based initiatives for the long-term conservation and sustainable use of tuna stocks, reducing bycatch and promoting ecosystem health.</p>	<p>industry standard for vessel owners, traders, processors and marketers</p>		<p>day-to-day operations</p>			
<p>Global Partnership for Ocean (ceased operations in 2015) Year: 2012 Domicile: Washington, DC, USA Typology: Policy Website: wedocs.unep.org</p>	<p>A blue-ribbon panel of 21 global experts from 16 countries representing the private sector, non-profit organisations, academia and multi-lateral institutions that provided recommendation</p>	<p>To tackle documented problems of overfishing, pollution, and habitat loss; To bring together and mobilise all oceans stakeholders around shared goals.</p>	<p>UN Bodies; IFI/DFI; Academic/Research Institutions; Business/Industry; International NGOs; National NGOs; Philanthropies (family); Philanthropies (other)</p>	<p>Assembly of GPO Partners (General Assembly): comprise the knowledge platform and adhoc working groups established around specific countries/themes/issues;</p>	<p>Member; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>Leadership; Strategic Partner</p>	<p>IFI/DFI</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>s for prioritising and implementing sustainable ocean investment. It ceased operations in 2015 without explanation.</p> <p>The Global Partnership for Oceans was launched in 2012 as a new approach to restoring ocean health. It sought to mobilise finance and knowledge to activate proven solutions for the benefit of communities, countries and global well-being.</p> <p>The GPO had over 150 partners representing governments,</p>			<p>Secretariat hosted by the World Bank that supports the GPO partners and various committees; GPO Fund Steering Committee (Steering Committee): manages the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for GPO activities; Oceans Investment Roundtable: GPO financiers (that is, bilateral and multilateral donors, dedicated finance instruments, and foundations) as a subset of the Assembly.</p>			

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	international organizations, civil society groups, and private sector interests committed to addressing the threats to the health, productivity and resilience of the ocean.						
EAT-Lancet Commission on Sustainable Healthy Food Systems Year: 2016 Domicile: Oslo, Norway Typology: Paradigmatic/Campaign Website: eatforum.org	EAT is a science-based global platform for food system transformation through sound science, impatient disruption and novel partnerships. EAT connects and partners across science, policy, business and civil society to achieve five urgent and radical transformations by 2050.	To shift the world to healthy, tasty and sustainable diets; To realign food system priorities for people and planet; To produce more of the right food, from less; To safeguard our land and oceans; and To radically reduce food losses and waste.	Gov't; Academic/Research Institutions; Business/Industry; Philanthropies (corporate); Philanthropies (others); Philanthropies (family); International NGOs; Investors/Banks	Board of Trustees (Board of Directors): governs and manages EAT; Advisory Council (Advisory Group): strategic advise; Staff/Team (Secretariat): day-to-day operations; Special Advisors: Special Advisors: experts, appointed by EAT Leadership, to offer insights in specific capacities or	Leadership; Strategic Partner; Other-advisor	Strategic Partner (UNFSS21; FAO; IFAD; WFP)	Business/Industry; Northern gov't/donors; Philanthropies (family); Philanthropies (corporate)

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>It is a non-profit founded by the Stordalen Foundation, Stockholm Resilience Centre and the Wellcome Trust to catalyze a food system transformation. The founder of EAT [Gunhild Stordalen] was appointed as Young Global Leader by the WEF in 2015, when EAT was still an initiative within the Stordalen Foundation portfolio (since 2013) and before it was established independently in 2016 by the Stockholm Resilience Center (SRC) and the Wellcome Trust.</p>			<p>geographies, strategic affiliation and hands-on support for ongoing EAT work.</p>			

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>The Wellcome Trust is a 'Health & Health Care' partner of the WEF. Stordalen will be in charge of Action Track 2 of the 2021 UN Food System Summit, having the WHO at her disposition as 'anchoring agency'.</p>						
<p>Global Council on Food Security Year: 2011 Domicile: Geneva, Switzerland Typology: Policy Website: reports.weforum.org</p>	<p>A WEF-led and convened multistakeholder and interdisciplinary knowledge network convened dedicated to promoting innovative thinking to shape a more resilient, inclusive and sustainable future in the area of food security. It is one of the 77 thematic/country/region-focused</p>	<p>To build a common agenda; To help raise awareness, leverage support for priority actions; To develop synergies to strengthen the global response to this challenge.</p>	<p>Academic/research institutions, UN bodies, national; Affected communities; Business/Industry; Gov't; Others regional alliances</p>	<p>The council itself is the governing body comprised of Chair, Vice Chair and members coming from business and industry, government, academic/research institutions, UN bodies, national farmers' associations and regional alliances.</p>	<p>Strategic partner; Initiator/convenor; Host</p>	<p>Strategic Partner</p>	<p>No information</p>

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	<p>issues convened by the WEF.</p> <p>Led by 28 global companies in collaboration with 14 governments, and a wide range of international organisations, civil society, academic and farmers' organisations, the initiative has set concrete goals to achieve this vision through targeted investment, greater collaboration, and improved efficiency; balancing growth with sustainability. The initiative has outlined the role that the private sector can play in realising sustainable</p>						

FOOD & AGRICULTURE

Multistakeholder Initiatives	Description	Objectives	Actors involved	Governance Structure	Role of Private Sector	Role of UN system organisations	Funders
	agriculture through multi-stakeholder partnerships.						
<p>* To be created: International Digital Council for Food and Agriculture</p> <p>International Platform for Digital Food and Agriculture.</p> <p>fao.org/3/ca7485en/ca7485en.pdf fao.org/3/nd058en/nd058en.pdf</p>							

