

Proudhon, Marx, and Anarchist Social Analysis

The previous chapters have introduced some of the key features of anarchist theory. In this one, we set up a dialogue between anarchism, classical Marxism, and to a lesser extent, mutualism and economic liberalism. As the other major class-based socialist ideology, classical Marxism both influenced anarchism and was the primary ideology against which anarchism defined itself. Discussing the relationship between classical Marxism and anarchism, and also comparing anarchism with economic liberalism, we are able to draw out many key features of anarchism—some of which are implicit and thus not often recognised—and also show that the differences between anarchism and Marxism go far beyond questions of the role of the state in a revolutionary strategy.

There is little doubt that anarchism is deeply imprinted with elements of classical Marxism—specifically, Marxist economics. At the same time, it generally rejects many of Marx's other ideas and incorporates many of Proudhon's views. Anarchism includes both "Proudhonian politics and Marxian economics."¹ In this respect, we can largely agree with Guérin's view that classical Marxism and anarchism belong to the same family of ideas, and drink "at the same proletarian spring."² The relationship between classical Marxism and the broad anarchist tradition is not necessarily as stark or polarised as sometimes assumed; the two are deeply entangled.

Nonetheless, we would suggest that the differences between classical Marxism and anarchism remain too profound to merit a "synthesis" of the two.³ The two hold different views on the nature of history and progress, the structure of society, the role of the individual, the goals of socialism, and the definition of class itself. At the same time, anarchism differs from important elements of a Proudhonian politics. Anarchism, then, is influenced by both Proudhon and Marx, but cannot be reduced to an amalgam of the two elements.

Cooperatives, Proudhon, and Peaceful Change

While it is not possible to demonstrate any links between Godwin, Stirner, and Tolstoy and the anarchist tradition, the same cannot be said of Proudhon. The anarchists acknowledged Proudhon as a forebear and the mutualists as kindred spirits. But anarchism was not Proudhonism, for there was much in the mutualist tradi-

tion that the anarchists could not accept. Anarchism, argued Bakunin, was “Proudhonism, greatly developed and taken to its ultimate conclusion.”⁴ From Proudhon, the anarchists took the notion of the self-management of the means of production, the idea of free federation, a hatred of capitalism and landlordism, and a deep distrust of the state. In his “instinct” for freedom, Bakunin commented, Proudhon was the “master of us all” and immeasurably superior to Marx.⁵

Yet anarchists rejected the mutualist notion that a noncapitalist sector could gradually and peacefully overturn the existing order. Bakunin maintained that cooperatives could not compete with “Big Business and the industrial and commercial bankers who constitute a despotic, oligarchic monopoly.” A noncapitalist sector could not, therefore, transform society by defeating the capitalist sector at its own game. On the contrary, the capitalist sector would conquer the noncapitalist one: economic pressures would lead cooperatives to hire wage labour, resulting in exploitation and a “bourgeois mentality.”⁶

Moreover, the Proudhonist solution offered little to the majority of peasants, not to mention the working class. Most peasants lived on rented land or were deeply indebted; they were not in a position to start operating a viable noncapitalist sector, let alone one that could overturn the existing order. For the anarchists, the peasants could only secure more land through direct confrontations, certain to be dramatic and violent; defending private property or promoting market socialism would not meet their needs. For many in the working class, subsisting on wages, the dream of setting up small business—of becoming one’s own boss—had a great appeal but was simply not practical, as the vast majority lacked the necessary income or the funds to invest in a People’s Bank. Unions and community groups that united workers in direct struggle were more relevant and effective.

Three basic distinctions between mutualism and anarchism followed. First, anarchists rejected private property in the means of production as unable to meet the needs of the peasantry and working class, whereas mutualists supported small proprietors and envisaged private profits and private property in their market utopia. Bakunin asserted that while cooperatives provided a valuable practical experience of self-management, they were not a significant challenge to the status quo. Furthermore, the popular classes could only reach their “full potential” in a society based on *collective* ownership by “industrial and agricultural workers.”⁷ Thus, within the First International, the anarchists voted with the Marxists against the mutualists in debates on property rights in 1869, contributing directly to the eclipse of mutualism and the generalised acceptance of common ownership as a core demand of the popular classes.

Second, the anarchists insisted on the need for revolutionary change, while the mutualists denied it. If the growth of a noncapitalist sector could not overwhelm capitalism, other means had to be found; if neither parliament nor revolutionary dictatorship were desirable, then only organs of counterpower, direct action, radical ideas, and ultimately revolution remained. Proudhon, on the other hand, did not really like or understand large-scale industry, and was hostile to strikes, which isolated him from the emerging labour movement.⁸ From his mutualist perspective, strikes were at best irrelevant and at worst a positive threat; they were not really viable means of struggle for his constituency of petty commodity producers, and if

they took place within the noncapitalist, cooperative sector, they would have highly destructive consequences.

This brings us to the third major difference: the mutualist tradition was historically geared toward the needs of the small independent farmers and craftspeople. These groups were relatively common in the France of Proudhon's time. In the late nineteenth-century United States, when Tucker wrote, these groups were under great pressure from the rise of modern industry and large-scale agricultural capitalism, and it was against this background that Proudhon's ideas got a new lease on life abroad. By contrast, the anarchism of Bakunin and Kropotkin had a different class character, addressing itself to the majority of peasants and the growing working class, and proposing radical struggles. Bakunin was certainly sympathetic to small producers, but he was convinced that Proudhon's solutions were no longer viable.

In Bakunin's view, the fundamental weakness in Proudhon's work was the absence of a sufficiently rigorous analysis of capitalism, which left his strategy for social change somewhat weak. He was an "incurable" idealist who lacked a sufficiently "scientific" analysis of the workings of society.⁹ The latter was to be found in Marx's economic analyses, and Bakunin praised Marx's economics as "an analysis so profound, so luminous, so scientific, so decisive ... so merciless an expose of the formation of bourgeois capital" that no apologist for capitalism had yet succeeded in refuting it.¹⁰

A Critical Appropriation of Marxist Economics

Marx's analysis of the core features of capitalism deeply impressed the early anarchists. His starting point was that production was the basis of all societies, and that it was in the organisation of production that the true character of a given society was to be found.¹¹ History consisted of a series of changing modes of production, each with their own internal logic. A mode of production was a specific configuration of "forces of production" (labour plus the means of production, like equipment and raw materials) and "relations of production" (the way in which people organised production), and each mode had its own peculiar dynamics and laws of motion.

A class society was one in which the means of production were owned by one class, with that class acting as the dominant force in society. Most modes of production were class systems and based on exploitation, meaning that an economic surplus, produced by the nonowning productive class, was transferred to the non-producing class by virtue of its ownership of the means of production. Each mode of production, in turn, had internal contradictions, and these ultimately gave rise to the emergence of a new mode of production. On a general level, there was a basic contradiction between the tendency of the forces of production to expand over time and the relations of production through which the forces were deployed; on another, there was the inherent struggle between the classes. These factors would lead to the overthrow of the old mode by a new one that allowed for the further development of the forces of production.

The current mode of production, Marx argued, was capitalism. Here, the means of production were held by capitalists but worked by wage labour, production was directed toward profit, and capitalists competed by reinvesting profits to

increase the means of production under their control. In all modes of production, the exploitation took place in production rather than in distribution; in the case of capitalism, workers were not exploited in the market, as Proudhon believed, but at the workplace. Workers sold their labour power or ability to work for a wage, but the value they added to goods through their labour, their actual work, was higher than the value of their wage. The workers, in other words, produced more value than they received in wages. The capitalists owned the products of the workers' labour and sold those goods for a profit, and this profit was derived from the unpaid surplus value created by the workers.

Capitalists invested much of the surplus value back into the forces of production, increasing the amount of variable capital (labour power) and constant capital (the means of production) at their disposal. Now Marx, like Proudhon, used a labour theory of value; he argued that only living labour created new value, and that value underpinned prices. All things being equal, and given the operation of a competitive market system that equalised prices for given commodities, the price of a commodity must correspond closely to the "socially necessary" or average labour time used to produce it. The cost of a Rolls-Royce was higher than that of a loaf of bread, because the socially necessary labour time involved in producing a Rolls-Royce was higher.

More specifically, Marx spoke of the exchange values of commodities, set in production by labour time, as determining prices. The use value or utility of a good could not explain prices, as use values varied widely between individuals, while many items with high use values (like water) had low prices and those with low use values (like diamonds) had high prices. It followed that there was a "law of value" operating in capitalism: given that all commodities had exchange values deriving from labour time, they must exchange in fixed ratios to one another. As capitalists competed with one another on the basis of price, lowering prices required reducing the amount of labour time necessary for the production of particular goods. This could be done by restructuring work or developing new means of production, with mechanisation providing the key means of lowering prices. Thus, capitalism demonstrated a tendency toward a "rising organic composition of capital," meaning an increase in the ratio of constant to variable capital.

It was the drive to mechanise that underpinned the astounding technological advances of the modern world, and allowed capitalism to sweep aside the peasantry and independent producers through large-scale capitalist production. These advances in the forces of production, however, did not benefit the working class. New technologies were typically used to increase exploitation (workers could produce a larger mass of surplus value for the same wage), which led to job losses, which in turn swelled the labour market and placed a downward pressure on wages. Given the limited purchasing power of the working class and the lack of overall planning in the economy, the output tended to outstrip the available markets. The immediate result was a tendency for capitalism to enter recurrent—for Marx, increasingly severe—crises, which were characterised by a sharp increase in competition between capitalists, attacks on the working class to reduce labour costs, a search for new markets, and the outright destruction of surplus productive capacity.

These developments were expressions of the contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production in capitalism. The second contradiction in the capitalist system was the class struggle. The capitalist class, Marx and Engels maintained, would grow smaller as a result of ongoing competition, while the working class would keep expanding, as other classes were swept into its ranks by capitalism.¹² Moreover, the working class would be concentrated in large plants, become increasingly unified as mechanisation eroded divisions of skill, and become increasingly organised. Locked together in large-scale production systems, existing as “social” rather than individual labour, workers had to cooperate in defence of their interests. Their struggles would lead first to unions, then to revolutionary Marxist parties, and ultimately to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Contrary to the views of economic liberals like Smith, capitalism was not the normal and inevitable human condition but merely the most recent in a series of modes of production, and was inevitably going to be replaced by a new socialist mode.

What Marx had done, drawing on liberal economics, French socialism, and German philosophy, was to develop a new theory of capitalism—a theory of unprecedented and still-unmatched analytic power. The imprint of Marx’s economic analysis can clearly be seen in the thinking of the anarchists. Bakunin’s only quibble with Marx’s *Capital* was that it was written in a style quite incomprehensible to the average worker, and he began a Russian translation of the book.¹³ Kropotkin despised Marx, but his understanding of class struggle, exploitation, and capitalist crisis was deeply imprinted with Marxist economics.¹⁴

Malatesta, who complained that anarchism had been too “impregnated with Marxism,” did not develop an alternative economic analysis, and implicitly used Marxist categories and models. Indeed, his close associate Carlo Cafiero (1846–1892) even published a summary of Marx’s *Capital*.¹⁵ Perhaps the most influential anarchist after Bakunin and Kropotkin, Malatesta was born to a moderately prosperous family of landowners in Italy.¹⁶ He became involved in the Italian radical movement as a student, linked up with the anarchists of the First International and joined the Alliance, and was involved in insurrectionary activity in the 1870s, after which he became a mass anarchist. Malatesta spent much of his life in exile, returning to Italy in 1914 and again in 1919. His last years were lived out under house arrest by Benito Mussolini’s fascist regime.

Marxist Economics and Anarchist Communism

The anarchists, however, did not adopt Marx’s ideas unconditionally or uncritically, and developed Marxist economics in important ways. First, they tended, probably unfairly, to downplay Marx’s achievements and innovations. Second, they criticised Marx’s use of the labour theory of value. Third, they sought to delink Marxist economics from Marxist politics. In the sections that follow, we look at how the anarchist tradition critically appropriated Marx’s economic theory as part of a process of developing its own insights into economics.¹⁷

Anarchists emphasised Marx’s largely unacknowledged debt to earlier English and French socialists, especially Fourier, Robert Owen, and Proudhon. For Rocker, Proudhon’s ideas played a key role in Marx’s conversion to socialism in the early

1840s, and Proudhon's analysis was a formative influence on Marxist economic theory.¹⁸ Rocker noted that Marx initially praised Proudhon as "the most consistent and wisest of socialist writers," and his writings as the "first resolute, ruthless, and at the same time scientific investigation of the basis of political economy, *private property*," a breakthrough that "makes a real science of political economy possible" for the first time. Proudhon, said the early Marx and Engels, was "a proletarian, an *ouvrier*," a champion of the "interest of the proletarians," the author of the first "scientific manifesto of the French proletariat."

Marx subsequently turned on Proudhon, suddenly declaring him a representative of "bourgeois socialism," and a plagiarist, whose ideas "scarcely" deserved a "mention" in a "strictly scientific history of political economy." This, Rocker argued, was unjust and hypocritical, for Marx always remained fundamentally indebted to Proudhon's ideas. Marx's concept of surplus value, "that grand 'scientific discovery' of which our Marxists are so proud," was derived directly from Proudhon's earlier use of the labour theory of value for a theory of exploitation, as well as from the insights of early English socialists. It followed that the Marxist claim to represent a scientific socialism sharply opposed to the older utopian socialism was misleading and dishonest.¹⁹ The term scientific socialism was, indeed, actually coined by Proudhon.²⁰ Later anarchists have also noted that Marx was influenced by Bakunin.²¹

Rocker did not leave rest the argument at this compelling point, however, but went on to cite questionable claims that key Marxist texts were plagiarised from earlier writers. These assertions were promoted by the anarchist Varlaam Cherkezov (1846–1925). Initially involved in extremist narodnik groups in Russia, Cherkezov was prosecuted in 1871, sent to Siberia but escaped in 1876, and moved via French and Swiss anarchist circles to London, where he became a close friend of Kropotkin and Malatesta. For Cherkezov, *The Communist Manifesto* was copied from *The Manifesto of Democracy*, an 1841 work by Fourier's disciple, Considérant.²² This contention had quite a wide circulation: for instance, in China it "quickly assumed nearly formulaic status."²³

These charges of plagiarism are not very convincing and smack of sectarianism. Nettlau made the point that Considérant and Marx were part of the same radical culture and aware of the same "general facts," and therefore neither needed to plagiarise the other; moreover, they interpreted these general facts in quite different ways, according to their political views.²⁴ It is worth adding that Considérant's views were quite different from those of Marx: he stressed peaceful reforms rather than revolution, the voluntary reorganisation of the economy rather than nationalisation, and class collaboration rather than the dictatorship of the proletariat.²⁵

The anarchists criticized Marx's use of the labour theory of value. For Marx, it was not possible to work out the exact contribution of each individual to production and the creation of new value but it was possible to determine the *average* value added to a given commodity. Marx believed that the law of value would operate after the "abolition of the capitalist mode of production."²⁶ Stalin later claimed that the law of value existed in the USSR.²⁷ This implied, in the first place, that some sort of nonexploitative wage system could operate under the proletarian dictatorship, with workers paid on the basis of output by the state. Second, this suggested that

the distribution of consumer goods under socialism would be organised through purchases with money—that is, markets.

It is against this background that Kropotkin's notion that an anarchist society must also be a communist one—communist in the sense of distribution by need, not output—should be understood. The anarchists of the First International tended to share with classical Marxism the view that a just wage system could be applied in a postcapitalist society, based on remuneration by output. This “anarchist collectivism” (as it was later known) was partly a holdover of mutualist ideas of the workers receiving the full product of their labour and was reinforced by Marxist thinking about a postcapitalist society.

Kropotkin challenged these views in a series of works.²⁸ In the first place, he made an argument for the social character of production. Production was, he insisted, a collective process, based on the knowledge, experience, and resources developed in the past, and undertaken by large numbers of people in a complex division of labour in the present. Consequently, individual contributions could not be isolated or calculated, nor could the contribution of a particular group of workers, in a particular industry, to a particular good, be properly calculated. The work of the metalworker was not separate from that of the miner who retrieved the ore, the railway person who transported it, or the worker who built the railway, and so on. This also meant that no clear distinction could be made between the production of capital equipment and consumer goods.

Luigi Galleani (1861–1931), who we will discuss more in chapter 4, added the point that the value of less tangible products, such as “Pascal's theorem ... Newton's law of gravitation, or ... Marconi's wireless telegraphy,” could scarcely be assessed, nor could the innovations of these men be separated from the ideas and discoveries of others.²⁹ Marx, then, may have been correct to contend that workers, by virtue of their position in production as social labour, needed to cooperate in order to change society, but his view that remuneration could be fairly calculated for different sections did not follow.

It is necessary at this point to discuss the question of the determination of prices under capitalism. Marx's use of the labour theory of value, his idea of exchange value, and his law of value were integral to his view that prices were objective and set by the average labour time in production. This notion was present in economic liberalism before the late nineteenth century, notably but not only in the work of Smith, where it coexisted uneasily with the perspective that prices were set by subjective factors through the “law” of supply and demand. According to this theorem, the competition of innumerable individuals within the market to maximize the consumption of goods that satisfied personal preferences set prices. A high supply and low demand led to a fall in prices, while a low supply and high demand led to a rise in prices.

Marx admitted that prices could vary somewhat according to supply and demand, but argued that prices were fundamentally set by labour time prior to sale. By the late nineteenth century—and in no small part in reaction to the way in which mutualists, Marxists, anarchists, and others were using the labour theory of value to claim class exploitation—economic liberals sought to develop an entirely subjective theory of price. The theory of marginal utility, developed from William Stan-

ley Jevons onward, suggested that in a free market all prices, including production prices, were determined entirely by individual preferences.

Where did the anarchists fit into these debates? It is useful here to look at Kropotkin's views on wages in capitalism. For Marx, labour power was a commodity, and like any other commodity, its price was set by the labour time required in its production—the labour time required to produce and reproduce the workers who embodied labour power. For Kropotkin, however, wage rates were often quite arbitrary and were set by a wide variety of factors, including the unequal power relations between the classes, government policies, the relative profitability of particular industries, and, last but not least, the ability of skilled and professional employees to establish monopolies in particular trades.³⁰

Like Smith, then, Kropotkin believed that *both* subjective utility and exchange value shaped prices, but he added that power relations also played an important role. Berkman developed the point, arguing that prices were not simply a reflection of subjective individual choices or objective exchange values.³¹ Prices were affected by labour time, by levels of supply and demand, and were also manipulated by powerful monopolies and the state.³² Born to a modest Jewish family in Lithuania, Berkman became an activist and left Russia for the United States, where he joined the anarchists.³³ In 1892, he attempted to assassinate the industrialist Henry Clay Frick and was jailed for fourteen years. After his release, he became active again, served two years for antimilitarist activities, and was deported in 1919 as part of the Red Scare—a massive crackdown on the Left starting in 1917—to Russia, where he became bitterly disillusioned with the Bolsheviks. He left in 1921 and ended up in Paris, committing suicide in 1936.

It followed from arguments like those of Kropotkin and Berkman that there was no possibility of operating a fair postcapitalist wage system. Indeed, if wages—like other prices—were partly set by power and class relations, and if—as Kropotkin believed—the dictatorship of the proletariat would be a new class system, then there was no reason to expect that the wages paid by the revolutionary state would be any more fair than those paid by openly capitalist ones. On the contrary, they would tend to form part of a larger apparatus of class.

Kropotkin's second argument against a postcapitalist wage system was centred on the issue of justice. Even if wages were a fair representation of individual contributions to production, it by no means followed that a wage system was desirable. Remuneration on the basis of output meant remuneration on the basis of occupation and ability, rather than effort or need. The output of an unskilled worker in an unskilled low-productivity job, like cleaning, was less than the output of a skilled worker in a high-productivity job, such as engineering, even if the actual effort of the engineer was lower. Further, remuneration by output provided no mechanism for linking income to needs; if the hypothetical engineer lived alone without family commitments and was healthy, and the hypothetical cleaner supported several children and had serious medical problems, the engineer would nonetheless earn a higher wage than the cleaner. Such a situation was both unjust and would “maintain all the inequalities of present society,” particularly the gap between skilled and unskilled labour.³⁴

Consequently, Kropotkin declared, genuinely communist distribution was necessary. Everyone should contribute to society to the best of their ability, and society should in turn provide for everyone's particular needs as far as possible. Kropotkin did not, it is worth noting, believe that people who refused to contribute to society but could do so should be rewarded; in line with the idea that rights followed from duties, he held that "everyone who cooperates in production to a certain extent has in the first place the right to live, and in the second place the right to live comfortably."³⁵

This conception meant that production should not be directed toward profit, as was the case in capitalism, but toward meeting human needs: "The great harm done by bourgeois society is not that capitalists seize a large share of the profits, but that all production has taken a wrong direction, as it is not carried on with a view to securing well-being to all."³⁶ Goods would be distributed from a "common store," created by labour, and where a particular good was scarce, it could be rationed with priority given to those most in need. In speaking of needs, Kropotkin did not refer only to basic goods like food and shelter, for he believed needs were wide-ranging and ever changing. In his view, there was a "need for luxury," including "leisure," resources to develop "everyone's intellectual capacities," and "art, and especially ... artistic creation."³⁷ This followed from the anarchist stress on individual freedom and the development of individuality, and from the creed's deep faith in human creativity and learning.

Kropotkin's communist approach meant the abolition of markets as a means of both distribution and setting prices. The information contained in prices arising in markets—whether from subjective utility or objective exchange value—must always provide inadequate information for a just system of distribution and a socially desirable coordination of economic life more generally. While some recent anarchists have suggested that prices could be used to coordinate economic life in an anarchist society, they concede Kropotkin's point in stressing that such prices should reflect not only use value or exchange value but factor in the costs and benefits of particular goods to society as a whole, and should not be generated in the market but through a process of participatory planning.³⁸

The importance of Kropotkin's arguments for anarchism is widely recognised, and the notion of "anarchist communism" was widely adopted in the broad anarchist tradition in place of "anarchist collectivism." Kropotkin was not the first to link anarchism and communism but he played the key role in winning the argument for communism in anarchist and syndicalist circles by the 1880s.³⁹ There are hints of a communist approach in some of Bakunin's works, while his close associate Guillaume was advocating communist distribution by 1876.⁴⁰ The Italians around Malatesta were also moving to adopting communism around this time, while the French anarchist Elisée Reclus (1830–1905) seems to have coined the term "anarchist communism." A geographer like Kropotkin, Reclus had been a Fourierist and was briefly involved, along with his brother Elie, in Bakunin's Brotherhood. From 1871 on, the brothers became militant anarchists. Reclus edited the journal *La Revolté* ("Revolt") and produced a stream of anarchist propaganda, enjoying at the same time a successful academic career. Like Kropotkin, he tended to the view that "anarchism was the truth" and "science would prove him right."⁴¹

It is important, then, to see Kropotkin's contentions about wages, prices, and markets not just as a debate among the anarchists about the operation of a tentative future society but also as part of a wider anarchist engagement with both economic liberalism and Marxist economics. This is a useful way to examine Kropotkin as well as reconsider his relevance for current debates in economics and development studies. In raising questions about the information provided by prices, Kropotkin also raised questions about neoliberalism, which draws on the marginalist tradition of price theory.

For Ludwig von Mises and Frederick von Hayek, only a price system based on a free market could generate the information needed to coordinate a modern economy, and provide scope for individual choice and freedom; the alternative was economic disaster due to the arbitrary calculations of self-interested state planners, and the continued expansion of the power of the state into public and private life.⁴² What Kropotkin was pointing out, however, was that prices in capitalism provided at best incomplete and partial information that obscured the workings of capitalism, and would generate and reproduce economic and social inequalities. Ignoring the social character of the economy with their methodological individualism, economic liberals also ignored the social costs of particular choices and the question of externalities: "It remains to be seen whether a robust day-labourer does not cost more to society than a skilled artisan, when we have taken into account infant-mortality among the poor, the ravages of anaemia and premature deaths."⁴³ While Mises and Hayek championed the free market, and saw in competition both the expression of human nature and the means of promoting individual freedom, Kropotkin viewed cooperation rather than competition as the basis for true individuality, and demanded the subordination of the economy to the needs of society rather than the freeing of the market from social controls.

History, Progress, and the State

From Kropotkin's stress on the satisfaction of human needs as a measure of progress, it is possible to derive a different conception of what is commonly called "development." For liberal economics, development consists of the creation of a competitive market system. For economic nationalists, development consists in creating a powerful national economy, even at the cost of popular living standards and labour rights. By contrast, for Kropotkin, development is about increasing the ability of society to meet human needs as well as facilitate individual freedom and fulfilment, and neither the free market nor state power can undertake this task for the mass of the people.

Measured like this, capitalism is not necessarily a highly developed form of society; it is perhaps less developed than egalitarian tribal societies. The achievement of a powerful industrial base is meaningless in itself. Indeed, unless the majority of people benefit directly, by having their scope for individuality and ability to meet their needs increased, it may even be a retrograde move. Given the class character of capitalism, the rise of newly industrialised countries really means the rise of powerful new ruling classes; it is by no means a necessary step toward popular emancipation. That a previously oppressed country develops into a world power

would, in other words, not break the cycle of class rule but simply reproduce it in new ways.

This view of historical progress also differs with that of classical Marxism, where historical progress is measured by the expansion of the forces of production. There can be little doubt that while Marx opposed capitalism, he also saw it as a necessary evil. It was a stage of history that laid the basis for socialism through developing the forces of production to the highest pitch, while also creating the working class that could overthrow the capitalists and create a socialist society based on the abundance that an advanced economy made possible.

It was precisely on this issue that Marx distinguished his scientific socialism from both utopian socialism and the views of Bakunin, who, he claimed, “does not understand a thing about social revolution, only the political phrases about it; its economic conditions do not matter to him.”⁴⁴ This was part of a larger tendency toward a teleological view of history in Marx’s thought: history progressed inexorably through an ongoing expansion of the forces of production that laid the basis for a succession of increasingly advanced modes of production, culminating in socialism and then the withering away of the state, the end goal of history.

There are ambiguities and contradictions in Marx’s thought, which can be interpreted as “Two Marxisms”: a “Scientific Marxism” centred on a deterministic and teleological approach, and a “Critical Marxism” that stressed human agency and will.⁴⁵ The two tendencies coexist uneasily in Marx’s thinking as well as in classical Marxism more generally. On the one hand, there is the Marxism of necessary stages of history and socialist predestination; on the other, there is the Marxism that sees the revolutionary party—with its ideas, tactics, will, dictatorship of the proletariat, and struggles—as the necessary bridge between capitalism and the end goal of history.⁴⁶

However, it is significant that Marx’s most voluntaristic works—dating mainly from the mid-1840s to the late 1850s—were not published in his lifetime; the public persona of Marx stressed scientific Marxism (even if his political strategy involved a fair degree of voluntarism). It is from the determinist and teleological strand of Marxism that Marx’s and Kautsky’s dismissal of the peasantry arises, and the view that one merit of capitalism is that it “rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life.”⁴⁷ It is also from this strand that the idea that societies must pass through bourgeois democratic revolutions before they can consider proletarian revolutions arises.

Such determinism led classical Marxists to see particular states as “progressive,” in the sense that they promoted capitalist transformation, and only some nationalities as “historic.” Marx and Engels tended to cast Germany in the role of the champion of progress in Europe, and supported the liberation of so-called historic nationalities like the Poles, while rejecting the liberation of many others, like the Czechs. Their preference for Germany arguably hid an “irrational nationalism” on the part of the two men.⁴⁸ At the same time, their tendency to disparage most Slavic nationalities was probably shaped by their own Russophobia.⁴⁹ In 1849, for example, Marx and Engels brought the pro-German and anti-Slav positions together:

It is inadmissible to grant freedom to the Czechs because then East Germany will seem like a small loaf gnawed away by rats.... The revolution

can only be safeguarded by putting into effect a decisive terror against the Slav peoples who for their perspective of their miserable "national independence" sold out democracy and the revolution.⁵⁰

Once certain states and nationalities were seen as progressive—Engels even spoke of "counterrevolutionary nations"—it was a small step to argue that working-class politics should be aligned to particular states.⁵¹ Discussing the impending Franco-Prussian War of 1870, Marx argued that the "French need a thrashing": if "the Prussians are victorious the centralisation of state power [will] be helpful to the centralisation of the German working class," and "German predominance will shift the centre of gravity [in] the Western European labour movements from France to Germany." German domination "on the world stage would mean likewise the dominance of our theory over that of Proudhon, etc."⁵²

Accordingly, Engels condemned the leaders of German socialism for failing to vote for war credits in the *Reichstag* (parliament) at this time, as the "establishment of a united German state is necessary for the ultimate emancipation of the workers, the war must be supported."⁵³ In later years, it was the regimes of the East bloc and various nationalist regimes in the less industrialised countries that were identified with "progress." Marxism's formal commitment to working-class internationalism has been consistently overwhelmed by this tendency of loyalty to particular states.

It was also from the perspective of capitalism as a necessary evil that Marx considered colonialism to be progressive in some respects. If capitalism was necessary, then those societies that did not spontaneously generate capitalism could only benefit from external domination that introduced capitalism. Marx claimed that "English interference" in India had "produced the greatest, and, to speak the truth, the *only* social revolution ever heard of in Asia." Thus, "whatever may have been the crimes of England, she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about the revolution."⁵⁴ As with the Germans and the Slavs, Marx's determinism hid a set of prejudices regarding Asian peoples as stagnant and nonhistoric.⁵⁵ Likewise, Engels declared that the colonisation of Algeria was a "fortunate fact for the progress of civilisation," and that the colonies "inhabited by a native population ... must be taken over" by the Western proletariat in the event of revolution and then "led as rapidly as possible towards independence."⁵⁶

The Labour and Socialist International passed anticolonial resolutions at its congresses in 1900, 1904, and 1907.⁵⁷ This was partly on the basis of humanitarian concerns about colonial repression. It also reflected a changing assessment of colonialism, increasingly regarded as making little contribution to fostering the development of the forces of production. In the Comintern, this assessment was developed to its logical conclusion: imperialism was now seen as a major obstacle to the development of the forces of production. For Lenin, imperialism no longer played a progressive role in promoting capitalist development.⁵⁸ The bourgeois democratic revolutions of the colonial and semicolonial world were therefore necessarily anti-imperialist, and must struggle against both local backwardness and foreign domination.

The initial Comintern theses on the national and colonial questions instructed Communists in these countries to support "revolutionary liberation movements" that were willing to break with imperialism, stating that where capitalism was not

“fully developed,” the struggle was primarily against feudalism and imperialism.⁵⁹ The Comintern theses on the Eastern question, likewise, argued for “the most radical solution of the tasks of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, which aims at the conquest of political independence.”⁶⁰ In this context, the bourgeois democratic revolution was also a national democratic one, as it had an anti-imperialist content.

By 1928, these ideas were explicitly formulated as the two-stage theory, which has dominated Communist parties in the less developed countries ever since. The task of the bourgeois democratic revolution was seen as so essential that both Lenin and Mao were willing to suggest that it must be led by the Communist Party where necessary.⁶¹ A “bourgeois revolution expresses the needs of capitalist development,” and is “*in the highest degree advantageous to the proletariat.*”⁶²

For Mao, the “chief targets at this stage of the Chinese revolution” were not capitalism, or capitalists as such, but “imperialism and feudalism, the bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries and the landlord class of our own country” as well as “the bourgeois reactionaries who collaborate with the imperialist and feudal forces.”⁶³ The key tasks were a “national revolution to overthrow imperialism” and a “democratic revolution to overthrow the feudal landlord oppression,” by an alliance of four classes—proletariat, peasant, petty bourgeois, and national bourgeois—led by the CCP: “Our present policy is to regulate capitalism, not to destroy it.”⁶⁴ This was followed in the 1950s by the period of “building socialism” and “socialist construction,” mainly based on extending state control of the peasantry in order to extract surplus that would finance industrialisation.⁶⁵

Many anarchists and syndicalists were openly sceptical of the determinist Marxist theory of history. On one level, as we have seen, this reflected a different yardstick for understanding progress and development. On another, the broad anarchist tradition was uncomfortable with Marx’s view that history moved in a straight line toward a better future. Both Bakunin and Kropotkin showed more than a hint of teleological thinking, but both generally advocated a more open-ended, voluntaristic, and humanistic model of history. For Bakunin, Marx’s position led him to regard the defeat of the peasant uprisings of feudal Europe as beneficial to the cause of human emancipation in general. If the “peasants are the natural representatives of reaction,” and the “modern, military, bureaucratic state” that emerged from these defeats aided the “slow, but always progressive” movement of history, it followed that the “triumph of the centralised, despotic state” was “an essential condition for the coming Social Revolution.”⁶⁶

This amounted, in Bakunin’s view, to supporting the defeat of popular movements and the expansion of a hostile state power. The result was the “out-and-out cult of the state” that led Marx to endorse some of the worst acts of the ruling classes. This sort of thinking led to a nationalist agenda: Marx’s support for the rising Germany, regardless of its rationale, made him a de facto “German patriot” who desired the glory and power of the German state above all, a “Bismarck of socialism.”⁶⁷ In contrast to Marx, Bakunin and Kropotkin regarded all states—not least modern capitalist ones—as obstacles to the liberation of the popular classes.

Scientific Marxism’s claim to a special understanding of history and its vision of a single linear history were also viewed with a good deal of scepticism. For Bakunin, Marx’s view of history led him to treat the horrors of the past as necessary

evils, rather than simply as evils, and to assume that the events of history were necessary for the cause of ultimate emancipation and therefore progressive. This prevented him from seeing that history did not simply move forward but often moved backward or sideways. It was full of accidents and tragedies, and even the forces of production did not inexorably expand over time. While the "necessity of dying when one is bitten by a mad dog" was inevitable but hardly desirable, so too were there many events in history that were inevitable but must still be condemned "with all the energy of which we are capable in the interest of our social and individual morality."⁶⁸

Marxism's teleological view of history, Kropotkin argued, was rooted in metaphysical ideas that had no rational basis. The Marxists had failed to "free themselves from the metaphysical fictions of old." Kropotkin insisted that "social life is incomparably more complicated, and incomparably more interesting for practical purposes" than "we should be led to believe if we judged by metaphysical formulae." He thought it was possible to develop a single, overarching theory of society, but added this must be through the "natural-scientific method, the method of induction and deduction," with evidence and logic used to test different hypothesis.⁶⁹

For Rocker, Marx remained influenced by philosophies like those of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel that held "every social phenomenon must be regarded as a deterministic manifestation of the naturally necessary course of events." Nevertheless, while it was possible to discover inexorable laws for the natural world that applied with "iron necessity," society was more complicated and unpredictable, and the direction of change was indeterminate, being the product of an incredible diversity of motives and decisions. Marx's historical "laws" were a system of "political and social astrology" with a predictive power "of no greater significance than the claim of those wise women who pretend to be able to read the destinies of man in teacups or in the lines of the hand."⁷⁰

While anarchism itself was a product of the capitalist world and the working class it created, many anarchists and syndicalists rejected the view that capitalism would inexorably lead to socialism. This was partly a critique of Marx's vision of how capitalism would develop. Rocker, for instance, doubted Marx's theory of the inevitable centralisation of capital.⁷¹ Malatesta pointed out that small and midsize companies were a typical, not a transitory, feature of capitalism, and formed a considerable part of the economy, even expanding in numbers alongside the growth of large centralised firms.⁷² He added that the working class itself did not necessarily become unified by the expansion of capitalism; it remained highly internally differentiated, and it was often the workers themselves who entrenched these divisions within their own ranks.⁷³

The matter went beyond a simple empirical critique to questions of strategy. Berkman, for one, insisted that it was a fallacy to claim that capitalism would inevitably be replaced by socialism: "If the emancipation of labour is a 'historic mission,' then history will see to it that it is carried out no matter what we may think, feel, or do about it. The attitude makes human effort unnecessary, superfluous; because 'what must be will be.' Such a fantastic notion is destructive to all initiative."⁷⁴

Likewise, for Malatesta, it was not the march of history that would unite the popular classes but the political work of revolutionaries.⁷⁵ For Rocker, the recogni-

tion of the centrality of human choice and will provided the basis for a truly revolutionary theory of history. If people could change the world by “human hand and human mind,” the popular classes could prepare the “way for a reshaping of social life.”⁷⁶ What was necessary was the “new faith” of which Bakunin spoke. For Berkman,

There is no power outside of man which can free him, none which can charge him with any “mission.” ... It is not the “mission” but the interest of the proletariat to emancipate itself. ... If labour does not consciously and actively strive for it, it will never happen.⁷⁷

Without this new consciousness, even a terrible capitalist crisis would not necessarily be replaced by socialism; it would more likely lead to an economic reconstruction in which the popular classes were crushed, such as a totalitarian state capitalism.⁷⁸ What happened depended, ultimately, on the choices made by the popular classes.

When Marx said of Bakunin “economic conditions do not matter to him,” he also remarked that “will, not economic conditions, is the foundation of his social revolution.”⁷⁹ If we qualify this by adding that Bakunin had in mind *conscious* will, informed by the “new faith,” Marx was perfectly correct. Bakunin was quite explicit on this issue: the anarchists do not want a revolution that was “realisable only in the remote future” but rather the “completed and real emancipation of all workers, not only in some but in all nations, ‘developed’ and ‘undeveloped.’”⁸⁰ It was not a question of struggling against, for instance, landlordism in order to facilitate the further development of capitalism but of struggling against landlordism where necessary, and capitalism where necessary, and destroying both; it was not a question of waiting for the transformation of the peasantry into proletarians but of uniting both popular classes in an international class struggle.

There was no need for the capitalist stage to be completed or even begun. Bakunin stressed the possibility that Russian peasant villages, organised through the semidemocratic commune (the *mir* or *obshchina*) could help make the revolution. Again, consistent with the emphasis on ideas as the key to changing society, he asserted that the *mir* itself must change if it were to play a revolutionary role; it must overcome its “shameful patriarchal regime,” lack of individual freedom, “cult of the Tsar,” isolation from other villages, and the influence of rich landlords on the village. This required that the “most enlightened peasants” take the lead in remaking the *mir*, linking with the working class, and uniting the villages. Radical intellectuals could play a part too, but only if they went to the people to “share their life, their poverty, their cause, and their desperate revolt.”⁸¹

The theme that peasant cultural traditions could facilitate revolution, if suitably reinvented, appears repeatedly in anarchist writings. It was stressed, for example, by Flores Magón, looking at Mexican peasant communities, and has appeared more recently in the writings of Nigerian anarchists.⁸² Born to a poor mestizo family in 1874, Flores Magón was initially a radical liberal (in the Latin American sense of a progressive democrat) who aimed at political reforms.⁸³ He was involved in university protests against the dictator Porfirio Díaz, edited *El Demócrata* (“The Democrat”) and then *Regeneración* (“Regeneration”) with his brother Jesús, and worked from exile in the United States starting in 1904. He founded the Mexican

Liberal Party (PLM), which organised armed uprisings in 1906 and 1908 as well as unions and strikes, became an anarchist and made the PLM into a largely anarchist body, and was arrested in 1912. Sentenced to twenty years in 1918, he died in Leavenworth Prison, Kansas, in 1922.

Kropotkin, Berkman, and Rocker developed another argument against the need for a capitalist stage.⁸⁴ Capitalism continually created obstacles to the realisation of human creativity and productivity through alienating work, low wages, unequal education, the use of new technologies to maximise profits and cut labour costs, economic crises, and unequal economic development within and between countries. This crippled the creativity and capacities of the popular classes.

An anarchist society, on the other hand, would achieve great advances in technology and scientific knowledge as labour was emancipated, work restructured, and a “general scientific education” was provided to all, “especially the learning of the scientific method, the habit of correct thinking, the ability to generalise from facts and make more or less correct deductions.”⁸⁵ This would provide the basis for an emancipatory technology and a prosperous society, created by the popular classes rather than inherited from the old ruling class. It was not necessary to wait for capitalism to create the material basis for freedom; freedom would create its own material basis.

The Vanguard and the State

In claiming that his theory was scientific, Marx was no different from, say, Kropotkin or Reclus, who saw their own theories as scientific. And both classical Marxists and anarchists were really developing social scientific theories in that they sought to find explanatory models of society that were empirically verifiable and logically consistent. Claims to scientific status are the common currency of modern ideologies. What classical Marxism also claimed, however, was that its theory was an “extraordinary and very superior theory of knowledge” that originated among middle-class intellectuals, but was able to transcend its social origins, and that must be embodied in the revolutionary party, with the sole right to lead the masses.⁸⁶

Classical Marxism purported to alone understand the movement of history and express the fundamental interests of the proletariat; it was, in fact, the only legitimate ideology of the working class. The Communists

do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement [but instead] always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole. The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the lines of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.⁸⁷

It was the Marxist character of the revolutionary party—bearing in it the “true” destiny of the working class—that entitled it alone to lead the working class to socialism via the dictatorship of the proletariat. For Lenin, there could “be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working masses themselves in the pro-

cess of their movement, the only choice is—either bourgeois or socialist ideology.”⁸⁸ By itself, the working class could only generate an economic consciousness, and this was a bourgeois consciousness. Citing Kautsky, Lenin declared that the radical intellectuals must bring “socialist ideology” to the working class from without. Even if—as Lenin was well aware—the Bolsheviks were disproportionately drawn from the middle class, they alone truly understood and represented proletarian interests.

Even on this level, the argument for the revolutionary party did not necessarily entail an authoritarian relationship between party and class. It was when the claim to a unique truth was welded to the strategy of the dictatorship of the proletariat that the transition to a claim to *rule* was made and the formula for a one-party dictatorship through an authoritarian state was written. On the one hand, the dictatorship of the proletariat was a “centralised organisation of force, of violence,” and “undivided power.” On the other, it was the revolutionary party that alone represented the proletariat, from which it followed that a proletarian dictatorship was equivalent to—and indeed required—party dictatorship:

By educating the workers’ party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat, capable of assuming power and *leading the whole people* to socialism, of directing and organising the new system, of being the teacher, the guide, the leader of all the working and exploited people in organising their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie.⁸⁹

The “revolutionary dictatorship of a proletarian party” was an “objective necessity” due to “the heterogeneity of the revolutionary class.”⁹⁰ And anyone who refuses to recognise that the “leadership of the Communist Party and the state power of the people’s dictatorship” are conditions for revolutionary change “is no communist.”⁹¹ “Only he is a Marxist who extends the recognition of the class struggle to the recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat.”⁹²

The working class as a whole could not rule since it was infused with “bourgeois ideology” and was politically heterogeneous. Every view that was not truly Marxist was antiproletarian and counterrevolutionary by definition. In Russia, the Bolsheviks were only one wing of a deeply Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDRP); their main rivals were the Mensheviks. Yet, for Lenin, the Bolsheviks alone were revolutionary and proletarian; even the Mensheviks were “henchmen and hangers-on” of the capitalists, while “anarchism and anarcho-sindicalism are *bourgeois* trends ... irreconcilably opposed ... to socialism.”⁹³

For Bakunin, this linking of a claim to truth and a claim to rule was a recipe for an authoritarian regime that would enslave the popular classes and create a new ruling class. On the one hand, as we have seen, Bakunin viewed the state as a centralised instrument wielded by a ruling minority, and he did not believe that even the most democratic dictatorship of the proletariat could lead to popular freedom:

What does it mean that the proletariat will be elevated to a ruling class? Is it possible for the whole proletariat to stand at the head of the government? There are nearly forty million Germans. Can all forty million be members of the government? In such a case there will be no government, no state, but, if there is to be a state there will be those who are ruled and those that are slaves.⁹⁴

If the proletarian dictatorship was “really of the people” and the whole proletariat was “elevated to a ruling class,” “why eliminate it” by having the state wither away?⁹⁵ If the dictatorship was not “of the people,” why claim that it was really the “proletariat ... elevated to a ruling class” rather than a regime dominating the proletariat?

On the other hand, Bakunin argued, the dictatorship of the proletariat would really be the dictatorship of the Communists: “Mr Marx and his friends” would “liberate” the masses in “their own way,” establishing a “despotic control” over the populace, which would be a “regimented herd.”⁹⁶ The strategy for socialism through a proletarian dictatorship was, in short, the road to a dictatorship *over* the proletariat. Authoritarian methods could not create libertarian outcomes; to “*impose* freedom and equality obliterates both.”⁹⁷

A “dictatorship has no objective other than self-preservation,” wrote Bakunin, and “slavery is all that it can generate and instil in the people who suffer from it.”⁹⁸ The party and the state would develop into a new class system—the “new privileged political-scientific class,” the “state engineers,” who would hold power.⁹⁹ The revolutionary state would also have to compete with other states to survive in the international state system; given the Marxist sympathy for capitalism’s civilising mission, it might realistically be expected to embark on wars and conquests, becoming a new imperial power.¹⁰⁰

In the wake of the Russian Revolution, these themes were further developed in the broad anarchist tradition. For Berkman, the “Bolshevik idea was a dictatorship” and “that dictatorship to be in the hands of *their* political Party ... because their Party, they said, represented the best and foremost elements, the advance guard of the working class, and their Party should therefore be dictator in the name of the proletariat.”¹⁰¹ For Maximoff, Lenin’s theory of the vanguard party was an “altogether reactionary” recipe for dictatorship, rooted in the writings of Marx and Engels:

The Marxian “dictatorship of the proletariat” connotes the dictatorship of the vanguard of the working class ... the “dictatorship of the proletariat” is in the last analysis, the dictatorship of the party, and by the same logic, the adversaries and enemies of this dictatorship inevitably are ... all those who do not belong to this ruling party. And since the state of the transitional period is also the party, and since this state must ruthlessly suppress its adversaries, it follows logically that terror has to be applied against all, save a very small handful of the “vanguard of the proletariat” organised into a party.¹⁰²

Moreover, Lenin advocated a highly centralised party, based on a “stable organisation of leaders,” and rejected the “absurdity” of a “primitive” conception of democracy as participatory.¹⁰³ Since the party is organised around subordination to the leaders, who “get control of the party apparatus,” “we have the dictatorship of the leaders within the party, and the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ becomes the dictatorship of the leaders,” and ultimately, “one single leader.”¹⁰⁴

State Capitalism and Libertarian Socialism

As we have noted in the previous chapter, Bakunin and Kropotkin went on to argue that Marxist regimes would not simply be dictatorships but also class sys-

tems. The state was necessarily an instrument for the rule of a (class) minority over a (class) majority, and a party dictatorship must therefore be part of an apparatus of class rule. This was particularly true of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for it involved the centralisation of the means of production in the hands of the state and thus the party. For Marx and Engels, the revolutionary state must “centralise all instruments of production” and “increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.” While the measures could differ between countries, there were “generally applicable” measures:

1. Abolition of private property in land and application of rents of land to public purposes.

2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.

...

5. Centralisation of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly.

6. Centralisation of all means of communication and transport in the hands of the state.

7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state; the bringing into cultivation of wastelands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.

8. Equal liability of all to labour. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.¹⁰⁵

In placing both the means of production and labour under direct state control, Bakunin contended, the revolutionary regime would be “the only banker, capitalist, organiser, and director of all national labour, and the distributor of its products.”¹⁰⁶ For Kropotkin, it would be “centralised state-capitalism,” “preached under the name of collectivism.”¹⁰⁷

Before 1917, of course, there were no such regimes and hence no way to test this hypothesis. After the Russian Revolution, a whole score of Marxist regimes were established. The death of Lenin in 1924 created a leadership crisis in the Bolshevik Party, fought out between a majority centred on Stalin and a Trotsky faction. In 1929, Trotsky was expelled from the USSR and later assassinated in Mexico under Stalin’s orders. Classical Marxism, by then largely embodied in Leninism, was split into the Stalinist mainstream, aligned with the USSR and including all the major Communist parties, and a tiny but vocal Trotskyist current. The differences between the two should not be overstated: both embraced classical Marxism and its theories, both saw the USSR as postcapitalist and progressive, and both envisaged revolution by stages in less developed countries.¹⁰⁸ It was, contrary to Trotsky’s prognosis that “Stalinism” was counterrevolutionary and unstable, the “Stalinists” who established every subsequent Marxist regime, starting with Eastern Europe, then East Asia, and then parts of Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.

There was some initial confusion among anarchists and syndicalists regarding the USSR and the Bolsheviks, who seemed far to the left of the old Labour and Socialist International, raised slogans that seemed quite libertarian, and sought to draw the syndicalist unions into a special wing of the Comintern: the Red International of Labour Unions, or “Profintern.” The soviets that arose in the 1917 revolu-

tion, and from which the USSR derived its name, were also initially democratic and self-managed popular councils, and gave Lenin by association a libertarian aura. Early news reports added to the confusion. Morgan Philips Price, a special correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian*, alleged for example that the “inner character of the Bolshevik movement” was “based on the theory of anarchy and syndicalism preached during the last century by Bakunin”; “It is not Socialism at all but Syndicalism.”¹⁰⁹

It is not surprising, then, that anarchists and syndicalists founded many of the Communist parties outside Russia—often on an openly libertarian and anti-statist platform—and that syndicalists attended the early Profintern meetings. Yet most anarchists and syndicalists came to the conclusion that the Bolshevik regime bore out Bakunin’s and Kropotkin’s predictions about the character of a revolutionary Marxist regime, pointing to the repression of Russian and Ukrainian anarchists along with the subordination of the soviets and the popular classes to the new state. Berkman’s Russian diary eloquently expresses this viewpoint:

One by one the embers of hope have died out. Terror and despotism have crushed the life born in October 1917. The slogans of the Revolution are foresworn, its ideals stifled in the blood of the people. The breath of yesterday is dooming millions to death: the shadow of today hangs like a black pall over the country. Dictatorship is trampling the masses under foot. The Revolution is dead; its spirit cries in the wilderness.¹¹⁰

Goldman held the same position.¹¹¹ The Bolshevik state was an “air-tight dictatorship,” in which “every channel of human contact is closed ... every thought is thrown back on itself and expression stifled,” a “dictatorship” that “paralysed the initiative of both the city proletariat and the peasantry.”¹¹² The “dictatorship of the proletariat had been turned into a devastating dictatorship of the Communist Party,” characterised by popular “unrest and dissatisfaction” with the “different rations and discriminations” meted out by the party. Born in a Jewish ghetto in Russia, Goldman immigrated to the United States, where she worked in various jobs, including as a seamstress and nurse.¹¹³ Becoming an anarchist and Berkman’s lover, she helped plan the attack on Frick, published *Mother Earth* from 1906 on, and was a tireless agitator and speaker. In 1910 alone, Goldman gave 120 talks in 37 cities in 25 states in the United States to 25,000 people.¹¹⁴ Jailed in 1917, and described by authorities as “one of the most dangerous women in America,” she was deported to Russia in 1919, campaigned against the Bolsheviks in the 1920s, joined the Spanish Revolution of 1936–1939, and died in 1940.

For Maximoff, too, the USSR was a class society. He described it as similar to the ancient slave-based societies, with a “slaveholding class” centred on a small “oligarchy,” characterised by “socialistic Caesarism based upon the bureaucracy—the new class which sprang from the Marxist State.”¹¹⁵ The “small class of the bureaucracy” exploited the “rest of the population ... workers, forced to give their labour energy to the State Trust ... to create the power of this Trust, at the same time increasing the economic standards of the administrative class.” It “imitated” the bourgeoisie, but was not capitalist.¹¹⁶ Its “principal economic peculiarity ... is production for use, rather than exchange,” with distribution organised by the bureaucracy rather than

the market, with all resources, including “the individual himself,” concentrated in the hands of the state.¹¹⁷

It was not clear from Maximoff’s initial analysis what dynamics shaped the mode of the production in the USSR. He argued that the system operated to increase the power and wealth of the ruling class, but this was vague. For anarchists, all class systems operate to the advantage of the ruling class.¹¹⁸ The same problem can be found in other anarchist texts of the time. Thus, Kubo Yuzuru (1903–1961), a Japanese militant from the syndicalist Libertarian Federal Council of Labour Unions of Japan (usually abbreviated as Nihon Jikyo), asserted that “Marxist class struggle does not bring an end to the strife or the contradiction of classes, but reverses the position of the opposed classes.... Their goal is to replace one ruling class with another.”¹¹⁹ Neither Maximoff nor Kubo explain why the USSR’s industrial base grew so rapidly under Stalin and his successors, or why it became an expansionist power starting in the 1930s.

Maximoff’s and Kubo’s approach nonetheless had the great merit of insisting that the USSR had a class system, and was more convincing than the notion, propounded by the elderly Kropotkin, that the Bolshevik regime was a system of “state communism.”¹²⁰ This formulation was unclear on the issue of whether the USSR was actually a class system and suggested, unlike Maximoff’s analysis, that distribution was based on need. If the USSR was communist—even state communist—why was the “devastating dictatorship of the Communist Party” associated with “different rations and discriminations,” as Goldman had reported?¹²¹ If there were different rations and discriminations, who—or rather, which class—made the decisions?

An alternative anarchist and syndicalist analysis used the idea of state capitalism, and focused on the notion that the Soviet state acted as a single capitalist conglomerate, exploiting labour and realising the surplus through the sale of commodities on behalf of a ruling class centred on the state managers who controlled the means of production. While council communists and a section of the Trotskyists also developed theories of the USSR as state capitalist, the anarchist analysis seems to have been the first of its type by socialists. The state capitalist theory was Maximoff’s initial line of reasoning. Writing in 1918, he argued,

Instead of hundreds of thousands of property owners there is now a single owner served by a whole bureaucratic system and a new “statified” morality. The proletariat is gradually being enserfed by the state. The people are being transformed into servants over whom there had risen a new class of administrators ... if the elements of class inequality are as yet indistinct, it is only a matter of time before privileges will pass to the administration.... Thus we are presently moving not towards socialism but towards state capitalism.... The single owner and state capitalism form a new dam before the waves of our social revolution.¹²²

Berkman, too, described the USSR as “a country partly State capitalistic and partly privately capitalistic,” and claimed that the state, headed by a “new class,” had become the employer instead of the individual capitalist of the past.¹²³

“Voline” (1882–1945) had a similar analysis. Voline was the pseudonym of Vsevolod Eichenbaum, who was born in 1882 to a Russian Jewish professional family. A law student radicalised by the 1905 Russian uprising, he forced into exile by

a state tribunal. In particular, he was linked to the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SR) formed in 1901. The SRs, who were divided into the Right SRs, the Left SRs, and SR Maximalists (whose views were often close to anarchism), evolved from the nineteenth-century narodniks and were by far the largest Russian revolutionary party. Voline moved to anarchism, left his exile in France for the United States in 1915 to avoid internment for antiwar activities, and returned to Russia in 1917.¹²⁴ Actively involved in the newspaper *Golos Truda*, he went to the Ukraine, where he helped found the regional anarchist federation Nabat (“Alarm Confederation of Anarchist Organisations”) and actively participated in the Ukrainian Revolution of 1918–1921, an event discussed in more detail in chapters 9 and 10. When the Bolsheviks crushed the Ukrainian anarchists, Voline went into exile, mainly in France, where he lived until his death in 1945.

Voline’s *The Unknown Revolution, 1917–1921*, is the definitive anarchist study of the Russian and Ukrainian Revolutions. Its core argument is that there was an “explicit and irreconcilable contradiction between the true Revolution,” based on the “vast and free creative movement of the labouring masses,” and “the theory and practice of authoritarianism and statism,” exemplified by the Bolsheviks.¹²⁵ The “government nationalised and monopolised everything, including speech and thought.” The Bolshevik state became the universal landlord, with the peasants “veritable serfs,” and also expropriated “the works, factories, [and] mines,” becoming the “sole initiator, organiser, and animator of the whole life of the country.”¹²⁶ It enforced its power through a centralised administration and network of police terror. Its system was “totalitarian” and “integral state capitalism”:

State-capitalism: such is the economic, financial, social and political system of the USSR, with all of its logical consequences and manifestations in all spheres of life—material, moral, and spiritual. The correct designation of this state should ... be ... USCR, meaning Union of State Capitalist Republics.... This is the most important thing. It must be understood before all else. The rest follows.¹²⁷

The situation of the Russian working class was essentially the same as that of the workers in other capitalist countries, except that there was only one employer, the party-state, in whose collective hands all the means of production were concentrated, to the benefit of the “state bourgeoisie.”¹²⁸ The peasantry fared even worse: having initially taken over the great estates in 1917, it was terrorised by the Bolsheviks beginning in 1918, lost control of the land, and by the 1930s was transformed into a class of unfree wage labourers on giant state “collective” farms.

Neither Maximoff nor Voline had much reason to regard the Bolshevik regime with sympathy. *Golos Truda* was suppressed, and both Maximoff and Voline received death sentences. In 1921, both men were in jail, went on a hunger strike, and were only released after the intercession of syndicalists attending Profintern meetings. Such experiences obviously biased the two against Bolshevism, but cannot be lightly dismissed, and form part of their case against the USSR and its rulers. Rocker reached the same conclusions independently:

That which today is called by this name [socialism] in Russia—and unthinking people abroad are repeating it mechanically—is in reality only the last word of modern monopoly capitalism which uses the economic

dictatorship of the trusts and cartels for the purpose of eliminating any undesirable competition and reducing the entire economic life to certain definite norms. The last link of such a development is not socialism but state capitalism with all its inevitable accompaniments of a new economic feudalism and a new serfdom; and that is the system which today is actually operating in Russia.¹²⁹

There are obvious Marxist objections to the anarchist theory of state capitalism. One is that the law of value did not operate properly in the USSR, partly because the state as sole proprietor did not operate a competitive internal market. As we have seen, however, the broad anarchist tradition does not see the law of value as a central feature of capitalism, and does not see centralised price setting as a particular objection to a theory of state capitalism.

A related objection is the view that competition did not exist within the Soviet economy, as it was centrally planned by the state. Yet it could be argued that as competition under capitalism does not take place *within* firms, and the "USCR" was a single giant firm, competition would rather take place at the international level with other capitalist firms. This suggests that the twentieth-century competition between the United States and the USSR was not a rivalry between two radically different systems but a form of *intercapitalist* competition. A third Marxist objection to the state capitalist thesis centres on the question of the ownership of the means of production. This is a complicated issue, but it is most revealing about the different ways in which classical Marxists and the broad anarchist tradition understood class itself, and will be discussed below in some depth.

For now, it is worth noting that the anarchists and syndicalists contended that the evolution of the USSR into a class system and ruthless dictatorship was not a deviation from classical Marxism but its logical conclusion. Stalin did not "fall from the moon," for all of the key features later called Stalinist—repression, labour camps, the suppression of dissent, the crushing of unions and the peasantry, and an official dogma enforced by the state—were created from 1917 onward, when Lenin and Trotsky held sway.¹³⁰ If the system was state capitalism, it also followed that the broad anarchist tradition should not support either of the sides in the post-1945 Cold War rivalry between the West and the East, for the two sides were rival *capitalist* blocs pursuing ruling class agendas. There was nothing progressive or socialist about the East bloc, and its collapse in many regions in 1989–1991 was *not* a defeat for the popular classes or socialism but a moment in the development of class society. Indeed, inasmuch as class struggle played a critical role in this collapse and opened some democratic space, the crisis of the East bloc was a popular *victory*.

Economic Determinism and the Broad Anarchist Tradition

Earlier, we noted that the "public" Marx stressed the scientific Marxism dimension of his thought. In this persona, Marx presented the "social world as imposing itself on persons, rather than being a fluid medium open to human intervention," and saw capitalism as a "stage in a social evolution *destined* to give rise to another, higher society—socialism."¹³¹ This outlook was at odds with the strand of critical Marxism in Marx's thought, and a number of Marxists have developed Marx's theories along more humanistic lines. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that Marx held many

avowedly deterministic views, and he took his public stand against the utopian socialists and the anarchists on precisely this basis.

More specifically, Marx saw history as primarily driven by economic developments. The relations and forces of production, on the one hand, were the base on which a superstructure of culture, law, philosophy, and politics—including the state—arose, with the superstructure viewed as determined by the needs of the base and functional to its reproduction. On the other hand, Marx tended to assign primacy to the forces of production over the relations of production, presenting the inexorable expansion of the forces of production as the primary mover in human history, the factor that necessitated ongoing revolutions in the relations of production, with new relations of production selected by their ability to facilitate the further expansion of the forces of production. Thus,

At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or—this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.¹³²

Likewise, for Engels,

all past history ... was the history of class struggles; ... these warring classes of society are always the product of the modes of production and of exchange—in a word, of the *economic* conditions of their time; that the economic structure of society always furnishes the real basis, starting from which we can alone work out the ultimate explanation of the whole superstructure of juridical and political institutions as well as of the religious, philosophical and other ideas of a given historical period ... the final causes of all social changes are to be sought ... in changes in the modes of production and exchange. They are to be sought, not in the *philosophy*, but in the *economics*, of each particular epoch. All moral theories are the *product*, in the last analysis, of the *economic stage* which society reached at that particular epoch.¹³³

The primacy of the “economic structure of society” as the “real basis” of society resounds throughout classical Marxism, and may be seen, *inter alia*, in Marx’s definition of class as the (non)ownership of the means of *production*, description of class systems as relations of *production* that arise from a particular development of the forces of *production*, view of the state as the instrument of the *economically* dominant class, hypothesis that the evolution of the *productive* forces lays the basis for socialism, and criticism of Bakunin for ignoring the *economic* conditions for social revolution. Marx called his model the “materialist” conception of history.

Both Marx and Engels qualified their conception somewhat, cautioning against a crude reading of the superstructure from the base—Engels speaks of the base as the “ultimate explanation” of the superstructure, the site of the “final causes” in the “last analysis”—but this does not fundamentally break with the economic determinism of the overall model. It opens the space to admit the possibility of some autonomous development in the superstructure, but does not admit of the

possibility that the superstructure can have fundamental and independent effects on the base, which remains the site of “final causes” and the “real basis” of society. The assertion that the base must be the “ultimate explanation” is exempted from verification, providing a “real” cause that is freed from the very scientific methodology on which Marx prided himself, and on which basis Marx declared his theory as uniquely suited to represent the working class.

Marx’s “materialist” conception of history is a profound and immensely compelling explanatory framework, capable of generating stunning insights. It is not surprising that the broad anarchist tradition responded to the doctrine in a range of ways. A section of the tradition embraced the model uncritically. IWW militants Haywood and Frank Bohm, for example, believed the “great facts of history ... were created by a deeper social force ... the economic or material force.”¹³⁴ Born in 1869 in the United States, Haywood worked from his youth, was radicalised by the execution of the Chicago martyrs, became a leading figure in the militant Western Federation of Miners, and helped form the IWW in 1905.¹³⁵ He served the Wobblies in a number of leading roles, even after the miners withdrew from the IWW. His views shifted toward syndicalism, and in 1913 he was among the syndicalists expelled from the Socialist Party of America (SPA) and “could not have cared less.”¹³⁶ In 1917, the U.S. federal government raided the IWW as part of the Red Scare, and Haywood was prosecuted. Found guilty, he fled to the USSR in 1921. In his last years he helped organise an unusual (and state-sanctioned) experiment in self-management in the Urals and Siberia called the Autonomous Industrial Colony. He died in 1928 and the Colony was closed by Stalin that year.

An alternative approach in the broad anarchist tradition is to formally adopt the materialist conception of history, but to use it in a critical and nuanced manner. The contemporary Italian Platformist group, the Federazione dei Comunisti Anarchici (FdCA), for example, is a “firm” supporter of “historical materialism” yet rejects teleological views of history, and denies the notion that any clear distinction can be drawn between the base and the superstructure.¹³⁷ This is an enormous modification of the theory and implicitly breaks with the materialist conception of the primacy of the economic factor.

This is also close to the approach adopted by Bakunin, Kropotkin, and others who maintained that economic factors were central but not necessarily primary. Economic factors shaped society in a range of profound ways, but cannot be taken as primary and determinant in every situation. Bakunin famously declared himself a “materialist,” yet went on to argue that Marx ignored “other factors in history, such as the ever-present reaction of political, juridical and religious institutions on the economic situation.”¹³⁸

Such “factors” were shaped by the “economic situation,” but also had independent effects on the economy. For instance, in Bakunin’s view, political cultures played an important role: “Even apart from and independent of the economic conditions in each country,” the “temperament and particular character of each race and each people,” arising from particular historical and social conditions, affected the “intensity of the spirit of revolt.”¹³⁹ Bakunin also alluded to historical events that had no economic basis and undermined the forces of production. He cited the destruction of the libraries of antiquity by the early Christians, which did not follow

from economic causes and was economically retrogressive in its effects.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, Bakunin noted, the classical Marxist strategy of a revolutionary state that acted as midwife to a new mode of production was inconsistent with Marx's own materialist theory of history, for it meant that the superstructure, which Marx treated as a reflection of the base, could revolutionise the base and fundamentally change society.¹⁴¹

Rocker acknowledged that "economic conditions and the special forms of social production" had played a key part in the "evolution of humanity," and added that the recognition of the "influence and significance of economic conditions on the structure of social life" lay at the heart of socialism. Marx, however, was incorrect in suggesting that "every historical event" could be traced to and explained on the basis of "the prevailing conditions of production," or that as a result, there were universal laws that shaped society and could be used to predict future events.¹⁴²

Many "thousands of events in history ... cannot be explained by purely economic reasons, or by them alone," observed Rocker, and this directed attention to factors such as the will to power, culture, and competition between states. The destruction of heresies by the medieval Catholic Church in Europe, for example, was an attempt at "the unification of faith" that was rooted in the church's "efforts at political power."¹⁴³ The state was no mere puppet of economic forces, but could and did act in ways contrary to the development of the forces of production; even where it promoted the forces of production, it did not follow that this was done at the best of those forces.

The long-term economic decline of Christian Spain from the sixteenth century onward, starting with the expulsion of the Moors and the Jews, was one example.¹⁴⁴ The rulers of the state were driven in this instance by religious fanaticism, a desire to consolidate power, and the imperatives of the alliance of state and church. The ruling class was also often concerned with a drive to maintain and expand state power, as was the case in the First World War, where the struggle for dominance in Europe between the great powers was as important as economic gain.¹⁴⁵ It was also too crude to discern in the motivations of capitalists nothing but a quest for economic aggrandisement. The "morbid desire to make millions of men submissive to a definite will," declared Rocker, "is frequently more evident in the typical representatives of modern capitalism than are purely economic considerations or the prospect of greater material profit," and the "possession of great wealth" is itself often pursued primarily as a means to access "enormous power."¹⁴⁶

The Anarchist Understanding of Class

Both classical Marxism and the broad anarchist tradition were models in which class was absolutely central. It would be a serious mistake, however, to assume that their understandings of class were the same. For Marx and Engels, as we have seen, class was a relation of production and premised on the ownership of the means of production: "By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern Capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage-labour"; and "by proletariat, the class of modern wage-labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour-power in order to live."¹⁴⁷ In

this sense, the state was an instrument of class power, but only in the sense that it was an instrument of an *economically* dominant class; it was a superstructure that arose from an *economic* base and thus reflected the imperatives of that base.

It is, on the other hand, only possible to understand the anarchist and syndicalist claim that a state must generate a new ruling class, and the contention that state managers are themselves part of a ruling class, by recognising that the broad anarchist tradition sees class as premised on the control of a range of resources and *not* only on economic ownership. We have touched on this issue in the previous chapter, where we saw that Bakunin spoke of the Serbian patriots becoming a ruling class in a country that had “no nobles, no big landowners, no industrialists and no very wealthy merchants” at independence.¹⁴⁸ His view that the patriots who controlled the newly independent state were a “new bureaucratic aristocracy” cannot be understood unless it is noted that class, in Bakunin’s thinking, is not just about the relations of production but also the *relations of domination*, not just about the ownership of the means of production but also about the ownership of the means of *coercion*—the capacity to physically enforce decisions—and the means of *administration*—the instruments that govern society.

Viewed in this way, the unequal ownership of the means of production is a necessary but not sufficient description of a class system. In the first place, the ownership of the means of production can only be used for exploitation if buttressed by relations of domination between the classes. If, as Marx argued, workers sell their labour power for less than the value of their actual labour, then the process of exploitation requires the deployment of both coercive and administrative resources to ensure that more work is done than is remunerated. For Bakunin, the “merchandise” that the worker “sold to his employer” is “his labour, his personal services, the productive forces of his body, mind, and spirit that are found in him and are inseparable from his person—it is therefore himself.” To force this self to work for another, to another’s benefit, requires that “the employer ... watch over him, either directly or by means of overseers; every day during working hours and under controlled conditions, the employer will be the owner of his actions and movements.”¹⁴⁹

Even in the workplace, then, where the relations of production are central, they are necessarily intertwined with the relations of domination, and the processes of exploitation and domination are interlinked. Nevertheless, given the rejection of economic determinism it is not possible to assert the primacy of one over the other. If the state is the ultimate guarantor of domination in the workplace, it also exercises domination outside the workplace, and not simply for the purposes of ensuring exploitation: the state controls persons and territories by virtue of the concentration of many of the means of coercion and administration in its hands in order to effect its rule. In the case of postindependence Serbia, the relations of domination preceded the creation of the relations of production enabling exploitation; in turn, the exploitation that arose helped to reinforce the domination. The “State ... and capitalism are inseparable concepts,” said Kropotkin, “bound together ... by the bond of cause and effect, effect and cause.”¹⁵⁰

From a strict Marxist perspective, the president of a country must be regarded as a waged worker, sharing the same position as the working class more generally; from an anarchist perspective, a president is by definition part of the ruling class,

and if great wealth is a means to obtain state power, state power is also a means to obtain great wealth. Here, presidents, kings, generals, members of parliament, mayors, directors of government departments, and heads of state companies are as much a part of the ruling class as are mining magnates or factory owners.

It follows that when Bakunin or Kropotkin speak of the *ruling class*, they do not simply mean the bourgeoisie, the *capitalists*, like Marx, but include also landlords and state managers. This class has common interests, although it is not necessarily a monolithic group with a single mind. While the relations of production and the relations of domination are deeply intertwined, and form different and mutually reinforcing elements of a single class system, they can also contradict one another. For example, the state might seek a war that disrupts the process of exploitation; likewise, the need to legitimise the larger class system and thereby aid in the reproduction of the relations of domination might lead to reforms that place limits on the rate of exploitation.

It is also possible to discern a somewhat wider understanding of the relations of production in the broad anarchist tradition than in the cruder forms of classical Marxism. This understanding is revealed by revisiting the issue of state capitalism. The exiled Trotsky insisted that the USSR was a proletarian dictatorship because the means of production were not “privately” held in the form of inheritable property.¹⁵¹ He believed that the victory of Stalin represented the victory of a “bureaucracy” that was not yet a class, and whose rise signified the degeneration of the USSR, but was not a break with its fundamentally postcapitalist character. Just as a union bureaucracy distorts a union yet leaves the union basically proletarian in character, the Stalinist bureaucracy distorted the USSR, yet left it a (degenerated) workers’ state.

Leaving aside Trotsky’s view that the negative features of the USSR arose with Stalin and his conceit that he had not been part of the ruling bureaucracy, there is an important point here. This is the narrow conception of ownership of the means of production that allows Trotsky to claim that a company director who does not own shares is not really a capitalist and that “nationalized” state property is by definition not “private” property. In arguing that the USSR was state capitalist, the anarchists revealed a differing perspective on the issue: there was “a single owner served by a whole bureaucratic system and a new ‘statisted’ morality” operating a system of state capitalism; a “new class” had replaced the individual capitalist of the past; the state was the owner of “the works, factories, [and] mines,” operating an “integral state capitalism”; and it was the “last word of modern monopoly capitalism which uses the economic dictatorship of the trusts and cartels for the purpose of eliminating any undesirable competition.”¹⁵²

These contentions only make sense if the broad anarchist tradition posits a somewhat broader understanding of ownership than that of Trotsky. A ruling class can own property collectively through a state and deprive another class of ownership. This is legal ownership—inasmuch as appointment to posts, the rights and powers that accompanied particular offices, and the procedures governing decisions are legally defined—but it is not the individualised legal ownership that Trotsky had in mind. It is institutional ownership, in which a ruling class collectively holds the means of production through the state apparatus, rather than through stock certificates. At the same time, ownership involves more than simply a right to allocate

existing property to one's heirs. It also entails *control* over the uses to which the means of production are put—that is, decisive power over fundamental decisions regarding major investments and day-to-day utilisation. In state capitalism, then, exploitation and domination are even more closely linked than in private capitalism, concentrating class rule to an extraordinary extent, accounting for Bakunin's and Kropotkin's use of images like “barracks” and “autocracy,” respectively, to describe such regimes.¹⁵³

Finally, it is necessary to examine the question of why *class* is regarded as central to the anarchists and syndicalists. There are innumerable forms of hierarchy and inequality in society, after all, and the victims in every case have an interest in changing the social relations that oppress them. Moreover, anarchists are committed to the removal of all forms of economic and social inequality, and regard their revolution as emancipating all humanity. Why, then, do anarchists and syndicalists advocate a class-based strategy for social change, and link women's emancipation and national liberation to a class framework, rather than favour a decentralised multiplicity of emancipatory struggles, or subordinate class issues to feminist or anti-imperialist concerns?

The answer lies in the unique character of class inequality. Only class, of all the social relations, involves both domination *and* exploitation; *only* the popular classes are exploited, and *only* exploited classes are able to create a society without exploitation, for they alone do not have a vested interest in exploitation. If exploitation is an integral feature of modern society and human freedom requires the abolition of exploitation, then class struggle alone can emancipate humanity. Viewed from this perspective, forms of oppression that are not strictly reducible to class—such as gender and race—must be addressed within a class framework, for this provides the only basis for general emancipation; conversely, it is only through opposing divisions in the working class—divisions that are based on prejudice and unfair discrimination—that the class revolution, which can alone emancipate humanity, is possible. As Bakunin put it, “You are working for humanity.... The working class [and peasantry] has today become the sole representative of the great and sacred cause of humanity. The future now belongs to the workers: those in the fields and those in the factories and cities.”¹⁵⁴

These points bring us back to the broad anarchist tradition's advocacy of counterpower and counterculture. While social structure is important, agency is vital, and the anarchists and syndicalists stress the centrality of self-organisation and ideas in shaping society. If one's class position generates basic sets of class interests shaped by one's position in the larger system of class rule—and provides the broad parameters of individual consciousness and choice—real living individuals interpret those interests and organise their actions in a wide range of ways, even ways that contradict their basic class interests.

If there is a degree of correspondence between social position and individual outlook, then there is also space for contradictions between the two. Bakunin, for instance, held that the difference between the irrational prejudices of the popular classes and the ruling classes was that “the masses' prejudices are based only on their ignorance, and totally oppose their very interest, while the bourgeoisie's are based precisely on its class interests and resist counteraction by bourgeois science itself.”¹⁵⁵

Here we have claims that ideas have their own irreducible logic, that it cannot be assumed that classes always act in a unified manner, and that popular class unity is in large part the product of the battle of ideas, rather than the inexorable outcome of capitalist development.

Thus, for Rocker, class divisions and class interests are facts. Every “larger country contains many distinctions of a climatic, cultural, economic and general social nature,” “between its great cities, its highly developed industrial regions, its out-of-the-world villages and mountain valleys to which hardly a glimmer of modern life has penetrated.” This corresponds in part to class, for the “differences of economic interest and intellectual effort within the nation have naturally developed special habits and modes of living among the members of the different social classes,” and “every stratum of society develops its special habits of life into which a stranger penetrates with difficulty.”¹⁵⁶

What “national customs and morals,” Rocker asks, can be shared by a “modern industrial magnate and a common labourer,” by “a society lady surrounded by every luxury and a cottage housewife in the Silesian mountains,” by “one of the members of Berlin’s ‘millionaire quarter’ and a Ruhr miner”? The classes have almost no points of “intellectual contact”: workers find it difficult to understand that there is a “purely human” dimension to the capitalist, while the capitalist sees the worker as a “total stranger,” often with “openly displayed contempt.”¹⁵⁷

Yet there are also deep divisions between the worker and peasant, a “sharp antagonism of town and country,” and a gulf between the “intellectual leaders of the nation and the great masses of the working people,” affecting even those intellectuals involved in the popular movements.¹⁵⁸ There are also many divisions within each class, and a wide range of possible views; a worker in exactly the same objective circumstances might be a Christian, a Muslim, or a Jew.¹⁵⁹ Likewise, while the “mental attitude” of command and the “brutal spirit of mastery” shapes many capitalists, others support reform movements that are “by no means determined” by their economic interests, such as the abolition of monarchy and the power of the church.¹⁶⁰

If these variations cannot be explained simply by reference to class position, ideas must be independent variables, even if it is arguable that the class system sets the broad *boundaries* of subjectivity. It follows that the ruling classes are not a monolithic entity with a single mind, or necessarily understand perfectly their own interests or act in a rational manner to secure those interests in the most effective manner. It is possible for the rich and powerful to fall out among themselves over issues of nationality, politics, or the question of future reform as well as to fight civil wars, and it is equally possible for them to make serious mistakes. There is no reason to regard the popular classes as different from the ruling ones in any of these respects.

Thus, anarchists like Bakunin and Rocker lay the basis for the rejection of functionalist reasoning, which when coupled with a crude class analysis, posits that classes always act in accord with their own best interests and infers that their actions are always somehow functional to those interests. This is a form of circular reasoning—if capitalists, for example, always act in their own best interests, it is difficult to find an action that cannot be construed as functional to their ultimate interests—and follows from a structuralist view of the class system as an automated

social machine, rather than as a society of people with all their biases, complexities, and shortcomings.

In Conclusion: Toward an Anarchist Social Analysis

In *Anarchist Communism*, Kropotkin stressed the anarchist commitment to careful social analysis; the “method followed by the anarchist thinker,” he argued, “entirely differs from that followed by the utopists,” for it “does not resort to metaphysical conceptions” but “studies human society as it is now and as it was in the past.”¹⁶¹ Anarchists should develop a nuanced and careful social analysis, one that is empirically verifiable and theoretically logical, and that can provide a basis for social transformation.

How well do the anarchists and syndicalists fare? In this chapter, we have suggested that the broad anarchist tradition was profoundly influenced by both Proudhon and Marx (see figure 3.1), but did its best to eschew determinism, teleological views of history, economic reductionism, and functionalism. The key elements of an anarchist social analysis have emerged in schematic form. Anarchist analysis, in its most sophisticated form, centres on the notion that class is a principal feature of modern society and thus that class analysis must be key to understanding society. At the same time, it takes ideas, motives, and actions seriously, and avoids monistic models of society.


In rejecting economic determinism and stressing the importance of subjectivity, though, this analysis does not replace one form of determinism with another. Reacting against Marxism, for example, postmodernists adopted an idealist form of determinism, in which reality consists of discourses and texts that determine the social world but cannot be scientifically tested, for every person is trapped within a discourse and must therefore reproduce the discourse in the process of research and analysis. Postmodernists are, like Stirner, relativists for whom truth is a matter of opinion, and the most widely accepted truth is that imposed by the most powerful people. This is not the route anarchism takes.

Without necessarily going as far as Kropotkin, whose later writings optimistically claimed society could be analysed with the precision of the “exact natural sciences,” anarchism maintains that the validity of theories can be tested against a reality external to the subject.¹⁶² A fairly sophisticated social analysis that does not reduce the social world to class, or class to economics, and that avoids structuralism as well as idealism yet still takes class as central, is present in anarchist thought.

It follows from these points that anarchists and syndicalists cannot take refuge in the faith that history will automatically generate a revolution. The transition from a class-in-itself—existing objectively, with its own interests, but disorganised—to a class-for-itself—organised to pursue its own agenda and aims—requires activism and ideological work. In his discussion of anarchism, Berkman stressed that no fundamental social change can ever take place until the working masses themselves rejected the “present institutions” that oppressed them—that is, until they changed their minds.¹⁶³ This change requires recognition of Berkman’s key point that “the Idea is the Thing.” The *possibility* of a revolutionary class struggle arises from the

character of modern society, in other words, but a revolutionary popular movement has to be *politically* constituted.

Figure 3.1
The Anarchist Tradition



Notes

1. K. J. Kenafick, "The Life of Bakunin," in *Marxism, Freedom, and the State*, ed. K. J. Kenafick (London: Freedom Press, 1990), 15.
2. Guérin, "Marxism and Anarchism," 118-19.
3. For a contrary view, see *ibid.*, 124-25.
4. Bakunin, "The Paris Commune and the Idea of the State," 263.
5. *Ibid.*, 263.
6. M. Bakunin, "On the Cooperative Movement," in *Bakunin on Anarchism*, ed. S. Dolgoff (Montréal: Black Rose, 1980), 399.
7. *Ibid.*, 399.
8. See, especially, Brogan, *Proudhon*, chapters 4 and 5.

9. Bakunin, quoted in Guillaume, "A Biographical Sketch [Bakunin]," 26.
10. Bakunin, *The Capitalist System*, n.p.
11. While there are numerous general guides to Marxist theory, including his theory of capitalism, the following ones are highly recommended: B. Fine, *Marx's "Capital"* (London: Macmillan, 1975); A. Giddens, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim, and Max Weber* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); D. McLellan, *Karl Marx: His Life and Thought* (New York: HarperCollins, 1976); R. Miliband, *Marxism and Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). The reader who wishes to tackle Marx's own texts on economics is advised to start with his *Value, Price, and Profit*, before moving to volume 1 of his masterwork, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*. See K. Marx, *Value, Price, and Profit: Addressed to Working Men* (1865; repr., Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, n.d.); K. Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* (1867; repr., London: Penguin, 1976).
12. Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, 15–38.
13. Bakunin, *The Capitalist System*, n.p., note 2.
14. See, for example, P. Kropotkin, *The Conquest of Bread* (1892; repr., London: Elephant Editions, 1990), 168.
15. Quoted in Guérin, "Marxism and Anarchism," 117, 118.
16. See, inter alia, V. Richards, "Notes for a Biography," in *Errico Malatesta: His Life and Ideas*, ed. V. Richards (London: Freedom Press, 1965).
17. In an important article, Rob Knowles has drawn attention to the way in which anarchism has been marginalised in accounts of the history of economic thought and economics; R. Knowles, "Political Economy from Below: Communitarian Anarchism as a Neglected Discourse in Histories of Economic Thought," *History of Economics Review*, no. 31 (2000): 30–47. We hope our discussion can make some contribution to rectifying this situation.
18. R. Rocker, "Marxism and Anarchism," in *The Poverty of Statism: Anarchism versus Marxism*, ed. A. Meltzer (1920; repr., Orkney, Scotland: Cienfuegos Press, 1981), 79–83. The following Marx and Engels quotes are from Rocker.
19. *Ibid.*, 76–83. The Marx quotes are from Rocker. See also Nettlau, *A Short History of Anarchism*, 246–47.
20. Possony, introduction, xix.
21. Guérin, "Marxism and Anarchism," 119.
22. Nettlau, *A Short History of Anarchism*, 76–77; see also Nettlau, *A Short History of Anarchism*, 246–47.
23. Dirlik, *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution*, 227.
24. Nettlau, *A Short History of Anarchism*, 246–47.
25. *Ibid.*, xxxvi–xxxviii.
26. See Marx, *Capital*, especially chapter 49. In Marx's comments on *The Gotha Programme*, the same idea can be found: "He [the worker] receives from the community a check showing that he has done so much labour ... and with this check he draws from the common store as much of the means of consumption as costs an equal amount of labour ... there prevails the same principle that today regulates the exchange of commodities"; Marx, *The Gotha Programme*, 28–29.
27. See J. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (1951; repr., Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), especially chapters 3 and 7.
28. See, for instance, Kropotkin, "Anarchist Communism," 57–62; Kropotkin, *The Conquest of Bread*, 45–49, 159–73; Kropotkin, "Modern Science and Anarchism," 169–74.
29. L. Galleani, *The End of Anarchism?* (1925; repr., Orkney, Scotland: Cienfuegos Press, 1982), 19–20, 42.
30. Kropotkin, *The Conquest of Bread*, 165–66.
31. *Now and Then: The ABC of Communist Anarchism* was published as a single volume in 1929 in the United States by the Vanguard Press, but is currently generally available as two separate

books: A. Berkman, *The ABC of Anarchism*, 3rd ed. (1929; repr., London: Freedom Press, 1964); A. Berkman, *What Is Communist Anarchism?* (1929; repr., London: Phoenix Press, 1989).

32. Berkman, *The ABC of Anarchism*, 18–21, 68–70; see also Berkman, *What Is Communist Anarchism?* 5–8.

33. Avrich, *Anarchist Portraits*, chapter 14.

34. Kropotkin, *The Conquest of Bread*, 164.

35. Quoted in Eltzbacher, *Anarchism*, 114.

36. Kropotkin, *The Conquest of Bread*, 101.

37. *Ibid.*, 108–10.

38. For instance, the recent anarchist “participatory economics” model suggests the use of prices to assess the costs and benefits of different choices, but argues that these prices must take account of efforts, externalities, and social costs; M. Albert, *Parecon: Life after Capitalism* (London: Verso, 2003).

39. A. Pengam, “Anarcho-Communism,” in *Non-Market Socialism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, ed. M. Rubel and J. Crump (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1987), 67–70.

40. See J. Guillaume, “On Building the New Social Order,” in *Bakunin on Anarchy: Selected Works by the Activist-Founder of World Anarchism*, ed. S. Dolgoff (1876; repr., London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971).

41. Fleming, *The Anarchist Way to Socialism*, 166.

42. Mises, *Socialism*; Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*.

43. Kropotkin, *The Conquest of Bread*, 164.

44. A. W. Gouldner, *The Two Marxisms: Contradictions and Anomalies in the Development of Theory* (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan, 1980), 11:69.

45. *Ibid.*, 33–88. These should not be misunderstood as equivalent to classical Marxism and libertarian Marxism, respectively; council communism is often infused with determinism and teleology, while Lenin’s stress on the vanguard party as the critical agent of change was profoundly voluntaristic, as was the Maoist stress on the “people’s army.”

46. We would like to thank Bert Altena for his comments on this section.

47. Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, 22.

48. A. M. Bonanno, *Anarchism and the National Liberation Struggle*, 2nd ed. (London: Bratach Dubh, 1976), 13.

49. On Marx’s “Russophobia,” see McLellan, *Karl Marx*, 202–3, 261–62, 288, 362, 377, 389, 438–39.

50. Quoted in Bonanno, *Anarchism and the National Liberation Struggle*, 1315.

51. Forman, *Nationalism and the International Labor Movement*, 58.

52. Karl Marx, letter to Friedrich Engels, July 20, 1870, quoted in Rocker, “Marxism and Anarchism,” 85. Also quoted in Rocker, *Nationalism and Culture*, 234–35; F. Mehring, *Karl Marx: The Story of His Life* (1936; repr., London: George Allen and Unwin, 1951), 438.

53. Mehring, *Karl Marx*, 438–41.

54. Quoted in B. Warren, *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism* (London: Verso, 1980), 40–41.

55. S. Seth, *Marxist Theory and Nationalist Politics: The Case of India* (New Delhi: Sage, 1995), chapters 1 and 2.

56. Quoted in Warren, *Imperialism*, 44.

57. Steenson, *Karl Kautsky*, 72–75, 174–79, 192–93.

58. Warren, *Imperialism*, chapter 3. Warren was, however, incorrect to suggest that Lenin believed that the historical role of capitalism as a whole was ended; while Lenin saw capitalism in the West as entering into a state of decay, his formulations continued to see the “national bourgeoisie” of the colonial and semicolonial world as a progressive force.

59. Comintern, "Theses on the National and Colonial Question Adopted by the Second Comintern Congress," in *The Communist International, 1919–1943: Documents*, ed. J. Degras (1920; repr., London: Frank Cass and Co., 1971), 141, 143–44.
60. Comintern, "Theses on the Eastern Question Adopted by the Fourth Comintern Congress," in *The Communist International, 1919–1943: Documents*, ed. J. Degras (1922; repr., London: Frank Cass and Co., 1971), 389.
61. See, for example, Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution," 429–61; Mao Tse-tung, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," in *Revolutionary Thought in the Twentieth Century*, ed. B. Turok (1939; repr., Johannesburg: Institute for African Alternatives, 1990), 77–79.
62. Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution," 451–52.
63. Mao, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," 77–79 (emphasis added).
64. Mao, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," 372, 379, 384.
65. Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People," in *Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tsetung*, ed. Editorial Committee for Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tsetung (1957; repr., Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1971), 433–34, 444–45.
66. Bakunin, "The International and Karl Marx," 309–10.
67. *Ibid.*, 314–16.
68. *Ibid.*, 311.
69. Kropotkin, "Modern Science and Anarchism," 150–54.
70. Rocker, *Nationalism and Culture*, 23–28; see also 520–22.
71. Rocker, "Marxism and Anarchism," 75.
72. See, for example, E. Malatesta, *Fra Contadini: A Dialogue on Anarchy* (1883; repr., London: Bratach Dubh, 1981), 40n2.
73. E. Malatesta, "Syndicalism: An Anarchist Critique [sic]," in *The Anarchist Reader*, ed. G. Woodcock (1907; repr., Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1977), 221–22; E. Malatesta, in *Errico Malatesta: His Life and Ideas*, ed. V. Richards (London: Freedom Press, 1965), 199–201.
74. Berkman, *The ABC of Anarchism*, 44.
75. Malatesta in Richards, *Errico Malatesta*, 118.
76. Rocker, *Nationalism and Culture*, 27, 32–37, 40–41.
77. Berkman, *The ABC of Anarchism*, 44.
78. Rocker, *Nationalism and Culture*, 32–35, 522.
79. Quoted in Gouldner, *The Two Marxisms*, 69.
80. Bakunin, "Letter to *La Liberté*," 284.
81. See Bakunin, "Statism and Anarchy," 346–50.
82. See, for example, R. Flores Magón, "Sin Jefes" ["Without Bosses"], *Regeneración*, March 21, 1914; S. Mbah and I. E. Igariewy, *African Anarchism: The History of a Movement* (Tucson, AZ: See Sharp Press, 1997).
83. Flores Magón has received increasing scholarly attention. Useful sources include Avrich, *Anarchist Portraits*, chapter 15; Hart, *Anarchism and the Mexican Working Class*; C. M. MacLachlan, *Anarchism and the Mexican Revolution: The Political Trials of Ricardo Flores Magón in the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); D. Poole, ed., *Land and Liberty: Anarchist Influences in the Mexican Revolution: Ricardo Flores Magón* (Orkney, Scotland: Cienfuegos Press, 1977).
84. Berkman, *The ABC of Anarchism*, 21–25, 74–80. See, for example, Rocker, *Nationalism and Culture*, 525–27, 550–51.
85. Bakunin, "Statism and Anarchy," 327.
86. Gouldner, *The Two Marxisms*, 57–58.

87. Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, 40.
88. V. I. Lenin, "What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement," in *Selected Works in Three Volumes*, ed. V. I. Lenin (1902; repr., Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), volume 1, 121–22.
89. Lenin, "The State and Revolution," 255.
90. Trotsky, *Writings of Leon Trotsky*, 513–14.
91. Mao, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," 371.
92. Lenin, "The State and Revolution," 261–62.
93. V. I. Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," in *Selected Works in Three Volumes*, ed. V. I. Lenin (1918; repr., Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), volume 2, 599.
94. Bakunin, "Statism and Anarchy," 330.
95. *Ibid.*, 331–32.
96. *Ibid.*
97. Bakunin, "Letters to a Frenchman on the Current Crisis," 193–94.
98. *Ibid.*, 204.
99. Bakunin, "Statism and Anarchy," 331–33.
100. *Ibid.*, 339.
101. Berkman, *What Is Communist Anarchism?* 98; see also 105–7, 111.
102. G. P. Maximoff, *The Guillotine at Work: Twenty Years of Terror in Russia: The Leninist Counter-Revolution* (1940; repr., Orkney, Scotland: Cienfuegos Press, 1979), 19–20, 257; see also 35–47, 322–26, 330, 333–34.
103. Lenin, "What Is to Be Done?," 151–52, 178, 182, 187–89, 197–202, 207.
104. Maximoff, *The Guillotine at Work*, 257.
105. Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, 55–56.
106. Bakunin, "Letters to a Frenchman on the Current Crisis," 217.
107. Kropotkin, "Modern Science and Anarchism," 170, 186.
108. The two-stage formulation of Stalin and Mao found its echo in Trotsky's "permanent revolution" thesis: under the conditions of late development, the bourgeoisie was supposedly too weak to carry out bourgeois democratic tasks, which then fell to the revolutionary party. Trotsky envisaged a rapid move from one stage to another in some cases, where the democratic revolution develops quickly into the socialist one, becoming a "permanent revolution." There is no break with stage theory here, simply a compression of the time frame.
109. M. P. Philips, "The Russian Class Struggle: Bolshevik Syndicalism Leading," in *Dispatches from the Revolution: Russia, 1916–1918: Morgan Price Philips*, ed. T. Rose (December 5, 1917; repr., London: Pluto Press, 1997), 105.
110. A. Berkman, *The Bolshevik Myth (Diary, 1920–1922), including the "Anti-Climax"* (1925; repr., London: Pluto Press, 1989), 319.
111. See E. Goldman, *My Disillusionment in Russia* (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1923); E. Goldman, "The Failure of the Russian Revolution," in *The Anarchist Reader*, ed. G. Woodcock (1924; repr., Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1977).
112. E. Goldman, *Trotsky Protests Too Much* (Glasgow: Anarchist Communist Federation, 1938), available at <http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/Goldman/Writings/Essays/trotsky.html> (accessed February 19, 2004).
113. See E. Goldman, *Living My Life*, 2 vols. (1931; repr., London: Pluto Press, 1988). See also R. Drinnon, *Rebel in Paradise: A Biography of Emma Goldman* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961); A. Wexler, *Emma Goldman: An Intimate Life* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984).
114. Marshall, *Demanding the Impossible*, 399.
115. Maximoff, *The Guillotine at Work*, 256; see also 41–43, 321.
116. *Ibid.*, 326. At one point Maximoff even spoke of a "soviet bourgeoisie"; *ibid.*, 327.

117. Maximoff, *The Programme of Anarcho-syndicalism*, 11–12.
118. *Ibid.*, 11–12.
119. Kubo Yuzuru, “On Class Struggle and the Daily Struggle,” in *Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas, Volume 1: From Anarchy to Anarchism, 300 CE to 1939*, ed. R. Graham (1928; repr., Montréal: Black Rose, 2005), 380.
120. P. Kropotkin, “Letter to the Workers of Western Europe,” in *Kropotkin’s Revolutionary Pamphlets: A Collection of Writings by Peter Kropotkin*, ed. R. N. Baldwin (April 28, 1919; repr., New York: Dover Publications, 1970), 252ff.
121. Goldman, *Trotsky Protests Too Much*.
122. M. Sergven [G. P. Maximoff], “Paths of Revolution,” in *The Anarchists in the Russian Revolution*, ed. P. Avrich (September 16, 1918; repr., London: Thames and Hudson, 1973), 122–25.
123. Berkman, *What Is Communist Anarchism?* 111–12.
124. See Avrich, *The Russian Anarchists*, 137–38; Avrich, *Anarchist Portraits*, chapter 8.
125. Voline, *The Unknown Revolution, 1917–1921* (1947; repr., Montréal: Black Rose, 1990), 247–48; see also 157–58, 188–93, 209–17, 249–56, 356–58, 381–89, 418–20, 423–25, 430–32.
126. *Ibid.*, 255–56.
127. *Ibid.*, 358.
128. On the workers and peasants, see *ibid.*, 359–75. On the ruling class, see *ibid.*, 377–85, 395–98, 410–15.
129. Rocker, *Nationalism and Culture*, 546.
130. Voline, *The Unknown Revolution*, 351.
131. Gouldner, *The Two Marxisms*, 32, 41.
132. K. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859; repr., London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 20–21.
133. F. Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (1883; repr., Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1917), 90–91, 94–95.
134. W. D. Haywood and F. Bohm, *Industrial Socialism* (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1911), 56. For other examples, see, *inter alia*, A. E. Woodruff, *The Advancing Proletariat: A Study of the Movement of the Working Class from Wage Slavery to Freedom* (Chicago: IWW Publishing Bureau, 1919); Industrial Workers of the World, *The IWW: What It Is and What It Is Not* (Chicago: IWW Publishing Bureau, 1928). For a De Leonist example, see Socialist Labour Party [Daniel De Leon], *The Socialist Labour Party: Its Aims and Methods* (Edinburgh: Socialist Labour Press, 1908).
135. See M. Dubofsky, “Big Bill” Haywood (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987).
136. *Ibid.*, 60.
137. S. Craparo, *Anarchist Communists: A Question of Class, Studies for a Libertarian Alternative Series* (Fano, Italy: Federazione dei Comunisti Anarchici, 2005), 90–96.
138. Bakunin, “God and the State”; Bakunin, “Letter to *La Liberté*,” 281–82.
139. *Ibid.*, 282–83.
140. Bakunin, “The International and Karl Marx,” 310–11.
141. Bakunin, “Letter to *La Liberté*,” 281–82.
142. Rocker, *Nationalism and Culture*, 23–31.
143. *Ibid.*, 28, 28–29.
144. *Ibid.*, 29–31.
145. *Ibid.*, 35–40.
146. *Ibid.*, 40–41.
147. Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, 13n1.
148. Bakunin, “Statism and Anarchy,” 343.
149. Bakunin, *The Capitalist System*, n.p.
150. Kropotkin, “Modern Science and Anarchism,” 181.

151. L. Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed* (London: New Park, 1967), 254.
152. Sergven [Maximoff], "Paths of Revolution," 122–25; Berkman, *What Is Communist Anarchism?* 111–12; Voline, *The Unknown Revolution*, 358; Rocker, *Nationalism and Culture*, 546.
153. Bakunin, "Letter to *La Liberté*," 284; Kropotkin, "Anarchist Communism," 50.
154. Bakunin, "Three Lectures to Swiss Members of the International," 62.
155. Bakunin, "The Policy of the International," 100–1.
156. Rocker, *Nationalism and Culture*, 270–72; see also 260.
157. *Ibid.*, 270–72; see also 260.
158. *Ibid.*
159. *Ibid.*, 25.
160. *Ibid.*, 32, 40–41.
161. Kropotkin, "Anarchist Communism," 47.
162. Kropotkin, "Modern Science and Anarchism," 150.
163. Berkman, *The ABC of Anarchism*, 35–39.