



**MAINE.—Clifford.**  
 New-Hampshire.—Burke, Eastman, Reding.  
 New-York.—Dodge, C. A. Fry, K. K. McKim,  
 Pennsylvania.—Furness, Gerry, Gustave, Jack,  
 Keino, Newhard, Plumer, Snyder.  
 Ohio.—Dean, Doan, Matthews, Medill, Sewey.

Here the peculiar friends of the poor, friends to the diffusion of information, friends of the largest liberty, and, to cap the whole, friends of a State rights!

Such is the party and such the leader, who, in alliance with slaveholders, are to be all-powerful in the next Congress.

Of President Tyler I need not now speak. Everybody knows what his bent is in regard to Texas. But here is Mr. Gilmer, a veteran leader, a practical man, the plebeian representative of the rabal, and of the slave-breeding and slave-trading interests, giving out to the party, that Texas must be admitted, and that 'SOON.' This seems to me startling! I cannot do but think that it is one of many means, now in operation, to prepare the party for the measure, to familiarize the country with it, and, among the first business of the new Congressional majority, to attach the province, and trust to time, management, and, above all, the impossibility of recalling the step, to make the North acquiesce therein. It is the opinion, I think, of a majority of the northern members with whom I converse, that there is a great danger, and some think a certainty, that the scheme will succeed.

It would not be proper, in this connection, to overlook Mr. Upham, Secretary of the Navy. As the advocate of the slave-basis in the Virginia Convention in 1820,—as the calculator, even at that early period, of the advance on the price of Virginia slaves in case of the acquisition of Texas,—as one who is under accumulated suspicion, in consequence of the late proceedings of Commodore Jones at Monterey,—as one who has great sway in the Executive at this time, and is likely to retain it to the end of the present reign,—he ought to be observed with a special vigilance. The triumvirate, Messrs. Tyler, Upham and Wise, are all from one of the most decayed of the habitable parts of Virginia. The inhabitants have no business of any importance, except breeding slaves for the market. The interest which makes the South most earnest, in a pecuniary view, for the acquisition of Texas, exists in greater force in that Congressional district, (Wise's), to which all three belong, than in any other throughout the whole South.

There is yet another indication, which has given me much pain. It is an insidious argument, addressed by the moderate slave friends of the South to their political friends of the free States, who are more or less opposed to slavery, and who cannot be affected by any appeal from that quarter, unless it has a primary view to the maintenance of the constitutional rights of the people of the free States, and the benefit, so far as they think the Constitution will admit, of the slaves everywhere. The argument is this: The opening of new regions for slave labor in the extreme Southwest, is the best and only way of withdrawing the slaves from the old slave States on the Atlantic and in the West. Now, therefore, although the acquisition of new territory in the Southwest will create new slave States, yet by the drain which it will establish of the slave population in that direction, it will also, *pari passu*, make the old slave States free, and thus, in effect, the number and strength of the free States will be increased by the acquisition! Or, to use an expression which I have heard here, slavery will be rolled off from Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, &c. into Texas! This is the argument; and I know nothing of all the corrupt and insidious means to which I have adverted, or which can be imagined, that is half so corrupt and insidious as this. The logical defect is, that it leaves out of view the constant and active renovation of the slave population in the old slave States, by the regular business of breeding expressly for the market, by far the most atrocious and infamous part of the system of American slavery. The moral defect is, that it is an attempt to perpetuate this part, under the pretence of benevolence and patriotism. There is not the slightest doubt, that Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina and Kentucky would have abolished slavery long ere this, if it had not been for the slave-market which the acquisition of Louisiana opened to them. Thus it is perfectly self-evident, that instead of that effect upon the old slave States, which it is pretended will ensue from new acquisition of territory in the Southwest, the very reverse will inevitably take place. This is the A, B, C of abolition.

I had well nigh forgotten to notice one other important point in Mr. Gilmer's letter. He plainly and repeatedly intimates, that it is the destiny of this nation, (and no nation, this serene philosopher tells us, can escape its destiny) to usurp this whole continent; and he expressly names California as the limit of the splendid national career to which he invites us. The power of language is so inadequate to express properly my abhorrence of such inconceivable political depravity, that I leave the subject here.

If the freemen of the North shall be willing, upon full knowledge and sober deliberation, to give their sanction and co-operation to such a scheme, he it is, I have done my best that they should be forewarned. I have written all night; it is daybreak. I have done.

WASHINGTON, Jan 27, 1843.

A post-master in Ohio was lately charged with purloining money from a letter, a very high crime, subjecting the perpetrator to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not less than two, and not exceeding twenty-one years. The Representative from that district, a member much respected, called on the Post-master General, and stated that he was well acquainted with the accused, and knew him to be a man of moral principle. He requested that notice of the charge and an opportunity to be heard should be given; and for this purpose, that action on the case should be delayed a little. 'Not a day,' was the reply, and the removal was forthwith made! The individual removed, now applied for a copy of the charge, desiring to save his character, though he had lost his office. But this was also refused, and thus the matter stands. No prosecution for the alleged crime has been commenced; the conclusion is, therefore, inevitable, that it was a false and unrighteous pretext for effecting the removal of a public officer, in order to put in his place a more convenient and useful instrument of corrupt tyranny and base ambition.

Another instance, to show the meanness and duplicity with which this government is administered. A man applied to Mr. Tyler for the appointment of marshal, presenting a strong recommendation from John Tyler himself. It had been written during the brief administration of Harrison. Mr. Tyler, after taking two or three days to consider of it, informed the applicant that he had made up his mind to give him the appointment; but he added, that there was a son of Duff Green, who was seeking the appointment of deputy marshal, and he (Mr. T.) desired that it should not be given to him, because he wished to keep clear of that family. An assurance was given to this effect, and the applicant went home to await his commission. In a few days, he received information that that very son of Duff Green was appointed marshal! I am told that it was the interposition of Mr. Callahan that produced this change in Mr. Tyler's determination. But this is not a solitary instance. I have heard of other cases equally flagrant. These are not novelties in the management of our executive affairs. Many things of the kind occurred in Gen. Jackson's reign. There was the case of Eldridge Gerry. He came to Washington in 1829 to solicit a renewal of his appointment as surveyor at Boston. Jackson promised to re-nominate him to the Senate, and Mr. G. proceeded to Richmond, where the Convention for altering the Constitution of Virginia was in session; and while he was there, another person was nominated to the Senate and confirmed. Mr. Gerry, on his return, called upon the President and reminded him of his promise, but he utterly denied it, and when Mr. Gerry persist-

ed firmly in his statement, the President flew into a violent rage, and several persons present, among them, I believe, Mr. Van Buren, urged and persuaded Mr. G. to retire from the storm. Another instance will carry us back much further, to the time when this corrupt and disreputable system, of bartering the public offices for partisan services, took its rise.

At the accession of Jefferson, *Winkup Sargent*, of Massachusetts, was Governor of the Mississippi territory. Some charges of official misconduct were made against him. He came to Washington for the purpose of investigating them and making his defence. On his arrival, he was informed by rumor that a commission was already made out for his successor. His sought interviews with Mr. Madison, then Secretary of State, and with Jefferson. Both assured him that no such step had been taken in the matter, and the latter assured him that no such step should be taken until he had been heard. Relying on this pledge of the President, he left Washington for a few days for the purpose of procuring some papers necessary to his defence; and while he was thus absent, he received a letter from Madison, informing him that he was dismissed! Subsequently, he found that C. Claiborne had actually been appointed and commissioned as Governor of Mississippi, previous to his (Mr. Sargent's) arrival at Washington, and his interview with the President and Secretary of State!

If there be any proposition in which all mankind concur, it is that a republic cannot be maintained without virtue in the people and the rulers. Why is this shameless and alarming duplicity and depravity to have been thus early introduced and naturalized among us? My belief is, that they originated in the necessity, which the slaveholders were under, (in order to obtain and keep the supremacy,) of prostituting the patronage of the federal government to the strengthening and securing of their peculiar interests. It has always been observed that the 'spoils' principle has been applied almost exclusively to places and aspirants in the free States. In the slave States, where all, except those who, through force, are silent, and united in support of the system of terror, there is no need of using the federal patronage to create a party among the people and in Congress in favor of it. But in the free States, such a party could be formed and maintained only by appeals to the avarice and ambition of needy and aspiring demagogues. Without such a party in those States, slavery in the South could not be maintained five years. Accordingly, all the arts of consummate Machiavellism—all the corruption, which springs from political depravity and produces it, have been employed to form and keep up such a party in the free States. Hence, we have the most rank corruption infecting this early our body politic. Hence the frequency and enormity of public robberies, and the decline of all confidence in public men. Hence, the conversion of the republic into a vast arena of prize-fighters; and hence, each succession becomes a contest not of two pretenders, but of a hundred thousand. This is a humiliating and disgraceful picture of our affairs, but is it not strictly correct? For my part, I shall look upon him as a great benefactor, who will convince me that the reverse is true, or that there is a hope that it ever will be, except with the abolition of slavery or the dissolution of the Union.

In a conversation, somewhat warm, which I had with a Georgia slaveholder a few days ago, he openly and exultingly boasted that if he had a great man at the North, they could always buy him. Of course, they can buy the little ones. And are the people of the North forever to submit to this most detestable and degrading traffic, a traffic worse than the slave-trade? Will they much longer consent to see their leaders and agents bribed to betray their interests and degrade their character, themselves all the while furnishing the money from their hard earnings, by which the vile system is carried on? It cannot, it cannot.

D. L. C.

about the twenty-fourth of September, eighteen hundred and forty-two.

The affiant further stated on his oath as aforesaid, that the said George Latimer was arrested in Boston since his escape from Virginia, and there found on his person and taken from his possession, the watch-key and silver pencil-case, which were stolen from his storehouse when it was broken and entered as aforesaid, on or about the first day of January, eighteen hundred and forty-two.

And the affiant on his oath states, that he does verily believe, and doth charge, that the said George Latimer did, in the night-time, burglariously and feloniously enter and break his storehouse aforesaid, on or about the first day of January, eighteen hundred and forty-two, and did then and there steal, take and carry away from said storehouse, about eighty dollars in money belonging to affiant, and various articles of his property of the value of at least ten or twelve dollars, and among the things so taken was the silver pencil-case and watch-key aforesaid.

JAMES B. GRAY.

The above affidavit was subscribed and sworn to by said James B. Gray, before me, Miles King, Mayor of said borough of Norfolk, and State of Virginia, at the time and place, and verified in the manner stated in the caption of said affidavit.

In testimony of which, I, Miles King, Mayor, [Seal.] aforesaid, have subscribed my name and affixed my seal of office hereto, the day and year first aforesaid.

M. KING, Mayor.

ing committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor, or chief magistrate of the State from which the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of this State to cause such person to be arrested, or to cause him or her to be arrested and secured, &c.

Such is the substance of the provisions made in the Constitution and law for the surrender of fugitives from justice. The Constitution simply declares that a person charged with treason, felony, or other crime, upon demand of the executive authority, shall be arrested, or to cause him or her to be arrested, and secured, &c.

The law, in carrying out this provision, declares that the demand must be made upon the executive authority, and the copy of an indictment found, or an affidavit produced, charging the fugitive with having committed treason, felony, or other crime.

The proceeding is not one of ordinary occurrence, where the process issues in the ordinary way, and is committed to an officer to be served; but the application for a surrender is from a State to a State, shortly after the larceny committed on or about the 24th of September, 1842, he charged a colored man, named George Latimer, then held to service and labor with him and owned by him as his slave, with the commission of the last-mentioned larceny; soon after which, the said George Latimer absconded and escaped to the State of Massachusetts and city of Boston; after his escape, the said James B. Gray, Mayor of said borough of Norfolk, and State of Virginia, demanded of the executive authority of the State government to watch over the rights and privileges of the citizens, and to see that they enjoy the protection and security guaranteed by the law. This process seeks to deprive persons in the enjoyment of these privileges of their liberty, to remove them to another jurisdiction, and to place them upon trial. It must have been obvious to the members of the Constitution and the law, that in a country of such vast dimensions as this, it would be no light or trivial matter to be removed from one remote part to another, to be tried among strangers, for alleged offences. They must have anticipated that such a power would be likely to be perverted and abused; and to guard against unjust, oppressive arrests, and the removal of persons under the protection of law upon frivolous and colorable pretences, and to secure the rights of the accused, the law provides that the arrest should be upon their view of constitutional duty, thus invoking the States themselves to watch over the exercise of this power, and see that it is kept circumscribed within proper limits. These seem to me to have been the prevailing views of those who made the Constitution and the law, and I think that the power intended to be conferred upon the executive authority of a State is not nominal, but substantial—that the issuing of a warrant is not intended to be a mere ministerial act, a peremptory duty imposed upon the executive, in the discharge of which he can exercise no discretion, but is to depend upon a just interpretation of the Constitution, and the law tending to restrain all abuse and perversion of the power.

The Constitution makes a charge of treason, felony or other crime the foundation of the right to make the demand, and of the obligation to deliver up the fugitive. The law superadds to the Constitution, that the demand must be sustained by the copy of an indictment found, or an affidavit made before a magistrate, charging the person demanded with treason, felony, or other crime. The case before me rests upon an affidavit, and the question is, whether the charge of crime is such as to authorize an arrest.

An affidavit comes from no responsible authority, but is the voluntary act of any person who chooses to make it. It may as well be the offspring of base, malevolent, vindictive feelings, as of pure and honorable sentiments; it may as well spring from the malice and spite of a personal enemy, as from a faithful administration of criminal justice. It is usually made by a party claiming to be aggrieved, and, at the best, is weak evidence, over which almost necessary hangs a shade of distrust. It comes from a source unknown, and without any voucher for the respectability or truthful character of the affiant. Upon such a document, the executive authority of a State is required to cause a person under the protection of the laws, to be arrested, and that he may be removed to the State from whence the demand comes, to answer to the charge contained in it.

Taking into view all these circumstances, it is apparent to my mind, that such a process is open to great abuse, unless it is watched over with scrupulous care.

What then are the requisites of a charge contained in an affidavit which authorize an arrest? The decision of this question is referred by the Constitution and the law to the executive authority; and when I take into view the probable motives which induced such a reference to the executive, the rights involved, and all the other circumstances which necessarily attend the issue of such a warrant, I am satisfied, that taken as a whole, should be full and clear, defining the crime, and embodying such facts as necessarily raise a decided presumption of guilt; and I consider such facts as part of the charge, neither contained in one or more affidavits, in regard to which there is some variance of practice.

I cannot persuade myself that an affidavit in which it is merely alleged that a crime has been committed, and the affiant believes, or has reason to believe, that the person demanded perpetrated it, is such a charge as the framers of the Constitution and the law anticipated. Such a construction would, in my belief, encourage abuses, work out injustice and oppression, and turn a salutary provision of the Constitution into an instrument of evil instead of good. It is difficult to assign any adequate motive for regarding the affidavits of the executives of the States, in such a manner, but I believe, that the mere ministerial agents of any and every affidavit-maker who can persuade an easy conscience that any one against whom he is moved by hatred, malice, revenge, or any other corrupt motive, is guilty of a crime. It appears to me, therefore, that when an affidavit does not contain a specification of such facts as the Constitution provides for, and such proofs as are probable to be explained, would produce conviction, it does not contain such a charge as the Constitution and law require.

I am confirmed in this view of the subject from the facts which have, from time to time, come to my knowledge, tending to prove that the abuses do exist, which seem to have been anticipated when the provisions were made which refer the papers in such cases to the consideration of the executives of the States.

In the commercial States, for example, the crime of cheating by false pretences is often the charge upon which a requisition is made, and is peculiarly liable to abuse. I have the best reason for believing that in many cases the complainants have been prompted by no regard for the administration of justice, but have sought for an executive warrant, intending to compel the payment of a debt, and to compel the payment of debts, and in many instances have been accomplished, to drop the prosecution, if that could be effected. But when this did not succeed, and such persons have been brought to trial, they have generally been acquitted. I have also been made acquainted with an instance in which the payment of a debt was the object of the process, but to extort a large sum of money from a pretence of indemnifying the creditors for their trouble and expense, while there was scarcely a doubt of the innocence of the accused.

In many other ways I have had just reason to believe that this process has been employed, not in aid of the public justice, but to effect selfish and censurable objects, to the terror and alarm of the persons arrested.

From these considerations I am convinced, that the people cannot be protected against an unwarrantable use of the process except by great vigilance, and exacting a charge which establishes a case of probable guilt; nor do I anticipate that this will be wholly arrest the abuse.

If the executive authority of a State is to be authorized, in certain cases, the demand, and require the surrender of fugitives charged with crime. The Constitution provides, that a person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.

The law of Congress upon this subject declares, that whenever the executive authority of any State in the Union shall demand any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State to which such person shall have fled, and shall, moreover, produce the copy of an indictment found, or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any such State, charging the person so demanded with hav-

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I am confirmed in this view of the subject from the facts which have, from time to time, come to my knowledge, tending to prove that the abuses do exist, which seem to have been anticipated when the provisions were made which refer the papers in such cases to the consideration of the executives of the States.

In the commercial States, for example, the crime of cheating by false pretences is often the charge upon which a requisition is made, and is peculiarly liable to abuse. I have the best reason for believing that in many cases the complainants have been prompted by no regard for the administration of justice, but have sought for an executive warrant, intending to compel the payment of a debt, and to compel the payment of debts, and in many instances have been accomplished, to drop the prosecution, if that could be effected. But when this did not succeed, and such persons have been brought to trial, they have generally been acquitted. I have also been made acquainted with an instance in which the payment of a debt was the object of the process, but to extort a large sum of money from a pretence of indemnifying the creditors for their trouble and expense, while there was scarcely a doubt of the innocence of the accused.

In many other ways I have had just reason to believe that this process has been employed, not in aid of the public justice, but to effect selfish and censurable objects, to the terror and alarm of the persons arrested.

From these considerations I am convinced, that the people cannot be protected against an unwarrantable use of the process except by great vigilance, and exacting a charge which establishes a case of probable guilt; nor do I anticipate that this will be wholly arrest the abuse.

If the executive authority of a State is to be authorized, in certain cases, the demand, and require the surrender of fugitives charged with crime. The Constitution provides, that a person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.

The law of Congress upon this subject declares, that whenever the executive authority of any State in the Union shall demand any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State to which such person shall have fled, and shall, moreover, produce the copy of an indictment found, or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any such State, charging the person so demanded with hav-

ed firmly in his statement, the President flew into a violent rage, and several persons present, among them, I believe, Mr. Van Buren, urged and persuaded Mr. G. to retire from the storm. Another instance will carry us back much further, to the time when this corrupt and disreputable system, of bartering the public offices for partisan services, took its rise.

At the accession of Jefferson, *Winkup Sargent*, of Massachusetts, was Governor of the Mississippi territory. Some charges of official misconduct were made against him. He came to Washington for the purpose of investigating them and making his defence. On his arrival, he was informed by rumor that a commission was already made out for his successor. His sought interviews with Mr. Madison, then Secretary of State, and with Jefferson. Both assured him that no such step had been taken in the matter, and the latter assured him that no such step should be taken until he had been heard. Relying on this pledge of the President, he left Washington for a few days for the purpose of procuring some papers necessary to his defence; and while he was thus absent, he received a letter from Madison, informing him that he was dismissed! Subsequently, he found that C. Claiborne had actually been appointed and commissioned as Governor of Mississippi, previous to his (Mr. Sargent's) arrival at Washington, and his interview with the President and Secretary of State!

If there be any proposition in which all mankind concur, it is that a republic cannot be maintained without virtue in the people and the rulers. Why is this shameless and alarming duplicity and depravity to have been thus early introduced and naturalized among us? My belief is, that they originated in the necessity, which the slaveholders were under, (in order to obtain and keep the supremacy,) of prostituting the patronage of the federal government to the strengthening and securing of their peculiar interests. It has always been observed that the 'spoils' principle has been applied almost exclusively to places and aspirants in the free States. In the slave States, where all, except those who, through force, are silent, and united in support of the system of terror, there is no need of using the federal patronage to create a party among the people and in Congress in favor of it. But in the free States, such a party could be formed and maintained only by appeals to the avarice and ambition of needy and aspiring demagogues. Without such a party in those States, slavery in the South could not be maintained five years. Accordingly, all the arts of consummate Machiavellism—all the corruption, which springs from political depravity and produces it, have been employed to form and keep up such a party in the free States. Hence, we have the most rank corruption infecting this early our body politic. Hence the frequency and enormity of public robberies, and the decline of all confidence in public men. Hence, the conversion of the republic into a vast arena of prize-fighters; and hence, each succession becomes a contest not of two pretenders, but of a hundred thousand. This is a humiliating and disgraceful picture of our affairs, but is it not strictly correct? For my part, I shall look upon him as a great benefactor, who will convince me that the reverse is true, or that there is a hope that it ever will be, except with the abolition of slavery or the dissolution of the Union.

In a conversation, somewhat warm, which I had with a Georgia slaveholder a few days ago, he openly and exultingly boasted that if he had a great man at the North, they could always buy him. Of course, they can buy the little ones. And are the people of the North forever to submit to this most detestable and degrading traffic, a traffic worse than the slave-trade? Will they much longer consent to see their leaders and agents bribed to betray their interests and degrade their character, themselves all the while furnishing the money from their hard earnings, by which the vile system is carried on? It cannot, it cannot.

D. L. C.

ing committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor, or chief magistrate of the State from which the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of this State to cause such person to be arrested, or to cause him or her to be arrested and secured, &c.

Such is the substance of the provisions made in the Constitution and law for the surrender of fugitives from justice. The Constitution simply declares that a person charged with treason, felony, or other crime, upon demand of the executive authority, shall be arrested, or to cause him or her to be arrested, and secured, &c.

The law, in carrying out this provision, declares that the demand must be made upon the executive authority, and the copy of an indictment found, or an affidavit produced, charging the fugitive with having committed treason, felony, or other crime.

The proceeding is not one of ordinary occurrence, where the process issues in the ordinary way, and is committed to an officer to be served; but the application for a surrender is from a State to a State, shortly after the larceny committed on or about the 24th of September, 1842, he charged a colored man, named George Latimer, then held to service and labor with him and owned by him as his slave, with the commission of the last-mentioned larceny; soon after which, the said George Latimer absconded and escaped to the State of Massachusetts and city of Boston; after his escape, the said James B. Gray, Mayor of said borough of Norfolk, and State of Virginia, demanded of the executive authority of the State government to watch over the rights and privileges of the citizens, and to see that they enjoy the protection and security guaranteed by the law. This process seeks to deprive persons in the enjoyment of these privileges of their liberty, to remove them to another jurisdiction, and to place them upon trial. It must have been obvious to the members of the Constitution and the law, that in a country of such vast dimensions as this, it would be no light or trivial matter to be removed from one remote part to another, to be tried among strangers, for alleged offences. They must have anticipated that such a power would be likely to be perverted and abused; and to guard against unjust, oppressive arrests, and the removal of persons under the protection of law upon frivolous and colorable pretences, and to secure the rights of the accused, the law provides that the arrest should be upon their view of constitutional duty, thus invoking the States themselves to watch over the exercise of this power, and see that it is kept circumscribed within proper limits. These seem to me to have been the prevailing views of those who made the Constitution and the law, and I think that the power intended to be conferred upon the executive authority of a State is not nominal, but substantial—that the issuing of a warrant is not intended to be a mere ministerial act, a peremptory duty imposed upon the executive, in the discharge of which he can exercise no discretion, but is to depend upon a just interpretation of the Constitution, and the law tending to restrain all abuse and perversion of the power.

The Constitution makes a charge of treason, felony or other crime the foundation of the right to make the demand, and of the obligation to deliver up the fugitive. The law superadds to the Constitution, that the demand must be sustained by the copy of an indictment found, or an affidavit made before a magistrate, charging the person demanded with treason, felony, or other crime. The case before me rests upon an affidavit, and the question is, whether the charge of crime is such as to authorize an arrest.

An affidavit comes from no responsible authority, but is the voluntary act of any person who chooses to make it. It may as well be the offspring of base, malevolent, vindictive feelings, as of pure and honorable sentiments; it may as well spring from the malice and spite of a personal enemy, as from a faithful administration of criminal justice. It is usually made by a party claiming to be aggrieved, and, at the best, is weak evidence, over which almost necessary hangs a shade of distrust. It comes from a source unknown, and without any voucher for the respectability or truthful character of the affiant. Upon such a document, the executive authority of a State is required to cause a person under the protection of the laws, to be arrested, and that he may be removed to the State from whence the demand comes, to answer to the charge contained in it.

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POETRY.

For the Liberator. THE NEW DRAGON OF WANTLEY. A BALLAD. Ye have heard of the dragon of Wantley Moor—

MISCELLANY.

From the Broom Republican. Punishment by Death. During the present session of the Legislature, an earnest effort, and we hope a successful one, will be made to erase from the statute book of this State, the law which provides for infliction of death upon capital offenders.

Wise—Mr. Speaker, what is the point of appeal? A MEMBER.—It has no point to it, Wise. (Great laughter.) SPEAKER.—The Speaker gave the floor to the reporter of the bill, as is customary.

Ye may, if ye will, for a time, reckless of the impending vengeance of Heaven, secure the entrance and bring the approbation of all good men,—purge your infernal traffic; ye may make your dark prison-houses resound with the clank of chains; your victims may writhe under the lash; their blood saturate the ground, and reek up in appeals to God.

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