centre for the study of developing societies

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

Attitudes, anxieties and aspirations of India's youth: changing patterns

A Report

Principal Investigator
Sanjay Kumar

Advisory Committee
Suhas Palshikar
Sandeep Shastri



लोकनीति

Published by
Lokniti - Centre for the Study Developing Societies (CSDS)
29 Rajpur Road, Civil Lines, Delhi -110054
Phone: +91-11-23942199 Fax: +91-11-23943450
Email: csdsmain@csds.in; lokniti@csds.in
Website: www.csds.in; www.lokniti.org

Designed by: Bhavana Gupta and Harsha Khattar
Printed by: Bookwell, 3/79, Nirankari Colony, Delhi-110009

Team

Analysis and Report Writing

Arushi Gupta
Asmita Aasaavari
Jyoti Mishra
Pranav Gupta
Shashwat Dhar
Shreyas Sardesai
Souradeep Banerjee
Vibha Attri

Research Support

Dhananjay Kumar Singh
Himanshu Bhattacharya
Nitin Mehta
Sam Solomon
Sana Salim

State Coordinators

A. K. Verma
Anupama Saxena
Bhanukumar Parmar
Biswajit Mohanty
Dhruba Pratim Sharma
E. Venkatesu
Harishwar Dayal
Jagrup Singh Sekhon
K. M. Sajad Ibrahim
Kushal Pal
Nitin Birmal
P. Ramajayam
Prabhat Mohanty
Rakesh Ranjan
Sanjay Lodha
Suprio Basu
Yatindra Singh

State Supervisors

Anita Agarwal
Ashish Bhatt
Kamal Srivastava
Nidhi Seth
Nirmal Singh
Nurul Hassan
Reetika Syal
Shamshad Ansari
Umesh Bujji
Veena Devi

Special Thanks

Hilal Ahmed
Mark Friedrich
Pankaj Madan
Sanjeer Alam

Contents

List of Tables

List of Tables

List of Tables

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Figures

Important things to keep in mind while reading Tables and Figures

In many Tables and Figures, particularly those with many categories, the percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Big Cities include the ten most populous cities of India (Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Ahmedabad, Jaipur, Surat and Pune) spread across 8 States and the most populous cities of 11 remaining States in which the survey was conducted. Smaller Cities include other cities/towns in the sample that are 30% to 100% urban and are smaller than the largest city of a State. Villages are those locations that are less than 30% urban.

In a few Tables/Figures, the ten most populous cities have been categorised separately as Biggest cities/Mega Cities and the most populous cities of the remaining States have been categorised as Big Cities.

South India includes Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Telangana.

East India includes Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha and West Bengal.

West & Central India includes Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra.

North India includes Delhi, Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.

Several Tables/Figures show analysis by Economic Class and Caste/Community. Please refer to Appendix II to find out how the Class and Caste classifications were constructed/arrived at.

The 2007 percentages in comparative Tables/Figures are from the CSDS-KAS Youth Survey 2007. While comparing with the 2007 data, we have ensured that the comparisons are made with the same age group and the same 19 States where the survey was conducted in 2016. The sample size in 2007 was 5513.

1. Introduction



1. Introduction

1.1. Rationale behind the survey

This report presents the findings of a sample survey-based study on India's young population (15-34-year-olds) conducted by the Centre for the Study in Developing Societies (CSDS) along with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) in April and May, 2016. It has been ten years since CSDS in partnership with KAS conducted its first survey on the attitudes and perceptions of India's youth. Ten years is a long time, long enough at least for many economic, political, socio-cultural and technological changes to have taken place in a country. If one were to sum up the changes very briefly, economically, the Indian economy continues to liberalise and grow at a rapid pace and has come to acquire the tag of the world's fastest growing economy. Politically, the last decade, especially its latter half, has been rather tumultuous with India witnessing a major anti-corruption movement that spawned the rise of a brand new political party, and a landmark national election in 2014 that fundamentally changed the nature of the regime ruling the country. Socio-culturally, there have been frequent conflicts between the forces of conservatism and liberalism on various issues such as women's rights, minority rights, LGBTQI rights/decriminalising homosexuality, censorship and freedom of expression, and more recently on the issue of growing intolerance in society. On the lifestyle front, there has been a proliferation of the mall, multiplex, and café/restaurant culture across Indian cities and towns which have radically changed the way urban Indians spend their money and their leisure time. Lastly, tremendous advancements in the world of communications and networking technology in the last ten years have also drastically transformed the way we live, communicate and consume information. Our televisions have got thinner, our phones have got smarter, and a deeper penetration of the internet and the growth of social networking sites have led to greater inter-connectedness. Mindful of these significant developments in India over the last one decade, CSDS and KAS felt the need of conducting another round of survey of young Indians in order to measure the continuities and changes in their attitudes and practices that may have taken place.

Another key consideration driving the second round of the CSDS-KAS Survey was that of India's rich demographic dividend, an issue that has been written about and discussed a lot in recent times. Different parts of the world today are going through different stages of demographic shift. While Japan, China and many countries are dealing with an ageing demographic profile, in India and neighbouring South Asian countries however the youth cohort still constitutes a significant share of the total population, and is projected to remain so for the next decade at least. In India, about two-thirds of its population is aged below 35 years and about one-third falls in the age group of 15-34 years. The population of this young cohort rose from 353 million in 2001 to 422 million in 2011 and it is expected to increase further to 464 million by 2021 before it starts declining (The Hindu, 2013). Further, the median age in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal is much lower at the moment than in countries such as USA, UK, Germany and France. While the latter group has median ages between 37 and 44 years (Pew Research, 2014), the South Asian region has them ranging from 21 to 31 (UNFPA, 2009).

This youth bulge in India and its immediate neighbourhood has meant that the emerging economies of the South Asian region currently have a demographic dividend that is not possessed by several other countries including the best of the developed world. However, this is naturally not going to last forever. These relatively low median ages in South Asia will inevitably increase in the next few decades. India's median age for instance is expected to rise from 25 to 30 by 2025 and to 39 by 2050. Similarly, Pakistan's is expected to increase from the current 21 to 27 by 2025 and to 34 by 2050. This means that both the youth bulge and the promise of the demographic dividend for South Asia will gradually subside. It therefore becomes necessary to understand the issues, needs and aspirations of the young populations of these countries so that their potential can be tapped and fully realised before it gets too late.

More significantly, an understanding of the sociological and psychological well-being of young people is also crucial. It is important to know the mindsets of youngsters and the opinions they hold with respect to key socio-political issues, because if the expectations of this growing mass of youth are not addressed on time, then the disappointments of this burgeoning population could translate into social unrest and violence. In fact, this scenario is no longer just a possibility; it is gradually becoming a reality. The recent spate of agitations spearheaded by dominant castes in several states of India demanding quota benefits in government jobs are a reminder, perhaps, of the precarious and uncertain lives that thousands of young Indians are living, mostly on account of rampant joblessness and heightened job insecurity. If their concerns, anxieties and aspirations are not addressed immediately, they could well turn into the 'Precariat' or 'the new dangerous class' (Standing, 2011).

Moreover, over the last decade, numerous countries and continents, irrespective of their youth bulge have witnessed youth driven protests. The commonality across international protests such as the Arab Spring in 2010-11, the Occupy Wall Street Movement in 2011, and national events such as the India Against Corruption Movement of 2011, the wave of protests in the aftermath of the Delhi gang rape in late 2012, and youth' engagement with politics during the birth of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in 2013, has been the visible mobilisation and participation of 20 somethings. More recently, in the events that unfolded across prominent educational campuses such as the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), the Hyderabad Central University (HCU), Film and Television Institute of India (FTII), the Jadavpur University (JU), and the Delhi University (DU), not only were young

people recognised as having played a vital and central role, if not exclusive, their participation and angst somewhat debunked the myth of young people as being self-absorbed and depoliticised. Even though many of these protests have been painted as being ideological in nature with students divided in opposing camps, they also point at a much deeper social problem of discontent and disillusionment due to exacerbated unemployment, scarcity of resources, and reduced opportunity for social mobility. Across contexts, they reflect a common experience of precariousness.

1.2. About the survey

The CSDS-KAS Youth Survey 2016 was conducted in 19 States of the country among 6122 respondents in the age group of 15-34 years in the months of April and May, 2016. While the first round of the Youth Survey (back in 2007) had been conducted among 14-34 year-olds, for the latest round we decided not to include the 14-year-olds in our sample even as we retained the outer limit of 34 years. The National Youth Policy of the Government of India defines 'Youth' as those aged between 15 and 29 years (GoI, 2014). Our definition of youth adheres to the lower limit set by the government but extends the outer limit by five years. We did this for two reasons – one, so that we could compare with the past, and two, it gave us the chance to capture the attitudes and experiences of a wide spectrum of young people ranging from adolescents to young adults; school-going youth to youth who had married and settled down in life; those born in the early 1980s to those born at the start of the 21st century. In the survey we find these two extreme ends to be mostly differing in their beliefs, desires, anxieties and behaviour. However there are some matters on which they show a convergence.

While drawing the sample we also decided to give more preference to urban youth (particularly those living in the largest and large cities in terms of population) than rural youth. We adopted this strategy as it allowed us to do a deeper analysis of youth living in different types of urban areas - both big and small. It must be noted, however, that throughout this report while making generalised claims about the Indian youth on the whole, we have ensured that the achieved sample has been weighted in such a manner that it mirrors the actual rural-urban profile of India's 15-34-year-old population as per Census 2011 data. It is only while analysing by localities - big cities, smaller cities and villages, that we have not weighted the data by actual rural-urban proportions. For more technical details of the study design and sample see Appendix I.

The survey was conducted using a standardised questionnaire (Appendix III) which was administered face to face at the residence of the respondents. In each of the 19 States where the survey was conducted, the questionnaire was translated in the local language that is understood by most people of the state. For example, in Kerala it was in Malayalam, in Gujarat in Gujarati, in Assam in Assamese, and in Haryana in Hindi. Most questions in the questionnaire were structured, i.e., close-ended. However there were some that were kept open-ended in order to find out the respondent's spontaneous feelings about an issue without giving him/her a pre-decided set of options.

1.3. Structure of the report

This report consists of nine chapters (including the introduction) and each chapter discusses survey findings that touch upon, in some way or the other, on the three aspects mentioned in the title of the report - attitudes, aspirations and anxieties of India's youth. The first chapter is the introduction that you are now reading. The second chapter looks at the job profile, job preferences and career priorities of young Indians. The third chapter scrutinises the opinions of youngsters on the highly contentious policy of reservations in the employment and education sectors. The fourth chapter measures the degree of political participation among the youth and examines their attitudes regarding select political issues. The fifth chapter shares findings related to the social and cultural attitudes of youngsters and attempts to place them on the conservative-liberal spectrum. The sixth chapter takes a detailed look at the attitudes, preferences and practices of India's youth with respect to the institution of marriage. The seventh chapter focuses on a variety of aspects related to the lifestyle and habits of the youth. The eighth chapter highlights their various anxieties and insecurities and tries to ascertain their emotional state of mind. Finally, the ninth chapter attempts to understand and analyse experiences of discrimination in India. In most of these chapters we have tried to give comparisons with the previous round of the Youth Survey conducted in 2007 in order to highlight the changing patterns with respect to youth behaviour and attitudes. However some of the questions that have been asked in this latest round were not asked back then, thus making a comparative exercise impossible. We would like readers of this report to keep this in mind.

1.4. Important takeaways from the survey

While each chapter in this report deals with specific issues that may or may not be related, broadly speaking, in this introductory chapter we would like to highlight three takeaways from the survey that we believe are most significant. One, as mentioned

earlier in this introduction, there is growing concern among India's burgeoning youth population about jobs and if this is not addressed on time then it could have serious repercussions. Two, the appropriation of modernity by Indian youth seems to be to some extent superficial in nature. They seem to be or at least aspire to be outwardly modern in how they dress, live and consume, however their views on women, marriage and science are quite narrow-minded. Three, cross-group friendships or having a friend who belongs to a community other than one's own appear to have a liberalising effect on youth attitudes and lessens prejudice among them.

1.4.1. Employment concerns

The CSDS-KAS Youth Survey 2016 finds that among young employed Indians today, only a small fraction is employed in decent paying professional jobs. A vast proportion reported themselves as either being self-employed or engaged in low-paid jobs that do not guarantee a steady wage (Chapter 2). It is little surprise then that the survey also found employment and jobs to be the top-most concern of young Indians. When asked in an open-ended question what they thought was the most important issue facing India, a plurality of young Indians said it was unemployment. Nearly every fifth youth who was surveyed cited joblessness as the greatest problem confronting the country (Table 1.1). The survey also found anxiety with respect to jobs to be among the top five anxieties of the youth, irrespective of whether they are employed or not employed (Chapter 8).

Table 1.1: Biggest problem facing India according to country's youth (%)

	Proportion
Unemployment	18
Poverty/economic inequality	12
Corruption	9
Lack of clean drinking water	6
Population growth	4
Lack of education/illiteracy	3
Casteism and communalism	3
Development concerns	2

Note: The question was an open-ended one. Only those responses whose proportion was 2% or more have been shown in the table.

If a decade ago, the lack of employment opportunities was making most young Indians opt for self-employment, today it seems to be making them extend their years of education. Many among today's young generation are studying further either in order to delay their entry into the workforce or perhaps as means of "timepass" (Jeffrey, 2010). In the survey, about one-third of young respondents described themselves as students on being asked about their occupation. This proportion describing themselves as 'students' is more than two-times the one recorded in the youth survey conducted by CSDS-KAS in 2007. While the fact that more and more youngsters are studying now is undoubtedly a positive development as it increases the possibility of a higher degree of skill formation among them and perhaps indicates a desire among them to move away from menial and low paying work, what is cause for serious worry however is that the survey also found self-reported unemployment to be much higher among young graduates than those with lower levels of education. In other words, it found the acquisition of greater education and skills by the youth to be not necessarily guaranteeing gainful employment to them. This could be due to three factors. One, the demand doesn't match the supply. That is, there just aren't enough jobs being generated for the millions of graduates entering the labour market every year. This includes youth belonging to communities that have traditionally not been highly educated but are now beginning to make huge investments in education in order to achieve social and economic mobility. Two, some educated young people might be choosing to stay unemployed than work in jobs that they believe are not commensurate with their educational qualifications. And three, it is also highly possible that the sectors in which they are seeking jobs - service and manufacturing – do not find their education and skills to be such that it would make them employable.

Despite having registered much faster rates of growth than the agricultural sector, the survey indicates that the service and manufacturing sectors have not been able to wean away young Indians from agricultural jobs. The survey found the farming sector continuing to be a major employer of young Indians. One in every six, as opposed to one in every seven a decade ago, described being associated with it with many of them describing themselves as agricultural workers rather than farmers tilling their own land. Even as the finding that agriculture is the source of livelihood for most young Indians is not unexpected

considering that it is the backbone of the country's economy, what is certainly surprising is the slight increase in the proportion of young Indians associated with agriculture compared to ten years ago.

Another interesting finding that the survey found with respect to jobs is that most young Indians continue to valorise a sarkari naukri or a government job, in fact slightly more than they did a decade ago. This could also partly explain the crisis of employability being faced by the service and manufacturing areas, especially those in the private domain. Notwithstanding the fact that India's 25-year-long journey on the path of economic reforms has transformed it into one of the fastest growing economies in the world and created many jobs in the private sector, for a majority of youth an ideal job continues to be one that is located in public sector as it offers them a sense of security, permanence and perhaps social status. This sentiment in favour of a government job cuts across localities and even youngsters residing in big cities are expressing a far greater preference for it than they did a decade back. The high preference for a job in the public realm also perhaps explains the strong support that the survey found for the continuation of reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and OBC communities, especially among youth belonging to these beneficiary communities (Chapter 3). However, it is not clear whether there has been a decline or increase in the level of this support over the years since questions related to reservations were not asked in the previous 2007 round of the Youth Survey. What is clear from the survey though is that a greater proportion of youth, barring those belonging to the upper castes, support rather than oppose the policy of reservations. They do however make a distinction between reservations in public sector jobs and private ones. The survey did not find support for quotas in the latter to be as enthusiastic as support for quotas in the former.

1.4.2. Misplaced modernity?

The second major takeaway from the survey is the streak of illiberalism that one notices among the youth with respect to their opinions on social and political issues and also with respect to some of their practices. In his book Mistaken Modernity (2000), sociologist Dipankar Gupta had lamented about a superficial version of modernity among India's middle classes and elites. According to Gupta the modernity of this particular class of Indians was characterised more by the adoption of Western consumer habits and lifestyle than by the adherence to notions of equality and tolerance. Gupta had defined true modernity in terms of attitudes, especially those that come into play in social relations. A decade and a half since Gupta's treatise on the hypocrisy of the Indian middle class little seems to have changed.

The CSDS-KAS Youth Survey found a fairly large proportion of young Indians across classes, to be exhibiting the same set of traits that Gupta had lamented about with respect to the Indian middle class. As young people are struggling to navigate a rapidly changing environment, they appear to be becoming outwardly modern in their appearance and consumption habits but their thoughts and views reflect a troubling inclination towards intolerance and conservatism. The survey found about two in five young Indians to be either highly or moderately style conscious, that is, they were found to be fond of wearing stylish clothes and shoes, keeping the latest mobile phones and visiting beauty parlours and salons (Chapter 7). Meanwhile, as a response to new opportunities for consumption and entertainment in the form of an emerging café, multiplex and mall culture, there has been a marked increase in the consumption and spending patterns of youth, particularly among those residing in cities. Close to half the youth in big cities and about one-third in smaller ones reported regularly watching movies in a cinema hall, regularly eating out at restaurants and cafes and regularly visiting shopping malls.

However when these consumption practices are juxtaposed with their attitudes on socio-cultural issues we notice a paradox. It seems that youth's responses to the frenzied globalisation of the last two decades have been different from what may have been anticipated. What the young have adopted in the name of modern is a form of consumerism. While they have welcomed the introduction of consumer goods and adapted to new modes of entertainment and consumption, their ways of thinking have not significantly transformed. The survey found a significant proportion of aspirational, style-conscious, smartphone-savvy and mall-visiting young Indians to be also holding illiberal (even regressive) views, although they may be slightly less likely to do so compared to those who are not as stylish and aspirational (Table 1.2).

Even as they embrace a certain aspect of Western modernity, the youth do not seem to subscribing to Western ideas of equality. To put it differently, there is a dissonance in their modernity; many of them seem to be modern in attire but not in their thoughts. For instance, overall over half the youth were found to be holding patriarchal and misogynistic views, including many young women (Chapter 5). Two in every five young Indians do not feel it is right for women to do a job after marriage, a similar proportion agreed with the proposition that men make better leaders than women. Over half the respondents also agreed in varying degrees with the proposition that wives should always listen to their husbands. Western studies have shown that having daughters has the potential of sensitising fathers to issues of gender equity. We tested this on our sample and found it to be working in the opposite direction. Young married men who said they had a daughter/s were found to be as patriarchal in their attitudes as those with sons.

Table 1.2: India's youth, high on style but not as much in thoughts (%)

	Very Patriarchal in mindset	Somewhat Patriarchal in mindset
Highly style conscious	25	22
Moderately style conscious	17	27
Not much style conscious	18	30
Not at all style conscious	31	29

Note: See Appendix II to find out how the Indices of Style Consciousness and Patriarchal Mindset were constructed. The rest of the respondents were either not much or not at all patriarchal in mindset.

Acceptance of homosexuality was also found to be quite low among the youth. Only one in every four approved of it either fully or partially. While this figure of approval might be considered by some to be promising given that there is social stigma around the issue and discussions about sexuality, particularly homosexuality are usually discouraged in Indian society, it is nevertheless very low compared to Western societies. Interestingly, the survey found acceptance of same-sex relationships to be much greater among those youth who were found to be highly religious in practice than those who reported being less religious or not religious at all. Moreover, acceptance of it was far greater among youth living in villages than those residing in big cities. One would have thought that a more liberal attitude with respect to this issue would be more prevalent in cities, but that is clearly not what the survey reveals.

On the issue of marriage the youth show a mixed attitude. While many more youngsters now than a decade ago do not consider marriage to be the be all and end all in life and many according to the survey seem to be delaying their age of marriage, at the same time their attitudes and practices with respect to inter-community marriages have largely remained unchanged (Chapter 6). Only a little over half the respondents were found to be in approval of inter-caste marriage. Although this figure has registered a sharp increase compared to a decade ago, nonetheless the survey findings reveal a paradox. This is because the reported outcome of inter-caste marriage (married respondents who said their spouse is not from their caste) was found to be only 4 percent. Meanwhile, the reported outcome of inter-religious marriage was even lower at 3 percent. The survey found that parent-arranged marriages are still the norm with over four in every five married youth describing their marriage as such. Only one in ten reported having had a love marriage. Not surprisingly, this tiny minority of youth with self-arranged marriages was found to be far more liberal in attitudes regarding love and relationships than those with parent-arranged marriages. They were for instance twice as likely to approve of dating before marriage, live-in relationships and the celebration of Valentine's Day as youth with arranged marriages, or for that matter even unmarried youth.

A plurality of young Indians also seem to lack a scientific temper since close to half the respondents were of the opinion that religion should get precedence over science when the two clash with each other. This sentiment was particularly high among highly style conscious youth, three in every five of whom preferred religion over science. Surprisingly, many graduates also took this position, although they are also more likely to take the counter position (Table 1.3).

Table 1.3: Most youth preferred religious beliefs over science when asked to choose between the two (%)

	Science should take precedence over religion	Religion should take precedence over science	No opinion
Youth (Overall)	**33**	**47**	**20**
Graduate or above	39	50	11
High School Pass	30	49	22
Primary Pass	24	49	38
Non-literate	14	25	60

We also tried to measure prejudice and discriminatory attitudes among Indian youth, and on this front the findings are not too alarming. After taking into consideration a whole host of questions that tapped prejudice, we found only one in every five youngsters to be discriminatory, either highly or somewhat. However, here too there are some areas of concern. Prejudice among Indian youth was higher than average with respect to non-vegetarians, those who drink alcohol and live-in couples. Also rather surprisingly, not many youth reported having faced discrimination. Merely one in every six reported being victims of discrimination in the recent past, be it on the grounds of religion, caste, economic status, region or gender (Chapter 9). The more educated youth were relatively more vocal perhaps because they possess greater capacities to perceive discrimination.

In terms of their political attitudes too, we noticed a slight tilt towards conservative rather than liberal ideas, on many issues (Chapter 4). Quite worryingly, censorship of cinema, an issue that comes up from time to time, does not seem to bother young Indians much. Three out of every five respondents agreed with the proposition that films that hurt religious sentiments should be banned. The survey also found fairly widespread support for the continuation of the death penalty with only about one-third wanting it abolished. On the issue of India-Pakistan relations, while a plurality was found to be in favour of improving relations with Pakistan, there was a significant chunk (about one-third) that was opposed to any peace initiatives with the neighbouring country. That said, not all politically-oriented questions elicited a conservative response. For instance, a plurality of respondents was of the opinion that student unions serve an important role and that they should not be banned. A fairly large proportion of youth also held the view that young Muslims are being falsely implicated in terrorism related cases. Both these views are far from being conservative. However, it must be stressed that on both these questions and the one on Indo-Pakistan relations there was a fairly large proportion of respondents who stayed silent choosing not express their opinion. On the other hand on questions related to censorship of cinema and death penalty, respondents were found to be far more vocal.

1.4.3. Cross-group friendships seem to liberalise attitudes

Even as Indian youth, on the whole, seem to be displaying an illiberal streak on many issues, the survey also notices a certain liberality with respect to their friendships and this openness seems to impact (or at least is correlated with) their attitudes and lessen their prejudices. The survey found a fairly large proportion of young Indians to have befriended people belonging to castes and religions other than their own. About four in five respondents reported having a close friend from another caste and about two in every three said they have close friends who do not belong to their own religion. There may have been an element of social desirability in the way in which they answered this question, nonetheless, this is an important finding as the inter-group contact theory or the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954) posits that inter-personal interactions and friendships between members of different groups help promote positive attitudes towards others and reduce prejudice. It has been argued that when friendships are intimate, people include aspects of their friends in their own self-concept (Aron et.al., 1991). The basic argument of the Contact theory is that bias against a category of people can be reduced as one learns more about that category of people. So if a Hindu becomes close friends with a Muslim, then he/she might grow to appreciate Muslim culture because of his closeness and intimacy to the Muslim friend and might develop positive feelings and attitudes toward Muslims as a group. The same process applies to all other groups - caste, gender and sexual orientation etc.

We find some validation of the inter-group contact hypothesis in our survey; that is, those with cross-group friendships were found to be more liberal and less prejudiced in their attitudes about other communities that those with same-group friendships. For instance, the survey found caste-based prejudice to be weaker among respondents with cross-caste friendships. When respondents were asked if they would have a problem if their neighbour belonged to a different caste, the proportion of those who answered in the affirmative was eight percentage points higher among those who reported not having a close friend from another caste than those who reported having one.

Having a close friend from another religion also makes a difference, in fact a bigger one than the one we see with respect to caste. Youth who reported having close friends from another religion were over two times less likely to feel uneasy if their neighbour belongs to another religion than those with only co-religionists as close friends. Not just friendships, marriage outside of one's religion also matters. Married youth who reported having a spouse from another religion were ten percentage points less likely to feel uneasy if their neighbour belonged to a different religion than those whose spouse is from the same religion.

To give another example from the survey, a cross-religion friendship was also found to matter in terms of anxiety among youth regarding mob violence and riots. Youth with close friends from another religion were found to be ten percentage points more anxious about riots breaking out in their city, town or village than youth who did not have any close friends from another religion.

Having a friend from the opposite gender appears to liberalise youth attitudes. Even though not too many youngsters reported having a friend from the opposite gender (only about two in five did), nonetheless among those who did we found there to be more broadmindedness, particularly with respect to issues related to women. Two in every three young men who reported not having any close female friends were found to be patriarchal in their mindset compared to it being a little less than half among young men who said they have close female friends. The direction of causality could of course be the other way round as well, i.e. more patriarchal men being less likely to befriend women because of their anti-women attitudes than those who are less patriarchal.

The survey also found a correlation between cross-religion, cross-caste and cross-gender friendships among the youth and their insecurity about friendships in general. We say this because anxiety about losing a friend was found to much greater among those who had a friend from another religion, another caste and the opposite gender than those who did not. This pattern is not

a one off and was witnessed across religious groups, Hindu castes and communities, and among both men and women (Table 1.4). Young Muslims, Hindus, Christians and Sikhs who reported having a close friend from a religion other than theirs showed much higher anxiety about 'losing a friend' than their co-religionists who don't have a close friend from another religion. Similarly, young Hindu Upper Castes, OBCs, Dalits and Adivasis having a close friend from another caste turned out to be more worried about 'losing a friend' than their counterparts who reported having no close friends from a caste other than theirs.

Table 1.4: Cross-caste, cross-religion and cross-gender friendships seem to be leading to greater insecurity about friendship (%)

	Worry about losing a friend	
	Quite a lot or somewhat	Very little or not at all
Youth (Overall)	**62**	**34**
Muslims who have a close friend from another religion	68	29
Muslims who don't have a close friend from another religion	42	51
Hindus who have a close friend from another religion	67	30
Hindus who don't have a close friend from another religion	55	41
Hindu UC who have a close friend from another caste	69	29
Hindu UC who don't have a close friend from another caste	60	38
Hindu OBC who have a close friend from another caste	68	29
Hindu OBC who don't have a close friend from another caste	54	42
Hindu SC who have a close friend from another caste	66	30
Hindu SC who don't have a close friend from another caste	53	42
Hindu ST who have a close friend from another caste	51	46
Hindu ST who don't have a close friend from another caste	13	81
Men who have a close female friend	69	30
Men who don't have a close female friend	62	34
Women who have a close male friend	68	30
Women who don't have a close male friend	56	39

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response. UC stands for Upper Caste; OBC stands for Other Backward Classes.; SC stands for Scheduled Caste; ST stands for Scheduled Tribe. See Appendix II for caste and community classification.

While in a multi-cultural and diverse country such as India, it is not surprising that the youth are entering into friendships that are not dictated by their communitarian identities, nonetheless it is significant considering the unequal relationships among castes and the history of tensions among religious communities, particularly between Hindus and Muslims. Moreover, the effect that such friendships have on their thought processes and biases needs to be noted and studied further.

References

Allport, Gordon W. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice.* Addison-Wesley.

Aron, Arthur, Aron, Elaine N., Tudor, Michael and Nelson, Greg. 1991. Close relationships as including other in the self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 60(2): 241-253.

GoI, 2014. *National Youth Policy 2014.* Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports. Available at: http://www.youthpolicy.org/national/India_2014_National_Youth_Policy.pdf. Accessed on 15 February, 2017

Gupta, Dipankar. 2000. *Mistaken Modernity: India between Worlds.* Harper India.

Jeffrey, Craig. 2010. Timepass: Youth, class, and time among unemployed young men in India. *American Ethnologist,* 37(3): 465–481.

Pew Research. 2014. 'Chapter 2. Aging in the U.S. and Other Countries, 2010 to 2050' in Attitudes About Aging: a Global Perspective. Available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/01/30/chapter-2-aging-in-the-u-s-and-other-countries-2010-to-2050/. Accessed on 15

February, 2017.

Standing, Guy. 2011. *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class.* Bloomsbury.

The Hindu. 2013. India is set to become the youngest country by 2020. Article by Girija Shivakumar. 17 April. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-is-set-to-become-the-youngest-country-by-2020/article4624347.ece. Accessed on 15 February, 2017.

UNFPA. 2009. 'Papers in Population Ageing. Demographic Prognosis for South Aisa: A future of rapid ageing'. Available at: http://www.ifa-fiv.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/059_South-Asia-Ageing.pdf. Accessed on 15 February, 2017.

2. Job preferences and career priorities



2. Job preferences and career priorities

2.1. Introduction

Two and a half decades after embarking on a programme of economic liberalisation, India's enchantment with the post-colonial state remains puzzlingly undiminished. Nowhere is this enchantment more striking than in young India's obsession with a sarkari naukri (government job). This comes out quite clearly in the CSDS-KAS Youth Survey 2016, which shows that two out of every three young people in India would choose a government job as their occupation, if they had a choice. Preference for a government job is strongest among the most educated, particularly within the large segment of young graduates who flood India's job market in millions every year, only to be hit by the grim reality of growing unemployment. This reality was best captured by a headline that appeared sometime back in a leading English newspaper. The headline reads "PhD holders among 23 lakh applicants for peon jobs in UP" (Hindustan Times, 2015). Given the fact that Uttar Pradesh is India's most populous state, it is probably not all that surprising if an advertisement for a peon's job in the state secretariat attracts a flood of applications. What is rather intriguing, and if one may so, unsettling is this - of these 23 lakh applicants, 1,50,000 were graduates, around 25,000 were post-graduates and some 250 even held a doctoral degree! These educated young people were among a large pool of candidates vying for a job that merely had primary school education and bicycle riding skills as its sole eligibility criteria.

More than anything else, such reports reveal the extent of joblessness in a country that happens to be one of the fastest growing major economies in the world today. Recent commentaries on the subject have harped on how India's economy is just not creating enough jobs despite a spike in growth rates (Jaffrelot, 2016). These claims are indeed backed by hard evidence. Unemployment rates have been rising consistently from 4.7 percent in 2012-13 to 5 percent in 2015-16 (GoI, 2016), even while India's annual GDP growth rate increased from 5.6 percent to 7.6 percent in the same period (The World Bank, 2016). While the ruling BJP-led NDA government has initiated some ambitious policy initiatives (Make in India and Skill India Mission) to boost India's flailing manufacturing sector and create gainful employment across the economy's major sectors, misgivings remain about the employability of India's young graduates. Not surprisingly, the issue of unemployment was recognised as the most important problem facing the country by a plurality of young respondents (18%) in our survey.

Any attempt to study the occupational preferences and career priorities of India's youth must be situated in the context outlined above. Using time-series data from the CSDS-KAS Youth Surveys conducted in 2007 and 2016, this chapter attempts to understand the occupational profile of India's youth by placing the occupation data in the context of various demographic and sociological changes taking place. It also delves into the question of how job preferences and career priorities of India's youth have largely remained unchanged over the last decade, (especially when it comes to a government job), despite a secular reduction in the size of the public sector and the corresponding expansion of the organised private sector. While there are puzzling continuities like these, there are also unexpected breaks from the past in terms of the declining salience of money as a determinant of happiness and the growing importance of job satisfaction as a factor shaping occupational choice.

2.2. Trends in occupational profile of India's youth

The occupational profile of India's youth seems to have undergone a significant change over the last one decade, with a third (32%) of the country's youth reporting their main occupation as 'student'. This figure is up by a whopping 19 percentage points since 2007, when a mere 13 percent respondents were reportedly pursuing their studies (Figure 2.1). Underlying these trends is an unprecedented boom in India's higher education sector, which has witnessed a rapid expansion since the 2000s (Varghese, 2015). Much of this expansion is accounted for by the proliferation of private universities, many of which offer degrees in technical and professional disciplines. However, the poor quality of education and bad infrastructure in many of these self-financing private institutions makes it difficult for a lot of young people studying in them to find gainful employment upon graduation.

If one discounts the proportion of youth still studying, agriculture emerges as the largest employer of India's youth. Considered to be the backbone of India's two trillion dollar economy, agriculture was found to employ about one-fifth (18%) of India's youth, up by four percentage points since 2007. About two-fifths (39%) of these youth are agricultural workers, working on other people's lands to earn their wages.

Business was reported as the main occupation by only 7 percent of respondents. Upon probing further, it was found that a plurality (40%) of these respondents run small shops and business establishments. A large segment of India's young population (18%) consists of those who stay at home. Many of them described themselves as housewives. Interestingly, the proportion of women reportedly engaged in housework was found to be roughly the same across the rural-urban divide.

A dissection of these findings by demographic data reveals the extent to which caste, educational attainment and occupational status overlap in India. Compared to upper caste youth, it is found that Dalit and Adivasi youth lag far behind when it comes to access to education. While over two-fifths of upper caste youth (42%) reported themselves as students, only about one-fourth of

Figure 2.1: Trends in occupational profile of India's youth (%)



Dalit youth (25%) and a mere one-sixth of Adivasi respondents (16%) said they were pursuing their studies (Table 2.1). OBC and Muslim youth figure somewhere in the middle, with about a third of them (33%) reporting themselves as students.

Table 2.1: Caste and community-wise occupational profile of India's youth (%)

	Profnl. jobs	Govt. employees	Business	Service	Skilled	Semi or unskilled	Farming	Students	Stay at home	Unemployed
Hindu Upper Caste	6	4	8	2	4	2	6	42	18	3
Hindu Peasant Prop.	5	3	6	4	6	3	19	33	17	1
Hindu Peasant OBC	3	2	7	1	4	4	19	33	18	3
Hindu Service OBC	3	2	6	3	5	5	21	32	18	3
Hindu SC	3	2	6	3	5	9	13	25	21	6
Hindu ST	2	1	4	0	2	4	58	16	10	2
Muslim	3	1	9	1	7	5	13	33	20	3
Others	6	3	8	1	6	3	12	37	12	4

Note: The rest reported being in other occupations. Peasant Prop. means Peasant Proprietors, OBC means Other Backward Classes, SC means Scheduled Caste, ST means Scheduled Tribe, Profnl. means Professional jobs. See Appendix II for caste and community classification.

Interestingly, the gap in educational attainment is very visible when analysed in terms of caste. Compared to 69 percent of upper caste youth, only 41 percent of youth from Dalit and 20 percent from Adivasi were found to have completed college education (Table 2.2). This finding finds strong support in the literature on educational inequality in India. Recent empirical work on the subject points out that there has been little improvement in caste based inequality at the college level in India, despite the long history of affirmative action aimed at granting historically marginalised groups access to a college education (Desai and Kulkarni, 2008).

Caste inequality also manifests itself in the occupational structure and more often than not, it ends up reinforcing embedded occupational hierarchies. Data show that a much larger proportion of Dalit youth are engaged in low-paid unskilled work compared to youth from other communities. Likewise, an overwhelming majority of Adivasi youth are engaged in agriculture and allied activities. On the other hand, one sees a relatively higher proportion of upper caste youth reporting themselves as professionals and government employees, occupations which have traditionally been the preserve of upper castes (Table 2.1).

While caste is certainly a pivotal factor affecting occupation, the level of education also matters quite a bit. This is not to say that caste and educational attainment are unrelated. They are as we have shown in Table 2.2. This is just to test the impact of education on a person's occupational status, independent of his/her caste background. It is observed that the lesser educated youth are mostly concentrated in occupations that fall at the lower rungs of the occupational ladder (Table 2.3). A bulk of these youngsters with little or no exposure to education, work in the informal sector, with most of them engaged in agriculture and allied activities. Conversely, those with the highest exposure to education are mostly pursuing their studies. A small but

Table 2.2: Caste and community-wise educational profile of India's youth (%)

	Graduate or above	High School Pass	Primary Pass	Non Literate
Hindu Upper Caste	69	24	4	3
Hindu Peasant Proprietor	55	37	7	1
Hindu Peasant OBC	49	36	9	6
Hindu Service OBC	50	36	9	4
Hindu SC	41	41	11	7
Hindu ST	20	34	20	26
Muslim	40	37	15	8
Others	58	31	8	4

comparatively significant fraction of them (7%) are engaged in high-end white-collar jobs. However, the most educated among the youth are also most vulnerable to being jobless. It is found that self-reported unemployment rates go up with a rise in the levels of educational attainment, with graduates reporting the highest levels of unemployment at 4 percent in the survey[1]. There are significant regional and inter-state variations in the volume of young people who report themselves as unemployed. The survey found a far higher concentration of unemployed youth in eastern India, most particularly in the states of Odisha and West Bengal. While some 8 percent of Odisha's youth reported themselves as unemployed, the corresponding figure for West Bengal is a whopping 13 percent. This is in stark contrast to west and central states like Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, where self-reported

Table 2.3: Education-wise occupational profile of India's youth (%)

	Profnl. jobs	Govt. employees	Business	Service	Skilled	Semi or unskilled	Farming	Students	Stay at home	Unemployed
Graduate+	7	4	8	2	4	3	7	42	12	4
High Sch. Pass	1	1	7	1	7	5	21	31	19	3
Primary Pass	1	-	3	2	4	10	38	7	31	1
Non-literate	-	-	2	1	1	9	56	-	29	-

Note: The rest reported being in other occupations. Sch. Means School, Profnl. means Professional.

levels of joblessness were found to be comparatively much lower at 2 percent and 1 percent, respectively. This could be either because these states do not have a substantial proportion of highly educated youth (the survey found this to be true for Madhya Pradesh, at least) and hence there is a low demand for white collar jobs, or it could be that these states have actually been able to provide better employment avenues to all.

2.3. Occupational preferences

The previous section gave a description of the occupational profile of India's youth. This section captures the trends in their job preferences over the last decade and highlights the factors that help explain why today's young people aspire for certain kinds of jobs and not others. In order to understand their job preferences, the CSDS-KAS Youth Survey asked respondents two questions on choice of occupation - an open-ended question on the occupation they would have chosen for themselves if they had complete freedom to do so, and a close-ended question on which among the following jobs they would choose if given a choice - a government job, a private job, or setting up one's own business/profession. Responses to the open-ended question indicate that even though one-fifths (21%) of the respondents still prefer their current job, about 16 percent of them would choose a job which lands them on the payrolls of the state, if we also include the preferences of those who wish to join the civil services, the police and the armed forces (Table 2.4). Among the most eager aspirants of a government job were people in the 15-22 age-bracket, students and unemployed youth.

This attraction towards a government job was seen even when respondents were asked to indicate their job preferences in a

[1]Self-reported unemployment among youth in the 15-21-year-old age-group is not factored in this analysis because a substantial proportion of young people in this age bracket are either in high school or are pursuing their undergraduate studies.

Table 2.4: After one's current job, a government job is the top favourite of India's youth (%)

Preferred occupation if one had the freedom to choose one	
My current job	21
Government job	11
Teaching	7
One's own business	5
Science and Engineering	3
Medicine and Health	3
Police	2
Military	2
Literature, Art, Entertainment, creative fields	1
Civil Services	1
Politics, Activism, Law	1
Farmer	1
Banking and Accounting	1
Others	7
No response	34

Note: No response is very high since the question was asked in an open-ended way.

close-ended question. It was found that an overwhelming majority of India's youth (65% or almost two-thirds) would prefer a government job, if given a choice. Setting up one's own business came a distant second (19% or one in every five), followed by a job in the private sector. Only 7 percent or less than one in every ten of India's youth said they would like to go for a private job, though it remains unclear as to which industry or sector within the private sector they would prefer to work in.

A quick look at the time-series data on job preferences of India's youth shows that the appeal of a government job has remained undiminished over the last decade. In 2007, in response to the same close-ended question, 62 percent of the youth had said they would prefer a government job. In the 2016 survey, it has increased slightly to 65 percent (Figure 2.2). Even after two and a half decades of pro-market reforms being in force, some two-thirds of India's youth still aspire for a job in the public sector. Given that just 2 percent of youth are actually employed in the public sector, the gap between expectation and reality is enormous. In fact, it has only gotten wider over the last decade with more and more young people competing for an even smaller pool of jobs in the public sector and the government itself outsourcing numerous services to private firms.

The other noteworthy thing about these figures is the sharp fall in preference for private jobs, particularly among graduates. There has been a perceptible shift in job preferences of this segment - a great number of them want to take up government

Figure 2.2: A government job continues to be most coveted profession for India's youth (%)



jobs now. Among other reasons, this marked shift can be attributed to the dismal state of India's corporate sector, which has witnessed a major slowdown in recruitment over the last few years. The post-2008 Financial Crisis period has seen a lot of firms cut their costs by hiring fewer employees and laying off sections of their workforce. However, the problem is not limited to jobs being scarce or unavailable; there is also a massive skill deficit in India's workforce, something which has been pointed out by several recent reports. It is estimated that a mere 2.3 percent of the workforce in India has undergone any formal vocational training compared to 68 percent in the United Kingdom, 75 percent in Germany, 52 percent in USA, 80 percent in Japan and 96 percent in South Korea (Wheebox, 2016) This renders a vast section of India's graduates unfit for gainful employment.

In addition to such reports, there is a rich body of ethnographic work that highlights the problem of unemployability among India's young graduates. In his classic study on unemployed young men in India, Craig Jeffrey points to how 'the idea of studying is only a means of timepass' and that a lot of these young people recognise that accumulating more degrees is unlikely to increase their employability (Jeffrey, 2010).

A large section of such youth continues to study and prepare for government exams in the faint hope of finding a government job someday. In a country where nine out of ten people are employed in the economy's informal sector, with a large majority of them having low earnings with limited or no social protection (IHD, 2014), the value of a government job cannot be overstated. An entry-level government employee is not only better paid compared to his/her counterpart in the private sector; s/he is also entitled to a host of 'non-wage benefits' that may have substantial monetary value. Among other things, government employees (at least a small fraction of them) get access to subsidised housing, schooling and health-care services. They are also entitled to receive regular post-retirement pension upon completing a certain stipulated period in service. Aside from these material benefits, a government job also carries with it an air of respectability in Indian society, one that cannot possibly be captured or expressed in utilitarian terms.

2.4. What shapes job preferences?

A person's job preferences are influenced and shaped by a variety of socio-economic factors. Parental influence and occupation, and even schooling for that matter, go a long way in shaping a person's occupational preferences. It is found that preference for a government job goes up significantly with greater parental influence on decisions about career/education. The occupation of the parent, particularly of father, has a discernible effect on the child's occupational status/preferences. A far greater proportion of young people whose fathers are professionals, government employees, businessmen and skilled workers reported their occupational status as student (58%, 48%, 49% and 45%, respectively) compared to those whose fathers are engaged in semi-skilled or unskilled work and farming and allied activities (29% and 25%, respectively). Moreover, the latter two occupational categories reveal a far greater degree of inter-generational occupational continuity than all other occupations. This is no co-incidence; it just reveals the extent to which occupational mobility is dependent on what your father does to earn a living. If your father is a farmer or an unskilled worker, you are far less likely to be studying and acquiring the skills that enable a person to move up the occupational ladder than somebody whose father is a high end professional, a government employee or a skilled worker. This is indicative of low inter-generational occupational mobility in the country.

Schooling, both in terms of public-private divide and the medium of instruction appears to have a clear relationship with job preferences. It was found that preference for a private job was nine percentage points higher among youth educated in private, English medium schools compared to those who studied in government, non-English medium schools.

Locality is yet another salient factor shaping job preferences. As Table 2.5 shows, a government job has a slightly stronger appeal in India's villages compared to towns and big cities. While there are more takers for private jobs in urban India, one can discern a growing sense of disenchantment with the private sector among youth living in metropolitan cities compared to about ten years ago, and this disenchantment is nowhere more clearly manifested than in their growing preference for a government job.

While the aforementioned factors help explain variations in job preferences of India's youth, what surpasses them all in its

Table 2.5: Preference for a government job has increased phenomenally among youth in big cities (%)

	Government job		Private job		Own Business	
	2007	2016	2007	2016	2007	2016
Big Cities	48	62	24	10	21	21
Smaller Cities	58	60	17	10	19	20
Villages	65	69	9	3	14	17

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

explanatory power is the level of education. It is observed that with higher levels of education, preference for a government job goes up significantly and this is particularly true for today's graduates, three-fourths of whom would like to take up a government job, if given a choice (Table 2.6). On the other hand, the less educated youth show greater inclination to set up their own business or be self-employed.

Table 2.6: Increase in preference for a government job among graduates (%)

	Government job		Private job		Own Business	
	2007	2016	2007	2016	2007	2016
Graduate or above	54	73	25	9	19	16
High School Pass	66	64	11	6	15	20
Primary Pass	53	57	7	3	18	24
Non-literate	49	32	8	1	15	23

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

2.5. Career priorities of India's youth

A related question to job preferences of India's youth is the question of career priorities, which primarily deals with the things that matter most to today's youth when it comes to choosing an occupation. To understand these priorities, the CSDS-KAS Youth Survey asked respondents to indicate which one of these jobs would they give most priority to – a permanent job even if it means drawing a little less salary, a job with an opportunity to work with people of their liking, a job with good income in which one doesn't have to worry about money, or a job that gives them a feeling of satisfaction? Findings indicate that a third of the country's youth accord the greatest priority to having a permanent job, even if it means drawing a little less salary. Job satisfaction comes a close second, followed by a good income (Figure 2.3).

A quick look at the decennial trends in young peoples' job priorities reveals an interesting pattern. While security of employment continues to be on top of the priority list, a high paying job is much less preferred today than it was a decade back (almost 13 percentage points less). Contrary to popular perception, this generation is also far less inclined to believe that having a lot of money is important to remain happy in life. The importance ascribed to money declined from 79 percent in 2007 to 60 percent in 2016. This generation also places greater premium on job satisfaction, with 26 percent of today's youth according the top priority to job satisfaction compared to 19 percent in 2007.

Disaggregating the data on job priorities by some select background variables throws up interesting findings. Locality has a

Figure 2.3: Job security continues to trump all other considerations; job satisfaction matters a lot more now than a decade ago (%)



Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

marked effect on job priorities. As we move from villages to big cities, having a permanent job becomes less and less of a priority for India's youth and having a job with a good income assumes much greater importance. In villages, some 37 percent of the youth accord the highest priority to job permanence, compared to a mere 24 percent in big cities. Likewise, about 20 percent youth in villages aspire for a job that pays them really well compared to 26 percent youth in big cities. This is understandable as the cost of living in a big city is exponentially higher than what it might be in a small town or a village. Also, with the kind of lifestyle today's youth aspire to lead having a good income becomes all the more important.

A person's educational attainment also appears to shape his/her career priorities, but only as far as the importance of work satisfaction is concerned. While youth across the extremes of the educational ladder are similarly positioned on the importance of a well paying job, they differ significantly in the value they place on job satisfaction. Findings show that job satisfaction matters to only 11 percent of non-literate youth, 16 percent of primary pass youth, 19 percent of those who have passed high school and a substantial 34 percent of those who have a graduate degree. In other words, the more educated you are, the greater value you place on finding satisfaction in the work you do.

2.6. Aspiration to migrate for higher education and work

Recent reports in some of India's leading newspapers reveal that more and more young Indians are crossing India's shores to study and find work in foreign countries. While it is true that lately there has been a surge in the number of young Indians going abroad to study and obtain work, findings show that only one in every seven youth cherishes dreams to obtain higher education abroad or to find work in some other country. Around four in every five youth don't have any such desire (Table 2.7).

Table 2.7: Not many young Indians have thought of going abroad for education or employment (%)

Are you thinking of…?	Yes	No
Obtaining higher education abroad	14	79
Working/finding a job abroad	15	81

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

There could be various reasons for this. One is finances. The prohibitive costs of studying in a foreign university, with its exorbitant tuition fees and high living expenses, ensure that a foreign education remains beyond the reach of most young Indians. This explains why youth from relatively well-off families are more eager to pursue their higher studies abroad. On being asked if they were thinking of obtaining higher education abroad, only about 14 percent of respondents from poor families said they were contemplating going abroad for higher studies, compared to over a third (34%) of respondents hailing from middle class families and 27 percent from rich families. The anticipated returns on investing in foreign education could be another deterrent, especially at a time when there is severe job crunch in countries that have traditionally been popular destinations for Indians seeking higher education and job opportunities abroad.

Not surprisingly, a person's educational attainment and schooling were also found to be associated with his/her desire to go abroad for the said purposes. The more educated youth are also much keener to go abroad for higher education and work, with a fifth (20%) of graduates aspiring to study in foreign universities and about the same proportion (22%) considering the possibility of finding work abroad. When we look at schooling, youth from private, English medium schools are far more open to the idea of going abroad to study and work compared to those who have studied in non-English medium, government schools. Of course, this has a lot to do with how educational attainment, schooling and economic status re-inforce each other because the richer you are, the more likely it is that you will be more educated and also have studied in a private, English medium school.

However, there is something else that matters more than one's economic condition and schooling in shaping a person's aspirations to go abroad - the density of one's kinship network, or what is called 'social capital' in academic parlance. The odds of going abroad to study and work increase phenomenally if the person has a family member or a close relative studying or working abroad. About 7 percent of the young respondents said they have a family member or a close relative who is studying or has studied abroad, and among them the desire to study abroad was about 56 percent. Similarly, 11 percent or little over one in ten respondents reported having a family member or close relative working abroad and among them the desire to work abroad was 54 percent. This also explains why youth from Kerala, Punjab and Tamil Nadu showed a higher than average willingness in the survey to not just pursue their higher studies abroad (24%, 24% and 20%, respectively) but also to find a job in a foreign country (48%, 32% and 24%, respectively) compared to youth from other states. People from these states are among the most numerically significant and well established within the larger population of overseas Indians.

2.7. Conclusion

From the preliminary analysis carried out in this chapter, some broad conclusions can safely be drawn. One, the occupational profile of today's youth has undergone a significant change over the last decade. This change has been brought about by the massive rise in the number of young persons pursuing further studies. Two, the aspiration for a government job remains undiminished since the last decade. In fact, with greater liberalisation and privatisation of the economy, the expectations from the state in terms of its perceived capacity to create jobs have only grown. As the government gets downsized in the coming years, there will be even greater competition for the fewer jobs that are available. The agitations by Jats in Haryana, Patels in Gujarat and the Marathas in Maharashtra are somewhat symptomatic of the underlying job crisis that is brewing in India. Three, since the jobs of the future are going to be skill-intensive; one of the prime tasks before governments and policy makers is to address the massive skill deficit that has kept India from fully realising its demographic dividend. An educated and skilled workforce is an asset that is surely worth investing in for a country that has some of the lowest rates of labour productivity in the world.

References

Desai, Sonalde and Kulkarni, Veena. 2008. Changing Educational Inequalities in India in the Context of Affirmative Action. *Demography,* 45(2): 245-270.

GoI. 2016. Report on Fifth Annual Employment - Unemployment Survey (2015-16): Volume I. Government of India. *Ministry of Labour and Employment. Labour Bureau.* Available at: http://labourbureaunew.gov.in/UserContent/EUS_5th_1.pdf. Accessed on 7 December, 2016.

Hindustan Times. 2015. PhD holders among 23 lakh applicants for peon jobs in UP. 17 September. Available at: http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/phd-holders-among-23-lakh-applicants-for-peon-jobs-in-up/story-OqHzHbvo16gUN2DfTkfYlI.html. Accessed on 7 December, 2016.

IHD. 2014. *India Labor and Employment Report 2014: Workers in the era of Globalization.* Institute for Human Development. Available at: http://www.ihdindia.org/ILERpdf/Highlights%20of%20the%20Report.pdf. Accessed on 7 December, 2016.

Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2016. India's Jobless Growth is undermining its ability to reap the demographic dividend. *The Indian Express,* 29 April. Available at: http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/economic-survey-india-unemployment-2775236/. Accessed on 7 December, 2016.

Jeffrey, Craig. 2010. Timepass: Youth, class, and time among unemployed young men in India. *American Ethnologist,* 37(3): 465–481.

The World Bank. 2016. World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=IN. Accessed on 7 December, 2016.

Varghese, N.V. 2015. Challenges of Massification of Higher Education in India. Research Paper. Centre for Policy Research in Higher Education, National University of Educational Planning and Administration.

Wheebox. 2016. *India Skills Report.* Available at: https://wheebox.com/logo/ISR-2016-small.pdf. Accessed on 1 December, 2016.

3. Opinion on the issue of reservations



3. Opinion on the issue of reservations

3.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the opinions and attitudes of India's young population on the issue of Reservations or quotas. The topic of Reservations or affirmative action in India has been a highly contentious and a hotly debated one. In India, reservation policies were adopted in the princely states and presidencies well before Independence for reducing caste-based inequalities and ending discrimination faced by historically disadvantaged groups. They have not only continued since then but have also been extended further. Not only are reservations applied in the political domain in the form of reserved constituencies for Scheduled Castes (former 'untouchables' or Dalits) and Scheduled Tribes (indigenous people or Adivasis) in the Lok Sabha and the state Vidhan Sabhas, but also in the spheres of education and employment; and it is in these two spheres that they are highly contentious. It is mandatory for most of the government run or controlled institutions (except for strategic areas) to have reservations in jobs and in admission to higher educational institutions. The proportions of reserved seats for SCs and STs in Central government-controlled public sector institutions are 15 and 7.5 percent, respectively. These quotas more or less reflect their actual proportion in the Indian population. Meanwhile, in the states, seats are reserved for SCs and STs according to their proportions in the state populations. Apart from SCs and STs, many states have also for long been providing reservations to 'Other Backward Classes' (OBCs) in public sector employment and higher educational institutions. OBCs are communities that are considered socially and economically deprived and marginalised. Since the early 1990s they have been beneficiaries of employment reservations at the all India level, and since 2005 reservations have been extended to them (excluding the creamy layer or affluent sections among them) in Central educational institutions of higher learning. Twenty-seven percent of all available seats are reserved for them in addition to the 22.5 percent reserved for SCs and STs.

In very recent times, there have been agitations by dominant agrarian castes such as Patidars in Gujarat, the Marathas in Maharashtra, Kapus in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, and Jats in Haryana, demanding inclusion in the OBC category on grounds of increasing socio-economic backwardness. There is also a demand for extending reservation benefits to economically weaker sections within the general category. At present the Constitution provides reservation to only three social classes - SCs, STs and OBCs, and no other. Also, reservation policies do not apply to private enterprises and private educational institutions, not even for SCs, STs, and OBCs. Suggestions for extending reservations to private sector employment have been met with strong resistance from many in the private sector.

To sum up the for and against arguments about reservation very briefly, the critics of reservation argue that they undermine merit and result in selection of less qualified candidates thus affecting efficiency, quality of public services, and the morale of workers (Guha, 1990). Some others have argued that the goal of social justice can be better served by initiating effective programmes of affirmative action instead of reservations as they exist (Shah, 1991). Meanwhile supporters of reservations view it as compensatory social justice for communities that have been discriminated against and denied equal treatment. It is argued that reservation isn't a programme for poverty removal, but that it was instituted to remove the monopoly of a few castes and the exclusion of castes (Krishnan, 2017). Many have also questioned the notion of hiring being truly meritocratic in the absence of reservations. It is argued by them that an applicant's class, caste, religious affiliation and family background are given prime importance by employers during the selection process and that the applicant's merit is determined through the lens of these considerations (Sachchidananda, 1990; Deshpande and Newman, 2007; Jodhka and Newman, 2007; Thorat and Attewell, 2007).

Given the highly contentious nature of the reservation issue and its potential to enhance or affect a young person's prospects in life (depending on which side of the debate one is on), the CSDS-KAS Youth Survey 2016 asked several questions related to it in order to gauge the mood of the youth on it. In a set of four separate questions the respondents were asked about their approval or disapproval for existing reservations for SC-STs and OBCs in government jobs and educational institutions. Apart from this, the respondents were also asked about their opinion on the proposal for extending reservation for SC-STs and OBCs in private jobs, and to backward Muslims in government jobs. Opinion of respondents was also sought on the emerging demands of the dominant farming communities to be included in the OBC category quota. This chapter will look at each of these in detail independently and then attempt to construct a broader picture about youth support or opposition to the idea of reservation.

3.2. Opinion on SC-ST quota in government jobs and educational institutions

Since caste-based inequalities are the basis for providing reservations in India, any analysis of this issue must be done in terms of caste. The survey, in fact, shows that the caste of the respondent makes a huge difference to his/her opinion on the issue of reservation. Asked if they supported reservation for SCs and STs in government jobs, young respondents belonging to the SC and ST communities (the beneficiary groups) were (not surprisingly) found to be more in support of it than youth from other communities. Seventy-one percent of SC youth and 60 percent of ST youth said they supported reservation for SCs and STs in government jobs (Table 3.1). A majority of Muslim youth (50%) and a plurality of OBC youth (44%) were also found to

be in support of it. The fairly strong support for SC-ST reservation among OBC youth can be explained by the fact that OBCs themselves are beneficiaries of reservation and hence might be averse to opposing reservations for others. With respect to Muslims, the high support for SC-ST reservation could be due to the desire for reservation benefits among many Muslims (as we shall see later in this chapter). Meanwhile, the lowest outright support for SC and ST reservation in government jobs was found among Upper Caste youth (30%).

Table 3.1: Measuring youth support for SC-ST reservation in government jobs (%)

	Complete Support	Conditional Support	Oppose	No response
Youth (Overall)	**48**	**6**	**26**	**18**
Hindu Upper Caste	30	10	43	18
Hindu OBC	44	8	27	21
Hindu SC	71	6	12	12
Hindu ST	60	3	11	27
Muslim	50	7	25	18
Others	54	10	25	10

Note: Conditional support means those who said there should only be SC quota or only be ST quota, or that quota should be there but the proportion should be less.

Table 3.2: Measuring youth support for SC-ST reservation in government educational institutions (%)

	Complete Support	Conditional Support	Oppose	No response
Youth (Overall)	**46**	**9**	**28**	**18**
Hindu Upper Caste	28	10	46	17
Hindu OBC	42	10	28	21
Hindu SC	67	7	14	13
Hindu ST	52	5	13	31
Muslim	49	7	25	19
Others	55	9	26	10

Note: Conditional support means those who said there should only be SC quota or only be ST quota, or that quota should be there but the proportion should be less.

An exact similar pattern was also found with respect to support for reservation for SCs and STs in educational institutions; that is, SC and ST youth were most supportive of it and Hindu Upper Caste youth were most opposed to it. Meanwhile, on comparing the support for both types of reservations - in government jobs and in educational institutions, we found slightly greater approval for the former among all communities. The difference is greatest among ST youth (60% for jobs as opposed to 52% for education) followed by SC youth (71% as opposed to 67%). (Tables 3.1 and 3.2).

Even though a majority of Dalit and Adivasi youngsters support reservation in government jobs and/or educational institutions for their communities, we notice differences in opinion among them based on their economic status. For instance, Dalit youth

Table 3.3: Lower class SC-ST youth favour quotas for SC-STs more than upper class SC-ST youth (%)

	Fully Support SC-ST reservation in govt. jobs		Fully Support SC-ST reservation in govt. educational institutions	
	SCs	STs	SCs	STs
Upper and Middle Class	65	58	63	47
Lower and Poor Class	74	62	69	54

from poor and lower economic strata are far more supportive of existing reservation provisions for them as compared to middle class or rich Dalit youth. Among Adivasis too, a similar pattern was found (Table 3.3).

Educational attainment does not seem to make much of a difference, at least with respect to Dalits. Both non-literate Dalit youth and highly educated Dalit youth were found to be equally supportive of reservation policies for their community. Among Adivasis, however, education does matter. Support for SC-ST reservations among them, be it for government jobs or for government educational institutions, rises with educational qualification. While only 48 percent of non-literate Adivasi youth were supportive of quota for SC-STs in government jobs, among those who had completed graduation or a higher degree, the figure of support was much higher at 65 percent. Similarly, only about one-third of non-literate Adivasis were found to be supporting reservation for their community in government-run educational institutions compared to nearly three in every five well-educated Adivasi youth (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4: Better educated ST youth more likely to favour quotas for their community than their less educated counterparts (%)

	Fully Support SC-ST reservation in govt. jobs		Fully Support SC-ST reservation in govt. educational institutions	
	SCs	STs	SCs	STs
Graduate or above	75	65	66	57
High School Pass	70	63	69	60
Primary Pass	62	63	62	54
Non-literate	74	48	69	34

3.3. Opinion on OBC quota in government jobs and educational institutions

Just as respondents were asked about their view on the existing SC-ST quotas, they were also asked about what they thought about the 27 percent quota for OBC communities. The overall support for the latter was found to be only slightly less than the overall support for the former. About 45 percent of the youth were in support of OBC reservation, be it in government jobs or government educational institutions (Tables 3.5 and 3.6). This is just a few percentage points less than overall youth support for SC-ST quotas.

There are, however, significant differences in the responses to the two questions when we break it down by caste. In the case of SC-ST quotas we had found the beneficiary groups (SCs and STs) to be more supportive of reservations than the non-beneficiary communities. In the case of OBC reservations, however, we find that the beneficiary community, i.e., OBC youth, both from the dominant section and the lower section, to be less supportive of reservation for their community as compared to Dalit and Muslim youth. While only about 46 percent of peasant OBC youth and 43 percent of artisanal and service OBC youth gave

Table 3.5: Measuring youth support for OBC reservation in government jobs (%)

	Complete Support	Conditional Support	Oppose	No response
Youth (Overall)	**45**	**5**	**30**	**19**
Hindu Upper Caste	29	7	48	17
Hindu Peasant OBC	46	7	26	21
Hindu Artisanal and Service OBC	43	4	31	22
Hindu SC	63	4	20	14
Hindu ST	32	2	26	41
Muslim	53	6	23	18
Others	55	5	31	10

Note: Conditional support means those who said there should be lesser quota.

Table 3.6: Measuring youth support for OBC reservation in government educational institutions (%)

	Complete Support	Conditional Support	Oppose	No response
Youth (Overall)	**45**	**6**	**30**	**20**
Hindu Upper Caste	29	7	45	18
Hindu Peasant OBC	47	6	25	22
Hindu Artisanal and Service OBC	43	5	30	22
Hindu SC	62	4	20	14
Hindu ST	28	3	28	41
Muslim	52	6	23	19
Others	54	6	30	10

Note: Conditional support means those who said there should be lesser quota.

complete support to the existing provision of reservations to OBCs in government jobs and educational institutions, the support among Dalits and Muslims was much higher at around 63 percent and 53 percent, respectively. On disaggregating Muslim responses in terms of castes, we found complete support for OBC reservation to be greater among Muslim OBCs (about 61%) than Muslim upper castes (about 45%). This does not come as a surprise as some Muslim communities in some states have been included in the OBC category and hence are eligible for reservation under the OBC quota.

When we analysed the responses of the Hindu OBC community through the prism of economic class, one common pattern emerged. Hindu OBCs from the lower economic strata were more likely to approve of reservation for OBCs in government jobs and government educational institutions than OBCs belonging to upper and middle classes or the creamy layer as it is known (Figure 3.1). This pattern by class holds even on disaggregating the larger OBC community into peasant OBCs and service OBCs.

Figure 3.1: Lower income Hindu OBC youth more supportive of quotas for OBCs (%)



3.4. Opinion on proposed reservations in private sector jobs

Post liberalisation, outsourcing and privatisation have decreased the number of jobs in the government sector and increased job opportunities in the private sector. This has led to increasing demands for extension of caste-based reservations to private sector employment. Reserving jobs in the private sector was part of the national Common Minimum Programme of the UPA-I government and it had initiated a national dialogue with political parties and industry leaders in 2004 to see how this can be implemented. However, the proposal had met with strong resistance from corporates, and since then, no significant headway has been made on this issue.

The CSDS-KAS Youth Survey attempted to gauge the opinion of young Indians on this aspect of reservation as well. Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed extending reservations to private sector jobs for the SC-ST and OBC communities. On the question of SC-ST reservation in private sector jobs, youth response was split down the middle - 38 percent supported the idea and 38 percent opposed it. About 3 percent gave it partial support and the rest did not respond to the question (Table 3.7). However, on the question of reservations for OBCs in private sector employment, the proportion of those opposed to it was greater than those in support of it. A little over two in every five youth (42%) opposed the idea of introducing quotas for OBCs in private sector jobs, and only one in every three (35%) supported it (Table 3.8).

These findings, when viewed comparatively, tell us two things - first, that there is slightly greater support among the youth to the idea of having quotas for SC-STs in private sector jobs than for the idea of quota for OBCs in the private sector. And second, that there is less support among the youth for the idea of private sector quotas than public sector quotas. While 48 percent and 45

percent were found to be in full support of reservations for SC-STs and OBCs in public sector jobs respectively, the figures drop to 38 percent and 35 percent respectively on the questions related to private sector quotas for the same communities. This overall pattern holds for SC-STs and OBCs as well; that is, youth belonging to these communities were also less likely to support the idea of quotas in private sector jobs for themselves than they were to support the existing provision of quotas in public sector jobs.

Table 3.7: Measuring youth support for idea of quotas for SC-STs in private sector jobs (%)

	Fully Support	Conditional Support	Oppose	No response
Youth (Overall)	**38**	**3**	**38**	**22**
Hindu Upper Caste	19	2	59	20
Hindu OBC	38	2	36	24
Hindu SC	57	3	25	15
Hindu ST	38	2	18	41
Muslim	39	2	38	22
Others	41	5	43	12

Note: Conditional support means those who said there should be quota only for SCs or only for STs.

Table 3.8: Measuring youth support for idea of quotas for OBCs in private sector jobs (%)

	Support	Oppose	No response
Youth (Overall)	**35**	**42**	**23**
Hindu Upper Caste	18	61	21
Hindu Peasant OBC	39	36	25
Hindu Artisanal and Service OBC	36	39	26
Hindu SC	50	33	17
Hindu ST	25	33	42
Muslim	39	39	23
Others	40	48	12

Once again, disaggregating the SC-ST and OBC responses by economic class seems to suggest that it is youth belonging to the lower classes among all these communities that show greater support for reserving seats in private sector jobs than those who are economically better-off (Figures 3.2 and 3.3).

Figure 3.2: Lower class SC-ST youth favour pvt. sector job quotas for SC-STs more than upper class SC-ST youth (%)



3.5. Opinion on proposed reservations for Muslims in government jobs

Demands for reservation for Muslims in public sector jobs have been gaining momentum ever since the publication of the Sachar Committee report in 2006 and the Justice Ranganath Mishra Commission report in 2009. While the former presented

Figure 3.3: Lower class OBC youth more supportive of private sector job quotas for OBCs than upper class OBC youth (%)



a dismal picture of discrimination being faced by Muslims in employment, the latter had recommended giving 10 percent reservation to Muslims in central and state government jobs on grounds of their socio-economic backwardness. This issue of extending reservations beyond caste has been highly controversial and has hit legal roadblocks with courts overruling the decisions of some state governments in this regard.

In the survey, we sought the opinion of respondents on this contested issue as well. The question asked to them was – Should reservations be implemented for backward Muslims in government jobs?[1] We found that the responses were not as enthusiastic as the ones witnessed in questions related to SC-ST and OBC reservations in government jobs. Overall, only about one in every three or 35 percent of the youth supported the idea of reserving seats for backward Muslims in government jobs. Two in every five (41%) were opposed to it and about a quarter (24%) did not respond to the question (Table 3.9). The figure of support for Muslim reservation (35%) is less in comparison to the support shown by the respondents to the questions related to reservation for SC-ST and OBC youth in government jobs (48% and 45%, respectively).

Table 3.9: Measuring youth support for idea of quota for backward Muslims in govt. jobs (%)

	Support	Oppose	No response
Youth (Overall)	**35**	**41**	**24**
Hindu Upper Caste	19	59	22
Hindu OBC	32	41	27
Hindu SC	49	31	19
Hindu ST	21	36	43
Muslim	60	21	20
Others	43	42	15

The idea of reservation for Muslims in government jobs found greatest support among Muslim youth, not surprisingly. Three in every five Muslim youth (60%) interviewed in the survey fully supported the idea and one in every five (21%) was opposed to it. About 20 percent did not answer the question. The second highest support for the idea was witnessed among Dalit youth at 49 percent. In fact, other than Muslim youth, Dalit youth was the only other category among whom support for the idea of Muslim reservation was found to be greater than opposition to it. Among youth belonging to all other communities, including OBCs, opposition to it was higher than support for it.

Interestingly, when we analysed the support for Muslim reservation among Muslim youth in terms of economic class (Figure 3.4), Muslim youth belonging to the upper and middle classes were found to be stronger supporters (64%) of the idea than those belonging to the lower economic strata (55%). This pattern is opposite of the one witnessed among lower and upper class SC-ST and OBC youth on questions related to SC-ST and OBC reservation (discussed earlier).

[1]At present, in some states, some Muslim communities have been included in the Central and State OBC Lists. They are, therefore, eligible for reservation as part of the OBC quota. The question asked in the survey relates to the demand/proposal for a separate quota for Muslims on the grounds of their backwardness.

Figure 3.4: Muslim reservation preferred more by upper class than lower class Muslim youth (%)



3.6. Opinion on demand of peasant communities to be included within the OBC quota

Another significant issue with respect to reservation on which youth responses were sought relates to the demand of many farming/peasant communities (who are neither strictly Upper Caste nor OBCs), to be included in the OBC category and thus be eligible for reservation. Such demands have come from Patidars in Gujarat, Jats in Haryana, Kapus in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, and Marathas in Maharashtra.

The survey found youth to be more opposed to this demand than in support. While every fourth youth (26%) was found to be in favour of inclusion of such communities within the OBC category, about one in every three or 34 percent were averse to the idea. One in every ten gave conditional support to the idea; that is, they were in favour of inclusion but only after increasing the existing OBC quota beyond 27 percent.

There were differences in opinion in terms of the social group to which the respondents belong. Among OBC groups (the community most likely to be affected by the inclusion of non-OBC communities within the OBC fold), youth belonging to dominant peasant OBC groups were far more supportive of the demand than youth from the service OBC communities. Among Dalit youth too, support for it was greater than the overall average (Table 3.10). Interestingly, youth belonging to the beneficiary groups or the group that is demanding this reservation, were not found to be much in support of the demand. Only about one in every four (23%) youth from the dominant non-OBC farming castes approved of it and two in every five (41%) were found to be opposed to it. There is however a class dimension to this. The poorest sections among these dominant farming communities support the demand (42%) much more than the privileged among them (15%). (Figure 3.5).

Table 3.10: Measuring youth support for demand of non-OBC farming communities to be included in the OBC category (%)

	Fully Support	Support but only after increasing existing OBC quota	Oppose	No response
Youth (Overall)	**26**	**10**	**34**	**30**
Hindu Upper Caste	18	6	53	23
Hindu Dominant Farming Castes	23	11	41	24
Hindu Peasant OBC	32	11	30	28
Hindu Artisanal and Service OBC	26	10	33	31
Hindu SC	33	11	30	27
Hindu ST	13	5	17	64
Muslim	26	11	30	33
Others	23	14	39	24

3.7. The broader picture

Taking into account the responses to all the reservation-related questions discussed above (barring the one on the demand of non-OBC farming castes), we constructed an Index of Attitude towards Reservation (see Appendix II to find out how the index was constructed) in order to understand the broader and more holistic sentiment regarding reservation among India's youth. The results indicated a polarised situation. While 37 percent of the youth were found to be strongly in support of the idea of reservation, 35 percent were strongly opposed to it. About 13 percent were moderately in support of reservations, and 16

Figure 3.5: Poorest sections among the OBC quota-demanding farming communities more in support of demand than the richer sections among them (%)



percent were low in their support (Table 3.11). The polarity on the issue was found to be strongest among youth residing in big cities, where 38 percent were strongly in favour of reservations and 37 percent strongly opposed to it. Youth in smaller cities were more likely to oppose the idea of reservations than support it. Meanwhile, it was opposite among youth in villages; they were more likely to support than oppose.

In terms of age, opposition to reservation was strongest among the youngest respondents, i.e., 15-17-year-olds at 39 percent followed by the oldest i.e., 30-34-year-olds (37%). Meanwhile, opposition to reservation was weakest among youth aged between 18-25 years at about 33 percent. In fact, nearly two in every five of them were strongly in favour of it. Educational attainment

Table 3.11: Overall support among youth for Reservation (%)

	Very High or High Support	Moderate Support	Low or Very Low Support	No Support
Youth (Overall)	**37**	**13**	**16**	**35**
Big Cities	38	14	12	37
Smaller Cities	32	14	19	35
Villages	38	12	17	33
15-17 years	32	13	16	39
18-21 years	40	14	15	32
22-25 years	37	13	18	33
26-29 years	38	12	15	36
30-34 years	37	11	15	37
Graduate or above	38	14	16	32
High School Pass	37	12	15	36
Primary Pass	33	9	17	41
Non-literate	32	5	15	48
Upper Class	32	14	15	39
Middle Class	37	12	16	35
Lower Class	41	13	16	30
Poor	36	12	14	38
Hindu Upper Caste	19	14	15	52
Hindu OBC	36	13	14	37
Hindu SC	55	13	12	19
Hindu ST	25	9	33	33
Muslim	45	11	19	25
Others	48	13	10	30

Note: See Appendex II to find out how the Index of Attitude towards Reservation was constructed.

makes a huge difference to a young person's perception of reservation. The more educated the youth, the more likely they are to support it. While 38 percent of youth who had completed college education were found to be strongly in support of reservations in general, the figure of high support among non-literate youth was six points less at 32 percent.

As discussed earlier with respect to specific questions, the economic background of a person matters quite a lot on how this issue is perceived. Youth from the lower class were found to be most supportive of reservations followed by those from the middle income categories. Upper class youth were least supportive of it. In terms of caste and community, Dalit and Muslim youth were found to be most in favour of reservations and Upper Caste youth most opposed to them. The view among OBC youth was polarised – both extreme support and extreme opposition to reservation can be seen among them. Meanwhile ST youth come across as being opposed to reservations in the reservation index because a high proportion of them did not answer many of the questions related to the issue.

Interestingly, we find a correlation between caste discrimination and support for reservation. About 9 percent of the youth reported having faced discrimination on the basis of caste and strong support for reservation among them was about 45 percent, which is much higher than the overall average of 37 percent (Figure 3.6). Meanwhile, having a discriminatory or non-discriminatory attitude towards other communities also makes a difference to one's opinion on reservation. Only 17 percent of youth who were found to be very discriminatory in their attitudes were strongly in favour of reservations. This figure of support was more than two times higher at 42 percent among those who were found to be not at all discriminatory in their attitudes towards others.

Figure 3.6: Discrimination and support for reservation seem to be related (%)



Note: See Appendix II to find out how the Index of Discriminatory Attitudes was consturcted.

3.8. Conclusion

To sum up, the CSDS-KAS Youth Survey 2016 has found there to be fairly strong support among India's youth for existing reservations for SC-ST and OBCs in government jobs and educational institutions. A greater proportion among all castes and communities, barring Hindu Upper Castes, were found to be in support of these quotas than opposed to it. This pattern of greater support than opposition can also be seen with respect to extending reservations to SC-STs in private sector jobs; however the degree of support for this idea is less than that offered to existing public sector reservations. The idea of extending reservations to OBCs in private sector jobs, however, does not find widespread support. The same is true for the proposal of extending reservations to Muslims in government jobs. This idea found approval only among Muslim youth and to some extent Dalit youth. Meanwhile the economic background of a young person belonging to a beneficiary group seems to matter in how they view the issue of reservations for their community. Youth belonging to economically well-off sections within SC-STs, OBCs, and the dominant farming castes were found to be slightly more opposed to reservations for their community than those who are less well-off within these communities. Only on the question of Muslim reservation is this pattern not seen. Muslim youth belonging to the upper and middle classes were more approving of the idea of extending reservations to Muslims (on grounds of backwardness) than their co-religionists from the lower class, perhaps because some among the latter category are already benefitting from reservations as part of the OBC quota in various states.

Finally, even as the overall reservation index as well as the individual responses to reservation-specific questions, suggest more support than opposition for the idea of reservation, we also found a desire among the young respondents to go beyond caste as the only basis of reservation. Many were found to be in favour of the idea having reservations only on the basis of economic status. When asked whether reservations should be only on the basis of caste or only on the basis of economic status or whether they should be scrapped altogether, two in every five youth (40%) preferred to have economic status as the criterion. While one

in every seven (14%) said it should continue to be on the basis of caste, about one in every ten (10%) wanted both caste and economic status to be the basis. Only 17 percent wanted the entire policy of reservation to be scrapped altogether. The desire for having economic status as the basis for reservation was also found among those respondents who showed high support for reservation in the overall reservation index. Nearly half of them (47%) were of the opinion that reservations should be on economic basis instead of caste. This sentiment in favour of the economic criterion was seen among youth across all castes and communities including those from reservation-beneficiary groups like OBCs (38%) and Dalits (41%). Dalit youth, however, were also found to be the most resistant (23%) to the proposition of doing away with caste as the criterion compared to youth from other communities.

References

Deshpande, Ashwini and Newman, Katherine. 2007. Where the Path Leads: The Role of Caste in Post University Employment Expectations. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42: 4133-4140.

Guha, Ashok. 1990. Reservations in Myth and Reality. *Economic and Political Weekly,* 25: 2716-18.

Jodhka, Surinder and Newman, Katherine. 2007. In the Name of Globalization: Meritocracy, Productivity, and the Hidden Language of Caste. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42: 4125-4132.

Krishnan, P.S. 2017. Quotas are for justice, not to plug job holes. *The Indian Express*, 3 January. Available at: http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/sc-st-reservation-quota-jobs-patidars-marathas-jats-4456243/. Accessed on 10 February, 2017.

Sachchidananda.1990. Welcome Policy. *Seminar*, 375: 18-21.

Shah, A.M. 1991. Job Reservations and Efficiency. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 26: 1732-4.

Thorat, Sukhadeo and Attewell. Paul. 2007. The Legacy of Social Exclusion: A Correspondence Study of Job Discrimination in India. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42: 4141-4145.

4. Political engagement and political attitudes of Indian youth



4. Political engagement and political attitudes of Indian youth

4.1. Introduction

Some landmark political events, economic transformations and social movements which have shaped India over the last six decades had either started from the country's campuses or had been led by youth leaders. It is difficult to imagine any change in the status quo without support among the youth. Hence, if one seeks to understand the advent of social and political transformations, it is necessary to examine where the youth stand on contentious political issues and progressive beliefs. Whether the youth are interested in engaging with the state or not? Active political participation indicates continued engagement with the state, rather than disillusionment, and can be considered as a positive appraisal for electoral democracy.

This chapter is broadly divided into four sections. First, it explores the engagement of the youth with mainstream electoral politics. This includes interest in politics, voting in elections, party identification and participation in election campaigns. Second, it examines participation in protests and demonstrations among the youth. What drives youngsters to participate in protests? Third, in the context of recent claims over rising intolerance, it ascertains the position of the Indian youth on the issue. Do they concur with the view that personal liberty is increasingly being curbed? Is there support for some progressive beliefs at least among the youth? Fourth, it looks at how the youth prioritise among multiple overlapping identities that all Indians hold?

4.2. Youth and mainstream politics

4.2.1. Interest in politics

We find that close to half of the Indian youth (46%) have no interest at all in politics. Less than one-tenth of the respondents (7%) said that they took a lot of interest in politics. At a normative level, interest in politics was not too high as only about half of them (51%) had an interest in it. At the same time, it is encouraging that interest in politics among the youth has steadily risen over the last two decades. In 1996, 37 percent youth had interest in politics which has increased by 14 percentage points over the years. Especially in the last seven years, there has been a substantial increase (Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: Steady rise in interest in politics among the youth (%)



Note: These figures are only for the 18-34-year-old age group. This had to be done in order to ensure comparability with past surveys. Figures for 1996, 2004 and 2009 are from the National Election Study (NES) conducted by CSDS during India's national elections. The question was however not asked in NES 2014.

Interest in politics among the youth seems to be positively related to education. The proportion of respondents interested in politics is 31 percentage points higher among college educated youth (56%) as compared to non-literate youth (25%). Also, young men are more likely to be interested in politics (55%) as compared to young women (42%).

Contrary to popular perception, youth in the cities are almost as interested or disinterested as youth from small towns and villages. In fact, youngsters residing in tier two cities are most likely to show an interest in politics. For instance, 42 percent of the youth residing in big cities (mostly state capitals excluding mega cities) were found to be interested in politics. Less than one third of the rural youth (31%) were interested in politics. Interest is least among youth from the metros/biggest cities of the country where more than half of the respondents (53%) said that they had no interest at all in politics (Table 4.1). We also found economic status to be associated with interest in politics. Thirty seven percent of youth from upper class households had interest in politics as compared to only around a quarter (26%) of the youth from poor families.

Theories of political socialisation suggest that family plays a great role in shaping the political attitudes of young ones (Niemi, 1974). Children having parents with high interest in politics have a high level of interest in politics too. This pattern was also observed in our study as well. Youth whose parents are interested in politics (either a lot or somewhat) are more likely to be interested in politics than youth whose parents do not take interest in politics at all (Figure 4.2). This was found to be true with

Table 4.1: Youth from big cities are most interested in politics (%)

	Interest in politics	Little interest in politics	No interest in politics at all
Youth (Overall)	**32**	**19**	**46**
Biggest Cities	28	16	53
Big Cities	42	20	37
Small Cities and Towns	33	19	44
Villages	31	19	45

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

respect to both mother's and father's political interest. Moreover, between the two, it seems that mother's interest in politics makes a slightly greater difference than father's interest, on the whole. It was found that among respondents who said that their mother took interest in politics, 59 percent said they take interest in politics. Meanwhile, among respondents who said that their father takes interest in politics, the figure of political interest was relatively less at 52 percent.

Figure 4.2: Youth's level of interest in politics related to their parents' interest in it (%)



Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

4.2.2. Voting

Political parties and leaders often make youth centric appeals claiming to represent the interests of this demographic group. There is a belief among many that youngsters form an independent political constituency which often votes across caste lines. Political parties and incumbent governments are trying to lure this segment through targeted policies and schemes. Increasing voter turnout among youngsters has been a focus area of the Election Commission of India. The commission also takes special measures for increasing registration rate among the youth. Increased voter turnout among the youth seems to be a recent phenomenon. Kumar (2014) showed that the 2014 Lok Sabha election was the first national election since 1999 when voter turnout among youth exceeded the overall turnout.

In the present survey, respondents were asked whether they had voted in any elections. More than half of the eligible voters (54%) said that they had voted in every election and close to one fifth (19%) said that they have voted in many elections. Only around one-tenth reported that they had never voted in any election. These figures may have an upward bias due to a social desirability. Thus, they may be considered as an upper bound. As this would have been true for previous surveys as well, we can make a comparison with earlier data. As compared to the 2007 Youth Survey, there has been a four percentage point decline in non-voters and a nine percentage increase in those who said they had voted in every election. The findings indicate that there has been a rise in electoral participation among the youth and a substantial proportion regularly cast their vote (Figure 4.3).

The relatively higher turnout among the lower economic class, marginalised social groups and the less educated in India has often been described as a paradox. This paradox seems to be prevalent even among the youth. We find that youth from marginalised social groups like Dalits, Adivasis and backward castes are slightly more likely to be regular voters as compared to upper caste youth.

Figure 4.3: Voting among 18-34-year-old youth (%)



4.2.3. Participation in campaign activities

Electoral participation includes a broad set of activities apart from voting in an election. Many individuals work as vote mobilisers for parties and participate in campaign activities. People may also attend campaign events like rallies and road shows organised by parties before elections. We find limited participation of the youth in campaign activities of political parties. Less than one-fifth of the youth had attended an election meeting (18%) or rally (16%). Participation in campaign activities is much lower as slightly less than one tenth of the respondents had done door to door campaigning (9%) or distribution of leaflet and posters (8%) (Figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4: Low participation in election campaign related activities (%)



Note: Time span given to the respondent was of 'last ten years'.

Using these multiple activities, an Index of Electoral Participation was constructed (see Appendix II to find out how it was constructed). It is worth mentioning that more than three-fourths of the youth (75%) has never participated in any of these activities. One-fifth of them (20%) have taken part in a few of these activities. Only a small fraction of the youth (5%) has actively participated in these activities and has been involved in at least four of them (Figure 4.5). High participation indicates the section of the youth which would be either working full time with a political party or as a highly active volunteer.

Socio-economic variables such as level of education and economic class are positively related to participation in campaign related activities as these involve opportunity costs in terms of both time and money. However we also notice a paradox with

Figure 4.5: Most youngsters have never participated in any election campaign related activity (%)



respect to education and many other variables. (Table 4.2) Even as the more educated youth are more likely to participate in campaign activities during an election, they are however less likely to vote in elections than those less educated than them. This paradox can also be seen in terms of locality. A greater proportion of youth living in the largest cities were found to be voting regularly compared to youth in cities that are smaller. However when it came to taking part in campaign activities, their participation was 10 points less than their counterparts in smaller cities. Similarly, Muslim youth are more likely than others to take part in campaign activities but less likely than others to vote regularly in elections. On the other hand lower OBC, Dalit and Adivasi youth vote more regularly compared to youth from other communities but are low on participation when it comes to taking part in campaign activities.

Table 4.2: Paradox of electoral participation (%)

	Vote regularly	Participate in campaign activities
Youth (Overall)	**74**	**25**
Biggest Cities	78	18
Big Cities	69	31
Smaller Cities	69	28
Villages	74	27
18 to 21 years	62	19
22 to 25 years	75	30
26 to 29 years	80	30
30 to 34 years	83	30
Graduate or above	72	29
High School Pass	69	24
Primary Pass	80	21
Non-literate	86	23
Men	75	32
Women	71	17
Hindu Upper Caste	73	25
Hindu Peasant OBC	74	26
Hindu Artisanal and Service OBC	78	20
Hindu SC	75	23
Hindu ST	79	16
Muslim	72	36
Christian	74	32
Sikh	74	31

Note: 'Vote regularly' includes those who have voted in all elections or most elections. 'Participation in campaign activities' includes those whose participation is high, moderate or low. These are respondents who would have participated in at least one campaign activity mentioned in Figure 4.4.

4.2.4. Party identification among the youth

The study examined party identification among the youth by asking them which political party they liked the most.[1] We found that only around half of the Indian youth (52%) identified themselves with any party.[2] One-fifth (20%) of the respondents said that they were fond of the BJP. Support for the Congress was exactly half as compared to the BJP – 10 percent. Further, we

[1] Figures for these questions indicate party preferences at the time of the survey in April-May 2016

[2] This category includes respondents who either mentioned – name of an independent candidate, NOTA, 'I do not like any party', 'I like all parties' or did not give any response.

categorised parties based on their central political ideology/agenda. Four percent of the youth were fond of socialist parties (JDU, JDS, RJD, INLD, BJD, and SP), 2 percent liked Left parties (CPM and CPI), 2 percent preferred Dalit parties (BSP, RPI-A, LJP, and VCK), and another 2 percent preferred parties whose founding principle was combating corruption (AAP and Loksatta). Thirteen percent of the respondents were found to be fond of other regional parties. These include parties like the AIADMK, DMK, Shiv Sena, TRS, TDP, JMM, SAD, NCP, AITC etc. (Figure 4.6).

There are a substantial proportion of youngsters who do not like any specific political party. Lack of party identification should not be solely interpreted as either disillusionment with all political parties in the country or apathy toward politics at large. We find that even around half of those youngsters who did not like any party (46%), said that the current political parties shall be able to solve problems of the country. Some of these youngsters may not consider themselves to be inclined towards a single party despite taking active interest in politics. They could be swing voters who shift between parties across elections based on their preferences.

Figure 4.6: BJP was most preferred party among youth when survey was conducted; close to half were unaffiliated (%)



There are sharp differences in party identification between regions. Party identification among the youth is relatively higher in the eastern part of the country where less than four out of ten respondents (37%) weren't fond of any party. It is least in western region where more than half of the respondents (54%) did not consider themselves to be close to any party. Support for the BJP is highest among north Indian youth where 30 percent of the respondents said that they were close to the BJP. Gap between the BJP and the Congress was least in eastern India where 19 percent of the youth supports the BJP and 11 supports the Congress.

Party identification seems to be relatively higher in rural areas where only 43 percent of the youth are politically unaligned. Support for the BJP seems to be coming from the metros and the villages. There is a nine percentage point difference in support for the BJP between small cities and villages. A community-wise analysis of party preferences reveals that party identification is much higher among Muslims and Sikhs. Only around four out of ten respondents among these groups weren't aligned to a political party. Support for the BJP is coming essentially from the party's core constituency – Upper castes and a section of Hindu OBCs. But, even among Dalits and Adivasis, it is leading the Congress. There is sectional support for the Congress among the youth. The party seems to have greater support among Adivasis and Muslims. Close to a quarter of Muslim respondents (24%) said that they supported the Congress party. These are essentially Muslims residing in states which witness a direct competition between the Congress and the BJP (Table 4.3).

4.3. Youth participation in protests and demonstrations

The 139 day student strike at the FTII, Pune in protest against Gajendra Chauhan's nomination as the institute's Chairman, mass protests in various universities across the country after Rohith Vemula, a PhD scholar at HCU committed suicide, the alleged 'anti-national' sloganeering at JNU and the subsequent arrest of students on charges of sedition. These protests are merely a few instances, over the last two years, which highlight youth engagement with politics outside mainstream electoral politics. Protests and demonstrations are considered as an important political activity as on most occasions they are either in opposition to/support of a state policy/action or for demanding state intervention on an issue.

In the present survey, one-sixth of the Indian youth (15%) said that they had participated in a protest and demonstration in the last two years. The level of youth participation in protests had increased substantially between 2011 and 2013, but there has been a sharp decline in 2016. The level of participation currently is higher than the 2011 survey. In 2011, only 12 percent of youth said that they had taken part in a protest or demonstration. This increased to 24 percent in 2013 as per the State of Democracy in

Table 4.3: Party identification by socio-economic background (%)

	BJP	Congress	Others	No party
Youth (Overall)	**20**	**10**	**22**	**48**
15-17 years	20	7	29	54
18-25 years	19	10	23	48
26-34 years	20	10	26	44
South India	9	8	32	51
East India	19	11	33	37
North India	30	8	15	47
West & Central India	22	11	13	54
Big Cities	20	9	21	50
Smaller Cities	14	8	24	54
Villages	23	10	24	43
Hindu Upper Castes	27	4	18	51
Hindu OBC	24	7	24	45
Hindu SC	14	10	25	51
Hindu ST	20	16	10	54
Muslim	6	24	27	43
Sikh	8	9	42	41
Christian	9	15	27	49

South Asia Study 2013 (Figure 4.7). The study was conducted soon after the Anna Hazare-led 'anti-corruption' movement which had witnessed massive youth mobilisation. In the current study, we find a significant decline in participation in protests and demonstrations as compared to 2013.

Figure 4.7: Decline in participation in protests as compared to 2013 (%)



Note: These figures are only for 18-34-year-old age group. This had to be done in order to ensure comparability with past surveys. The 2011 figure is from a nationwide survey conducted by CSDS and KAS for a study titled 'Indian Youth and Politics'. The 2013 figure is from a nationwide survey conducted by CSDS as part of the State of Democracy in South Asia (SDSA) project.

We find that participation in protests and demonstrations among the youth is relatively higher among some occupational groups. More than one-fourth of youngsters engaged in business (27%) said that they had participated in a protest in the last two years. Professionals, government employees and skilled and service workers are also relatively more likely to take part in protests. Participation seems to be relatively lower among those engaged in agriculture (14%) and unskilled labour (17%). Only a small fraction of students took part in protests and demonstrations as per the survey (Table 4.4). Less than one-sixth of the students said that they had participated in a protest in the last two years. The methodology of the survey did not allow off-site interviews of individuals not present in the household at the time of interview. Hence, there was a greater likelihood of missing out youngsters who have migrated for higher education. Thus, the figure for students should be considered as a lower bound.

Numerous factors may impede/facilitate participation in public activities like protests. These include opportunity cost of participation, social factors and associational activity. A combination of these factors may explain the occupational category wise trends in participation. Agricultural workers and unskilled labourers are concentrated in the informal sector of the economy which has limited formal associational activity. While we do find farmer organisations in the agriculture sector, there are very few bodies which exclusively work for agricultural labourers or marginal farmers. Also, most individuals in these sectors work as daily wage labourers. Thus, they have a high opportunity cost of political participation as it leads to a direct loss of income. High participation in protests among professionals, government employees and skilled workers can be attributed to multiple factors. Relatively better economic well-being provides them with adequate resources for participating in political activities. Also, these occupational groups also have stronger collective bodies. For instance, many professions have an apex body collective that represents them.

Table 4.4 Youth engaged in business & skilled work most likely to participate in protests; housewives least likely (%)

	Participation in protests
Youth (Overall)	**15**
Professionals	20
Government Job	20
Business	27
Skilled Workers	23
Service Workers	18
Semi/Unskilled Workers	17
Agriculture	14
Students	13
Housewives	8
Unemployed	14

A substantial proportion of the youth seems to be participating in associational activities. Participation in activities of student unions/organisations is almost comparable to mainstream political bodies. More than a quarter (26%) of the respondents said that they had participated in activities organised by a student organisation in the last two years. Not participating in activities of student unions should not be considered as disillusionment with student politics or unions at large. Only one fourth of the youth (25%) supports a ban on student unions. A plurality of the youngsters (46%) believed that they protect the rights and interests of students (Table 4.5). This sentiment was even stronger among college students from both government colleges (55%) and private colleges (61%). Lack of apathy with student unions is natural because they are the most vocal bodies for student rights. Also, the presence of student unions from across the ideological spectrum provides space to all students. There is high participation in activities of farmer organisations (23%) and trade unions (20%) as well. Expectedly, we find that associational activity does translate into participation in protests and demonstrations. More than one-fourth of the youth (27%) associated with at least one of these four – political parties, student unions/organisations, trade unions and farmer organisations, had taken part in a protest/demonstration. On the other hand, less than one tenth (7%) of those without any associational activity had taken part in a protest.

Table 4.5: Support for the existence of student unions is higher among students of private colleges (%)

	Support the existence of student unions	Want a ban on student unions
Youth (Overall)	**46**	**25**
Youth going to/went to a government college	55	30
Youth going to/went to a private college	61	25

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

4.4. Freedom of expression and rising intolerance

At the time of this survey, there was a raging public debate on freedom of speech and expression in the country. The constitution of India guarantees "a freedom of speech and expression" as a fundamental right (Part III, article 19 (1) of the Indian Constitution). This right is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions. What is protected under the right and what could be termed as a 'reasonable restriction' has been at the crux of numerous protests which have occurred over the past one year. The larger question is can something be said/done if it hurts the sentiments of another individual? What personal habits/statements could be termed as other regarding actions? This contestation over what may be termed as an other regarding action causing genuine harm has been the principal contestation in numerous controversies like the JNU episode, the Dadri Lynching and the beef ban, censorship of books and movies etc. About a year ago, numerous artistes and public intellectuals had publicly expressed apprehensions about growing intolerance in the country. They claimed that liberal 'voices' were being throttled in the public discourse and there was a sense of fear among those who wished to publicly counter orthodox views. Findings from the study suggest that the reality is neither as alarming as some may believe nor as tranquil as others may claim. Around half of the respondents (53%) said that, in the last two years, they had never hesitated in stating their views on a political issue. Yet, there are reasons to worry as around one-fourth of the youth (23%) said that they had hesitated in expressing their opinion on a political issue (Figure 4.8).

Figure 4.8: Around half the youth had no hesitation in expressing their political opinion (%)



Does the Indian youth also believe that people in the country have become less tolerant about listening to contrarian views? More than half of the Indian youth (53%) feels that people have become less tolerant about listening to views of others (Figure 4.9). This indicates that the popular claim about rising intolerance in the country is also shared by many youngsters. Personal experiences tend to shape perception of individuals. We find that youth who claimed that they had hesitated in expressing their opinion on political issues were slightly more likely to believe that tolerance had decreased. Almost six out of ten (59%) respondents who had hesitated agreed that people had become less tolerant as compared to only around half (53%) of those who had never felt hesitant.

Is this discussion over rising intolerance in India restricted to certain sections of the society? Broadly, it is the highly educated youth, living in cities which seem to believe that people in the country have become less tolerant as compared to earlier. It is

Figure 4.9: More than half believe that Indians have become less tolerant in the last few years (%)



worrying to find that youth from religious minorities like Muslims and Sikhs were more likely to agree that people have become less tolerant. Exposure to news media also seems to be playing a critical role as only around four out of ten youngsters (43%) with low exposure believed so as compared to almost two-third (64%) of those with high exposure. These figures should be considered with caution due to high no response among some groups (Table 4.6).

Table 4.6: Educated, urban, media exposed youth more likely to believe there is rising intolerance (%)

	People of India have become less tolerant
Youth (Overall)	**53**
Graduate or above	63
High School Pass	49
Primary Pass	38
Non-literate	26
Big Cities	62
Small Cities	58
Villages	48
High news media exposure	64
Moderate news media exposure	62
Low news media exposure	43
Hindu	51
Muslim	65
Christian	58
Sikh	70

In the study, we also ascertained the youth's opinion on contentious issues which have been at the centre stage of the ongoing debate over liberty and progressive beliefs - banning of movies which hurt religious sentiments, beef consumption and death penalty. We find that six out of ten respondents (60%) supported banning movies which hurt religious sentiments. Close to half of the youth (46%) object to allowing beef consumption. Around half of the youth (49%), support the status quo on capital punishment (Table 4.7). These figures clearly indicate that most youngsters remain averse to progressive beliefs on political issues. Responses may be partly biased due to social desirability.

Table 4.7: Most youngsters don't stand along with liberals on contentious political issues (%)

	Agree	Disagree	No Opinion
Death penalty should be abolished	33	49	18
Films that hurt religious sentiments should be banned	60	23	17
Consumption of beef is part of personal eating habits and nobody should have an objection	36	46	18

Youngsters from different religions don't seem to hold similar views on these issues. Muslim youngsters were largely in favour of abolishing death penalty as around half of them (47%) agreed with the given statement. Sikhs and Christian youth were least supportive of abolishing death penalty as only around one-fourth of them agreed with the state. Hindu youth are slightly less likely than others to support a ban on films which hurt religious sentiments (59%). Among other religious groups, there is almost equivalent support. Expectedly, we find sharp differences on the issue of beef consumption. This may be motivated by personal habits as consumption of beef is quite prevalent among Muslims and Christians. More than two-third of Muslim (69%) youth considers beef consumption to be a personal choice and opposes any objection to it. On the other hand, only 31 percent of the Hindu youth and 33 percent of the Sikh youth seem to concur with this view. A plurality of Hindu and Sikh youth seems to oppose beef consumption (Figure 4.10). However, among Hindus, whether one is a vegetarian or a non-vegetarian makes a significant difference to their opinion on this issue. Non-vegetarian Hindu youth were twice as likely as vegetarian Hindu youth

to support consumption of beef, 40 percent as opposed to 20 percent (Table 4.8). Quite interestingly, supporters of Left parties were highly liberal with respect to this matter. Ninety percent of them have no problems with beef consumption. Supporters of regional parties and the Congress party were relatively less liberal (50% and 40%, respectively) on this matter. AAP and BJP supporting youth were least liberal (35% and 23%, respectively).

Figure 4.10: Divergence among religious groups on some contentious issues (%)



How does one resolve this evident paradox between the overall perception of the youth on various contentious issues and their view on intolerance and freedom of expression? The average youngster doesn't hold a progressive position like liberals on many contentious issues. But neither does she disagree with their claim about rising intolerance and curbs on freedom of expression. Not surprisingly, the average person stands away from either end of the ideological spectrum.

Table 4.8: Non-vegetarian Hindu youth less likely to have a problem with beef consumption than vegetarian Hindu youth (%)

	Beef consumption is personal choice, nobody should have an objection
Non-vegetarian Hindus	40
Eggitarian Hindus	25
Vegetarian Hindus	20
Left supporters	90
Congress supporters	41
AAP supporters	35
BJP supporters	23
Other parties' supporters	50

4.5. Nation, religion, region or caste?

We asked respondents how proud they were about various identities held by them. They were asked to rank multiple identities - state, caste, religious and national identity based on how proud were they about holding them. Only around half of the respondents (51%) said that they were most proud of being Indian. Almost an equal proportion of respondents prefer other identities like - caste (13%) religion (14%) and region (11%) (Figure 4.11).

Are certain religious groups more/less likely to belong to a specific category among these? Slightly more than half of the Hindus (52%) consider being Indian as their primary identity. Caste seems to be the second preferred option as one sixth (15%) of Hindu respondents ranked it in the first position. Muslim respondents were slightly less likely to consider national identity to be their primary identity. Around four out of ten Muslim respondents (43%) gave first rank to being Indian. They are relatively more likely to consider their religious identity to be most important. Around one fourth of the Muslim youth (26%) placed their religious identity in the first position. Caste identity seems to be relevant for Muslim youth also as around one third of them placed it as their first or second most preferred identity. Sikh youth was also relatively less likely to be most proud of their national identity. Among them, regional identity seems to be quite important while caste is least relevant (Table 4.9). The prominence of region may be due to the concurrence between Punjabi culture and Sikhism.

Figure 4.11: Only half the youth consider being Indian as their primary identity (%)



Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

Table 4.9: Muslim youth more likely to prefer religious identity; Hindus, caste identity; and Sikhs, regional identity (%)

	Nation	Religion	Caste	Region
Hindu	52	12	15	11
Muslim	42	25	13	8
Christians	55	17	10	12
Sikh	43	18	3	21

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

Disaggregating further, we observe that level of religiosity matters among Muslim youth. Increased religiosity seems to be associated with greater likelihood of placing religion in the first position. Less than one-tenth of Muslim youth (6%) having low religiosity placed religion in the first position. While around three out of ten (29%) high religiosity Muslim youth placed it their first choice. Religiosity seems to be a factor only among Muslims (Figure 4.12).

Figure 4.12: Preference for religious identity among Muslim youth increases with religiosity (%)



This self-perception of social identities among Muslims could be linked to a perception about the manner in which the state treats minorities? Whether the state treats them at par with other religious groups or makes distinctions? Many Muslim youth have a tale to share like the recent acquittal of two Muslim youngsters in the Delhi Terror Attack case after spending more than a decade in police custody. In the study, close to half of the respondents overall seem to believe that Muslim youth are being falsely implicated in terror related cases (45%). Less than one third of the respondents disagreed with this statement. Do the overall figures reflect a cross community belief or is it solely because an overwhelming sentiment among Muslims? We find support for this belief among youth from all religious groups; though there are sharp variations in the level of support. Around four out of ten Hindu respondents (42%) agreed with it, while around one third disagreed (32%). Close to seven out of ten Muslim youngsters (71%) agreed with it and there was limited disagreement. Christians were the only social group who were divided on this issue. The proportion of Christian youth who agreed with this view (40%) was almost equivalent to those who disagreed (43%) with it (Table 4.10).

Regional identity is also important in the country as evident from the fact that around tenth of the youth (11%) considers it to be their primary identity. Like other sectional identities, regionalism also could deter national integration and social harmony on occasions. In many states, there have been concentrated movements and protests against undeterred entry of migrants. Supporters of such movements argue that undeterred entry of 'outsiders' leads to a dilution of regional culture and reduces

Table 4.10: Plurality of youth across most religious groups believe that Muslim youth are falsely implicated in terror cases (%)

	Agree that Muslim youth are falsely implicated	Disagree that Muslim youth are falsely implicated	No Opinion
Youth (Overall)	**45**	**31**	**24**
Hindu	42	32	26
Muslim	71	16	13
Christian	40	43	17
Sikh	51	33	16

economic opportunities for locals. An idea of 'son of the soil' has come to the forefront as many people believe preference should be given in employment to locals over migrants. There are demands for affirmative action for locals in education and employment. Respondents in the survey were asked whether locals should be preferred over people from other state for jobs. We find that close to two third of the youth (63%) seems to agree with this. This sentiment is not restricted to the metros only as even youth from villages seem to believe so. 68 percent of the youth from large cities and 66 percent from villages supported the idea of 'son of the soil' (Table 4.11).

Table 4.11: Relatively higher support for preference to locals over migrants in the big cities (%)

	Support preference for locals in jobs	Oppose preference for locals in jobs
Youth (Overall)	**63**	**22**
Big Cities	68	23
Smaller Cities	52	30
Villages	66	18

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

Why does the youth support such provisions? This belief doesn't seem to stem only from prejudice against individuals from other state. We find that even those who had no qualms about having a neighbour from a different state support special provisions for locals in equal measure. This belief seems to be, at least, partly driven by economic considerations. Unemployment is a major concern for the youth today (as indicated in Chapter 2) and they are likely to support any step which increases opportunities for them. Data also indicates that youth having high anxiety about job and employment are more likely to support the idea of 'son of soil' (Figure 4.13).

Figure 4.13: Anxiety about employment leads to support for preference to locals over migrants (%)



4.6. Conclusion

Overall, findings from the study seem to indicate that the average Indian youth seems to hold a nuanced position on most issues rather than the binaries which dominate the popular media discourse. For instance, while a plurality of the youth believes that intolerance has risen in the country, they also seem to disagree with liberals on most of the contentious issues. It is positive to note that the youth maintains an active engagement with politics including mainstream electoral politics.

References

Kumar, Sanjay. 2014. The Youth vote made a difference for the victory of the BJP. *Panjab University Research Journal Social Sciences,* 22(2): 45-57.

Niemi, Richard G. 1974. *How Family Members Perceive Each Other: Political and Social Attitudes in Two Generations.* Yale University Press.

5. Social and cultural attitudes



5. Social and cultural attitudes

5.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the social and cultural attitudes of Indian youth and tries to examine how liberal/conservative are their views. The first section explores the notion of patriarchy in the Indian society by assessing attitudes of young Indians towards women and some issues concerning them. The second section looks at how Indian youth perceive homosexuality, as well as their attitudes towards marriage, live-in relationships and dating in general. The third section examines discriminatory attitudes of young Indians towards others with respect to caste, religion, region, race, and dietary preferences. The fourth and final section discusses the overall liberal and/or conservative position of the Indian youth taking into account numerous aspects.

5.2. Youth attitudes towards women

Attitudes towards women form a crucial component of social and cultural attitudes and the CSDS-KAS Youth Survey 2016 attempted to empirically capture them by asking respondents several questions on this dimension. The questions dealt with women working after marriage, women attaining higher education, women taking up leadership roles, their right to dress the way they want, and a wife's position vis-a-vis her husband. The responses to these questions indicate the dichotomy of 'Ghaire-Baire' (Chatterjee, 1989). While, on one hand we notice a modest liberal attitude among youth towards women acquiring higher education, attaining leadership roles, and having the freedom to wear what they want; on the other hand we also notice that men display strong resistance towards women acquiring an equal position vis-à-vis men within the household. A majority of young respondents (51%) agreed (strongly or somewhat) with the proposition that wives should always listen to their husbands. Two in every five (40%) disagreed with it and about one in every ten (9%) did not answer the question (Table 5.1). Moreover, two-fifths of the youth (41%) were also in agreement with the proposition that it is not right for women to do a job after marriage. Interestingly, and worryingly, a fairly high proportion of young women respondents also held such conservative views. About one in every three young women were of the opinion that women should not work after marriage and over two out of every five of them favoured the idea of an obedient wife. This internalisation of patriarchal norms may explain their widespread persistence.

Table 5.1: Attitudes of young Indians towards women (%)

Statements read out to respondents	Fully Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Fully Disagree	No response
It is not right for women to work/do a job after marriage.	20	21	16	33	10
Overall, men prove to be better leaders than women.	20	23	17	28	13
Higher education is more important for boys than girls.	19	18	17	35	11
Wives should always listen to their husbands.	27	24	17	23	9
Girls should not wear jeans.	21	17	19	32	12

Using all the questions whose responses have been shown in Table 5.1, we created a summated Index of Patriarchal Mindset (see Appendix II to find out how the index was constructed). We found about a quarter (24%) of the young respondents to be very patriarchal and only one in six (18%) to be not patriarchal at all (Figure 5.1). The remaining youth fall somewhere in the middle - 29 percent were somewhat patriarchal in their views and another 29 percent were less patriarchal than that as they held conservative responses on only a few questions. Also, not only a substantial proportion of young men (57%), but also a fairly high proportion of young women (40%) was found to be patriarchal in their views.

There are differences in young people's patriarchal attitudes on the basis of locality. They decline with an increase in urbanity. Youth residing in villages were found to be more patriarchal (59%, if we combine the extreme and somewhat categories) in their mindset than youth living in cities (52%) and big cities (37%). (Figure 5.2)

Notions of patriarchy are to a large extent determined by the kinship system. There are differences in the kinship systems prevalent among different communities and regions of the country. Out of all the religious communities, Muslim youth were found to be most patriarchal (61%) followed by Hindu youth (53%). In comparison, Sikh and Christian youth were found to be less patriarchal (31% and 28%, respectively). There are also differences among various Hindu communities. Youth from the Hindu Adivasi community were found to be most patriarchal (70%) followed by Lower OBC youth (58%).

The survey by capturing differences in notions of patriarchy among various geographical regions of the country reveals interesting findings. Youth from the northern part of the country were found to be most patriarchal (57%) followed closely by youth from the western and central parts (about 56%). The southern and eastern regions seem to be relatively less patriarchal (49% and 46%,

Figure 5.1: Prevalence of patriarchal mindset (%)



Note: See Appendix II to find out how the Index of Patriarchal Mindset was constructed.

respectively). Such a divergence is perhaps a result of the different kinship systems that define the northern and southern parts of the country – the West Asian system in north India and the egalitarian East Asian system in the south (Dyson and Moore, 1983).

A high level of educational attainment weakens the tendency to have patriarchal mindsets. Our analysis observes that the more educated the youth, the less patriarchal they are likely to be in their thinking. Youth who are non-literate or have studied only up till primary school were found to be far more patriarchal (77% and 66%, respectively) than those who have only completed high school or attained higher education (59% and 41%, respectively).

Figure 5.2: Youth in villages are more patriarchal than those in cities (%)

Media plays an important role in the portrayal of women and influencing opinion on women's issues. According to conventional theory, a strong exposure to media is said to reinforce stereotypical notions about men and women (Wood, 1994). However, other studies argue that beyond providing entertainment, media increases the availability of information and exposure to other ways of life. In a predominantly rural country like ours, television media is the primary source of information for households (Jensen and Oster, 2009). Such studies underline the power of media in highlighting women's issues such as the dowry system, women's education, sanitation issues etc. (ibid). The survey's findings confirm the second argument. Youth who have no exposure to news media (see Appendix II to find out how the Index of News Media Exposure was constructed) were found to be very patriarchal. On the other hand, youth who were highly exposed to news media were less patriarchal (Table 5.2). This may also be a reinforcement of other effects like higher urbanity, greater education or class.

Interestingly, interaction and mingling with the opposite gender reduces notions of patriarchy as one experiences the 'otherness' of the other. If youth have close friends from the opposite gender, the notion of patriarchy reduces (Figure 5.3). For instance, 63 percent of young men who reported having no close female friends were found to be patriarchal compared to only 46 percent of young men who said they have close female friends. This difference was also noticed with respect to young women with close male friends and those without it. One should be cautious though as the relationship could also be in the opposite direction. It could be that young men holding patriarchal may be averse towards being friends with persons from the opposite gender.

Table 5.2: Exposure to news media reduces notions of patriarchy among youth (%)

Degree of media exposure	Very patriarchal mindset	Somewhat patriarchal mindset	Not much patriarchal mindset	No patriarchal mindset at all
High exposure to news media	20	27	28	24
Medium exposure to news media	16	29	34	21
Low exposure to news media	24	30	30	16
No exposure to news media	40	27	23	11

Figure 5.3: Having close friends from opposite gender weakens patriarchal tendencies (%)



5.3. Attitudes towards homosexuality

Contemporary Indian society is predominantly resistant to the idea of same-sex relationships which are still criminalised under Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, a colonial-era provision. In 2009, the Delhi High Court had declared parts of the Section unconstitutional as they violated basic human rights; however its verdict was later overturned by the Supreme Court in 2013. The matter is now under review. Homosexuality is a primarily a taboo topic for a majority of Indians even though Indian ethos towards sexual difference has been historically tolerant. While Indian epics are replete with half-men, half-woman characters, and ancient temple structures across India depict homosexual acts (Tharoor, 2016); homo-erotically inclined men are "continuously visible" in medieval history (Vanita and Kidwai, 2000). In the 21st century, however, majority of Indian youth are not comfortable with the idea of a love affair between two men or two women. When asked about their opinion on this issue in the survey, three in every five (61%) young respondents considered a love affair between two men as wrong, one in every ten (10%) considered it somewhat right and only one in every seven (14%) considered it right. Similarly, with respect to a love affair between two women, 61 percent of youth considered it to be wrong, 12 percent considered it somewhat right and only 14 percent saw nothing wrong with it (Table 5.3).

Age makes a difference to how homosexuality is perceived by the youth. The youngest respondents (15- to 17-year-olds) were more approving of homosexuality than the older youth. Interestingly, urbanity reduces approval for homosexuality. Youth living in big cities were found to be less approving of homosexuality (21%) than those living in smaller cities (27%) and villages (29%).

Numerous studies argue that religious beliefs play an important role in shaping one's attitude towards homosexuality. A Pew Research Center survey conducted in 39 countries in 2013, for instance, had found a strong relationship between a country's religiosity and opinions about homosexuality (Pew, 2013). However, in India, the CSDS-KAS Youth Survey finds religiosity to be not playing a significant role in determining attitudes towards homosexuality. If anything, it finds that those who are more religious (in practice) are more likely to be accepting of homosexuality. The higher the religiosity (see Appendix II to find out how the Index of Religiosity was constructed) among the Indian youth, the greater is their acceptance of homosexuality. On the question of love affair between two men or two women, only about 19 percent of Indian youth with a low level of religiosity considered such an affair right. In comparison, approval of homosexuality rose to about 30 percent among youth who are highly religious.

Table 5.3: Youth attitude towards homosexuality (%)

	Approve of love affair between two women	Approve of love affair between two men
Youth (Overall)	**25**	**24**
15-17 years	31	30
18-21 years	24	23
22-25 years	27	27
26-29 years	26	26
30-34 years	21	20
Highly religious	30	29
Somewhat religious	25	24
Not much religious	23	22
Not religious at all	19	19
Big Cities	21	20
Smaller Cities	27	25
Villages	29	27

Note: The rest of the respondents either disapproved or gave no opinion. Answer categories of right and somewhat right have been merged and shown as 'approve'.

5.3.1. Other conservative attitudes

The survey also found young people to be fairly conservative on issues of marriage, live-in relationships and dating. Over half of the young respondents (52%) were of the opinion that it was important in life to get married. Only 33 percent disagreed and the rest gave no opinion on the matter. Meanwhile, around one-third of the Indian youth (36%) still considers inter-caste marriage to be completely wrong. About a quarter (23%) saw them as being partially right, and only one-third fully approved of them. Close to half (45%) were found to be completely opposed to inter-religious marriages and only 28 percent were in complete support of them. Two-thirds (67%) did not approve of live-in relationships. Over half (53%) were opposed to dating before marriage with only about one in every seven approving of it. Two in every five (40%) were opposed to the celebration of Valentine's Day (Table 5.4). More discussion on some of these attitudes can be found in the following chapter. These figures should be considered to be a lower bound as there may be under-reporting of approval due to social taboos attached to many of these activities.

Table 5.4: Youth attitudes towards marriage, live-in relationships and dating (%)

	Approve	Somewhat Approve	Disapprove	No response
Inter-caste marriage	33	23	36	9
Inter-religious marriage	28	19	45	8
Man and woman living together without marrying	11	14	67	9
Man and woman meeting/ dating each other prior to marriage	15	22	53	10
Celebrating Valentine's day	26	20	40	14

5.4. Discriminatory tendencies among India's youth

Discrimination is a strong marker of social and cultural attitudes. An Indian is often described as 'Homo Hierarchus'[1] or a hierarchical man. The stratified and hierarchical society gives rise to several forms of discriminatory attitudes and practices. Many have become ubiquitous in our social and cultural attitudes and often go unnoticed or unrealised.

[1]The term 'Homo Hierarchicus' is owed to Louis Dumont's treatise on the caste system. The Indian man is often characterised as a hierarchical being based on the notion of purity and pollution.

The survey tried to measure the extent of discriminatory attitudes or prejudices among Indian youth. This was done by asking the respondent several questions that tried to ascertain her discomfort level about having a person from another religion, caste, region, race, and with a different dietary preference as his/her neighbour. The overall findings for each question have been given in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5: Measuring prejudice among the youth (%)

	Will be fine if they are my neighbour	Will be uneasy if they are my neighbour	Might be uneasy if they are my neighbour	No response
People who cook non-vegetarian food	72	23	4	2
People from another caste	81	13	5	2
People who drink alcohol	42	47	9	3
People from another religion	75	15	7	3
People from Africa	63	17	9	11
People from another state	71	14	9	6
Boy and girl living together outside of marriage	44	33	14	9

5.4.1. Discrimination on grounds of caste, religion and race

Though untouchability as a form of caste discrimination has receded in large parts of the country, invisible forms of discrimination persist and continue. Several studies show that caste discrimination exists in the housing market as landlords refuse to rent out their apartments to people belonging to lower castes. The Youth survey confirms this. Asked if they would have a problem if their neighbour belongs to a different caste than theirs; about one in every six or 13 percent youth reported having reservations. Four in every five (81%) said they would not have any problem.

Among various caste and community groups, surprisingly it is youth from Hindu Adivasi community (18%) followed by youth from Hindu OBC community (15%) who were most likely to express reservations. Though, Adivasis are known to have more egalitarian social practices, it is the onset of processes of modernisation and sanskritisation which must have contributed to their discriminatory attitudes pertaining to caste, especially among those Adivasis who were brought under the Hindu fold (Srinivas, 1996; Xaxa, 2005). However interestingly inter-mixing of people with other castes does 'liberalise' attitude towards other castes. Youth who reported having friends from another caste were two times less likely to have a problem if their neighbours belonged to another caste. Seventy-nine percent of young respondents reported having a close friend from another caste and only one in every eight of them (13%) said they would have a problem having someone from a different caste as their neighbour. Meanwhile, close to one-fifth of the respondents (19%) revealed that they don't have a close friend from a different caste and among them two in every five (22%) were found to be opposed to having a neighbour from a caste other than theirs.

In a deeply unequal society such as India, discrimination also exists on grounds of religion. For instance, discrimination in the housing market is even more pronounced for members of minority communities with their surnames being easily recognisable. Along similar lines, the survey also captured this discriminatory tendency whereby in response to the question on whether having a neighbour from a different religion would cause discomfort, a significant 15 percent (about one in every seven) youth answered in affirmative. Hindu youth were most likely to be uncomfortable; about 16 percent of them said having a non-Hindu as their neighbour would make them uneasy. However, once again, as seen with respect to caste, socialising outside one's own religious sphere has a liberating effect on one's discriminatory attitude. Youth who reported having close friends from another religion (two in every three reported having one) were less likely to feel uneasy (10%) than youth with only co-religionists as close friends (25%). Similarly married youth who reported having a spouse from another religion were less likely to feel uneasy if their neighbour belonged to a different religion than theirs. Less than one-tenth (7%) of the young respondents whose spouse is from a different religion said they would have reservations compared to one in every six (17%) of those whose spouse is from the same religion.

Discrimination on the basis of skin colour, generally associated with Western countries, is prevalent in India as well. In recent times, with several people from different countries of Africa having migrated and settled in various parts of the country in search of educational and job opportunities, there have been countless incidents of them having to deal with discrimination and racism

(Andre, 2016). Asked if they would feel uneasy if their neighbours are from Africa, about three in every five youth (62%) said no, they wouldn't, but a significant 17 percent said they would and nine percent said they might. Discrimination towards Africans is a reflection of the pan-Indian preference for fair skin and the denigration of those people who have a dark complexion. In Indian society, fair skin is something desirable and closer to purity, and dark skin is associated with dirt and hence applies to untouchables (Kakar and Kakar, 2007). Partially, this attitude may also be due to an immature generalization based on reports of many African migrants working as drug addiction

5.4.2. Discrimination towards people from other states

Increased internal migration in the last few decades has produced strong nativist feelings in several parts of the country. There is a fear of the 'other' coming and taking away one's resources and job opportunities. With this in mind, the youth survey attempted to capture such emotions among India's youth. On being asked if they would face discomfort if their neighbours are from another State, one in every seven or 14 percent of youth said they would and 9 percent said they might. Youth from the western and central region of the country followed by youth from the eastern region were more likely to be highly uncomfortable - 18 and 16 percent, respectively. Interestingly, this discomfort was greater in rural areas than urban areas, across all regions. Rural youth were found to be more highly uncomfortable with this prospect (16%) than youth in cities (10%).

5.4.3. Discrimination towards live-in partners

In Indian society, marriage is seen as a sacred union and a girl and a boy staying together outside marriage is looked down upon. When the young respondents were asked if they would be fine with an unmarried man and an unmarried woman living together as their neighbour, one-third or 33 percent reported having strong objections. This sentiment was stronger in villages (37%) and weaker in cities (28%) where live-in relationships are becoming common and widespread.

5.4.4. Discrimination on the basis of eating and drinking habits

On the question of whether having a neighbour who eats non-vegetarian food would cause discomfort or problems for them, nearly three-fourths (72%) youth reported not having a problem whereas nearly one in every four (23%) youth said they would. On this question, among religious communities, Hindu youth expressed the highest reservations (26%) and youth from the Christian community expressed the least amount of reservation (4%). In India, food has been a contested sphere and is reflective of caste hierarchies present and perpetuated. Certain kinds of food, especially non-vegetarian food (tamsic) is associated with the consumption habits of the lower castes and is derided by the upper castes, whose food habits are largely associated with vegetarianism (satvik) (Kakar and Kakar, 2007).

One hears of newspaper reports of people being denied accommodation in certain exclusive neighbourhoods of metropolitan cities on the basis of their eating habits. Among Hindus, youth from the upper castes were most opposed to idea of non-vegetarians as their neighbours. Over a quarter of them (26%) said it would cause discomfort to them. Along with upper castes, youth from the OBC community, who over the years have attempted to ape the social and cultural practices of the upper castes as a process of 'sankritisation', were equally resistant (26%) to their neighbours eating non-vegetarian food. The survey also found most upper caste youth and OBC youth to be pure vegetarians who do not even consume eggs (47% and 30%, respectively). In the survey, overall 30 percent of the young respondents reported themselves as being pure vegetarians and nearly half of them (47%) said they would have problems with a neighbour who consumes non-vegetarian food.

In recent times, several political parties in India have campaigned for the prohibition of sale and consumption of alcohol. The issue being socially desirable, 47 percent of India's youth expressed having a problem with their neighbours drinking alcohol. Young women were more likely to have a problem than young men - 51 percent to 44 percent.

However, cultural variations in drinking patterns across religions, castes and localities get reflected in the responses to this question. In terms of religious communities, Hindu youth and Muslim youth were more likely to have a problem with their neighbours drinking alcohol - 48 percent and 49 percent, respectively. Within the larger Hindu community, it is youth from the Hindu upper castes (53%) that expressed the highest reservations followed by youth from OBC groups (49%). Locality also makes a difference. Youth residing in villages were more likely to have a problem with their neighbours drinking alcohol (50%) than youth residing in small cities (44%) and big cities (42%).

Using all these questions whose responses have been shown in Table 5.5, we created a summated Index of Discriminatory Attitudes (see Appendix II to find out how the index was constructed). We found one in ten (9%) Indian youth to be very

discriminatory, another one in ten (10%) to be somewhat discriminatory, about a quarter (25%) to be low on discrimination and 56 percent to be not discriminatory at all (Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4: Extent of discriminatory attitudes among the youth (%)



Note: See Appendix II to find out how the Index of Discriminatory Attitudes was constructed.

However, given the diverse profile of India's youth there are bound to be several differences on the basis of locality, religion, caste, gender, etc. There is a big rural-urban divide when it comes to the youth bearing a discriminatory or prejudiced attitude. Youth residing in India's villages were found to be more discriminatory (23%) than youth residing in small cities and big cities (16% and 11%, respectively). A higher rate of urbanisation has played a role in reduction in discriminatory attitudes; though discrimination might exist in other invisible forms (Figure 5.5).

Figure 5.5: Youth in villages have a higher discriminatory attitude than those in cities (%)



Among all religious communities, Hindu youth were found to be more discriminatory than youth belonging to other religions. According to the survey, one in every five (20%) Hindu youth were discriminatory (highly and somewhat combined), followed by Muslim youth at 15 percent, Sikh youth at 9 percent and Christian youth at just 4 percent. In other words, Hindu youth were found to be four times more prejudiced than Christian youth and two times more discriminatory than Sikh youth.

The survey also points out the class differences in prevailing discriminatory attitudes. Youth from the upper, richer sections were found to be more discriminatory vis-à-vis youth from lower economic classes. The tendency to be discriminatory was found to be 20 percent among upper class and middle class youth, 19 percent among lower class youth and 17 percent among youth from the poorest economic background.

No significant gender differences on the question of discriminatory attitudes could be noticed. If anything, young women were found to be slightly more discriminatory than young men, 20 percent to 18 percent.

Discrimination stems from prejudices and education plays a significant role in breaking this connection between prejudice and discrimination. It is argued that education liberalises discriminatory attitudes among the youth as they are not socialised in a certain culture of prevailing prejudices. The survey corroborates this argument somewhat, but not entirely. This is because

even as youth who had completed college education were found to be least discriminatory in the survey (only 16% were), interestingly youth who had only studied up to primary and matriculation were found to be more discriminatory than youth who are non-literates (about 22% as opposed to 18%).

5.5. Are Indian youth socially liberal or conservative?

Using responses to all the attitudinal questions that have been discussed in this chapter up till now, we created a mega Index of Social Liberalism/Conservatism (see Appendix II to find out how the index was constructed). The idea was to measure the extent of youth's social liberalism and conservatism after taking various attitudes into consideration. While a social liberal is defined as one who believes in individual freedoms and stands for social justice, a social conservative is one who stands for preservation of traditional beliefs and is prejudiced in attitudes.

The results of the index show that a majority of Indian youth do not fall into the extreme categories of conservative or liberal and instead are somewhere in the middle. They express their liberal and conservative positions on certain issues and not on others. According to the index, only one in every ten youth (11%) can be described as being very conservative and one in every seven (14%) can be described as being very liberal. Thirty-seven percent are somewhat conservative and 38 percent are somewhat liberal (Figure 5.6). If we were to combine the somewhat conservative and somewhat liberal categories, then about three in every four youth (75%) can be described as having moderate social attitudes, neither extremely conservative nor extremely liberal.

Figure 5.6: Indian youth: how socially liberal or conservative? (%)



Dissecting the index gives us an opportunity to capture the diversity and complexities prevalent in Indian society. Beginning with locality, there are urban-rural differences seen in the overall social and cultural attitudes of the Indian youth. Youth residing in villages were mostly found to hold conservative views. On the other hand, youth residing in cities and big cities were found to be somewhat liberal and very liberal (Figure 5.7).

Figure 5.7: Rural youth are more socially conservative than urban youth (%)



Figure 5.8: Hindu youth more socially conservative; Christian less socially conservative (%)



Differences among youth on the basis of religion are evident. Christian youth followed by Sikh youth were found to be more socially liberal (77% and 70%, respectively) than youth belonging to Hindu and Muslim communities (51% and 49%, respectively) (Figure 5.8).

Within Hindus, there are differences among various caste and communities. Youth who belong to the Hindu Adivasi community were found to be the most socially conservative – 71 percent followed by Hindu OBCs (51%) and Dalits (48%). Upper caste youth were least conservative (39%). This could be due to the intersection between caste, education and class.

Youth with a scientific bent of mind were found be far more liberal than youth with a religious one (not to be confused with religiosity). In the survey one-third of respondents disagreed with the proposition that when there is a conflict between science and religion, religion is always right. Sixty-three percent of such respondents were found to be either strongly liberal or somewhat liberal in their social and cultural attitudes. On the other hand about 46 percent of the young respondents agreed with the proposition that religion gives better answers than science and among them only 55 percent were found to be liberal (very or somewhat).

Education is often recognised as an agent of social change. Apart from religious practices and caste ethos, socialisation of Indian youth is shaped by multiple agents, one of them being education and the survey confirms this. In the survey, the more educated youth were more liberal than the less educated ones. Two-thirds (65%) of respondents who had attained higher education (graduation or beyond) were found to be either very or moderately liberal. This figure drops to 46 percent among high school pass youth, 30 percent among youth who had studied only upto the primary level, and 23 percent among non-literate youth.

Universally, societies and individuals recognize the importance of education but in a post-colonial society such as ours, there is additional premium attached to English medium education. Unlike education with vernacular languages as the medium of instruction, it is believed that English medium education allows individuals to come in contact with Western education associated with a scientific outlook and liberal values. Moreover, given the hegemony of English language it has become a symbol of social capital and empowerment and is often cited as a tool to get rid of narrow-mindedness and parochialism. However, contrary to this perception, the survey found that the language in which the youth receive education makes no difference. Youth from both English and vernacular medium backgrounds were found to be equally liberal (strongly and somewhat) - 55 percent among each. No difference between the two could be seen even in the extreme category of highly liberal – 15 percent each.

As mentioned before, political and economic processes also shape social and cultural attitudes. In theoretical terms, politics is the autonomous, intervening variable that drives other social processes. The decade of 1990s marks a sharp break with the past as the country embarked on a process of economic liberalisation coupled with the advent of the forces of 'Mandalisation' and 'Hindutva'. Such massive changes were followed by further transitions with the emergence of the technological revolution which brought about tectonic shifts in the realms of technology and communication in the 21st century. Studying the impact of these processes on the shaping of social and cultural processes of the Indian youth would require us to differentiate the youth across three generations - pre-liberalisation (80s), post-liberalisation (90s) and youth born in the 21st century. There is a clear pattern across the three generations. There is a resemblance in the social and cultural attitudes of Indian youth of the 1980s and the youth who were born in the 21st century. Indian youth who were born in the pre-liberalisation era and youth who grew up during the technological revolution were largely found to be highly conservative and somewhat conservative. But youth who were born in the decade of 1990s or the liberalisation period were found to be socially liberal, particularly those born in the second half of the 90s. This is the cohort that would have begun understanding the world around them sometime between 2000 and 2005 (Table 5.6).

The so-called advances made in technology and communications have also increased the exposure of Indian youth to both

Table 5.6: Post-liberalisation era youth are most socially liberal; however those recently born are very conservative (%)

Generations of Indian youth	Socially very liberal	Socially somewhat liberal	Socially somewhat conservative	Socially very conservative
Pre-liberalisation (Born in the 80s) (27-34 year olds)	12	34	41	13
Born in first half of 90s (21-26 year olds)	16	41	35	9
Born in second half of 90s (17-20 year olds)	18	42	28	11
Born at the start of the 21st century (15-16 year olds)	10	34	42	14

media and social media. In the 21st century, mass media has a significant influence on modern culture; media shapes social and cultural attitudes and creates what is referred to as 'mediated culture'. What influence does news media have on the Indian youth? Survey responses show a clear relationship - the more exposed the youth are to news media, the more liberal they are. Youth who had no or low exposure to news media were more likely to hold conservative views than those with moderate or high exposure (Table 5.7).

Table 5.7: Indian youth with higher news and social media exposure are more socially liberal (%)

	Socially very liberal	Socially somewhat liberal	Socially somewhat conservative	Socially very conservative
News media				
High news media exposure	22	47	25	6
Moderate news media exposure	17	42	31	10
Low news media exposure	10	35	42	12
No news media exposure	6	23	51	20
Social media				
High social media exposure	24	48	23	5
Moderate social media exposure	23	46	23	8
Low social media exposure	16	44	34	6
No social media exposure	8	30	46	17

Along with news media, the proliferation of social media in the form of Facebook, Whatsapp, Twitter, etc. has had a great influence on the lives of Indian youth. The usage of social media seems to have an impact on their perception on social issues. Nearly three in every four youth (72%) who reported having high exposure to social media (see Appendix II to find out how Index of Social Media Usage was constructed) were found to be socially liberal (strongly and somewhat). On the other hand, only 38 percent of youth who were not exposed to social media at all were found to be socially progressive. In other words, liberalism among the youth seems to increase along side an increase in consumption of social media.

The rapid development in transport and communication has increased individual mobility. Mobility beyond one's village/city, state, and country has a significant impact on the way people think. A change in thinking is often attributed to constant interaction with new people and diverse cultures. Such interactions make one more acceptable of 'otherness' which is an indicator of a liberal mind. The survey has captured such mobility through an Index of Travel (see Appendix II to find out how it was constructed), which empirically measures the geographical boundary of youth's mobility. The survey found about one in every ten youth to have not yet travelled outside their village/town/city and among them 57 percent were found to be socially conservative which dropped to 43 percent among those who had travelled either outside their village/town/city or their state or the country.

5.6. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to examine the shades of liberalism and conservatism among India's youth by taking into account their responses to questions that gauged their prejudices and attitudes towards women, homosexuality, marriage, dating and live-in relationships. The examination reveals that Indian youth do not really fit into the prototype Western categories of liberal and conservative as more than three-fourths of them fall somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. They are neither entirely liberal nor entirely conservative but show shades of both. One has to look into the nuances and details, to capture their liberal and conservative expressions on social issues. Over a period of time, even as Indian youth have developed a liberal predisposition on matters related to women's education, engagement in paid work outside home after marriage, attaining leadership roles; a majority of them continue to believe that within the household a woman's position is subordinate to her male companion (her husband). Similarly, even as a majority of Indian youth are found to be mostly open and accommodating towards someone different from them in terms of religion, caste, food habits, colour of the skin etc., there is a still a significant section that holds discriminatory attitudes.

Unlike Western democracies, neither social conservatism nor social liberalism predominantly define the Indian society. India encompasses a range of social and psychological dispositions, norms and structures. Thus, it is difficult to place/situate Indian youth in the extreme categories of social liberal or social conservative. India has often broken the dichotomy between liberal-conservative as a result of modernity's interaction with tradition. Traditional social structures and norms have taken a new, modern avatar and in a similar fashion, modernity in the form of economic and technological changes has also affected traditional structures and norms (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1967).

References

Andre, Aletta. 2016. Being African in India: We are seen as demons. Al Jazeera. 26 June. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/06/african-india-demons-160620101135164.html. Accessed on 4 February, 2017.

Chatterjee, Partha. 1989. Colonialism, Nationalism & Colonized Women: The Contest in India. *American Ethnologist,* 16(4): 622-634.

Dyson, Tim and Moore, Mick. 1983. On Kinship Structure, Female Autonomy, and Demographic Behavior in India. *Population and Development Review,* Mar., 1984. 9(1): 35-60.

Pew Research. 2013. Global Divide on Homosexuality. 4 June. Available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/the-global-divide-on-homosexuality/. Accessed on 15 December, 2016.

Jensen, Robert and Oster, Emily. 2009. The Power of TV: Cable Television and Women's Status in India. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Aug., 2009. 124(3): 1057-1094.

Kakar, Sudhir and Kakar, Katharina. 2007. *The Indians: Portrait Of Indian People.* Penguin Books.

Rudoplh, Sussane and Rudoplh, Llyod. 1967. *The Modernity of Tradition.* University of Chicago Press.

Srinivas, M.N. (ed.). 1996. *Caste: Its Twentieth Century Avatar.* Penguin India Press.

Tharoor, Shashi. 2016. Overcoming India's Official Homophobia. April 11. Available at: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/overcoming-india-s-official-homophobia-by-shashi-tharoor-2016-04. Accessed on 4 February, 2017.

Vanita, Ruth and Kidwai, Saleem. 2000. *Same-Sex Love in India: Readings from Literature and History.* St. Martin's Press.

Wood, Julia. 1994. *Gendered Lives: Communication, Gender, and Culture.* Wadsworth Publishing.

Xaxa, Virginus. 2005. Politics of Language, Religion and Identity: Tribes in India. *Economic and Political Weekly,* 40(13): 1363-1370.

6. Marriage: attitudes, preferences and practices



6. Marriage: attitudes, preferences and practices

6.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the marriage-related findings from the CSDS-KAS Youth Survey. Throughout the world, marriage behavior and family life are changing. The composition, dynamics and ways of understanding families have changed considerably in the 21st century. In addition to a host of other factors, increase in the mobility of young and old people from villages to towns, processes of modernisation, industrialisation and urbanisation, expansion of higher education, cultural globalisation etc. have contributed to changes in social institutions such as marriage and family. As a result of these changes, young people are marrying late, couples are having fewer children, and more married women are engaged in paid work outside home. In the Indian subcontinent, as a social institution, marriage has remained nearly universal and socially compulsory. Here, marriage is not solely the union of two individuals; it is also a relation between two families. As an important decision driven by economic and socio-cultural factors, spouse selection is managed by parents and extended kin more often than by prospective spouses. Increasing urbanisation, education and employment of women in occupations have had a strong influence in paving the way for more inter-caste marriages. Socio-economic development and globalisation of the Indian economy have also contributed to the changing trends and patterns in marriages. In light of the changes taking place the world over and within the country, it needs to be explored whether and to what extent marriage as a social institution has undergone changes in India through the lens of young people's opinion. The following analysis focuses on both young married and unmarried people across geographical locations, gender, caste-class groups, and religious communities.

In its attempt to understand marital choices of the young, this chapter intends to examine whether the likelihood of self arranged marriages[1] increases with higher levels of educational attainment? Have love marriages replaced parent-arranged marriages as the dominant form of marriage in India? Most importantly, in an increasingly globalising India, do decisions around marriage continue to be a family affair only, operating within and influenced by considerations of caste, gotra or economic class.

While the chapter draws upon survey findings, it recognises that marriage arrangements in India do not necessarily fall into neat binary categories of 'arranged' and 'love' and need to be best viewed as a process involving a range of participation from the prospective couple, kin, etc.

Undoubtedly, there is a wealth of literature, mostly ethnographies, which have captured change and complexity of marriage in contemporary India. However, in the absence of nationally representative surveys on this theme, the extent of marital change in India is not well established. Given the long and distinguished history of survey research in India, findings on marriage from the CSDS-KAS Youth Survey 2016, we hope, will contribute by providing a richer understanding of marital decisions, outcomes and changes.

There is considerable heterogeneity within the Indian subcontinent as far as marriage practices are concerned. Geographically, the most notable difference is the divide between the North and South (Dyson and Moore, 1983; Karve, 1965; Kolenda, 1987). While cross cousin marriage is the accepted norm in South India, North India follows the principle of caste endogamy and gotra exogamy, i.e., marrying within the caste group but outside the gotra group. However for the purpose of the report, this chapter will avoid providing regional analysis and instead focus on an all India analysis of young people's marital choices.

By focusing on the cohort of married youth, the first part of this chapter makes multiple claims most notably that compared to the last decade, the proportion of married adults has decreased and this change has been most noticeable in rural areas. Marriage related preferences of married youth are explained with the help of explanatory variables such as education, age, gender, caste, etc. It also demonstrates that acceptance of inter-caste marriage has increased, however reported outcome remains low.

The second part examines the group of unmarried youth and discusses their marital choices in terms of parent-arranged and self-arranged marriages. It argues that similar to married youth, unmarried cohort are also displaying an inclination towards arranged marriage. This part again indicates a larger change of growing acceptance to the idea of not marrying.

The third part attempts to explain the qualities sought in potential spouses by young people.

The fourth part is on gender sensitive parenting wherein it has been explored whether gender of the child is likely to play a positive influence in married youth (fathers especially) being gender sensitive.

6.2. Importance attached to marriage seems to have declined

As per the 2016 survey, overall, 46 percent of the youth aged between 15 and 34 years are married while the remaining are unmarried. In the last one decade, the proportion of young married adults has decreased by eight percentage points. In 2007,

[1]For the purpose of this chapter, terms self-arranged marriage and love marriage will be used interchangeably.

a little over half of the youth (54%) were married. In 2016, this has reduced to 46 percent (Figure 6.1). This reduction has taken place among both young men and young women. While 48 percent of 15-34-year-old men were found to be married in the 2007 survey, in the 2016 survey the share of young married men was just 39 percent. Similarly, the proportion of young married women in the same age group declined from 61 percent in 2007 to 59 percent in 2016 (Table 6.1).

Figure 6.1: Proportion of married youth has declined in last decade (%)



Note: Some respondents did not reveal their marital status.

The sharpest drop in the proportion of married youth is in the age category of 21 to 25 years followed by 26 to 29 years (Table 6.1). Interestingly, there has been no significant decline in the proportion of youth marrying before the marriageable age allowed by law. Six percent of young men aged between 15 and 20 years reported being married in the 2016 survey. In 2007, the proportion of married men in the same age group had been 7 percent. Similarly, 6 percent of young women aged between 15 and 17 years reported being married in 2016, a slight increase of two percentage points compared to 2007. Meanwhile, older youth (26-34 years) are more likely to be married than younger youth, but even among them (particularly 26-29-year-olds) there

Table 6.1: Decline in proportion of married is sharpest among 21- to 25-year-olds (%)

	Married Overall		Married Men		Married Women	
	2007	2016	2007	2016	2007	2016
Youth (Overall)	**54**	**46**	**48**	**39**	**61**	**59**
15-17 years	5	5	5	4	4	6
18-20 years	18	16	11	9	27	28
21-25 years	56	40	44	30	71	53
26-29 years	78	72	70	64	87	84
30-34 years	90	90	88	88	94	94

has been a decline in the proportion of married. Roughly, then in relative terms, age of getting married has moved from early-mid twenties to late-twenties

While the decline in the proportion of married youth is visible across localities, it has been more pronounced in rural areas than in urban areas. In 2007, in rural areas over three-fifths (61%) of the 15- to 34-year-olds were married. In 2016, this had dropped by nine percentage points to 52 percent. In urban areas, there has been a six point decline in the proportion of married youth, from 46 percent to 40 percent in the last decade. In contrast to widely held beliefs that in urban areas, norms around marriage, upward mobility etc. are likely to be more relaxed, the survey reveals that the decline in the percentage of married youth has been most prominent in rural areas. This is definitely an encouraging sign of change in mindset as far as delaying the decision to get married is concerned.

In both localities, urban and rural, young men are less likely to get married than young women. Moreover, in both localities, there has been a sharper decline in the proportion of young married men over the last decade than in the proportion of young married women. In rural areas, the share of young married men fell from 54 percent in 2007 to 44 percent in 2016. Similarly, in urban areas, 41 percent of young men were married in 2007 which decreased to 33 percent in 2016 (Figure 6.2). Meanwhile, the decadal decline in the proportion of young married women in rural and urban areas has been four and one percentage point respectively. This finding is also corroborated by ethnographic studies which suggest that men have more choice than women over their marriage in India (Allendorf, 2013; Caldwell et.al., 1983; Allendorf and Pandian, 2016).

Expectedly, a higher share of young men are more likely to be unmarried than women. That is, the former are more likely to be able to delay the pressure of getting married. This is also supported by the prevailing customs of marriage and the associated notions of purity and pollution wherein there is greater pressure from and desire among families to control women's sexuality by getting them married at a socially appropriate age. The same does not hold true for men.

Figure 6.2: Decline in the proportion of married youth more pronounced in rural areas (%)



Analysing the youth's marital status by economic class, we find that the youth from upwardly mobile middle and upper economic classes are more likely to be unmarried than those from poor socio- economic background. Across economic classes, those who are non-literates are most likely to be married.

One possible explanation for the postponement of marriage and an increase in the percentage of unmarried youth maybe due to an increase in the level of educational attainment, greater bargaining power within the family resulting in ability to postpone the marriage question, and the relative change in public attitudes and mindsets. The demands of modern knowledge-based economy entail placing greater focus on one's career and aspiring for fast paced professional mobility. This may require postponing the immediate need to get married. However this pressure and exercise of greater individual agency has worked more in favour of young unmarried men than young unmarried women. Unlike a decade back, youth are marrying later in life now. Increasing opportunities to pursue higher education, expanding one's earning capacity by prioritising professional growth, and concerns around financial security are likely to have contributed to an increased share of unmarried youth.

Education is an important claim to modernity and is likely to impact spouse choice by opening possibilities and avenues for meeting potential mates. Being able to seek higher education pushes back marriage timelines. With successive levels of education, percentage of married youth decreases, i.e., non literates are more likely to be married than those who are high school pass or graduates. After all, education helps individuals attain greater levels of individuation and lessen familial control, and in the process also helps postpone the pressure to get married. In the 2007 survey, 45 percent of those who were college educated had reported being married. A decade later, this figure has reduced by ten percentage points to 35 percent (Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3: Educated youth are more likely to marry late (%)



6.2.1. An arranged marriage or a love marriage?

The type of marriage individuals enter into is indicative of the level of influence played by their family, prevailing societal values and norms, and peer group influence in the process of mate selection. Among others factors, preference for arranged marriage is likely to be indicative of the significance of consent of parents and family elders in the lives of young people.

The survey found 84 percent married youth to have had an arranged marriage, compared to a meager 6 percent who have had a love marriage. Four percent reported as having had a love cum arranged marriage (Table 6.2). Disaggregating the responses on preference for marriage type among married youth by locality, caste, religion, and education throws interesting findings.

Unlike the married youth in the big cities, youth in smaller cities are most likely to have had a love marriage and those in villages are least likely to have had one given the relatively strong hold of caste and marital norms in rural India. The fact that a small fraction of marriages (6%) are self-arranged i.e. based on love, clearly shows that one institution that globalisation, liberalisation and other economic forces have been unable to weaken is that of arranged marriage. The acceptance and reported incidence of arranged marriage continues to be extremely high in twenty first century India. Over 80 percent of the marriages in the big cities, small cities, and villages are arranged marriages.

Level of autonomy in partner choice is directly related to education. Access to education allows individuals to have greater bargaining power within the household, ability and confidence to take decisions independently, and opportunities to meet potential partners in educational institutions and/or workplace. This is also supported by the survey findings: love marriage is most prevalent among those who are graduates or above (9%), arranged marriages are most prevalent among those who are non-literates (92%), followed by primary pass (88%) and high school pass (86%). Love cum arranged marriage, a relatively new form of marriage is most prevalent among married youth who are college-educated.

An analysis of prevalent type of marriage among different caste groups reveals that over 80 percent of marriages across Hindu castes are arranged in nature. Young married Hindu Adivasis stand out in their preference for arranged marriage (92%). Meanwhile, of all Hindu communities, the incidence of love marriage is highest among young Dalits at 10 percent. In terms of religion, Christian and Muslim youth show a greater incidence of love marriages (12 and 7%, respectively) as compared to Sikhs (3%).

Married Sikh youth show an overwhelming preference for arranged marriage, with nine out of ten of them opting to have their parents choose their spouse. They are also most conservative and tend to marry only within their own religion, with almost no cases of inter-religious marriages having been reported in the survey. Compared to marrying outside caste, religion, gotra; married youth are most likely to be open to the idea of marrying someone outside their state.

Table 6.2: Four out of five married youth have had an arranged marriage (%)

	Had an arranged marriage	Had a love marriage	Had a love cum arraged marriage	No Response
Married Youth (Overall)	**84**	**6**	**4**	**6**
Big Cities	81	9	6	4
Smaller Cities	87	7	4	2
Villages	83	5	4	8
Graduate or above	78	9	5	8
High School Pass	86	5	4	6
Primary Pass	88	4	4	5
Non-literate	92	3	2	3
Hindu Upper Caste	86	6	3	6
Hindu OBC	81	6	6	7
Hindu Dalit	82	10	3	6
Hindu Adivasi	91	<1	2	6
Muslim	87	7	3	3
Christian	75	12	4	10
Sikh	90	3	3	5

6.2.2. Inter-caste marriage

Owing to the compulsions of democratic politics, there has been increased interaction between those at the opposite ends of caste hierarchy. Members of groups categorised as lower caste have been successful in pushing for affirmative action legislation with the support of upper caste members. However this doesn't signal the demise of caste hierarchy (Ahuja and Ostermann, 2015:3).

The relationship between marriage and caste is complex as marriage is arguably one of the most central social practices in India that implicates the caste system. Till date people choose to marry within their own caste as it guarantees the reproduction of caste from one generation to another. The fact that caste continues to govern relations in the private sphere is supported by how social outcome of inter-caste marriage is low despite increase in its acceptability. In the survey, the reported outcome of inter-caste marriage (married respondents who said their spouse is not from their caste) was only 4 percent while its social acceptance (those who did not see anything wrong with inter-caste marriages) was much higher at 55 percent. Trends in acceptance of inter-caste marriage show changes in expected direction. It has increased by 24 percentage points, from 31 percent in 2007 to 55 percent in 2016 (Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4: Youth opinion on inter-caste marriage (%)



Compared to 2007 findings, the acceptance has increased dramatically. This raises a valid question on whether social outcomes reflect people's actual preferences and can they be the sole indicator of social attitudes? Low percentage of inter-caste marriages may not necessarily imply low interest in such marriages, but may in fact indicate towards how there is a gap in the social approval and reported outcome of inter-caste marriage. The low reported outcome of inter-caste marriage (just 4%) indicates that even though previously unequal groups have become equal economically and socially, they remain distinct by subscribing to caste endogamy (Table 6.3).

Table 6.3: Nine out of ten married youth have married within their caste (%)

	Type of caste based marriage among married youth
Intra-caste marriage	92
Inter-caste marriage	4

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

One-third of those who had a love marriage were found to have married someone outside their caste. On the other hand, 97 percent of arranged marriages are within caste (Table 6.4).

Table 6.4: Is there any relation between type of marriage and caste of spouse? (%)

	Spouse is from another caste	Spouse is from same caste
Youth whose marriage was a love marriage	34	63
Youth whose marriage was an arranged marriage	1	97
Youth whose marriage was a love cum arranged marriage	13	83

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

Not just in practice, but in attitudes too, the survey found married youth who have had an arranged marriage to be displaying the most amount of resistance towards the idea of an inter-caste marriage and inter-religious marriage than those whose marriage had been a love marriage (Table 6.5). Religion is a bigger fault line than caste: overall the acceptance for inter-religious marriage is much lesser than caste. Married youth, both with arranged and love marriages, were most likely to be against a woman and a man living together outside marriage, although once again, when we compare the responses of those with a love marriage with those with an arranged marriage, the former were slightly more open minded about it. On the question of homosexuality too, those with an arranged marriage were slightly more likely to oppose it than those who have had a love marriage.

Table 6.5: Married youth who had a love marriage are more open-minded (%)

		Inter-caste marriage	Inter-religious marriage	Live-in before marriage	Dating before marriage	Celebrating Valentine's day	Love affair between women	Love affair between men
Those who had a love marriage	Consider it to be right	72	69	34	53	60	32	32
	Consider it to be wrong	15	28	62	42	30	57	57
Those who had an arranged marriage	Consider it to be right	43	35	15	25	30	23	23
	Consider it to be wrong	48	57	76	66	54	64	64

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

Meanwhile disaggregating the marriage data by caste reveals that inter-caste marriage is highest among Dalits (6%) compared to other castes. Only 3 percent of married youth belonging to Hindu upper castes reported that their partner was from a caste different than theirs.

On one level, openness to inter-caste marriage signals the weakening of caste boundaries and is a welcome trend. At another level, the fact that social outcome of inter-caste marriage is low indicates that even those who are well educated, urban, semi urban are in fact still largely adhering to traditional caste norms as far as marriage is concerned.

Given the socially accepted norm of caste endogamy and gotra exogamy, 92 percent of the marriages were reported to be within caste. This finding is particularly strong among those who are high school pass: 99 percent of married youth with education up till high school who had an arranged marriage married within their caste. Meanwhile, those who are graduates and have had a love marriage are most likely to have married someone outside their caste (43%).

Widespread inclination towards arranged marriage among the married youth is likely to be due to numerous factors. Firstly, it is a reflection of continuing hold of caste in everyday life and in marriage markets specifically. Secondly, it points towards continuing importance of familial authority, involvement of parents in spouse selection and family pressure to operate closer to tradition and convention. Thirdly, arranged marriages are perceived as robust and long lasting, with greater chances of parental support being extended to the couple in times of marital difficulty. Given the perceived lack of parental support in love marriages, they are seen as inferior, conflict ridden and less successful (Grover, 2007). This explains why young people are also overtly encouraged to opt for arranged marriage.

Therefore youth view arranged marriages as involving greater level of parental support, assistance and cooperation, supportive ties with natal family; compared to love marriage where parental role maybe subsumed. From a gender perspective, young women by preferring arranged marriage certainly continue to be linked to their parents. Moreover, post marital support in the form of parental support, i.e., shelter, mediation and intervention is especially critical for young women who often fear being thrown out by their spouse and his family in cases of marital dispute.

In context of marriage specifically, the onus of protecting family and community's honour, one of the most valued ideals among Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims, falls on women invariably. Mate selection without parental consent in this context is viewed as inappropriate behavior, resulting in punishment, shame and honor killings. Therefore from the perspective of young women, rejecting arranged marriage and opting for love marriage is accompanied by a fear of denigrating family's reputation, as a result of which married women are less likely to hold parents accountable for their marital problems. By taking responsibility for their own marital choices (i.e., by opting for love marriage), young women may not be able to extensively draw upon kin support or shelter.

While the survey found 88 percent of the married men to be working/doing a job, only 36 percent of married women were found to be involved in paid work outside home (Figure 6.5).

Figure 6.5: Huge difference between proportion of young married men and married women who are working(%)



6.3. Marital preferences of young unmarried people

Similar to the married cohort, among the unmarried too, preference for arranged marriage is high with 50 percent of the young unmarried cohort opting to have their parents take a decision regarding their life partner. Preference for love/self-marriage accounts for 12 percent and about one in ten (10%) would prefer a love cum arranged marriage. Roughly one-fifth (19%) had not yet made up their mind on the kind of marriage they would like to enter into and if at all they would like to get married (Table 6.6).

Table 6.6: Marital preference of unmarried young people (%)

	Would prefer love marriage	Would prefer arranged marriage	Would prefer love cum arranged marriage	Time will tell
Unmarried (Overall)	**12**	**50**	**10**	**19**
Big Cities	13	40	15	21
Smaller Cities	12	51	11	18
Villages	11	55	6	19
Graduate or above	12	48	12	20
High School Pass	11	52	8	18
Primary Pass	4	55	4	21
Non-literate	4	83	0	9
Hindu Upper Caste	12	49	11	20
Hindu OBC	9	55	9	18
Hindu Dalit	14	46	8	20
Hindu Adivasi	9	62	7	17
Muslim	15	44	12	22
Others	14	39	14	18
15-17 years	10	52	8	19
18-21 years	12	47	10	21
22-25 years	12	50	12	17
26-29 years	14	55	12	15
30-34 years	5	51	10	19

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

The relative anonymity of an individual's identity in a city not only makes it difficult for rules of purity and pollution to be observed, individuals also have much greater freedom to exercise their choice in mate selection. In cities, the search for partners differs from villages and is much less likely to be mediated by caste networks. Therefore, it is argued that youth in cities are more likely to shift from their family and caste networks to friends, professional networks and even rely on technology. Due to these reasons, their inclination towards love marriage is going to be higher than those in villages.

Figure 6.6: Changing perception about marriage (%)



Contrary to intuition, the survey suggests that there are no significant differences across localities as far as preference for love marriage is concerned. Highest preference for love marriage was seen among youth living in big cities (13%) followed by those in smaller cities (12% each) and villages (11%). Since perceived threat of violence in cases of transgressing social norms related to marriage and caste fault lines are relatively stronger in smaller cities than big ones, this might explain why unmarried youth in small cities have shown highest preference for arranged marriage (54%). In comparison, youth in big cities appear relatively less inclined towards arranged marriage (40%).

Those who are more educated seemed more willing to opt for love marriage (12%). Non- literate single youth were found to be more likely to prefer arranged marriage (83%).

Pattern of preference for love marriage is virtually identical among unmarried men and women, with a marginal difference of two percent. However, in the case of arranged marriage, young unmarried women (53%) appeared to be more inclined towards it than unmarried men (48%). This number is equal if we look at the highly educated young single men and women (48%). The pattern for decision to get married was virtually identical across genders wherein both young men and women were found to be equally likely to not have made up their mind on the type of marriage they want.

Very strikingly, youth from upper echelons of society (those categorised as rich in socio-economic categorisation) display highest preference for arranged marriage (55%) and lowest preference for love marriage (9%). Among all castes, unmarried Hindu Adivasi youth reported the highest preference for arranged marriage (62%) whereas unmarried Muslim and Dalit youth reported the highest preference for love marriage (15 and 14 percent, respectively). The highest proportion of unmarried youth inclined towards arranged marriage was found among 26-29-year-olds. The preference of this age cohort for love marriage is also the strongest (14%).

Respondents were asked their opinion on importance of getting married in life. Time series data on this question shows a noticeable shift in favour of opting to not marry. While one third agreed, more than half (52%) disagreed. Compared to a decade back, young people appear to be over two times more likely to be open to the idea of not marrying. Young people were in fact found to be two times less opinionated on the question in the 2016 survey than they were a decade back in the 2007 survey (Figure 6.6).

Among rural youth, agreement on this question (i.e., it is not important to get married in life) was found to be nearly three times greater as compared to 2007 (Table 6.7). Among urban youth it was two times more. Those who are primary pass, high school pass and graduate and above were found to be over twice more likely to express this sentiment than they were a decade back. 22-29 year olds were three times more likely to agree than they were a decade back.

Table 6.7: Young people across localities are now more open to idea of not getting married (%)

	In life, it is not important to get married		In life, it is important to get married	
	2007	2016	2007	2016
Rural	12	33	80	51
Urban	14	31	82	55

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

6.4. Life partner consideration

The wave of industrialisation and globalisation in India has had a profound impact on culture, lifestyle and dietary preferences. Indian youth's beliefs and attitudes towards marriage and the qualities they seek in their life partner have been redefined, more so because in India marriage is considered a lifelong partnership.

The marriage system in India has experienced a number of changes such as increase in women's age at marriage and the near universal adoption of dowry as a condition of marriage, alongside changing gender roles in private and public realms. Over the decades, there has been a much greater influx of women in the workforce. There has also been heightened awareness of sexual harassment forcing people to re-evaluate assumptions about men and women. In light of this, it is argued that not only would there be much greater cultural acceptance of unmarried and married women's engagement with paid work outside home but also a new focus in marriage markets and socio-cultural values of mate preference wherein unmarried women's careers would be given due importance, if not equal to those of their male counterparts.

Certain socio cultural values such as physical features and skin color of potential spouse, and personality traits such as simplicity and an understanding and respectful nature, are often considered indispensible and important values to be kept in mind while selecting marriage partner. Therefore, such cultural values are likely to remain constant and impervious to changes in rest of the society, given their large-scale social acceptability and desirability across different cohorts.

Respondents were asked to state important considerations that they would keep in mind while choosing a life partner. Among married youth, those who have had a love marriage were much more likely to cite love as an important consideration than those who had an arranged marriage or love-cum-arranged marriage. Earlier analysis in this chapter has shown that 97 percent of arranged marriages are endogamous in nature (within castes) and caste has been an important factor that often overrides other aspects in marriage markets. In complete contrast, an analysis of considerations that are sought in potential life partner among married youth suggests that those who had an arranged marriage did not cite caste, religion, region as their most important consideration while choosing a life partner. Those who had a love marriage (11%) were more likely to give primacy to the profession and salary, looks and skin colour (10%) of their spouse than those who had an arranged marriage. On other parameters such as education, being understanding and respectful, good nature and simple personality, there are no marked differences between those who had a love marriage and those who had an arranged marriage. Regardless of type of marriage, married youth expect their potential spouse to be good natured and simple (among those with love marriage - 15%, arranged marriage - 13%, and both types of marriage - 16%), be understanding and respectful (love marriage - 9%, arranged marriage -

Table 6.8: Qualities sought by young people in marriage partners (%)

	All youth, married or single	Those with an arranged marriage	Those with a love marriage	Those with love cum arranged marriage	Unmarried youth
Good nature and simple personality	14	13	15	16	15
Educational qualification	8	3	2	8	11
Understanding and respectful	6	6	9	8	6
Looks/skin colour	5	4	10	2	6
Traditional, cultured, moral	5	5	9	4	5
Good job or income	4	4	11	4	5
Caste, religion, region etc.	2	2	0	2	1
Love and companionship	2	1	3	1	1
Consent of parents	1	2	1	0	1
Family background	1	1	0	0	1
Should know housework	1	2	1	3	1
Other qualities	2	3	4	2	3
No opinion	49	54	33	51	46

Note: The question was asked in an open ended manner and hence the proportion of no opinion is very high as many respondents either could not think of an answer or simply refused to answer.

6%, and both types of marriage - 8%). Nine percent of those who have had a love marriage expect their partner to be traditional, cultured and have moral values, as opposed to 5% of those who had an arranged marriage (Table 6.8).

No response in this question was strikingly high (49%). Disaggregating the no response figures by background variables reveals that among the married youth, those who had an arranged marriage and love-cum-arranged marriage were more likely to not have given an answer to this question (54% and 51% respectively) than those who had a love marriage (33%). Young women were more likely to not have provided an answer to this question than men. More than half the youth in villages (53%) did not have an opinion in this question, followed small and big cities (47% and 45% respectively). Similarly, 53 percent of married and 46 percent of unmarried youth did not provide their opinion on this question.

6.4.1. Advertisement in matrimonial websites and newspapers

On the question of matrimonial advertisements, the survey throws a strikingly interesting finding, indicating that only 3 percent of youth have placed a matrimonial advertisement whereas 87 percent have not. Among the married cohort, roughly as many youth who had a love marriage and an arranged marriage had given matrimonial advertisement in a newspaper/website (4% each).

The fact that till date a large majority of marriages are endogamous in nature and only 3 percent of the young population in the sample of this survey has relied on matrimonial advertisements indicates that there is continued reliance on traditional methods of marriage. Large majority of marriages are taking place within familiar kin networks. Contrary to media projection of scores of youngsters finding potential partners on matrimonial sites, the survey finding suggests that reliance on matrimonial websites is far less than what is assumed.

6.5. Effect of having a daughter on married youth's attitudes

In India, social norms and practices are mostly governed by patriarchal ideologies that define the roles of men and women. These views often play out alongside increasingly reshaped roles for women in society. The presence of daughters may be instrumental in fathers being more conscious of gender related differences among boys and girls and hence more gender sensitive. Studies too have shown that having daughters has the potential of sensitising parents (fathers particularly) to issues of gender equity (Warner and Steel, 1999:503).

Therefore it would be important to examine whether gender of the child is likely to play a positive influence in married youth being gender sensitive. This is particularly important in a context laden with gender discrimination in practically all realms of life. Keeping this in mind, the attitude of married youth with children on critical issues was analysed. Respondents were asked questions such as whether it is right for women to work after marriage, whether men are better leaders than women, wives must always listen to their husbands etc. Contrary to intuition, young married men with daughters and also children of both genders were less likely to be open to the idea of women working after marriage than young married men with sons. In the case

Table 6.9: Having a daughter does not seem to liberalise married youth's mindset regarding married working women (%)

	It is not right for women to do a job after marriage	
	Agree	Disagree
Married men with son/s	48	45
Married men with daughter/s	53	40
Married men with children of both genders	53	36
Married women with son/s	32	59
Married women with daughter/s	33	55
Married women with children of both genders	38	48

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

of young married women too, the pattern was similar. Those with sons appeared to be more gender sensitive with 59 percent of them supporting women's decision to work post marriage compared to 55 percent support among young married women

with daughters (Table 6.9).

Protectionist attitude of married youth, males particularly, is likely to contribute to the formation of such an illiberal/parochial mindset. The fact that married men with daughters are more likely to be opposed to women working after marriage shows that in context of Indian youth, there is in fact a reversal of the idea of gender sensitive parenting. Young fathers with sons are more resistant (48%) to women being involved in paid work outside home post marriage than mothers with sons (32%) indicates that having sons might be connected to men's resistance to social change with regard to gender.

Education has been argued to have a liberalizing effect on people by exposing them to divergent worldviews and lifestyles. Indeed, numerous studies have suggested that higher societal educational attainment has led to increased tolerance and acceptance of gender equity issues (Warner and Steel, 1999:508). However, this may not necessarily hold true as far as opinion on women working after marriage is concerned.

Examining the views of married men and women with sons and daughters by their level of educational attainment, we see that married males who are high school pass and above are most likely to not support women working after marriage (57%). Also, the opinion of married men with daughters who are graduates and above is sharply divided (49% agree, 50% disagree).

In the case of married women who are graduates and above and have sons, education can be seen to have a liberalizing effect, since they are more likely to support women's decision to work after marriage, compared to primary pass married women who are least likely to do so.

Table 6.10: Having a daughter does not seem to liberalise married youth's mindset regarding women in leadership positions (%)

	'Overall, men prove to be better leaders than women'	
	Agree	Disagree
Married men with son/s	49	41
Married men with daughter/s	49	40
Married men with children of both genders	51	35
Married women with sons	35	50
Married women with daughter/s	39	45
Married women with children of both genders	36	45

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

Opinion on leadership and gender differences is closely connected to the gender of the child. The data reveals that presence of a daughter in men's lives does not necessarily make them more sensitive on matters related to gender equity. Close to half of the young men, irrespective of whether they have a son or daughter, believe that men are better leaders (Table 6.10).

Table 6.11: Having a daughter does not seem to liberalise married youth's mindset about a wife's position vis-à-vis her husband (%)

	'Wives should always listen to their husbands'	
	Agree	Disagree
Married men with son/s	61	33
Married men with daughter/s	59	35
Married men with children of both genders	62	26
Married women with son/s	47	44
Married women with daughter/s	53	36
Married women with children of both genders	51	37

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

There is striking difference in the proportion of married youth who agree that women should always listen to their husbands and in this case we again see that parenting daughters does not have much of a positive impact on young men (Table 6.11). Nearly three out of five young married men with daughters expect that wives should listen to their husbands.

What is equally alarming is that women with daughters do not appear to be broad minded on this question with 53 percent of them endorsing that wives must obey their husbands. It is thus clear that in contrast to the gender sensitive parenting argument made earlier, married men with daughters are more regressive in attitudes than married women with sons, in relative terms.

On the question of whether higher education is more important for boys than for girls, a positive impact of parenting daughters can be seen wherein married men with daughters are slightly more likely (59%) to disagree that higher education is more important for boys than for girls, in contrast to married women with sons (56%).

The assumption that young men with daughters are more likely to be extra cautious towards concerns of gender equity and equality since it is a more personal issue when it has the potential to affect their children as their daughters are likely to face gender barriers does not hold true for all questions. These findings also reveal that assumptions around and changes associated with accepted traditional norms about the role of men and women in society have not adapted to keep pace with India's rapid economic growth and rise in opportunities for women. In spite of increased opportunities to benefit from economic liberalisation and cultural globalisation, youth have not necessarily been able to embrace new ways of thinking about gender and family.

6.6. Conclusion

Using national level data, the chapter has demonstrated that while on one hand arranged marriages where young people have negligible say in the choice of their spouse continue to be the dominant and popular form of marriage in India, on the other hand, compared to the last decade, an increasing proportion of young people are now delaying marriage. Similarly, while the acceptance of inter-caste marriages has increased, the reported outcome of such marriages continues to be low.

So what are these results indicative of? Firstly, the fact that in the minds of young people (both married and unmarried) there is widespread inclination towards arranged marriages, indicates that parent arranged marriages are not likely to become obsolete any time soon. Even as newer forms of marriages have emerged, they continue to hold hallmarks of arranged marriage.

Secondly, in spite of popular media's imagery placing emphasis on love marriages and young people's adaptability to the emergence of new leisure opportunities and increased consumerism, there has not been an accompanied structural change in mindsets. In twenty first century India, marital decisions of youth are not based on personal choice but continue to be guided by considerations such as family pressure, tradition and convention. This contrasts sharply with the assumption of leisure good modernity having been accompanied by an equivalent change in mindsets.

Thirdly, the fact that decline in the proportion of married youth is accompanied by very high support for arranged marriage provides a glimpse into how both change in people's ways of thinking and continuity of tradition coexist. Despite deep effects of globalisation, the case of Indian youth in the global scenario is an exception where support for arranged marriage can be found not just among parents both among their children too. This is indicative of how liberalisation and liberalism in the social realm is still somewhat lagging behind.

The opening up of the economy fostered new economic opportunities and a decade later India saw the birth and the increasing rise of the power of new media. This facilitated some of the greatest changes in contemporary India. The onset of globalisation and the simultaneous rise in consumerism has been accompanied by a desire among people across socio-economic classes, middle classes particularly to embrace a certain kind of modernity. In the last two decades, urban, semi urban and to extent rural dwellers have been able to shed their inhibition and adapt themselves to a new consumption pattern and experience. Adaptability towards new leisure opportunities such as internet, mobile phones, malls etc has been far smoother than changes in socio- cultural realms and ways of thinking. What people, particularly the youth have adapted to as modern is in fact merely consumerism. Consumption of the so called 'modern' in the form of technology, films and dietary preferences has also been accompanied by a fear of these 'western' influences undermining what is considered as traditional Indian culture. This reflects deeply in people's outlook towards marital preferences. It is thus clear that one site where Indians have chosen to negotiate economic, social and cultural modernity is in the arena of marriage.

References

Allendorf, Keera. 2013. Schemas of marital change: from arranged marriages to eloping for love. *Journal of Marriage and Family,* 75(2): 453–469.

Allendorf, Keera and Pandian, Roshan K. 2016. The Decline of Arranged Marriage? Marital Change and Continuity in India. *Population and Development Review*, 42(3):435–464.

Ahuja, Amit and Ostermann, Susan L. 2015. Crossing Caste Boundaries in the Middle-Class Indian Marriage Market. *Studies in Comparative International Development,* May 2015.

Caldwell, John C., Reddy, P.H. and Caldwell, Pat. 1983. The causes of marriage change in South India. *Population Studies,* 37(3): 343–361.

Dyson, Tim and Moore, Mick. 1983. On kinship structure, female autonomy, and demographic behavior in India. *Population and Development Review,* 9(1): 35–60.

Grover, Shalini. 2007. Looking Inside Marriage: Lived experiences, notions of love and kinship support amongst working women in New Delhi. Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi. Working Paper Series No.E/285/2007.

Karve, Irawati. 1965. *Kinship Organization in India.* Asia Publishing House.

Kolenda, Pauline. 1987. *Regional Differences in Family Structure in India.* Rawat Publications.

Warner, Rebecca and Steel, Brent S. 1999. Child Rearing as a Mechanism for Social Change: The Relationship of Child Gender to Parents' Commitment to Gender Equity. *Gender and Society,* 13(4): 503-517.

Additional Bibliography

Andrist, Lester and Banerji, Manjistha and Desai, Sonalde. 2011. Negotiating Marriage: Examining the Gap between Marriage and Cohabitation in India. India Human Development Survey. Working Paper No. 9.

Banerji, Manjistha, Martin, Steven P. and Desai, Sonalde. 2013. Are the Young and the Educated More Likely to Have "Love" than Arranged Marriage? A Study of Autonomy in Partner Choice in India. India Human Development Survey. Working Paper No. 8.

Dernéa, Steve. 2003. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Ally McBeal and Arranged Marriages: Globalization on the Ground in India. *Contexts,* 2(3): 12-18.

Fernandes, Leela. 2000. Nationalizing 'the Global': Media Images, Cultural Politics and the Middle Class in India. *Media, Culture and Society,* 22.

Gupta, Dipankar. 2000. *Mistaken Modernity: India between Worlds.* Harper Collins.

Jain, Dipti and Kundu, Tadit. 2016. How women marry in India. *Livemint,* 17 June.

Karttunen, Klaus and Tenhunen, Sirpa. 2016. *Contentious Connections: Social Imagination in Globalizing South Asia.* Cambridge Scholars Publishing, UK.

Liechty, Mark. 2003. *Suitably Modern: A description of the effects of globalisation on affluent Indians.* Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

7. Lifestyle and habits

7. Lifestyle and habits

7.1. Introduction

This chapter highlights the lifestyle and habits of Indian youth as gathered from the CSDS-KAS Youth Survey 2016. It seeks to explore the youth's ways of living and doing things, and how they are getting impacted by the inter-connected processes of globalisation, liberalisation, consumerism, urbanisation and exposure to newer forms of communication technology. The chapter reports the survey findings related to the nature of living arrangement of India's youth, their style preferences, their leisure lifestyle, their health-related behaviours, their engagement with various forms of media, both traditional and new, and their religious practices. Broadly speaking, it finds the youth's lifestyle preferences, practices and interests to be a mix of both the old and the new.

7.2. Living arrangement of youth

The survey found 65 percent or two-thirds of youth (15-34-year-olds) to be living with their parents. About 31 percent or one-third were found to be living with their spouse, and the remaining 4 percent were staying either with a friend, in a hostel, or alone (Table 7.1). While a greater proportion of younger youth, not surprisingly, were found to be living with their parents than older youth, what is interesting is that 33 percent of young people aged between 30 and 34 years, and a similar proportion of married youth, also reported living with their parents.

Table 7.1: Living arrangement of young Indians (15-34-year-olds) (%)

	Live with parents	Live with life partner	Live with friend/in a hostel/ alone etc.
Youth (Overall)	**65**	**31**	**4**
15-17 years	96	1	3
18-21 years	83	12	5
22-25 years	67	27	5
26-29 years	48	48	4
30-34 years	33	63	3
Men	77	19	4
Women	49	48	3
Married	33	64	3
Unmarried	94	2	6
Graduate or above	75	20	5
High School Pass	67	30	3
Primary Pass	41	57	2
Non-literate	26	71	2
Big Cities	71	26	3
Smaller Cities	68	30	2
Villages	63	33	4

This high incidence of youth living with their parents in India is in contrast with some of the Western countries like the United States. A 2014 Pew Research Center Study had found only 32 percent of the American youth in the age group of 18-34 years to be living with their parents. The figure for the same age-group in India is 59 percent according to our survey (Figure 7.1).

Not just America, youth in EU countries as a whole are also far less likely to be living with their parents than Indian youth. Eurofound's European Quality of Life Survey in 28 EU countries in 2011 had found 48 percent of 18-29-year-olds to be living with their parents. The figure for the corresponding age group in India is 68 percent according to our survey (Figure 7.2). Out of the 28 countries in which the EU survey was conducted, only in Hungary, Italy, Malta and Slovenia was there a higher proportion of youth living with their parents compared to what our survey finds for India.

Figure 7.1: Living with parents: a comparison of Indian and American youth (18-34-year-olds) (%)



Note: Figures for USA are from a survey done in 2014 by Pew Research Center. Available at: http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/05/24/for-first-time-in-modern-era-living-with-parents-edges-out-other-living-arrangements-for-18-to-34-year-olds/. Accessed on 7 September, 2016.

Figure 7.2: Living with parents: a comparison of Indian and EU youth (18-29 years) (%)



Note: Figures for Europe/EU countries are from a Eurofound's European Quality of Life Survey conducted in 2011 (published in 2014). Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/mar/24/young-adults-still-living-with-parents-europe-country-breakdown; Accessed on 7 September, 2016.

The living arrangement of Indian youth differs significantly by gender. A greater proportion of young men (77%) aged between 15 and 34 years were found to be staying with their mother and/or father than young women (49%) from the same age group (Table 7.1). This gender gap of nearly 30 points is much bigger than the one seen in USA where 18- to 34 year-old men were only six points more likely to be living with their parents than young women from the equivalent age category (Pew, 2016). This wide difference in India can be attributed to marital status since a higher proportion of young women (59%) were found to be married compared to young men (39%) by the survey.

Educational attainment is also significantly correlated to living arrangements. The survey found a far greater proportion of highly educated youth to be living with their parents than youth who were less educated. About 75 percent or three-fourths of youth who had completed college education reported that they were staying with their mother and/or father as opposed to 67% percent of high school pass youth, 41 percent of primary pass youth, and 26 percent of non-literate youth. This pattern is unlike the United States, where the Pew Research Study had found a greater proportion of non-college educated youth to be living with their parents than college-educated youth.

A little over three in every five or 62 percent of the youth belonging to economically disadvantaged backgrounds (poor and lower class) were found to be living with their parents compared to 68 percent and 71 percent of youth from the economically well-off classes (middle class and upper class, respectively). An explanation for this could be that youth from less prosperous backgrounds may have had to move out of their homes in search of employment in order to support their family. The survey, in fact, did find employment to be making a difference. Only 62 percent of employed youth were staying with their parents compared to 89 percent employment-seekers and 92 percent students. It also found a greater proportion of youth in big cities to be staying with their parents than their counterparts in smaller cities and villages, who are more likely to move out of their localities to bigger cities in search of employment or better education.

7.3. Style preferences and style consciousness

Indian youth seem to be quite conscious about how they look. This aspect seems to emerge from their responses to a battery of questions on style preferences. Sixty-one percent said they are very or somewhat fond of wearing stylish clothes, 58 percent

reported being fond of wearing stylish footwear, 59 percent are quite fond of keeping the latest mobile phones, 41 percent have high to moderate fondness for buying perfumes and deodorants, 39 percent said they like applying fairness creams quite a lot, and 36 percent reported a high or moderate degree of fondness for visiting beauty parlors and salons (Table 7.2).

Table 7.2: Most youth are fond of wearing stylish clothes followed by keeping latest mobiles (%)

	Very or somewhat fond	Not much fond	Not fond at all
Wearing stylish clothes	61	17	20
Keeping the latest mobile phone	59	13	27
Wearing stylish shoes/sandals	58	18	22
Buying deodorants/perfumes	41	20	37
Applying fairness creams	39	21	38
Visiting beauty parlors/salons	36	19	42

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

Taking into account the answers to all the questions reported in Table 7.2, we constructed an Index of Style Consciousness (see Appendix II to find out how it was constructed) in order to measure the youth's overall style consciousness. We found 19 percent of the youth to be very style conscious, 23 percent to be moderately conscious, 25 percent to be not much conscious, and about 33 percent to be not conscious about style at all (Figure 7.3).

Figure 7.3: Degree of style consciousness among youth (%)



Note: see Appendix II to find out how the Index of Style Consciousness was constructed.

Youth aged between 18 and 21 years (mostly college-going youth) were found to be the most style conscious (51%) followed by those aged between 15 and 17 years (mostly school-going youth) at 48 percent. Being stylish or looking good was least important to the older age groups (Table 7.3). Contrary to popular belief, young men were found to be more style conscious than young women as per our Index, 44 percent to 39 percent. Marriage, however, makes a difference. While married men were found to be more style conscious than their female counterparts, single or unmarried women were found to be more conscious than their married men. The survey found the youth living in big cities to be far more style conscious than those residing in small cities. Meanwhile, youth from small cities were found to be more style conscious than those living in villages.

Not surprisingly, class too matters. A far greater style consciousness was recorded among economically well-off youth than those belonging to the lower economic stratas, most probably because they have the economic means to buy the latest gadgets and beauty products.

There seems to be a correlation between social media usage and style consciousness. Only 23 percent of youth with no exposure to social media reported being quite style conscious as opposed to 73 percent with very high exposure to social media. This was found to be particularly true for young women more than young men. While 54 percent of young women with high exposure to social media were found to be quite conscious about their style and personal appearance, the corresponding figure among young men highly exposed to social media was just 33 percent.

Table 7.3: Style consciousness more among younger youth, young men & youth in big cities (%)

	Quite style conscious	Not much style conscious	Not at all style conscious
Youth (Overall)	**42**	**25**	**33**
15-17 years	48	28	24
18-21 years	51	28	21
22-25 years	45	23	32
26-29 years	38	25	37
30-34 years	28	23	49
Big Cities	59	25	16
Smaller Cities	44	28	28
Villages	36	24	40
Men	44	26	30
Women	39	24	37
Married Men	30	25	45
Married Women	27	23	50
Unmarried Men	53	27	20
Unmarried Women	57	25	18

Note: Categories of 'very style conscious' and 'somewhat style conscious' have been merged to form 'quite style conscious.'

7.4. Leisure lifestyle

During the survey respondents were asked questions about how frequently they engaged in outdoor leisure activities such as watching movies in a cinema hall, eating or drinking out at a restaurant or cafe, and going to a shopping mall. Thirty-three percent of the youth reported watching a movie in a cinema hall regularly, that is, either once a week or at least once a month. About 30 percent regularly visit a restaurant or hotel or café. Meanwhile 28 percent of the youth reported going to a shopping mall regularly (Figure 7.4). This indicates that, overall, movie watching is the most preferred form of outdoor leisure activity/ entertainment among India's youth.

Figure 7.4: Watching a movie in cinema hall is more preferred that eating out and going to a shopping mall (%)



Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.
'Regularly' means 'once a week' or 'once a month'; 'Rarely' means 'few times a year' or 'very rarely'

Urban youth, not surprisingly, were found to be doing these activities much more, particularly those residing in big cities (Table 7.4). The likelihood of doing these activities seems to be also dependent on some other socio-economic variables. The age of the youngsters, for instance, determines how much they do these things. 18-21-year-olds were more likely than others to be going out for movies and shopping. Meanwhile dining out is mostly something that 22-25-year-olds do quite a lot. Having the economic means to do these things is also a factor. Upper and middle class youth were found to be more prone to be indulging

in these outdoor leisure activities than lower class and poor youth. Young men are more likely to do all these things in a greater proportion than young women. Meanwhile out of all these things, young women are more likely to go to a shopping mall than eat out or watch a movie.

Table 7.4: Younger, rich, and big city youth engage more in outdoor leisure activities (%)

	Watch a movie in a cinema hall regularly	Eat/drink in hotel/restaurant/café/bar regularly	Go to shopping mall/complex regularly
Youth (Overall)	**33**	**30**	**28**
Big Cities	49	48	50
Smaller Cities	39	31	32
Villages	25	22	17
15-17 years	33	30	26
18-21 years	39	31	33
22-25 years	36	33	31
26-29 years	32	32	27
30-34 years	26	25	23
Men	40	34	30
Women	23	24	26
Upper Class	45	42	40
Middle Class	39	37	35
Lower	29	25	22
Poor	22	19	18

Note: 'Regularly' means 'once a week' or 'once a month'.

Quite interestingly, our analysis found a much higher proportion of youth who have close friends from the opposite gender to be more into doing these things/activities than those who do not have close friends from the opposite gender (Figure 7.5). That is, young men who have close female friends were more likely to go out for a movie, eat out at a restaurant or visit a shopping mall than men who do not have close female friends. This was the case with respect to young women as well.

Figure 7.5: Youth with close friends from the opposite gender engage more in outdoor leisure activities (%)



Note: 'Regularly' means 'once a week' or 'once a month'.

There also seems to be a connection between youth's style consciousness and the frequency of their outdoor leisure activities. For instance, while only 5 percent of those who never go to a shopping mall were found to be quite style conscious, the figure of high style consciousness among those who do so regularly was seven times more at 37 percent (Table 7.5). Similarly, regular visitors to restaurants and cafes were also seven times more likely to be highly style conscious than those who never visit restaurants.

Table 7.5: Frequency of outdoor leisure activities seems to be determining youth's style consciousness (%)

	Very style conscious	Somewhat conscious	Not much style conscious	Not conscious at all
Regularly visit shopping mall	37	33	24	6
Rarely visit shopping mall	19	26	30	26
Never visit shopping mall	5	12	22	61
Regularly visit restaurants	34	33	23	10
Rarely visit restaurants	18	23	29	31
Never visit restaurants	7	13	23	57
Regularly visit cinema halls	30	33	26	11
Rarely visit cinema halls	17	22	27	34
Never visit cinema halls	8	12	22	58

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.
'Regularly' means 'once a week' or 'once a month'; 'Rarely' means 'few times a year' or 'very rarely'.

7.5. Health related behaviour

The survey tried to find out about the eating, drinking and smoking habits of the youth, and their level of physical activity. Eighty-seven percent of the youth reported eating green vegetables often, that is, either daily or a few days a week (Table 7.6). Seventy-three percent said they eat fruits often. About 30 percent of the respondents said they drink fizzy drinks like Coke and Pepsi often, and 24 percent reported having 'junk' food such as burgers and pizzas frequently. In terms of physical activity, 35 percent reported playing a sport often (in the 2007 Youth Survey the corresponding figure had been about 15 percent only – Figure 7.6) and 31 percent said that do some physical exercise either daily or a few days a week. All these habits were found to be more prevalent among youth belonging to middle and rich classes than those from less privileged backgrounds, among youth belonging to younger age groups than older, among young men than young women, and among youth living in big and small cities compared to villages (Table 7.7).

Table 7.6: Health related behaviours of India's youth (%)

	Daily	Few days a week	Few days a month	Very rarely	Never
Eating green vegetables	59	28	4	7	1
Eating fruits	33	40	9	17	1
Playing a sport	21	14	9	21	34
Doing physical exercise	20	11	8	19	41
Drinking Coke, Pepsi etc.	9	21	17	36	16
Eating junk food	7	17	16	32	26
Smoking cigarettes/bidis/hukka	5	4	3	9	75
Drinking alcohol	5	3	2	9	77

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

Smoking cigarettes and consuming alcohol, meanwhile, do not seem to be very prevalent among Indian youth; at least they did not report doing so. Three in every four or 75 percent of the respondents said they have never smoked a cigarette and 77 percent said that they had never drunk alcohol. Since questions related to smoking and drinking suffer from a social desirability bias in surveys, these figures should be read in that context. All the same, the survey found smoking cigarettes and drinking alcohol to be more prevalent among older youth than younger ones, youth belonging to less privileged backgrounds and those residing in rural areas (Table 7.8).

Interestingly, the survey found the prevalence of drinking and smoking among youth to be highly correlated to a household

Figure 7.6: Frequency of playing a sport (%)



Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.
For 2016, the answer categories of 'daily' and 'few times a week' have been merged to form 'often' and the categories of ' few days a month' and 'very rarely' have been merged to form 'sometimes'.

Table 7.7: Health-related behaviours - categories of youth that stand out (%)

	Healthy habits				Unhealthy habits			
	Eating greens regularly	Eating fruits regularly	Playing a sport regularly	Doing physical excercise regularly	Drinking fizzy drinks regularly	Eating junk food regularly	Smoking cigarettes regularly	Drinking alcohol regularly
Age	15-17 yrs.	15-17 yrs.	15-17 yrs.	15-17 yrs.	15-17 yrs.	15-17 yrs.	26-29 yrs.	26-29 yrs.
Gender	Men	Men	Men	Men	Men	Men	Men	Men
Education	Graduate	Graduate	Graduate	Graduate	Graduate	Graduate	Non-lit.	Non-lit.
Class	Middle	Upper	Upper	Upper	Upper	Upper	Lower	Poor
Locality	Big Cities	Smaller Cities	Smaller Cities	Smaller Cities	Big Cities	Big Cities	Villages	Villages

Note: 'Regularly' means those who do these activities 'daily' or 'few times a week'. Only those categories have been reported among whom the prevalence of these activities was highest compared to others. Non-lit.means non-literate.

member also doing the same. Youth belonging to households in which a household member drinks alcohol were found to be five times more likely to drink alcohol than youth in whose house no family member drinks (46% as opposed to 9%). Youth in whose house someone smokes were found to be nearly four times more likely to smoke than youth in whose house nobody smokes (40% as opposed to 11%).

The study also found that those youth who worry a lot turn to drinking and smoking as it may be providing them temporary comfort and happiness. Twelve percent of youth who do not worry at all were found to smoke compared to 23 percent of those who worry a lot. Similarly, 14 percent of the youth with no anxieties were found to be drinking alcohol compared to 19 percent of the highly anxious youth.

In 2011, an American study by National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse on teenagers had found that those who in a typical day spend any time on social networking sites are at increased risk of smoking, drinking and drug use (Chicago Tribune, 2011). The CSDS-KAS Youth Survey 2016 too reports a similar finding for India. The prevalence of drinking among youth with no exposure to social media was found to be only 18 percent as opposed to 30 percent among those very highly exposed to social media. A similar pattern was observed with respect to smoking as well. One in every five or 20 percent of youth with no social media exposure were found to be smokers compared to 32 percent of those very highly exposed to media.

The survey found a majority of Indian youth (18-34-year-olds) to be non-vegetarian (58%). Thirty percent said they were pure vegetarians and 9 percent described themselves as eggitarians (Figure 7.7). There has been little change in this regard over

Table 7.8: Drinking and smoking more prevalent among rural than urban youth (%)

	Smoke	Drink
Youth (Overall)	**21**	**19**
15-17 years	11	10
18-21 years	19	17
22-25 years	23	21
26-29 years	26	23
30-34 years	27	23
Upper Class	18	17
Middle Class	22	19
Lower Class	23	20
Poor	21	18
Big Cities	13	14
Smaller Cities	23	19
Villages	24	21

Note: All those who said they smoke or drink alcohol either 'daily', 'few days a week', 'few days a month' or ' very rarely' have been taken to mean those who 'Smoke', 'Drink'.

the last decade. In a national survey conducted by CSDS in 2006, a similar proportion of youth from the same age-group had described themselves as vegetarians and eggitarians. Interestingly, in the latest survey, the non-vegetarian respondents were found to be far less worried about their health and their body image than the vegetarian youth (see following chapter on Youth Anxieties for details).

Figure 7.7: Virtually no change in youth's dietary preferences (18-34-year-olds) (%)



Note: The 2006 figures are from the State of the Nation Survey conducted by CSDS in January 2006.

7.6. Social media usage

The CSDS-KAS Youth Survey 2016 found half (50%) of the young respondents to be not exposed to social media at all. It was found that these respondents had never used any of the 'popular' social media platforms, be it Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp or YouTube (see Appendix II to find out how Index of Social Media Usage was constructed). The remaining 50 percent were found to be exposed to social media but in varying degrees with very high usage of these platforms being only 8 percent (Figure 7.8).

When the survey was conducted, 75 percent reported having never used Twitter, 62 percent had never used YouTube, 54 percent had never used WhatsApp and 51 percent had never been on Facebook (Table 7.9). In terms of daily usage, WhatsApp

was used most (30%), followed by Facebook (25%), YouTube (11%) and Twitter (7%). Even though these figures of usage are not all that high, they have however sharply increased compared to 2014. In a 2014 survey conducted by CSDS during the National elections, only 6 percent of the 18-34-year-olds had reported using Facebook on a daily basis and 82 percent had reported having never used it. Meanwhile, daily Twitter usage among the youth at that time was also extremely low at just one percent and no usage of Twitter whatsoever had been very high at 96 percent (Table 7.10).

The survey found that among all youth, those most exposed to social media platforms are 18-21 years-olds, those who are students, those who are highly educated, those who live in big cities, those who belong to the upper class and those who are unmarried. This pattern remains unchanged when we look at the various platforms individually.

Figure 7.8: 50% respondents were not exposed to social media when survey was conducted (%)



Note: See Appendix II to find out how the Index of Social Media Usage was constructed.

Table7.9: WhatsApp and Facebook are most popular among youngsters (15-34-year-olds) (%)

	Use daily	Use few days a week	Use few days a month	Use very rarely	Never use
WhatsApp	30	5	2	7	54
Facebook	25	8	3	11	51
YouTube	11	8	3	12	62
Twitter	7	5	2	8	75

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

Table 7.10: Social media usage has increased since 2014 among 18-34-year-olds (%)

	2014	2016
Facebook usage		
Daily	6	25
Sometimes	8	11
Rarely	3	11
Never	82	50
Twitter usage		
Daily	1	7
Sometimes	2	7
Rarely	1	8
Never	96	74

Note: Figures for 2014 are from National Election Study Pre-Poll conducted by CSDS during the Lok Sabha elections.
In 2016, answer categories of 'few days a week' and 'few days a month' have been merged to form 'sometimes'.

Interestingly, youth who reported taking selfies regularly were found to be more active on the social media. Among those who said that they took selfies regularly, 62 percent found to be very exposed to social media. Meanwhile among those reported that they never take selfies, only 2 percent were found to be highly exposed to social media. Youth who are conscious of their style and looks were also found to be far more exposed to social media than youth who are not. The survey found a difference of 33 percentage points among the very style conscious youth and not all style conscious youth in this regard.

7.7. Mobile phone and laptop penetration, and internet usage

The penetration of mobile phones among India's youth has increased tremendously over the last decade. Four in every five (81%) of them reported owning a mobile phone in the survey - while 43 percent had a smartphone, 38 percent had a basic phone. This proportion is over two times more than the figure of mobile ownership recorded in the 2007 Youth Survey - 34 percent (Figure 7.9). Personal computer and laptop ownership among the youth has also increased in major way in a decade. While only 8 percent youth households owned a computer or a laptop in 2007, the figure recorded in the 2016 survey was 24 percent, a three-fold increase.

Even as ownership of these gadgets has gone up, the survey found that access to the internet on them is quite low. Thirty percent of the youth who owned a personal computer or laptop did not have access to internet on it. Meanwhile 58 percent of those with a mobile phone had no access to internet on it. Overall, the survey found (when it was conducted in early 2016) that 64 percent of the youth had no immediate access to the internet whatsoever. This includes those who did not have a phone and a computer both, and those who had both or either one of the two but without an internet connection. Only 36 percent were found to have immediate access to the internet, either on one gadget or both gadgets.

Figure 7.9 Mobile ownership among youth has more than doubled in a decade (%)



Having a smartphone makes a huge difference to how much a person uses Facebook, Twitter and e-mail, watches YouTube videos, takes selfies, plays video games and listens to the radio (Table 7.11). Youth with smartphones were found to be more into all these activities than youth with a simple phone and those without any type of phone. Interestingly, having a smartphone instead of a simple phone has the greatest impact on Twitter usage. Smartphone users were twelve times more likely to regularly

Table 7.11: Impact of a smartphone on a young person's life (%)

	Play video games regularly	Take selfies regularly	Use Facebook regularly	Use WhatsApp regularly	Watch videos on YouTube regularly	Use Twitter regularly	Listen to radio regularly	Check or send emails regularly
No Phone	7	4	5	4	3	2	14	3
Basic phone	9	9	9	7	4	2	18	6
Smartphone	44	54	66	73	41	25	31	41
In net terms (smartphone/ basic phone)	*4.9*	*6.0*	*7.3*	*10.4*	*10.3*	*12.5*	*7.7*	*6.8*

Note: Regularly here means either 'daily' or 'few days a week'.

use Twitter than simple phone users. They were ten times more likely to regularly watch videos on YouTube and use WhatsApp, seven times more likely to regularly use Facebook and check or send emails, six times more likely to regularly take selfies, and five times more likely to regularly play video games.

Interestingly, the youth's increasing usage of social media via smartphones does not mean that they have cut down on their book reading habits. The survey found 31 percent of the youth to be very fond of reading books and 25 percent to be somewhat fond. About 18 percent reported being not too fond of reading books and 26 percent were not fond at all. If we compare these figures with those recorded in the 2007 Youth Survey, we find book readership among youth to be on the rise. In 2007, only about 22 percent had reported reading books/magazines and periodicals a lot. Moreover, time spent on social media is not affecting the youth's regularity of reading books. In fact, the survey found that the greater was the exposure of youth to social media, the greater was their fondness for reading books (Figure 7.10).

Figure 7.10: No impact of social media usage on book reading habit (%)



7.8. News media exposure

The study also tried to measure the youth's news consumption through various news mediums - newspaper, television and internet. It found that traditional mediums still dominate. Fifty-seven percent of the youth watch news on TV regularly, that is, either daily or a few days a week. About 53 percent read newspapers regularly and only about 18 percent read news on the internet regularly (Table 7.12). Both TV News viewership and newspaper readership has gone up among youth compared to 2007. A decade ago, about 49 percent youth were regular newspaper readers and about 48 percent were frequent TV News viewers (Figure 7.11). However, given the exponential growth of the News Media sector in India in the last decade, the 4-point rise in the readership of newspapers and the 9-point increase in viewership of TV News among youngsters should be viewed as being modest.

Table 7.12: Majority of youth regularly read newspapers or watch news on TV (%)

	Regularly	Few days a month	Very regularly	Never
Watch news on TV	57	3	16	22
Read newspapers	53	4	16	26
Read news on internet	18	3	11	63

Note: 'Regularly' means those who said 'daily' or 'few days a week'.

Overall, it was found that 16 percent of the youth do not seek news from any of the three mediums – newspaper, TV, or internet. In other words they do not consume news at all. At the other extreme, only 8 percent of the youth are very highly exposed to news media, that is, they consume news on all three mediums (Figure 7.12) (See Appendix II to find out how Index of News Media Exposure was constructed).

The degree to which the youth consume news on media is linked to their socio-economic status. The higher their socio-economic status, the higher is their exposure to news media. Educated youth, youth belonging to the upper class, and youth living in big cities were found to be more exposed to the news media than less educated, less privileged and less urban youth, respectively. In terms of age, 18-21-year-olds were found to be most exposed to news media and the oldest youth, that is, 30-34-year-olds, were least exposed.

Figure 7.11: No drastic increase in newspaper readership and TV news viewership among youth in last decade (%)



Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response. Figures are for the 15-34-year-old age category for both years. Newspaper readership 2007 - Answer categories of 'daily' and 'frequently' have been merged to form 'frequent readers'; answer categories of 'rarely' has been put into 'infrequent readers'. Newspaper readership 2016 - Answer category of 'regularly' has been shown as 'frequent readers'. Answer categories of 'few days a month' & 'rarely' have been merged to form 'infrequent readers'. TV news viewership 2007 - Answer categories of 'daily 'and 'more than once a week' have been merged to form 'frequent viewers'. TV news viewership 2016 – Answer category of 'regularly' has been shown as 'frequent viewers'. Answer categories of 'few days a month' and 'very rarely' have been merged to form 'infrequent viewers'.

Figure 7.12: One in every six youth has no exposure to news media (%)



Note: See Appendix II to find out how Index of News Media Exposure was constructed.

7.9. Participation in religious activities

The CSDS-KAS Youth Survey 2016 found India's youth to be quite religious. About 78 percent of the respondents reported praying quite often (either regularly or sometimes). 68 percent said they go to a religious place of worship frequently. 49 percent reported watching religious shows on television quite often. 46 percent often engage in activities such as singing religious songs, bhajans or taking part in satsangs. 46 percent reported keeping fasts either regularly or sometimes, and finally 39 percent said that they read a religious book quite often (Table 7.13).

Table 7.13: Praying is the most frequent religious activity among youth (%)

	Regularly	Sometimes	Only on festivals	Never
Do puja/namaz/prayer/paath	38	40	14	7
Go to temple/mosque/church/gurudwara etc.	20	48	23	9
Watch religious shows on TV	13	36	13	36
Do bhajan/kirtan/satsang	11	35	22	31
Keep vrats/upwaas/rozas/fasts	11	35	32	22
Read a religious book	8	31	13	45

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response. These figures are for 15-34-year-olds.

Collating the responses to all these individual questions together we constructed an Index of Religiosity (see Appendix II to find out how the index was constructed) in order to measure the youth's overall religiosity. We found only 4 percent of youth to be not religious at all (Figure 7.13). About a third (36%) had low religiosity, a quarter (25%) were moderately religious, another quarter (23%) were highly religious and about one in every eight (12%) were found to be extremely religious in terms of their practices.

Figure 7.13: Every third youth is either very highly or highly religious (%)



Comparisons with past CSDS surveys reveal that India's youth seem to be praying or visiting religious places of worship far more than they were two to three years ago (Table 7.14). They seem to be however engaging relatively less in other religious activities such as bhajans, kirtans and keeping of fasts.

Table 7.14: Young Indians visiting religious places of worship much more (%)

	2007	2009	2014	2016
Do puja/namaz/prayer/paath	88*	73**	73**	79
Go to temple/mosque/church/gurudwara etc.	--	52**	56**	68
Watch religious shows on TV	33**	--	--	50
Do bhajan/kirtan/satsang	--	53*	58*	47
Keep vrats/upwaas/rozas/fasts	--	53*	55*	47

Note: Figures are for the 18-34-year-old age category for all years. Figures for 2009 and 2014 are from NES Post-Poll surveys conducted by CSDS during the Lok Sabha elections.
2007 - *Answer categories of 'daily', 'one a week' and 'occasionally' have been merged.
** Answer categories of 'daily' and 'more than a week' have been merged.
2009 - *Answer categories of 'daily' and 'weekly' have been merged.
** Answer categories of 'frequently' and 'occasionally' have been merged.
2014 - * Answer categories of 'daily' and 'weekly' have been merged.
** Answer categories of 'frequently' and 'occasionally' have been merged
2016 - Answer categories of 'regularly' and 'sometimes' have been merged.

The survey found age to be making a significant difference to youth's religiosity. As they grow up, the young seem to get more religious (Table 7.15). While 30 percent and 34 percent of the 15-17-year-olds and 18-21-year-olds were found to be highly religious, respectively, the figure of high religiosity among older youths (22-25-year-olds, 26-29-year-olds and 30-34-year-olds) was in the range of 37 to 39 percent. According to the survey, young women in India are more likely to be highly religious than young men. The difference among the two genders in terms of high religiosity was recorded at seven percentage points. In fact, young women across all religious groups, except Muslims, were found to be more religious than their male counterparts. Among Muslims an equal proportion of young men and women were found to be highly religious. Interestingly, the survey found the highly educated youth to be more religious than those less educated than them. Only 19 percent of non-literate youths were found to be highly religious compared to 39 percent youths who had completed graduation. Youth in small cities and villages reported a higher level of high religiosity (38% and 37%, respectively) than youth in big cities (33%). Christian youth were found to be the most religious (in religious practice) followed by Muslim, Sikh and Hindu youth. A strong relationship also exists between class and religiosity. In terms of Hindu castes, Upper Caste youth are more highly religious (41%) compared to youth from OBCs (35%), SCs (33%) and STs (29%). Finally, in terms of class, youth from economically well-off backgrounds are more highly religious than those belonging to lower and poor economic status. The gap between rich and poor is of 14 percentage points.

Table7.15: Younger youth are less religious than older counterparts (%)

	Very high or high religiosity	Moderate religiosity	Low, very low or no religiosity
Youth (Overall)	**35**	**25**	**40**
15-17 years	30	27	44
18-21 years	34	21	44
22-25 years	37	24	39
26-29 years	39	24	37
30-34 years	38	27	35
Men	33	23	44
Women	40	26	34
Graduate or above	39	22	39
High School Pass	36	26	39
Primary Pass	32	26	42
Non-literate	19	33	49
Big Cities	33	23	44
Smaller Cities	38	22	40
Villages	37	26	37
Hindu Upper Caste	41	22	37
Hindu OBC	35	26	40
Hindu SC	32	22	46
Hindu ST	29	24	47
Muslim	38	33	29
Christian	47	17	36
Sikh	36	25	40
Upper Class	43	24	33
Middle Class	38	25	37
Lower Class	35	24	41
Poor	29	25	47

Note: Answer categories of 'high religiosity' and 'very high religiosity' have been merged to form 'highly religiosity' and 'no', 'very low' and 'low' have been merged to form 'low or no religiosity'.

7.10. Conclusion

Based on this chapter's findings, it can be broadly argued that the lifestyle preferences and habits of Indian youth exhibit a mixed streak of tradition and modernity. While on the one hand we find a fairly large proportion of youth to be quite religious (at least in practice), on the other we find them to be getting attracted to and adopting newer forms of technology, fashion and leisure trends. The two proclivities seem to be taking place side by side. For instance, the survey found many youth to be fond of hanging out in shopping malls and cafes. At the same time, it also found many to be visiting a religious place of worship, in fact more so than they did a decade ago. This means that for many of today's Indian youth, praying and purchasing or religion and materialism seem to go hand in hand and there is no contradiction between the two. Similarly, it is seen that even as most youth seem to be getting more exposed to liberal Western cultures through their smartphones and on the internet, they seem to be adopting only those aspects of 'modernity' that suit them, and moving out of parents' home after a certain age is certainly not one of them.

References

Chicago Tribune. 2011. Study: Teen users of Facebook, Myspace more likely to drink, use drugs. 24 August. Available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-08-24/news/ct-met-social-menace-20110824_1_social-media-teen-substance-abuse-teen-users. Accessed on 29 September, 2016.

Pew Research. 2016. For First Time in Modern Era, Living With Parents Edges Out Other Living Arrangements for 18- to 34-Year-Olds. 24 May. Available at: http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/05/24/for-first-time-in-modern-era-living-with-parents-edges-out-other-living-arrangements-for-18-to-34-year-olds/. Accessed on 7 September, 2016.

The Guardian. 2014. Europe's young adults living with parents - a country by country breakdown. 24 March. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/mar/24/young-adults-still-living-with-parents-europe-country-breakdown; Accessed on 7 September, 2016.

8. Anxieties and emotional distress



8. Anxieties and emotional distress

8.1. Introduction

Nervous about speaking in front of an audience, tense about finding or losing a job, uncomfortable about travelling by the underground train, avoiding going to the market for fear of a terrorist attack, dreading an upcoming mathematics exam, or just simply worried about attending a family gathering - anxiety can manifest itself in many different forms among people. It is one of the most common psychological traits found in people. Occasional anxiety is a natural and normal part of life. We can all be and indeed show some kind of anxiety or the other; and being anxious about something may not be so bad as it may help us in some cases to perform better or improve a certain aspect about ourselves. However, when anxiety is persistent, wide-ranging, touches extreme levels and starts dominating and affecting our lives, the situation changes as it can lead to physical and mental disorders and affect those around us. While anxiety is found among both the young and the old, the former are particularly vulnerable to it. In the United States, for instance, a recent study, published in the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, in which researchers analysed data collected from a random sample of people from ages 21 to 100 years, found that people in their twenties and thirties reported having the highest levels of depression, anxiety, and stress, plus the lowest levels of happiness, satisfaction and well-being compared to older people who were found to be the happiest (Oaklander, 2016). In India too, today's young generation exhibits similar tendencies.

8.2. A highly anxious young generation

The CSDS-KAS Youth Survey 2016 found the Indian youth to be a highly anxious generation, with worry and stress weighing them down - be it a 15-year-old about to finish school or a 34-year-old who has settled down in life. Young Indians across age-groups are suffering from fairly high disquietude, even though the degree of such anxiety and its causes may differ somewhat.

During the survey, respondents were asked 14 questions related to anxiety. These questions probed their worry levels regarding employment, education, personal health, parents' health, personal looks, marriage, maintaining family traditions, family problems, losing a friend, English-speaking skills, sexual harassment, road accidents, mob violence and terrorist attacks. Taking the responses to all these questions into consideration, we constructed an Index of Anxiety (see Appendix III to find out how it was constructed). We found over half (55%) of India's youth (15-34-year-olds) to be highly anxious and another one-fourth (26%) to be moderately so. Only about one in every seven (14%) were found to be not too anxious, and just 5 percent showed no anxiety at all (Figure 8.1).

A small caveat is in order here. Being highly anxious does not mean that a person could be suffering from an anxiety disorder. That is certainly not for us to determine and is the job of a mental health expert. Moreover, these are self-reported levels of anxiety and there may be a difference in how the interviewees perceived themselves and their actual condition.

Figure 8.1: Degree of anxiety among India's youth(%)



Note: See Appendix II to find out how the Index of Anxiety was constructed. 'Highly anxious' includes those who are 'very' or 'quite anxious'.

When each of the 14 items that went into constructing the index was looked at individually, parents' health emerged as the matter that the young in India worry most about, followed by their own health. Family problems and maintaining family traditions are also matters of high anxiety for the Indian youth, followed by anxiety about jobs and one's looks. Matters that cause least worry to them are sexual harassment and quite surprisingly, marriage (Table 8.1).

Table 8.1: Level of worry among youth about select matters (%)

	Worry (Quite a lot+ somewhat	Worry Quite a lot	Worry somewhat	Worry very little	Don't worry at all
Parents' health	87	68	19	5	7
Personal health	83	54	29	8	7
Family problems	82	57	25	8	8
Maintaining family traditions	77	48	29	11	11
Job/employment	73	46	27	10	14
Body shape/weight/looks	69	38	31	15	14
Losing a friend	60	35	25	14	22
Road accident	57	27	30	18	23
Studies/education	54	33	21	14	28
Riots or mob violence	49	23	26	21	26
Inability to speak good English	45	23	22	17	34
Terrorist attack	44	24	20	17	34
Marriage	38	18	20	17	39
Harassment/teasing	35	18	17	16	44

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

8.3. 18-21-year-olds are most anxious

While on the whole India's youth come across as being highly anxious, some age-groups within them are more anxious than others. 18-21-year-olds, for instance, seem to be the most anxious of all. Overall, three out of every five of them (61%) reported high levels of anxiety (Figure 8.2). This is higher than the extreme worry levels seen among other age brackets - 57 percent among 15- to 17-year-olds, 58 percent among 22- to 25-year-olds, 51 percent among those aged between 26 and 29 years, and 47 percent among 30- to 34-year-olds. In fact, anxiety peaks at the early age of 18-21 years and then drops thereafter as the young grow older. 18- to 21-year-olds are those just out of school and making sense of the new world around them. As they enter college, many students experience several firsts which includes new friends, a new lifestyle, exposure to new cultures and different ways of thinking. Many among them also start worrying about their future prospects in the job market. The survey found them (18-21-year-olds) to be more worried than the other age-groups about jobs, marriage, and harassment (Table 8.2). The age-groups 15 to17 years and 22 to 25 years also show fairly high levels of anxiety. The former age-group was found to be distinct from others when it came to worrying about studies, looks and body image, losing a friend, and lack of good English-speaking skills. Anxiety among the latter group (22-25 years) was found to be mostly on account of jobs followed by road accidents, riots, terrorist attacks, and marriage. Marriage is also something that causes distinct worry among the 26-29-year-olds.

Figure 8.2: Overall anxiety among youth by age-groups (%)



Table 8.2: Worry about select matters by age groups (%)

	15-17 years	18-21 years	22-25 years	26-29 years	30-34 years
Job/employment	68	78	78	72	71
Studies/education	83	74	58	47	39
Maintaining family traditions	75	77	78	74	78
Family problems	75	80	83	82	85
Riots or mob violence	48	50	52	47	48
Road accident	54	58	59	56	55
Terrorist attack	42	49	47	42	41
Personal health	82	82	84	83	85
Body shape/weight/looks	74	72	70	71	65
Inability to speak good English	61	56	48	40	36
Losing a friend	69	66	62	62	54
Parents' health	87	89	87	87	86
Marriage	31	42	41	41	36
Harassment/teasing	32	42	37	33	33

Note: Worry in this table includes answer categories of 'worry quite a lot' and 'worry somewhat'.

8.4. The hierarchy of worries

Youth across all five age-groups worry most (and almost equally so) about their parents' health and their personal health, and about family matters (Table 8.3). Harassment or teasing meanwhile is the least of their worries followed by marriage. Overall, the top three anxieties of youth aged between 18-21, 22-25, and 26-29 years are the same - parents' health, personal health and family problems, in that order. In fact, these three aspects along with maintaining family traditions figured in the list of top five

Table 8.3: Order of worry about select matters by age-groups

Order	15-17 years	18-21 years	22-25 years	26-29 years	30-34 years
1.	Parents' health	Parents' health	Parents' health	Parents' health	Parents' health
2.	Studies	Own health	Own health	Own health	Family problems
3.	Own health	Family problems	Family problems	Family problems	Own health
4.	Family problems	Job	Job	Family traditions	Family traditions
5.	Family traditions	Family traditions	Family traditions	Job	Job
6.	Personal looks	Studies	Personal looks	Personal looks	Personal looks
7.	Losing a friend	Personal looks	Losing a friend	Losing a friend	Road accident
8.	Job	Losing a friend	Road accident	Road accident	Losing a friend
9.	Poor English	Road accident	Studies	Studies	Riots
10.	Road accident	Poor English	Riots	Riots	Terrorist attack
11.	Riots	Riots	Poor English	Terrorist attack	Studies
12.	Terrorist attack	Terrorist attack	Terrorist attack	Marriage	Poor English
13.	Harassment/teasing	Marriage	Marriage	Poor English	Marriage
14.	Marriage	Harassment/teasing	Harassment/teasing	Harassment/teasing	Harassment/teasing

Note: The respondents were asked about each worry separately. Based on their responses to each, this order has been arrived at.

anxieties of each and every age-group. Worry about jobs is among the top five anxieties of every age-group barring the 'still in school' age-group of 15-17-year-olds. In the hierarchy of anxieties, worry about personal looks and losing a friend is somewhere in the middle among all groups.

8.5. Urban life seems to be producing greater anxiety among youth

The survey found anxiety among youngsters to be more prevalent in urban areas than in rural areas and more particularly among those residing in cities, and further among those in big cities. As opposed to 87 percent youth in big cities who reported high or moderate anxiety, youth in smaller cities showed slightly lesser anxiety at 85 percent (Figure 8.3). Youth in villages were found to be relatively least anxious. Three-fourths (76%) of them reported feeling anxious. The differential gap in the levels of anxiety between the highly urban youth and rural youth appears even bigger when we analyse it in net terms. Net anxiety (high and some anxiety minus low and no anxiety) in big cities was found to be 22 percentage points greater than the net anxiety among youth living in villages.

Figure 8.3: Degree of overall anxiety among youth by locality (%)



In fact, youth living in big cities showed much greater anxiety than youth of small cities and villages on most matters. The difference in degree of anxiety between youth residing in these three locations was greatest with respect to body image. The level of worry among big city-youth about body image was found to be 76 percent, which is seven percentage points greater than the worry level among rural youth (69%) and nine points greater than the anxiety level among small city-youth (67%) (Table 8.4).

Table 8.4: Youth residing in big cities most anxious about almost everything (%)

Worry/anxious about…	Big Cities	Smaller Cities	Villages
Job/employment	77	74	72
Studies/education	66	60	58
Maintaining family traditions	78	75	76
Family problems	80	80	82
Riots or mob violence	52	54	46
Road accident	63	63	50
Terrorist attack	52	52	39
Personal health	88	82	81
Body shape/weight/looks	76	67	69
Inability to speak good English	53	49	47
Losing a friend	67	67	57
Parents' health	91	88	85
Marriage	41	41	35
Harassment/teasing	45	39	31

Note: Worry in this table includes answer categories of 'worry quite a lot' and 'worry somewhat'.

Table 8.5: Greater the education or economic status, greater the anxiety (%)

	Highly anxious	Somewhat anxious	Not much anxious	No at all anxious
Upper Class	59	26	11	3
Middle Class	58	24	13	5
Lower Class	56	27	14	4
Poor	47	25	18	11
Graduate or above	64	23	9	3
High School Pass	50	28	16	6
Primary Pass	42	28	21	9
Non-literate	27	26	31	16

With respect to studies too, big city-youth showed a significantly higher level of anxiety than small city and village-youth; six and eight points more, respectively. Anxiety levels of big city-youth were also greater than small city-youth on matters such as harassment/eve-teasing, jobs, the inability to speak good English, personal health, parents' health and maintaining family traditions. Anxiety levels among youth in big cities and small cities are more or less similar when it comes to matters such as marriage, terrorist attacks, road accidents, riots, family problems and losing a friend. On all these issues they have much greater anxiety than rural youth, who show least anxiety on all issues barring one - body image. On this issue the youth of rural areas were found to be a bit more anxious than small-city-youth.

8.6. Anxiety rises with higher economic status and education

The survey found youth from economically better off backgrounds to be more anxious. High anxiety among youth belonging to the upper class was found to be 12 percentage points more than high anxiety among youth who are poor (Table 8.5). Education too seems to significantly impact anxiety levels. Graduate youth were found to be two times more highly anxious than non-literate youth. They were also one and a half times more highly anxious than youth who had completed only primary education. Gender, meanwhile, seems to make only a marginal difference as young men were found to be only three points more anxious than young women.

8.7. The anxiety questions

We conducted a deeper analysis of each of the 14 questions related to anxiety that were asked in the survey. In this section we present a short analysis of each of them. Our aim is to report some of the most striking findings.

8.7.1. Anxiety about parents' health

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, of all the various anxieties it is concern about the health and well being of one's parents that makes young people in India most anxious. Overall, nearly seven out of ten youth were found to worry a great deal about the health of their parents. This high worry for parents' health was much greater among unmarried/single youth compared to married youth, 74 percent as opposed to 65 percent. Anxiety levels among youth about parents' health were also found to be linked to the amount of influence that their parents have had on them. Three in every four youth who said that the biggest influence in their life had been their parents reported worrying a lot about their parents' health as opposed to two in every three youth who said that their spouse or sibling had been the biggest influence in their life. Interestingly, high anxiety about parents' health was found to be greatest among youth residing in the northern states of the country at 81 percent.

8.7.2. Anxiety about personal health

Anxiousness about one's own health and fitness follows concern for parents' health as the second strongest anxiety among India's youth. It has also gone up significantly in the last decade. While 74 percent had reported worrying (greatly or somewhat) about it the 2007 Youth Survey done by CSDS-KAS, in 2016 a much larger proportion of youth - 83 percent - said they were anxious

about it. Out of this 83 percent, 55 percent belong to the greatly worried category. This figure is quite alarming, although just how many of them are hypochondriacs or suffer from abnormal chronic anxiety cannot be ascertained by us. Economic status and worry about personal health are strongly correlated. Youth belonging to better and more privileged economic backgrounds were found to be much more anxious about their health than those who were not so well off. The reason for this greater worry among upper class youth may well be linked to their dietary preferences and lifestyle. Our analysis found worry about personal health to be particularly high among youth who reported eating junk food or drinking fizzy drinks on a regular basis (Table 8.6). Health anxiety was also found to be quite high among those who exercise regularly or play a sport. It could be that the former worry about health because they have poor eating and drinking habits, and the latter worry because they are health conscious. Interestingly, we found youth who are vegetarian to be showing much higher anxiety about their health than youth who are non-vegetarian.

Table 8.6: Anxiety about personal health (%)

	Worry about personal health			
	Quite a lot	Somewhat	Very little	Not at all
Youth (Overall)	**54**	**29**	**8**	**7**
Pure vegetarian	68	23	4	5
Vegetarian but eat egg.	68	23	5	3
Non-vegetarian	47	31	11	10
Eat burgers, pizzas, fast food regularly	67	22	5	5
Exercise regularly	65	22	6	6
Play a sport regularly	65	21	6	7
Drink fizzy drinks regularly	64	23	6	6
Drink alcohol regularly	60	26	12	3
Eat fruits regularly	60	27	7	6
Eat greens regularly	57	27	7	7
Smoke cigarettes regularly	53	31	11	5

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

8.7.3. Anxiety about maintaining family traditions

In the order of anxieties among India's youth, anxiety about maintaining family traditions comes third. High anxiety about it was found to be greatest among Hindu and Muslim youth (about 50%) and least among Christian youth (30%). It was also found to be greatest among highly religious youth (59%). Married youth were found to be more greatly worried about maintaining family traditions (51%) than youth who are single (47%). Moreover, among married youth those whose marriage was an arranged one reported much higher anxiety (51%) about maintaining family traditions compared to those whose marriage was a love marriage (43%).

8.7.4. Anxiety about family problems

The marital status of the youth also seems to determine their worry levels about family problems. High anxiety about family problems was found to be greater among married youth (60%) than among single youth (53%). Youth who live with parents or with their spouse, were also found to be more highly worried about family problems (57%) than youth who live with friends, in a hostel or all by themselves (48%). On the whole, anxiety about family problems among the youth has gone up since the last CSDS-KAS Youth Survey in 2007. About 88 percent worry (highly or somewhat) about it now as opposed to 73 percent a decade ago.

8.7.5. Anxiety about jobs

Anxiety (high or somewhat) about jobs has also seen a rise in the past ten years, from 70 percent to 73 percent. The survey found

unemployed youth and students to be worrying much more about jobs than employed/working youth. Education and locality make a difference and the worry levels about jobs across the three categories – unemployed youth, students, and working youth - goes up if they are graduates and are located in urban areas (Table 8.7). Youth who said they prefer a government job were found to worry far more (55%) about jobs than youth who said they prefer a private job (48%) or having their own business (39%). Similarly, youth who said they would prefer a permanent job even if it meant drawing a lesser salary were found to be more worried (57%) about jobs than youth who said they would either prefer a job with a good income (44%), or a job which has good people around (45%), or a job that gives them satisfaction (51%).

Table 8.7: Anxiety about jobs (%)

	Worry about jobs			
	Quite a lot	Somewhat	Very little	Not at all
Youth (Overall)	**46**	**27**	**10**	**14**
Employed	50	28	10	10
Students	54	24	8	12
Unemployed	59	25	10	5
Urban Employed	54	29	7	8
Urban Students	55	23	9	11
Urban Unemployed	65	17	12	5
Graduate Employed	60	27	8	6
Graduate Students	59	23	8	9
Graduate Unemployed	67	19	11	3

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

8.7.6. Anxiety about studies

With its strong emphasis on exams and academic outcomes, school emerges as a significant stressor among youth with worry about studies being greatest (83%) among the school-going age-group of 15-17-year-olds. Very interestingly, worry about studies among youngsters was also found to be linked to their father's education. It was found that the higher was the father's educational qualification, the higher was the likelihood of their teenage or adult child to worry about studies. Only about one-fourth of the youth whose father has completed primary education were found to be worried a lot about studies. In comparison, the proportion of those highly worried about studies was one-third among those whose fathers have studied up to middle pass, half among those whose fathers have studied till intermediate or completed graduation, and two-thirds among those whose fathers are post-graduates. Anxiety about studies was also found to be linked to the type of institution a person has studied in. Being or having studied in a private college or a private school increases the level of worry of the young about studies. About 70 percent of school-going youth (15-17-year-olds) studying in a private school were found to be highly worried about studies as opposed to 62 percent of school-going youth studying in a government school (Table 8.8). Similarly, 64 percent of college-going youth (18-23 year olds) studying in a private college were greatly worried about studies as opposed to 59 percent of college-going youth studying in a government college.

Table 8.8: Anxiety about studies (%)

	Worry about studies			
	Quite a lot	Somewhat	Very little	Not at all
Youth (Overall)	**33**	**21**	**14**	**28**
15-17-year-olds in a private school	70	22	5	3
15-17-year-olds in a government school	62	19	9	8
18-23-year-olds in a private college	64	24	4	7
18-23-year-olds in a government college	59	23	11	6

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

8.7.7. Anxiety about personal looks and body shape

The survey found two of five youth to be highly anxious about the way they looked and their body shape. This anxiety with respect to one's looks and physique was found to be particularly high among upper class youth compared to poorer youth (Table 8.9). Meanwhile, young men were found to be more worried about their personal looks than young women, except in big cities. The youngest respondents (15-17-year-olds) were also found to be more worried about their looks than those slightly older (18-25-year-olds) than them, except in big cities. Taking selfies on the phone also seems to be connected with worrying about personal looks. Those who reported taking selfies daily were nearly two times more likely to highly worry about personal looks than those who never take selfies, 60 percent to 32 percent. Similarly, those who reported being very fond of applying fairness creams were also twice as likely to worry about their looks as those who don't use fairness creams, 63 percent to 30 percent. Quite interestingly, non-vegetarians were found to be least worried about their looks and body image compared to vegetarians. In regional terms, the youth of north India were found to be the most anxious (56%) about their looks compared to the youth of other regions.

Table 8.9: Anxiety about personal looks and body shape (%)

	Worry about body shape/weight/looks			
	Quite a lot	Somewhat	Very little	Not at all
Youth (Overall)	**38**	**31**	**15**	**14**
Upper Class	49	27	13	10
Middle Class	39	32	16	13
Lower Class	41	32	13	13
Poor	32	31	16	19
Men in Big Cities	46	30	13	11
Women in Big Cities	48	28	12	11
Men in Smaller Cities	39	29	18	12
Women in Smaller Cities	32	34	17	15
Men in Villages	41	30	13	16
Women in Villages	33	33	15	16
15-17-year-olds in Big Cities	47	27	12	12
18-25-year-olds in Big Cities	49	28	11	12
15-17-year-olds in Smaller Cities	46	26	11	11
18-25-year-olds in Smaller Cities	37	31	19	12
15-17-year-olds in Villages	45	29	8	16
18-25-year-olds in Villages	41	30	13	15
Youth who are vegetarians/eggitarians	51	30	10	9
Youth who are non-vegetarians	32	32	17	17

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

8.7.8. Anxiety about losing a friend

Youth with close friends from another religion, caste, and gender were found to be more anxious about losing a friend than those who don't (Table 8.10). The pattern with respect to religion was seen among youth belonging to all religious groups, i.e., young Muslims, Hindus, Christians and Sikhs who reported having a close friend from a religion other than theirs showed much higher anxiety about 'losing a friend' than their co-religionists who don't have a close friend from another religion. Even in terms of caste, young Upper castes, OBCs, Dalits and Adivasis having a close friend from another caste turned out to be more worried about 'losing a friend' than their counterparts who reported having no close friends from a caste other than theirs. Similarly, men and women with friends from the opposite gender also reported worrying more about 'losing a friend' than those men and women who said they don't have a close friend from the opposite gender. This is particularly stronger in the case of women.

Table 8.10: Anxiety about losing a friend (%)

	Worry about losing a friend			
	Quite a lot	Somewhat	Very little	Not at all
Youth (Overall)	**35**	**25**	**14**	**22**
Those with a close friend from opposite gender	43	25	15	15
Those without any close friend from opposite gender	34	26	12	24
Those with a close friend from another caste	40	26	14	17
Those without any close friend from another caste	26	23	12	35
Those with a close friend from another religion	39	27	14	16
Those without any close friend from another religion	33	21	13	29

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

8.7.9. Anxiety about road accidents

According to government statistics, 1.46 lakh people were killed in road accidents in India in 2015 and a majority or over half (54%) of them were from the age-group 15-34 years (The Hindu, 2016). Moreover, within this broader age-group of 15-34, it is the 18-24 year old category to which 53 percent of the victims belonged (GoI, 2017). It is little surprise then that the CSDS-KAS Youth Survey data found anxiety (quite a lot and somewhat combined) about road accidents to be highest among this age-group at about 59 percent. This is also the age when many young people learn to drive a car or ride a bike or scooter. It is also the age when most of them move out of their secure environments and begin to travel much more.

8.7.10. Anxiety about riots and mob violence

With respect to anxiety about mob violence and riots, the survey found Muslim youth to be most anxious about it followed by Christian and Sikh youth (Table 8.11). Among Muslim youth, those residing in small cities were found to be twice as highly anxious about riots breaking out as those living in big cities, 35 percent as opposed to 16 percent. The survey also found that youth had faced discrimination on account of their religion were more likely to be highly worried about riots and mob violence than youth who had not, 36 percent compared to 23 percent. Meanwhile, young people who have a friend from another religion

Table 8.11: Anxiety about riots and mob violence (%)

	Worry about riots and mob violence			
	Quite a lot	Somewhat	Very little	Not at all
Youth (Overall)	**23**	**26**	**21**	**26**
Muslim	27	27	17	26
Christian	24	28	25	23
Sikh	23	30	10	34
Hindu	23	25	22	26
Muslims in Big Cities	16	25	34	23
Muslims in Smaller Cities	35	23	16	24
Muslims in Villages	26	32	10	26
Those who've faced discrimination on account of religion	36	26	19	19
Those who haven't faced discrimination on account of religion	23	26	22	27
Those who have a close friend from another religion	25	28	23	23
Those without a close friend from another religion	22	21	20	34

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

seemed to worry slightly more about a riot taking place in their area than youngsters who reported not having a friend from another religion.

8.7.11. Anxiety about inability to speak good English

The worry about inability to speak good English was found to be greater among the more educated youth than the less educated ones (Table 8.12). It is also very high among the youngest cohort (15-17 years old) in big cities. In fact, the 15-17-year-olds across all three locations (big cities, smaller cities and villages) showed much higher anxiety than the oldest cohort (30-34 years) on this issue. The youth residing in the northern and southern Indian states were found to be more highly anxious about their English speaking skills (34% and 29%, respectively) than youth living in states located in the eastern and western parts (18% and 16%, respectively). High worry about English speaking skills was also found to be much greater among youth thinking of studying abroad or finding a job abroad than those who are not planning to go abroad, 34 percent to 23 percent.

Table 8.12: Anxiety about inability to speak good English (%)

	Worry about inability to speak good English			
	Quite a lot	Somewhat	Very little	Not at all
Youth (Overall)	**23**	**22**	**17**	**34**
Graduate or above	30	28	18	23
High School Pass	24	23	19	30
Primary Pass	15	16	13	51
Non-literate	7	5	6	68
15-17-year-olds in Big Cities	37	25	15	21
30-34-year-olds in Big Cities	23	20	18	36
15-17-year-olds in Smaller Cities	31	35	14	14
30-34-year-olds in Smaller Cities	17	22	21	36
15-17-year-olds in Villages	34	26	15	20
30-34-year-olds in Villages	16	17	16	47

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

8.7.12. Anxiety about a terrorist attack

Degree of news media exposure seems to determine anxiety levels about a terrorist attack taking place. While only one in five youth with low exposure to news media were found to be highly worried about terrorist attacks, among youth with high news media exposure the proportion is one in three. Terrorist attacks being a more urban phenomenon, the survey found youth in big and small cities to be much more highly worried (27% each) about terror attacks than rural youth (21%). The survey also found Muslim and Sikh youth to be most highly anxious (33% and 31%, respectively) about a terrorist attack taking place than Christian and Hindu youth (26% and 23%, respectively).

8.7.13. Anxiety about marriage

Marriage, the survey found, is not a big worry for the majority of Indian youth. Overall, only about 18 percent of them were found to be highly worried about it and another 20 percent were somewhat anxious about it. Within the broader category of youth, however, the level of worry differed depending on one's age. Two in every five (41%) of those aged between 18 and 29 years were highly worried about marriage. This is largely the age-group that consists of mostly those who are either thinking of marriage or are newly married. These worry levels dropped to 36 percent among the 30-34-year-olds, nine out of ten of whom were found to be married in the survey. Having married outside one's religion makes a huge difference to one's anxiety about marriage. About 45 percent of those youth who have married someone from outside their religion were found to worry a lot about their marriage as opposed to 18 percent of those who have married co-religionists (Table 8.13). Marriage outside of caste also makes a similar difference in the respect, although to a lesser degree. What kind of a marriage one has had, love or arranged,

also determines the level anxiety about one's marriage. Youngsters whose marriage is a love marriage were found to be slightly more greatly worried about their marriage than those youth who have had an arranged marriage, 20 percent as opposed to 17 percent. However, within both these types of marriages, the religion or caste of the spouse makes a big difference. While 38 percent of those whose marriage is an inter-caste or an inter-religious love marriage reported worrying a lot about their marriage, among those whose marriage is an intra-caste or intra-religious love marriage the level of worry was found to be three times less at 12 percent. Similarly youth with an arranged marriage outside of their caste and religion were twice as likely to highly worry about marriage as youth with an arranged marriage within their community, 33 percent as opposed to 17 percent. Parental influence on the decision to marry is also a factor. Single youth who said that their parents will influence their decision to marry or married youth who said that their parents had influenced their marriage decision were found to be over two times more likely to highly worry about their marriage than youth who denied parental influence on the issue of marriage, 26 percent as opposed to 11 percent. When looked at by locality, the survey found the city-youth to be more anxious about marriage than village-youth. Within cities, both big and small, the age-group found to be most worried about it is the 26-29-year-olds. In villages, it is the 18-21-year-olds. Finally and rather interestingly, anxiety about one's looks and body shape among the youth may also be shaping their worry about marriage. Nearly one-third of those highly worried about their looks and body shape

Table 8.13: Anxiety about marriage (%)

	Worry about marriage			
	Quite a lot	Somewhat	Very little	Not at all
Youth (Overall)	**18**	**20**	**17**	**39**
Those who have married outside caste	33	15	18	30
Those who have married within caste	18	17	14	45
Those who have married outside religion	45	8	5	41
Those who have married within religion	18	17	15	44
Those whose love marriage is outside caste/religion	38	15	17	26
Those whose love marriage is within caste/religion	12	18	15	29
Those whose arranged marriage is outside caste/religion	33	14	9	41
Those whose arranged marriage is within caste/religion	17	17	14	46

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

were also found to worry highly about marriage. In comparison only about 7 percent of those not worried at all about their looks worry highly about marriage. The survey also found a link between taking selfies on one's phone and applying fairness creams on one's face, and worry levels regarding marriage. While 28 percent of those who take selfies on their phone daily were found to worry highly about marriage, the figure dropped to 18 percent among those who never take their own pictures on the phone. Likewise, while 26 percent of those fond of applying fairness creams showed high anxiety about marriage, the figure of anxiety among those not at all fond of it was 17 percent.

8.7.14. Anxiety about harassment and teasing

On the issue of harassment and teasing, young women, not surprisingly, more than young men worry a lot about it, 23 percent to 16 percent (Table 8.14). The gap between the genders widens further to 13 percentage points when we take into account moderate worry as well. This anxiety about harassment is particularly strong among young women living in the northern states followed by the southern states. 58 percent of young women in north India and 45 percent in south India reported worrying either a lot or somewhat about teasing and harassment. Anxiety about harassment was found to be greater among young women living in cities as compared to women of villages; and within the broader category of cities it was stronger in the bigger cities than the smaller ones.

Age makes a difference to how women responded to this question. 18-21-year-old women were most worried about harassment followed by 22-25-year-old women. Women in the age category 30-34 years were least worried of all about this issue. Interestingly, young women who said that they have been discriminated on account of their gender in the recent past were also more likely to worry highly (33%) about harassment than women who had not been discriminated against on grounds of gender.

Table 8.14: Anxiety about harassment and teasing (%)

	Worry about harassment/teasing			
	Quite a lot	Somewhat	Very little	Not at all
Youth (Overall)	**18**	**17**	**16**	**44**
Women	23	20	14	37
Men	16	14	17	47
Women in North India	38	20	9	28
Women in South India	27	18	11	40
Women in East India	15	25	23	34
Women in West & Central India	12	20	17	45
Women in Big Cities	29	24	13	31
Women in Smaller Cities	24	21	17	32
Women in Villages	20	19	14	42
15-17-year-old Women	22	20	14	36
18-21-year-old Women	32	19	11	34
22-25-year-old Women	25	23	13	34
26-29-year-old Women	21	19	18	39
30-34-year-old Women	17	19	16	41

Note: The rest of the respondents gave no response.

8.8. Emotional distress among the youth

Even as the young in India show very high levels of overall anxiety (55%), the incidence of emotional distress among them is considerably lower. After taking into account youth responses to questions on frequency of depression, loneliness, worthlessness and suicidal thoughts (see Appendix II to find out how Index of Emotional Distress was constructed), we find that only about 7 percent of India's young suffer from high emotional distress. About one in every four youth (24%) fall in the moderately distressed category, 18 percent in the low distress category and over half of them (51%) reported no emotional distress whatsoever (Figure 8.4).

Figure 8.4: Level of emotional distress among India's youth (%)



Note: See Appendix II to find out how Index of Emotional Distress was constructed.

Both anxiety and distress seem to have an impact on each other. About 10 percent of the highly anxious were found to be highly emotionally distressed as opposed to only 2 percent of the least anxious youth. Similarly, the greater the level of emotional distress, the more likely are youth to be anxious. Three in every four or 75 percent of those with high emotional distress reported very high anxiety levels as opposed to just 44 percent of those who showed no distress whatsoever (Figure 8.5).

Figure 8.5: How is anxiety affected by the presence and absence of emotional distress? (%)



Our analysis found high emotional distress to be particularly high (at least double the overall average) among those youth who drink alcohol, those who smoke, those who have put out an advertisement for marriage, those who regularly use social media, those who are extremely religious, those who are fond of visiting beauty parlours or salons, those who had a love marriage, and young working women, especially those who are single (Table 8.15). A note of caution is in order here. This does mean that all youth who belong to these categories suffer from high emotional distress. This only means that going by the survey the likelihood of finding emotionally distressed people among these categories was significantly greater than it was among other groups.

Table 8.15: Categories among whom high emotional distress was found to be much higher than average (%)

	High emotional distress	Moderate emotional distress	Low emotional distress	No emotional distress
Youth (Overall)	**7**	**24**	**18**	**52**
Those who drink alcohol	22	28	11	39
Single women who are working	22	20	20	38
Those who have put out a matrimonial ad	21	33	15	31
Those who smoke	18	30	13	39
Those who are very religious	15	25	15	45
Those who are very fond of visiting salons/parlours	14	34	14	38
Those with very high social media exposure	14	26	20	43
Working women	14	24	16	46
Those who had a love marriage	13	25	21	42

Note: These figures only point to a correlation, not causality. Causality can only be speculated and could well be in the reverse direction.

Also, the direction of causality with respect to some of these behavioral aspects seems to be the other way round. That is, it is not the presence of these traits and practices that may be leading to emotional distress among the young generation but instead it is distress that may be leading to such behaviour. The survey found many of these behavioral traits to be much greater among those youth with high emotional distress than those with no distress at all. For instance, 31 percent of the highly emotionally distressed youth were found to be drinking alcohol regularly as opposed to 8 percent of youth who suffer from no distress at all (Table 8.16). Similarly, the higher the distress, the greater the tendency of youth to eat junk food regularly, smoke regularly, be highly style conscious and indulge in shopping and eating out regularly.

8.8.1. Work or studies-related stress

Overall, 19 percent of the young respondents reported feeling stress from their studies or their job very often[1] (Table 8.17). This stress was greater among those who worry a lot about studies and about their job than those who don't. Among those who

[1]The question on work or education related stress was not included in the overall Index of Emotional distress.

Table 8.16: Impact of emotional distress on lifestyle and behaviour (%)

	Drink alcohol regularly	Smoke regularly	Eat junk food	High news media exposure	High social media exposure	High religiosity exposure	Given a matrimonial ad	Very style conscious	Take selfies
High distress	31	31	51	40	52	52	10	29	36
Moderate distress	11	15	42	28	47	47	5	28	31
Not much distress	6	9	40	27	35	34	3	15	31
No distress	8	9	37	17	29	29	2	16	24
Net of extremes	*3.9*	*3.4*	*1.4*	*2.4*	*1.8*	*1.8*	*5*	*1.8*	*1.5*

Note: Net figures have been calculated by dividing High distress figures by No distress figures

are very anxious about their studies, a third (34%) were found to feel stressed very often as opposed to just 6 percent among those who don't worry at all about studies. Similarly there was a twenty-point gap in terms of high stress levels among those who worry a lot about job than those who don't worry at all. Worrying about education or jobs is also correlated to how much one discusses these issues with one's parents. The survey found that those who discussed career or education with their parents often were over four times more likely to feel stress often than those who never discussed these things with their parents. Parental influence on these matters shows a similar result. About 30 percent of those who said that their parents will have or have had a high influence on their career or education related decision reported feeling stress very regularly as opposed just 8 percent among those who denied any parental influence on these matters.

The survey also found that the youngest among the young (15-17-year-olds followed by 18-21-year-olds) feel the weight of stress most as compared to their older counterparts. The more aged youngsters (30-34-year-olds) are least likely to feel stress. Stress levels were also found to be greatest among youth residing in smaller cities than big ones. Feeling stress also has a strong connection with education. The more educated youth reported feeling greater stress than the less educated youth. In terms of job types, youth with professional jobs (scientist, doctor, lawyer, teacher etc.) were found to be the most stressed followed by youth who were in a government job. Young students too showed higher stress than others. Young farmers, young housewives, and those who were unemployed showed the least amount of stress. Interestingly, the survey also found young working women to be more highly stressed than young working men, 26 percent as opposed to 17 percent.

Table 8.17: Categories among whom stress was found to be much higher than average (%)

	Feel stress from work/studies			
	Very often	Somewhat	Very little	Never
Youth (Overall)	**19**	**29**	**14**	**32**
Those who worry a lot about studies	34	31	12	22
Those living in Small Cities	32	31	11	23
Those who discuss career/education with parents often	31	33	13	22
Those who reported high parental influence on career/education	30	28	11	28
Those who worry a lot about job/s	29	31	12	24
Working women	26	24	11	33
Those in a professional job (doctors, lawyers, teachers etc.)	25	36	12	25
15-17-year-olds	25	28	15	28
Those who discuss career/education with parents sometimes	24	36	13	23
Students	24	34	14	26

Note: These figures only point to a correlation, not causality. Causality can only be speculated and could well be in the reverse direction.

8.8.2. Tension and depression among Indian youth

About one in eight (12%) 15-34-year-olds reported feeling depressed very often, in the survey (Table 8.18). The survey found the incidence of depression to be greatest among those youth who said they often feel lonely (62%) followed by those who often feel worthless (54%) and those who often feel stressed due to work or studies (43%). It was also found to be quite high among youngsters who reported feeling fully dissatisfied with life (22%). Such people were, in fact, two times more likely to be often depressed than those who were fully satisfied with life. Anxiety and depression are correlated. Depression was particularly strong among those with high anxiety about matters such as marriage, English-speaking skills and studies, in that order. An experience of discrimination is also connected to depression. Youngsters who reported facing discrimination on several grounds such as gender, religion, caste, state and economic class, were two times more likely to be highly depressed than youngsters who had faced not discrimination on any of these grounds. Type of marriage also seems to make a difference. About one in every five or 19 percent of married youth whose marriage was a love marriage reported being depressed very often as opposed to 11 percent with an arranged marriage. High depression was also reported in much higher proportion (19%) by those who were also highly exposed to media. It was also much stronger among highly religious youth than the less religious. The direction of causality, of course, could be the other way round, i.e., depression could be leading to greater media exposure and more religiosity. In terms of locality, youth in rural areas were more likely to be depressed than youth in urban areas. Among urban areas, it was city-youth more than mega city-youth who reported higher depression. The level of education of youngsters was found to be related to their depression levels. The more educated were more likely to be highly depressed than the less educated - 14 percent among graduates and 6 percent among non-literates. In terms of gender, women reported higher depression than young men, 15-10. Moreover among young women it was single/unmarried women who were found to be more highly depressed at 17 percent. Married young women also reported fairly high depression levels at 13 percent. This was even higher among married women who have had a love marriage (19%). Type of marriage also made a difference among men. 17 percent of married young men with a love marriage reported high depression. The incidence of depression was also quite high (14%) among youth with a job. Interestingly, the very stylish or style conscious youth were also found to be more depressed than those who were not. 51 percent of them reported being depressed often or sometimes as opposed to 31 percent among those who were not at all style conscious.

Table 8.18: Categories among whom mental tension/depression was found to be much higher than average %

	Feel mental tension/depression			
	Very often	Somewhat	Very little	Never
Youth (Overall)	**12**	**27**	**20**	**37**
Those who often feel lonely	62	26	7	5
Those who often feel worthless	54	29	9	7
Those who often feel stressed from work/studies	43	31	13	13
Those who faced a lot of discrimination in last 5 yrs	25	34	22	10
Those who are fully dissatisfied with life	22	26	10	39
Those who worry a lot about marriage	22	25	17	32
Those who worry a lot about their poor English	21	28	19	30
Those who worry a lot about studies	19	29	19	31
Those with high exposure to media	19	31	21	28
Those who had a love marriage	19	28	20	32
Those who are highly religious	17	32	20	30
Unmarried/Single Women	17	27	22	31

Note: These figures only point to a correlation, not causality. Causality can only be speculated and could well be in the reverse direction.

8.8.3. Loneliness among Indian youth

The survey found less than one in ten (8%) young Indians to be extremely lonely (Table 8.19). These are those who said they felt lonely very often. On doing some deeper analysis we found the loneliest youth to be located among those who often feel

worthless. Fifty-seven percent such respondents reported feeling lonely very often. Higher than average incidence of frequent loneliness was also found among those highly exposed to media (18%). It could be that being lonely is turning them towards the media as a means to overcome their loneliness. Similarly, those who reported eating junk food such as burgers, pizzas, chips daily were also more likely to report higher loneliness than those who ate junk food less frequently. Once again, the direction of causality could be reverse, that is, loneliness leading to a greater propensity to eat junk food. Dissatisfaction with one's life also correlates with loneliness. About 17 percent of those fully dissatisfied with life reported being lonely very often as opposed to 8 percent among those who were happy with the way their life was going. Loneliness was also found to be greater among 18-21-year-olds (11%), particularly among women belonging to this age category (17%). The survey found loneliness to be higher than average among the highly style conscious youth, those thinking of looking for a job abroad and those extremely anxious about their looks and body shape. In villages, the highly lonely youth were found to be more likely to belong to the middle class than other classes and in the mega cities they were more likely to be the rich.

Table 8.19: Categories among whom feeling of loneliness is higher than average (%)

	Feel lonely			
	Very often	Somewhat	Very little	Never
Youth (Overall)	**8**	**24**	**21**	**43**
Those who often feel worthless	57	30	6	7
Those with very high exposure to media	18	32	22	28
Those who are fully dissatisfied with life	17	22	18	39
18-21-year-old women	16	24	24	35
Those who eat fast food daily	16	29	16	36
Those thinking of looking for a job abroad	13	24	19	41
Those who are very style conscious	13	32	24	30
Middle Class in Villages	13	27	19	40
Upper Class in Mega Cities	12	25	19	40
Those who are very worried about their looks/weight	12	29	21	36

Note: These figures only point to a correlation, not causality. Causality can only be speculated and could well be in the reverse direction. Mega cities include Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Ahmedabad, Pune, Surat and Jaipur.

Table 8.20: Categories among whom feeling of worthlessness is much higher than average (%)

	Feel worthless			
	Very often	Somewhat	Very little	Never
Youth (Overall)	**5**	**15**	**15**	**61**
Those who often feel lonely	32	31	13	24
Those who watch/read/listen to news a lot	13	21	18	48
Those who are very highly religious	12	19	19	47
Those who are fully dissatisfied with life	11	15	14	57
Those who eat junk/fast food daily	10	16	22	49
Those who worry a lot about marriage	9	20	17	50
Those with a desire of settling abroad	9	17	15	58
Those who are fully dissatisfied with current job	9	16	19	49

Note: These figures only point to a correlation, not causality. Causality can only be speculated and could well be in the reverse direction.

8.8.4. Worthlessness among Indian youth

If a high degree of loneliness is found among only 8 percent of the youth, the incidence of feeling worthless is even less at 5 percent (Table 8.20, previous page). However, just as loneliness seems to be determined by worthlessness, the latter too seems to be impacted by the former. Among those who said they feel lonely very often, the prevalence of a feeling of high worthlessness was six times the overall average. Once again, as in the case of loneliness; exposure to news media, religiosity and dissatisfaction with life are also linked to the intensity/regularity of feeling worthless. So is the consumption of junk food. Anxiety about jobs, marriage, one's looks and not being able to speak good English may also be contributing to a feeling of worthlessness. High worthlessness was also found to be higher than average among the very style conscious youth. 18-21-year-olds, particularly women and those living in rural areas were also more likely to report feeling highly worthless than other youth. Living in a mega city seems to reduce the likelihood of feeling worthless. Seventy percent of youth residing in mega cities reported never feeling worthless as opposed to about 60 percent in smaller cities, towns and villages. Interestingly, the survey found the feeling of being 'good for nothing' to be higher than average among those who regularly participate in the activities of a religious or spiritual organization. Perhaps a feeling of worthlessness is what is making them participate in such activities.

8.8.5. Sucidal thoughts among Indian youth

About 3 percent of the total sample reported getting suicidal thoughts very often and another 6 percent sometimes (Table 8.21). The propensity to get suicidal thoughts very often was found to be ten times greater (31%) than the average among those youth who reported feeling worthless very often. It was five times greater than average among youth who said they often felt lonely or often felt depressed and three times higher among those who felt stressed from work or studies very often. The tendency to feel suicidal was also found to be more among those who eat junk food daily and those who regularly participate in the activities of a religious or a spiritual organization. The latter could be causing the former, which is to say the feelings of ending one's life could be leading to these habits and practices. Higher suicidal tendencies were also found to be significantly higher than average among those with a high aspiration of going abroad, among those who worry a lot about marriage and about their English speaking skills, and among those with high exposure to news media. Dissatisfaction with one's current job or with one's life also leads to suicidal thoughts but not to the extent witnessed among some other categories. Only 6 percent of those completely unhappy with their job and 5 percent of those completely dissatisfied with their life reported feeling suicidal very often. The

Table 8.21: Categories among whom suicidal tendencies are higher than average (%)

	Feel suicidal			
	Very often	Somewhat	Very little	Never
Youth (Overall)	**3**	**6**	**6**	**79**
Those who often feel worthless	31	16	14	38
Those who often feel lonely	16	13	8	62
Those who often feel depressed	14	12	9	62
Those who participate regularly in religious/spiritual organizations' activities	11	12	5	68
Those who often feel stressed	10	7	8	72
Those who eat junk/fast food daily	9	13	6	69
Those with a high aspiration to go abroad	9	7	7	75
Those who worry a lot about marriage	7	8	7	72
18-21-year-old women	7	5	8	75
Those who are very religious (in practice)	6	10	14	65
Those who are fully dissatisfied with current job	6	8	7	72

Note: These figures only point to a correlation, not causality. Causality can only be speculated and could well be in the reverse direction.

highly religious and the highly style conscious also seem to be more likely to feel suicidal than the less religious and the less style conscious. As in the case of worthlessness, youth in mega cities are least like to feel suicidal than youth living elsewhere. Rural youth were found to be most highly suicidal (5%). The survey also found young women between the ages 18 and 21 years to be two times more prone to getting suicidal thoughts than all youth.

8.9. Very few have taken medical help for mental issues

The survey asked the youth whether they had ever consulted a doctor for therapy related to mental problems. Only about 6 percent reported doing so, a figure that is alarming given that the survey also finds 55 percent of the youth to be highly anxious and about 31 percent to be having high or moderate emotional distress (Table 8.22). While it is true (and the survey finds) that the more anxious and the more emotionally distressed are more likely to have consulted a psychiatrist or mental health expert, the figures even among them are alarmingly low. Among youth who are very anxious, only 8 percent have consulted a doctor; and among the highly distressed only 18 percent or about one in five have gone to a therapist. More shockingly, only one in every five youth (21%) who get suicidal thoughts very often has sought therapy (Table 8.23). The practice of consulting a doctor for mental therapy was also found to be significantly greater than the overall average among those who have faced a lot of discrimination, those who suffer from a high feeling of worthlessness, and those who are extremely lonely or very depressed. But once again, these are worryingly low figures given the level of affliction. Type of marriage also makes a difference. Youths who have had love marriage or would prefer a love marriage are also more likely to have consulted a doctor than youth with a preference for arranged marriage. Economically well-off youth and 30-34-year-olds residing in mega cities were also found to have consulted a doctor for therapy much more than the overall average. Young women were slightly more likely to have consulted a therapist than young men, particularly women belonging to the 18-21 and 26-29 years age-groups.

Table 8.22: Very few anxious and emotionally distressed youth have sought psychiatric help (%)

	Consulted a doctor for therapy
Youth (Overall)	**6**
Very anxious	8
Quite anxious	6
Somewhat anxious	5
Not much anxious	5
Not all anxious	2
High emotional distress	18
Moderate emotional distress	8
Low emotional distress	8
No emotional distress	2

Table 8.23: Who among the young are most likely to have consulted a therapist? (%)

	Consulted a doctor for therapy
Youth (Overall)	**6**
Those who often feel suicidal	21
Those who have faced a lot of discrimination	17
Those who often feel worthless	15
Those who often feel lonely	15
Single youth who would prefer a love marriage	13
Those who are very depressed	10
Upper Class in Mega Cities	10
Those who had a love marriage	9
Those who often feel stressed	9
30-34-year-old Graduates	9
30-34-year-olds in Mega Cities	9

8.10. Conclusion

It appears that the young in India are a greatly anxious generation who seem to be worrying about a whole host of matters at the same time. While different age groups among the young have different worries, what is uniform and consistent across age groups is anxiety related to parents' health, personal health, family problems, and maintaining family traditions. These four matters seem to be causing a great deal of worry among the India's youngsters, whatever their age. On the whole, anxiety among youth seems to be more an urban phenomenon than rural with the highest anxiety levels being recorded among youth residing in big cities. Anxiety levels also seem to be dependent on educational and economic status with the more educated and economically better-off sections among the youth reporting much higher anxiety than the rest. Meanwhile, even as one notices high levels of anxiety among them, the survey did not find many youth to be emotionally distressed. The two conditions are different although they were found to be inter-related – those with higher anxiety were more likely to be emotionally distressed. Emotional distress as measured by us through incidence of loneliness, depression, worthlessness and getting suicidal thoughts, does not seem to be widespread among the youth with over half them not reporting any of these conditions in the survey. Nonetheless, there is a fairly significant proportion of youth (about one in every three) that was found to suffer from either all these conditions or at least some of them and worryingly about four-fifths of them have not sought medical help for it yet.

References

Oaklander, Mandy. 2016. Old People Are Happier Than People in Their 20s. *TIME Health*, 24 August. Available at: http://time.com/4464811/aging-happiness-stress-anxiety-depression/. Accessed on 14 December, 2016.

The Hindu. 2016. 1.46 lakh lives lost on Indian roads last year. 10 June. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/146-lakh-lives-lost-on-indian-roads-last-year/article8710699.ece. Accessed on 15 December, 2016.

GoI. 2017. Total Number of Persons Killed in Road Accidents in India. *Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Government of India.* Available at: https://data.gov.in/catalog/total-number-persons-killed-road-accidents-india; Accessed on 15 December, 2016.

9. Experiences of discrimination



9. Experiences of discrimination

9.1. Introduction

Discrimination, a prejudicial treatment of people based on negative stereotypes about the communities to which they belong, is detrimental to the harmony and integration of any society. It is generally understood as biased behaviour that harms or disadvantages a specific member of a group or the group as a whole. It stems from deeply entrenched beliefs of superiority vis-a-vis others and can be perpetrated on the basis of a range of factors such as caste, religion, race, region, class, sex, sexual preference, age or disability. While all these types of discrimination can be experienced by a person belonging to any age-group, the impact of discrimination on the young can be particularly severe. As they grow up, the young have increasingly greater interactions with others in their micro-system and are therefore at a higher risk of witnessing discrimination or being recipients of it. Such experiences at a young age can not only have terrible consequences for their health, self-esteem, and inclusion in society, but can also lead to alienation or violent behavioural tendencies. It is therefore essential that stereotypes and prejudices are confronted with evidence based on the youth's actual attitudes and experiences of discrimination.

9.2. Measuring discrimination faced by India's youth

Keeping this in mind, the CSDS-KAS Youth Survey 2016 asked young respondents five questions regarding their encounters with bias. The questions probed whether they had in a span of five years faced discrimination because of their region, caste, gender, religion, and their economic status. Based on their answers, it was found (see Appendix II to find out how the Index of Experience of Discrimination was constructed) that about 2 percent had thought to have faced discrimination either on all five grounds or on four of the five grounds. Seven percent had faced discrimination on two or three grounds and 8 percent on just one out of the five grounds. This means that one in every six youth (17%) had faced discrimination on at least one count in a span of five years (Figure 9.1). A note of caution is in order here. It must be kept in mind (throughout this chapter) that these are self-reported figures of discrimination and that there may well have been under-reporting by respondents as many may not have perceived an actual act of discrimination as being discrimination. Nonetheless, these figures do tell us something important, especially when analysed by different socio-demographic variables.

Figure 9.1: Measuring discrimination faced by India's youth (%)



Note: See Appendix II to find out how the Index of Experience of Discrimination was constructed.

When looked at by age, this figure of 17 percent increased to 22 percent among the 18-21-year-olds (Table 9.1). This is precisely the period of life when most Indian youth are out of school and increasingly start interacting with the wider world, hence increasing their chances of encountering prejudice in some form or the other. Meanwhile, the 15-17-years-olds or those still in school, reported least discrimination (11%). Put differently, they were two times less likely to have experienced discrimination than the 18-21-year-olds.

An analysis by educational qualification also shows a pattern. The highly educated youth reported having faced discrimination much more than the less educated youth (Table 9.2). Whereas one in every five graduate youth reported having been discriminated against in some way or the other, among high school pass youth the figure was 15 percent and among primary pass and non-literate youth it was even lower at 13 and 12 percent, respectively. It could be argued that the highly educated youth reported relatively greater discrimination because they were in a better position and more equipped intellectually to judge discriminatory practices. This also means that many among the less educated youth could also have been victims of

Table 9.1: 18-21-year-olds more likely to have experienced discrimination than others (%)

	Faced nearly all kinds of discrimination	Faced some kinds of discrimination	Faced few kinds of discrimination	Faced no discrimination whatsoever
15-17 years	2	3	6	89
18-21 years	3	10	9	78
22-25 years	1	7	9	83
26-29 years	2	7	9	82
30-34 years	2	6	7	85

prejudice in some form or the other but they may not have realised it or seen it as such due to their low intellectual capacities to judge such discrimination. This is of course just a supposition.

Table 9.2: Are educated youth better at judging discrimination? (%)

	Faced nearly all kinds of discrimination	Faced some kinds of discrimination	Faced few kinds of discrimination	Faced no discrimination whatsoever
Graduate or above	2	8	10	80
High School Pass	2	7	6	85
Primary Pass	1	7	5	88
Non-literate	2	3	7	88

In terms of locality, the incidence of discrimination was found to be the highest in smaller cities, where 22 percent of the young respondents reported experiencing some discrimination or the other. Rural youth came next at 17 percent. Youth in big cities, meanwhile, reported the least amount of discrimination with only 14 percent of them reporting as having been discriminated against on at least one of the five grounds (Table 9.3).

Table 9.3: Youth in small cities more likely to have faced discrimination than those in big ones (%)

	Faced nearly all kinds of discrimination	Faced some kinds of discrimination	Faced few kinds of discrimination	Faced no discrimination whatsoever
Big Cities	1	5	8	86
Smaller Cities	4	10	8	78
Villages	2	7	8	83

The overall survey findings with respect to Indian youth's experiences of discrimination could tempt one to conclude that discrimination is not a big problem in India. However, in a country where social exclusion, particularly on the grounds of caste, has become a social norm, for anyone to come to such a conclusion would be highly naive. Moreover, the fact that the survey finds every sixth youth to have experienced some form of discrimination in the recent past could be considered by some to be a fairly high occurrence. Also, to reiterate the point made earlier, what should also be kept in mind is that these are self-reported levels of discrimination and it could be the case that an individual who may well have faced discrimination had not viewed it as such, thereby not reporting it as discrimination to us in the survey. The lower than expected figures could also be on account of the survey design having missed out youth living in hostels, many of whom migrate from remote parts of the country (particularly the north-eastern states, and Jammu and Kashmir) to 'mainland India' for education and jobs. Their experiences of discrimination have been widely reported in the media in recent times, and it is very possible that the survey did not capture them well. Moreover, the survey was not conducted in the north-eastern states (except Assam) and in Jammu and Kashmir, hence the experiences of youth living in these states has also not been factored into this analysis.

There is however some reason to believe that discrimination experienced by the youth has declined over the years. Nearly

a decade ago, in 2007, when a similar question was asked of Indian youth in the first CSDS-KAS Youth Survey, responses acknowledging discrimination had been of a higher proportion. The questions asked then had also probed the issue of discrimination on the basis of caste, economic status, gender, religion and region. However, the question wording in that survey was slightly different from the one asked in 2016. In 2007, the question probed the frequency of discrimination experienced, with the answer categories offered being 'Often', 'Sometimes' and 'Never'. In 2016, the question simply probed the experience of discrimination with the answer categories just being 'Yes' and 'No'. Moreover, the respondents in 2007 were not given any recall period similar to the 2016 survey. Nevertheless, for the purposes of a rough comparison, if we ignore the differences in question framing and treat those who answered often and sometimes in 2007 as Yes/having experienced discrimination and those who said never or did not give an opinion as No/not having experienced discrimination, then we find that overall after taking all five questions into consideration, in 2007 about 15 percent of the youth had reported facing a lot of discrimination, 22 percent had faced some discrimination, 18 percent had faced little discrimination and 44 percent had not experienced any discrimination whatsoever. However, if we were treat only those who answered 'often' as having experienced discrimination and the rest as not having experienced any, then the story is somewhat like what we find in 2016.

9.3. Experience of discrimination based on economic status

The survey found economic background and caste to be the strongest grounds for discrimination out of all the five questions asked. This had been the case in 2007 as well, but to a much higher degree (perhaps due to different question wording). Overall, 9 percent of the young respondents in 2016 said they had been discriminated against based on their economic status (Table 9.4). Not surprisingly, the poorer the youth, the greater was their likelihood of having experienced discrimination on economic basis. Whereas 11 percent of youth belonging to the poorer sections and 9 percent from the lower class said they had faced discrimination on economic grounds, among youth belonging to the upper and middle classes only 7 percent said so. On disaggregating the responses of the poor further, it was found that the feeling of economic discrimination was strongest among poor youth who were graduates (18%). It was also quite strong among poor youth in small cities (16%) followed by big cities (12%). The experience of discrimination on economic lines was also much higher than average among young Muslims who were also poor and poor aged between 18 and 25 years.

Table 9.4: Experience of discrimination based on economic status among youth (%)

	Experience of discrimination based on economic status
Youth (Overall)	**9**
Upper Class	7
Middle Class	7
Lower Class	9
Poor	11
Poor in Big Cities	12
Poor who are18-25 years-old	14
Poor who are Muslim	14
Poor in Smaller Cities	16
Poor who are Graduates	18

9.4. Experience of discrimination based on caste

Caste too was found to be among the top grounds of discrimination, although its incidence appears to have gone down as compared to 2007. Overall, 9 percent of Indian youth reported having experienced caste-based discrimination in the five years preceding the survey (Table 9.5). In 2007, 7 percent had said they had experienced it frequently and 23 percent reported experiencing it sometimes. Once again, it needs to be re-emphasized that these figures cannot be compared strictly with 2016 because of the difference in question wording. The sense of caste-based discrimination in 2016 was found to be greatest among young Dalits at 15 percent followed by young Adivasis (11%) and thereafter Young Muslims (10%). Hindu Upper Caste youth were least likely to say that they had been treated unfairly based on their caste with only 5 percent saying so. OBC youth, be

they from the upper or the lower sections, reported similar levels of caste discrimination at 7 percent. Being more educated made a difference in perception of caste discrimination among Dalits, Muslims and Upper OBCs. Young Graduates belonging to all these three communities were more likely to report unfair treatment based on caste than the less educated in these communities. Eighteen percent of young Dalit graduates, 13 percent of young Muslim graduates and 10 percent of young Upper OBC graduates reported facing discrimination based on their caste identity.

Table 9.5: Experience of discrimination based on caste among youth (%)

	Experience of discrimination based on caste
Youth (Overall)	**9**
Hindu Upper Caste	5
Hindu Peasant OBC	7
Hindu Artisanal and Service OBC	7
Hindu Dalit	15
Hindu Adivasi	11
Muslim	10
Graduate Dalit	18
Graduate Muslim	13
Graduate Peasant OBC	10

9.5. Experience of discrimination based on religion

Discrimination on the basis of religion was reported by 5 percent of all young respondents (Table 9.6). However, this overall figure does not reveal the true picture because the religion of a person made a huge difference to their response. There are significant variations when we look at this finding by the religious community of the respondent. Muslim youth were much more likely than others to have reported religion-based discrimination. About one in every seven or 13 percent of them said they had been discriminated against based on their Muslim identity. If we disaggregate Muslim responses to this question further, we find that Muslim youth living in smaller cities were most likely to have been victims of religious bias - 27 percent reported having faced discriminatory treatment for being Muslims. This is twice more than what all Muslim youth had reported. Muslim youth who reported being highly religious were also much more likely than other Muslim youth to report religious discrimination. A little over one in five of them (22%) said they had experienced religious discrimination. Other categories among Muslim youth who reported relatively higher faith-based discrimination are those belonging to the poor and lower classes, graduate and high school pass Muslims, and Muslim men. Youth from the Christian faith, also a religious minority, too reported a slightly higher

Table 9.6: Experience of discrimination based on religion among youth (%)

	Experience of discrimination based on religion
Youth (Overall)	**5**
Hindu	4
Muslim	13
Christian	6
Sikh	2
Muslim Men	14
High School Pass/Graduate Muslims	15
Lower Class/Poor Muslims	16
Highly religious Muslims	22
Muslims in Smaller Cities	27

than average discrimination at 6 percent. This sentiment however is not shared by young people belonging to another minority community - the Sikhs. In fact, of all religious groupings, Sikh youths were least likely to have experienced any discrimination based on their faith. Only 2 percent said so. Meanwhile, 4 percent youth belonging to the majority Hindu community reported unfair treatment based on their religion.

9.6. Experience of discrimination based on region or state

Discrimination on account of one's state or the region to which one belongs was reported by only 5 percent of the young respondents (Table 9.7). This sentiment was particularly strong among youth from the southern and eastern states who had travelled outside their state and more particularly among youth from Bihar, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh who had gone beyond their state borders. Fifteen percent, 14 percent and 12 percent such youth, respectively, reported having experienced discrimination outside their state. The survey was not conducted in the north-eastern states (barring Assam) and Jammu and Kashmir; hence we are unable to say anything about the discrimination faced by youth from these regions, which is a very real problem.

Table 9.7: Experience of discrimination based on region or state among youth (%)

	Experience of discrimination based on region
Youth (Overall)	**5**
From South and has travelled to another State	6
From East and has travelled to another State	10
From West and has travelled to another State	2
From North and has travelled to another State	4
From Bihar and has travelled to another State	15
From U.P. and has travelled to another State	12
From T.N. and has travelled to another State	14

9.7. Experience of discrimination based on gender

Gender discrimination was experienced by 5 percent of the total sample, and young women, not surprisingly, were more likely to have experienced it than young men, 8 percent to 3 percent (Table 9.8). Among young women, the experience of gender discrimination was greatest among those living in the southern states (12%), those who were Dalit and Muslim (10% each) and those in the age bracket of 18 to 21 years. Women living in small cities were also more likely to have experienced gender discrimination than all women.

Table 9.8: Experience of discrimination based on gender among youth (%)

	Experience of discrimination based on gender
Youth (Overall)	**5**
Men	3
Women	8
Women living in small cities	9
18-21-year-old women	9
Muslim women	10
Dalit women	10
Women in Southern States	12

A young woman's experience of discrimination also seems to be correlated with anxiety about harassment. Young women who reported unfair treatment based on their gender were found to be more likely to be highly anxious about sexual harassment

and teasing than women who did not report any gender discrimination (Table 9.9). The former were also found to be more likely to be less patriarchal or hold anti-women views than the latter (Table 9.10). What is striking though is that a sizeable proportion (39%) of those young women who reported gender-based discrimination also hold patriarchal views.

Table 9.9: Experience of gender discrimination among young women may be leading to greater anxiety about harassment (%)

	Worry a lot about harassment	Worry somewhat about harassment	Worry little about harassment	Never worry harassment
Women who have experienced gender discrimination	33	24	15	25
Women who have not experienced gender discrimination	23	20	14	38

Table 9.10: Young women who have experienced gender discrimination found to be less patriarchal in mindset (%)

	Very patriarchal	Somewhat patriarchal	Not much patriarchal	Not patriarchal at all
Women who have experienced gender discrimination	10	29	37	23
Women who have not experienced gender discrimination	21	26	31	23

Note: See Appendix II to find out how the Index of Patriarchal Mindset was constructed.

9.8. Experience of discrimination and emotional distress

The experience of discrimination may be making the youth more emotionally distressed. The survey reveals a pattern in this regard. One in every six (17%) respondents who reported having faced a lot of discrimination also reported high emotional distress (Figure 9.2). The prevalence of high distress among those who faced no discrimination whatsoever was substantially lower at 6 percent, which is less than one in ten.

Figure 9.2: Experience of discrimination linked to emotional distress (%)



Note: See Appendix II to find out how the Index of Emotional Distress was constructed.

In fact, when we unpack both the discrimination and emotional distress index, we find that discrimination based on each of the grounds (caste, gender, religion, caste, economic status and state) was found to be linked to all questions of emotional distress (stress, depression, loneliness, worthlessness and suicidal thoughts) asked in the survey. Those youth who had experienced discrimination based on caste, gender, religion, economic status and state were more likely to feel stressed, depressed, lonely, worthless and suicidal than those who had not experienced such discriminations (Table 9.11). Moreover, barring economic status, discrimination based on all other grounds seems to have the highest impact in net terms (experience divided by not experienced) on getting suicidal thoughts. Gender discrimination in fact has the strongest effect on getting suicidal thoughts. Youth who had experienced gender discrimination were 2.11 times more likely to feel suicidal than youth had not encountered such prejudicial treatment. Caste-based discrimination comes next. Youngsters who had been discriminated based on their caste identity were 1.87 times more likely to feel suicidal than those who had not. Meanwhile, out of all forms of discrimination, economic discrimination has the strongest impact on feeling worthless. Those who had experienced discrimination based on their economic background were 1.77 times more likely to feel worthless than those who had not. Caste, religion and region

based discriminations are also linked quite strongly to the feeling of worthlessness.

Table 9.11: Youth discriminated against more likely to feel stressed, depressed, lonely, worthless and suicidal (%)

	Stressed often or sometimes	Depressed often or sometimes	Lonely often or sometimes	Worthless often or sometimes	Suicidal often or sometimes
Experienced caste discrimination	54	51	42	30	15
Not experienced caste discrimination	48	38	31	18	8
Net (experience/not experienced)	*1.12*	*1.34*	*1.35*	*1.66*	*1.87*
Experienced gender discrimination	59	56	49	29	19
Not experienced gender discrimination	48	38	31	19	9
Net	*1.22*	*1.47*	*1.58*	*1.52*	*2.11*
Experienced state based discrimination	59	51	41	27	15
Not experienced state based discrimination	48	38	31	19	9
Net	*1.22*	*1.34*	*1.32*	*1.42*	*1.66*
Experienced religious discrimination	51	50	43	29	15
Not experienced religious discrimination	49	38	31	19	9
Net	*1.04*	*1.31*	*1.38*	*1.52*	*1.66*
Experienced economic discrimination	57	52	45	32	13
Not experienced economic discrimination	48	38	31	18	9
Net	*1.18*	*1.36*	*1.45*	*1.77*	*1.44*

Note: Net figures have been calculated by dividing experienced by not experienced.

Having experienced discrimination also impacts anxiety levels among the young. Whereas three-fourths of youth who had faced a lot of discrimination in a span of five years reported high anxiety levels, only half of those (53%) who faced no discrimination at all reported similar anxiety levels (Figure 9.3).

Figure 9.3: Degree of discrimination faced correlated to anxiety levels (%)



Note: See Appendix II to find out how the Index of Anxiety was constructed.

Figure 9.4: Discriminatory attitude greater among those who have faced discrimination (%)



Note: See Appendix II to find out how the Index of Discriminatory Attitudes was constructed.

9.9. Discriminatory attitude greater among those who are discriminated against

The survey also found that there is a strong link between being a victim of discrimination and being discriminatory in attitude. In other words, the survey reveals that those who claimed to have been discriminated against on the basis of their religious background, gender, economic class, caste or state were also more likely to discriminate or hold discriminatory views towards others than those who hadn't experienced any discrimination. Over one in every three youth (36%) who reported facing a lot of discrimination were also discriminatory in their attitude towards others. This is two times more than the discriminatory attitude witnessed among those who said they had faced no discrimination at all (Figure 9.4).

This 'the discriminated becoming discriminatory' finding also held true for the individual questions on discrimination. Thirty-six percent of young people who said they faced discrimination on the grounds of their religion also said they would feel uncomfortable having someone from another religion as their neighbour. This figure of discomfort of having a neighbour from another religion was on the other hand much less (21%) among those who had not faced discrimination based on their religious identity (Table 9.12). This difference can also be seen in the caste related question. Whereas 25 percent of those who reported facing discrimination on the basis of caste said that they won't prefer their neighbour to be from another caste, the proportion of those holding the same view was 17 percent among those who had not faced any discrimination on account of their caste. Finally, those who had received unfair treatment based on their region/state were more likely to feel uncomfortable having a neighbour from belonging to a different region/state than those who had not been discriminated against based on their place of residence, 31 percent to 22 percent.

Table 9.12: Link between discrimination and discriminatory attitude, disaggregated (%)

	Proportion
Faced discrimination on grounds of religion and won't prefer a neighbour from another religion	35
Have not faced discrimination on grounds of religion and won't prefer a neighbour from another religion	21
Faced discrimination on grounds of caste and won't prefer a neighbour from another caste	25
Have not faced discrimination on grounds of caste and won't prefer a neighbour from another caste	17
Faced discrimination on grounds of region and won't prefer a neighbour from another state	31
Have not faced discrimination on grounds of region and won't prefer a neighbour from another state	22

This finding that the chance of someone who has been discriminated against also being intolerant is not unique to India alone. A survey done by The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in 2008-2009 among 3,000 Muslim and non-Muslim young people in France, Spain and the UK about their experiences of and attitudes towards discrimination, social marginalization and violence had also suggested a similar correlation. The study had concluded that "young people who felt highly alienated or excluded and those who had been a victim of either emotional or physical violence themselves because of their cultural or religious background, skin colour or language were highly likely to be involved in using emotional violence towards others." (FRA, 2010; p.71)

9.10. Conclusion

This section has made an attempt to measure discriminatory treatment experienced by India's youth. In a positive sign, the study finds that most young people have not been discriminated against at all. Nevertheless, it does find that a significant proportion (one in every six) of the youth have experienced discrimination at least once in recent times, either on the grounds of caste, religion, gender, region or economic status. Out of all these grounds, the study finds economic background and caste to have been the most prevalent basis for discrimination. About one in every ten youth reported having faced discrimination on the basis of their economic status and their caste. Caste-based discrimination was most likely to have been experienced by Dalit youth. Muslim youth were found to be more likely to have experienced discrimination because of their religion. The analysis of the discrimination data consistently finds educational attainment to be enhancing perceptions of discrimination. The more educated youth, be they, Dalit, Muslim or poor, were found to be more likely to report experiences of discrimination than the less educated youth from these categories. There also seems to be correlation between discrimination experienced by the youth and their emotional state of mind. Youth who have experienced a high amount of discrimination also reported higher emotional distress and a greater degree of anxiety. The survey findings related to discrimination also seem to suggest that those youth who have been discriminated against are also more likely to discriminate against others.

Reference

FRA - European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2010. *Experience of discrimination, social marginalisation and violence: A comparative study of Muslim and non-Muslim youth in three EU Member States.* Available at: http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1202-Pub-racism-marginalisation_en.pdf. Accessed on 25 December, 2016.

Appendix I: Technical details of study design and sample



Appendix I: Technical details of study design and sample

Sampling strategies

This study is based on a sample survey of 6122 respondents aged between 15 and 34 years across 19 major States of India. The survey was conducted by Lokniti, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi, in the months of April and May, 2016.

Our primary objective was to target a sample of 6500 respondents aged between 15 and 34 years nationally, excluding Jammu and Kashmir and many of the small States. Our second objective was to give more weightage to urban youth (particularly those living in the largest and large cities in terms of population) than rural youth in our overall sample.

To fulfill these twin objectives, here's how we went about the sampling:

We first obtained a list of all Assembly Constituencies (ACs) of the 19 States where we had decided to conduct the study, namely, Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. Subsequently, all ACs were listed out along with their level of urbanity (as per Census 2001) in percentage terms.

We set a target of about 72 interviews to be conducted in each assembly segment. As our overall target was of 6500 interviews, this meant that we had to sample 90 assembly segments across the 19 States.

Next, since one of our objectives was to ensure that a larger proportion of the sample falls in urban areas, we decided to divide the number of ACs where the study was to be conducted (90) in an urban-rural proportion of 67 percent to 33 percent. About 69 percent of India's population is rural and 31 percent is urban according to Census 2011. However we decided to more or less inverse this proportion keeping in mind the objective of our study. This meant that out of the 90 ACs that had to be sampled, 60 had to be urban and 30 rural.

Once this was decided, the multi-stage stratified random sampling method was adopted -

Stage 1 involved the selection of urban and rural ACs.

Stage 2 involved the selection of Polling Stations (PS) within the selected urban and rural ACs.

Stage 3 involved the selection of respondents within the selected PSs.

Stage 1

Selection of urban ACs

Step 1 - From the state-wise list of ACs, those ACs falling within the Lok Sabha or Parliamentary Constituencies (PC) of 10 largest cities of India in terms of population (Delhi, Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Pune, Surat and Jaipur) were arranged in 10 separate strata. These ten largest cities are spread across 8 States. Delhi's PCs are - New Delhi, South Delhi, East Delhi, West Delhi, North West Delhi, Chandni Chowk and North East Delhi. Mumbai's PCs are - Mumbai South, Mumbai North, Mumbai South Central, Mumbai North Central, Mumbai North West and Mumbai North East. Kolkata's PCs are - Kolkata Dakshin, Kolkata Uttar, Dum Dum, Jadavpur and Barrackpore. Chennai's PCs are – Chennai North, Chennai Central and Chennai South. Bangalore's PCs are - Bangalore North, Bangalore Central and Bangalore South. Hyderabad's PCs are Hyderabad, Secunderabad and Malkajgiri. Within all these PCs, only those ACs with an urban population of over 35 percent were listed for sampling. They were all listed in 10 separate strata as per their official AC number. Following this, 3 ACs from within each strata/ city (3x10=30) were chosen randomly using the systematic random sampling method.

Step 2 - ACs of the largest city (in terms of population) of the remaining 11 States were listed as per their official AC number in 11 separate strata. Following this, one AC from each city was chosen randomly. The reason a city was chosen even in small States like Assam, Jharkhand etc. was to ensure an adequate urban sample from them/the regions in which they fall, for the purposes of analysis.

Step 3 - The remaining ACs in all States which are 30-100 percent urban were listed in another stratum. States were ordered in terms of the share of their 15- to 34-year-old urban population in India's total 15-34-year-old urban population (from high to low) and the ACs within them were ordered in terms of their official AC number. Once this was done, 11 ACs were chosen randomly using the systematic random sampling method.

Selection of rural seats

Step 4 - The remaining ACs which are under 30 percent urban were listed in another stratum. States were ordered in terms of the share of their 15- to 34 year-old rural population in India's total 15-34 year old rural population (from high to low) and 30 assembly segments were chosen randomly using the systematic random sampling method.

Having followed this method, this is what the sample looked like in every state:

Table A1: Sample spread across 19 States

	Assembly seats from the 10 largest cities of India spread across 8 states	Assembly seats from the largest cities of the remaining 11 states	Assembly seats that are 30%-100% urban from remaining assembly seats of all 19 States	Assembly seats that are <30% urban from remaining assembly seats
South				
Andhra Pradesh	-	1 AC (Vishakhapatanam)	1 AC (Narasaraopet)	2 ACs
Telangana	3 ACs (Hyderabad)	-	1 AC (Ibrahimpatanam)	1 AC
Tamil Nadu	3 ACs (Chennai)	-	3 ACs (Krishnagiri, Udumalaipatti, Kovilpatti)	1 AC
Karnataka	3 ACs (Bangalore)	-	2 ACs (Belgaum Dakshin, Hassan)	2 ACs
Kerala	-	1 AC (Kochi)	1 AC (Ponnani)	1 AC
East				
Assam	-	1 AC (Guwahati)	-	1 AC
Bihar	-	1 AC (Patna)	-	3 ACs
Jharkhand	-	1 AC (Jamshedpur)	-	1 AC
Odisha	-	1 AC (Bhubaneshwar)	1 AC (Rourkela)	2 ACs
West Bengal	3 ACs (Kolkata)	-	1 AC (Bally)	2 ACs
West & Central				
Chhattisgarh	-	1 AC (Raipur)	-	1 AC
Madhya Pradesh	-	1 AC (Indore)	1 AC (Amlai)	2 ACs
Maharashtra	6 ACs (Mumbai, Pune)	-	2 ACs (Amaravati, Ulhasnagar)	2 ACs
Gujarat	6 ACs	-	1 AC (Morbi)	1 AC
North				
Haryana		1 AC (Faridabad)	1 AC (Jagadhari)	1 AC
Delhi	3 ACs (Delhi)	-	-	NA
Punjab	-	1 AC (Ludhiana)	1 AC (Pathankot)	1 AC
Rajasthan	3 ACs (Jaipur)	-	1 AC (Dholpur)	2 ACs
Uttar Pradesh	-	1 AC (Kanpur)	2 ACs (Rampur, Etawah)	4 ACs
Total	**30 ACs**	**11 ACs**	**19 ACs**	**30 ACs**

Stage 2

Selection of Polling Stations

We decided to sample four Polling Stations (PSs) from within each AC using the systematic random sampling method. In ACs sampled from within the 10 largest cities, the largest cities of each state, and the 30-100 percent urban category, PSs that were urban in nature were sampled randomly. While this was a straightforward exercise for the first two categories (ACs sampled from

10 largest cities, and the largest cities) since all PSs within them were urban in nature, for the third category (30-100% Urban) where some PSs were rural in nature we adopted a slightly different method. For this category, the random sampling of urban PSs was done only after having first identified all urban PSs (as indicated on the electoral roll of each polling station) within the 19 sampled ACs. Finally, in the ACs sampled from the rural category (<30% urban), four PSs each were randomly sampled. These were almost all likely to be of rural nature, but if by chance an urban PS was selected, it was replaced by rural one situated right next to it/close to it.

Stage 3

Selection of respondents

The selection of 18- to 34-year-old respondents was done from within the latest electoral rolls of PSs that were sampled in Stage 2. The random sampling was systematic as respondents were selected at regular intervals. Since not all voters in an electoral roll (our sampling frame) fall in the 18 to 34 year age group, the fixed interval method could not be strictly implemented. Instead a suitable respondent closest to a fixed selection point was selected. Taking into consideration a lower completion rate in urban areas in our past surveys, 30 respondents were randomly selected for interviews in urban PSs and 25 in rural PSs of which investigators were expected to interview 15-16 people. This meant that on average 62 respondents aged between 18 and 34 years were to be interviewed in every AC making the targeted sample of this age group about 5580 respondents in the total targeted sample of 6500 respondents. In percentage terms this was to be about 86 percent of the entire targeted sample and hence quite representative of their actual proportion in the total 15-34 year old population of India which is 83 percent. This assumption more or less worked as eventually, the final achieved sample was 6122 of which 5220 were 18 to 34 year olds (85 percent).

Since electoral rolls do not have information of citizens below 18 years of age, a different approach was adopted for sampling/interviewing 15 to 17 year olds. Apart from the randomly selected 18 to 34 year-olds in every PS, as many as 20 households were randomly selected for interviews per PS. This means that in addition to their task of getting in touch with the randomly sampled 18-34 year old respondents in a PS, field investigators were asked to knock on the doors of these 20 randomly sampled households in the same PS and check if they had a 15 to 17 year old residing there. From these 20 households, the investigators were expected to interview 2 to 3 respondents aged between 15 and 17 years ensuring that at least one male or one female is also interviewed from among them. This meant that on average about 10 respondents in the 15 to 17 years age group were interviewed in every AC making the targeted sample of this age group around 900 respondents in the total targeted sample of 6500 respondents. In percentage terms this was to be about 14 percent of the entire targeted sample and hence quite representative of their actual proportion in the total 15-34 year old population of India which is 17 percent. The final achieved sample of 15 to 17 year olds was 902. This is 15 percent of the total achieved sample of 6122.

Fieldwork

The fieldwork of the survey took place in the months of April and May 2016. Before going to the field, Field Investigators (FIs) were imparted training about the survey method and interviewing techniques at day-long training workshops conducted in each of the 19 States. The FIs conducted face to face interviews with the respondents at the place of residence of the respondent using a standardized questionnaire in the language spoken and understood by him/her. A total of 6122 interviews could be completed across the 19 States. Before being finalized, the entire questionnaire (see Appendix III) was piloted and tested in Delhi. Most questions in the questionnaire were structured, i.e., close-ended. However there were some that were kept open-ended in order to find out the respondent's spontaneous feelings about an issue without giving him/her a pre-decided set of options. During the survey, around 35-40 minutes was requested from the respondent to administer the survey. The questionnaires that returned from the field were checked/reviewed for incompleteness and coding errors. The checking and the subsequent data entry took place at the CSDS office in Delhi. The analyses presented in this report have been done using a standard social science statistical package (SPSS).

Sample profile and data weighting

The achieved sample is quite representative of India's 15-34 year old population. The proportion of various demographics in the sample largely matches with the actual proportion of those groups in India's 15-34 year old population, except in terms of locality as we made a deliberate choice to oversample urban respondents. While making generalized claims about the Indian

Table A2: Profile of the raw sample and the weighted sample (%)

	Actual proportion in 15-34-year-old population of India according to Census 2011	Raw proportion in achieved sample	Proportion after weightage by actual State population proportion age-group proportion*	Proportion after weightage by actual State population proportion, age-group proportion and locality proportion**
15-34 years old Urban	33.3	65.2	58	32.9
15-34 years old Rural	66.7	34.8	42	67.1
15-17 years old	17.2	14.8	17.2	17.2
18-21 years old	23.1	9.6	23.1	23.1
22-25 years old	21.4	20.4	21.4	21.4
26-29 years old	17.4	18.7	17.4	17.4
30-34 years old	20.9	36.6	20.9	20.9
15-34-year-old Muslims	14.5	11.5	11.2	10.3
15-34-year-old Christians	2.2	2.5	2.7	3.0
15-34-year-old Sikhs	1.8	2.1	2.0	1.7
15-34-year-old SCs	16.8	17.7	17.3	18.5
15-34-year-old STs	NA	6.7	6.6	9.2
15-34-year-old OBCs	NA	42.3	42.4	43.7
15-34-year-old Women	48.4	41.8	40.7	40.5

*This weight was applied only for analysis by Locality
**This weight was applied for a generalised analysis of Indian youth.

youth, we ensured that the achieved sample was weighted in such a manner that it mirrored (nearly) the actual profile of India's 15-34 year old population as per Census 2011 data (Table 2, Column 4). For such generalized analysis, the sample was weighted by three weights - one, the proportion of the 15-34-year-old population of a State in the total 15-34-year-old population of the 19 States where the survey was conducted; two, the actual proportion of different age groups (15-17, 18-21, 22-25, 26-29, and 30-34) in the larger 15-34-year-old population of the 19 States; three, the actual proportion of urban and rural youths in the larger 15-34-year-old population of the19 States. While analysing only by locality, i.e., Big Cities, Small Cities and Villages or Biggest Cities, Big Cities, Small Cities and Villages, the achieved sample was weighted only by the first and second weights mentioned above, not the third.

Appendix II: Details of how the indices were constructed



Appendix II: Details of how the indices were constructed

Index of Anxiety

The index was constructed by taking into account 14 questions asked during the survey. They are:

Q13a: How much do you worry about job/occupation?

Q13b: How much do you worry about studies?

Q13c: How much do you worry about maintaining family traditions?

Q13d: How much do you worry about family problems?

Q13e: How much do you worry about riots or mob violence in your city/village?

Q13f: How much do you worry about a road accident?

Q13g: How much do you worry about a terrorist attack?

Q37a: How much do you worry about your health?

Q37b: How much do you worry about your body shape/weight/looks?

Q37c: How much do you worry about your inability to speak good English?

Q37d: How much do you worry about losing a friend?

Q37e: How much do you worry about your parents' health?

Q37f: How much do you worry about your marriage?

Q37g: How much do you worry about harassment/teasing?

In each question, the response options offered to the respondent were 'quite a lot', 'somewhat', 'very little', and 'not at all'.

Step 1: An answer that was either 'quite a lot' or 'somewhat' was assigned a score of 1. An answer that was either 'very little' or 'not at all' was assigned a score of 0. A no response/no opinion to the question was also assigned a score of 0.

Step 2: The scores of all 14 questions were summed up. The resulting summated scores ranged from 0 to 14.

Step 3: The summated scores were distributed across five newly created categories that indicated different degrees of anxiety. Summated scores that ranged from 12-14 were categorised as 'Very anxious'. Summated scores that ranged from 9-11 were categorised as being 'Quite anxious'. Summated scores ranging from 6-8 were categorised as 'Somewhat anxious'. Summated scores that ranged from 3-5 were categorised as 'Not much anxious' and summated scores that totalled 0-2 were categorised as 'Not anxious at all'.

	Summated Scores	Weighted Distribution (%)
Very anxious	12-14	23.6
Quite anxious	9-11	31.1
Somewhat anxious	6-8	25.7
Not much anxious	3-5	14.0
Not anxious at all	0-2	5.5

Index of Attitude towards Reservation

This index was constructed by taking into account 7 questions asked during the survey. They are:

Q61a: Should reservation for SCs and STs in government jobs continue?

Q61b: Should reservation for SCs and STs in government colleges/universities continue?

Q61c: Should reservation for OBCs in government jobs continue?

Q61d: Should reservation for OBCs in government colleges/universities continue?

Q62a: Should reservation for SCs and STs in private jobs be implemented?

Q62b: Should reservation for OBCs in private jobs be implemented?

Q62c: Should reservation for backward Muslims in government jobs be implemented?

In Q61a and Q61b, the possible response options were 'yes', 'no', 'only for SC', 'only for ST' and 'less quota'. In Q62a, the possible responses were 'yes', 'no', 'only for SC' and 'only for ST'. In Q61c, Q61d, the possible response options were 'yes', 'no', and 'less quota'. In Q62b and Q62c, the response options were 'yes' and 'no'.

Step 1: An answer that was either 'yes', or 'only for SC' or 'only for ST' or 'less quota' was assigned a score of 1. Meanwhile, a 'no' response was assigned a score of 0. A no response/no opinion to the question was also assigned a score of 0.

Step 2: The scores of all 7 questions were summed up. The resulting summated scores ranged from 0 to 7.

Step 3: The summated scores were distributed across six newly created categories that indicated different degrees of support for reservation. A summated score of 7 was categorised as 'Very high support'. These are respondents who indicated complete or partial support for reservation in all 7 questions related to reservations. Summated scores of 5 or 6 were categorised as 'High support'. A summated score of 4 was categorised as 'Moderate support'. Summated scores of 2 or 3 were categorised as 'Low support'. A summated score of 1 was categorised as 'Very low support'. Finally, a summated score of 0 was categorised as 'No support'.

	Summated Scores	Weighted Distribution (%)
Very high support for reservation	7	23.4
High support for reservation	5-6	13.5
Moderate support for reservation	4	12.6
Low support for reservation	2-3	12.5
Very low support for reservation	1	3.1
No support for reservation	0	35.0

Index of Discrimination

The index of discrimination was constructed by taking into account 5 questions asked during the survey. They are:

Q25a: In the last five years have you ever faced discrimination on account of your state/region?

Q25b: In the last five years have you ever faced discrimination on account of your caste?

Q25c: In the last five years have you ever faced discrimination on account of your gender?

Q25d: In the last five years have you ever faced discrimination on account of your religion?

Q25e: In the last five years have you ever faced discrimination on account of your economic status?

The possible response options to all five questions were 'yes' and 'no'.

Step 1: A 'yes' response was assigned a score of 1. A 'no' answer was scored as 0. No response to the question was also scored as 0.

Step 2: The scores of all five questions were summed up. The summated scores of all questions ranged from 0 to 5.

Step 3: The summated scores were distributed across four new categories. Summated scores that were either 4 or 5 were

	Summated Scores	Weighted Distribution (%)
Faced a lot of discrimination	4-5	1.9
Faced some discrimination	2-3	7.0
Faced little discrimination	1	8.1
Faced no discrimination at all	0	83.0

categorised as 'Faced a lot of discrimination'. In other words those falling within this category had answered either all five or four of the five questions in the affirmative. Summated scores that were either 2 or 3 were categorised as 'Faced some discrimination'. A summated score of 1 was categorised as 'Faced little discrimination'. Finally, 0 was categorised as 'Faced no discrimination at all'.

Index of Discriminatory Attitudes

This index was constructed by taking into account 7 questions asked during the survey. They are:

Q42a: Would it create discomfort/problems for you if they were your neighbours - people who cook non-veg food?

Q42b: Would it create discomfort/problems for you if they were your neighbours - people from another caste?

Q42c: Would it create discomfort/problems for you if they were your neighbours - people who drink alcohol?

Q42d: Would it create discomfort/problems for you if they were your neighbours - people from another religion?

Q42e: Would it create discomfort/problems for you if they were your neighbours - people from Africa?

Q42f: Would it create discomfort/problems for you if they were your neighbours - people from another state?

Q42g: Would it create discomfort/problems for you if they were your neighbours - a man and woman living together outside of marriage?

In each question, the possible response options were 'yes', 'no', and 'maybe'.

Step 1: An answer that was either 'yes' or 'maybe' was scored as 1. No response to the question was also scored as 1. A 'no' answer was assigned 0 points.

Step 2: The scores of all 7 questions were summed up. The resulting summated scores ranged from 0 to 7.

Step 3: The summated scores were then distributed across four newly created categories that indicated different degrees of discriminatory attitude. Summated scores ranging from 5-7 were categorised as 'Very discriminatory'. Summated scores of 3 or 4 were categorised as 'Somewhat discriminatory'. Summated scores of 1 or 2 were labelled as 'Not too discriminatory'. Finally, a summated score of 0 was categorised as 'Not at all discriminatory'.

	Summated Scores	Weighted Distribution (%)
Very discriminatory	5-7	8.6
Somewhat discriminatory	3-4	10.5
Not too discriminatory	1-2	24.9
Not at all discriminatory	0	56.1

Index of Electoral Participation

The index of electoral participation was constructed by taking into account 5 questions asked during the survey. They are:

Q18a: In the last ten years, have you attended an election meeting during any election?

Q18b: In the last ten years, have you taken part in a procession or a rally during any election?

Q18c: In the last ten years, have you done door to door campaigning during any election?

Q18d: In the last ten years, have you donated or collected money during any election?

Q18e: In the last ten years, have you distributed leaflets or put posters during any election?

The possible response options to all five questions were 'yes' and 'no'.

Step 1: A 'yes' response was assigned 1 point. A 'no' response was scored as 0. Those who did not answer the question were also assigned a score of 0.

Step 2: The scores of all questions were summed up. The summated scores of all questions ranged from 0 to 5.

Step 3: The summated scores were then distributed across six newly created categories that indicated different levels of electoral participation. A summated score of 5 was categorised as 'Very high electoral participation'. These are basically those respondents who said that they participated in all five election-related activities. A summated score of 4 was labelled as 'High electoral participation', 3 as 'Moderate electoral participation', 2 as 'Low electoral participation', 1 as 'Very low electoral participation' and 0 as 'No electoral participation'.

	Summated Scores	Weighted Distribution (%)
Very high electoral participation	5	2.5
High electoral participation	4	2.1
Moderate electoral participation	3	3.6
Low electoral participation	2	7.5
Very low electoral participation	1	9.7
No electoral participation	0	74.5

Index of Emotional Distress

The index was constructed by taking into account 4 questions asked during the survey. They are:

Q39b: How often do you feel mental tension/depression?

Q39c: How often do you feel lonely?

Q39d: How often do you feel that I am not worth anything?

Q39e: How often do you get thoughts of suicide/ending your life?

In each question, the response options offered to the respondent were 'very often, 'sometimes', 'very little', and 'never'.

Step 1: The response categories of 'very often' or 'sometimes' were defined as being distressed, and the categories of 'very little' or 'never', or anyone who gave 'no response' were defined as being not distressed.

Step 2: Any response belonging to the 'not distressed' category was assigned a score of 0 across all the four questions. However, responses belonging to the 'distressed' category were not treated as being equal across all questions. They were instead assigned different scores/weights depending on the nature of the question. In the question on loneliness (Q39c), response options 'very often' or 'sometimes' were assigned a score of 1. In the questions on depression (Q39b) and worthlessness (Q39d), they were assigned a score of 2. In the question on suicidal thoughts (Q39e) they were weighted even higher and assigned a score of 3.

Step 3: The scores of all four questions were summed up. The resulting summated scores ranged from 0 to 8.

Step 4: The summated scores were distributed across four newly created categories that indicated different levels of emotional distress. Summated scores that ranged from 6-8 were categorised as 'High emotional distress'. Summated scores that ranged from 3-5 were categorised as 'Moderate emotional distress'. Summated scores that were either 1 or 2 were categorised as 'Low emotional distress'. Finally, a summated score of 0 was categorised as 'No emotional distress'.

	Summated Scores	Weighted Distribution (%)
High emotional distress	6-8	7.0
Moderate emotional distress	3-5	23.8
Low emotional distress	1-2	17.6
No emotional distress	0	51.6

Index of News Media Exposure

The index was constructed by taking into account 4 questions asked during the survey. They are:

Q67h: How often do you watch news on TV?

Q67i: How often do you read the newspaper?

Q67j: How often do you listen to the radio?

Q67k: How often do you read news on internet websites?

In each question, the response options given to the interviewee were 'daily', 'few days a week', 'few days a month' 'very rarely' and 'never'.

Step 1: The response option of 'daily' was scored as 4, 'few days a week' was scored as 3, 'few days a month was scored as 2, 'rarely' was scored as 1, and 'never' and those who did not give a response were scored as 0.

Step 2: The scores of all questions were summed up. The summated scores of all questions ranged from 0 to 12.

	Summated Scores	Weighted Distribution (%)
Very high exposure	12	8.0
High exposure	9-11	16.5
Moderate exposure	7-8	16.5
Low exposure	4-6	28.0
Very low exposure	1-3	15.0
No exposure	0	8.1

Step 3: The summated scores were then distributed across six newly created categories that indicated the intensity of news media exposure. A summated score of 12 was labelled as 'Very high exposure', a score of 9 to 11 was categorised as 'High exposure', 7 or 8 as 'Moderate exposure', 4 to 6 as 'Low exposure', 1 to 3 as 'Very low exposure' and 0 as 'No exposure'.

Index of Patriarchal Mindset

This index was constructed by taking into account 5 questions asked during the survey. They are:

Q35a: 'It is not right for women to work/do a job after marriage'; do you agree with this statement or disagree with it?

Q35b: 'Overall, men prove to be better leaders than women'; do you agree with this statement or disagree with it?

Q35c: 'Higher education is more important for boys than girls'; do you agree with this statement or disagree with it?

Q35d: 'Wives should always listen to their husbands'; do you agree with this statement or disagree with it?

Q35e: 'Girls should not wear jeans'; do you agree with this statement or disagree with it?

In each question, response options offered were 'agree fully', 'agree somewhat', 'disagree somewhat', and 'disagree fully'.

Step 1: An answer that was either 'disagree fully' or 'disagree somewhat' was scored as 1. Meanwhile a response that was either 'agree fully' or 'agree somewhat' was assigned a score of 0. A no response/no opinion to the question was also assigned a score of 0.

Step 2: The scores of all 5 questions were summed up. The resulting summated scores ranged from 0 to 5.

Step 3: The summated scores were then distributed across four newly created categories that indicated different degrees of patriarchal mindset. A summated score of 0 was categorised as having a 'Very patriarchal in mindset'. These are respondents who either agreed with all the five statements read out to them or stayed silent on the issue preferring not to respond. Summated scores of 1 or 2 were categorised as 'Somewhat patriarchal mindset'. Summated scores of 3 or 4 were labelled as 'Not much patriarchal mindset'. Finally, a summated score of 5 was categorised as 'No patriarchal mindset at all'.

	Summated Scores	Weighted Distribution (%)
Very patriarchal mindset	0	23.5
Somewhat patriarchal mindset	1-2	28.7
Not much patriarchal mindset	3-4	29.4
No patriarchal mindset at all	5	18.3

Index of Religiosity

The index was constructed by taking into account 6 questions asked during the survey. They are:

Q46a: How often do you do puja/namaz/prayer/path?

Q46b: How often do you do bhajan/kirtan/satsang?

Q46c: How often do you keep vrats/upwaas/rozas/fasts?

Q46d: How often do you go to temple/mosque/church/gurudwara?

Q46e: How often do you watch religious shows on TV?

Q46f: How often do you read a religious book?

In each question, the response options given to the interviewee were 'regularly', 'sometimes', 'only on festivals' and 'never'.

Step 1: Anyone who said 'regularly' was assigned a score of 3. Anyone who said 'sometimes' was assigned a score of 2. The response category of 'only on festivals' was assigned 1 point. Those who said 'never' or those who did not give any opinion on the question (no response) were scored as 0.

Step 2: The scores of all questions were summed up. The summated scores of all questions ranged from 0 to 18.

Step 3: These scores were then distributed across six newly created categories that indicated the intensity of religiosity. Summated scores ranging from 14 to 18 were labelled as 'Very high religiosity', 11 to 13 as 'High religiosity', 8 to 10 as 'Moderate religiosity', 5 to 7 as 'Low', 1 to 4 as 'Very low religiosity' and 0 as 'No religiosity'.

	Summated Scores	Weighted Distribution (%)
Very high religiosity	14-18	11.9
High religiosity	11-13	23.8
Moderate religiosity	8-10	24.5
Low religiosity	5-7	22.5
Very low religiosity	1-4	13.0
No religiosity	0	4.3

Index of Social Liberalism/Conservatism

This index was constructed by taking into account 20 questions asked during the survey. They are:

Q35a: 'It is not right for women to work/do a job after marriage'; do you agree with this statement or disagree with it?

Q35b: 'Overall, men prove to be better leaders than women'; do you agree with this statement or disagree with it?

Q35c: Higher education is more important for boys than girls'; do you agree with this statement or disagree with it?

Q35d: 'Wives should always listen to their husbands'; do you agree with this statement or disagree with it?

Q35e: 'Girls should not wear jeans'; do you agree with this statement or disagree with it?

Q35f: 'In life it is not very important to get married'; do you agree with this statement or disagree with it?

Q36a: Do you consider the marriage between a man and a woman belonging to different castes right or wrong?

Q36b: Do you consider the marriage between a man and a woman belonging to different religions right or wrong?

Q36c: Do you consider a man and a woman living together without marriage right or wrong?

Q36d: Do you consider a man and a woman meeting/dating each other before getting married right or wrong?

Q36e: Do you consider celebrating Valentine's Day right or wrong?

Q36f: Do you consider love affair between two women right or wrong?

Q36g: Do you consider love affair between two men right or wrong?

Q42a: Would it create discomfort/problems for you if they were your neighbours - people who cook non-veg food?

Q42b: Would it create discomfort/problems for you if they were your neighbours - people from another caste?

Q42c: Would it create discomfort/problems for you if they were your neighbours - people who drink alcohol?

Q42d: Would it create discomfort/problems for you if they were your neighbours - people from another religion?

Q42e: Would it create discomfort/problems for you if they were your neighbours - people from Africa?

Q42f: Would it create discomfort/problems for you if they were your neighbours - people from another state?

Q42g: Would it create discomfort/problems for you if they were your neighbours - a man and woman living together outside of marriage?

In Q35a-Q35f, the response options offered to the respondent were 'agree fully', 'agree somewhat', 'disagree fully', and 'disagree somewhat'. In Q36a-Q36g, the possible response options were 'right', 'somewhat right' and 'wrong'. In Q42a-42g question, the possible response options were 'yes, 'no', and 'maybe'.

Step 1: In Q35a-Q35e, 'disagree somewhat' or 'disagree fully' was assigned 1 point. Meanwhile 'agree fully' or 'agree somewhat' or 'no response' to the question were assigned a score of 0. No response. In Q35f, 'agree fully' or 'agree somewhat' were given 1 point and 'disagree fully' or disagree somewhat' or 'no response' were scored as 0. In Q36a-Q36g, 'right' or 'somewhat right' were scored as 1 and 'wrong' or 'no response' to the question were scored as 0. In Q42a-42g, 'yes' or 'maybe' or 'no reponse' to the question were scored as 0. Meanwhile 'no' was scored as 1.

Step 2: The scores of all 20 questions were totalled. The summated scores of all questions ranged from 0 to 20.

Step 3: The summated scores were distributed across four newly created categories that indicated degrees of social liberalism. Summated scores between 15 and 20 were categorised as 'Very socially liberal', 10 and 14 as 'Somewhat socially liberal', between 5 and 9 as 'Somewhat socially conservative', and between 0 and 4 as 'Very conservative'.

	Summated Scores	Weighted Distribution (%)
Very socially liberal	15-20	14.3
Somewhat socially liberal	10-14	38.1
Somewhat socially conservative	5-9	36.3
Very socially conservative	0-4	11.3

Index of Social Media Usage

The index was constructed by taking into account 4 questions asked during the survey. They are:

Q67a: How often do you use Facebook?

Q67b: How often do you use Twitter?

Q67c: How often do you use WhatsApp?

Q67d: How often do you watch videos on YouTube?

In each question, response options given were 'daily', 'few days a week', 'few days a month''very rarely' and 'never'.

Step 1: The response option of 'daily' was scored as 4, 'few days a week' was scored as 3, 'few days a month' was scored as 2, 'rarely' was scored as 1, and 'never' and those who did not give a response were scored as 0.

Step 2: The scores of all questions were summed up. The summated scores of all questions ranged from 0 to 16.

Step 3: These scores were then distributed across six newly created categories that indicated the intensity of social media usage. Summated scores ranging from 14 to 16 were labelled as 'Very high usage', 11 to 13 as 'High usage', 7 to 10 as 'Moderate usage', 4 to 6 as 'Low usage', 1 to 3 as 'Very low usage' and 0 as 'No usage'.

	Summated Scores	Weighted Distribution (%)
Very high usage	14-16	8.2
High usage	11-13	10.8
Moderate usage	7-10	13.0
Low usage	4-6	8.7
Very low usage	1-3	9.4
No usage	0	50.0

Index of Style Consciousness

The index was constructed by taking into account 6 questions asked during the survey. They are:

Q27a: How fond are you keeping the latest mobile phone?

Q27b: How fond are you wearing stylish clothes?

Q27c: How fond are you wearing stylish shoes/sandals?

Q27e: How fond are you applying fairness cream on the face?

Q27f: How fond are you buying deodorants/perfumes?

Q27g: How fond are you going to a beauty parlour/salon?

In each question, the response options offered to the respondent were 'a lot', 'somewhat', 'very less' and 'not at all'.

Step 1: An answer that was either 'a lot' or 'somewhat' were scored as 1. The answer categories of 'very less' or 'not at all' or those who did not give any opinion on the question (no response) were scored as 0.

Step 2: The scores of all questions were summed up. The summated scores of all questions ranged from 0 to 6.

Step 3: These summated scores were then distributed across four newly created categories that indicated different degrees of style consciousness. A summated score of 6 was categorised as 'Very style conscious'. Summated scores that ranged from 4 to 5 were categorised as 'Somewhat style conscious'. A score of 2 or 3 was labelled as 'Not much style conscious' and summated scores that were either 0 or 1 were categorised as 'Not style conscious at all'.

	Summated Scores	Weighted Distribution (%)
Very style conscious	6	19.1
Somewhat style conscious	4-5	23.1
Not much style conscious	2-3	26.1
Not style conscious at all	0-1	31.7

Index of Travel

The index of travel was constructed by taking into account 3 questions asked during the survey. They are:

Q21a: Have you ever travelled outside your district?

Q21b: Have you ever travelled outside your state to another state?

Q21c: Have you ever travelled outside India to another country?

The possible response options to all three questions were 'yes' and 'no'.

Step 1: A 'yes' response was assigned a score of 1. Meanwhile a 'no' response was assigned a score of 0. Anyone who did not answer the question was also assigned a score of 0.

Step 2: The scores of all questions were summed up. The summated scores of all three questions ranged from 0 to 3.

Step 3: The summated scores were then distributed across four newly created categories that indicated different levels of travel/mobility. A summated score of 3 was categorised as 'Travelled a lot'. These are basically those respondents who said that they had travelled outside their district, outside their state to another state and outside the country. A summated score of 2 was labelled as 'Travelled somewhat', 1 as 'Travelled very little' and 0 as 'Not travelled at all'.

	Summated Scores	Weighted Distribution (%)
Travelled a lot	3	3.4
Travelled somewhat	2	51.6
Travelled very little	1	32.6
Not travelled at all	0	12.4

Class Classification

The Economic Class index was constructed by taking into account the type of house a respondent lives in, the occupation of the respondent, the assets owned by the respondent's household and the monthly income of the household. In the case of a respondent being a student or housewife, the occupation of the main earner of the household was taken into consideration.

The index was constructed in three steps.

Step 1: The first step involved defining the typical/standard characteristics of four pre-determined classes - upper class, middle class, lower class, and poor.

A typical Upper Class respondent was defined in the following terms:

Type of house: a respondent who lives in a bungalow/independent house/flat with 5 rooms or more; a respondent in a village living in a pucca house.

Occupation: a respondent who is either in a professional job or is an elected official or a Class I employee in the government or a big businessman or a farmer/cultivator who owns over 10 acres of land.

Asset: a respondent whose household owns a car; a rural respondent whose household owns a pumping set or a tractor.

Income: a rural respondent with a household monthly income of over Rs 8,000; a town respondent with a household monthly income of over Rs 13,000; a city respondent with a household monthly income of over Rs 17,000.

Each of the four categories above was assigned a score of 4.

A typical Middle Class respondent was defined in the following terms:

Type of house: a respondent in a city/town living in a house/flat with 3-4 rooms; a respondent in a village living in a mixed house or a pucca-kuchha house.

Occupation: a respondent who is either in a lower professional job or is a Class II employee in the government or a medium businessman or a farmer/cultivator who owns over 5-10 acres of land.

Asset: a respondent whose household owns at least two of the following four items - a microwave, washing machine, refrigerator and power backup/inverter.

Income: a rural respondent with a household monthly income of Rs 4-000-8,000; a town respondent with a household monthly income of Rs 7,000-13,000; a city respondent with a household monthly income of Rs 9,000-17,000.

Each of the four categories above was assigned a score of 3.

A typical Lower Class respondent was defined in the following terms:

Type of house: a respondent in a town/ city living in house with 1-2 rooms or in a mainly kutcha house; a respondent in a village living in a kuchha/mud house.

Occupation: a respondent who is either a medical technician or a Class III/IV employee in the government or a small businessman/ petty shopkeeper or a farmer/cultivator who owns 1-4 acres of land or a skilled worker.

Asset: an urban respondent whose household owns only LPG gas; a rural respondent whose household owns LPG gas and a fan/ cooler but nothing else.

Income: a rural respondent with a household monthly income of Rs 1-000-4,000; a town respondent with a household monthly income of Rs 2,500-7,000; a city respondent with a household monthly income of Rs 4,000-9,000.

Each of the four categories above was assigned a score of 2.

A typical Poor Class respondent was defined in the following terms:

Type of house: a respondent in a town/ city living in a jhuggi jhopri; a respondent in a village living in a hut.

Occupation: a respondent who is either an ayah or a maid or an unskilled worker or agricultural labourer or is unemployed.

Asset: an urban respondent whose household has none of the assets asked about in the questionnaire; a rural respondent whose household only has LPG gas.

Income: a rural respondent with a household monthly income of upto Rs 1,000 only; a town respondent with a household monthly income of upto Rs 2,500 only; a city respondent with a household monthly income of upto Rs 4,000 only.

Each of the four categories above was assigned a score of 1.

Step 2: All the scores were added up. The summated scores ranged from 4 to 16.

Step 3: The summated scores were distributed across four class categories. A respondent with a summated score of 13-16 was categorised as being 'Upper Class/Rich'. A respondent with summated scores of 11 or 12 was categorised as being 'Middle Class'. A respondent with a summated score of either 8 or 9 or 10 was categorised as being 'Lower Class'. Finally, a respondent with a summated score of 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 was categorised as being 'Poor'.

	Summated Scores	Weighted Distribution (%)
Upper Class/Rich	13-16	18.5
Middle Class	11-12	28.9
Lower Class	8-10	28.9
Poor	4-7	23.6

Caste and Community Classification

Hindu Upper Caste - Brahmin, Bhumihar, Rajput, Kayastha, Vaish, Jain, Punjabi Khatri and Other Upper castes.

Hindu Peasant Proprietor/Dominant farming castes - Jat, Reddy, Kamma, Nair, Maratha, Patel, Patidar, Velama, Kapu, Telaga, Balija, Naidu and Other Peasant Proprietors. In some tables the Peasant Proprietors or the Dominant farming castes have been merged with Hindu Upper Caste.

Hindu Peasant OBC - Gujjar, Thevar, Yadav, Kurmi, Mudaliar, Gowda, Lodh, Vanniyar, Munnuru Kapu, Koeri, Kushwaha, Mutharayars, Mudiraj, Vokkaliga, Kalinga, Lingayat, Thurpu Kapu, Gaderia, Koppulu Velama, Kunbi, Maratha Kunbi, Koli, Charan, Rabari, Bharwad, Kshatriya-Thakore (Gujarat), Chaudhary (Gujarat), Nadar, Koch, Dhangar, Vanjari, Leva Patil, Gowari, Agri, Powar, Mali/

Saini, Kashyap and Other Peasant OBCs.

Hindu Artisanal and Service OBC - Darzee, Thatihar, Lakhera, Badhai, Kumhar, Lohar, Sunar, Kewat, Dhobi, Nai, Teli (oil pressers), Jogi, Newar, Dhimar, Bhat, Landless Labourers, Toddy tappers and Other Service OBCs.

Hindu SC - Jatav, Satnami, Balmiki, Pasi, Pano, Devendrakula Vellar, Dhobi/Kori, Khatiks, Rajbhanshis, Mala, Namasudras, Mahar, Boyar, Dom, Dhobi (non-OBC), Kewat (non-OBC), Dhanuk,, Kori, Adi Karnataka, Adi Dravida, Thiruvalluvar, Banjara, Bhovi, Holaya, Pulaya, Kuruva and Other SCs.

Hindu ST - Mina, Bhil, Gond, Oraon, Santhal, Munda, Kondh, Baiga, Kharia, Bhumij and Other STs.

Muslim Upper - Ashraf (Sayyad, Sheikh), Mughal (Khan), Muslim Rajput and Other Muslim Upper castes.

Muslim OBC - Muslim peasants, traders, craftsmen, weavers and Other Muslim OBCs.

Muslim Other – Muslim unclassifiable

	Weighted Distribution (%)
Hindu Upper Caste	13.3
Hindu Peasant Proprietor/Dominant farming caste	7.8
Hindu Peasant OBC	25.6
Hindu Artisanal and Service OBC	9.7
Hindu SC/Dalit	16.5
Hindu ST/Adivasi	7.6
Muslim Upper	5.2
Muslim OBC	4.3
Muslim Other	0.8
Other	9.1

Appendix III: Questionnaire



State Code

A.C. No.

P.S. No.

Res. No.

Investigator Roll No.

CSDS-KAS Youth Survey 2016

F1. State Name:

F2. Assembly Constituency (A.C.) Name: _____

F3. Polling Station (P.S.) Name: _____

F4. Name of the Respondent: (Res.)_____

F5. Address of the Respondent_____

_____

F6. Date of interview ***(dd/mm/yyyy)***: _____

F7. Name of Investigator & Roll No. : _____

*I have come from **(give name of your university)/**the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), a research organization located in Delhi. We are studying the opinions and attitudes of Indian youth for which we will interview hundreds of young people across the country. The findings of the research will be used for writing articles and academic purposes. The survey is an independent study and is not linked with any political party or government agency. The interview will take about 35 to 40 minutes. Kindly spare some time for this interview and answer my questions as I need your active cooperation for making this study successful. Your identity will be kept strictly confidential.*

F8. May I begin the interview now? 1. Agrees to be interviewed 2. Does not agree to be interviewed

Q1. Gender: 1. Male 2. Female 3. Other

Q2. Age _____ years 98. Didn't tell

Q3. Who do you live with – with your parents, with a friend, with your life partner, in a hostel or alone?

1. With parents 2. With friend/companion 3. With life partner 4. In a hostel
5. Alone 6. Other_____ 8. No response (NR)

Q4. Up to what level have you studied? ***(Note down answer and later consult codebook for coding)***

_____ 9. Did not tell

Q4a. ***(If in college or went to college)*** Is the college that you went to or go to, a government college or a private college?

1. Government 2. Private 3. Other_____ 8. Don't know (DK) 9. Not applicable (NA)

Q4b. ***(If in college or went to college)*** Are/were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the following things in college?

	Satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Dissatisfied	Can't say	NA
a. Level of education/teachers	1	2	3	8	9
b. With the college fees	1	2	3	8	9
c. With the classroom's condition	1	2	3	8	9
d. Condition of student union politics	1	2	3	8	9

Q4c. ***(If in school/went to school or if in college/went to college)*** Was the school where you spent most of your schooling years a government school or a private school? 1. Government 2. Private 3. Other_____
8. DK 9. NA

Q4d. ***(If in school/went to school or if in college/went to college)*** Are/were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the following things in school?

	Satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Dissatisfied	Can't say	NA
a. Level of education/teachers	1	2	3	8	9
b. With the school fees	1	2	3	8	9
c. With the classroom's condition	1	2	3	8	9
d. With the toilet's condition	1	2	3	8	9

Q4e. ***(If in school/went to school or if in college/went to college)*** Is/was your school an English medium school?

2. Yes 1. No 3. Some subjects 4. After some classes 8. NR 9. NA

Q5. **a.** Are you thinking of obtaining higher education abroad?

2. Yes 1. No 3. Have already obtained there 4. Non-literate 8. Can't say

b. Has any member of your family or a close relative studied or is studying abroad?

2. Yes 1. No 8. No response

F M

Q6. Up to what level have your parents studied? ***(Note down answer and Consult codebook for codes)***

Father:_____ Mother:_____ 9. No response

Q7. What is your main occupation? ***(Note down answer and code later from the codebook. If the respondent calls himself/herself a student or housewife then note down that as well)***

_____ 98. No response

Q7a. ***(If works/has an occupation)*** How satisfied are you with your work/occupation – a lot, somewhat or not at all satisfied?

1. A lot 2. Somewhat 3. None at all 8. No response 9. NA

Q8. Occupation? (***Note down answer and consult codebook for codes; if retired then ask from which position did they retire***)

a. **a.** What is your mother's occupation?_____ 98. No response

b. **b.** What is your father's occupation?_____ 98. No response

Q9. If suppose you had the complete freedom to choose your occupation, which occupation would you have chosen? ***(Note down answer. Coding will be done at CSDS)*** _____

97. The same occupation that I do now 98. No response

Q10. **a.** Are you thinking of working or finding a job abroad?

2. Yes 1. No 3. Have already worked abroad 8. Can't say (CS)

b. Has any member of your family or a close relative worked or is working abroad?

2. Yes 1. No 8. No response

Q11. If you had to choose from among the following what would you have chosen – a government job, a private job or your own business/profession?

1. Government 2. Private 3. Own business/profession 8. Can't say

Q12. Out of these four kinds of jobs which one would you give most priority to? ***(Read out answers 1 to 4 to the respondent)***

1. Permanent job even if it means drawing a little less salary.
2. Job with an opportunity to work with people of your liking.
3. Job with good income in which one doesn't have to worry about money.
4. Job that gives you a feeling of satisfaction. 8. Can't say

Q13. How much do you worry about the following things – quite a lot, somewhat, very little or not at all?

	Quite a lot	Somewhat	Very little	Not at all	NR
a. **a.** About job/occupation	1	2	3	4	8
b. **b.** About studies	1	2	3	4	8
c. **c.** About maintaining family traditions	1	2	3	4	8
d. **d.** About family problems	1	2	3	4	8
e. **e.** About riots or mob violence in your city/village	1	2	3	4	8
f. **f.** About a road accident	1	2	3	4	8
g. **g.** About a terrorist attack	1	2	3	4	8

Q14. Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your life these days? ***(If satisfied then ask further whether fully or somewhat. If dissatisfied then ask whether fully or somewhat)***

1. Fully satisfied 2. Somewhat satisfied 3. Somewhat dissatisfied
4. Fully dissatisfied 8. Can't say

Q15. How do you see your future after ten years. Do you think your life will be a lot better, somewhat better, or will it be worse?

1. A lot better 2. Somewhat better 3. Worse 4. Same as it is now 8. CS

Q16. How much interest do you take in politics - a lot, somewhat, very little or none at all?

1. A lot 2. Some 3. Very little 4. None at all 8. Can't say

Q17a. Does your mother take more interest in politics than you or less interest?

1. More 2. Less 3. Same 4. Does not take interest at all 8. CS

Q17b. Does your father take more interest in politics than you or less interest?

1. More 2. Less 3. Same 4. Does not take interest at all 8. CS

Q18. In the last ten years, have you taken part in the following activities during any election?

	Yes	No	No response
a. Attended an election meeting?	2	1	8
b. Taken part in a procession or a rally?	2	1	8
c. Done door to door campaigning?	2	1	8
d. Donated or collected money?	2	1	8
e. Distributed leaflets or put posters?	2	1	8

Q19. In the last two years how many times have you taken part in activites like a protest demonstration, a sit-in, a procession or a movement – many times, a few times or never?

1. Many times 2. A few times 3. Never 8. No opinion

Q19a. *(If took part)* What was the demonstration/movement about? *(You can take up to two responses)*

a. _____ 98. No response 99. NA

b. _____ 98. No response 99. NA

Q20. *(If respondent is 18-34 years old)* Ever since you became a voter, have you voted in every election, many elections, some elections or hardly ever voted?

1. Every time 2. Many times 3. Sometimes 4. Hardly ever 5. Never voted
6. Just turned 18 8. No response 9. Not applicable

Q21. Have you ever travelled .....?

	Yes	No	No response
a. Outside your district?	2	1	8
b. Outside your state to another state?	2	1	8
c. Outside India to another country?	2	1	8

Q22. How much do you discuss the following matters with your mother or father – often, sometimes, very little or never?

	Often	Sometimes	Very less	Never	Felt shy	CS
a. About politics	1	2	3	4	5	8
b. About your career/education	1	2	3	4	5	8
c. About your romantic or love relationships	1	2	3	4	5	8
d. About marriage	1	2	3	4	5	8

Q23. And how much influence did will your parents have on these decisions – a lot, some, very less or none at all?

	A lot	Some	Very little	Not at all	CS
a. About your career/education	1	2	3	4	8
b About your marriage	1	2	3	4	8

Q24. a. **a.** Do you have a desire of settling down abroad?

2. Yes 1. No 3. Have already lived abroad 8. CS

b. **b.** *(If yes in Q24a)* Then in which country? ***(Note down answer and consult codebook for coding)***

_____ 98. CS 99. NA

c. **c.** *(If answered in Q24b)* Why do you have a desire to settle down in this country? ***(Note down answer consult codebook for coding)***_____ 98. CS 99. NA

d. **d.** Is any member of your family or a close relative living abroad or has lived abroad?

2. Yes 1. No 8. No response

Q25 **Q25a** **Q25.** In the last five years have you ever faced discrimination on the following basis? ***Q25a. (If yes)*** Where did you experience it the most? ***(Note answer and consult codebook)***

	Yes	No	*(If yes)* Where did you experience it most?
a. On account of your state/region	2	1	_____ 98. NR 99. NA
b. On account of your caste	2	1	_____ 98. NR 99. NA
c. On account of your gender	2	1	_____ 98. NR 99. NA
d. On account of your religion	2	1	_____ 98. NR 99. NA
e. On account of your economic status	2	1	_____ 98. NR 99. NA

Q26. How often do you do the following things – at least once a week, at least once a month, few times a year, very rarely or never?

	Week	Month	Year	Very rarely	Never	No response
a. Go to watch a movie in a cinema hall	1	2	3	4	5	8
b. Go to eat or drink in a hotel/restaurant/café/bar	1	2	3	4	5	8
c. Go to a shopping mall/complex	1	2	3	4	5	8

Q27. And how fond are you of the following things - a lot, somewhat, very less or not at all?

	A lot	Somewhat	Very-less	Not-at-all	NR
a. Keeping the latest mobile phone	1	2	3	4	8
b. Wearing stylish clothes	1	2	3	4	8
c. Wearing stylish shoes/sandals	1	2	3	4	8
d. Reading books	1	2	3	4	8
e. Applying fairness cream on the face	1	2	3	4	8
f. Buying deodrants/perfumes	1	2	3	4	8
g. Going to a beauty parlour/salon	1	2	3	4	8
h. Listening to music/songs	1	2	3	4	8

Q28. Do you agree or disagree with these statements? ***(If agree then ask further whether fully or somewhat. If disagree then ask whether fully or somewhat)***

	Agree		Disagree		CS
	Fully	Somewhat	Somewhat	Fully	
a. It is important in life to be more successful than others.	1	2	3	4	8
b. One cannot succeed much in life if one is honest.	1	2	3	4	8
c. To remain happy it is important to have a lot of money.	1	2	3	4	8
d. Success is less dependent on hard work and more on luck or connections.	1	2	3	4	8
e. Films that hurt the sentiments of any community should be banned.	1	2	3	4	8
f. Whenever there is a clash between science and religion, religion is always right.	1	2	3	4	8

Q29. Which political party do you like **the most**? ***(Note down answer and consult codebook for coding)***

_____ 96. No party 98. Can't say

Q29a. ***(If like in Q29)*** What is the one thing that you like **the most** about this party? ***(Note down answer and consult codebook for coding)***_____98. No response. 99. NA

Q30. Do the existing political parties in our country provide a good option to solve the country's problems?

2. Yes, they do 1. No, they don't 3. Some do, some don't 8. Can't say

Q31a. According to you from what age should a person be allowed to contest elections? _____ years 98. NR

Q31b. And after what age should leaders not be allowed to contest elections? _____ years

97. There should be no age limit 98. NR

Q32. Are you married? 1. Married 2. Married ***(Gauna not performed, not started living together)***

3. Widowed 4. Divorced 5. Separated 6. Deserted

7. Unmarried ***(Go to 32e)*** 8. Live with partner but not married 9. NR

Q32a. ***(If answer is 1/2/3/4/5/6 in Q32)*** Do you have children? 2. Yes 1. No 8. NR 9. NA

Q32b. ***(If have children)*** Is it a boy or a girl? 1. Boy 2. Girl 3. Both 8. NR 9. NA

Q32c. ***(If answer is 1/2/3/4/5/6 in Q32)*** Was your marriage a love marriage or an arranged marriage decided by the family?

1. Love marriage 2. Arranged marriage 3. Both 4. Other_____ 8. No response 9. NA

Q32d. ***(If answer is 1/2/3/4/5/6 in Q32)*** Is/was your husband/wife…?

a. From your caste 2. Yes 1. No 3. Don't know 8. No response 9. NA

b. From your gotra 2. Yes 1. No 3. Don't know 8. No response 9. NA

c. From your religion 2. Yes 1. No 8. No response 9. NA

d. From your state 2. Yes 1. No 8. No response 9. NA

Q32e. ***(If single/unmarried)*** When you get married, would you prefer a love marriage or an arranged marriage decided by the family? 1. Love marriage 2. Arranged marriage 3. Both 4. Time will tell 8. No response 9. NA

Q33. Have you ever given an advertisement for your marriage on a matrimonial website or in a newspaper?

2. Yes 1. No 8. Can't say

Q34. What was/will be the most important consideration for you while choosing your life partner? ***(Note down answer and consult codebook for coding)***_____98. Can't say

Q35. Tell me for each statement, do you agree with it or disagree with it? ***(If agree then ask further whether fully or somewhat. If disagree then ask whether fully or somewhat)***

	Agree		Disagree		CS
	Fully	Somewhat	Somewhat	Fully	
a. It is not right for women to work/do a job after marriage.	1	2	3	4	8
b. Overall, men prove to be better leaders than women.	1	2	3	4	8
c. Higher education is more important for men than women.	1	2	3	4	8
d. Wives should always listen to their husbands.	1	2	3	4	8
e. Girls should not wear jeans.	1	2	3	4	8
f. In life, it is **not** very important to get married.	1	2	3	4	8

Q36. Do you consider the following things right or wrong?

	Right	Somewhat right	Wrong	Can't Say
a. Marriage between a men and women belonging to different castes	1	2	3	8
b. Marriage between a men and women belonging to different religions	1	2	3	8
c. A men and women living together without marriage	1	2	3	8
d. A men and women meeting/dating each other before getting married	1	2	3	8

		Right	Somewhat-right	Wrong	Can't Say
e.	e. Celebrating Valentine's Day	1	2	3	8
f.	f. Love affair between two women	1	2	3	8
g.	g. Love affair between two men	1	2	3	8

Q37. How much do you worry about these – quite a lot, somewhat, very little or not at all?

		Quite a lot	Somewhat	Very little	Not at all	No response
a.	a. About your health	1	2	3	4	8
b.	b. About your body shape/weight/looks	1	2	3	4	8
c.	c. About your inability to speak good English	1	2	3	4	8
d.	d. Losing a friend	1	2	3	4	8
e.	e. About your parent's health	1	2	3	4	8
f.	f. About your marriage	1	2	3	4	8
g.	g. About harassment/teasing	1	2	3	4	8

Q38. How **unsafe** do you feel to walk alone on the street after dark in your city/village - a lot, somewhat, very less or not at all?

1. A lot 2. Somewhat 3. Very little 4. Not at all 5. In some areas 8. Can't says

Q39. How often do you feel the following things – very often, sometimes, very little or never?

		Very often	Sometimes	Very little	Never	No response
a.	a. Stress from work at school/college/job	1	2	3	4	8
b.	b. Mental tension/depression	1	2	3	4	8
c.	c. Loneliness	1	2	3	4	8
d.	d. Feeling that I am not worth anything	1	2	3	4	8
e.	e. Getting thoughts of suicide/ending your life	1	2	3	4	8

Q40. Have you ever consulted a doctor to lessen your mental tension?

2. Yes 1. No 8. No answer

Q41. In your opinion, what is the **biggest** problem in India today? ***(Note down answer and consult codebook for coding)***

_____ 98. Can't say

Q42. Would it create discomfort/problems for you if these were your neighbours?

		Yes	No	Maybe	No answer
a.	a. People who cook non-vegetarian food/meat/fish	2	1	3	8
b.	b. People from another caste	2	1	3	8
c.	c. People who drink alcohol	2	1	3	8
d.	d. People from another religion	2	1	3	8
e.	e. People from Africa	2	1	3	8
f.	f. People from another state	2	1	3	8
g.	g. A men and women living together outside of marriage	2	1	3	8

Q43a. In your opinion which thing should the government focus on **first and foremost** from the following four things - electricity, water, toilets or roads? 1. Electricity 2. Water 3. Toilets 4. Roads 8. CS

Q43b. And among these four things what should the government focus on **first and foremost** - agriculture, education, army or health facilities? 1. Agriculture 2. Education 3. Army 4. Health 8. CS

Q44. In the last two-three years, how many times have you felt hesitant to express your political opinion or your thoughts in front of people – many times, sometimes or never?

1. Many times 2. Sometimes 3. Never 8. Can't say

Q45. Which religion do you follow?

1. Hindu 2. Muslim 3. Christian 4. Sikh 5. Buddhist/NeoBuddhist 6. Jain
7. No religion 8. Other *(specify)*_____ 9. Did not answer

Q46. How often do you do the following activities – regularly, sometimes, only on festivals or never?

	Regularly	Sometimes	Only on festivals	Never	No response
a. Doing puja/namaz/prayer/path	1	2	3	4	8
b. Doing bhajan/kirtan/satsang	1	2	3	4	8
c. Keeping vrats/upwaas/rozas/fasts	1	2	3	4	8
d. Going to temple/mosque/church/gurudwara	1	2	3	4	8
e. Watching religious shows on TV	1	2	3	4	8
f. Reading a religious book	1	2	3	4	8

Q47. As compared to two-three years ago, have you become more religious or less religious?

1. More religious 2. Less religious 3. Same as before 8. Can't say

Q48. Ranking from 1 to 4, please tell me how proud do you feel of the following four identities - your state identity, your caste, your being Indian, and your religion? I mean from among these four identities which identity will you place on the first position, which one on the second position, which one on the third position and which one on the fourth position? *(While taking the answer for this question, show the respondent the questionnaire* Rank (from 1 to 4)

a. Your state identity _____ 8. Did not tell
b. Your caste _____ 8. Did not tell
c. Your being Indian _____ 8. Did not tell
d. Your religion _____ 8. Did not tell

Q49. Which among these two statements do you agree with – first or second? *(Read out the statements)*

1.There should be student unions to protect the rights and interests of the students.
2. Student unions should be banned as they disturb the academic environment.

1. Agree with first statement 2. Agree with second statement 8. Can't say

Q50. Do you agree or disagree with the statements that I am about to read out to you? *(If respondent agrees then ask further whether fully or somewhat. If disagrees then ask whether fully or somewhat)*

	Agree		Disagree		C.S.
	Fully	Somewhat	Somewhat	Fully	
a. Young Muslims are being falsely implicated in terrorism related cases.	1	2	3	4	8
b. India should abolish the death penalty.	1	2	3	4	8
c. Nowadays, people in India have become less tolerant about listening to someone else's views.	1	2	3	4	8
d. India should be governed by a strong leader who doesn't have to bother about winning elections.	1	2	3	4	8
e. For jobs in your state (name of state) priority should be given to people from your state over people from any other state.	1	2	3	4	8
f. Eating beef/cow meat is part of people's personal eating habits and nobody should have an objection to this.	1	2	3	4	8
g. It is very important to have English medium education in school.	1	2	3	4	8

Q51. Which among these two statements do you agree with – first or second? ***(Read out the statements)***

1. The government of India should try to improve its relationship with Pakistan.
2. Efforts by the Indian government towards improving relations with Pakistan won't yield anything.

1. Agree with first statement **2. Agree with second statement** **8. Can't say**

Q52. How often do you do the following things – daily, few days a week, few days a month, rarely or never?

	Daily	Week	Month	Rarely	Never	No response
a. **a.** Eating fruits	1	2	3	4	5	8
b. **b.** Eating green vegetables	1	2	3	4	5	8
c. **c.** Eating burgers, pizzas, chips or fast food	1	2	3	4	5	8
d. **d.** Drinking coca cola, pepsi, sprite type drinks	1	2	3	4	5	8
e. **e.** Playing a sport	1	2	3	4	5	8
f. **f.** Doing some physical exercise	1	2	3	4	5	8
g. **g.** Smoking cigarettes/bidis/hukka	1	2	3	4	5	8
h. **h.** Drinking alchohol	1	2	3	4	5	8

Q53. Does anyone in your house smoke cigarettes/bidis? 2. Yes 1. No 8. No response

Q54. Does anyone in your house drink alcohol? 2. Yes 1. No 8. No response

Q55. What is the one thing that makes you proud to be an Indian? ***(Note down answer and consult codebook for coding)***

_____ 97. Nothing 98. DK

Q56. What is the one thing that <u>doesn't</u> make you proud to be an Indian? ***(Note down answer and consult codebook for coding)*** _____ 97. Nothing 98. DK

Q57. Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with India's present situation? ***(If satisfied then ask further whether fully or somewhat. If dissatisfied then ask whether fully or somewhat)***

1. Fully satisfied 2. Somewhat satisfied 3. Somewhat dissatisfied 4. Fully dissatisfied 8. CS

Q58. How do you see the future of India after ten years. Do you think it will be a lot better, somewhat better, or will it be worse?

1. A lot better 2. Somewhat better 3. Worse 4. Same as it is now 8. CS

Q59. Do you have a computer/laptop/notepad at home?

2. Yes 1. No 8. No response

Q59a. ***(If yes)*** Do you have an internet connection on your computer/laptop/notepad?

2. Yes 1. No 8. No response 9. NA

Q60. What kind of a mobile phone do you have – is it a normal one or a touch screen smartphone?

1. Normal phone 2. Smartphone 3. I don't have a mobile phone 8. No response

Q60a. ***(If have mobile phone)*** Do you have an internet connection on your mobile phone?

2. Yes 1. No 8. No response 9. NA

Q61. Should these reservations continue for the following people…?

	Yes	No	Only SC	Only ST	Less quota	NR
a. **a.** Reservation for SCs and STs in government jobs	1	2	3	4	5	8
b. **b.** Reservation for SCs and STs in government colleges/universities	1	2	3	4	5	8
c. **c.** Reservation for OBCs in government jobs	1	2	-	-	5	8
d. **d.** Reservation for OBCs in government colleges/universities	1	2	-	-	5	8

Q62. And should these new reservations be implemented for the following people...?

	Yes	No	Only SC	Only ST	No answer
a. Reservation for SCs and STs in private jobs	1	2	3	4	8
b. Reservation for OBCs in private jobs	1	2	_	_	8
c. Reservation for backward Muslims in government jobs	1	2	_	_	8

Q63. For the last few years, many communities have been demanding reservation in the OBC category quota. In your opinion should their demand be accepted, rejected or should they be included only after increasing the existing OBC quota?

1. Accept demand 2. Reject demand 3. Include after increasing quota 8. CS.

Q64. Which one of these three statements related to reservation do you agree with most*? (Read out statements 1 to 3 only and then take the answer from the respondent)*

1. Reservation should only be on the basis of caste.
2. Reservation should only be on the basis of economic condition/criterion.
3. Reservation should be scrapped altogether. 8. *(Not to be read out)* Can't say
4. *(Not to be read out)* Reservation should be based on both caste and economic condition

Q65. Could you tell me the name of one well known person (living or dead or fictional) who you admire the most? *(Note answer. And cunsult codebook for coding)*_____98. CS

Q66. Keeping in mind the people associated with your life, tell me who are you <u>most</u> influenced by in your life? *(Do not read out answers)* 01. Parents 02. Mother 03. Father 04. Brother/Sister 05. Friend 06. Husband/Wife 07. Teacher 08. Colleagues at work 09. Neighbour 10. Other *(specify)*_____ 11. No one 98. No opinion

Q67. How often do you do the following things – daily, few days a week, few days a month, very rarely or never?

	Daily	Week	Month	Rarely	Never	No response
a. Use Facebook	1	2	3	4	5	8
b. Use Twitter	1	2	3	4	5	8
c. Use Whatsapp	1	2	3	4	5	8
d. Watch videos on YouTube	1	2	3	4	5	8
e. Check or send e-mail	1	2	3	4	5	8
f. Take selfies on your phone	1	2	3	4	5	8
g. Play video games	1	2	3	4	5	8
h. Watch the news on TV	1	2	3	4	5	8
i. Listen to the radio	1	2	3	4	5	8
j. Read the newspaper	1	2	3	4	5	8
k. Read news on internet websites	1	2	3	4	5	8

Q68. Which news channel do you watch <u>most</u> on TV? *(Note down answer and consult codebook for coding)*

_____ 98. Can't say 99. Not applicable

Q69. Which channel do you watch <u>most</u> on TV for entertainment? *(Note down answer and consult codebookfor coding)*

_____ 998. Can't say 999. Not applicable

Q70. Which newspaper do you read the <u>most</u>? *(Note down answer and consult codebook for coding)*

_____ 98. Can't say 99. Not applicable

BACKGROUND DATA

Personal Information

Z1. Now I am going to ask you about a few groups /associations. Please tell me for each how often do you participate in their activities - regularly, sometimes, rarely or never?

		Regularly	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	NR
a.	a. Any political party	1	2	3	4	8
b.	b. Labour/Trade union	1	2	3	4	8
c.	c. Student organization/union	1	2	3	4	8
d.	d. Farmers' association	1	2	3	4	8
e.	e. Sports /cultural organization	1	2	3	4	8
f.	f. Religious/spiritual organisation	1	2	3	4	8

Z2. Are you a pure vegetarian, a vegetarian but eat eggs or are you a non-vegetarian who also eats chicken, meat or fish?

1. Pure vegetarian 2. Vegetarian but eat egg
3. Non-vegetarian, eat chicken, meat, fish etc. 8. Did not tell

Z3.

a. Is any of your **close** friends from another religion than yours? 2. Yes 1. No 8. No response

b. Is any of your **close** friends from another caste than yours? 2. Yes 1. No 8. No response

c. Is any of your **close** friends from the opposite gender? 2. Yes 1. No 8. No response

Z4. What is your Caste/Jati-biradari/Tribe name? ***(Consult codebook for code)***_____

Z4a. And what is your caste group? ***(Double check and consult code book)***

1. Scheduled Caste (SC) 2. Scheduled Tribe (ST)
3. Other Backward Classes (OBC) 4. Other

Z5. At your home, what language do you speak in the most while conversing with your family members?

(Note down answer and consult codebook for codes)_____98. No response

Household Information

Z6. What type of area is it? 1. Village 2. Town 3. City 4. Metropolis

Z6a. ***(If Town/City/Metropolis in Z6)*** Type of house where Respondent lives

1. House/Flat/Bunglow 2. House/Flat with 5 or more rooms
3. House/Flat with 4 rooms 4. Houses/Flat with 3 rooms 5. Houses/Flat with 2 rooms
6. House with 1 room 7. Mainly Kutcha house 8. Slum/Jhuggi Jhopri 9. NA.

Z6b. ***(If village in Z6)*** Type of house where Respondent lives

1. Pucca (both wall and roof made of pucca material)
2. Pucca-Kutcha (Either wall or roof is made of pucca material and other of kutcha material)
3. Kutcha/Mud houses (both wall and roof are made of kutcha material)
4. Hut (both wall and roof made of grass, leaves, un-burnt brick or bamboo) 9. NA.

Above Below Z7. What is the total number of family members living in your house? ***(If more than 9, Code 9)***

Above 18 years:_____ Below 18 years :_____

Z8. Total agricultural land including orchard and plantation owned by your household ***(as on date of survey):***

_____ ***(Ask in local units, but record in standard acres. If more than 99, Code 99. If no land or no answer then code 00)***

			Yes	No	
	Z9.	Do you or members of your household have the following:			
a.		**a.** Car/Jeep/Van	1	2	
b.		**b.** Scooter/Motorcycle/Moped	1	2	
c.		**c.** Air Conditioner	1	2	
d.		**d.** Washing machine	1	2	
e.		**e.** Microwave	1	2	
f.		**f.** Fridge	1	2	
g.		**g.** Fan/Cooler	1	2	
h.		**h.** TV	1	2	
i.		**i.** LPG gas	1	2	
j.		**j.** Invertor/generator for power back up	1	2	
k.		**k.** Toilet in the house	1	2	
l.		**l.** Pumping Set ***(Ask only in village)***	1	2	9. NA
m.		**m.** Tractor ***(Ask only in village)***	1	2	9. NA

Z10. Can you tell me the total monthly income of your household - putting together the income of all members?

_____ *(Record exact amount in Rupees. If respondent does not give any amount then record 000000)*

Mobile/Telephone number of the respondent_____