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**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

Precedence: Deadline 11/15/2009

Date: 9/24/2009

To: All Field Offices

Attn: SACs  
CT/DT ASACs  
CDCs

From: Counterterrorism  
Front Office [redacted]

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Drafted By: [redacted] rm

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Case ID #: (U) [redacted] (Pending)

Title: (U) COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM GUIDANCE  
BASELINE COLLECTION PLAN  
ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE

Synopsis: (U//FOUO) To provide the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) and Field Offices with administrative and operational guidance regarding CTD's Baseline Collection Plan for both Domestic Terrorism and International Terrorism investigations.

(U) ~~Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20080301~~  
~~Declassify On: 20331205~~

Details: (U//FOUO) In an effort to better standardize information and intelligence collection, as well as provide investigative guidance for both Domestic Terrorism (DT) and International Terrorism (IT) investigations, CTD has established a framework (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Baseline Collection") to guide investigators in obtaining information and intelligence and using investigative methods during the course of

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To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 9/24/2009

b7A

each DT and IT investigation. The Baseline Collection is not an all inclusive listing, but rather a best practice list of items which should be accomplished when legally permissible, relevant, and consistent with the Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) during an Assessment or predicated investigation.

(U//FOUO) The Baseline Collection Plan was established to develop programmatic standards in terms of quality and thoroughness of assessments and predicated investigations. It is important to ensure that Baseline Collection is conducted to avoid gaps in investigative efforts. Recipients are reminded that all investigative efforts are subject to the Attorney General Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (AGG-Dom) and the FBI's Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG). As such the least intrusive means of investigation/collection should be utilized whenever possible, but when necessary investigators should not hesitate to use any lawful method or technique authorized under the AGG and/or DIOG. The Baseline Collection Plan is intended to serve as a guide through the various investigative stages; common sense should apply when determining whether a particular item contained in Baseline Collection pertains to a specific assessment or investigation.

(U//FOUO) Field offices are directed to re-evaluate their existing cases against the Baseline Collection Plan. Field Supervisors should routinely address Baseline Collection with agents and TFOs during investigative file reviews. In addition to standardizing information and intelligence collection, Baseline Collection will help to establish a foundation of intelligence upon which the FBI may base the decision to continue or close an Assessment or investigation.

(U//FOUO) Investigators are reminded that the Baseline Collection items are in no particular order. Furthermore, information not called for by collection of the Baseline should also be collected if legally permissible, practical, and relevant to the case. The decision to conduct any investigation must take into account the credibility of the original information constituting the predication or the credibility of the source of that information. If that original information or source is ever deemed not credible, any investigation based upon it should be reevaluated to determine whether predication continues to exist. No investigative techniques should be used if information is developed that undermines in a critical way the factual predication of the investigation or assessment.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 9/24/2009

b7A

### I. Assessments

(U//FOUO) Type 1 and Type 2 Assessments are carried out to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security or to collect foreign intelligence. For a list of authorized methods and techniques available to investigators during Assessments, see AGG-Dom Part II.A. or DIOG Part 5.

(U//FOUO) In Type 1 and 2 IT and DT Assessments, investigators may, when relevant to the purpose of the Assessment, collect the information that is necessary to answer the questions detailed below in Category A. The Assessment may continue until factual information is developed that warrants opening a predicated investigation or until a judgement can be made that the target does not pose a terrorism or criminal threat. Assessments may not remain open solely to collect more information if the purpose of the Assessment has been achieved or if the information is not necessary to achieve it.

Category A: In order to be able to answer the Category A questions accurately, database checks will be necessary. You will generally need the following information about each subject of your assessment in order to run the necessary database checks to answer the Category A questions. This information should be collected if you can do so with techniques available during an assessment. REMEMBER: NSL's and administrative subpoenas are not permitted during an assessment; grand jury subpoenas are limited during Type 1 and 2 assessments to subscriber information.

1. Subject's full legal name and aliases. Note: Some nationalities and cultures do not distinguish between first, middle, and last names in the same manner as the U.S. Thoroughness may require database checks of each of the known names in the position of the last name.

2. Subject's date and country of birth.

3. Subject's USPER status, see AGG-Dom, Part VII, U.

4. Subject's passport number(s) and country of issuance.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U)  9/24/2009

b7A

5. Subject's Social Security Number, if USPER, or any other unique identifying numbers relevant to the database checks, such as alien registration number, driver's license, etc.

6. Subject's telephone number(s) or email address(es) or other internet communication media utilized by the subject.

7. Subject's current address or addresses and any prior address(es), particularly if it appears that the subject recently relocated to the current location(s). It will normally be unnecessary to ascertain previous addresses of the subject that are more than 5 years past.

8. Subject's current place of employment and position. When available identifying information has been obtained, it should be used to conduct the checks necessary to answer the following questions. These questions are generally relevant to all counterterrorism assessments. Only information about your subject that is relevant to answering these questions or to resolving the assessment should be documented in FBI case files. Please avoid collecting or documenting personal information about the subject that is not relevant to the assessment. The questions below are not in any particular order and are not all inclusive; the least intrusive but effective means should be utilized to answer each question. While some databases are suggested, open source information may also be checked to answer these questions.

1. Has your subject ever been the target of or referenced in another FBI investigation? Query ACS and
2. Has the subject's current address or place of work been referenced in other FBI investigations? Query ACS and
3. Does your subject have a criminal history (conviction or arrest) that is relevant to the activity at issue in this assessment? Query criminal/law Federal, State, local Enforcement databases: DMV, NCIC, available local law enforcement systems. Keep in mind that profit-driven crimes, such as fraud, identity theft, and dealing illicit narcotics, can be as relevant to counterterrorism assessments as crimes of violence

b7E

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [redacted] 9/24/2009

b7A

and firearms violations. Information that is not likely to be relevant and generally should not be documented in FBI files include petty, non-violent misdemeanors or traffic offenses or failure to appear/contempt citations. Any active arrest warrant should be noted in your assessment.

4. Is there reason to believe that your subject has been in telephone contact with subjects of other FBI investigations? If so, compare relevant data concerning the subject's telephone number contained within FBI databases: [redacted]

b7E

[redacted] If appropriate, conduct link/network/timeline analysis.

5. Is there reason to believe that your subject has been in email contact with subjects of other FBI investigations? If so, compare relevant data concerning the subject's email account(s) contained within FBI databases: [redacted] ACS, [redacted] If appropriate, conduct link/network/timeline analysis.

b7E

6. Does your subject have any special licenses/permits, including a commercial drivers license which authorizes the transportation of hazardous materials or which authorize the subject to obtain or possess explosive materials? Regardless of licensing requirements, do you have any reason to believe that your subject has access to hazardous or explosive materials, whether through employment or otherwise?

7. Within the past year, has your subject traveled to foreign locations that are relevant to the assessment? Identify subject's travel history through [redacted]

b7E

[redacted] Consider contacting [redacted] and requesting USPER subject's [redacted]

8. Does your subject live alone or with other adults? If the subject lives with other adults, do you have any reason to believe that the other adults are involved with any criminal or national threat behavior of the subject?

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [redacted] 9/24/2009

b7A

9. For targets possessing an international nexus, does the U.S. Intelligence Community have any relevant information about your subject? Query Intelligence Community databases regarding the identifying information about the subject: Guardian, ACS, [redacted]

[redacted] The substantive desk at FBIHQ may also be able to assist the Field in seeking information from intelligence/law enforcement agencies in the countries to which your subject traveled. [redacted]

b7E

relatively intrusive step because it reveals the FBI's interest in the traveler, especially [redacted]

[redacted] Accordingly, such contacts should be done only through FBIHQ and only when the available information justifies this level of intrusion.

10. Could the subject's job reasonably support the covert collection or transfer of money or funds for terrorism or criminal purposes? (e.g., export/import, overseas shipping, cash business, etc...) If so, does the subject have any previously identified suspicious monetary transactions? Review [redacted]

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11. Is there any reason to believe that the subject has purchased or is licensed to possess firearms or explosives? If so, run NCIC checks and/or contact [redacted]

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12. Is there any reason to believe, considering the subject's background, including employment and criminal history, that he/she has received specialized training or experience or has specialized knowledge in military tactics or operations, law enforcement, firearms, or explosives, or similar subjects?

II. Preliminary Investigations (PI)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [redacted] 9/24/2009

b7A

(U//FOUO) Preliminary investigations may be initiated on the basis of any "allegation or information" indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national security. For a list of authorized methods in a PI, see the AGG-Dom, Part II, B.4.a.iii.

(U//FOUO) The following Category B questions, as well as Category A questions, should be answered during the course of a Preliminary Investigation.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Category B

1. Is there any reason to believe that the subject is associated with a terrorist organization? If so, what

b7E

Note: IT and DT cases may only be opened on a terrorist/extremist group if they are opened as full, Terrorism Enterprise Investigations and are consistent with the criteria set forth in the AGG-DOM, Part II, C.

Note: The IICT priorities are updated quarterly. Current information regarding IICT priorities can be found on the committee's website:  
[http://nctc.sgov.gov/iict/ct\\_tiers.html](http://nctc.sgov.gov/iict/ct_tiers.html)

2. Who are the subject's close associates? There are a number of ways to identify close associates including:

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3. Have any of the subject's close associates been a subject of or referenced in an FBI investigation? Query ACS and [redacted]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [redacted] 9/24/2009

b7A

4. Is there reason to believe that any of the subject's close associates are involved with or possess relevant information about the activities of the the subject that are the focus of the investigation? Query ACS, [redacted]  
[redacted]

b7E

5. Is there reason to believe that any of the subject's associates are connected to local and/or global networks of extremists?

6. Does the U.S. Intelligence Community have any relevant information regarding the subject's close associates?

7. For a reasonable period of time that is not less than five (5) years (unless the subject is aged 23 years or less), what has been the subject's work history?

8. Has the subject's current employer or past employer been the subject of or referenced in an FBI investigation?

9. What is the subject's educational background, including degree and field of study? Does his/her educational background provide any specialized knowledge or expertise that is relevant to the activities being investigated?

10. Has the subject traveled outside the United States within the past ten (10) years? If so, is there any reason to believe that contacts in those foreign locations are relevant to the conduct being investigated? [redacted]  
[redacted]

b7E

11. Has the agent been able to obtain the subject's photograph? (Photograph may be obtained through state DMV, physical surveillance, etc.)

12. Has the subject received any specialized training that is relevant to the investigation, such as:

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~



~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [redacted] 9/24/2009

b7A

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b7E

- 13. What language does the subject speak primarily? Is there reason to believe the subject speaks or reads other languages? If so, which ones?
- 14. Is there reason to believe that the subject is associated with any group or organization with which to facilitate any of the activity under investigation?
- 15. Is there reason to believe that the subject has access to funds or sources of income other than through his/her employment? Possible other sources of funds or income could include financial institutions and associated accounts, informal banking mechanisms (hawalas, *inter alia*), wire transfers, cash couriers, commercial services and/or the use of commodities (gold, diamonds, etc.) For investigations with a [redacted]

[redacted]

- 16. [redacted] Is there reason to believe that the subject has [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] There are a number of ways to ascertain this information, including use of

[redacted]

subject. With regard to [redacted]

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[redacted] If subsequent

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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

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To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [redacted] 9/24/2009

b7A

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17. Has the subject's identity, residence and employment been confirmed?
18. Has the subject been known to make statements that would be generally consistent with a desire to commit terrorist acts, either on behalf of a group or individually?
19. Would the subject be a valuable CHS for the FBI? If so, has a plan been developed to recruit the subject as a CHS?

### III. Full Investigations (FI)

(U//FOUO) Full Investigations may be initiated if there is an "articulable factual basis" of possible criminal or national threat activity. For Full Investigations, all methods may be used when properly authorized, see the AGG-Dom, Part II, B.4.b.ii.

(U//FOUO) The following Category C questions, as well as Category A and Category B questions, may be answered during the course of a Full Investigation.

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ Category C

1. Is the subject, in fact, a member of or associated with the terrorist organization identified in response to Category B, Question 1.
2. If the subject is, in fact, a member of or is associated with a terrorist organization, does he or she have any present intent to engage in acts of violence?
3. Does the FBI fully understand the scope of the subject's relationship with the terrorist group and its members? Can any further intelligence profitably be gained by continuing the investigation, including any technical coverage?

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [redacted] 9/24/2009

4. Does the FBI have a strategy to disrupt any plans to commit acts of violence or other criminal conduct associated with the subject and the terrorist organization?

IV. Closing or Converting Preliminary Investigations to Full Investigations

(U//FOUO) ECs to close PIs or FIs should contain an affirmative analytical finding concerning a lack of potential criminal violations or national security threats warranting further investigation of the subject. Field Offices are encouraged to close PIs that, based upon the Baseline Collection and intelligence developed, do not warrant the commitment of further investigative resources.

(U//FOUO) Alternatively, ECs to convert PIs to FIs should contain a predicative statement detailing the articulable factual basis (see AGG-Dom Part II.4.b.i) to justify a Full Investigation; as well as an affirmative analytical finding regarding a potential criminal violation or national security threat warranting further investigation of the subject. ECs for conversion should also describe the quality and quantity of derogatory information predicating a conversion to a FI.

(U//FOUO) All closing or conversion ECs should contain a description of the Baseline Collection to date.

V. Disruption Strategy and Source Recruitment

(U//FOUO) The long-term goal of a DT or IT investigation is to [redacted]

[redacted]

(U//FOUO) If the risk to public safety is too great, or if all significant intelligence has been collected, and/or the threat is otherwise resolved, investigators may, with substantive desk coordination and concurrence, implement a disruption strategy. A successful strategy may employ a range of tools

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 9/24/2009

b7A

including arrests, interviews, or source-directed operations to effectively disrupt subject's activities. Additionally, and when warranted, all subject interviews should specifically address the subject's activities and potential recruitment as a source.

VI. In Closing

(U//FOUO) This standardized approach to all Counterterrorism investigations will allow CTD and field offices to more effectively and efficiently manage both DT and IT investigations. CTD will ensure an open dialogue is maintained with all field office DT/IT Supervisors in order to identify intelligence gaps, provide guidance and recommendations, and ensure all available CTD resources are appropriately utilized in each investigation.

(U//FOUO) DT/IT Supervisors should address Baseline Collection items with Agents and TFOs during regularly scheduled investigative file reviews. In addition, the Baseline Collection Plan guidance should be taken into consideration by DT/IT Supervisors, Case Agents and CDCs, when making the decision to close and/or convert an assessment, PI or FI.

(U//FOUO) If in doubt that the appropriate authority exists in an individual case to answer a Baseline Collection question, please consult your CDC and/or CTD and OGC substantive units.

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To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (U) [REDACTED] 9/24/2009

b7A

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Field offices are requested to review existing DT and IT investigations against the Baseline Collection Plan by 11/15/2009 and apply the Baseline Collection Plan for all new DT and IT investigations.

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