

THE "PROUD INTERNATIONALIST": The Globalist Vision of David Rockefeller

**by Will Banyan © March 2006
Research Paper for General Distribution
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Contents:

1. The "Proud Internationalist"..... 1

2. The Heir Apparent..... 3

 2.1 From PhD to International Banker..... 4

 2.2 The Education of an Internationalist..... 6

 2.3 A Modern Day Medici..... 8

 2.4 The Responsibilities of the Rich..... 11

 2.5 Emperor of the Establishment..... 13

 2.6 "Ambassador-without-portfolio"..... 15

3. Towards "One World"..... 21

 3.1 The Need for American Leadership..... 21

 3.2 Creating a Global Market..... 25

 3.3 Integrating the Western Hemisphere..... 28

 3.4 Population Control..... 38

 3.5 The Death of the Nation State..... 40

 3.6 "One World", Ready or Not..... 43

4. Trilateralism..... 44

 4.1 Brzezinski's Trilateral Solution..... 45

 4.2 Nixon's Nemesis..... 47

 4.3 Founding the Trilateral Commission..... 48

 4.4 The "Broad Consensus"..... 50

 4.5 Get Carter!..... 53

 4.6 Trilateralism from Reagan to Clinton..... 55

 4.7 The Neo-Conservative Challenge..... 60

5. Under David Rockefeller's Shadow..... 65

Afterword: The Missing Quote..... 67

Endnotes..... 68

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1. The "Proud Internationalist"

Most analysis of the role of David Rockefeller in the New World Order is usually ridiculed by smug commentators in the "responsible" press as the stuff of fantasy. For these oracles, descriptions of David Rockefeller as "one of the foremost partisans of world government under the UN" (Jasper), the "*éminence grise* of international power politics" (Wilkes) and "one of the most high profile, and most obvious, New World Order manipulators on the planet" (Icke)¹ are not to be taken seriously. Indeed, to contend that this globe-trotting billionaire ex-banker, philanthropist and founder of the Trilateral Commission could have any global designs *and* the political influence to realise them, is taken as a sign that one has fallen for the infantile ravings of the "black helicopter crowd." Perhaps, it is implied, only those afflicted by a peculiar mental malady could possibly believe or even contemplate such claims.

Back in 1996, for example, high-rating US national radio talk-show host Rush Limbaugh openly mocked these beliefs in his so-called "Kook Test":

Question No. 5. Do you believe that David Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger and other famous members of the New World Order provide daily instructions to agents of the FBI, CIA, BATF, and National Organization of Women?

[...]

Question No. 9. Do you believe that the feminist movement was the brainchild of David Rockefeller for the purpose of having men and women at war with each other on a daily basis so as to distract them from the real conspiracy of the CFR?

[...]

If you have answered even one of these questions "yes", then you are a kook and have passed the test.²

David Rockefeller himself has often scoffed at such claims. In a letter to the *New York Times* in 1980, he took issue with the "nonsensical defamation" he claimed to have been subjected to over the years. "I never cease to be amazed by those few among us who spot a conspiracy under every rock, a cabal in every corner", Rockefeller wrote, lamenting that he was usually "singled out as the 'cabalist-in-chief'."³ Eighteen years later, Rockefeller's mirth remained intact. "It's so absurd I can't help but, to some extent, find it amusing", he told the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* in 1998, commenting on conspiracy theories about himself and the Trilateral Commission.⁴

Yet curiously, David Rockefeller's key role in promoting global political and economic unity is not only explicitly recognised but is openly celebrated by the power-elite. According to one recent tribute, because of his "contributions to enterprise and humanity" David Rockefeller had become "one of the world's most respected citizens." The speaker, Thomas d'Aquino, President and CEO of the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, addressing an elite gathering in 2002, had no qualms praising Rockefeller's "impressible urge to promote international cooperation and understanding" and his "passions for the promotion of international cooperation"

and "inter-American cooperation."⁵ Equally unrestrained was Harvard University President Neil Rudenstine, who praised David Rockefeller in a 1999 speech as an "informed, observant, experienced, modest, and generous citizen of the world, interested in the welfare of all."⁶

At celebrations for the 25th anniversary of the Trilateral Commission's US group in 1998, a roster of adoring Establishment heavyweights repeatedly toasted the "sense of vision" (Georges Berthoin), "farsightedness and leadership" (Shijuro Ogata), "great munificence" (Conrad Black) and "sense of obligation" (Henry Kissinger) of their Honorary Chairman. The "first global history of mankind is about to start", claimed Berthoin, a former European Chairman of the Trilateral Commission, and it was all due to David Rockefeller, the "gentleman-pioneer of the trilateral world."⁷ Similarly, at a book signing for Rockefeller's autobiography, *Memoirs*, held in late 2002 at the United Nations headquarters in New York, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan hailed the plutocrat's contribution to world order:

I think *without internationalists like you, the international system we have been trying to build, the international system we have today, wouldn't be here.* So, thank you very much, David.⁸

Equally glowing accolades were delivered in November 2003 at the Synergos Institute's "University for a Night", also held in the UN's New York headquarters, where David Rockefeller received the Institute's Annual Award for "Outstanding Leadership in Bridging Divides." Presenting the award, philanthropist and former CNN-owner Ted Turner hailed David Rockefeller's role as an "unofficial ambassador to the world" and praised his "keen understanding that the world was getting smaller and smaller and that it was vital to embrace and cooperate with everyone." Obviously awed by his subject, Turner continued:

We now live in a world where we are related by economics, politics, the environment, technology and human nature. *We can no longer think of the people and problems in other parts of the world as "foreign" to us. David certainly understood this early in the game,* and has been a tireless and inspirational advocate in this regard. *He wears the badge of "proud internationalist" openly, as do I.*

Concluding his remarks, Turner left little doubt as to the plutocrat's objectives:

I'm worried by a lot of things these days – *war, the nuclear threat, overpopulation.* But it's reassuring to know that a man like *David is worried, too, and what's more, that he's working with diligence and vision, with the help of the best people around, to find a solution.*⁹

Another speaker, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, also waxed lyrical about the plutocrat, approvingly quoting former South African President Nelson Mandela's description of David Rockefeller as a "great man." Adding his own words of praise, President Obasanjo lauded Rockefeller for being a "great modernizer and internationalist" during his banking career, and in his current role as a "'globalist' and world actor." "I thank David for being a remarkable Rockefeller", said President Obasanjo, "[and] God Almighty for giving you to the world."¹⁰ Participants at the event all received a *Bridging Leadership Tribute Album* that served as a "small reminder" of the "historic impact Mr Rockefeller has had on our world."¹¹

But we need not take their word for it. After years of denying and ridiculing such charges, David Rockefeller has finally put an end to the speculation, making the following admission in his recent autobiography *Memoirs* (2002), in a chapter titled "Proud Internationalist":

For more than a century, ideological extremists at either end of the political spectrum have seized upon well-publicized incidents...to attack the Rockefeller family for the inordinate influence they claim we wield over American political and economic institutions. Some even believe we are part of a secret cabal working against the best interests of the United States, characterizing my family and me as "internationalists" and of conspiring with others around the world to build *a more integrated global political and economic structure - one world, if you will*. If that's the charge, *I stand guilty, and I am proud of it*.¹²

David Rockefeller's bold confession, finally given late in his life, is clearly momentous but it also warrants further scrutiny, for his account in *Memoirs* omits much important detail. Only by examining Rockefeller's statements, articles and speeches over the past 40 years can the true extent of his vision of "a more integrated global political and economic structure" be understood. And such examination also reveals that David Rockefeller has not been an idle dreamer, but has used his position as arguably the most powerful and influential Rockefeller of the latter half of the 20th century to advocate a revamped version of the Wilson-Fosdick world order model.

This research paper proposes to examine three aspects of David Rockefeller's contribution to the New World Order: (1) the basis for his authority and reputation as a behind-the-scenes power player; (2) the objectives of his globalist ideology; and (3) the creation and purpose of the Trilateral Commission. The primary intention of this paper, through reference to a wide range of publicly available sources, is to cast some light, not so much on his manipulations, but on his *vision*. In short, it will try to make plain why David Rockefeller calls himself a "proud internationalist."

2. The Heir Apparent

One of the more common observations made by biographers of the Rockefeller family is that of all John D. Rockefeller, Jr's offspring, it is David, despite being the youngest, who has emerged as the true heir to the vast reservoir of political and economic power originally amassed by John D. Rockefeller, Sr. As Peter Collier and David Horowitz observe in their book, *The Rockefellers* (1976), in contrast to his siblings it was David who was "the most serious, the one who was conscious of his birthright from the beginning."¹³ Even Senior seemed to sense that his genes had finally re-emerged under David, and he doted on his youngest grandson with a degree of affection he had not given to his own son.¹⁴

Coincidentally, David Rockefeller recalls in *Memoirs* that it was in 1937, at the funeral service for Senior (who died at the age of 97), that he learned not only that he was the deceased monopolist's "favorite" but that Senior had "always thought" David was "most like him[self]." Having received this confirmation of his status from Senior's trusted valet of some 30 years, John Yordi, David admits to having been

ecstatic: "I thought it would have been [his older brother] Nelson, *but I couldn't pretend I wasn't pleased.*"¹⁵ It is noteworthy that David Rockefeller starts *Memoirs* with this incident, as it is one of the few admissions to his true status.

2.1 From PhD to International Banker

It is a truism, noted by many Rockefeller family biographers, interested observers and retainers that the five sons of John D. Rockefeller Junior each took somewhat different paths in life. In this summation, for example, Henry Kissinger (though excluding, for some reason, Winthrop), in the third volume of his memoirs, *Years of Renewal* (1999), provided the following insight:

Each Rockefeller brother had selected some speciality to which he devoted his resources and energy: John concentrated on population; David on international affairs, New York and art; Laurance on the environment and the sciences; and Nelson first on Latin America, then on national politics and always on art.¹⁶

Appearing in a section devoted to praising Kissinger's long-deceased benefactor Nelson Rockefeller, the brief of description of David Rockefeller's "speciality" – "international affairs, New York and art" – should not be surprising. Though, given that Kissinger had actually known David longer than Nelson, one might have expected some more informative insights. Nevertheless, the differences between David and his (now deceased) brothers were more than an interest in "international affairs, New York and art."

David lacked Nelson's hunger for public adulation and *overt* political power; nor did he share John and Laurance's determination to be totally immersed in philanthropy; and he displayed no interest in following Winthrop's retreat into political obscurity. Instead he showed an inclination to emulate John D. Rockefeller Senior's combination of considerable private power with a low public profile. Educated at Harvard, the London School of Economics (LSE) and the University of Chicago, David Rockefeller became the only one of Junior's children to have earned a PhD. Invariably the subject of his assessments were economic matters: at Harvard his senior thesis was on Fabian socialism; the subject of his PhD dissertation at the University of Chicago was essentially an attack on government regulation of business activity titled "Unused Resources and Economic Waste" (1940).

As Rockefeller explains in *Memoirs*, his PhD thesis "dealt with one aspect of a wider issue: whether to rely principally on market forces or governmental intervention to correct the extraordinary levels of unemployment and the underutilization of industrial capacity that had characterized...the Great Depression." Many economists considered the idle factories of the Great Depression years to be "wasteful." Rockefeller, though, came down firmly on the side of the pro-market economists concluding that "the failure to use an economic resource per se is not evidence of waste." He also argued that using the existence of idle factories to justify government intervention in the economy could "lead to inappropriate actions and counterproductive results." In making these assessments David Rockefeller admitted that he was not only influenced by the free market economists but also by the example set by John D. Rockefeller Sr. In particular the curious notion that when businessmen make decisions they not only considered profits but "the needs of their workers and

the broader community." "Grandfather would have agreed with these propositions", Rockefeller now claims.¹⁷ Given what is now known about Senior's business record, in particular his intolerance of unions and his ruthless attacks on competitors, this is a remarkable assertion.

Despite only six months full-time work, Rockefeller's thesis was accepted by the University of Chicago and he was duly awarded his doctorate in August 1940. We do not know what his examiners really thought of this budding plutocrat's work or who they were. One of the few published academic reviews of his thesis—which had been published as a book by the University of Chicago in 1941—gently suggests that David Rockefeller's academic achievement was rather slight. At first glance the review, coincidentally by an economist from the University of Chicago, seems positive, suggesting that: "Throughout the book, a high level of intellectual analysis is maintained." Yet the reviewer also manages to damn the heir's achievement with the faintest of praise: "The lack of statistical data does not mean that the book is not worthwhile"; "...the weakest part of the book is the discussion of monopoly..."; and "The book contains a clear statement of accepted economic thought, but it makes *little or no contribution* to the body of economic theory."¹⁸ Faced with such artful detraction, perhaps that is why David Rockefeller does not sport the honorific "PhD."

Upon completion of his studies, but with "no interest" in working in the Family Office with his brothers, Rockefeller contemplated a career in "government service." Through some of his burgeoning network of contacts the youngest of John D. Rockefeller Junior's brood was able to return to New York in May 1940 to work as secretary to New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia. Assigned to a large office next to the Mayor's, Rockefeller's job – for the symbolic salary of "a dollar a year" – involved sitting in on conferences and staff meetings, drafting letters and renting commercial space at La Guardia Airport. In mid-1941, tiring of local politics and seeking what he calls "administrative experience", David Rockefeller started work with a new government body, the Office of Defense, Health, and Welfare Services. However, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, which pulled the US into Second World War, this proved to be a short-lived career move.¹⁹

In mid-March 1942, Rockefeller enlisted in the US Army as a private, even though, he acknowledges, his father could have used his influence to get him an officer's commission.²⁰ After completing his basic training, Rockefeller was assigned to the Counter-Intelligence Corps; in early 1943 seeking a commission, he applied for officer candidate school and in March 1943 he became a second-lieutenant. The most important phase of Rockefeller's wartime service soon followed when in August 1943, he was assigned to the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency (JICA) in Washington DC. Barely a month later, he was posted to Algiers as part of the JICA detachment supporting General Eisenhower's Allied Force Headquarters. Throughout the remainder of the war, Rockefeller served as an intelligence officer in North Africa and France, until February 1945 when he was assigned to Paris as an assistant military attaché. There his job involved more intelligence collection, including in Germany.²¹

For Rockefeller his wartime service in intelligence was to prove "invaluable", in fact it served as a "training ground and testing place" for what he would do later in life. In particular Rockefeller claimed that he discovered "the value of building contacts with well-placed individuals as a means of achieving concrete objectives." Rockefeller

learned that his own "effectiveness" depended on his ability to "develop a network of people with reliable information and influence." This period would mark "the beginning of the networking process" that Rockefeller has followed all his life.²²

Returning to the US in 1946, David went to work for the "family bank", Chase Manhattan. He started as a low-ranking officer, but, thanks to the Rockefeller family's controlling interest, he rapidly rose through the ranks, becoming: an Executive Vice President in 1955; Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors in 1957; President in 1961; and Chairman and Chief Executive Officer in 1969. David ran the bank until his retirement in 1981, but continued to play a role as Chairman of the bank's International Advisory Committee. David would later boast that he was "the first member of the family since Grandfather who has had a regular job in a company and has devoted a major part of his life to being in business."²³ However, as he lamented in *Memoirs*, it was apparently "not an easy decision" as he still desired to work with government or in philanthropy, particularly on international affairs.²⁴ But, in truth, neither avenue has ever been closed to him.

2.2 The Education of an Internationalist

David Rockefeller attributes much of his internationalist fervour to the influence of his parents, his overseas travelling experiences and his changed world outlook following World War II. He writes that it was his parents who first impressed on him "the importance of the world beyond the United States." His father, Junior, "was a staunch supporter of the League of Nations" and, through the Rockefeller Foundation, "one of the principal funders of health, education, and cultural endeavours around the world."²⁵ But there were other influences, including his education at Harvard University and the University of Chicago during the 1930s, and his early membership of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1949 and the Bilderberg Group from 1954.

It was at Harvard, under the guidance of Professor Gottfried von Haberler (1901-1995), that Rockefeller received more vigorous indoctrination into the benefits of free trade. Described by Rockefeller as a "staunch supporter of free trade", Haberler would have given compelling guidance – for the Austrian professor was, according to one biographer, "one of the first economists to make a rigorous case for the superior productivity and universal benefits of 'free' or politically unrestricted international trade..." Rockefeller recalls that Haberler's course on international trade had influenced him greatly; and laments that the professor's ideas were ignored during the 1930s "when nations around the world gave in to the siren song of protectionism."²⁶

At the Rockefeller-found and funded University of Chicago, these views were reinforced by another of his tutors, the economist Jacob Viner (1892-1970). Lauded by Rockefeller as an advocate of "unobstructed trade as a means of generating economic growth", Viner was not only one of the leading free trade theorists of his time, but was an advocate of using international institutions to manage the world economy. Viner also supported the formation of regional trade groupings – provided they acted as building blocs for global free trade – as he argued in his paper, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The Customs Union Issue* (1950). He was also a participant in the Council on Foreign Relations War and Peace Studies Project during the Second World War, as one of the "research secretaries of the highest caliber" on the Economic Group (Kraft). Fittingly,

Rockefeller includes Haberler and Viner among those academics he admits to owing an "intellectual debt", hailing them as "truth seekers" whose example he has attempted to follow.²⁷

Another key institution that influenced the plutocrat's outlook was the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the New York-based foreign policy planning organisation described by some academic researchers as being "operated by and for the corporate upper class" (Shoup); and which is credited with "developing the foreign policy of the United States between the wars and even more during and after the Second World War" (Roberts).²⁸ In *Memoirs*, David Rockefeller only mentions his participation in CFR from 1949 when he joined Council's Board of Directors, but his involvement with the CFR had started earlier. In fact Rockefeller had already played a role in the Council's deliberations as the secretary of the CFR Study Group on "Reconstruction in Western Europe", that met over 1946-47. The deliberations of that group are credited with influencing the Truman Administration's decision to reconstruct war-ravaged Europe with US funds – subsequently known as the Marshall Plan.²⁹

Rockefeller naturally understates the Council's influence on his thinking, merely observing that he found it to be the "best place" for pursuing his "interest in global affairs." Tellingly, the plutocrat admits his motivation for joining the CFR was his determination to "play a role" in the process of ensuring the US provided leadership in building "a new international architecture" following World War II. He also disputes the suggestion the CFR's "strength and reputation" stems from it being a "secret pipeline into the White House and the State Department." Instead it is because of the "quality" of the Council's membership, its central location, "excellent staff and facilities", and a "tradition of rigorous debate and non-partisanship" that it "continues to influence the formulation of American foreign policy."³⁰ While Rockefeller correctly identifies the wide range of views among the CFR's members, for him the Council's enduring value has been its role in devising schemes for world order that conform to his Wilsonian vision. For example, marking the CFR's 75th anniversary in 1997, David Rockefeller hailed the Council's role as America's "premier school for statesmen", observing that it was from the CFR's War and Peace Studies project that America's post-war plans for a "just and durable international system" had emerged, and from more recent CFR studies that "awareness of global economic interdependence gained particular prominence in national policy discussions."³¹

David Rockefeller has also had a long association with the secretive Bilderberg group. In May 1954, Rockefeller attended the first meeting of the Bilderberg group as a member of the 20-strong American contingent.³² He had been one of 40 prominent Americans identified and subsequently contacted by John Coleman, chair of Committee for a National Trade Policy and of the American committee of what was known quite simply as "the Group", to see if he would be willing to attend the planned conference.³³ Rockefeller, naturally, accepted and went to become one of the Group's most regular participants, including as a member of its Steering Committee, and since the death of fellow Steering Committee member George Ball in 1994, he remains one of the only original founding members still in regular attendance.³⁴

The Bilderbergers have long been controversial, with many researchers attributing to the annual secret gathering a role in establishing the European Union and facilitating the planning of a world government.³⁵ David Rockefeller insists, naturally, that the

"truth" is that Bilderberg is no more than an "intensely interesting discussion group" which does not reach a consensus. Precisely what is discussed at the Bilderberg meetings, Rockefeller does not say, preferring to characterise the cabal as a little more than a unique networking opportunity.³⁶ Bilderberg, Rockefeller claimed in a 1990 interview, gave him "an opportunity to become acquainted with some of the leaders of Europe and the United States on a very informal basis one got to know them on a first-name basis."³⁷ When asked by Tony Gosling, editor of www.bilderberg.org, what was being discussed at the Bilderberg meeting in Versailles in May 2003, David Rockefeller was characteristically vague: "Exchanges about the state of the world." He also denied there was anything sinister about the lack of mainstream media reporting on the event. "There's nothing secret about it", he told Gosling, "It is a private meeting. There's a difference between private and secret."³⁸ Indeed.

Other Bilderbergers, however, such as former British Prime Minister Denis Healey, admit there is a Bilderberg consensus. "To say [the Bilderbergers] were striving for a world government is exaggerated but not wholly unfair", Healey told British journalist Jon Ronson. In fact, claimed Healey, most of its members believed that "a single community throughout the world would be a good thing."³⁹ Such a consensus would have obviously reinforced Rockefeller's globalist inclinations, making the Bilderbergers more than merely an unusually well-connected social rendezvous.

This is but a small sample of the influences on David Rockefeller's globalist outlook, but it also illustrates his reliance on the ideas of others. Despite his PhD, Rockefeller is not quite the theoretical mastermind behind the New World Order that he appears to be. Instead, like most plutocrats intent on changing the world, he appropriates the ideas of others, usually Establishment academics and technocrats, incorporating them into his own global vision when it suits his purposes. But, admits the plutocrat, he has "never been particularly dogmatic" in his political or economic beliefs, preferring to support "effective people and practical policies."⁴⁰ Thus, for Rockefeller, ideas or protégés can be discarded once they are no longer useful to him or his ultimate goal of "a more integrated global political and economic structure."

2.3 A Modern-Day Medici

David Rockefeller's globalist inclinations would be of little interest if not for his uniquely powerful position both in the United States and globally. In attempting to describe his power, academics and journalists have used many superlatives, and it is instructive that these descriptions are similar. During the 1960s the descriptions were somewhat restrained, though the key truth was not entirely evaded. For example, a profile of Rockefeller that appeared in *TIME* magazine in 1962—a painting of "Banker David Rockefeller" graced the cover—not only identified the plutocrat as "one of the world's richest men", but described the newly appointed President of Chase Manhattan as "the prime mover in a profession that since the days of the Medici has heavily shaped the course of world's economic affairs." In fact:

Rockefeller is one of that little group of men who sit at the financial hub of the world's wealthiest nation and by their nods give the stop or go sign to enterprises from Bonn to Bangkok. They wield vast powers...⁴¹

The *Christian Science Monitor*, also in the 1960s, described Rockefeller as "a businessman who is listened to all over the world."⁴² While social commentator Ferdinand Lundberg in his 1968 polemic, *The Rich and the Super-Rich*, identified Rockefeller as a "*finpol*" or "financial politician", that social strata comprising the "big stockholders" and managers of the corporations, whose daily activity "is identical with the work of government leaders", except that they have at their fingertips "vast financial resources" for which they not held strictly accountable, and they rarely hold elected office, though they are as powerful as typical politicians.⁴³ In his later work, *The Rockefeller Syndrome* (1975), Lundberg was more effusive in his description:

On his throne [David Rockefeller's] financial and economic authority, necessarily also political, is far greater than that of his much-touted and roundly damned grandfather ever was, or that of his shrinking father. He is the real inheritor and enhancer of Rockefeller power...As former chairman and a director of the Council on Foreign Relations, David Rockefeller is quite obviously a power in the realm...⁴⁴

Many other commentators have shared this assessment. David Rockefeller is "[t]he single most powerful private citizen in America today", claimed Florida State University academic Thomas R. Dye in his 1976 book, *Who's Running America?*⁴⁵ The journalist Bill Moyers, in his 1980 TV special, *The World of David Rockefeller*, described the plutocrat respectively as "the unelected if indisputable chairman of the American Establishment" and "one of the most powerful, influential and richest men in America", who "sits at the hub of a vast network of financiers, industrialists and politicians whose reach encircles the globe."⁴⁶ "David is the undisputed, unelected and self-appointed head of the international corporate and financial community", claimed Robert Eringer in his book *The Global Manipulators* (1980).⁴⁷ As "a member of one of the nation's richest and most powerful families", observed the *New York Times* in 1983, "what [Rockefeller] is determined to have he often gets."⁴⁸ "Rockefeller's power can't be underestimated", wrote Canadian journalist Linda Diebel in the *Toronto Star* in 1993, "He is a titan."⁴⁹ A NewsMax.com report in 1998, described Rockefeller as "one of the world's most influential private figures."⁵⁰

But Rockefeller has always rejected such assessments, insisting that his power is limited and that he has no real leverage with world leaders or government officials, merely good access to them. In an interview with *Forbes* magazine in 1972, for example, David Rockefeller downplayed the idea that he had any such power:

*I have no power in the sense that I can call anybody in the government and tell them what to do. Because of my position I'm more apt to get through on the telephone than somebody else, but what happens to what I suggest depends on whether they feel this makes sense in terms of what they are already doing.*⁵¹

Dye disputes this, claiming that the real reason for David Rockefeller's elaborate denial is simple: with it already well known that he "exercises great power", the plutocrat has "no reason to try to impress anyone" by openly admitting it.⁵² In fact, Rockefeller's position and behaviour are similar to that of the Medici banking family that unofficially ruled 15th-century Florence by subverting the elaborate electoral system through a combination of deception, corruption and violence. The Medicis were effectively the shadow government of Florence – a fact acknowledged in the Florentine expression, "the secret things of our town." That was because, as Tim Parks notes in the *New York Review of Books*, the Medici family leadership

understood that "to hold power for any length of time, one must appear not to hold it."⁵³ Although not known for emulating their more controversial practices, David Rockefeller is like the Medicis, his shadowy yet powerful political role one of the "secret things" of Washington, DC.

There is a range of anecdotal evidence to support this assessment. In 1999, for example, the Irish rock star Bono (from U2), then trying to secure support for Third World debt relief, received an important lesson about the US power structure from then CFR President Leslie Gelb. He had explained to Bono "the great chain of influence—from *David Rockefeller* to UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin to former Chairman of the Fed, Paul Volcker to a number of key Republicans—that led from Wall Street to Washington and back again."⁵⁴ Gelb, though, disputed Bono's suspicion that there must be an "Elvis"—a "single figure with enough clout" to achieve anything in the US political system—and informed him that "he would need the support of every one of these American dignitaries."⁵⁵ Sure enough, Bono, working with Bobby Shriver, met with World Bank President James Wolfensohn, Paul Volcker and then with David Rockefeller:

After Volcker came Rockefeller, the wise old man of Wall Street, and former Chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank. "That meeting went really well," Bobby remembers, "We discussed then-current initiatives and problems with these. We corresponded back and forth for several months." And after Rockefeller came Holbrooke, and after Holbrooke, Bob Hormats, Vice Chairman of Goldman Sachs.⁵⁶

Despite Gelb's insistence there was "no Elvis", of all the non-government figures they met with, it is arguable that Rockefeller's input was pivotal. They *had* to talk with him. We also might note that Holbrooke, Volcker, Wolfensohn and Hormats had each been, at some stage in their careers, in a subordinate position to Rockefeller and all owed some of their success to his influence and support. The ambitious Holbrooke's service in the Carter Administration was undoubtedly aided by his membership of the Trilateral Commission.⁵⁷ While Volcker, a Trilateral Commissioner and former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who had "also served in management positions at Chase Manhattan Bank" according to the *New York Times*;⁵⁸ became Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board thanks in no small part to David Rockefeller, who had "strongly recommended" Volcker to the Carter Administration after refusing the post for himself.⁵⁹

Many of these Washington DC power-brokers have not been afraid to admit their debt to David Rockefeller. Former World Bank President James Wolfensohn, for example, was effusive in his praise of his benefactor at a CFR symposium, held in May 2005, celebrating the plutocrat's 90th birthday. A fawning Wolfensohn declared he "could not refuse" the invitation to speak at the event:

Because the person who had perhaps the greatest influence on my life professionally in this country, and I'm very happy to say personally there afterwards, is David Rockefeller, who first met me at the Harvard Business School in 1957 or '58. And I want you to know that, coming from Australia, to meet a Rockefeller was really quite something. It builds my prestige in Australia to no end to be able to say that I've met David Rockefeller. But the extraordinary thing about it was not the "bloom in the sky" character of the Rockefeller name. It was the personal character of David and [his wife] Peggy that caused us to both admire and to love them. And I want to say,

David, Happy Birthday, and thank you for everything that you did for [my wife] Elaine, for me, and our family in these intervening years.⁶⁰

We can also see this in the case of former Secretary of State and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell. In *Memoirs* we can find no mention of Colin Powell as a personal acquaintance of Rockefeller, let alone a friend. Equally not a single mention of the plutocrat may be found in Powell's memoir *A Soldier's Way* (1995)—even though Powell's co-writer Joseph Persico had been Nelson Rockefeller's speechwriter for eleven years—yet Powell has claimed a close relationship with him. Addressing a Council of the Americas conference in April 2003, Powell had lavished praise on his hitherto unknown "great mentor":

And I also want to take this chance, David, *to thank you for being such a great mentor to me over so many years and through so many different capacities and jobs that I have occupied in Washington.* And I deeply appreciate knowing of your support from a distance, from New York, and it is...with a great sense of humility that I thank you for your support.⁶¹

Even one of David Rockefeller's own aides, Ridgeway Knight, acknowledged in an interview with Bill Moyers, that his employer seemed to be uniquely and enormously powerful, despite not actually being in government:

MOYERS: It's amazing to me that in his world the bank operates as, like a country does.

KNIGHT: Well, what impresses me most is that I've represented a number of presidents, and spoken for a number of secretaries of state, but *I've never seen doors open more easily than when I say I'm coming for David Rockefeller* – it's fantastic.⁶²

Rockefeller's preference for this behind-the-scenes political role stems from his profound distaste for normal democratic politics. Although clearly interested in power, David Rockefeller, after working for Mayor La Guardia, apparently found the idea of having to depend on the whims of the voting public unattractive. "The danger in that field," he later commented, "is that you spend all of your time running for office."⁶³ Unstated, of course, is the plutocrat's probable discomfort at the prospect of being publicly accountable in any way for his actions – something that would be an affront to the enormous power this Rockefeller saw as his due.

2.4 The Responsibilities of the Rich

Instead of facing the public, as his brothers Nelson and Winthrop chose to do, David Rockefeller has found a surer route to power by fulfilling the family tradition of using philanthropy as a "bridge" between the private and public sectors. Rockefeller typically presents the motives behind his philanthropy as benevolent; as an embodiment of Junior's belief that "philanthropy was about being a good neighbor." "I have tried to emulate Father by contributing to a variety of not-for-profit organizations throughout my life," he writes in *Memoirs*.⁶⁴ But this is disingenuous, for David Rockefeller's actual motives for embracing philanthropy and the concept of "corporate social responsibility" have more in common with Andrew Carnegie's elitist view that the super-rich have an exclusive right to shape society.

It has been in other forums, in little-noticed speeches to elite gatherings, that David Rockefeller's true intentions have been revealed. Like Carnegie, Rockefeller considers an active political role by the rich to be a matter of duty rather than a mere whim, as he stated to one gathering that "the opportunities for possessing wealth carry with them *comparable responsibilities*."⁶⁵ In fact, he told the New York Economic Club in 1996, philanthropy performs a vital social function in which the rich and businessmen in general are able to realise their "*responsibility to society* beyond that of maximising profits for shareholders." Although "making profits must come first", as profits are "the most important instrument we have to promote the broader welfare of our society", the former Chairman of Chase Manhattan maintained that the captains of industry should style themselves as "business statesmen" and be "vocal and visible speaking out on community, industry and national issues."⁶⁶

This also includes active involvement in the non-profit area, supporting various organisations whether dealing with domestic or international issues. There is "nothing wrong with perpetuating one's name by endowing an organization or building", Rockefeller told a gathering of some 400 political, civic and business leaders at the Sid W. Richardson Foundation dinner in Dallas in 1985, but with government in retreat in many areas, "the private area must take up the slack."⁶⁷ Unless the business class is actively involved in resolving "societal problems", he warned the New York Economic Club, the public may become "disenchanted with business" and "demand that government *resume its previous role* as the arbiter of our economic life."⁶⁸

And thus David Rockefeller's real agenda becomes clear: *the rich must govern*, limiting the role of elected officials; but the multitude must be placated lest they clamour for the return of real democracy, threatening the reign of the plutocrats.

This agenda spans decades. In the *TIME* profile of the plutocrat in 1962, for example, it was reported that it was David Rockefeller's "conviction that private enterprise has a major contribution to make in solving the world's economic and social problems." To illustrate the global banker offered these words of wisdom and a warning:

Business leaders must point out forcefully and persuasively those government policies or actions that prevent the private economy from achieving its full potential and making its maximum contribution to the common good.

...[I]f they do not concern themselves with the full spectrum of problems civilization faces, they will find themselves, a few years hence, living in a very different and less congenial world.⁶⁹

Perhaps more troubling has been Rockefeller's advocacy of legislation to legally entrench the right of the corporate sector to assume a governing role. Addressing an American Bar Association conference in 1973 – he was its keynote speaker – David Rockefeller appealed to the "nation's lawyers and judicial system" for their assistance in developing "new legislation" that would give the corporate sector "the necessary statutory power" to "respond more effectively to its public responsibilities."⁷⁰ Rockefeller was particularly keen on "new statutes" that would "encourage substantive public involvement by corporations."⁷¹ Despite presenting his proposal as a benevolent action which would ensure that corporations would serve "public needs", Rockefeller's actual objective was to weaken government power over corporate activities, while ensuring corporations assumed more governmental powers. Thus, in

addition to new legislation, Rockefeller sought the "removal of impediments to corporate performance created by contradictory and inconsistent regulation." Pollution controls seemed to be particularly offensive to him.⁷²

The plutocrat also encouraged his audience, then in the midst of a study of "one of the major challenges of our times—the public assault on corporations", to implement their findings "in various legislatures and courts." Rockefeller hoped they would also continue to "inform public opinion" until it became "generally accepted" for corporations to be more extensively involved in dealing with "public issues."⁷³ It was a remarkable agenda, unmatched in its audacity; yet also increasingly successful in recent years as evidenced by the promotion of the oxymoronic concept of "corporate social responsibility." But we should not be surprised that David Rockefeller would articulate such an approach. As one of the leading purveyors of private power in the US, if not the world, clothing his own unaccountable authority in the language of "responsibility" is a logical attempt to confer some legitimacy, some semblance of benevolence on what is an undemocratic exercise of power.

Despite its altruistic allusions, the "corporate social responsibility" advocated by David Rockefeller has more in common with the outdated and anti-democratic concept of *noblesse oblige* or "noble obligation." According to one definition, *noblesse oblige* means that "some group, by virtue of position, sees itself as having a general right or duty to override the people's wishes whenever it sees fit...by reason only of its allegedly higher quality of judgement or consciousness." Irrespective what euphemisms are used to express it – think of Rockefeller's wistful rhetoric about the corporate sector's "responsibility to society" and the desirability of "business statesmen" coming to the fore – this concept is "inconsistent with any notion of self-government or popular control of government."⁷⁴ It is about building a *plutocracy* not strengthening democracy.

2.5 Emperor of the Establishment

But what is the source of David Rockefeller's power? It seems unlikely that it would be David's personal fortune, although sizeable at US\$2.5 billion according to the 2006 *Forbes 400*, it is a pittance compared to the US\$51 billion of Bill Gates and the US\$40 billion of Warren Buffet. Yet it pays to remember there only 92 Americans richer than him—at least based on his declared fortune.⁷⁵ Another more obvious source has been his executive positions at the Chase Manhattan Bank. But the primary basis, as Dye explains, is in his enduring role as "director of the vast Rockefeller empire"; that is, his leadership of "the Rockefeller network of industrial, financial, political, civic, and cultural institutions."⁷⁶ At the centre of this network are the remnants of the vast fortune originally amassed by John D. Rockefeller, Sr, and then dispersed into an abundance of family trusts and philanthropies. This includes the Rockefeller Foundation (2004 net assets, US\$3.1 billion),⁷⁷ the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF) (2004 end of year net assets, US\$781 million),⁷⁸ the Rockefeller Family Fund (RFF) (2000 net assets, US\$68 million),⁷⁹ and the David Rockefeller Foundation (assets unknown). As a former Vice-Chairman (1968-1980), Chairman (1980-1987) and now an Advisory Trustee of the RBF, and Honorary Trustee of the RFF, David Rockefeller has always been at the hub of this network.

Outside of this financial nucleus is a plethora of public institutions including foundations, non-government organisations and various government advisory boards that David Rockefeller has been involved with, usually in a leading role. His myriad positions include: Honorary Chairman of Rockefeller University; Chairman Emeritus of the Museum of Modern Art in New York City; Director of the Overseas Development Council; Director of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council; Vice-Chairman of the Advisory Council on Japan-United States Economic Relations; Vice-Chairman of the Advisory Council for US-China Trade; Chairman of the New York Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Chairman of the US Advisory Committee on Reform of the International Monetary System; Honorary Chairman of the Japan Society; a director of International House; a trustee of the University of Chicago; a trustee of the John F. Kennedy Library; and President of the Board of Overseas Study at Harvard University.

In 1983 he became a member of the Reagan Administration's Commission on Security and Economic Assistance (which grew out one of Rockefeller's recommendations). In 1992 he was named as a member of the Russia-American Bankers Forum set up by the US Federal Reserve Board and Russia's first post-Soviet government. More recently David Rockefeller has been an honorary jury member on the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation's (LMDC) International World Trade Center Site Memorial Competition and currently sits on the board of the World Trade Center Memorial Foundation (WTCMF). In fact Rockefeller was the *first* pick for the WTCMF – the so-called "marquee name that would draw other power-brokers", according to the *New York Times* – the selection having been made by LMDC Chairman John C. Whitehead, who counts Rockefeller as one of his "old friends."⁸⁰

This impressive range of institutions that Rockefeller has been involved in also includes a raft of policy-planning organisations devoted to international political and economic affairs. David Rockefeller's role in these organisations has never been marginal, and his positions include: Director (1949-1985), Chairman (1970-1985) and Honorary Chairman of the **Council on Foreign Relations**; founder (1973), North American Chairman (1977-1991) and Honorary Chairman of the **Trilateral Commission**; a life member of the **Bilderberg Group**; Chairman and Director of the **Institute for International Economics** (IIE); founder (1965), Chairman (1965-1970) and Honorary Chairman of the **Council on the Americas** (COA); founder of the **Center for Inter-American Relations** (later merged with the Americas Society); founder, Honorary Chairman, Chairman (1981-1992), and Director of the **Americas Society**; and a trustee of the **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace** (CEIP). He is also a co-founder of the **Dartmouth Conference**, the **International Executive Service Corps** (Chairman, 1964-68), and the **Global Philanthropists Circle**.

Viewing this remarkable resume one cannot help but agree with the Lundberg's observation that David Rockefeller is "a high personage, far from an ordinary citizen."⁸¹ But perhaps that is an understatement. At a recent "book party" for the retiring plutocrat, former US Trade Representative Carla Hills celebrated Rockefeller's pivotal role in maintaining this network:

Had [David Rockefeller] not been the founder, long-time chairman and benefactor and even often all of the above, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Council of the Americas, the Institute for International Economics, the Trilateral Commission, the

White House Fellows Program, and I could name so many more, might not exist. And if they did, they might not assuredly be as effective as they are today.⁸²

True to his Medici-like preference for avoiding public scrutiny, David Rockefeller has rejected formal government appointments, including offers to be Secretary of the Treasury and Defense, numerous ambassadorial positions and Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. In *Memoirs*, Rockefeller cites "political considerations" and his devotion to Chase Manhattan as his reasons for declining these offers. He also believed, not without good reason, that through his Chase chairmanship he could "accomplish much that would benefit the United States as an 'ambassador without portfolio'."⁸³ At the panel discussion on *Memoirs*, held in October 2002 at Johns Hopkins University, David elaborated further, noting that his position at Chase provided him with "a rather unique [sic] opportunity to play a quiet but hopefully useful role."⁸⁴ And on the *Charlie Rose Show* (also in 2002), David added that he could achieve much more outside of government as he was not limited to four-year terms, thus enabling him to do "a lot of interesting things" over decades.⁸⁵

He gave his most succinct (yet still self-serving) explanation for avoiding public office in an interview with Maria Bartiromo on CNBC in November 2003:

Well, I felt that I had a rather unique opportunity as chairman of the Chase to deal with the leaders of the world on a rather personal basis. *If you accept a political job, it's for a specific period of time. I never felt that I would necessarily be able to make more of a contribution in the country or the world by becoming even secretary of the Treasury, even though that's a very important job.*⁸⁶

Thus the limits of Rockefeller's rectitude become apparent: not only are "political jobs" unattractive because of the problem of public accountability, they are far too short in duration.

2.6 The "Ambassador-without-portfolio"

As a self-appointed "ambassador without portfolio" Rockefeller has used his unique access to visit countless heads of state, ostensibly on business for Chase or as part of CFR delegations, but often as an unofficial emissary for Washington. As Eringer noted in 1980, when he was not attending to bank business or "taking the chair of his hush-hush international conferences", Rockefeller spent his time "circling the globe in his private Grumman Gulfstream jet and dropping in on world leaders to offer advice."⁸⁷ In 1973, according to Gary Allen, Rockefeller "met with 27 heads of state, including the rulers of Russia and Red China."⁸⁸ Lundberg's description of the jet-setting plutocrat's private diplomacy in 1975 observed a similar pattern:

Big crowds always turn out when [David Rockefeller] planes in abroad, as though he were a head of state. And in every country he visits he has a scheduled meeting with the head of state, as though he were a roving ambassador or potentate. And he is the latter, an American sheik. At home he entertains just about every head of state or high official at his Pocantico Hills home, sometimes putting them up overnight or for several days.⁸⁹

A report in *Forbes* magazine twenty-five years later noted that despite his advancing age, the plutocrat continued with his busy schedule:

Rockefeller spends less than half the year at his home in New York City. The rest of the time he's travelling either for Chase or such groups as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission or Rockefeller University. He's a workaholic who wakes at 5 a.m. and reads the day's memoranda before non-stop appointments. On Sept. 2 in Sao Paulo, for example, he had ten meetings in over ten hours.⁹⁰

The scope of the plutocrat's global networking is impressive. Over the past forty years David Rockefeller has had private meetings with hundreds of national leaders—a privilege usually only afforded to senior officials or other heads of state. The list includes: Soviet and Russian leaders Nikita Khrushchev, Alexi Kosygin, Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin; Arab and Middle Eastern leaders Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt), Anwar Sadat (Egypt), King Hussein (Jordan), Sheik Jabber (Kuwait), King Faisal (Saudi Arabia), Saddam Hussein (Iraq) and the Shah of Iran; Israeli Prime Ministers Ehud Barak and Gold Meir; Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, Li Peng, Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin; South African leaders Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki; Cuba's Fidel Castro, and in the case of Mexico and Brazil "every head of state since World War II."⁹¹ The product of these associations is a global network of power and influence, with David Rockefeller at its centre – ultimately embodied in his massive electronic Rolodex, located in his office in the Rockefeller Center, reputed to contain 150,000 names of "everyone [Rockefeller] has met since he was an assistant military attaché at the US Embassy in Paris in the 1940s."⁹²

But what has David Rockefeller actually done in his various missions? A few examples are illustrative. In July 1964, while in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) attending a Dartmouth Conference,⁹³ he had a two-hour meeting with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, apparently at the suggestion of then UN Secretary General U Thant. Rockefeller later debriefed President Johnson, with whom he had a "good relationship", on his talks with Khrushchev which covered such subjects as the war in Vietnam, Cuba, and trade.⁹⁴ During the 1970s, as one of the "few Americans who had access to senior leaders" in the Middle East, Rockefeller claims to have played the role of a "diplomatic go-between." He met with the leaders of the Arab countries and would pass on their views to the White House and State Department, usually to Henry Kissinger.⁹⁵ In 1982 Rockefeller "accepted an invitation" from the Reagan Administration to form a committee of businessmen to help promote a new aid program that provided incentives to US firms to do business with Jamaica. This program was later became the Caribbean Basin Initiative.⁹⁶

And on September 28, 2001 Rockefeller met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, during which they "exchanged views on Sino-US relations and other issues of common concern", according to the Chinese *People's Daily*. Jiang reportedly expressed his "appreciation for Rockefeller's contributions to the growth of Sino-US relations." While Rockefeller described the US-China relationship as "one of the most important bilateral relations in the world" and indicated that he was "glad" see encouraging signs of an improvement in that relationship. The plutocrat also said that "the U.S. people are grateful to the Chinese government and people for their sympathy and support for the U.S. people following the September 11 incident."⁹⁷

In the world of international affairs such diplomatic niceties are mandatory; even for those envoys whose only credentials appear to be their own name. But there is more

to Rockefeller's globe-trotting than him merely acting as a private conduit for diplomatic messages. There have in fact been a number of instances where his visits have led to changes in policy by national governments, or have even influenced, in no small degree, US foreign and economic policy. There are three examples worth briefly reviewing, which provide some insights into how Rockefeller has exercised his global influence and White House connections:

(1) Guinea: Rockefeller's direct dealings with President Ahmed Sekou Toure, Guinea's leader in the early 1980s, led to a number of changes in the African country. Under Toure Guinea had become, in Rockefeller's words, a "Marxist police state", an oppressive socialist government heavily reliant on Soviet aid, but by the late 1970s Toure realised "that perhaps he'd bet on the wrong horse." Visiting the US in 1979, Toure sought Rockefeller's help in attracting US investors; he also invited the plutocrat to Guinea. In 1982 the plutocrat visited Guinea – Rockefeller recalls that he was welcomed "like a head of state" – and he came away determined to help the country. Rockefeller claims he then "persuaded the State Department" to invite Toure to the US; Reagan later met with Toure and sent agricultural aid to Guinea. Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau also issued an invitation to Toure. In addition Rockefeller sponsored an economic conference on Guinea's investment potential, and had the Toure and his wife as guests at his Tarrytown estate. Assessing his efforts in 1983, Rockefeller noted that Toure had "not completely changed from socialism," but the African leader was at least "giving private enterprise a chance."⁹⁸

(2) USSR/Russia: Perhaps Rockefeller's most important project were his efforts during the latter half of the 1980s to open up the Soviet Union to foreign investment with a view to ultimately integrating it into the world economy. The impetus for these efforts was Mikhail Gorbachev's famed efforts to reform the USSR by encouraging political openness (*glasnost*) and economic restructuring (*perestroika*). Rockefeller notes in *Memoirs*, that he was interested in "Gorbachev's proposals for reform of the Soviet domestic economy and political order."⁹⁹ In an effort to accelerate these reforms in his preferred direction, David Rockefeller made a number of overtures to Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders, though with varying degrees of success.

His initial efforts seemed to make some headway. In 1986 after leading a business delegation to the USSR, Rockefeller reported to the Trilateral Commission that the Soviet Union had become more flexible and was prepared to discuss joint ventures. The USSR subsequently announced that it would permit 49 percent foreign ownership of Soviet enterprises.¹⁰⁰ But in 1987, during Gorbachev's visit to Washington DC, the signs were less encouraging. Attending a reception at the Soviet Embassy, Rockefeller asked Gorbachev how the rouble could become an international currency without free movement of people and goods across Soviet borders. Gorbachev's vague answer – that the Politburo was "studying the issue" and would "make some important decisions before long" – failed to impress the plutocrat.¹⁰¹

Rockefeller visited the USSR again in early 1989 at the head of a high-powered Trilateral Commission delegation which included Henry Kissinger, former French President Giscard d'Estaing, former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, and William Hyland, editor of the CFR's journal *Foreign Affairs*. In their meeting with Gorbachev, the Trilateral delegation sought an explanation on how the USSR would integrate into the world economy; "in phases" Gorbachev replied. The delegation also

suggested that the USSR was too large to be outside of international economic organisations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Gorbachev, despite indicating the Soviet leadership was "close" to making a decision on whether to join those bodies, said the Soviet Union wanted "reciprocal steps" from the West as they could not "accept the rules of participation" for those organisations.¹⁰²

In their report to the Trilateral Commission released later that year, Kissinger, d'Estaing and Nakasone, reflected the delegation's collective impatience with Gorbachev's responses. They noted that in contrast to the "great expectation" that had initially accompanied Gorbachev's reform process, the USSR they saw in January was "much more somber." It was obvious to them that Gorbachev had "every incentive" to cut military spending and to seek "beneficial economic relationships, including foreign investment, with the nonsocialist countries." Yet in practice Gorbachev's economic reform program had only "created a great deal of turmoil without achieving much in substance." The authors were adamant, however, that the only type of *perestroika* they would support involved the "radical transformation of the Soviet system" bringing the USSR "closer to Western concepts of market economics..."¹⁰³

Among their recommendations was the admonition that no "global financing" should be offered to the USSR as it would only perpetuate "an unbalanced economy" without delivering the "necessary fundamental reforms in prices, freer enterprises and convertibility of the rouble." They also recommended against giving the USSR full membership in the IMF and GATT "until it is clear that the Soviet Union is ready to accept the obligations of being a member, and that *its economic system has been sufficiently altered* to assure reciprocal benefits to its economic partners." Instead the Soviet Union should only be offered "observer status" in those bodies so the USSR could learn to "adapt its own rules to normal international practice."¹⁰⁴ Gorbachev's request for special treatment had been rejected; the USSR would have to change.

In *Memoirs* Rockefeller notes that the main problem with Gorbachev was that he remained "strongly committed to the essentials of a centralized Communist economy."¹⁰⁵ Obviously what was needed was a new leader, one who was prepared to make the hard decisions that Gorbachev, could not and would not make; someone who would deliver the desired "radical transformation of the Soviet system." That new leader soon emerged in the person of Boris Yeltsin, a flamboyant Communist Party member who had resigned from the Politburo amid much controversy in October 1987 for criticising the slow pace of reform. Despite being cast out, Yeltsin had staged a comeback, establishing himself as one of the USSR's highest profile and more radical reformers, who supported private property rights, cuts to defence spending, and an end to special privileges for the Communist Party hierarchy.¹⁰⁶

Inevitably he came to Rockefeller's attention. The extent of this interest became apparent when in September 1989, Yeltsin came to the US on a week-long private speaking tour organised by the Esalen Institute, "a little-known group supported by David Rockefeller and several other wealthy Americans."¹⁰⁷ The first speech of Yeltsin's tour was at the CFR headquarters in New York. Rockefeller introduced Yeltsin, though his comments, noted the *Washington Post*, could not be reported under the CFR's off-the-record rules. After the meeting, however, Rockefeller told the *Post* that he found Yeltsin to be "a charming and impressive person who clearly is a

highly skilled politician."¹⁰⁸ It cannot be confirmed how crucial Rockefeller's public praise was, but the fact Yeltsin was actually in the country seemed to prompt a last-minute invitation from the otherwise Gorbachev-friendly White House. Yeltsin went on to have his first ever meeting with President Bush; he also met with National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of State James Baker.

In contrast to Rockefeller's effusive praise, the Bush Administration's initial impressions were not good: Baker found Yeltsin to be "a flake" who knew little about market economics; while Scowcroft thought him "devious."¹⁰⁹ But for Yeltsin, according to one of his biographers, the trip was a "formative experience", one that "marked the moment when he threw overboard the last of his illusions about 'building socialism' and communist ideology..."¹¹⁰ Yet the Bush Administration never quite embraced Yeltsin, despite the "powerful new evidence" that emerged in 1991, according to Beschloss and Talbott, that Russia's first democratically elected president was a "champion of democratic ideals and free markets." Bush was heavily criticised by the Bill Clinton during 1992 election campaign for sticking with Gorbachev.¹¹¹ But in line with the Trilateral Commission's recommendations the Bush Administration refused to provide financial aid to the USSR; Bush reportedly reasoning it would only "help communism stave off bankruptcy" – a position also supported by Yeltsin.¹¹²

David Rockefeller did not re-emerge in the picture until sometime after the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991.¹¹³ In February 1992 Rockefeller attended a dinner held in Yeltsin's honour at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. According to a *New York Times* report, "the dinner brought Yeltsin together with about 50 prominent people now or recently in government, finance and business..." It proved to be a revealing event with Yeltsin reportedly announcing to his hosts: "I promised you when I saw you last year that I would destroy Communism, and I was as good as my word." Clearly desperate for foreign investors, Russia's new leader had announced that his country was "willing to mortgage its gold, diamonds and gas deposits as backing for investment." And in a sign that did not bode well for the future, Yeltsin reportedly "scribbled notes furiously throughout the meal, and was disarmingly frank about his own ignorance of the fine points of capitalism."¹¹⁴

In June 1992, the host of that dinner, Gerald Corrigan, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, announced the formation of the Russia-American Bankers Forum, a body that would oversee the restructuring of the Russian banking and financial system and look at creating a Russian-American investment bank. The Forum's co-chairs, Corrigan and Yuli Voronstov, an adviser to Yeltsin and Russia's ambassador to the UN, explained to the press that the restructuring of the banking system would be "the mainstay of a new market economy." While the proposed investment bank "could help to channel US private sector capital investments in Russia and to lay the groundwork for the development of US commercial bank operations in Moscow."¹¹⁵ Rockefeller had already told the press in April 1992 that he would be participating in the proposed Forum.¹¹⁶

The purpose of the Forum seemed laudable: to help Russia develop a financial system to enable it to cope with economic reform. As Corrigan explained, "Everyone in the government and business circles understands that a banking system is necessary for economic reform to work." Under the program 250 aspiring Russian banking staff attended a five-week course on "Advanced Studies in Banking and Finance" at

Fairfield University in Connecticut.¹¹⁷ Speaking about the Forum while visiting Moscow, Rockefeller admitted to feeling optimistic about the project, though he cautioned it would take some time to see results. "You can't change from a centralized system to a market system overnight without a lot of problems," he told reporters.¹¹⁸

Yet, in spite of recognising there would be "a lot of problems" in an "overnight" change, going slow did not seem to be on the plutocrat's agenda; there would be no alternative to the impending "radical transformation". This had become evident in a meeting – a day *before* the above comment was made – attended by Corrigan, Rockefeller, Vorontsov and another Forum member, Cyrus Vance (former Secretary of State and Trilateral Commissioner), in which Yeltsin had argued the IMF should ease its demands for oil prices to freed quickly as such a move would only "worsen the social situation" in the country. "We are already taking a lot of unpopular measures in order to speed up to the maximum the advance to a market-based system," Yeltsin had added. Corrigan's response was hardly reassuring; he told Yeltsin that "U.S. bankers were 'encouraged' by reforms in Russia but stressed that privatization *had to be carried out quickly*." Rockefeller presumably concurred.¹¹⁹

In retrospect it is unclear if this much-vaunted Forum did any good in view of the key role played by Russia's private banks in the corrupt mass transferral of state resources, via the "loans-for-share program", into the hands of the so-called "oligarchs" in 1995. As related by dissident former World Bank economist Joseph Stiglitz, the loans-for-share program was the "most egregious example" of bad privatization in Russia. When the Russian Government took out a series of loans from private banks, it put up shares in many of its enterprises as collateral. Then "Surprise!—the government defaulted on its loans; the private banks took over the companies in what might be viewed as a sham sale...; and a few oligarchs became instant billionaires."¹²⁰

Far worse conclusions can be drawn on the period of IMF-directed "shock therapy" – supported by Corrigan and Rockefeller – which plunged most of the Russian population into poverty and hardship. It was estimated in 1996, for example, that nearly 45 million Russians had fallen into poverty since 1991. Infant mortality had also risen during the period of shock therapy, while life expectancy in men and women, after five years of reforms, had dropped by approximately four years.¹²¹ Seemingly indifferent to these depressing statistics and the fact Yeltsin was forced rule by decree in 1993 to neutralise Communist opposition to the reform program, David Rockefeller maintained his faith in the Russian leader. The occasion was a private meeting at the Russian consulate in Manhattan in September 1994, where Yeltsin sought to convince US business leaders yet again that Russia's reforms were on track. Rockefeller seemed convinced, telling the press that Yeltsin "made a very favourable impression" and that the meeting had been "reassuring."¹²²

(3) Vietnam-US Relations: Rockefeller had supported the Vietnam War during the 1960s so it is ironic that he was a strong opponent of the embargo against the country. In October 1993 as the leader of a CFR-sponsored delegation of US businessmen that was visiting Vietnam, David Rockefeller called for the US trade embargo against Vietnam to be lifted. Rockefeller told reporters that he felt "strongly" that there was a "need for a change" in US policy towards its former foe. As for the outstanding issue of American soldiers Missing-In-Action (MIA) from the Vietnam War, Rockefeller expressed his hope that once it was "understood" the Vietnamese were cooperating

"the embargo too will be removed." "I think President Clinton has taken several steps which are moving in the right direction," Rockefeller added, "But I feel after what we've heard here, that the process should be accelerated, and I would hope normalisation of relations would come much sooner."¹²³

Rockefeller seemed unusually prescient. Lifting the embargo had been one of Clinton's foreign policy objectives but concerns of over opposition from veterans and POW/MIA groups had stayed his hand. However, two months after Rockefeller's visit, Winston Lord, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and former CFR President (1977-1985), reportedly "returned from Vietnam in December with a favourable report on Hanoi's increased cooperation" on the POW/MIA issue.¹²⁴ On February 3, 1994, Clinton lifted the trade embargo; he normalised relations in 1994.

Such are the requirements of power. But it is a secretive process. As David Rockefeller works for himself or is representing private or non-government organisations he easily evades the requirements of public accountability. No mechanisms for disclosure; no procedures for exploring his activities seem to exist. The Logan Act does not seem to have been invoked to investigate his activities, despite this private citizen having for decades visited world leaders as though he were one himself, dispensing advice, exchanging views, and identifying problems. Yet Rockefeller sits outside government, far beyond the reach of its rules, regulations and public relations requirements, but it is arguable he has exerted more influence over governments than the people to whom they are actually accountable. He lurks in the background, the occasionally visible shadow ruler...

3. Towards "One World"

Clearly, government positions have held few attractions for David Rockefeller. However, as an unofficial but uniquely powerful "ambassador without portfolio", he has been able to do "a lot of interesting things" without ever being called to account. Driving most of his activities over the past 40 years has been his vision of creating "a more integrated global political and economic structure—one world." To achieve this goal, Rockefeller has supported a multidimensional strategy comprising US global leadership, the United Nations, multinational corporations, international economic integration, global and regional free trade, population control and global governance.

3.1 The Need for American Leadership

The cornerstone of David Rockefeller's New World Order vision is US leadership. Rockefeller traces his devotion to the concept to when he "returned from World War II believing that *a new international architecture had to be erected* and that the United States had a moral obligation to *provide leadership to that effort*."¹²⁵ In the immediate post-war period, according to Rockefeller, America "played a pivotal—and, for the most part, a highly constructive—role in the world."¹²⁶ This role he has insisted on maintaining, irrespective of changes to the global political landscape and America's position in it. Despite America having lost much of its strength, "[w]e are still a major power in the world and, as such, *have a responsibility we cannot shirk*", the plutocrat proclaimed in 1980 to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council.¹²⁷ In fact,

"we must restore our rightful role in the world by reasserting the strength of our currency and our economy", Rockefeller argued in a 1979 address that warned of America's economic decline.¹²⁸

But for David Rockefeller, US leadership has never meant unilateralism or a crude imperialism to secure global dominance; instead, it had to be used to build a New World Order based on supranational institutions and economic interdependence. This was to be achieved through cooperation with other nations, either in a "trilateral partnership" with Western Europe and Japan or under the tutelage of international organisations such as the United Nations. "With the dissolution of the Soviet Union," Rockefeller told a Business Council for the United Nations (BCUN) gathering in 1994, "the opportunity for *enlightened American leadership* is, perhaps, even greater than it was in 1939, at the beginning of the Second World War, or in 1945 when the Cold War began."¹²⁹ However, it was an "illusion" that "Americans by themselves have the wisdom to frame sound policy for a diverse community of nations", Rockefeller averred on the occasion of the CFR's 75th anniversary in 1997. That goal could only be achieved "through patient collaboration among leaders from many countries", with the US playing a key role in "fostering that collaboration."¹³⁰

And just as his brother Nelson had argued 30 years before, David Rockefeller insists in *Memoirs* that the United States has no choice in the matter, for international circumstances are compelling and irresistible; America *must* lead:

The United States *cannot escape from its responsibilities. Today's world cries out for leadership, and our nation must provide it.* In the twenty-first century there can be no place for isolationists; we must all be internationalists.¹³¹

But in asserting that this "internationalist" policy must be followed, Rockefeller has rejected unilateralism. Thus we find in *Memoirs* this veiled criticism of the increasingly imperialistic agenda adopted by the administration of George W. Bush:

The world has now become so inextricably intertwined that *the United States can no longer go it alone, as some prominent politicians have urged that we should.* We are the world's sole superpower and its dominant nation economically. *One of our duties is to provide judicious and consistent leadership* that is firmly embedded in our national values and ideals.¹³²

Perhaps conscious his message had not got through to the White House, which had launched its invasion of Iraq without any direct UN authorisation¹³³ and seemed driven by a desire to undermine the United Nations,¹³⁴ David Rockefeller made his message somewhat plainer in November 2003 just prior to attending an important event in Washington DC. The occasion was the presentation of the George C. Marshall Foundation's Marshall Award to then Secretary of State Colin Powell. Rockefeller was due to share the podium with Vice-President Dick Cheney – an opponent of securing UN authorisation for the invasion of Iraq according to some accounts¹³⁵ – to present the award. Speaking to the *Atlanta-Journal Constitution* before travelling to Washington DC, Rockefeller made it clear that he did not share Cheney's contempt for the UN or his belief in unilateral US leadership:

My outlook is that *the United States, the most powerful nation in the world, has an obligation to play an international role.* The stronger a nation is, the more it has an

obligation to take on a public sense, a more sense. I applaud what Colin Powell is doing.

I am disturbed that there isn't more recognition of more people in the Republican Party – *even if they may disagree with what is done sometimes in the United Nations. It plays a role in the world and should be given more support.*

*I think we can't go it alone. It is not in our best interests.*¹³⁶

It remains unclear, though, if David Rockefeller explicitly disapproved *or* approved of using military force to take over Iraq's oil resources out of the hands of Saddam Hussein – a leader he once had met with personally¹³⁷ – for the benefit of the US. He was certainly aware of what really motivated the invasion. In an exchange with a reporter from *The Washington Times* in early 2003 the plutocrat seemed to give the game away by acknowledging the banal reality behind US interests in the region:

Q: What do you think when people say the United States is only interested in the Middle East because of its oil?

A: Seventy percent of the world's oil reserves are found there. Our industries are dependent on oil, and *we have a compelling reason to use Iraqi oil as well as oil from other countries. Without Iraqi oil, not enough oil is being produced today for our country to function. That's just a fact.*¹³⁸

Buried in his answer is a degree of resignation, given that nearly thirty years ago Rockefeller had gone on the public record as someone of note who was worried about America's growing dependence on foreign sources of oil. Back in 1977, not long after the first of the so-called "oil shocks", Rockefeller told the Economic Club in New York that in his view the US had "failed miserably to fashion an adequate energy policy – one that will curb its appetite for oil imports..."¹³⁹ Addressing an energy conference being held at the Forum Club in Houston, Texas in March 1980, the plutocrat was adamant: "I do not believe the way to better the future lies in *perpetuating our dangerous dependence on others for strategic materials...*"¹⁴⁰

His solution, in view of recent events is instructive. The background to his Texas speech was yet another oil shock, this time in the wake of the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Rockefeller had spoken pessimistically of "perilous times" and suggested conditions were obviously ripe for both oil conservation *and* an increase in domestic oil production. The Carter Administration, however, seemed determined to stymie the latter through its "greater emphasis on preserving inaccessible wilderness areas than providing oil to power the nation's future." For Rockefeller this was both "dangerous" and the "wrong direction" for the US; the "right direction" was through "immediate and vigorous domestic exploration." He took issue with environmental regulations that had "withdrawn three-fourths of the land from mineral exploration development." It was time, he said, to "pull in sharply on the environmental reins" and accelerate domestic oil exploration and production.¹⁴¹

The plutocrat's declaration on the need to reduce US dependence on foreign energy sources can be read cynically in view of the American record of the past 30 years of *increasing* its reliance on foreign oil.¹⁴² We might also note that in his criticisms of the Carter Administration's energy policies Rockefeller restricted himself to attacking its

environmental regulations which had curtailed domestic oil production. Absent from Rockefeller's critique was any mention of the so-called "Carter Doctrine", first announced in the January 1980, in which Carter committed the US to repelling "by any means necessary, including military force" any "attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region." The Pentagon's first commander in the Persian Gulf, Lieutenant General Robert Kingston would explain his basic mission as being to "assure the unimpeded flow of oil from the Arabian Gulf." Yet, in calling for energy conservation, Rockefeller echoed Carter's more unpopular call in July 1979, for Americans to deal with the "clear and present danger" to the US posed by its energy dependence by being less extravagant in their oil consumption. The "Carter Doctrine" was an acknowledgement that path had been abandoned.¹⁴³

Oil conservation at home and accommodating OPEC were the "soft" responses to the oil shocks of the 1970s. For Rockefeller – who had already accompanied a delegation of US oilmen who visited the White House in 1969 in an attempt to convince Nixon to "placate the Arabs"¹⁴⁴ – this could be the only response. In *Memoirs*, he wistfully describes how his preferred response to the oil shocks was an "adjustment process" comprising "conservation, improved technology to increase energy efficiency, and exploration to find new sources of oil."¹⁴⁵

The "hard" response, in contrast, the one being pursued today, was to seize the oil fields of the Middle East by force. This option already been canvassed in the early 1970s by the first generation of neo-conservatives. Putting forward his case for military action against the Arab states behind the oil shocks, for example, the so-called "godfather" of neo-conservatism, Irving Kristol had argued that "smaller nations are not going to behave reasonably...unless it is costly to them to behave reasonably."¹⁴⁶ While in his lengthy article in *Commentary*, Robert Tucker described as "astonishing" that in America's reaction to the "oil crisis" the "meaningful threat of force" was absent.¹⁴⁷ At the time, this naked endorsement of military force was condemned by some critics as little more than a call for "international armed robbery" (Ravenal), if not the product of "sick minds" (Akins).¹⁴⁸

By 1980, though, the tide was beginning to turn, as "leading members of the American foreign-policy elite" concluded that *dominance* of the Persian Gulf was "critically important to the well-being of the United States."¹⁴⁹ For once and not for the last time, Rockefeller appeared to be out of step. Yet the argument, as always within the ranks of the power-elite, was about means, not necessarily ends. The method was in dispute; the motives – securing access to resources and markets to the benefit of US commercial interests – went unchallenged. It seems that after having at one time advocated an approach that avoided war, David Rockefeller, seems to have shifted, acquiescing to the inevitable, though insisting that it be done under UN auspices and in closer collaboration with America's allies, not through unilateral US military action. The victors in this power elite dispute are obvious, though the losers, at the lower echelons of the global food chain, only grow in number...

Perhaps the main conclusion to be drawn from this is that for David Rockefeller, US leadership is essential to achieve his goal of "one world." Although, ultimately US power would evaporate in the new world order Rockefeller hopes to create, that power must be maintained for as long as possible to prevent other emerging superpowers from seizing the initiative.

3.2 Creating a Global Market

Although crucial, US leadership has not been the only component of Rockefeller's vision; undermining national sovereignty through economic integration has been of equal importance. As the only trained economist of his generation of Rockefellers, having been taught by the leading free trade and free market theorists of the 1930s and 1940s, David has long been aware that the power of national governments can best be undermined by steadily reducing their control over economic matters. In fact, he has always regarded government regulation as an obstacle to prosperity and often argued for the need to "prune the forest of rules and let the economy grow."¹⁵⁰ But in advocating the lifting of restrictions on business, whether through deregulation or free trade, David has always recognised that this will erode national autonomy.

For example, in a lecture he gave in Manchester, UK, in 1975, David Rockefeller singled out multinational corporations (MNCs) as one of the other main drivers of this process, describing them as "the most important instruments in the unprecedented expansion that has taken place in world trade." The purpose of his lecture, however, was to defend MNCs from the "new demonology" emanating from the Third World-dominated UN General Assembly, primarily in the form of the so-called New International Economic Order and Lima Declarations. These declarations aimed to reorder the world economy by subjecting MNCs to global regulations, relieving Third World debts and changing international trade rules to favour developing countries. Finding this agenda objectionable, Rockefeller accused the "revolutionary left" and "radical politicians" of "calling most persistently for punitive taxes and crippling regulation of multinationals."¹⁵¹

It was in his concluding prescription that David Rockefeller made it clear how crucial MNCs are to his goal of an integrated global economy:

We should be doing all in our power to lift the siege that is taking shape around our beleaguered multinational companies. *They still have much work to do in helping to create a true world economy.* We must let them get on with this unfinished business.¹⁵²

Arguing the case for foreign investment in 1969, Rockefeller claimed that foreign investors had at least three "social obligations" to fulfil in the "poorer countries." The first was to "promote economic growth—at a profit—just as he does at home"; second, to "try to apply new technologies to social problems just as he does at home"; and finally, foreign investors in developing countries should see themselves as a "trainer of men for work."¹⁵³ Following these measures, he argued, would: "do more than anything I can think of to restore and strengthen hope *in the idea of international cooperation.*"¹⁵⁴ Driven by this conviction, in 1972 Rockefeller had called for a massive public relations campaign – a "crusade for understanding" – that would eliminate the dangerous anti-corporate "suspicions" of the public by explaining why the MNCs should be free to move goods, capital and technology around the globe.¹⁵⁵

As always, the rhetoric sounded impressive, even altruistic, yet it was undermined by the plutocrat's practices. Time and time again Rockefeller has revealed that a stable environment for business trumps all his other proclaimed concerns. Moreover, the reforms he has promoted tend to produce private monopolies and widespread poverty.

In November 1967, for example, David Rockefeller, representing Chase Manhattan, was a key participant in a three-day conference held in Geneva, which "designed the corporate takeover of Indonesia", according to John Pilger. By then Indonesia was a going concern after a military coup, led by General Suharto, had ousted the left-leaning President Sukarno. The conference, sponsored by the Time-Life Corporation, was attended by a plethora of leading US corporations all seeking access to Indonesian markets and resources. Chase Manhattan ensured they got it, taking the lead in the meetings to "hammer out policies that were going to be acceptable to them and other investors", according to an academic who examined the conference documents. The President of Time Inc, James Linen, sounded like Rockefeller when he hailed the conference as confirming that the "world of international enterprise is more than governments" and that "international enterprise" was "shaping the global economy at revolutionary speed."¹⁵⁶ It truly was a world safe for business...

Rockefeller was also involved in Mexico's "free market" transition, which started during debt crisis of 1982. According to the *Toronto Star*, "Powerful U.S. industrialists, led by David Rockefeller, convinced then [Mexican] president Miguel de la Madrid that he had to agree to neo-liberal monetary programs in order to win a massive infusion of foreign loan money." These programs included "massive privatization"; out of the 1,155 state firms that existed in 1982 only 220 were left by 1994. Most of the reforms were overseen by Madrid's successor, Carlos Salinas, who privatized the banks and the airlines, and "changed the constitution to allow communal land to be sold and got rid of the state steel mills." But Salinas "neglected to put in place controls to ensure that public monopolies didn't become private monopolies." The result was that the powerful state companies were purchased by a few wealthy families; 24 new billionaires were created in Mexico. The result, according to one critic, was that Mexico had once again become "a nation ruled by a small elite tied to foreign banks and corporations."¹⁵⁷

Rockefeller, though, as he had already demonstrated with his non-reaction to the suffering caused Russia's reforms, was unperturbed. In fact, in October 2004, at a special dinner in New York, hosted by the Council of the Americas, Rockefeller praised Salinas (then about to leave office) as "one of the world's two great leaders of the past 50 years, the other being Egypt's late president, Anwar Sadat."¹⁵⁸

On free trade, Rockefeller has been equally adamant that it both a path to world order and a means of defeating national sovereignty. Addressing the Empire Club of Canada in December 1971, for example, he advocated as a "longer-term objective" the "removal of barriers to trade..." The plutocrat warned that the failure to "eradicate" protectionism "promptly" would not only lead to "widespread epidemic of new barriers against trade and investment", but it would allow the "inward-turning virus" of protectionism and a "self-defeating nationalism" to take hold.¹⁵⁹ "In a world of growing interdependence," Rockefeller told British writer Anthony Sampson in the 1970s, "the last thing we want is protection."¹⁶⁰ Indeed, the "expansion of trade" and the "emergence of a genuine world economy", he declared at Manchester in 1975, were "our best prospects for maintaining peace among nations."¹⁶¹

As for the economic pain and social upheavals that the shift towards a world built on free trade might entail, the plutocrat saw only positives. For example, in his comments

on the free-trade deal forged between Canada and the US in the 1980s, Rockefeller was indifferent to the nay-sayers, but enthusiastic about the outcome. "There may be specific companies in both countries that have trouble with it, as is the case with any change of this magnitude", he told the *New York Times*, "But over all for the country and for consumers *it is a good thing*."¹⁶²

Seemingly driven by this conviction, Rockefeller has opposed protectionism at every opportunity. In 1992 he voiced his support for a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round talks of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), warning that if the talks collapsed it would "set back trade in the rest of the world and encourage protectionist forces."¹⁶³ In April 1994 GATT was formally replaced by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) – a body that some observers were warning would be little more than a "free-trade World Government" that would create a "global corporate utopia in which local citizens are toothless..."¹⁶⁴ The report of the Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood* (1995), seemed to confirm this, hailing the WTO as "a crucial building block for global economic governance."¹⁶⁵

Such warnings now seem prescient. According to Joel Bakan, author of *The Corporation* (2004), for example, the WTO has "evolved into a powerful, secretive, and corporate-influenced overseer of government's mandate to protect citizens and the environment from corporate harms." In fact, since 1994, the WTO had become "a significant fetter" on the ability of national governments to "protect their citizens from corporate misdeeds."¹⁶⁶ David Rockefeller, who now describes the WTO as a "constructive" international activity, must be pleased.¹⁶⁷

Following the collapse of Communism, however, disappointment was evident when the plutocrat surveyed the world scene, observing that nationalism was threatening free trade. "There is no doubt that nationalism in different forms has been a growing reality ever since the disappearance of the Soviet empire and the discrediting of communism," he told the Kyodo News Service at the end of 1994. In fact: "One might have hoped that (the end of the Cold War) *would bring nations closer together and enable nations to work together more*, but that certainly has not always been the case." Rockefeller cited as an example of this trend the opposition of then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's to US participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. Mahathir was resisting an "integrated economic system led by industrialized nations", the plutocrat opined, because he feared that "he would...lose his influence."¹⁶⁸ But for a man whose power will only increase in such a system, the concerns of national leaders are but an obstacle to be overcome.

The situation only seemed to worsen with the passing in 1997 of the Helms-Burton bill, which penalised countries that pursued economic relations with Cuba. Before an audience at the University of Toronto in September 1997, the plutocrat confessed to "a feeling of horror" when President Clinton signed the bill. "I can see no justification for it," Rockefeller explained, noting that the bill "went against all of the rules of the WTO", which the US had just joined. Moreover, after casually overlooking his own record of unaccountable and shadowy string-pulling, Rockefeller attributed the Helms-Burton act to intense lobbying by refugee Cubans in New Jersey and Florida, a fact our man-of-the-people found "outrageous."¹⁶⁹ He also reportedly used his speech to deride in "measured tones" the opponents of free trade, "including labour unions and environmentalists [and] congressional right wingers."¹⁷⁰

In November of that year our favourite plutocrat would again go on the record – in the pages of the *New York Times* – in defence of free trade, pushing for Congress to give President Clinton "Fast Track" authority to approve trade agreements. The "anti-trade forces" who opposed giving Clinton that power, Rockefeller dismissed as being on "the wrong side of history." But he warned that the US had lost its "historic leadership on trade", leaving the Western Hemisphere open to Europe and Japan, and other countries which sought "preferential agreements for themselves rather than a market open to all." By supporting Fast Track, Rockefeller argued, the US would "show the world" that it was "committed to the principle of *an open global society*."¹⁷¹

Free markets and free trade remain at the core of David Rockefeller's mantra, along with the contradictory inevitability of globalisation and the need for politicians to do more to bring it about. Yet, undercutting our erstwhile plutocrat's prognostications and recommendations is a whiff of hypocrisy. In Rockefeller's case this takes the form of generous farm subsidies he applies for and receives from the US federal government. According to figures compiled by the Heritage Foundation, over a period of five years – from 1996 and 2000 – David Rockefeller received "\$352,187 in subsidies for growing crops like corn, wheat, and soybeans on the family farm in Hudson, New York."¹⁷² In 2001 this billionaire "earned" a "personal record high" of \$134,556 in agricultural subsidies – 91 percent more than he received in 2000.¹⁷³

How can we reconcile this unnecessary (and shabby) pocketing of taxpayers money – even though the amounts received are just small change to this billionaire – with David Rockefeller's proclaimed concern with the proliferation of "unaffordable safety nets"?¹⁷⁴ Or his openly documented disdain for those Americans who "weigh down our payrolls and depress our productivity and...take a free ride at the expense of real producers"; in particular those who "abuse" what he euphemistically described as "economic cushions" such as "unemployment and old age benefits, sick leave, disability pay, [and] food stamps..."? Or his admonition that treating "public assistance" as a "matter of entitlement" should be resisted as it "undermines our self-reliance"?¹⁷⁵ How can we balance his acceptance of agricultural subsidies with his comment in 1992, that the ongoing protection of the US sugar beet industry was "unjustified"?¹⁷⁶ Perhaps the only way is to remember that only the powerful can assert with absolute impunity that old, poisonous maxim: *do as I say, not as I do*.

3.3 Integrating the Western Hemisphere

David Rockefeller has not only pursued his goals globally, but has sought to establish economic interdependence at the regional level. Most of his efforts in that regard have been devoted to the economic and political integration of the Americas, or the Western Hemisphere, evident in his close if not pivotal involvement in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) plan. It has been a long-term concern of this plutocrat. Evidence of his interest in this objective can be traced back to the late 1950s when he was a member of the Foreign Economic Policy panel of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project, the deliberations of which were later published as *Prospect for America* (1961). That panel specifically endorsed a "Western Hemisphere Common Market" – a "common market embracing the entire Western Hemisphere" – that would "eliminate barriers to trade and investment."¹⁷⁷

In 1965, to help achieve this objective, David Rockefeller created a business lobby group, the Council for Latin America, now known as the Council of the Americas (COA). The Council's purpose, David explained in a *Foreign Affairs* article in 1966, was to "stimulate and support economic integration." But in supporting this objective, his ultimate aim was to lock the entire region into a neo-liberal policy matrix, making it more attractive to multi-national corporations. Without integration, Rockefeller argued, "there is inefficient division of markets and costly duplications of effort"; only through "closer cooperation" could the Latin American nations "make the best of their own resources and *provide the broadest appeal to foreign investment*." He also sought to reassure Latin America's elite that most US businessmen considered "Latin American economic integration" to be "absolutely imperative to true progress."¹⁷⁸

Now, some 40 years on, the Council remains committed to these goals. According to the Rockefeller Archives Center, the COA not only "promotes the free market and private enterprise as the means to attain economic growth and prosperity," but it "played a key role in the passage of [NAFTA]" and has been an "active proponent" of the FTAA.¹⁷⁹ The Council currently describes its purpose as "promoting regional economic integration, free trade, open markets and investment, and the rule of law throughout the Western Hemisphere." It is not an altruistic agenda, but one that the COA expects will eventually deliver "the economic growth and prosperity on which *the business interests of its members depend*."¹⁸⁰ This approach should not be surprising, for Rockefeller has long objected to what he calls the "faulty economic model" of government regulation, subsidies and protectionism that most Latin American countries adopted in the 1950s and 1960s.¹⁸¹

During the 1960s, David had been somewhat blunter in his criticism, identifying Communism as the threat to US business interests in the region. In a 1964 speech, for example, David Rockefeller had publicly complained about the growing popularity of "coldly anti-capitalist" sentiments in Latin America, which he blamed on a "relentless campaign" of "Communist propaganda." "Soviet, Castro and Chinese Communist agents", he subsequently wrote in *Foreign Affairs*, were moving through Latin American cities and villages "spreading half-truths and whole falsehoods" that blamed American businesses for all the ills afflicting the region. He maintained that this "Communist propaganda" had convinced many Latin American politicians to impose laws aimed at "curtailing or expelling foreign investors." At the same time Rockefeller claimed to be "genuinely distressed" at the "feeble response" of US corporations to the Communist threat. He therefore insisted on a strategy to "combat the Communist propaganda", warning his fellow American businessmen that, if they failed to act, "we stand in grave danger of losing our investments, our markets."¹⁸²

To combat and contain this threat of "militant communism" and "Communist Imperialism" in Latin America Rockefeller had initially supported the "Alliance for Progress", an aid program to the region launched by President John F. Kennedy on March 13, 1961.¹⁸³ Yet the Alliance for Progress was not intended as a business-friendly program, but rather as a means of combating Fidel Castro's growing appeal in the region. According to Kennedy biographer Robert Dallek, Castro's call to Latin Americans to "throw off the yoke of U.S. domination challenged Kennedy to offer a competing message of hope that countered convictions about Yankee imperialism." Instead of a militant campaign against Communist influence, Kennedy envisaged an

alliance between the US and Latin American that would "advance economic development, democratic institutions and social justice."¹⁸⁴ From Kennedy's point of view, according to Seyom Brown, "he had little choice but to reidentify the United States with the rising demands of the poor and disenfranchised."¹⁸⁵

For a rich businessman and banker like Rockefeller, these objectives were problematic and he soon revealed serious misgivings with what he described as the Alliance for Progress's "heavy reliance on government planning." In a speech to the Economic Club of Chicago in April 1963, Rockefeller had argued for the Alliance program to be changed so it placed "far greater emphasis on private investment." Rockefeller believed the region needed to attract "fresh capital" and to do this it needed a "favourable investment climate." To achieve this he suggested formation of a "series of business advisory committees which would work with the various government organisations charged with implementing the Alliance." To oversee the activities of these local committees and to provide advice on "matters of broad policy" he also proposed the creation of a "Hemisphere Business Committee."¹⁸⁶

It was an important issue for Rockefeller, who would use a Commerce Committee for the Alliance for Progress report in 1963 as a platform to call for a "comprehensive reappraisal" of the "policies and actions" needed to achieve the Alliance's "broad objectives." Rockefeller, and his two co-authors, Standard Oil of New Jersey Vice President Emilio G. Collado and First National City Bank Executive Vice President Walter B. Wriston, took issue with the Alliance program's "heavy emphasis...on government planning" and its failure to "encourage private initiative and enterprise." US policies towards Latin America, they insisted, should "discourage" both "tendencies towards nationalization of industries" and "complex import controls with high and highly variable tariffs, quotas and other forms of trade restriction." There should be an emphasis on "creating an atmosphere in which private business planning can go on without undue concern about possible changes in the rules of game." They recommended that US aid be used as an "inducement" to Latin American nations to "adopt policies which will improve the business climate"; and it should "withhold aid" from countries that did not toe the line.¹⁸⁷ David Rockefeller's agenda for the region could not be clearer: Latin America *must* be made safe for capitalism.

However, as he laments in *Memoirs*, by the end of the 1960s American plans for the region – including his own – were to be stymied by a "powerful tide of intense nationalism, strident anti-Americanism and revolutionary populism." The "hope for the hemisphere" raised by the Alliance for Progress had been "shattered" and replaced by policies that closed Latin America borders "every more tightly to foreign, especially American, companies and capital." In the early 1970s Rockefeller approached the Nixon Administration to suggest that Nelson Rockefeller be sent to Latin America as presidential emissary to conduct a fact-finding mission. Nelson was duly sent but "unfortunately...met animosity almost everywhere"¹⁸⁸ – and indifference from Nixon who displayed his contempt for the Rockefellers¹⁸⁹ by casually ignoring Nelson's report.¹⁹⁰ A significant set back given that *The Rockefeller Report on the Americas* placed "great stress on explicit economic policy which would permit a closer integration of the Latin American and US markets..."¹⁹¹ The situation only worsened during the 1970s with most Latin American countries borrowing heavily from overseas sources to fund public sector deficits and infrastructure projects. The

result, following a collapse in commodity prices, was that by the early 1980s most of Latin America was in the midst of an "economic cataclysm."¹⁹²

In *Memoirs*, David casually boasts of his role in reversing this trend as the founder and Chairman of his other philanthropic organisation, ostensibly dedicated to Latin American cultural affairs: the Americas Society. He recalls that by the mid-1980s there was apparently a "growing realisation throughout the region" that growth could only be restored through "fundamental political and economic reform." He used the Americas Society to make his contribution. In 1983, the Society's Latin American Advisory Council, set up by David, agreed on the need to find a solution to the devastating debt crisis then afflicting most of Latin America—a crisis David's bank had a direct role in instigating, as he admits in *Memoirs*: "banks like Chase must bear a large share of the responsibility." Rockefeller tasked the Institute for International Economics (of which he was a board member) to research the issue and propose a solution. The result was the influential IIE study, *Toward Renewed Economic Growth in Latin America* (1986), which advocated "lowering trade barriers, opening investment to foreigners, and privatising state-run and -controlled enterprises."¹⁹³

These prescriptions are now known, quite aptly, as the "Washington Consensus", seeing that these policies were imposed on the region by Washington-based IMF and World Bank, both under the controlling influence of the US Treasury Department. The impact of these policies has reportedly been devastating. In the case of Bolivia, for example, despite 17 years of such policies it remains "the poorest country in South America", according to a survey in *Harper's Magazine*. Although the reforms have delivered foreign investment "largely in the form of multinational corporations taking control of privatised entities", "prosperity has not followed." Instead the wealthy have become wealthier; the poor more desperate and key infrastructure has decayed. In the region as a whole during the last 20 years per capita income rose less than 6 percent compared to 73 percent during the 1960s and 1970s.¹⁹⁴

This would be considered a dubious achievement, though for David Rockefeller there is some hope that the period of "stalled growth" in the region can be restored. One reason for his optimism is the existence of a "comprehensive and resilient framework of institutions...to deal with international and economic and financial problems." Among the institutions Rockefeller cites as a bulwark against a socialist revival is the "incipient Free Trade Area of the Americas."¹⁹⁵

The inclusion of the FTAA is no surprise given David Rockefeller's crucial role in turning that particular idea into a reality. Despite his long-term interest in this objective, it was not until the end of the 1980s that the plutocrat was able to really push the issue. In 1989, while in Caracas, David gave a speech calling for intensified economic cooperation between the US and Latin America.¹⁹⁶ Later that year, in an interview with *Forbes*, he suggested that the "nations of North and South America must draw together, much as the nations of Europe are unifying through the Common Market." To help build closer ties between North, South and Central America, Rockefeller proposed creation of a biannual forum of government leaders and business executives he planned to call the "Congress of the New World." Aside from discussing foreign debt, environmental issues and narcotics, Rockefeller believed this group should "work towards establishing a trade zone", although he cautioned that the

fragility of the Latin American economies made complete free trade in hemisphere "unrealistic in the short run."¹⁹⁷

Nevertheless, it was clear that his message was getting through. On June 27, 1990, President George H. W. Bush endorsed extending NAFTA further south. At the COA-sponsored "Forum of the Americas" conference held in April 1992 in Washington D.C.; attended by Bush and other regional leaders, David Rockefeller proposed creating a "Western Hemisphere free trade area."¹⁹⁸ The plutocrat later noted with some pride that participants at the Forum were "unanimous" in supporting the goal of a "full Western Hemisphere free trade area by 2000."¹⁹⁹ Despite the implications of the deliberations at the Forum, media attention was slight. As the *American Banker* observed in its report on the Forum, few in the media caught on to the repercussions of what Rockefeller was proposing and exactly who was on board:

David Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger, whose every utterance once attracted the elite of the news media, lured only a ragged band from futuristic magazines, obscure newsletters, and sundry other publications to a press conference last week.

Even more disconcerting to the hosts, the reporters who showed up *didn't seem interested in the idea that Mr. Rockefeller was promoting: free trade in the Western hemisphere by the year 2000.*

The press event was part of Mr. Rockefeller's "Forum of the Americas," which attracted more than *400 bankers and business people from North and South America, united by an intense dislike of trade barriers...*

In fact, *something very big is afoot, but by the time the press and everybody else catch on they may be too late to do anything but kick themselves for not taking Mr. Rockefeller seriously.*

Unseen by the absent media, at a reception Thursday night were people wearing on their lapels the names of such corporate giants as AT&T, J.P. Morgan, Citicorp, Xerox, and Texaco.

What were they talking about?

A South American diplomat: "If the free trade agreement among Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. goes through, *all of South America will quickly climb on board, creating an even more vast trading zone.*"²⁰⁰

The plutocrat explained his objectives again in June 1992, at an American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico luncheon in Mexico City:

If the combined North American market represents an exciting prospect - as it does - then, in my opinion, a market with a population that is twice as large can truly be called exhilarating. *And that is what we would have if we can manage to unite the entire hemisphere, an economic zone second to none in the world, with more than 700 million people who already generate a combined annual GNP (gross national product) of about \$7.5 trillion.*²⁰¹

In line with this overall objective, Rockefeller was a staunch supporter of NAFTA repeatedly presenting it as the "first step" towards a hemispheric free trade zone and, more importantly, as a means of preventing Latin American governments from

deviating from the "Washington Consensus." The proposed North American accord could be a "first step" toward a hemispheric trade bloc "stretching from Baffin Island to Tierra de Fuego," he averred in Mexico City.²⁰² In a statement he issued in August 1992 as the Council of Americas Chairman, Rockefeller hailed NAFTA as the "first step toward the creation of a hemisphere-wide free trade area", one that would "lock in the economic reforms being undertaken by most of the countries of the region."²⁰³

Rockefeller also gave conditional support to sub-regional trade pacts in the Americas, such as MERCOSUR (comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), as long as such arrangements contributed to the overall goals of hemispheric unity and a business-friendly environment. As he told a seminar on Western Hemispheric integration in 1992: "There is nothing to be feared from regional subgroupings if they lower trade and investment barriers, clearing the path toward larger cooperative agreements in the hemisphere."²⁰⁴

With so much riding on NAFTA we should not be surprised that as the Clinton Administration attempted to push NAFTA through Congress in 1993, David Rockefeller and the Council of the Americas took a leading role. It was noted by many observers that NAFTA enjoyed "strong support from David Rockefeller and other such establishment types."²⁰⁵ In the years leading up to the NAFTA vote Rockefeller had already worked hard to shore up the necessary political support in US and the rest of the region. That included entertaining then Mexican President Carlos Salinas at the Rockefeller family estate at Tarrytown, New York; sponsoring numerous NAFTA conferences; and organising trips to South America and Mexico for President Bush, Vice-President Dan Quayle and other business leaders.²⁰⁶

As the US Congress considered the NAFTA treaty, David Rockefeller became more overt in his support for NAFTA. Using language that was frequently apocalyptic, he warned of dire consequences if Congress failed to pass the agreement. "Everything is in place – after 500 years – to build a true 'new world' in the Western Hemisphere", he wrote in the *Wall Street Journal* in October 1993. However, he worried that everything he and Nelson had "worked hard to accomplish", although "nearer now to realization than they have ever been", was "threatened by a rejection of NAFTA by the US." Given what was ultimately at stake – "a free trading area stretching from Canada's Hudson Bay to Tierra del Feugo at the tip of South America" – Rockefeller averred: "I truly don't think 'criminal' would be too strong a word to describe rejecting NAFTA."²⁰⁷ "The consequences of not passing NAFTA," he told a journalist in mid-1993, "will be so bad I hate to contemplate them."²⁰⁸ He also warned that rejecting NAFTA "would hurt [the] political position" of Mexico's then reformist President Carlos Salinas²⁰⁹ – who later fled Mexico to escape corruption charges.

The result, though, as some more incisive analysts have recognised, "was never in doubt"; the pro-NAFTA campaign, supported by "a Who's Who of U.S. business and political leaders", had actually "began years ago and dwarfed in size, scope and spending power anything its opponents could come up with up to, and including, the vote." According to the Council for Hemispheric Affairs, NAFTA supporters spent "25 times more than anti-NAFTA forces." Even Rockefeller's public worrying appears to have been part of the pro-NAFTA camp's "end-game strategy of making the race appear tight and the opposition formidable."²¹⁰

The success of David Rockefeller's efforts is apparent not only in the passing of NAFTA by the US Congress in 1993, but in the agreement, reached in Quebec in April 2001, to begin to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas, with the objective of covering the whole hemisphere (except Cuba) by 2006. Rockefeller recalls how in the months leading up to the "Summit of the Americas", held in Miami in December 1994, he and several members of the COA had "met often" with officials from the White House and State Department, and Latin American diplomats "to press the point" the summit would be an "opportune moment to hammer out the framework for the Free Trade of the Americas." A "key player" during this time, according to Rockefeller, who had helped in "getting the President to move ahead" and the COA's main "liaison" in the White House, was Clinton's Chief of Staff, Thomas F. McLarty III²¹¹ – now President of Kissinger-McLarty Associates and a member of the Council of Americas Board of Directors.²¹²

Our modest and unassuming plutocrat, who had earlier lobbied hard but unsuccessfully for "fast track" trade promotion authority for Bill Clinton,²¹³ was also able to claim an "integral role" for the COA—and, by implication, himself—in obtaining the same powers for George W. Bush.²¹⁴ In fact, on the eve of George W. Bush taking office, a "Policy Brief" full of recommendations was transmitted to the president-elect from Council of Americas Chairman, William Rhodes, Honorary Chairman David Rockefeller, and President Thomas McNamara.²¹⁵ The brief emphasised the FTAA was the "top priority goal" of the COA, and they encouraged the new administration to "make the FTAA a reality." This would require "early progress on securing Fast Track authority"; in fact securing Fast Track would have to be the "highest trade priority" of the new administration and the 107th Congress as it was "fundamental" to the ability of the US to "secure a FTAA."²¹⁶ It is not for nothing that other anti-N.W.O. analysts have concluded that with regards to David Rockefeller: "no other individual has been as instrumental in the design, promotion and implementation of NAFTA, FTAA and other regional schemes."²¹⁷

It is perhaps noteworthy that a parade of American politicians and senior officials have publicly confirmed David Rockefeller's key role as the driving force behind both NAFTA and the FTAA. At the Forum of Americas conference on April 23, 1992, for instance, US President George H.W. Bush paid tribute to the plutocrat:

And David [Rockefeller], thank you sir. And thank you for your really vital work in rallying the private sector and congressional support for the North American free trade agreement and for the Enterprise for the Americas initiative. And let me say to his many friends here that David's personal involvement has been a major factor in the success we've enjoyed so far with both these significant initiatives.

Bush's successor, Bill Clinton, in his remarks to the Council of Americas 30th Washington DC Conference on May 2, 2000, was just as effusive in his praise for the elderly billionaire:

David Rockefeller, I want to thank you for taking the lead 35 years ago now in establishing the Council of the Americas. And I want to thank the Council for its support of our efforts, beginning with NAFTA, alleviating the financial crisis in Latin America, the free trade area of the Americas, and the Caribbean Basin Initiative, as well as our efforts with Colombia.

Despite their obvious differences over the role of the UN, the administration of George W. Bush has also heaped praise on Rockefeller for his efforts in promoting the economic integration of the Americas. "Mr. Rockefeller, thank you very much for your support of trade in our hemisphere", President Bush stated at the Council of Americas 31st Washington DC conference on May 7, 2001. At the Council of the Americas 33rd Annual Washington Conference, on April 28, 2003, Secretary of State Powell thanked Rockefeller for "all of your efforts throughout the course of your distinguished career in business and philanthropy to increase understanding among the people who call our hemisphere home." Powell's successor, Condoleezza Rice, was just as generous in her comments on May 3, 2005:

David, thank you for the now 40 years that you have had the vision to have an organization like this and for the great work that it has done. Thank you very, very much for your commitment.

The adulation extends south of the border. On September 24, 1997, for example, in recognition of his pro-NAFTA efforts David Rockefeller received the Mexican Order of the Aztec Eagle, the highest award Mexico presents to foreign nationals. Presenting the award, Mexico's Secretary of Foreign Relations, José Angel Gurría, described Rockefeller as "a great human force that has brought Mexico and the United States closer together." An official statement lauded the plutocrat as a "key figure in strengthening the ties Mexico and the United States share today."²¹⁸

Thirteen years after its creation NAFTA persists; progress in the FTAA remains elusive however. A key obstacle is that the "region has begun turning leftward again"; according to the *New York Times*, the new leaders in Venezuela, Brazil and Bolivia apparently sharing "a strong emphasis on social egalitarianism and a determination to rely less on the approach known as the Washington Consensus..."²¹⁹ Plans are reportedly in train – instigated by these same South American leaders – to merge MERCOSUR with the Andean Community of Nations trade bloc (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) to form an entity known as the "South American Community of Nations." This new body would "consolidate under a model similar to the European Union and achieve commensurate political and economic bargaining power."²²⁰ Perhaps not quite what David Rockefeller had in mind.

On the eve of the fourth FTAA conference, held in November 2005 at Mar Del Plata in Argentina, *The Economist* reported that the free trade consensus forged in 1994 had "unravelling." Opposition to the FTAA was being led by Venezuela's controversial President Hugo Chavez, who had endorsed a "Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas." Driving this there was widespread "disillusion with free-market reforms seen as having been sponsored by the United States."²²¹ The summit itself was something of a fiasco. Argentine President Nestor Kirchner used the summit to denounce the FTAA and also attack Bush for failing to lift agricultural subsidies. The Mar del Plata summit had produced "nothing but noise and disappointment", observed COA Board member Alan Stoga; "The result was a failure. There was no agreement on a formula to advance the FTAA."²²² COA Vice-President Eric Farnsworth remained optimistic, though, declaring:

It is an excellent idea whose time may not yet have come. But it will come...We won't get FTAA by 2005, but it's still a defining element in hemispheric affairs, a reality amplified by the meeting in Mar del Plata. Hemispheric trade and investment

will continue to expand. In the end, it may just take a different form, and somewhat longer than we originally thought.²²³

It is evident that for David Rockefeller NAFTA and the FTAA serve a number of purposes, nearly all advantageous to US businesses. **First**, aside from breaking down trade and migration barriers between the US, Mexico and Canada, NAFTA was to be a stepping stone towards a hemispheric free trade zone. **Second**, the FTAA would open up the entire region – North, Central and South America – to exploitation by most American multi-national corporations. **Third**, and arguably the most important, the FTAA would "lock in" the Washington Consensus. Publicly, though, David Rockefeller declares himself a "strong believer in the FTAA" on the grounds that free trade is the "most powerful instrument for bringing about progress and development in the world for the benefit of the people of the world."²²⁴

Critics are not sure, charging that democracy would be short-circuited by the FTAA, its conditions committing its members-states to those corporate-friendly policies in perpetuity. According to Michel Chossudovsky, Professor of Economics at Ottawa University, under the FTAA "[f]undamental economic, social and institutional relations would be enshrined into a set of legally binding conditions." In fact, through the FTAA the harsh "economic medicine" of the IMF would become "permanently entrenched in international law." This would allow for the privatisation of government services including water, sewer systems, roads and other municipal services; the creation of a "charter of rights" that would protect corporations from national governments; the deregulation of national banking institutions and the dollarisation of the western hemisphere. Chossudovsky claims the FTAA is not about trade, but it is about "the American Empire"; behind the FTAA, he claims, are "the powers of Wall Street and the military-industrial complex."²²⁵

When it comes to his ultimate vision for the region, however, David Rockefeller remains circumspect, giving away little. For instance, when asked in October 2002 at Johns Hopkins University if he supported Robert Pastor's vision of a "North American Community" modelled on the European Union,²²⁶ Rockefeller was evasive, saying only that it was in "our interest" for NAFTA to be extended to South and Central America—before retreating into cant about free trade being an "engine of growth and development."²²⁷ At his speech at the University of Toronto in 1997, however, Rockefeller signalled how porous he wanted to see the borders in North America, describing as "unfortunate" that the Helms-Burton act forced Canadians to obtain visas when visiting the US. He acknowledged the purpose of that act was deal with migration from Mexico and Central America.²²⁸ In 1992, Rockefeller hinted at bigger plans for the region with his assertion hemispheric free trade would require societal and political transformation, not just economic change. According to the plutocrat: "We face serious and persistent patterns of thought and behaviour *that require modification* if a free trade system is to function effectively."²²⁹

Rockefeller's words are ominous and invite further exploration but he has left us few other direct clues as to his thinking. But the institutions he belongs to and technocrats he associates with give us some indicators. Henry Kissinger, for example, a long time Rockefeller family adviser, in a frequently quoted op-ed essay in 1993 seemed to hint at NAFTA's potential impact on global politics when he hailed NAFTA as the "most creative step toward a new world order taken by any group of countries since the end

of the Cold War" as well as "the first step toward the even larger vision of a free trade zone for the entire Western Hemisphere." This envisaged "regional Western Hemisphere Organization", he added, would also be the "first step toward the new world order that is so frequently cited but so rarely implemented."²³⁰

Then there is the aforementioned Robert Pastor, a CFR-member and contributor to the Institute for International Economics, who used a recent article in *Foreign Affairs* to challenge the United States to "provide a model for other regions in the world" by leading the process of greater integration in North America. To this end Pastor endorsed the formation of range of institutions including: a "North American Commission"; a "North American Parliamentary Group"; a "Permanent Court on Trade and Investment"; and a "North American Customs and Immigration Force." Pastor urged the US and Canada to "merge immigration and refugee policies" and for all three governments to "develop a North American passport." He insisted that sovereignty "is not a fixed concept" and was critical of all three governments for being "zealous defenders of an outdated conception of sovereignty."²³¹

Many of Pastor's proposals found their way into a CFR report released in mid-2005 – *Creating a North American Community* – which was subsequently amplified by Pastor in testimony before Congress. Pastor caused an uproar with his calls for the US to be secured "at the borders of America as whole" by a "common security perimeter" encompassing the United States, Mexico and Canada.²³² Given that Pastor was on the CFR Task Force which wrote the report this was not surprising; Rockefeller-admirer Thomas d'Aquino was also on the panel. The preliminary report – issued by the Task Force's chairmen – explicitly denied its proposed "North American community" would be "modelled on the European Union" or aim to create "any sort of vast supranational bureaucracy", yet its six key recommendations proposed uniformity across North America in the areas of border control, education, external tariffs, investment regulations, and energy security. It even proposed a "North American Border Pass with biometric identifiers."²³³

But even these proposals are not new; they draw on decades of planning by the institutions of the Establishment – planning that David Rockefeller was intimately involved in – specifically the RBF Special Studies Project. Thus if we return to the pages of *Prospect for America (PFA)*, where the "Western Hemisphere Common Market" was first mentioned, we find that America's objective should be a "world community" comprised of "strong regional organizations" under an "*international body of growing authority*."²³⁴ To this end *PFA* was clear in advocating the formation of "regional associations", based on economic *and* political integration, in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas.²³⁵ For example, *PFA* not only called for the "economic integration of Europe", but the formation of "European political institutions of equal scope and significance."²³⁶ Likewise the envisaged "Western Hemisphere Common Market" would go beyond merely lowering trade barriers to encouraging "co-operation" in the "promotion of general economic growth and development" and "social objectives" such as "education, low-cost housing, health, and technical assistance."²³⁷ In short: the foundations for *regional government*.

We can therefore presume that David, much like Nelson did, sees the *economic* integration of the Americas as a step toward regional *political* integration, and *then* ultimately complete *global* political and economic integration.²³⁸

3.4 Population Control

The Rockefeller family has been involved in population control ever since the 1920s, when John D. Rockefeller Jr, at the urging of his adviser Raymond B. Fosdick, gave financial support to Margaret Sanger's Planned Parenthood movement. The lead, though, was taken by Junior's eldest son, John D. Rockefeller III, who established the Population Council in 1952. David Rockefeller's public role in this effort has long been slight, and he appears to have little to say on the issue, other than to give it his overall support. In *Memoirs*, for example, David merely notes that JDR III was "deeply concerned about the dangers of escalating world population growth long before most people recognized this critical issue."²³⁹ Clearly even David agreed it was a "critical issue", but to what degree? There are a few clues.

In his address before The Economic Club of Chicago in April 1963, Rockefeller made a somewhat vague statement on the need for population control:

Still another problem that defies quick and easy solution is population control...Unquestionably, population growth has proved a far more formidable problem in terms of human welfare than had been anticipated. A great deal more study must be devoted to the relationships between population factors and general development problems...²⁴⁰

He also wrote (or at least signed) the foreword to the Rockefeller Foundation's 1997 report *High Stakes: The United States, Global Population and Our Common Future*. But his language was more reminiscent of JDR III who had painted population control as an essentially noble effort to save the inhabitants of the underdeveloped parts of the world from the ill effects of too much breeding. The plutocrat described population control as a "worldwide effort to improve the quality of life for women and families throughout the world through family planning." The provision of "quality reproductive health care and contraception", he argued, "is essential if we want to build a world which can feed, educate and provide jobs for all people." It was a vision of generosity, tempered only by his implicit linkage of overpopulation with the "insidious cycle of poverty, resource depletion, low wages, unemployment and civil unrest" that "affects the whole world, including the United States." But not to worry, for David Rockefeller was "convinced" that international family planning had been "an investment...in the realization of human potential."²⁴¹

Rockefeller's fear-mongering about the "insidious cycle of poverty, resource depletion, low wages, unemployment and civil unrest" stemming from overpopulation fits into a well-establishment pattern. It is the sort of list that academic advocates of population control might devise and which certain plutocrats might look upon as a "new humanitarian justification for the age-old game of empire." Particularly for those "developed country elites", according to researcher Steve Weissman, who by the 1950s could only see in the developing world "people, people, people, each one threatening the hard-won stability which guaranteed access to world's ores and oil, each one an additional competitor for the use of limited resources."²⁴²

Back in February 1966, in a speech before the Economic Club of Detroit, David Rockefeller demonstrated perhaps more clearly than any other Rockefeller that those concerns drove his support for population control. Rockefeller had spoken about an

issue "of such seriousness that no mere changing of terms can obscure its profound meaning for all of us." What he was referring to was the "desperate chase of world's resources...to catch up with accelerating growth of the global population." Rockefeller seemed particularly concerned with the "increasing imbalance between people and food", warning that unless this trend was reversed in Latin America, the Far East and Africa "widespread famine" would be the result.²⁴³

But our plutocrat, despite his odd homage to the idea that the business community must do something because "we belong to the Family of Man", had two other burning concerns: security and economics.

First, the plutocrat was concerned that if the "gap between population and food supply and...between wealthy and poor nations" was not resolved "pockets of security will be engulfed by a sea of want." Even worse could follow, Rockefeller warned: "We risk unleashing upon this globe a frustration, a bitterness, an anguished fury more explosive than growth of population itself."²⁴⁴ The implications were clear: population growth must be checked or the elites of the First World would be forced to cede political and economic control to the Third World masses.

Second, Rockefeller was particularly worried about the impact of population growth on the "economic well-being" of US businesses. He claimed that overpopulation would prove an obstacle to "sustained development" and the creation of a "climate of stability and order" in the Third World. Both these conditions Rockefeller deemed as "necessary to attract private capital." But he had a much bigger concern, namely the threat that population growth posed to the ability of US business to gain access to foreign raw materials:

Sound development and continuing investment abroad are also necessary *to secure sources of supply for materials required by our domestic productive plant...* We know that *we are rapidly depleting our domestic reserves of a vast array of minerals needed by our industrial complex.* And we know, too, that *if the population barrier to development keeps other countries from having anything to sell to us*, we cannot sell to them [emphasis added].

There was also the danger that if "rampant population growth" stymied development the "whole intricate weave of international commerce and finance" could unravel.²⁴⁵ It was a sobering story Rockefeller presented to the Economic Club with the presence of too many people in Africa, Asia and Latin America identified as: (1) a deterrent to foreign investors; (2) an obstacle to foreign (i.e. US) exploitation of their natural resources; and (3) a threat to the global economy. Ultimately the bottom line prevailed in their thinking; future profits were at serious risk, something *must* be done.

Fortunately Rockefeller had come with a solution, offering what he called "four essential steps" to resolve this problem. The first three steps involved: "having ... [developing] nations undertake programs of population control"; encouraging the "emerging nations" to develop their agricultural base; and making US assistance to developing nations "more effective and more realistic", and preferably directed through "multi-national institutions" such as the World Bank and World Health Organisation.²⁴⁶ The fourth step, to "encourage fully" private enterprise in the developing countries, fitted in with Rockefeller's free-market religion. He argued that economic development would not occur unless governments adopted policies that

attracted "the investment of both domestic and foreign capital." Unfortunately most Third World governments had "frustrated free enterprise with a tangle of restrictions, prohibitions and conditions." The US government's assistance to these countries should therefore be "conditioned upon a change in these attitudes and policies..."²⁴⁷ No such changes were required of the United States...

Over the years many anti-N.W.O. researchers have sought to demonstrate the complicity of the Rockefellers, among others, in elaborate and genocidal schemes to achieve population control through extreme measures, including biological warfare. The evidence for these allegations, however, remains the subject of controversy, if not outright ridicule in more respectable quarters. What is not in doubt is that the Rockefeller created and funded Population Council has been the forefront of efforts, since the 1950s, to promote somewhat more benign forms of population control, such as contraception and sterilisation. However, the Population Council's targeting of populations in developing countries whose per capita and cumulative resource consumption is meagre, especially compared to the US, confirms that its motivations are questionable. David Rockefeller's acknowledgement, some forty years ago, that resource access is an issue is revealing, as is his attempt to use population control as an excuse to force many developing countries to change their economic policies. As always, a proclaimed concern for the welfare of the deprived many hides a plan to protect the selfish concerns and excessive comforts of the few...

3.5 The Death of the Nation-State

Like his father before him, and his brother Nelson, David Rockefeller has long regarded the nation-state as a dying institution. Over the past 40 years, in numerous forums, Rockefeller has declared that the world either is becoming or is already "interdependent" both politically and economically—an outcome he disingenuously attributes to inevitable historical forces rather than to economic and political policies, the adoption of which he has advocated both publicly and privately. There are many examples:

- In a 1963 address David referred to the "increasingly international character of American business and the consequent interconnectedness among the world's financial markets."²⁴⁸
- In 1966, appearing before the Economic Club of Detroit, he described the world as "highly interdependent."²⁴⁹
- To an audience of stockbrokers in Britain in April 1975, Rockefeller declared: "the world economy has become more and more interdependent."²⁵⁰
- Visiting Australia in 1978 as a guest of the Committee for the Economic Development of Australia, he repeatedly spoke of "our interdependent world", "today's interdependent world", and of how "we are all part of *one global economy*."²⁵¹
- Speaking to the Commonwealth Club of California in 1979, he treated the death of the nation-state as a *fait accompli*, describing "the inevitable push toward globalism", and how "the exponential growth of world trade and

international economic competition has given rise to a truly interdependent world economy." In fact, David prophesied – somewhat prematurely – "[b]y the year 2000, the term 'foreign affairs' will be an anachronism."²⁵²

- "[I]f there is one constant in our otherwise troubled world", he told the Empire Club of Canada in October 1980, "it is the inexorable momentum with which our two economies, as well as the global economy, have become increasingly integrated and interdependent."²⁵³
- By 1996, with the concept of globalisation fast emerging as the business buzzword of the decade, David could confidently talk of "the emergence of globalized competition and an integrated world economy."²⁵⁴

Most recently, in *Memoirs*, David leaves no doubt that he thinks we should regard the erosion of national sovereignty as inevitable:

*Global interdependence is not a poetic fantasy, but a concrete reality that this country's revolutions in technology, communications, and geopolitics have made irreversible. The free flow of investment capital, goods, and people across borders will remain the fundamental factor in world economic growth and in strengthening of democratic institutions everywhere.*²⁵⁵

But the more important question is, what does David believe should fill this growing vacuum? What sort of "more integrated global political and economic structure" does the plutocrat have in mind? David's own answers, though fragmentary, reveal a commitment to the concept of global governance. As defined by the Commission on Global Governance, the term refers to an international order in which nations are no longer the dominant political institution, but must share authority not only with the UN system but also with "non-governmental organizations (NGOs), citizens' movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market."²⁵⁶

Having worked hard over the past 40 or more years to erode the power of nation-states—and having created countless other problems of a global nature in the process—David now turns to international institutions, MNCs and NGOs to fill this governmental gap.

First, David has long had a favourable view of international institutions, especially those founded by the US, believing they hold the key to realising his aim to "erect an enduring structure of global cooperation."²⁵⁷ His commitment to the UN, for example, can be seen in his membership of groups including the United Nations Association of the USA, Allies of the United Nations, and the Emergency Coalition for US Financial Support for the United Nations. In his message to the UN poster exhibition, *For A Better World*, in 2000, David claimed that, ever since the UN was created in 1945, he has been "one of its staunchest advocates." He continued:

There are many who believe the United Nations, through its multiple missions of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and the support of sustainable economic development, is the embodiment of hope for mankind. I agree.²⁵⁸

David has also identified the WTO, NAFTA, the IMF and the World Bank as "constructive international activities."²⁵⁹ In a "globalized economy", he once wrote in

the *Wall Street Journal*, "everyone needs the IMF"—for without it, "the world economy would not become an idealized fantasy of perfectly liquid, completely informed, totally unregulated capital markets."²⁶⁰ Back in 1971 Rockefeller had suggested creation of an "International Commission" that would "formulate the longer-term strategies for improving the world's overall monetary, trade and investment relationships." Among its many tasks, his proposed Commission would examine developing an "international currency unit."²⁶¹

Second, as for the role of the multi-national corporations, David Rockefeller notes that the retreat of state power caused by deregulation has provided many opportunities for the business sector to assume a more overtly political role. In 1996, Rockefeller argued that with governments reducing their social expenditures, it was up to "business leaders and their corporations [to] expand their involvement" in the "not-for-profit sector."²⁶² Or, as he put it to *Newsweek* in 1999:

In recent years, there has been a trend in many parts of the world toward democracy and market economies. That has lessened the role of government, which is something business people tend to be in favour of. But the other side of the coin is that somebody has to take the government's place, and *business seems to me to be a logical entity to do that.*²⁶³

This includes supporting the UN, as in 1994 he told the Business Council of the United Nations that "business support for the numerous internationally related problems in which [the UN] is involved has never been more urgently needed."²⁶⁴ Yet, in the early 1990s, Rockefeller reportedly boasted that MNCs had moved beyond being able to help governments to being in control:

We are now in the driver's seat of the global economic engine. We are setting government policies instead of watching from the sidelines.²⁶⁵

Third, David Rockefeller envisages a crucial role for NGOs, especially the various philanthropic foundations (a sizeable number of which he controls), in addressing global problems. The message had already been delivered in 1989 by the then President of the Rockefeller Foundation, Peter Goldmark, Jr, at a three-day conference celebrating the 150th birthday anniversary of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. "Every major foundation should have an international dimension to its program," said Goldmark. "In a period of planetary environmental danger, global communications, intercontinental missiles, a world economy and an international marketplace of ideas and arts and political trends, there is simply no excuse not to." David Rockefeller admitted that Goldmark's speech came with his blessing, if not direction, with a decision made to be "meaningful" by focusing on "philanthropy for the 21st century" instead of merely praising John D. Rockefeller, Sr.²⁶⁶ Speaking at the Rockefeller University in December 2000, Rockefeller explained how collaboration between foundations and the state could bring about "positive social change." He gave as an example the so-called "Green Revolution" – which modernised agricultural practices across much of the Third World in the 1950s – a program that had been "initiated by the Rockefeller Foundation."²⁶⁷

The true scope of David's "philanthropy for the 21st century" has become more evident throughout the 1990s, with the Rockefeller Foundation, the Rockefeller Family Fund and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund all providing funding to NGOs, either

through direct grants or indirectly via organisations such as the Funders Network on Trade and Globalization. Many of the NGOs that have received Rockefeller-sourced grants—such as the World Development Movement, The Ruckus Society and the Center for Public Integrity—are ostensible opponents of the same corporate globalisation agenda that Rockefeller has done so much to promote, while others are proponents of strengthened and "democratised" international institutions and laws.

Nevertheless NGOs, through their currently unrivalled ability to circumvent normal diplomatic processes by claiming to represent "civil society", have proved to be very effective, generally publicly unaccountable organs for both eroding national sovereignty and building global governance. As some analysts have observed, NGOs are at the forefront of a "new diplomacy" that "devalues national sovereignty in favour of multilateral agreements" in which interest groups seek to "accomplish internationally what they cannot achieve domestically" (Davenport). The NGO approach, another analyst warned, involves the "undermining of decision-making systems based on constitutionalism and popular sovereignty", in favour of a system that "posits 'interests' (whether NGOs or businesses) as legitimate actors along with popularly elected governments" (Bolton).²⁶⁸

Although some NGOs are adamantly opposed to David Rockefeller's pro-market and pro-free trade agenda, his overall strategy appears to be to co-opt, compromise and ultimately control as many of the NGOs as possible, utilising them as a vital third force both for creating and, in some cases, managing the emerging structure of global governance. As for those NGOs that cannot be deradicalised and accommodated, and insist on pursuing more revolutionary anti-capitalist agendas and methods, they have been deprived of funding and left to the mercy of state oppression. In mid-2001, it was reported that "think-tanks and organisations opposed to globalisation" were being "denied resources." The presidents of the major foundations, including the Rockefeller Foundation, were "personally monitoring" funds allocations by their program managers to ensure that anti-globalisation groups were excluded.²⁶⁹

Clearly, the NGOs have their uses, but Rockefeller will not tolerate the anti-corporate rhetoric actually becoming policy—especially if it threatens his own goals.

3.6 "One World", Ready or Not

In *Memoirs*, David Rockefeller admits without any trace of irony to his goal of building "a more integrated global political and economic structure—one world." Considering the tangible evidence of his New World Order agenda, much of it from his own public statements and writings, it would be churlish to dismiss as "right-wing nuts" or proponents of "wacky conspiracy theories" those who have long been suspicious of the plutocrat's activities. Claims that David Rockefeller is "the consummate advocate of world government whose vast wealth and influence...have launched, promoted or funded every 20th century step on the way to global tyranny",²⁷⁰ perhaps deserve a more respectful hearing than they currently receive from those bastions of acceptable ideas – the mainstream media and academia.

But what is particularly striking about David's New World Order vision is that, despite his sometimes flowery rhetoric about democracy, he has never engaged the voting public on his agenda. Instead, he has used his power and influence to convince,

cajole and even coerce political leaders and government officials into supporting policies for which ordinary voters have never asked. The top of political pyramid has and remains David Rockefeller's focus. His public utterances are infrequent, most of his lectures are before exclusive audiences, and the true extent of his dealings with the upper echelons remains shielded from the public and thus cloaked in mystery.

In a working democracy, the exercise of such unelected power should be a serious matter. Publicly acceptable attitudes, however, ensure that those who object to David Rockefeller's methods and objectives remain marginalised and easily ridiculed. Even though at exclusive gatherings the power-elite will continue to give thanks to David Rockefeller for his unstinting service and leadership in promoting and *achieving* some measure of "international cooperation", the requirements of the existing political order demand that the significance of these celebrations be denied.

As for the self-described "proud internationalist", the globalisation process he has helped unleash is proving unstoppable, if only because relatively few political leaders are willing to challenge the "consensus."

David Rockefeller now has the luxury of promoting solutions to the problems he helped cause, as he did in December 2001 in his role as President of the Global Philanthropists Circle. Addressing a forum at the University of Guanajuato in Mexico, Rockefeller stated that globalisation had created "unacceptable" levels of poverty the world over. "Free trade," he said, "has helped generate wealth, but it has not helped poor people who still find themselves in tough situations." True to his devotion to keeping government out of the hands of the people, the plutocrat emphasised the role of privately-funded "social organizations" in improving conditions for the world's disadvantaged. He recommended that both businesses and governments become more active in preventing people from falling into the "abyss of extreme poverty."²⁷¹

Regrettably, such hypocrisies are typical of the plutocracy.

4. Trilateralism

One of David Rockefeller's more infamous and enduring achievements in service of the New World Order is his creation of the Trilateral Commission. According to the plutocrat's somewhat sparse account in *Memoirs*, he embraced the trilateral idea in the early 1970s when he realised "that power relationships in the world had fundamentally changed." Although the US was still the dominant superpower, its economic leadership was being eroded by a newly resurgent Japan and Western Europe. More worryingly, the previously friendly post-war relationship between the three regions had "deteriorated alarmingly", therefore, Rockefeller observed, "something had to be done." His solution was, of course, to set up a "trilateral organization" – the Trilateral Commission – that would "bridge national differences and bring Japan into the international community."²⁷²

There is, of course, far more to Rockefeller's support for trilateralism and the foundation of the Trilateral Commission than his tale of intellectual self-discovery acknowledges. Besides downplaying his heavy reliance on Zbigniew Brzezinski's original trilateral concept, Rockefeller fails to mention his key goals in forming the

Commission. These included: establishing a new elite policy-planning organisation to supplement if not replace a Council on Foreign Relations, which Rockefeller considered too fractured by the Vietnam War to be effective; reining in the Nixon Administration, which had taken advantage of Establishment divisions to reject the liberal internationalist program; and finally, encouraging unity among the industrialised powers as a temporary alternative to a United Nations increasingly dominated by radicalised Third World states, so that together they could achieve his goal of a "more integrated global political and economic structure."

4.1 Brzezinski's Trilateral Solution

It was Brzezinski, then a young upcoming professor at Columbia University, who had conceived the trilateral idea – first in the pages of the CIA-funded journal, *Encounter*,²⁷³ and subsequently in his book, *Between Two Ages: America in the Technetronic Era* (1970). Brzezinski had warned of a looming "serious crisis", as rapid technological change in the First World – which was creating a global "technetronic society" – widened the economic gap between it and the Third World. To prevent this inevitable "global fragmentation" from causing chaos, Brzezinski had called for the formation of a "community of developed nations" comprising "the Atlantic states, the more advanced European communist states and Japan." Arranged as a "council for global cooperation", this "community" would develop a "long-range strategy for international development based on the emerging global consciousness."²⁷⁴

This approach was necessary, according to Brzezinski, because of the obvious decline in America's superpower status. The United States "cannot shape the world single-handed", he argued; instead, America had to collaborate with other advanced countries in a "joint response" to ensure global stability. He advocated a two-stage program, with the US, Western Europe and Japan linking up in the first phase and the "advanced communist states" being included in the second. From the outset Brzezinski conceived of his community as having a key role in global policy-making. The proposed community would operate as a "high level consultative council for global cooperation" which would bring together on a regular basis "the heads of governments of the developed world to discuss their common political-security, educational scientific, and economic-technological problems." It would also act as an alternative to the United Nations, an organization whose effectiveness, Brzezinski claimed, had been "unavoidably limited by the Cold War and by north-south divisions."²⁷⁵

The role of this "community", he continued, would be to "assist and perhaps even accelerate the further development" of international financial institutions such as the World Bank, possibly leading to the implementation of a global taxation system. It could also "provide a base for implementing more far-reaching and visionary proposals for global cooperation." Displaying his globalist credentials Brzezinski presented his envisaged "community of developed nations" as a "step toward greater unity" and a "realistic expression of our emerging global consciousness", one that would provide an "international framework" for East-West reconciliation, and an "effective response" to the threat of "global fragmentation." Although "more ambitious than the concept of an Atlantic community", it would be "less ambitious than the goal of world government, [but] more attainable."²⁷⁶

Between Two Ages proved influential from the outset. It received numerous positive reviews, and the Brookings Institution funded a program of "Tripartite Studies" to explore the feasibility of the idea. Brzezinski also pushed his trilateral concept in a number of articles in the CFR's journal, *Foreign Affairs*, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's new periodical, *Foreign Policy*. These articles, which focused on building the first phase of his trilateral plan, were also noteworthy in that Brzezinski explicitly justified trilateralism as the correct response to the Nixon Administration's numerous excesses.

Brzezinski's criticisms of Nixon's foreign policy were threefold. **First**, by "turning its back" on the Third World, Nixon was failing to deal with the "contagious threat of global anarchy"; thereby increasing the risk of "social and political fragmentation." **Second**, Nixon's recognition of China and détente with the USSR was having "a negative effect on American-European and American-Japanese relations", as well as creating splits among the capitalist countries which the Communist states might exploit. And **third**, the "balance of power" approach favoured by Nixon was an "unrealistic and fundamentally untenable" strategy that offered "little leadership and historical direction."²⁷⁷ In fact, claimed Brzezinski, with international stability being challenged by "global anarchy", the Nixon Administration:

..fails to seize the opportunity to postulate a larger community of the developed nations, spanning Japan, Western Europe and the United States, as the historically relevant response to that challenge.²⁷⁸

As an alternative to the foreign policy of the Nixon Administration, a means of preventing global chaos and repairing alliance relationships, and "for the sake of human progress",²⁷⁹ Brzezinski presented a somewhat revamped version of his original "community of developed nations" proposal, advocating the formation of a "council representing the United States, Western Europe and Japan, with regular meetings of the heads of governments as well as some small standing machinery."²⁸⁰ In a 1973 article for *Foreign Affairs*, Brzezinski provided a more detailed prescription. **First**, there should be "annual trilateral cabinet meetings"; **second**, a "standing secretariat...with a common policy planning and review staff" should be established to support the above and to act as a "stimulant to the emergence and crystallization of common perspectives and policies"; **third**, there should be consultations in a larger framework, such as between countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); and **fourth**, regular three-way meetings between the parliamentarians of the trilateral countries should be held.²⁸¹

Brzezinski continually emphasised that trilateralism was a means to an end, specifically the liberal internationalist goal of "global unity." He claimed that his prescriptions, if undertaken, would entrench closer cooperation between the advanced industrialised countries, thus creating "a stable core for global politics" that would respond more effectively to the threat of war, to "the new danger of social fragmentation brought about by poverty", and to the possible collapse of the "global eco-system."²⁸² The United States, Japan, and Western Europe would be "in the front rank of a global effort to reorder international political and economic relations."²⁸³ It would be, in short, "a *building-block approach* toward the goal of creating a *global community* that is stable and progressive."²⁸⁴

4.2 Nixon's Nemesis

There can be little doubt that Brzezinski's attack on Nixon was attractive to David Rockefeller; for the plutocrat was already fast losing patience with the Nixon Administration, especially on economic matters. Nixon's "New Economic Policy" (NEP) of 1971, which had imposed wage and price controls and increased tariffs, had incensed Rockefeller along with most of the Establishment. As he admits in *Memoirs*, he regarded the NEP as a "futile effort" to fight inflation, one that conflicted with his own inclination "to allow markets to have a freer rein."²⁸⁵ Consequently, he had sought an audience with Nixon to discuss the "international monetary and trade picture", presumably to set the wayward President on the correct course, but Nixon's Chief of Staff, H. R. Haldeman, blocked him. Eventually, Rockefeller secured a meeting with Nixon's aide, John Ehrlichman, but his *démarche* was a failure; his views were dismissed by Nixon's officials as "not especially innovative."²⁸⁶

This calculated rebuff made it all the more easy for Brzezinski to sell his trilateral concept directly to David Rockefeller. Both spent their summer holidays at Seal Harbor in the US state of Maine, and Brzezinski used the opportunity to discuss his scheme with the plutocrat.²⁸⁷

The impact of these discussions was evident in David Rockefeller's criticisms of Nixon's foreign policy, expressed in a private meeting in 1972 with presidential aspirant Jimmy Carter. As revealed in Roland Perry's book, *The Programming of the President* (1990), Rockefeller hinted at having some reservations about the Nixon Administration, noting that despite Nixon "proving to be a good President" and he and Nelson having "a lot of time for Henry [Kissinger]", unfortunately "neither of them is a businessman, a banker." Rockefeller was concerned that their lack of economic sense was leaving the US vulnerable to Third World attempts to control the supply of key commodities, especially oil. Furthermore, according to Perry, he was also worried that the Soviets and Chinese "might use *détente* as a front for expansion and the ultimate weakening of the capitalist nations."²⁸⁸ These arguments were pure Brzezinski.

David Rockefeller's other motivation in creating the Trilateral Commission was the declining effectiveness of the Council on Foreign Relations, much of it caused by an incendiary public debate over the Vietnam War. Although the Establishment's position had shifted to backing an immediate withdrawal – now that the war had been deemed too financially costly to continue²⁸⁹ – the Council itself remained divided between supporters and opponents of the war. These divisions came to a head in 1970 when David, as the new CFR Chairman, attempted to appoint William Bundy, one of the architects of the conflict, as editor of *Foreign Affairs*. The appointment provoked outrage among those new CFR members, mostly academics, who opposed the war on moral grounds, some of them publicly branding Bundy a "war criminal." This upset Rockefeller, who considered Bundy to be a "man of quality and culture", but it was also clear to him that the war had "poisoned the atmosphere" at the Council.²⁹⁰

The impact on Rockefeller of the battle over Bundy's appointment was profound. According to journalist John B. Judis, the plutocrat "lost confidence that high-level policy discussions could be carried on at the Council on Foreign Relations", and to remedy this he "began to cast about for a new organization." Inspired by Brzezinski's

call for "more informal three-way contacts" between the "social elites" of the three regions, Rockefeller decided to establish a new policy-planning clique that would bring together the power-elites of the advanced capitalist countries.²⁹¹

4.3 Founding the Trilateral Commission

Rockefeller launched his crusade in 1972. In March of that year, in speeches at Chase International Financial Forums, David Rockefeller proposed creating an "International Commission for Peace and Prosperity", comprising "leading private citizens" from Europe, North America and Japan who would devise solutions to the world's problems. The "problems of the future" which Rockefeller identified reveal much about his broader global agenda: "reduction in world tensions; international trade and investment; environmental problems; control of crime and drugs; population control; and assistance to developing nations." Rockefeller also took Brzezinski with him to that year's Bilderberg meeting in Knokke, Belgium, where he proposed including Japanese representatives at Bilderberg rather than forming a new organisation. David Rockefeller's reason for including Japan, as he recently explained to a Japanese newspaper, was quite straightforward: "I felt that with the growing strength of Japan, it would be good to have Japan included in this." His proposal received enthusiastic support from the conveniently present Brzezinski, but it was "shot down in flames", Rockefeller claimed, by British MP Denis Healey.²⁹²

Undaunted, Rockefeller moved to a more congenial environment, summoning various notables from the US, Western Europe and Japan to the Rockefeller family estate at Pocantico Hills in August 1972. Those at the meeting agreed with Rockefeller that "something should be done"; and thus the Trilateral Commission was born, with Brzezinski nominated as its first Director. The Commission was publicly launched in July 1973 – along with its magazine, *Dialogue* – as an organisation that would "formulate and propose policies" to achieve the Commission's goal of "closer cooperation among the three advanced regions."²⁹³ This event also conveniently coincided with a particularly strident *Foreign Affairs* article by Brzezinski, which insisted that "*the active promotion of such trilateral cooperation must now become the central priority of US policy.*"²⁹⁴

Viewing this turn of events brings into perspective the observation made by Stephen Gill in his book *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission* (1990), who observed that "initiating the Trilateral Commission without David Rockefeller is as unimaginable as *Hamlet* without the Prince." In fact, without "Rockefeller's imprimatur" Brzezinski's proposals for trilateral cooperation "might well have disappeared..." Moreover, notes Gill:

Rockefeller's unique international influence was mentioned in most of the interviews I conducted with Commissioners, and he was always cited as *the* key figure. Indeed, at least initially, Rockefeller recruited each member personally.²⁹⁵

With his new policy-planning organisation in hand, David Rockefeller paid a visit to Nixon's newly appointed Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, to inform him of the good news. No mention of this encounter can be found in Kissinger's massive three-volume memoirs; but at the Trilateral Commission's 25th anniversary dinner in 1998, he revealed what had transpired:

In 1973, when I served as Secretary of State, David Rockefeller showed up in my office one day to tell me that *he thought I needed a little help. I must confess, the thought was not self-evident to me at the moment.* He proposed to form a group of Americans, Europeans and Japanese to look ahead into the future. And I asked him, "Who's going to run this for you, David?" He said, "Zbig Brzezinski" *I knew that Rockefeller meant it.* He picked something that was important. *When I thought about it there actually was a need.*²⁹⁶ (Emphasis added.)

If we pause to consider this encounter further, it tells us much about David Rockefeller's enormous power in the US political system. There are arguably few people in this world, especially those outside of government, who can stride into the US State Department and inform the incumbent Secretary of State that as their Administration's foreign policy has been found wanting, an organisation has been set up – to be headed by Brzezinski, one of the harshest critics of Nixon's foreign policy and who was also known for his bitter personal rivalry with Kissinger – to "help" them take a proper course. Even fewer could expect to secure the immediate and unquestioning acquiescence of the Secretary of State, especially one with Kissinger's ego, who had earlier brazenly rejected demands from two Establishment delegations that US forces be withdrawn from Vietnam "immediately."²⁹⁷ Such things are impossible for most US citizens; unless, of course, one is David Rockefeller.

Nevertheless, not being one to lose face willingly, especially before such a distinguished audience, Kissinger embellished his account, suggesting the purpose of Rockefeller's visit was to seek his blessing for the trilateral venture—a blessing that he naturally, and modestly, gave: "And so I encouraged David to go ahead, though I deserve no credit whatever for the consequences." But history does not quite bear Kissinger out, for he did not become Secretary of State until September 1973, by which time the Trilateral Commission was publicly up and running, rendering his blessing redundant. And even if we assume that the (then septuagenarian) manipulator's memory was faulty in his 1998 address, and that the meeting with Rockefeller actually took place earlier in 1973 when he was still only Nixon's National Security Advisor, Kissinger's reputation fares no better.

If Rockefeller's visit was indeed earlier in the year, it might explain Kissinger's "Year of Europe" speech, given in April 1973, which curiously drew heavily on the trilateralist concept. Identifying the need for "new types of cooperative action" to deal with a range of global problems, Kissinger called for a "new Atlantic Charter" involving Western Europe, the US, Canada and "ultimately Japan."²⁹⁸ But Kissinger's "Year of Europe" was a defective version of trilateralism as it put Europe in a subordinate role to the US, sparking much anger in Europe. Consequently, many Trilateralists airily dismissed Kissinger's proposal, suggesting that it had "surface[ed] without any real prior consultation", "lack[ed] substance" (Brzezinski), and amounted to "an Administration attack on the European Community" (Schaetzel).²⁹⁹ Irrespective of when the plutocrat's visit to Kissinger occurred, there can be no doubt that Kissinger's incompetent attempts to launch trilateralism would only have reinforced David Rockefeller's belief that the Nixon Administration "needed a little help."

That was 1973. By 1974, Nixon had resigned in disgrace and many of his key aides, including Haldeman and Ehrlichman, had been either dismissed or imprisoned. Only Kissinger, ever the opportunist and perhaps more acutely aware of the costs of

defiance, remained in place, above the fray. The Trilateral Commission, meanwhile, went from strength to strength, holding the founding session of its Executive Committee in Tokyo in October 1973. In May 1975, the first plenary meeting of all of the Commission's regional groups – North America, Europe and Japan, comprising some 300 members – took place in Kyoto. In its *Third Annual Report*, released in mid-1976, the Commission triumphantly noted that there was a "noticeably increased emphasis on trilateral ties as the cornerstone of American foreign policy."³⁰⁰

There was a strong element of truth in that assessment. One of the chief recommendations of a 1977 report by the Atlantic Council, for example, was for the US to "draw far more closely together with other like-minded states" especially its "main allies, and trading partners in North America, Europe and Asia."³⁰¹

4.4 The "Broad Consensus"

The creation of the Trilateral Commission was an important triumph for David Rockefeller; for he had almost single-handedly established a new elite policy-planning organisation, one that expanded the boundaries of the existing elite political network to include Japan. But of immeasurably greater significance was the fact that the Trilateral Commission was exclusively dedicated to Rockefeller's vision of world order. However, as David Rockefeller was to increasingly complain, he was dogged by persistent allegations that the Commission was a "great conspiratorial body" which controlled the world and had "all sorts of evil designs for the rest of the planet", with him identified as the "cabalist-in-chief." Naturally, he dismissed these accusations as "foolish attacks on false issues", "absurd" and the product of "pure and simple ignorance." In truth, Rockefeller insisted, the Commission was merely "a group of concerned citizens" interested in "fostering greater understanding and cooperation among international allies", and whose membership, he asserted in 1980, actually reflected a "broad range of political views."³⁰²

Yet Rockefeller's ridicule and claims of a "broad range of political views" flatly contradicted earlier statements by himself and other Trilateralists confirming the Trilateral Commission's ideological uniformity, especially its commitment to liberal internationalism. For example, the foreword to a collection of the Commission's Task Force reports, published in 1978, observed that despite some differences the "uniting element" in the Trilateral Commission was the "broad consensus" that "the cooperation of the three regions is necessary to assure smooth management of global interdependence." The foreword was co-signed by the European Chairman Georges Berthoin, by the Japanese Chairman Takeshi Watanabe, and by the North American Chairman David Rockefeller.³⁰³ Other members were more direct in identifying the globalist core of the Trilateral Commission's ideology. C. Fred Bergsten, for example, one of a number of officials who defected from the Nixon Administration to join the Commission, left no doubt; declaring "Liberal internationalism is our creed."³⁰⁴

This "broad consensus" was that the US had no choice but to embrace trilateralism. With its economic power waning, David Rockefeller claimed, America was a superpower in decline and therefore unable to fulfil its global security commitments; however, growing global economic interdependence meant that it could not retreat into isolationism. He made this clear to the World Affairs Council in 1980:

Today, whether we like it or not, *the world including the United States has become truly interdependent. Gone are the days when America could be the military policeman of the world, the moral preacher of the world, the sole arsenal of democracy, or a patch of prosperity on the globe.*³⁰⁵

However, as Rockefeller had observed in 1975, the urgent task of managing an "interdependent world" could not be entrusted to the United Nations, as radical nationalist and anti-capitalist forces had captured its main institutions. Commenting on the profusion of UN committees established to examine the activities of multinational corporations, Rockefeller detected an alarming "distrust of free enterprise and the free market economy." Noting the failure of this radicalised UN to create "a unified world polity", he concluded harshly that "the United Nations has largely reduced itself to a forum for the expression and promotion of narrow national or bloc interests rather than the broad human interests its charter proclaims." Those "broad human interests", he claimed, could only be served when "free market forces are able to transcend national boundaries."³⁰⁶

The solution to these contrasting trends was obvious. In a speech to the Japan-America Society in 1979, Rockefeller asserted that it was imperative that the US collaborate with the other capitalist powers to manage global affairs:

Economically as well as politically, the US must exercise constructive leadership, recognizing that, today, *we can neither dominate nor escape the global marketplace. Only in concert with other nations* can we hope to achieve a freer, safer and more prosperous world that should be the goal of all nations and all people.³⁰⁷

It should come as no surprise that, contrary to David Rockefeller's claims of a "broad range of political views" but in tune with the "broad consensus", his logic was echoed by other leading figures in the organisation. Commission member and former Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, for example, explained at the Commission's 1980 meeting in London that since America had "lost its once dominant position", the only solution was for the trilateral countries to "cooperate amongst themselves to share the responsibility for maintaining a stable political order and for undertaking sound economic management..."³⁰⁸ While the Commission's North American Chairman Gerard C. Smith told the CFR in 1974 that since it was now "obvious" the United Nations "was not going to fulfil its promise as a universal organisation around which a universal structure could be formed", other approaches were necessary. Although "less ambitious" than the UN, he explained, the "trilateral community could well be a major factor in building a new world order."³⁰⁹

The "broad consensus" was also reflected in the Commission's Task Force reports, the so-called "Triangle Papers", most of which seemed to recommend as a response to growing interdependence what we now call "global governance." For example, Triangle Paper No. 14, *Towards a Renovated International System*, described the "world of separate nations" as "a mental universe which no longer exists", given that social, economic and political interdependence had "grown to an unprecedented scale." Its strategy for the "management of interdependence" involved "piecemeal functionalism", in which global solutions to international problems would be reached by approaching each one separately; and the decentralised management of the international system, with local administrations enforcing rules made at the global level.³¹⁰ Triangle Paper No. 11, *The Reform of International Institutions*,

recommended – to achieve the "overriding goal" of making "the world safe for interdependence" – the "checking of the intrusion of national governments into the international exchange of both economic and non-economic goods."³¹¹

Considering these proposals we might see in a slightly different light the remarks made before the Trilateral Commission on March 15, 1999, by Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in the Clinton Administration. He stated:

I am struck once again by David Rockefeller's prescience in founding the Trilateral Commission. Long before the term "globalization" was coined, he understood how very important international consultation is.

That the Trilateral Commission demonstrates Rockefeller's "prescience" is an intriguing yet unsustainable (if not delusional) notion. The unstated objective of the Commission was to coordinate the elites of the most powerful non-Communist countries in the world, to encourage them to harmonise their foreign and economic policies, and to try to ensure that certain countries did not step out of line. In effect the goal of the Commission's to *hasten* globalization, not to merely adapt to it.

Also underlying this Trilateral agenda was an antipathy towards democracy. This was best expressed by its controversial report, *The Crisis of Democracy* (1975), which found fault with the pursuit of the "democratic virtues of equality and individualism" as it had led to the "delegitimation of authority generally and a loss of trust in leadership", not to mention an unacceptable rise in "nationalistic parochialism."³¹² To stem this "excess of democracy", which had surged since the 1960s to challenge "existing systems of authority, public and private", there needed to be, argued the report's American co-author, Samuel P. Huntington, "a greater degree of moderation in democracy."³¹³ Previously, he observed, US presidents had "operated with the cooperation of a series of informal governing coalitions"; Truman, for example, had been able to "govern the country with the cooperation of a relatively small number of Wall Street lawyers and bankers." Since the 1960s, however, this was "no longer possible" as the "sources of power in society had diversified tremendously."³¹⁴ An observation shared by Brzezinski, who attributed the "waning of the WASP-eastern seaboard-Ivy League foreign affairs elite" to Vietnam and "[s]ocial change."³¹⁵

The situation in the 1970s was seen as particularly grave, with popular forces, ranging from civil rights, environmental and feminist groups, through to "value-orientated intellectuals", contributing to the "weakening of authority throughout society" and the loss of governmental authority.³¹⁶ People no longer felt a "compulsion to obey" those whose authority was "based on hierarchy, expertise and wealth"; and there had been a decline in the "measure of apathy and non-involvement" the democratic system required to function.³¹⁷ To stem this tide the report's co-authors agreed there was a need to "restore a more equitable relationship between governmental authority and popular control."³¹⁸ It was, in other words, a prescription for restoring (though it was never really "lost", just diluted) elite control of the political process. Or as controversial academic Noam Chomsky memorably put it in his analysis of the report: "the prerogatives of the nobility must be restored and the peasants reduced to the apathy that becomes them."³¹⁹

The agenda was clear. How well was it followed? Within the United States, David Rockefeller's most potent area of influence, the record has arguably been mixed.

4.5 Get Carter!

By the mid-1970s, according to Richard Ullman, the Director of the CFR's "1980s Project", the Trilateral Commission's approach to world order had become "the consensus position on foreign policy" in the USA.³²⁰ Nixon's successor, Gerald Ford, made great efforts to conform to this consensus, appointing two Trilateral Commissioners to his cabinet: Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson and Secretary of Transportation William Coleman. Consultations between the Commission and the administration were also encouraged: in late 1975, the Commission's Executive Committee met with Ford; and in May 1976, Commission members also met with Kissinger, Richardson and Coleman.³²¹ Trilateralist rhetoric was also adopted, as Ullman observed: "President Ford's fulsome statements at the Western summits of Rambouillet and San Juan and many of Kissinger's recent speeches could have been lifted from the pages of *Dialogue*..."³²² David Rockefeller, however, found Ford's efforts wanting and he actively cultivated a replacement regime from within the ranks of the Democrats.

The alternative President soon emerged in the form of Jimmy Carter, Governor of Georgia. Carter seemed to be the ideal Trilateralist candidate; he had been an enthusiastic member of the Trilateral Commission ever since David had personally invited him to join in 1973, attending all of its meetings. During the election campaign, Carter had publicly thanked the Commission for giving him a "splendid learning opportunity" and endorsed its basic precepts, pointedly rejecting Nixon's balance-of-power strategy. A running theme in Carter's campaign speeches was that "the time had come" to replace "balance-of-power politics with world order politics" and to "seek a partnership between North America, Western Europe and Japan."³²³

Assisted by Ford's politically self-destructive decisions to drop Nelson Rockefeller as his running mate (annoying the Establishment) and pardon Nixon over Watergate (annoying voters), Carter sailed into the White House in January 1977, ready to start a new era. Although confident of Carter's commitment to trilateralism, David Rockefeller did not let his new *protégé* in the White House completely off the leash and continued to provide direction. While only two meetings between Carter and Rockefeller at the White House are recorded in Carter's official diary,³²⁴ according to historian Robert Wood, "Carter's White House files are peppered with correspondence from David Rockefeller."³²⁵ Rockefeller also mentions in *Memoirs* that prior to his trip to China in January 1977, he met briefly with Carter and Brzezinski before they actually took office.³²⁶ Carter also hosted a reception for Trilateral Commission members on June 12, 1978, attended by 167 guests.³²⁷

Moreover, Carter had appointed 26 former Trilateralists – all Trilateral Commission members must resign before joining government – to senior positions in his administration³²⁸ effectively surrendering his administration to adherents of David's Trilateralist ideology. In fact Carter's leading foreign policy officials – National Security Advisor Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance – were both Trilateralists. With so many Trilateralists in the White House as well as heading the

Defense and State Departments and the Federal Reserve, David undoubtedly felt certain that there would be no repeat of Nixon's mischief-making.

Yet, despite its seemingly impeccable Trilateralist pedigree, the Carter Administration did not remain in favour for long. In 1978, a new member of the Trilateral Commission took issue with Carter's new "human rights" policy of pressuring America's Third World allies to stop human rights violations. Speaking to the editor of *Dialogue*, this new Trilateralist warned of "great dangers" in Carter's approach, including "producing revolutions in friendly countries." Instead, the US needed to practise "selectivity" in its international human rights policy and be more lenient towards "authoritarian regimes" (i.e., US client states), as they were more likely to evolve into democracies than were "totalitarian regimes" (i.e., Communist states). America's human rights policy, he said, "must maintain this crucial distinction."³²⁹

The new member was Henry Kissinger, and his arguments struck a chord with Rockefeller – who already had demonstrated a curious indifference to the atrocities carried out by the many dictators he had dealt with over the years. "I do believe," he said in 1979, "that repeated lecturing and public condemnation of regimes that we find repressive are not likely to produce the desired results."³³⁰ Under Carter, he told the World Affairs Council in 1980, America's "vital interests" had been "subordinated to worthy but fuzzily defined moral issues – *such as human rights* and the proliferation of nuclear technologies." The plutocrat insisted that while it was "only proper" for the US to press the cause of human rights, "it should be prudent since our interference may be capable of toppling regimes whose substitutes are unknown."³³¹

To be sure, Carter's actual record in promoting human rights was barely groundbreaking; in fact, it was marked by some major omissions, especially in the case of Cambodia – where his administration opted to support indirectly the genocidal Khmer Rouge.³³² Nevertheless, that David Rockefeller could publicly urge the Carter Administration to overlook human rights abuses by US allies and then be awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by Bill Clinton in 1998 for "fighting for human rights" is yet another of the cruel hypocrisies of our times. (Kissinger received the same award from Gerald Ford in 1977.) Clinton's description of David Rockefeller as "a genuine humanitarian of the likes our nation has rarely seen",³³³ also demonstrates the truth of Chomsky's contention that a "culture of terrorism" pervades the US power-elite. It is, after all, usually only the powerful that can celebrate and reward such blatant double standards.³³⁴

There was more to Rockefeller's growing impatience with the Carter Administration: its foreign policy was also failing to meet his expectations, which was evident in the plutocrat's alarm at the "slippage of America's strength and leadership on the global scene."³³⁵ The bitter disputes within the hapless President's foreign policy team, especially between fellow Trilateralists Brzezinski and Vance, seemed to be producing an incoherent foreign policy. The Carter Administration, David claimed, had "often fallen short" in its explanation and execution of its foreign policy. In fact, "Communication of policy has been confusing because policies have been conflicting"; and that Washington was "sending out signals that merely read zigzag, switch and somersault, but don't tell anybody what we're up to or what we may do next. Friends and foes alike find us unpredictable and undependable."³³⁶

Another of Rockefeller's concerns was America's declining economic fortunes. The failure of Carter "to put our economic house in order" was proving damaging: "the international monetary system has been shaken and America's global leadership has been weakened." He also complained of a "regulatory rampage" emanating from Washington, that was reducing corporate profits and productivity.³³⁷

David Rockefeller's public denunciations of Carter were reinforced by a more calculated reprimand he delivered to the President in a White House meeting (seemingly absent from the White House Diary) on April 9, 1979. At the end of a meeting (about a project in New York City), Rockefeller handed Carter a one-page memo which described how the plutocrat had visited no less than twenty countries in the preceding months, most of which "consider themselves friends of the United States." According to the memo, the news from these countries was not good:

With virtually no exceptions, the heads of state and other government leaders I saw expressed concern about United States foreign policy which they perceive to be vacillating and lacking in an understandable global approach. In this regard, the uneven application of laudable human rights objectives were frequently alluded to...[and] they have questions about the dependability of the United States as a friend.

Not surprisingly Carter "reacted coolly" to Rockefeller's suggestion that these leaders be invited to the US to be reassured of American reliability; and when Rockefeller started to raise the issue of recent events in Iran the "clearly irritated" President brought the meeting to an abrupt end.³³⁸ A couple of months later, in what might have been an attempt to atone for rebuffing the plutocrat, Carter offered Rockefeller the Chairmanship of the Federal Reserve Board; but Rockefeller rejected the offer.³³⁹ But it was too late; Carter's days were numbered.

4.6 Trilateralism from Reagan to Clinton

David Rockefeller's wish for regime change was soon realised in 1980, when the Republican candidate Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) secured a sizeable victory over Carter. The role of the plutocrat in Carter's defeat is already well known. Rockefeller, in collaboration with Henry Kissinger and former CFR Chairman John J. McCloy, had pressured Carter to admit the recently deposed Shah of Iran into the United States for medical treatment. This act precipitated the hostage crisis at the US Embassy in Tehran that was immensely damaging to Carter, although whether Rockefeller anticipated that outcome is contested. In *Memoirs*, he makes no secret of his motives, arguing that the Shah "deserved more honorable treatment from the most powerful nation on earth." But he rejects the contention of "journalists and revisionist historians" that there was "a 'Rockefeller-Kissinger behind-the-scenes campaign' that placed 'relentless pressure' on the Carter administration to have the Shah admitted to the United States regardless of the consequences." According to Rockefeller it would be "more accurate to say that for many months we were unwilling surrogates for a government that had failed to accept its full responsibilities."³⁴⁰

Not surprisingly, David Rockefeller's name has come up in connection with the so-called "October Surprise" conspiracy, in which it is alleged that elements in the Reagan campaign – notably Reagan's campaign manager and future CIA Director Bill Casey – conspired to disrupt the Carter Administration's attempts to negotiate the pre-

election release of the hostages, in the knowledge that an "October Surprise" would be a sure vote-winner for Carter. Evidence of David Rockefeller's direct involvement seems elusive, but Robert Parry from *The Consortium News* has uncovered a number of tantalising clues. For instance, one of Rockefeller's aides at Chase Manhattan, Joseph Reed, is alleged to have spoken of such disruption plans in a meeting with Bill Casey at the CIA in 1981. Reed – whom Reagan appointed Ambassador to Morocco – is alleged to have said something along the lines of: "we f---d Carter's October Surprise." Rockefeller, Reed, another Rockefeller aide, Owen Frisbie, and former CIA officer turned Chase Manhattan employee, Archibald Roosevelt, are known to have visited Casey during the campaign on September 11, 1980; none of the surviving participants have divulged the purpose of that meeting. Additionally Rockefeller's lawyer in Geneva, Jean A. Patry, has been identified as the conduit in some dubious money transactions that may have facilitated the disruption exercise.³⁴¹

The Reagan Administration soon resolved many of the problems Rockefeller had identified under Carter, even though many of its key members were suspicious of the Trilateral Commission. Reagan himself had attacked Carter's foreign policy, according to a *New York Times* report in 1980, because he had found that "19 key members of the Administration are or have been members of the Trilateral Commission." He had also told the *Christian Science Monitor* in April 1980 that he would shun the directions from the Trilateral Commission.³⁴² Reagan also seemed to be making plenty of headway against his main competitor for the nomination, George H.W. Bush, by denigrating his Trilateral connections.

Alarmed by Reagan's progress and no doubt by his anti-Trilateralist rhetoric, just prior to the New Hampshire primary in early 1980, David Rockefeller reportedly "convened a secret meeting of like-minded Republicans aimed at developing a strategy for stopping Reagan by supporting Bush and, failing that getting Gerald Ford into the race." Reagan apparently heard about the meeting and was "really hurt" at the lack of trust shown by Rockefeller in his leadership, pointing out that he was a supporter of "big oil" and "big business." As the campaign progressed Reagan moderated his rhetoric.³⁴³ As part of his drive to "mend a breach with the GOP's old eastern establishment wing" a reluctant Reagan was compelled to take former-Trilateralist Bush on as his Vice President.³⁴⁴

Reagan also embraced Kissinger's "crucial distinction"; although it had been repackaged as a "neo-conservative" idea with the publication of "Dictatorships and Double Standards" in *Commentary* (November 1979). The author of the essay – which exactly replicated Kissinger's argument – was Trilateralist Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. On that strength of that article Reagan made her US Ambassador to the UN. It was also probably no coincidence that in November 1980, David Rockefeller reportedly told a group of Latin American leaders that Reagan's victory would lead to a "lessening of human rights restrictions on their countries." Rockefeller also aroused much ire when he used that occasion to praise Argentina's brutal military regime for having "stabilized" the country.³⁴⁵

Nevertheless Reagan's attacks on the Trilateral Commission had reportedly made Rockefeller "uncertain whether he would enjoy the kind of access to the White House he had enjoyed in the past." Such uncertainty would prove short lived, as the plutocrat later acknowledged, noting in October 1981 that he had spoken to Reagan "about a

half-dozen times since the election." "I don't think we were ever better received than by the Reagan Administration", Rockefeller told the *New York Times*, "Perhaps surprising to them, they're finding we have a lot in common." Rockefeller was optimistic: "My enthusiasm has grown. I didn't adequately recognise the strength of his leadership."³⁴⁶ This enthusiasm would carry on into Reagan's second term, with Rockefeller praising the Reagan for performing to his expectations. "It is heartening that the current administration in Washington is dedicated to encouraging the private sector and lessening the role of government", the plutocrat told an exclusive audience at the Sid W. Richardson Foundation in Fort Worth, Texas, in 1985.³⁴⁷

Not everything was so rosy. On international economic policy, for example, in late 1982 Rockefeller criticised the Reagan Administration for being "too modest" in its support for increased member contributions to the IMF. He described the Reagan Administration's proposal to increase member contributions by 25 per cent as "too small" and argued that it would be "better to increase it to 50 per cent."³⁴⁸ With the Latin American debt crisis looming, Rockefeller seemed mindful of the need to ensure the IMF was sufficiently cashed up to bail out many of these countries – subject to corporate-friendly conditions.

There were also differences on government expenditure. In October 1983, Rockefeller echoed the views of his fellow Business Council members, then meeting in Hot Springs, that tax increases and spending cuts might be necessary to reduce the ballooning Federal Government budget deficit. Describing the budget deficit as a "major problem for us", Rockefeller said that he suspected "some kind of tax increase may have to be part of a package to reduce the deficit." The call for spending cuts came after a "closed-door speech" by Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger to the Business Council, in which he sought their support for increasing military spending to 29 percent of the total budget to counter the USSR. Despite the standing ovation for the Secretary, Rockefeller was not wholly convinced, telling the *New York Times* that while he thought Weinberger was "correct" in his assessment of the Soviet military threat, it did not mean they could not "cut a little bit out" of the federal budget. Noting that the main areas of government expenditure were "defense and human services", Rockefeller was clear: "It seems to me something has to be done in both."³⁴⁹

The cut to defense spending that Rockefeller sought was apparently consistent with the opinions of the majority of Trilateral Commission members. According to Gill, because of the "enormous budget deficits" caused by Reagan military build up "this aspect of Reagan policies was opposed by most Commission members." However, during 1980-85, the Commission was "unable to exert a great deal of influence in the security sphere."³⁵⁰ A fact evident in the 50 percent increase in the defense budget (in 1987 dollars) from \$US 187 billion in 1980 to \$US 289 billion by 1989; in fact Reagan spent almost \$2 trillion on defense during his two terms.³⁵¹

Despite this, the only real problem with Reagan identified by Rockefeller in *Memoirs* was that his electoral campaign in 1980 had been critical of the Trilateral Commission. But even this was overcome when "Reagan ultimately came to understand Trilateral's value and invited the entire membership to a reception at the White House in April 1984."³⁵² A number of conservative commentators were somewhat alarmed by this development. Richard Viguerie, publisher of the *Conservative Digest*, for example, concluded the meeting was proof that Reagan was

"more in tune with David Rockefeller...than an anti-tax leader or a pro-life leader at the grassroots level." Much of the media ignored the event, except for the *Omaha World-Herald*, which castigated Viguerie and other critics, suggesting they were the sort of conservative who "think the Trilateral Commission is a power elite engaged in an international conspiracy to create a one-world economic order." The *Omaha World-Herald* assured their reader that not only was there "nothing wrong" in Reagan meeting the Commission, in fact it was "good that Reagan has taken the opportunity to acquaint himself with the group's work and its concerns."³⁵³

The limits of the Trilateral Commission's influence became more apparent during the presidency of George H.W. Bush (1989-1993). Bush came into the White House with a somewhat tortured history with the Commission. His public story was that he had resigned from both the Trilateral Commission and the CFR in October 1978 on the grounds they were "too liberal."³⁵⁴ The real story was more intriguing. Several weeks after resigning as Director of the CIA in early 1977, Bush had accepted an invitation from Rockefeller to join the Trilateral Commission. He attended the Trilateral Commission conferences in Bonn (1977) and Washington DC (1978) and would later describe the Commission as a "very worthwhile organisation." Despite resigning from the Commission, he had clearly retained Rockefeller's favour, attending a private meeting with the plutocrat and some other bankers in March 1979, securing financial support for his bid for the presidency.³⁵⁵ Bush also received a plethora of \$1000 donations, the maximum individual contribution allowed under law, from David Rockefeller and other Rockefeller family members and employees.³⁵⁶

However, after Bush's shock victory over Ronald Reagan in early 1980 in the primary race in the state of Iowa, his Trilateral-Rockefeller connection soon became an issue. William Loeb, the publisher of the *Manchester Union-Leader* in New Hampshire, attacked Bush as "a spoiled little rich kid who has been wet-nursed to succeed and now, packaged by David Rockefeller's Trilateral Commission, thinks he is entitled to the White House as his latest toy." The paper challenged its readers: "Will the elite nominate their man, or will we nominate Reagan?"³⁵⁷ Bush's campaign also ran afoul of the Florida Conservative Union which ran full-page advertisements in Southern newspapers warning voters: "The same people who gave you Jimmy Carter want now to give you George Bush." "This whole Trilateral thing boggles the mind," complained a frustrated Bush, "For something like this to divert attention from substantive foreign-policy questions is crazy." Yet, as *Newsweek* observed, there seemed to be "little question" Bush's ties with the Trilateral Commission had "cost him blue-collar votes."³⁵⁸ It also cost him the presidential nomination and he eventually settled for the vice-presidency.

When Bush Sr finally entered the White House as President in January 1989, he not only came with long-standing family ties to the "Wall Street financial world and the military industrial complex",³⁵⁹ but as a member of the exclusive Yale University-based secret society Skull and Bones.³⁶⁰ Despite those connections there were relatively few Trilateralists in his Administration, especially at cabinet level – no more than four, according to at least one source.³⁶¹ At the same time, though, it was not entirely clear that Bush had abandoned the Trilateral Commission's objectives. David Rockefeller told the *Washington Post* in 1988 that Bush remained "fully supportive" of the Trilateral Commission's activities, and claimed that despite Bush's resignation from both the CFR and the Commission "he hasn't walked away from

them."³⁶² Perhaps less helpful was Rockefeller's description of Bush as an "Establishment centrist", and his assessment that Bush's somewhat mixed message during the 1988 campaign was due to "political expediency."³⁶³

David Korten suggests that Bush's commitment to the Trilateralist agenda was evident in his support for global free trade and NAFTA – goals also supported by David Rockefeller.³⁶⁴ As for his foreign policy record, however, despite his Gulf War rhetoric about creating a "new world order", Bush arguably fell short of the liberal internationalist vision championed by the Commission and its founder. As one Trilateralist later complained, contrary to Bush's "distinctly Wilsonian note of idealistic internationalism", Desert Storm was actually "dedicated to preserving the sanctity of international boundaries and the notion of national sovereignty." Also, by failing to live up to his rhetoric, Bush had given "the forces of isolationism an even greater opening" (Talbot).³⁶⁵

The Clinton Administration, in contrast, which had nearly a dozen Trilateralists in senior positions, showed considerably greater fealty to the Trilateral Commission's goals. This was perhaps inevitable given that Bill Clinton (1993-2001), contrary to his public image as a man who had succeeded despite his humble beginnings, including a broken home; came to the White House with strong Establishment connections. Aside from being a Rhodes Scholar and a student of Carroll Quigley at Georgetown University, Clinton was a member of the Commission, joining in 1989.³⁶⁶ He had become a member of the CFR in 1988, apparently on the strength of a recommendation from Madeline Albright, a former Carter Administration official and a protégé and friend of Brzezinski.³⁶⁷ And in 1991, according to *TIME*, at the invitation of "Washington's most powerful back-room fixer", his friend the lawyer Vernon Jordan, Clinton attended the Bilderberg conference in Baden-Baden, Germany. It was Clinton's "coming-out party", quipped Jordan,³⁶⁸ the "powerbroker who travels the world", himself a member of the Trilateral Commission and a board-member of American Express, the Ford Foundation and the Brookings Institution.³⁶⁹

The recommendations of Triangle Paper No. 41, *Global Cooperation After The Cold War* (1991) – co-authored by Joseph Nye, later Clinton's Assistant Secretary for Defense – seemed to shape Clinton's foreign policy agenda. Arguing that in the post-Cold War world "the need for trilateral cooperation in a wider global context is as great, perhaps greater than ever", the report proposed a 10-point agenda for "broad multilateral cooperation" to prevent the break-up of the world economy into "separate blocs."³⁷⁰ This agenda included: encouraging European integration; making international institutions such as the UN Security Council, IMF, World Bank, GATT, the International Atomic Energy Agency and World Bank "more effective"; and transforming the Group of Seven into a "more effective institution" with a "permanent secretariat."³⁷¹ America also had a crucial role to play; "[m]anaging interdependence" should be "central" to its strategy. The US would have to "use multilateral institutions" and "develop the habit of decision-sharing" as "no large country will be able to achieve what it wants unilaterally."³⁷²

Elements of this agenda were subsequently reflected in Clinton's "enlargement" strategy, announced by his National Security Advisor, the Trilateralist Anthony Lake, in 1993. Lake argued that the "major market democracies" must "act together" to prevent "economic disaster" by "updating international economic institutions" and

"striking hard" for global free trade.³⁷³ Such apocalyptic language had already been invoked by a high powered panel of Trilateral Commissioners, led by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, who told the press in April 1992 of their concerns of impending "disaster", if the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations were not finished.³⁷⁴ Clinton showed his commitment to the Trilateralist agenda in other ways. For example, at the 1994 Group of Seven meeting, held in Naples, Italy:

President Clinton...challenged the G-7 to take a more visionary approach to global issues and to decide on the kind of institutions needed to the world into the next 20 years...Mr Clinton's point is that we need new institutions for the next phase of world development to add to the European Union...; the World Trade Organisation...; and Partnerships for Peace (the NATO package of quasi-institutional membership for central and eastern European nations). Apart from these, Mr Clinton argues, we are still working with the post-World War II structures - the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United Nations. It was a theme reiterated by the US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, when he told reporters that a new set of institutions was needed to deal with the kind of problems likely in the 21st century - crime, narcotics, environment, population, nuclear non-proliferation.³⁷⁵

Such pronouncements would have been music to the ears of David Rockefeller, evident in his public praising of Clinton in 1995 for supporting global free trade, according to a report in the *Arkansas Democratic Gazette* in which Rockefeller was also described as a "leading voice" in advising Clinton on trade policies for Latin America.³⁷⁶ The plutocrat's enthusiasm for Clinton would explain his reported efforts to protect Clinton from impeachment over the Lewinsky scandal in 1998.³⁷⁷

4.7 The Neo-Conservative Challenge

The new millennium seemed to mark a period of profound and even positive change in the Trilateral Commission. The Commission's original goal – "to foster closer cooperation among those core democratic industrialized areas of the world which shared leadership responsibilities in the wider international system" – remained intact. Although the "deepening" of the "growing interdependence" the Commissioners had observed in the 1970s, into "globalization" had apparently "intensified" the need for "shared leadership and thinking by the Trilateral countries." The Commission had also agreed that the Trilateral framework needed to be "widened to reflect broader changes in the world." In short this meant inviting new countries into its membership.³⁷⁸

When this proposal was first made at the 1996 Trilateral Commission conference in Vancouver, Rockefeller reportedly balked. "If we tried to cover the whole world, it becomes a private United Nations and would be rather unproductive," David Rockefeller had said when the question of expanding Asian membership was raised.³⁷⁹ By 1999, however, it became clear that a compromise had been reached when Volcker announced to the press that the Commission had "taken steps importantly to extend the range of the discussion ... to people outside the traditional trilateral areas..." As proof of this commitment, that year's conference in Washington DC included observers from China, Korea, Russia and Ukraine.³⁸⁰

The resulting expansion has been dramatic. In 2000 the North American Group widened its membership to accept up to ten members from Mexico – it currently has seven. The Japanese Group was transformed in 2000 into the "Pacific Asia Group"

and now has over 100 members from Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The European Group has also expanded, inviting members from countries in Central and Eastern Europe. A new category has also been created, that of "Participants from Other Areas", with 14 nations represented including Kuwait, Hong Kong, Morocco, Argentina, Turkey, Israel, South Africa, Jordan, Russia, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Brazil.

Given these positive developments some 30 years after the Trilateral Commission was founded, it would be easy to conclude that if that organization is not "exposed and opposed – their long sought-after goal of world government may become a reality."³⁸¹ But there are some compelling reasons to think such pessimism is premature. Recent events, in particular the unleashing of the aggressive imperialist agenda of current US President George W. Bush in the wake of 9/11, have thrown into doubt the Trilateral Commission's effectiveness in promoting a coordinated policy by the three regions. Splits have appeared, particularly in the lead-up to the US-led invasion of Iraq. At the 2002 meeting in Washington DC, for example, the Europeans and Asian delegates were reportedly at odds with their American counterparts over the Bush Administration's plans to invade Iraq.³⁸²

This may seem incongruous given that Vice-President Dick Cheney, Deputy Secretary of State (formerly the US Trade Representative) Robert Zoellick, former Deputy-Secretary of Defence (now World Bank President) Paul Wolfowitz, former Defense Policy Board Chairman Richard Perle and Bush's former Deputy Assistant, Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Planning, and presidential envoy to Iraq, Robert Blackwill were all Trilateral Commission members. Moreover, Wolfowitz, Zoellick and Blackwill had all been contributors to Trilateral Commission task force reports. In his contribution to Task Force Report #50, *Managing the International System Over the Next Ten Years: Three Essays*, Wolfowitz even appeared to toe the Trilateral line arguing that: "If we can sustain Trilateral cooperation, we will have a strong base to tackle the specific challenges we face."

Perhaps of greater importance was that George W. Bush – who had never been a Trilateral Commission member³⁸³ – was praised by David Rockefeller in *Memoirs* for having campaigned "aggressively in favour of free trade" in 2000. This was a marked contrast to the final years of the Clinton Administration, where the push for free trade had been stymied by "strongly protectionist" Democrats and the "isolationist wing" of the Republican Party. Rockefeller was also clearly pleased with the performance of Powell and Zoellick at the Council of Americas meeting in 2001, where they had "laid out cogent arguments for the United States to again assume leadership in the effort to facilitate both regional and global trade agreements."³⁸⁴ In fact the Bush Administration was not averse to reminding the liberal internationalist wing of the Establishment of its free trade achievements. Deputy Treasury Secretary Kenneth Dam, for instance, almost seemed to be gloating when he told the Trilateral Commission conference in Washington DC in April 2002, that: "if anyone here feared that this Administration would turn its back on multilateralism and the World Trade Organization, those sceptics were clearly mistaken."³⁸⁵

But it is also the case that Cheney, Wolfowitz and Perle were also very prominent in the neo-conservative network that had grown in stature during the 1990s. Their objectives, as outlined in the planning documents of the neo-conservative Project for a

New American Century (PNAC), rested not on cooperation amongst the advanced industrialised nations for the purposes of building a global system based on international institutions, but maintaining and asserting US dominance. The PNAC report *Rebuilding America's Defenses* (2000), for example, argued that as the US was now the "world's only superpower", "America's grand strategy should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible."³⁸⁶

Moreover, Cheney and Wolfowitz were intimately involved in the notorious *Defense Planning Guidance for the 1994-1999 Fiscal Years (DPG)*, leaked to the press in early 1992. The *DPG* aroused much public ire when it declared America's "first objective" in the post-Cold War world should be to "prevent the re-emergence of a new rival." Maintaining US global leadership was its paramount goal. And, in what was widely interpreted as a veiled reference to restraining Western Europe and Japan, the *DPG* called on the US to "account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations *to discourage them from challenging our leadership* or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order." Additionally it was a document "conspicuously devoid of references to collective action through the United Nations", noted the *New York Times*.³⁸⁷ Responding to the public outcry President George H.W. Bush publicly disavowed the *DPG*. But eight years later the PNAC report, *Rebuilding America's Defenses*, endorsed the *DPG* as "a blueprint for maintaining U.S. preeminence", claiming that its "basic tenets" remained "sound."³⁸⁸

Even the "moderate" Zoellick, a signatory to the (now) infamous January 26, 1998 PNAC letter to Clinton which called for the "removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power", showed neo-conservative inclinations. In his contribution to a 1999 Trilateral Commission report, for example, Zoellick sought to justify and explain America's "different vision" of world order. True, Zoellick invoked the Trilateralist vision when discussing the maintenance and future expansion of the "political community" of the US, Europe and Japan; and the need to "link" China, Russia and India into a "global economic system of finance, trade and information."³⁸⁹ But he also cited the prospect of US rivalry *with* China and Russia, the "increasing dangers" of weapons of mass destruction, and of smaller powers pushing for regional dominance as sufficient reason for the US to develop the ability to "project power to hotspots around the globe without fear of retaliation..." America would also need to develop plans to protect itself, especially from WMD; this would include "options for pre-emption..."³⁹⁰ He explained that as the US had a "sense of responsibility for the global order", it would be "reluctant" to cede its freedom of action to international institutions such as the United Nations. Instead he predicted the United States would "justify this capacity for unilateral action as a safeguard for the system."³⁹¹

A likely source of this neo-conservative antipathy toward the liberal internationalist agenda favoured by both the Trilateral Commission and its founder can be found in the writings of Irving Kristol, the so-called "godfather" of neo-conservatism and, incidentally, the father of PNAC co-founder William Kristol. Writing in the *Wall Street Journal* in 1970s, Irving Kristol had observed that the "ideological complexion of the Trilateral Commission does not significantly differ" from that of the "foreign policy establishment as a whole." However, he posed the question: "what if the elites have been basically wrong, and the population basically right?"³⁹² This was a telling comment from an influential intellectual who, in a more recent attempt to explain the

"neo-conservative persuasion", would claim that the neo-cons think "world government is a terrible idea since it can lead to world tyranny."³⁹³

Perhaps more important is the fact that the purveyors of this agenda, whether individually, or through the various think-tanks they were members of, were not beneficiaries of funding from David Rockefeller or from Rockefeller foundations. PNAC, for instance, up until 2000, was funded by just three foundations – the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the now defunct John M. Olin Foundation. Many of key figures associated with the neo-conservative agenda, whether in the Bush Administration or advising from the sidelines, have worked for think-tanks funded by these three foundations. This includes the American Enterprise Institute (which houses PNAC), the Heritage Foundation, the Potomac Foundation and the Hoover Institute.³⁹⁴ And finally one should not forget in terms of numbers there were more high-level members of the Bush Administration involved in PNAC (12) than were members of the Trilateral Commission (4).

The neo-conservative agenda, with its focus on US global hegemony as an end in itself, was subsequently reflected in the Bush Administration's response to the events of 9/11. The administration made few moves to enhance the power of the United Nations or other international institutions to combat terrorism, as many prominent Establishment commentators had urged. Instead it showed in its determination to invade Iraq, not only on the flimsy pretext of eliminating unauthorised WMD programs and ultimately without direct support from the UN Security Council, but even without aid from its ostensible Trilateral allies, a preference for unilateral action. This was only reinforced with its doctrines of pre-emption, Bush's call for a "global democratic revolution", and its repeated hostility towards European allies who failed to support its policies. In fact, the Bush Administration's *National Security Strategy* released in September 2002, seemed to deliberately echo the *DPG* and the PNAC report with its assertion that the US armed forces would need to be "strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States."³⁹⁵ Not surprisingly these policies caused no small amount of dissension within the Trilateralist ranks.

As noted before, the Trilateral Commission meetings in Washington and Prague in 2002 were reportedly marred by angry debates between US and European participants, not only over Iraq, but deeper issues of world order. At the Washington DC meeting, for example, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld got into a testy exchange with billionaire George Soros over the Pentagon's apparent failure to expand peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan.³⁹⁶ The most widely reported clash occurred in Prague between the EU External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten and Richard Perle. Patten took aim at the "distinguished unilateralists" in the Bush Administration, accusing them of abandoning the "path laid down fifty years ago [of] trying to build a World Empire without an Emperor..." based on international laws and institutions. In his scathing rebuttal Perle confirmed that the Bush Administration had "largely rejected" the "globalist attitude" of the Clinton Administration.³⁹⁷

More trenchant critiques emerged in subsequent meetings. At the October 2003 meeting in Porto, Portugal, for example, Dominique Moisi, a Special Adviser at the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI), noted with alarm that the US and EU were "as much divided by the threat of terrorism, as united by it." Moisi warned

of a trans-Atlantic divide: "an American West and a European West." But he did not see the problem as purely a neo-conservative one, but a consequence of transformations in Europe and the US that needed to be bridged; there was a need to "reinvent the West". The "Imperial revisionism" of the US would have to be replaced by a "Responsible revisionism" in which America, Europe and other democratic nations "would work together, to rebuild multilateral institutions such as the United Nations." The US could no longer use the limitations of the UN as "an alibi for unilateral action"; through a renewed and reinvigorated trans-Atlantic relationship America and Europe could "give teeth to the UN" and at the same time restrain the "legitimate but dangerous" "revisionist instinct" of the US. To achieve this reinvented West, Moisi advocated the creation of an "'action-oriented' Wise Men Committee between the United States and the European Union."³⁹⁸

In his own assessment, at the Trilateral Commission conference in Warsaw in May 2004, Zbigniew Brzezinski was considerably harsher. Brzezinski warned that the environment which had sustained the "democratic trilateral core" of North America, Europe and East Asia as the "critical source of stability" in the world was in danger of being "derailed" by the War on Terror. He noted that the US had become "more isolated, mistrusted, and in some places more hated than ever before"; its relationship with the world had become defined by a "largely theologically defined self-declared 'War on Terrorism'." Coupled with other alarming trends in Europe, Russia and China, there was a danger of "escalating global chaos." The solution was obvious yet familiar: "We need...a revitalized, politically focused, strategically pointed, and geopolitically enlarging trilateralism."³⁹⁹ In other forums Brzezinski argued that America needed to cooperate closely with Japan and Europe to cope with the "many forces of chaos in the Global Balkans", otherwise it risked being "mired, alone, in hegemonic quicksand."⁴⁰⁰

If a pattern can be discerned from these exchanges and criticisms, it is that a clear endorsement from the Trilateral Commission's more important members of its conduct of the Global War on Terror has eluded the Bush Administration. In fact the opposite has largely been the case, with its policies pilloried by those whose own views match David Rockefeller's globalist vision.

With Bush seemingly prepared to sacrifice the trilateral relationship, David Rockefeller's modest assessment in *Memoirs* of the Trilateral Commission as an "invaluable forum for dialogue" and a "vigorous and effective collaborator on the world scene" now seems unduly optimistic.⁴⁰¹ However, one should not declare the Trilateral Commission to be finished. Its membership continues to be a roster of the powerful; the Commission remains the "central meeting point for the transnational corporate elite", according to one recent study.⁴⁰² The forum also continues to be a place where the elite seek to build a consensus around a set of core goals identified by David Rockefeller and his collaborators back in the 1970s. With the United States clearly overextended in the Middle East, the potential for a significant strategic reversal in a forthcoming administration is likely. Though it must be acknowledged, even if Bush's successor is truly more "moderate", his administration's unilateralist course has set back the David Rockefeller Trilateralist agenda of building a more unified global community for some years yet. Unfortunately the neo-conservative alternative is no improvement – it may not be a world government, but it still delivers the tyranny the neo-conservatives claim to oppose...

5. Under David Rockefeller's Shadow

In October 2002, after nearly 10 years of work, David Rockefeller finally released his autobiography, *Memoirs*. It was not a true autobiography in the sense of David personally writing it, but a group effort befitting a billionaire plutocrat. The project, overseen by the Rockefeller family historian Peter J. Johnson, employed during that period at least 15 other people who assisted in researching archives, transcribing interviews and constructing a chronology of David's life. According to a *New York Times* report, David "talked his memoirs out" and then edited the transcripts and subsequent drafts in a time-consuming process that "tested the patience and diplomacy of all involved."⁴⁰³

Reactions to *Memoirs* were wide-ranging. Many reviewers were impressed by David Rockefeller's account, praising the plutocrat as a "charming, low-key gentleman" (Frank), a "discreet and diplomatic banker" (Lenzner), and a "decent, hardworking man" (Auchinloss). There were a few dissenting opinions, with some reviewers expressing alarm at his "tone deafness – even eagerness – to do business with unsavoury regimes" (Stern), and observing that Rockefeller seemed "coldly aloof from the horrors that his friends and contacts perpetrated", having spent "much of his career at Chase doing business with tyrants" (Brooks). One reviewer blasted *Memoirs* as "completely unrevealing", "soporific and self-important" and "not worth reading", noting that although an important figure warranting a book, David Rockefeller, a man of "mediocre intellect", was "obviously not the one to write it" (Schwarz).⁴⁰⁴

However, with most reviewers of *Memoirs* indifferent to some of the more questionable aspects of David Rockefeller's life, this venture has been a public relations success for the now 90-year-old plutocrat. An image of Rockefeller as a genial and well-intentioned globetrotting philanthropist and banker has been successfully cultivated; we are even encouraged to find some humour in his apparent obliviousness to his great wealth and remarkable access to (and influence over) world leaders. For NWO researchers, however, while *Memoirs* provides some valuable clues and admissions, it is hardly a comprehensive source of information on David Rockefeller's lifetime of effort in building the New World Order. Indeed, as the preceding analysis of his New World Order vision – drawing on other sources – has revealed, a different, less-benevolent assessment is warranted.

The differences between David's vision and that of Nelson are also instructive. While Nelson Rockefeller's vision was meandering and subject to the immediate counsel of his bevy of advisers and his overwhelming desire to reach the White House, David held fast to some core strategies – US leadership, trilateralism, economic integration and free trade – adjusting them as circumstances dictated. He also put to the most effective use the Rockefeller philanthropic empire, setting up a number of policy-planning cliques while taking leading roles in existing groups, giving him an unrivalled position to influence those in government. Unlike Nelson, David Rockefeller was not seduced by the trappings of power, by the awe and bewilderment that the Oval Office instils in most mortals – he knew he already had the power...

David Rockefeller's strategy also reveals something fundamental about wealth and power: it does not matter how much money one has; unless it is employed to capture and control those organisations which produce the ideas and the policies that guide governments and the people who eventually serve in them, the real power of a great fortune will never be realised. As Gary North reminds us:

Self-funded conspiracies rarely amount to anything. They have neither the leadership nor the supporters to produce anything of significance. It is when they get the state involved that their schemes become a major threat to the public good.⁴⁰⁵

Involving the state in his schemes has been at the heart of David Rockefeller's activities over the past four decades. Whether through his personal contacts with national leaders, or providing crucial support to aspirants to high office, or his leading role in many pivotal policy-planning organisations, Rockefeller has sought to place his personal stamp upon what governments actually do. In pursuing his agenda, detailed above, Rockefeller has not only operated beyond the reach of public accountability, but has done so with a discernible indifference to popular will. That this has occurred for so long, with apparent impunity, is surely a cause for concern.

Thus it can be safely said that, in contrast to the ultimately marginal role of his brother Nelson, David Rockefeller's contribution to the New World Order has been substantial, even pivotal. He has not only been one of its key architects, but also been a leading builder. While Nelson could only talk about the New World Order and that he would build it if he were President, David Rockefeller actually used his unelected, unaccountable yet powerful position to turn his words into government policy. As a report in the *New York Times*, observed in 1995:

Despite his modesty on the subject, it is for his efforts to use *private means to influence public policy* that [David] Rockefeller would like to be remembered. "I would like to be thought of as having seen that there was *an important role for the private sector in world affairs* and cooperating with governments for the benefit of both parties," he said. "That's what I've tried to demonstrate with my activities on behalf of the Chase and with things like the Council of the Americas and the Trilateral Commission," two public service organizations he helped establish.⁴⁰⁶

It is therefore fitting to conclude this examination of David Rockefeller's globalist vision with one of the unintentionally sinister attempts to celebrate the plutocrat's achievements. This was given by former US Trade Representative Carla Hills, who claimed at a panel discussion on *Memoirs* at Johns Hopkins University in late 2002 that the "richness and breadth" of Rockefeller's "many contributions" to causes "that benefit all of us"⁴⁰⁷ was best captured in this famous quotation by 19th-century clergyman Edwin H. Chapin (1814 -1880):

Not armies, not nations, have advanced the race; but here and there, in the course of ages, an individual has stood up and cast his shadow over the world.

* * * * *

Afterword: The Missing Quote

When I submitted this essay to a number of other New World Order researchers for review in February 2006, it occurred to me that I had omitted without any explanation a key statement allegedly made by David Rockefeller at the Bilderberg meeting held in Baden-Baden, Germany on June 5-9, 1991. This is the "missing quote":

We are grateful to the Washington Post, The New York Times, Time Magazine and other great publications whose directors have attended our meetings and respected their promises of discretion for almost forty years. ... It would have been impossible for us to develop our plan for the world if we had been subjected to the lights of publicity during those years. But, the world is now more sophisticated and prepared to march towards a world government. The supranational sovereignty of an intellectual elite and world bankers is surely preferable to the national auto-determination practiced in past centuries

It is a widely used quote. A search on Google for this quote brings up nearly 1200 hits, and it has been reproduced in numerous books as startling evidence not only of David Rockefeller's mendacity, but as proof that they *do* conspire at Bilderberg to build world government. Its widespread distribution stands in contrast to Rockefeller's admission in *Memoirs* about his desire for a "more integrated global political and economic structure – one world"; a Google search brings up just 461 hits. And I have not found it mentioned in any of the recent books purporting to provide a history of the New World Order that have been released since *Memoirs* was published. Of course, its inclusion is not mandatory, but to omit that quote, when it comes from a source that cannot be dismissed by skeptics is curious.

My reason for omitting the above Bilderberg quote from the foregoing study stems primarily from concerns over its providence. Most internet sites which carry the quote do not bother to cite the document from which it was lifted. This creates a problem given the explosive nature of Rockefeller's alleged statement as it makes it much harder to confirm its authenticity. The actual source of the quote appears to be a French publication, *Lectures Francaises* (July-August 1991), which reportedly obtained a copy of Rockefeller's address to the Bilderbergers. The key to its wider dissemination, though, was its partial reproduction in the Monaco-produced *Hilaire Du Berrier Reports* (September 1991).⁴⁰⁸

How *Lectures Francaises* obtained a copy of that speech is not clear, though one may find on the internet assertions the quote actually comes from a tape-recording of Rockefeller's speech covertly obtained. If his English speech was translated into French and then back into English that might account for some of the odd phrases used such as "supranational sovereignty" and "national auto-determination." But that still leaves the problem of the gratuitous language, including the thanks given to the media for being discrete about the Bilderberg agenda, and the specific identification of "world government" as their goal. It is difficult not to be skeptical about its authenticity.⁴⁰⁹

It could be argued, however, as does "Voxfux", that it does not matter in the end if the quote is real or not, as the evidence of a conspiracy by Rockefeller and his cronies to

replace the existing world order with another "new", though not necessarily better, world order is overwhelming:

Weather[sic] or not there was a tape recorder to pick up Heir Rockefeller's kind offerings to the world (sarcasm) *I challenge anyone to prove that Rockefeller DIDN'T make the comment. Because all the evidence is screaming out that the [sic] is such a private globalist conspiracy, and it is right up in our face every day.* You need only examine 40 years of our world to know that these Bilderbergers said those things. Whether it was said in one sentence or across a broad range of handshakes. Whether it was conveyed with a blink of the eye, an understanding or a pat on the back, or explicit verbal instructions, make no mistake about it, when this "Old Boy" network gathers in their secret chambers their objectives are as they always were, as they always will be - To conspire to tighten their grip onto power at any price.⁴¹⁰

But it is arguable that it *does* matter. David Rockefeller's involvement in the New World Order seems to be an article of faith for most researchers (much like the existence of Satan is for those of the Judeo-Christian and Islamic religions). His name is frequently bandied about in connection with the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderbergers and the CFR, and more than a few researchers have made more lurid (though poorly sourced) allegations against him,⁴¹¹ but precious little has been done to examine the sum total of what he has actually said on the public record. This has made it harder to argue the case – outside of sympathetic audiences – that David Rockefeller is not only uniquely powerful, but has been pursuing a global agenda at variance with the maintenance of national sovereignty and freedom. However, as this study has attempted to demonstrate, there is more than enough evidence in the public domain to condemn him as both an elitist and a globalist.

The Bilderberg quote is therefore optional; though in my opinion it is best left aside until we can obtain compelling proof of its authenticity.

Endnotes:

- ¹ William F. Jasper, *Global Tyranny ...Step By Step: The United Nations and the Emerging New World Order*, Western Islands, 1992, p.283; John Wilkes, "Hit-job on Margaret Thatcher", in James Gibb Stuart, *Hidden Menace to World Peace*, Ossian, 1993, p.159; and David Icke, *...and the truth shall set you free*, Bridge of Love, 1995, 2nd edition, p.173.
- ² See "The Rush Limbaugh 'Kook Test'", Verbatim transcript as recorded from his February 20, 1996 radio broadcast at http://sonsofliberty.org/wrecking_crew/kookstest.html.
- ³ David Rockefeller, Letter to the *New York Times*, August 25, 1980.
- ⁴ Rockefeller, quoted in Ellen Sorokin, "Trilateral Meeting to discuss terrorism", *The Washington Times*, April 6, 2002.
- ⁵ Thomas d'Aquino, "Tribute to David Rockefeller, Honorary Chairman, The Americas Society", On the Occasion of a Presentation to David Rockefeller, Honorary Chairman, Americas Society, during a meeting of the Chairman's International Advisory Council of the Americas Society to Vancouver, June 6, 2002, pp. 1-2, at The Americas Society website, <http://www.americas-society.org>.
- ⁶ Neil L. Rudenstine, "Pitching into Commitments", Remarks in Honor of David Rockefeller, Marshall Award Dinner, New York Public Library, May 17, 1999, in Neil L. Rudenstine, *Pointing Our Thoughts: Reflections on Harvard and Higher Education, 1991-2001*, President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2001, p.217.
- ⁷ Georges Berthoin, Shijuro Ogata, Conrad Black and Henry Kissinger, "Toasts to the Trilateral Commission Founder and Honorary Chairman, David Rockefeller", on the occasion of the US Group's 25th Anniversary Evening, December 1, 1998, at <http://www.trilateral.org>.
- ⁸ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, "Remarks at book signing by David Rockefeller", December 17, 2002, at <http://www.un.org> (emphasis added).
- ⁹ Ted Turner's Remarks, "Presenting The Synergos Institute's Annual Award for Outstanding Leadership in Bridging Divides to David Rockefeller", University for a Night, November 6, 2003, at www.synergos.org.
- ¹⁰ Plenary Remarks by President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, University for a Night, 6 November 2003 at www.synergos.org.
- ¹¹ "Tribute to David Rockefeller", University for a Night, 6 November 2003 at www.synergos.org.
- ¹² David Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, Random House, 2002, p. 405 (emphasis added). When revising Part 3 of "Rockefeller Internationalism" in mid-2003 for publication in *Nexus* magazine, I was surprised to find that despite its immeasurable significance, most NWO researchers seemed to be completely unaware of Rockefeller's admission in *Memoirs*. One of the few exceptions at the time was Richard C. Sizemore, "David Rockefeller: His Memoir Revelations", January 1, 2003, at <http://www.Sanspap.com>. This situation has since changed (see Afterword, below) with over 400 websites now carrying the *Memoirs* quote.
- ¹³ Peter Collier & David Horowitz, *The Rockefellers: An American Dynasty*, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976, p.222.
- ¹⁴ Ron Chernow, *Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr*, Warner Books, 1998, p.661.
- ¹⁵ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, p.4 (emphasis added).
- ¹⁶ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, Simon & Schuster, 1999, p.185.
- ¹⁷ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, pp.94-96.
- ¹⁸ George H. Brown, "Review of David Rockefeller, *Unused Resources and Economic Waste*", *The Journal of Business of the University of Chicago*, April 1943, pp.142-143 (emphasis added).
- ¹⁹ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, pp.98-103.
- ²⁰ *ibid*, p.106.
- ²¹ *ibid*, pp.107-121.
- ²² *ibid*, p.122, 418.
- ²³ Rockefeller, quoted in Chernow, *Titan*, p. 662.
- ²⁴ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, pp.123, 145.
- ²⁵ *ibid*, p.406.
- ²⁶ *ibid*, p.80; and Joseph T. Salerno, "Biography of Gottfried Haberler (1901-1995)", Ludwig von Mises Institute website, <http://www.mises.org>.
- ²⁷ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, pp.89, 91-92; "Jacob Viner, 1892-1970" at The History of Economic Thought website, <http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/>; and Joseph Kraft, "School for Statesmen", *Harper's Magazine*, July 1958, p.67.

- ²⁸ Laurance H. Shoup, "The Council on Foreign Relations and American Policy in Southeast Asia, 1940-1973", *The Insurgent Sociologist*, Winter 1977, p.19; and Priscilla Roberts, "'The Council has been your Creation': Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Paradigm of the American Foreign Policy Establishment?", *Journal of American Studies*, April 2001, p.66.
- ²⁹ Thom Burnett & Alex Games, *Who Really Runs The World? The War Between Globalisation and Democracy*, Collins & Brown, 2005, p.108; and James Perloff, *The Shadows of Power: The Council on Foreign Relations and the American Decline*, Western Islands, 1988, p.82.
- ³⁰ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, pp.406-408.
- ³¹ David Rockefeller, "The Council at 75", September 1997, at the CFR website, <http://www.cfr.org>.
- ³² Hugh Wilford, "CIA Plot, Socialist Conspiracy, or New World Order? The Origins of the Bilderberg Group, 1952-55", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, September 2003, p.74. Though a trivial matter there is some disagreement on the size of that first US contingent. David Rockefeller claims there it was eleven-strong (*Memoirs*, p. 410), while James A. Bill's biography of prominent Bilderberger George Ball claims it had 17 members (*George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy*, Yale University Press, 1997, p.54).
- ³³ Wilford, "Origins of the Bilderberg Group", pp.73-74.
- ³⁴ Bill, *George Ball*, p.53.
- ³⁵ See, for example, Jim Tucker, *Jim Tucker's Bilderberg Diary*, American Free Press, 2005; Mike Peters, "The Bilderberg Group and the project of European unification", *Lobster* 32, December 1996; and Gary Allen & Larry Abraham, *None Dare Call It Conspiracy*, Western Islands, 1971, pp.93-97. Allen and Abraham declare to be a "fact" that the "ultimate goal of the Bilderbergers is a world government"; the Bilderberg role is to "coordinate the efforts of the European and American power elites" in service of this objective (ibid, p.93).
- ³⁶ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, pp.410-411
- ³⁷ Rockefeller, quoted in Bill, *George Ball*, p.54.
- ³⁸ David Rockefeller, quoted in Tony Gosling, "On the Record", www.bilderberg.org, May 2003.
- ³⁹ Healey, quoted in Jon Ronson, *Them: Adventures with Extremists*, Picador, 2001, p.299. It might be argued, though, that Healey would like to present the Bilderbergers as being in accord with his own beliefs rather than an annual conference of more divergent trans-Atlantic opinions. Thus we might consider that Healey has reportedly endorsed turning the UN into "an effective – and genuinely international – organisation", with a larger full-time military headquarters, its own army or "a UN foreign legion", as well as its own intelligence body and more wide-ranging powers to intervene for the purposes of peace "enforcement" (Quoted in Steve Platt, "Global forces", *New Statesman & Society*, June 16, 1995, pp.22-23). In contrast, that avaricious social climber and long-time Bilderberger Conrad Black has repeatedly and publicly rejected the UN route to world harmony. In a speech given in 2003, for example, Black declared: "The United Nations is principally composed of corrupt, failed, despotisms and the suggestion that its opinions can be aggregated into an unappealable world supreme court is bunk" (Lord Conrad Black, "Britain is Right to Stick by America", The 2003 Ruttenberg Lecture, http://www.travelbrochuregraphics.com/extra/2003_ruttenberg_lecture.htm). Clearly, this issue of the notable discrepancy between the image of the Bilderberg as a place of consensus (despite the near impenetrable veil of secrecy) and the reality of significant *public* differences of opinion among its attendees on how the world should be run warrants further investigation.
- ⁴⁰ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, p.486.
- ⁴¹ "Man at the Top", *TIME*, September 7, 1962, p.53.
- ⁴² Quoted in Ferdinand Lundberg, *The Rich and the Super-Rich: A Study in the Power of Money Today*, Lyle Stuart, 1968, p.628.
- ⁴³ ibid, pp.254-255, 610.
- ⁴⁴ Ferdinand Lundberg, *The Rockefeller Syndrome*, Lyle Stuart Inc., 1975, pp.288 & 305.
- ⁴⁵ Thomas R. Dye, *Who's Running America?: The Carter Years*, Prentice-Hall, 1976, p.157.
- ⁴⁶ Moyers, quoted in Larry Abraham, *Call It Conspiracy*, Double A Publications, 1985, p.37.
- ⁴⁷ Robert Eringer, *The Global Manipulators: The Bilderberg Group, The Trilateral Commission – Covert Power Groups of the West*, Pentacle Books, 1980, p.69.
- ⁴⁸ Charlotte Curtis, "The David Rockefeller Touch", *New York Times*, November 8, 1983.
- ⁴⁹ Linda Diebel, "Kissinger's 'truly New World Order'", *Toronto Star*, February 7, 1993.
- ⁵⁰ "David Rockefeller to the Rescue", NewsMax.com, October 16, 1998, <http://www.newsmax.com>.

- ⁵¹ Rockefeller, quoted in Dye, *Who's Running America?*, p.160 (emphasis added).
- ⁵² *ibid*, p.160.
- ⁵³ Tim Parks, "Mad at the Medicis", *New York Review of Books*, May 1, 2003.
- ⁵⁴ Nooreena, Hertz, *I.O.U. The Debt Threat and Why We Must Defuse It*, Fourth Estate, 2004, p.1 (emphasis added).
- ⁵⁵ *ibid*, p.2.
- ⁵⁶ *ibid*, pp.8-9.
- ⁵⁷ Laurence H. Shoup, *The Carter Presidency and Beyond: Power and Politics in the 1980s*, Ramparts Press, 1980, pp.156-157.
- ⁵⁸ *New York Times* quoted in Holly Sklar, "Trilateralism: Managing Dependence and Democracy – An Overview" in H. Sklar, (ed), *Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management*, South End Press, 1980, pp.2-3.
- ⁵⁹ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, p.369.
- ⁶⁰ James D. Wolfensohn, "Council on Foreign Relations Special Symposium in honor of David Rockefeller's 90th Birthday", Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y, May 23, 2005 http://www3.cfr.org/pub8133/james_d_wolfensohn/council_on_foreign_relations_special_symposium_in_honor_of_david_rockefellers_90th_birthday.php (emphasis added).
- ⁶¹ Secretary Colin L. Powell, "Crisis and Opportunity: Realizing the Hopes of the Hemisphere", Remarks to Council of the Americas' 33rd Annual Washington Conference, Washington D.C., April 28, 2003 at US State Department website (emphasis added).
- ⁶² Abraham, *Call It Conspiracy*, p.37 (emphasis added).
- ⁶³ Rockefeller, quoted in Collier and Horowitz, *The Rockefellers*, p.225.
- ⁶⁴ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, p.488.
- ⁶⁵ David Rockefeller, "Giving: America's Greatest National Resource", *Vital Speeches of the Day*, March 15, 1985, p.328 (emphasis added).
- ⁶⁶ David Rockefeller, "America After Downsizing", *Vital Speeches of the Day*, September 12, 1996, p.42 (emphasis added).
- ⁶⁷ Rockefeller, "Giving", pp.330, 331.
- ⁶⁸ Rockefeller, "America After Downsizing", pp.41-42 (emphasis added).
- ⁶⁹ David Rockefeller, quoted in "Man at the Top", *TIME*, September 7, 1962, p.57.
- ⁷⁰ David Rockefeller, "Corporate Capacity for Public Responsibility", *The Business Lawyer*, March 1973, p.53.
- ⁷¹ *ibid*, p.55.
- ⁷² *ibid*, p.57.
- ⁷³ *ibid*, p.58.
- ⁷⁴ Geoffrey de Q. Walker, *Initiative and Referendum: The People's Law*, Centre for Independent Studies, 1987, p.68.
- ⁷⁵ A recent report in the *New York Times* hinted that his true wealth could be understated: "Mr. Rockefeller will not say how much he is worth, but Forbes magazine last year estimated his wealth at \$2.5 billion, and placed him among the 100 wealthiest Americans" (Karen W. Arenson, "Turning 90, a Rockefeller Gives the Presents", *New York Times*, June 9, 2005). In 2002 Rockefeller stated that media estimates that his fortune amounted to \$2.5 billion "aren't terribly far off." An unidentified aide told *USA Today* that the estimates by *Forbes* were "close, give or take a few hundred million" (Quoted in Bob Minzeshimer, "Rockefeller's modest 'Memoirs'", *USA Today*, October 23, 2002).
- ⁷⁶ Dye, *Who's Running America?*, pp.153, 157.
- ⁷⁷ Rockefeller Foundation, *2004 Annual Report*, Rockefeller Foundation 2005, pp.71-72.
- ⁷⁸ Rockefeller Brothers Fund, *2004 Annual Report: Building a just, sustainable, peaceful world*, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc, 2005, p.99.
- ⁷⁹ See "Rockefeller Family Fund" at www.undueinfluence/rockefeller_family_fund.html. According to its own website, the RFF was incorporated in 1967 by Nelson, David, Laurance, John and Martha Rockefeller to provide "a public means for members of the third, fourth, and fifth generations of the Rockefeller family to express their philanthropic concerns" ("About the RFF" at www.rffund.org).

- ⁸⁰ David W. Dunlap, "Trade Center Memorial Getting New Muscle", *New York Times*, January 5, 2005; and John C. Whitehead, *A Life in Leadership: From D-Day to Ground Zero*, New America Books, 2005, p.7.
- ⁸¹ Lundberg, *The Rich and the Super-Rich*, p.620.
- ⁸² Carla Hills, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Riordan Roett and David Rockefeller, *Memoirs: The Rockefeller Family in International Affairs*, Panel discussion on David Rockefeller's new book at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, October 31, 2002.
- ⁸³ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, pp.485-487.
- ⁸⁴ Carla Hills et al., *Memoirs: The Rockefeller Family in International Affairs*, *ibid.*
- ⁸⁵ "Interview with David Rockefeller", *The Charlie Rose Show*, October 21, 2002.
- ⁸⁶ "Interview: David Rockefeller talks about his life as a successful businessman and billionaire, " *CNBC: Special Report With Maria Bartiromo*, 17 November 2003 (emphasis added).
- ⁸⁷ Eringer, *The Global Manipulators*, pp.72-73.
- ⁸⁸ Gary Allen, *The Rockefeller File*, '76 Press, 1976, p.28.
- ⁸⁹ Lundberg, *The Rockefeller Syndrome*, p.293.
- ⁹⁰ "A Wealth of Names", *Forbes*, January 10, 2000 at <http://www.Forbes.com>.
- ⁹¹ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, p.419.
- ⁹² "A Wealth of Names", *Forbes*, January 10, 2000. at <http://www.Forbes.com>
- ⁹³ Rockefeller writes that the "Dartmouth Conference" was "[i]nitiating by Norman Cousins...to improve understanding between the two superpowers through face-to-face meetings and dialogue" (*Memoirs*, p.223). Cousins is better known as one of "the most effective of the new advocates of world government" in the aftermath of World War II. Following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Cousins had written a lengthy editorial in the *Saturday Review of Literature* (which he published) declaring the "need for world government was clear long before August 6, 1945", but since the bombing that need had been "raised...to such dimensions that it can no longer be ignored." His book-length version of that editorial, *Modern Man Is Obsolete* (1945) went through fourteen editions. He subsequently became a leading figure in the United World Federalist organisation. In 1948 Cousins led a delegation to the White House seeking to convince President Truman to set up a commission to investigate strengthening the United Nations; Truman rejected the proposal (Cousins quoted in Lawrence S. Wittner, *One World Or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement Through 1953*, Stanford University Press, 1993, pp.66-67, 270-271). Curiously Rockefeller only describes Cousins as the "publisher of the *Saturday Review*" (*Memoirs*, p.223).
- ⁹⁴ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, pp.225-232.
- ⁹⁵ *ibid.*, pp.272-279.
- ⁹⁶ Alexander M. Haig Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Regan and Foreign Policy*, MacMillan Publishing Company, 1984, p.91. Haig was the first Secretary of State in the Reagan Administration.
- ⁹⁷ "China Always Stands for Developing Constructive and Cooperative Sino-US Relations: Jiang", *People's Daily*, September 29, 2001. It was not their first meeting in Beijing. Rockefeller had met with Jiang in 1998, the Chinese President reportedly calling the plutocrat an "old friend" of the Chinese people. David Rockefeller in turn had praised the China's "tremendous achievements in economic construction", and indicated that its responsible behaviour during the Asian Financial Crisis had "won China credit in the rest of the world" ("Chinese President Meets with Former Head of Chase Manhattan", *People's Daily*, October 23, 1998).
- ⁹⁸ Rockefeller, quoted in Curtis, "David Rockefeller Touch."
- ⁹⁹ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, p.240.
- ¹⁰⁰ Stephen Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp.187, 224.
- ¹⁰¹ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, p.241.
- ¹⁰² Quoted in "Mikhail Gorbachev's Meeting with Representatives of Trilateral Commission", *Ecotass*, February 6, 1989.
- ¹⁰³ Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Yasuhiro Nakasone & Henry Kissinger, "East-West Relations", *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1989, pp. 4-5.
- ¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*, pp.14-15 (emphasis added).
- ¹⁰⁵ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, p.240.

- ¹⁰⁶ John Morrison, *Boris Yeltsin: From Bolshevik to Democrat*, Penguin Books, 1991, pp.92, 98-99.
- ¹⁰⁷ John Cassidy, "Boris in Wonderland", *The Sunday Times*, September 17, 1989.
- ¹⁰⁸ Rockefeller, quoted in Don Oberdorfer, "Yeltsin: Gorbachev Has Year to Prove Self", *Washington Post*, September 12, 1989.
- ¹⁰⁹ Baker and Scowcroft, quoted in Michael Beschloss & Strobe Talbott, *At The Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War*, Warner Books, 1993, pp.104-105.
- ¹¹⁰ Morrison, *Boris Yeltsin*, p.101.
- ¹¹¹ Beschloss & Talbott, *At The Highest Levels*, pp.399, 472.
- ¹¹² *ibid*, p.376.
- ¹¹³ Taking a contrary view, Jim Tucker claims in his *Bilderberg Diary* that at the 1991 Bilderberg meeting in Baden-Baden, Germany, "Rockefeller and Kissinger praised actions by Gorbachev in 1991, whom they coached closely and to whom they had easy access" (p.74). He also claims, without citing any supporting documentation, that in 1989 the Trilateral Commission had "developed a plan whereby Mikhail Gorbachev and some East Bloc countries would initiate 'reforms' demanded by the West in order to make it politically palatable to send tax dollars to prop up the communist system and save it from collapse" (p.59). He does not mention Rockefeller's courting of Yeltsin, nor the explicit strategy of the Trilateral Commission, cited above, to withhold aid until there had been a "radical transformation" of the Communist states. Tucker's account miraculously switches from railing against the Bilderbergers and Trilateral Commission in 1991 for allegedly seeking to use billions of "American tax dollars" to "ensure the survival of the Soviet Union" (p.75), to criticising, in 1992, the "Bilderberg boys" for their plan to "exploit the rich natural resources, cheap land, property and labor in the former Soviet Union" (p.88). Evidently the information Tucker received in 1991 was inaccurate...
- ¹¹⁴ Yeltsin, quoted in Alison Mitchell, "Yeltsin's pitch impresses business leaders in NY", *Dallas Morning News*, February 2, 1992 (excerpted from the *New York Times*).
- ¹¹⁵ "Russian banking reform launched in the US", *Russia Express-Perestroika*, July 6, 1992; and "Russian Forum to include Rockefeller, Vance", Reuters, June 19, 1992.
- ¹¹⁶ Steven Mufson, "Riding Herd On Russia's Reform Effort", *Washington Post*, April 26, 1992.
- ¹¹⁷ Corrigan, quoted in "U.S. power brokers train Russia's army of bankers", *The Pantagraph Bloomington*, May 24, 1993. See also "Russian Bankers Looking West", *New York Times*, July 31, 1993; & "Ripe for reform", *The Banker*, August 17, 1993, p.6.
- ¹¹⁸ Rockefeller, quoted in "Banks Plan Aid Project for Russia", *Portland Oregonian*, June 28, 1992.
- ¹¹⁹ Quotes in "Russia, IMF at odds on oil-price freeing: Yelstin", *Agence France-Presse*, June 27, 1992 (emphasis added). The article does not report any comments made by Rockefeller during the meeting.
- ¹²⁰ Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, Penguin Books, 2002, pp.159-160.
- ¹²¹ John Gray, *False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism*, Granta Books, 1998, pp.147-151.
- ¹²² Rockefeller, quoted in "Yeltsin Courts U.S. Business, Seeks Investment", *Dow Jones News Service*, September 26, 1994.
- ¹²³ Rockefeller, quoted in John Rogers, "Rockefeller urges ending embargo against Vietnam", Reuters News, October 7, 1993.
- ¹²⁴ Quoted in William F. Jasper, "Clinton Sells Out POW/MIAs", *The New American*, March 7, 1994.
- ¹²⁵ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, p.406 (emphasis added)
- ¹²⁶ David Rockefeller, "America's Future: A Question of Strength and Will", *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Spring 1979, p.14
- ¹²⁷ David Rockefeller, "In Pursuit of a Consistent Foreign Policy: The Trilateral Commission", *Vital Speeches of the Day*, June 15, 1980, p.517 (emphasis added).
- ¹²⁸ Rockefeller, "America's Future", p.19
- ¹²⁹ David Rockefeller, quoted in *Business Council for the United Nations Briefing*, Winter 1995, p.1 (emphasis added).
- ¹³⁰ David Rockefeller, *The Council at 75*, September 1997, at the CFR website, <http://www.cfr.org>.
- ¹³¹ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, *ibid*. (emphasis added).
- ¹³² *ibid.*, p.419 (emphasis added).

¹³³ This is a contentious issue. Supporters of the Bush Administration and some opponents—notably the John Birch Society—insist that the invasion was a United Nations-sanctioned operation because UNSC Resolution 678 authorized the use of force if Iraq failed to disarm. Critics, including UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, counter that neither 678 nor any of the other resolutions cited by the Bush Administration gave explicit permission to the US or any other country to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime. For contrasting views on this issue see: Peter Slevin, "U.S. Says War Has Legal Basis", *Washington Post*, March 21, 2003, p.14; Michael O'Hanlon, "Why the war wasn't illegal", *The Washington Times*, September 26, 2004; "Iraq war illegal, says Annan", BBC News, August 16, 2004; and Philippe Sands, *Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules*, Allen Lane, 2005, pp.174-203. For examples of the John Birch Society's explanation on why the invasion of Iraq should be seen as a pro-UN and UN-authorized operation see: William Norman Grigg, "Should America Go to War?", *The New American*, October 21, 2002; William Norman Grigg, "Same Ends, Different Means", *The New American*, March 24, 2003; and John F. McManus, "U.S. Defenders or UN Enforcers?", *The New American*, May 30, 2005, esp, p.17.

¹³⁴ In the lead up to the war leading neo-con groupie (and also a Trilateralist and Bilderberger) Richard Perle, then chairman of the Defense Policy Board, cheerily predicted that: "What will die in Iraq is the fantasy of the United Nations as the foundation of a new world order" (Richard Perle, "United they fall", *The Spectator*, March 22, 2003, p.22). Later that same year Perle reportedly admitted that the invasion of Iraq had been illegal under international law. "I think in this case international law stood in the way of doing the right thing", Perle told an audience in London, "International law...would have required us to leave Saddam Hussein alone" (Quoted in Shaheen Chughtai, "US hawk admits Iraq war 'illegal'", *Aljazeera.net*, November 21, 2003).

¹³⁵ For evidence of Cheney's concerted opposition to the UN route, primarily on the grounds that it would mire the US in endless debates thus delaying action, see Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, Simon & Schuster, 2004, pp.153, 157, 163, 174-176.

¹³⁶ Rockefeller, quoted in Michael E. Kanell, "David Rockefeller still leads a public life", *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, November 14, 2003 (emphasis added).

¹³⁷ See Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, 300-302.

¹³⁸ Rockefeller, quoted in David Chaffee, "A life of Rockefeller achievement", *The Washington Times*, January 10, 2003 (emphasis added).

¹³⁹ David Rockefeller, "Problems, Perspectives and Responsibilities", *Vital Speeches of the Day*, April 1, 1977, p.359.

¹⁴⁰ David Rockefeller, "Remarks to the Energy Conference", *Houston Law Review*, July 1980, p.959 (emphasis added).

¹⁴¹ *ibid*, pp.955-958.

¹⁴² In fact, since 2001 imported oil now accounts for over 55 percent of America's petroleum consumption, compared to 30 percent in 1973, and it is projected by the US Department of Energy that this will increase to 70 percent in 2025 (Michael Klare, *Blood and Oil: How America's Thirst for Petrol is Killing Us*, Hamish Hamilton, 2004, pp.13, 18).

¹⁴³ Carter and Kingston quoted in Andrew Bacevich, "The Real World War IV", *The Wilson Quarterly*, Winter 2005, pp.43-44.

¹⁴⁴ Anthony Sampson, *The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Made*, Coronet Books, 1975, p.218.

¹⁴⁵ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, p.285.

¹⁴⁶ Irving Kristol, "Where Have All the Gunboats Gone?", *Wall Street Journal*, December 13, 1973, quoted in Noam Chomsky, *Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There*, Pantheon Books, 1982, p.427.

¹⁴⁷ Robert W. Tucker, "Oil: The Issue of American Intervention", *Commentary*, January 1975, p.22. For analysts of the Bush Administration's disastrous imperial foray into Iraq there is much food for thought in this article as Tucker seems to anticipate many of the concerns, (mistaken) assumptions and the probable motives of the architects of the 2003 invasion. For example, Tucker observes that US intervention in the Persian Gulf would also "clearly...markedly improve" the position of Israel (p.29); and makes the optimistic prediction that as a "worst-case assumption" the US would be "deprived of oil from the occupied area not for eight or nine months, but for three or four months and possibly less" (p.26). Tucker also muses that "we simply do not know what would bring the public to support intervention in the Persian Gulf" (p.29) and describes as "well founded" the assumption that a US invasion of the Persian Gulf would have to be undertaken "unilaterally and...in the face of condemnation by most of the world" (p.27). In fact, there may be a case to be made that Tucker's scholarly affront, along with Kristol's belligerent proposal, formed the "intellectual" origins of the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq.

¹⁴⁸ Earl Ravenal, "The Oil Grab Scenario", *The New Republic*, January 18, 1975, p.16; and James Akins, quoted in Eliot Marshall, "Oiling the Way for Higher Petroleum Prices", *The New Republic*, August 16 & 23, 1975, p.24. Akins, a State Department official who later became US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia in 1973, had advocated accommodating OPEC's

- demands in an article in *Foreign Affairs* (April 1973); proposals that were "becoming US policy" in 1975, according to one pundit (*ibid.*, p.2).
- ¹⁴⁹ Bacevich, "The Real World War IV", p.52.
- ¹⁵⁰ David Rockefeller, "Facing Up to the Hard Facts of Inflation", *Vital Speeches of the Day*, November 15, 1980, p.76
- ¹⁵¹ David Rockefeller, "Multinationals Under Siege: A Threat to the World Economy", *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Fall 1975, pp.313-314, 321.
- ¹⁵² *ibid.*, pp. 322 (emphasis added).
- ¹⁵³ David Rockefeller, "International Financial Challenges", *Vital Speeches of the Day*, November 15, 1969, p.85.
- ¹⁵⁴ *ibid.*, p.86 (emphasis added).
- ¹⁵⁵ David Rockefeller, quoted in Richard J. Barnet & Ronald E. Muller, *Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations*, Simon & Schuster, 1974, pp.20, 21.
- ¹⁵⁶ Linen, quoted in John Pilger, *The New Rulers of the World*, Verso, 2002, pp.37-49.
- ¹⁵⁷ Linda Diebel, "Mexico's fire sale", *Toronto Star*, December 18, 1995 (emphasis added).
- ¹⁵⁸ Don C. Becker, "Publisher's Notebook", *The Journal of Commerce*, October 5, 1994, p.8A.
- ¹⁵⁹ David Rockefeller, "The World Monetary System: A Pattern for the Future" (December 16, 1971), in *The Empire Club of Canada Speeches 1971-1972*, The Empire Club Foundation, 1972.
- ¹⁶⁰ David Rockefeller, quoted in Anthony Sampson, *The Money Lenders*, Viking Press, 1981, p.188.
- ¹⁶¹ Rockefeller, "Multinationals Under Siege", pp.312-313.
- ¹⁶² David Rockefeller, quoted in Kurt Eichenwald, "Many Business Leaders Enthusiastic About Pact", *New York Times*, October 5, 1987 (emphasis added).
- ¹⁶³ David Rockefeller, quoted in Steven Mufson, "Industrial Nations Long on Rhetoric, Short on Action; U.S., European Community Waffle on Free-Trade Rules", *Washington Post*, April 24, 1992.
- ¹⁶⁴ Walter Russell Mead, "Bushism, Found", *Harper's Magazine*, September 1992, p.38.
- ¹⁶⁵ Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance*, Oxford University Press, 1995, p.167.
- ¹⁶⁶ Joel Bakan, *The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power*, Constable, 2004, pp.23, 25. Bakan is a co-creator of the documentary of the same name released in 2004.
- ¹⁶⁷ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, p.406.
- ¹⁶⁸ David Rockefeller, quoted in Mikio Haruna, "Nationalism threat to free trade, says Rockefeller", **Japan Economic Newswire**, January 1, 1995 (emphasis added).
- ¹⁶⁹ Rockefeller, quoted in David Crane, "U.S. policies under fire; Helms-Burton law slammed by Rockefeller", *Toronto Star*, September 30, 1997.
- ¹⁷⁰ Paul Knox, "World Buzz: Rockefeller: a whisper from the past", *The Globe & Mail*, October 1, 1997.
- ¹⁷¹ David Rockefeller, "Give Clinton Fast Track, Or We'll Pay the Price", *New York Times*, November 7, 1997 (emphasis added).
- ¹⁷² Brian M. Riedl & John E. Frydenlund, "At the Federal Trough: Farm Subsidies for the Rich and Famous", *Heritage Foundation Background* #1505, November 26, 2001, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Agriculture/BG1505.cfm>.
- ¹⁷³ Brian Riedl, "Still at the Federal Trough: Farm Subsidies for the Rich and Famous Shattered Records in 2001", *Heritage Foundation Background* #1542, April 30, 2002 <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Agriculture/BG1542.cfm>.
- ¹⁷⁴ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, p.92.
- ¹⁷⁵ David Rockefeller, "The Values By Which We Live", *Vital Speeches of the Day*, December 1, 1979, p.108.
- ¹⁷⁶ David Rockefeller & Akio Morita, "Capitalism East and West: A Dialogue", *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Winter 1992 at www.npq.org/issues/v91/p34.html.
- ¹⁷⁷ Rockefeller Brothers Fund, *Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports*, Doubleday & Co, 1961, pp.160, 228-229.

- ¹⁷⁸ David Rockefeller, "What Private Enterprise Means to Latin America", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1966, pp.410-411 (emphasis added).
- ¹⁷⁹ Ken Rose, *Select Rockefeller Philanthropies*, Rockefeller Archive Center, Undated, p.15.
- ¹⁸⁰ Council of the Americas, *2000 Annual Report*, Council of the Americas, 2001, p.4 (emphasis added).
- ¹⁸¹ David Rockefeller, "A Hemisphere in the Balance", *Wall Street Journal*, October 1, 1993, p.A10.
- ¹⁸² Rockefeller, "What Private Enterprise Means to Latin America", p. 402; and David Rockefeller, "The US Business Image in Latin America", *Vital Speeches of the Day*, October 15, 1964, p.8.
- ¹⁸³ Apparently at Kennedy's "express request", in 1963 David Rockefeller had set up the Business Group for Latin America (a precursor to the Council of the Americas), a coalition of American corporations which had, amongst other activities, provided covert financial support to the anti-Communist Chilean presidential candidate, Eduardo Frei, in 1964 (Seymour M. Hersh, *Kissinger: The Price of Power – Henry Kissinger in the Nixon White House*, Faber & Faber, 1983, p.260).
- ¹⁸⁴ Robert Dallek, *John F. Kennedy: An Unfinished Life*, Penguin Books, 2003, pp.340-341.
- ¹⁸⁵ Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan*, Columbia University Press, 1983,156.
- ¹⁸⁶ David Rockefeller, "The U.S. Role in Latin America" (April 23, 1963), in *The Economic Club of Chicago: History's Witnesses 1927-2002*, Economic Club of Chicago, 2002, p.85.
- ¹⁸⁷ Emilio G. Collado, David Rockefeller & Walter B. Wriston, "A Reappraisal of the Alliance for Progress", *The International Executive*, Spring 1963, pp.24-25. Collado was also a member of the Bilderberg Steering Committee (Allen & Abraham, *None Dare Call It Conspiracy*, p.94).
- ¹⁸⁸ Rockefeller *Memoirs*, pp.431-434.
- ¹⁸⁹ The contempt was long-standing. When considering whether to appoint Nelson or David to his cabinet after winning office, Nixon reportedly grumbled that he did not know "why there even has to be *one* Rockefeller" (quoted in Collier & Horowitz, *The Rockefellers*, p.406).
- ¹⁹⁰ According to Nelson's former speechwriter, Joseph Persico, "Richard Nixon...barely raised a finger to implement the Rockefeller recommendations", though Nelson had decided it was not Nixon's fault, but his own for failing to "infect his friend Henry Kissinger with his own passion for Latin America; and Henry was now largely shaping the Nixon foreign policy" (Persico, *The Imperial Rockefeller: A Biography of Nelson Rockefeller*, Simon & Schuster, 1982, p.106). David Rockefeller, in contrast, seemed to have much greater success in deploying Kissinger in support of the Latin American cause.
- ¹⁹¹ *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, November 1970, p.760. *The Rockefeller Report on the Americas* also endorsed giving the Organisation of American States "increased authority and [an] expanded structure" (p.153) and creating a "Western Hemisphere Security Council" to oversee security issues in the region (quoted in *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, April 1970, p.307).
- ¹⁹² Rockefeller *Memoirs*, pp.431-434.
- ¹⁹³ *Ibid*, pp.434-435.
- ¹⁹⁴ William Finnegan, "The Economics of Empire: Notes on the Washington Consensus", *Harper's Magazine*, May 2003, pp.43, 46-48.
- ¹⁹⁵ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, p.441.
- ¹⁹⁶ *ibid*, pp.436-437.
- ¹⁹⁷ Edwin A. Finn Jr., "The Rockefeller Congress (David Rockefeller's Philanthropy in Latin America)", *Forbes*, October 30, 1989.
- ¹⁹⁸ Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, pp.436-437.
- ¹⁹⁹ Rockefeller, "A Hemisphere in the Balance", p.A10.
- ²⁰⁰ Jim McTague, "Media Sit Out Rockefeller's Free-Trade Fest Series", *American Banker*, April 27, 1992 (emphasis added).
- ²⁰¹ David Rockefeller, quoted in, "North American free trade talks", *Mexico Business Monthly*, August 1, 1992 (emphasis added).
- ²⁰² *ibid* (emphasis added).

- ²⁰³ David Rockefeller, quoted in Linda Diebel, "New trade deal called 'job plan for Mexico'", *Toronto Star*, August 13, 1992 (emphasis added).
- ²⁰⁴ David Rockefeller, quoted in James Brooke, "Latin America's Regional Trade Boon", *New York Times*, February 15, 1993 (emphasis added).
- ²⁰⁵ Andrew J. Glass, "Clinton Crew Tacks Away From Port", *The Plain Dealer* (Cleveland), September 5, 1993.
- ²⁰⁶ Linda Diebel, "Kissinger's 'truly New World Order'", *Toronto Star*, February 7, 1993.
- ²⁰⁷ Rockefeller, "A Hemisphere in the Balance", p.A10.
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- ⁴⁰³ Diana B. Henriques, "Untypically, a Rockefeller Tells the Story of His Life", *New York Times*, October 23, 2002.
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⁴⁰⁵ Gary North, "My Conspiracy Is Bigger Than Your Conspiracy!", LewRockwell.com, January 26, 2006.

⁴⁰⁶ Stephanie Strom, "Last of the Big-Time Rockefellers", *New York Times*, December 10, 1995 (emphasis added; including Rockefeller quotes).

⁴⁰⁷ Carla Hills, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Riordan Roett, and David Rockefeller, *Memoirs: The Rockefeller Family in International Affairs*, Panel discussion on David Rockefeller's new book at the School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, October 31, 2002.

⁴⁰⁸ *Lectures Francaises* is identified as the ultimate source of the quote in Des Griffin, *Fourth Reich of the Rich*, Emissary Publications, 1995 Edition, p.130; and William F. Jasper, "European Nightmare", *The New American*, March 1, 1999.

⁴⁰⁹ There is no mention of Rockefeller's alleged speech in the chapter on the Baden-Baden meeting in *Jim Tucker's Bilderberg Diary*, pp.71-81.

⁴¹⁰ "New World Order Terrorist by David Rockefeller", with Vofux Comment annotation, at Voxfux website, [www.voxfux.com/articles\(close\)/00000042.htm](http://www.voxfux.com/articles(close)/00000042.htm) (emphasis added).

⁴¹¹ See for example Dr Edward G.v. Englebart's somewhat incoherent effort "The Betrayal of America (Chapter One) Anatomy of a Covert Pro-Terrorism Agenda" (October 28, 2005 with updates), at www.acsa.net. Englebart describes Rockefeller as being "at once both enigma and the embodiment of suspected evil on a par with Genghis Khan and Attila the Hun, in fact, far, far overshadowing them" and seems particularly offended by Rockefeller's apparent dental ill-health and the exorbitant price of his business suits. As for Englebart's more serious allegations against Rockefeller, he makes no attempt to provide supporting documentation, thus fatally undermining whatever impact his tome hopes to have.