NUMBERS ARE PEOPLE COCK-UP BEFORE CONSPIRACY • CITE PRIMARY SOURCES OR GO HOME


Showing posts with label public investment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label public investment. Show all posts

Tuesday, 10 November 2015

WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT GREEK PRIVATE EDUCATION

In the early years of the Greek crisis, I used to feel a stirring of guilty pleasure when foreign media were forced to take deep dives into Greek politics. I would imagine young journos doing their meticulous research with a smug look on their faces and then suddenly being hit with a depressing realisation: "wow, this story goes so deep and so far back; I don't know who to trust; and every policy decision past or present hurts someone! - is that how it feels to be Greek?"

I rarely feel this way anymore, but the Economist's recent piece on Greek private education brought it all back for a moment.

VAT on Private Education: the story so far

As readers may know, in the aftermath of its capitulation in July and as details of the Third Memorandum were being ironed out with the Troika Institutions Quadriga, the Greek government found itself looking for alternatives to a VAT hike on beef. This idea, nominally popular with creditors, had run into stiff opposition within the ruling party, and speculation persists that pressure was being applied on the government by the French, eager to protect their beef exports (context here and here).

The Greek counter-proposal was to raise VAT on private education to an eye-watering 23%, and the story offered to the electorate at the time - that this was a specific demand from Greece's creditors - turned out to be a lie. On 'discovering' this in September, Syriza (now campaigning for re-election) pledged to reverse the measure if re-elected. However, on returning to power, they found little to offer the creditors in return and mooted a counterproposal for a three-tier VAT regime (0% for primary and pre-primary, 6% for vocational and cramming schools and 13% for private secondary schools). Unfortunately, the three-tier proposal was illegal. The VAT Directive lists services to which a two-or three-tier VAT regime may apply but this does not include education (for the entire context, read Articles 98, 132-133 and Annex III here). Effectively, the Greek government has only ever had a choice between applying a full VAT rate or a zero VAT rate to all private education.

With opposition to the VAT hike growing, and a number of private schools already in significant difficulty as a result, the Greek government will now, perhaps more appropriately, raise equivalent from gambling instead. Turns out the owners of newly-privatised OPAP aren't as good at lobbying as private schools, or maybe they did their lobbying too early.

Unfortunately, too little actual evidence was used in debating this issue; which is a shame because the facts on the ground tell us a fascinating (and often tragic) story about Greek society and how it's coping with the crisis.

An objection in principle

Before I go into the statistics, I need to clarify one thing: I believe that true education should not be taxed, and definitely shouldn't be subject to VAT of all taxes. Education, whether private or public, is not consumption; it is an investment. The time to tax is is when the human capital it creates starts generating income. There is a significant debate about how good the returns on investment in education are and whether any of the mechanisms that we assume produce its returns actually work (see this gem from Pseudoerasmus for example), but there is no doubting the purpose of most such spending; it is an investment in human capital.

I say most because not all spending with education providers purchases education as such. Parents may eg pay a premium for kids to be looked after a little while longer while they're at work. This extra schooling might build no human capital, but instead simply buy employers and employees additional flexibility. Rich parents might pay for access to a social elite - an investment in social capital but also (in less meritocratic societies) in future economic rents - which many libertarians would happily agree should be taxed. Parents afraid of the stiff competition their kids will face in getting into university or finding a job market may be paying for teaching-to-the-test even though they know it does not build human capital; as a kind of insurance for their children.

How education spending should be taxed or subsidised, whether it is investment or consumption, and whether it ought to be promoted or suppressed through better co-ordination really depends on these questions. It is perhaps natural for the ideological Left (whatever's left of it in Syriza) to despise private provision of a public good. However it's also worth bearing in mind a historical irony: in Greece's modern history, the expulson and, later, exclusion of teachers with open communist sympathies from public schools contributed strongly to building the supply of private tuition; this may also help explain its ability to specialise in serving lower-income groups.

How many Greek households use private education anyway?

The obvious starting point is the actual share of pupils enrolled in private education. 'Private education' is a very wide term, so it helps to speak more precisely by level of education, and to distinguish between provision in private schools and tuition in private institutions such as frontistiria, or by private tutors. Each of these sectors is a whole different kettle of fish, and taxability varies. Private one-on-one tutoring in particular can go underground in the blink of an eye - good luck collecting VAT on that.

About 7% of Greek pre-primary and primary school pupils go to private schools (see p 416 here or raw data here). The percentage falls as children grow, from 5% in lower secondary (gymnasio) to 4% in upper secondary (lykeio). By most countries' standards this is actually a small share of the population - only three OECD countries have (marginally) less privatised education systems. On last count (2012) there were ca 75,500 pupils in Greek private schools excluding nurseries and pre-schools (on which more details will follow), and an additional 11,500 in the latter.

Not only is the Greek private school population small in relative terms, it's also not growing; in fact (again, excluding nurseries) it peaked in 2003 and has fallen relatively consistently over the years, both in absolute numbers and as a share of the pupil population. Demand for upper secondary schools is positively falling in the long term. Overall, the private school population was down 12% from its peak even in 2007, and down 18% in 2012. This suggests to me that, all other arguments aside, private school fees make for a rather poor tax base, unless they are somehow a fantastic proxy for undeclared income (which I expect they are not).


But schools are not the only kind of private education out there. Private foreign language tuition is common. Over half a million Greek children were enrolled in 6,500 language schools as of 2013 - roughly one in three Greek children in education of any kind.

Then there is private tuition across a range of academic subjects, whether remedial or as a top-up for students cramming ahead of their final exams. PISA findings reveal that the majority of Greek secondary school pupils attended private lessons outside school in 2012 - 56% in the case of mathematics, though fewer when it came to other subjects. That might sound like a lot but the equivalent figure was 74% in 2009 and 2006; clearly parents cut down during the crisis. Possibly because of this, the overlap between different kinds of private lessons isn't as big as one might think. If you can get hold of the raw PISA 2012 data (I did) you can combine these figures to reveal that 72% of Greek high school kids had private lessons of some kind or other in 2012.

Shockingly, this included 69% of Greek kids in single-parent households. This is shocking because half of all single-parent households in Greece were, by that time, struggling to afford food. Let me repeat this in case it did not penetrate; in 2012 a good percentage of Greek single parents (38%, if you assume single parents have on average as many kids as two-parent households) were to some extent willing to prioritise paying for private lessons over food. One does not do this sort of thing on a whim; these people were no doubt convinced that private lessons were crucial if their children were to have any hope of getting out of poverty.

What about primary education?

There is one type of private education that is in particular demand among Greece's lower middle class: private nurseries, primary schools and pre-schools. As already demonstrated, the percentage of pre-primary school children going to private institutions doubled during the peak of the crisis (2011-12). As early as 2010, spending on primary and pre-primary education was already shooting up among the top 20% highest-earning households.

This is due to a combination of push and pull factors. The crisis forced more Greek women to become economically active, most of them working part time or only occasionally (on which much more detail here). This added, over exactly the years of the pre-primary boom, between 3 and 4 hours of childcare per week for the average household. This increase did not come from existing users taking on more hours, but from more families leaving their kids (especially those under 3) with nurseries. An even more important factor was the pilot operation of 801 all-day schools (see p 40 here) supported by EU structural funds. The pilot was meant to have a demonstration effect, with the Greek government taking over the cost of the scheme once it was convinced of its practicability and benefits. It did not, and the private primary education boom proved to be short-lived - in fact since 2012 the numbers have been slowly reverting back to normal as fewer and fewer people can afford nurseries, or alternatively fewer women can find part-time work.

Is it true that private schooling makes up for failings in the educational system?

There are two ways to approach this question. One is a matter of efficiency, as assessed by Koutsampelas (2015). I cite this study with apologies to the authors, who clearly are still working on the paper and don't want it used as is by other researchers until it has been finalised. They find [...] household willingness to pay €2,182 (annually, in 2009 prices) in 2009 and 2,517 (annually, in 2013 prices) in 2013 per school-age child for substituting state for private education. The corresponding figures for government cost per school-age child is €4,33915 and€ 3,70716 or 2009 and 2013 respectively, suggesting that from the consumers’ point of view the public provision of education in Greece might be inefficient.

You can check Koutsampelas' sums here. If you combine Eurostat's data with the OECD's figures on pupil numbers, the result is ca EUR3600 per pupil for primary and pre-primary and EUR4400 per pupil for secondary school as of 2012. Of course these figures are down from a peak of EUR4100 and EUR5600 respectively in 2009 and, assuming no change in pupil numbers in 2013, they would be 3300 and 3900 respectively.

The second way is to ask whether private school pupils do better than their state-educated peers, and why. The OECD's PISA assessment finds a persistent, statistically significant difference across all areas, with private schools performing better. However, the PISA 2009 assessment also found that, once the effects of pupils' social backgrounds, school independence and competition for pupils are taken into account, private school pupils actually do marginally worse. Adding 'independence' to the mix is not trivial though. Greek schools have probably the least discretion in deciding on their own curricula in the developed world (see IV.4.2. here).

Then there is the question of whether private out-of-school tuition makes up for failings of public schools specifically as opposed to those of the educational system. The answer is likely to be no. Going back to the PISA 2012 data, you can see that pupils in private schools still use private tutoring as much as public school students. When it comes to non-traditional subjects (ie not language, science or mathematics) they arguably use more private tuition.

UPDATE 15/11: PISA 2012 included three trick questions, in which pupils were invited to rate their familiarity with the made-up concepts of "proper numbers"; "declarative functions"; and "subjunctive scaling." Only ca. 3% of Greek pupils claimed to understand all three concepts well, but about 37% claimed at least some familiarity with all of them. This isn't bad by international standards. However, what is really interesting is the correlation between such 'overclaiming' and out-of-school tuition. Greek pupils that received out-of-school tuition in mathematics in 2012 were significantly more likely to over-claim (ca a quarter of a s.d.), and pupils that received 6 hours of out-of-school tuition per week or more were even more so - a full s.d above average. It could be reflex: when taught to the test, a pupil knows it's best to try some answer and show familiarity than none at all. It could be psychological pressure; a child taught on the insistence of parents may be eager to please. Or it could be confusion: a child desperate to keep track of new concepts may genuinely feel one is vaguely familiar, even if it is not.




Do poorer Greeks use private education?

The latest data we have suggest that, in 2010, and among Greek two-parent families with children, education made up ca. 5% of consumption spending. Among single parents, this went up to 10%. This generally includes all spending on education; books tend to be free but a wide range of accessories are not. Even so, private schools and tutoring are likely the major driver.

Eurostat doesn't break these figures up by income bracket and household composition at once, but there is a breakdown by income quintiles across the whole population here. This suggests that the top 20% of households by income spent 2.3 times as much on education as the bottom 20% in 2010 - but the differences are greatest for pre-primary and primary education, where the top 20% spent 6x as much. So we know that private education spending is skewed towards higher incomes - but is it the top end of the distribution driving this or the bottom end?

PISA confirms that private schooling in Greece is skewed towards higher incomes - more so than other countries, but suggests that this is mostly due to the exclusion of the very poor, not exclusivity to the privileged (see fig. 2.1 and 4.2 here). Private lessons and cram schools are, as we saw, widely used by lower income families and even charitable shadow education is becoming increasingly common. But again this is a story of the very poor missing out on a near-necessity, not the well-off enjoying a luxury: on PISA's standardised socio-economic status index non-users score a very significant 0.4 of a standard deviation lower than users.*

It's worth noting that Greek society is changing rapidly during the crisis. The findings of Koutsampelas (2015) suggests that Greek state schools are now receiving an influx of children from newly-poor, once middle-class families. This group dominates the flow out of private education to such an extent that the progressiveness of public education spending has actually increased during the crisis even though the class composition of state schools has widened to include better-off people.
The downside of this is that the government has rarely been able to budget for the increased demand for public schooling, leading to widespread teacher shortages and putting the Greek education budget under further pressure.

Epilogue

In Greece, attendance of private schools is rare, and falling. In fact, the crisis has pushed previously middle-class families into state education, leading to mass teacher shortages. Use of private daycare is more common and an important, if dysfunctional, contributor to labour market flexibility. But private lessons, cram schools and tutoring are extremely common, even though they too have taken a hit during the crisis. There is no suggestion that private tutoring in Greece is economically efficient; it is a bad, path-dependent solution to a poor education system. Because of this function, it's also a desperate necessity. Private schooling, on the other hand, is efficient up to a point; it does not make up for failings in public schools as such, simply for the lack of school autonomy and choice in the educational system as a whole.

The cases of private nurseries and of single parents using private tuition make me think of all the times critics have told me to put 'people over numbers' and check my figures against their (sometimes atypical, and almost always second-hand) slice-of-life anecdotes. The numbers are people, guys. The numbers are always people. Telling their story well is the same art as that of putting a tearful first-hand account into context. And if you can't be bothered to do the one, you probably can't do the other correctly either.


* [Bear in mind, PISA's index is a composite, and uses posessions, immigrant status, parents' jobs and parents' education to create a status proxy; this means it is not as variable as family income - if neither parent has become unemployed it is likely that a child's PISA status will not have changed throughout the crisis.]


PS: What if private schools do not confer an advantage after accounting for socio-economic status?

I can't know without running the OECD's regression whether school independence makes more of a difference ot the private/public performance gap than socio-economic status. But what if its impact turns out to be negligible? What would that mean? I have three pet theories.

1. Some of the Greek private school system may not be in the business of producing 'education'. It may be efficient in terms of meeting parents' actual requirements, which may not match a reasonable person's idea of 'good education.' Parents may be willing to spend money in order to ensure their kids are supervised while they work long hours; or are allowed to coast or get away with poor conduct; or are spared from mixing with 'the wrong sort' or have a chance to make their way into the elite.

2. Demand for private schooling could be compensating specifically, but inefficiently, for the lack of independence and competition among state schools. Parents may be willing to pay for a more tailored curriculum, or for non-mainstream teaching methods. This tailoring, however, may be inefficient because of Greece's fragmented geography and relative scarcity of children - which means that parents can rarely find exactly the 'alternative' education they need, and the schools may themselves struggle to find the specialist labour that they need. In other cases, parents with a demand for tailored schooling may genuinely want a good education but have preferences as to what this entails that don't prioritise academic achievement (eg they might want an education that provides religious indoctrination; or an environment that nurtures creativity).

3. Greek private schools may, by virtue of being private, have access to inferior inputs. If people who train as teachers in Greece value secure jobs more than marginal differences in pay and are willing to wait and/or relocate to get such jobs, they might prefer to pass up offers from private schools, especially if they are highly qualified on paper. Similarly, people moving into teaching (or a specific kind of teaching) after switching careers out of necessity may also be more likely to go into private schools for similar reasons. Parental effort is also an input. Parents who opt for private schooling because it helps them trade off money for working time may have less time to devote to supervising or encouraging learning.

Friday, 12 November 2010

I DAREZ PAUL MUPPET KRUGMAN TO DEBATE TEH AUSTRIAN THEORY

This post is copied from Jeff Harding's post on The Daily Capitalist. I have matched Jeff's pledge and would urge you to do the same. At best, my guy loses and we help feed some hungry people over in NY. At worst, Paul MUPPET Krugman gets his ass handed to him in a symbolic defeat of Keynesian MUPPET running dogs the world over AND we help feed some hungry people over in NY. I'm happy either way.


========================================



I Dare Paul Krugman To Debate Austrian Theory

UPDATED
How much would it be worth to you to see arch-Keynesian Paul Krugman debate a top-notch Austrian theory economist on business cycle theory?
Krugman has prattled for years about Austrian theory being a flawed dead-end of economics. My guess he has never read anything by Mises, Hayek, or Rothbard, the greatest scholars of the Austrian School. He doesn’t understand it in any way; I have read his critiques and they are uninformed.
Robert Murphy, one of the bright young lights of Austrian theory economics, has challenged Krugman to a debate. Now let me say others have tried to draw Krugman out, but he won’t do it. Murphy, who got his Ph.D at NYU, has made an offer of debate that Krugman will be hard pressed to refuse. Here’s the challenge:
When Krugman agrees to debate Murphy at the Mises Institute, $100,000 will be donated to the Fresh Food Program of FoodBankNYC.org, a non-profit dedicated to feeding the hungry of NYC .
Murphy is soliciting donations for the debate through The Point, a web site that hosts campaigns. Launched only 4 days ago, they already have raised $22,000 $28,000 $32,000 57,165. I just pledged $100. If Krugman doesn’t accept the challenge, I will not be charged. If he does, I get a charitable donation deduction to the Food Bank of NYC.
Click the banner below to donate. Please join me. This will be money very well spent.



Badges

UPDATE: Murphy has put up this video of himself prepping for the Krugman debate:



Can you imagine a Keynesian High Priest taking himself this seriously?

Friday, 22 October 2010

Live blogging the LSE Hellenic Observatory Fiscal Policy Conference

*****

Owsiak: change in public debt in Poland unrelated to GDP growth. This is meant to be Laffer-bashing. 75% of Polish state spending is non-discretionary, cannot be cut or re-allocated.

Options? Must review social model. What will be provided by the state? This must be resolved through a Swedish-type social pact. Tax must be reviewed, seen as an investment.

Sure Prof. I'll see tax as an investment when it finances investment. Right now it finances consumption - read your own slides.

Two conditions for social pact: One transparency. Who pays what, for what. And two: imrpoved management: how many civil servants?

Greece's problem also a problem for Poland. Society never knows what public finances really look like.

*****

Prof. Owsiak of the U. Cracow correctly notes an irrational approach to public finances, but says soaring budget deficits due to 'neoliberal' approach to tax as barrier to growth, tax competition by new member states, tolerance of tax avoidance.

Owsiak: time to concentrate on revenue side. Laffer curve does not work.

*****

Back from coffee break: FONDAFIP speaker comments that France is a public spending champion among the EU or OECD nation.

Reformed public finance in 2001, implemented in 2006, including a new 'peformance-centred' rationaly.

FR tries to deliver maximum spending forecasts, has a new comprehensive review cycle and a new 'multi-year planning law'.

*****

Q&A;

On role of external auditors, independence of government audit office: there are provisions in the law and efforts to establish a system of internal audit in finmin plus a new directorate to deal with GAO auditing. Gosh sounds pointless.

On moral hazard and government incentives in a world of easy debt and EU money and how to not return to these: Big political obstacles and vague gestures. Tax admin needs to be more autonomous from politicians, departure from partisanship. Some posts are goldmines, people lobby and fight for these.

On bank of Greece monitoring and why no one listened: Question dismissed with shared snickers with Christodoulakis about how the BoG wants to make recommendations to everyone but never wants to reform itself, like all central banks. Answer the question man.

*****

Rapanos: Greek tax offices extremely numerous by oecd standards for clientelist reasons. Tax officers have enormous discretion and can only be transferred with the minister's personal approval. A dd to this frequent tax amnesties destroying credibility and huge backlog of 150,000 tax court cases pending, no dispute reoslution mechanism - a recipe for corruption.

*****

Greek budget has 14,000 items - 6,000 to 7,000 transfers between them annually, each requiring approval.

LOL
- but new law will ban transfers and give more power of control to parliament.

Still now explicit national fiscal rules and lack of commitment, no external auditors (expect hospitals and municipalities I think)

Accrual accounting only on the revenue side.

*****

Rapanos - too much opacity. None or rudimental budgeting in General Gov't despite huge amount of money. Parliament is a rubber-stamp mechanism. The executive has all power on fiscal policy.

Greece needs huge improvement to institution and ex-post auditing, not just on a legalistic basis (e.g. 'Is money spent according to law?' Is pointless. Is it spent correctly and as budgeted?)

Also a need for efficiency measures beyond eu-funded projects.

Finmin control - too little accountability elsewhere. (See earlier note on new budget law)

*****

Rapanos - Greece GDP forecasts optimistic (plus 0.35 percentage points). OECD and EU also over-optimistic.

Even conservatives like the IMF used rosy projections for our fiscal measures.

Sounds like yomamanomocs but he has a point. Everyone was asleep at the wheel.

*****

Rapanos: takes 3 years for preliminary budgeted deficit estimates to be evaluated. Deviations are substantial - targets never met. We're getting revenues wrong consistently since Euro accession, revising downwards.

And that's just Central Gov't - none on local Gov't

*****

Rapanos: Greece missing numerical fiscal rules,independent fiscl councils, medium-term budget framework, budgetary procedures

****

Rapanos is on now - the Chair of NBG. Says commentators misunderstand the Greek fiscal institutionl framework - which is a) crucial and b) missing.

*****

Christodoulakis hails Greece's latest bond issue. Ooh. We're getting cocky.


*****

Greek finmin has sent ms Drosou, hardly an operator. She rolls out the usual blurb and celebrates the new Organic Budget law requiring Greek ministries to have a CFO and take responsibility for their own budgets. Wow.

*****

FONDAFIP: EU "a common house in which we can survive difficult times"


*****

Objective is not to instruct one wayward member but to "learn from one another" - we're all bankrupt anyway!

*****

Prof. Featherstone touches on the CSR in the UK, remembers to moan about the cut to Higher Education budget.

*****

And we're off. Prof. Featherstone looks more like a Greek academic than I though - bit of a jowl, tweed, hideous yellow tie.


Prof. Bouvier can't make it but his wife will stand in. Great start to conference on sound management.

*****

Journos seem to have had a late night - taking their time getting in. The blog's favourite Economist hack isn't here yet either, but is meant to be attending.

*****

Conference Programme available here: lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/Events/CONFERENCE%20-%20Public%20Financial%20Management%20(22.10.2010)/Programme_for_website.pdf

Looking forward to ex-finmin N. Christodoulakis' contributions. He looks like a nice guy up close, and suitably low-key.

*****

Tune in later today for highlights of the event as they take place. I predict many LOLs.

_____

Sunday, 25 July 2010

CLIENTELIST STATE FAIL, DATA WIN!

Back to our data fetishism today with some of the best-ever data on the wastefulness of Greek public investment - the only type of government spending with a snowflake's chance in hell of producing growth. This paper comes straight from the LSE’s Hellenic Observatory, whose work I’ve cited before.

In his time as an NBG Senior Research Fellow, a certain Y. Psycharis (of the humble but clearly well staffed University of Thessaly) managed to piece together a complete and consistent set of Greek regional investment data over 30 years – a very formidable task. 

Psycharis' aim was to examine how much the allocation of funds varies between different regions, how it is determined, and how it has changed with successive governments. His key findings, thought tactfully delivered, are devastating. I reproduce the key findings with no additional commentary as none is needed:


“Neither a North-South/Mainland-Island/Urban-Rural divide nor ‘the needs based approach’ could carry sufficient explanation for the allocation of public investment.”
“Second, contrary to what many researchers have portrayed about history and inertia for the stability of the devolved spending in the UK and ‘the remarkable stability’ of regional spending pattern in the USA, the regional allocation of public investment in Greece is changing over time.”
“Third, the level of underdevelopment - and as result redistribution - does not appear to have constantly and systematically comprised the principal criterion to explaining the regional pattern of resource allocation in Greece during the period 1976-2005.”
“Fourth, the policy followed throughout the study period concerning the regional distribution of public investment does not seem to have been dictated by a higher-level strategic regional development plan.”
“Last but not least, the regional distribution of public investment seems to be affected by electoral geography. The electoral preferences of prefectures, even the place of origin of certain members of each government, seem to comprise explanatory variables for the regional distribution of public investment.”



Thank you Mr. Psycharis. More on our misuse of public funds here.

Friday, 7 May 2010

WE NO CANZ BITEZ BULLET

A little aside from the drama of the past week.

Eurostat has just reported on agricultural employment and incomes across the EU. Its figures are a damning indictment of the subsidy-junkies that run Greek agricultural policy, and indeed much of the industry itself.

Europe lost one quarter (25%) of its workforce in agriculture between 2000-9. This is neither a good nor a bad thing. It simply reflects Europe's plummeting competitiveness in this sector. By way of (some) compensation, Europe's agriculture workers made 5% more in real terms, as less productive units were replaced with more productive ones. Overall, income was down by 21.25% in real terms

Not in Greece though. Our agricultural sector held on to almost all of its workforce, with a net reduction of only 2.6%, the lowest in Europe. The tradeoff is that income per employee (before benefits and subsidies) fell by 17% in real terms. Overall income fell by 19.2% in real terms.

This 2% difference over ten years is what we get for having the 121st cheapest agricultural policy in the world. It would be the worst return on investment in the world if not for everything else we spend money on.

To understand why, see my earlier roundup of facts and figures here.

Friday, 22 January 2010

KEYNESIANISM FAIL

According to the updated Stability and Growth Programme, our current government is committed, despite everything, to a 15.3% reduction in public consumption over 3 years. I'm not sure they can do it, but I'm 100% sure it's the right thing to do, if they can pull it off.

Now not everybody takes my view on this. Our general union for the private sector has, as I've blogged here, made a strong if misguided Keynesian case for fiscal stimulus. Our farmers are clearly asking for a follow-up of the mad EUR500m package of last year. And some of our ministers, most notably our influential francophone Competitiveness minister, simply don't like what they see as neoconservative chemotherapy.

Apparently, a look at Greek government data from 1960 to 2000 shows that:

  • shrinking government increases growth
  • increasing government spending can have non-negative effects only if spending is shifted from public consumption to public investment
  • but even then it tends not to contribute to growth.



But of course it can be argued, as many do, that these are exceptional times. We need, it is argued, a massive fiscal stimulus (pre-election the opposition mooted a EUR3bn package) to keep the economy from spiralling downwards into the Dark Ages.

Now this is a valid if factually false argument based on the same old spin on Keynesianism that has reigned supreme over Greek fiscal policy for decades. The Keynesian philosopher's stone is the multiplier effect: you pour one penny into the economy, and the froth generated by the merry-go-round of increased spending inevitably turns it into 1.4. It's like a macro-economic get-rich-quick scheme. And it works even better when interest rates are, as they are now, at rock bottom.

The problem is that any extra spending has to be financed by debt issued in the teeth of a fiscal crisis. A EUR 3bn stimulus package does not, therefore, cost only the going interest rate (let's call it 5% or EUR150m). It costs interest plus, eventually, the marginal increase in interest on THE WHOLE OF OUR PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT. That, if any reminder were needed, currently stands at EUR 300bn and rising. So if raising the extra EUR 3bn increases the interest rate by 10 basis points (5% to 5.1%), the cost of funding the deficit in year will be the 150m + 0.1% * 300bn = 300m. This means a EUR3bn stimulus package will cost, in the long run, three times what our Keynesians think it will. Now if we could depend on a multiplier of 4 (which not even the most rabid Keynesians would not dare put on paper) and on bond market conditions to drastically improve, it might be worth spending more at this point, but of course we can't.

Now this is a very crude analysis, but happily someone's gone and run a rather more sophisticated one based on Greek data, and they have found the same.

LET'S GET CUTTING YORGO!

Monday, 28 December 2009

AI IZ IN UR PROCUREMENT AGENCIES, DRIVING UP UR INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS


Eleutherotypia ran a long article about a week ago on the major Greek road works, citing "an EC report" which found endless budget over-runs and extremely high costs among the Greek projects funded by the 3rd Community Support Framework (CSF III). I have no doubt we're not doing very well. Perhaps because we're getting people like this to do the work:




In most policy circles, it is considered polite to offer citations, but journalists have no time for such niceties. Perhaps if any of them actually got paid, they would be able to afford a home computer so they could double-check what their well-placed "source" was saying.

Here is the link to the actual evaluation study. Note the database of CSF III public works in excel format. That's where the money is.

Friday, 25 December 2009

CUT IN DEFENCE SPENDING DELIVERS SAVINGS FOR GREECE

Nobody shoots donkeys anyways.
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/06/16/afx6548315.html

O HAI... AI IZ AT HOME, PLAYING PLAYSTATION


“It’s a terrible waste of money,” said the former official. “It happens all the time. This is the Greek reality.”

He estimated that hosting the Olympic Games in 2004 cost Greece more than £12 billion, double what it would have been without “money flying this way, that way and often under the table”. Bribes are routinely paid by Athenians to speed up bureaucracy. Tax evasion is also rampant.

As for the new, centre-left government of George Papandreou, the prime minister, who is also the son and grandson of Greek prime ministers, the former official was dismissive. “They’re a bunch of amateurs,” he said. “Not one of them has ever earned a penny in the private sector.”

The previous government — of which he had been a member — was just as incompetent. He confirmed a rumour that Costas Karamanlis, the former prime minister, spent long hours on a PlayStation computer game at home when he might have been attending to matters of state.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article6962790.ece