Ο ΛΑΟΣ ΔΕΝ ΞΕΧΝΑ, ΟΚ. ΑΛΛΑ ΤΙ ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙ (ΚΕΝΤΡΟ)ΔΕΞΙΑ;

Ο λαός, λέει το σύνθημα, δεν ξεχνά τι σημαίνει δεξιά. Όπως όλα τα συνθήματα, έτσι κι αυτό είναι αστείο. Ο λαός ξεχνά και ξαναθυμάται κατά το συμφέρον του, και τη μανούβρα αυτή μπορεί να την κάνει και σε μετα-γνωσιακό επίπεδο: ξεχνά πως κάποτε ήξερε, ή θυμάται πως κάποτε ξέχασε, τι σημαίνει Δεξιά. Έτσι κάπως η ΝΔ ανακαλύπτει το αντιμνημόνιο που ξέχασε μετά το 2012 και η πρώτη φορά Αριστερά συγκυβερνά με Ανελ και κάνει (προσωρινά) υφυπουργό τον Πόρτα-Πόρτα.

Εντούτοις, ενόψει των εσωκομματικών εκλογών στη ΝΔ, με τον Καμμένο άλλη μια φορά κυβερνητικό εταίρο και την ΧΑ σταθερά τρίτο κόμμα (αν και ευτυχώς σε απόλυτους όρους η ψήφος της πέφτει) το σύνθημα είναι τουλάχιστον επίκαιρο αν εκφραστεί λίγο διαφορετικά. Κυρίως δε γίνεται επίκαιρο το τί σημαίνει κεντροδεξιά: ένα ερώτημα-δείγμα παρακμής από μόνο του, όπως και η συζήτηση περί κεντροαριστεράς που προηγήθηκε της τελικής διάλυσης του ΠαΣοΚ.

Προσωπικά δεν με ενδιαφέρει πώς ορίζουν την (κεντρο)δεξιά οι επίδοξοι ηγέτες της. Τα λόγια είναι τσάμπα εξάλλου, και όλοι έχουν κίνητρο να ανοιχτούν σε ένα πλατύ κοινό. Ούτε με ενδιαφέρει πώς την ορίζουν οι αντίπαλοί της. Με ενδιαφέρει μόνο το πώς καταλήγει κανείς να θεωρεί τον εαυτό του (κεντρο)δεξιό - ποιές αρχές, αξίες, μνήμες, συνθήκες διαβίωσης και παραστάσεις ωθούν κάποιον στο να ταυτιστεί με αυτή τη λέξη. Ευτυχώς υπάρχει τρόπος να το ελέγξουμε.

Τα στοιχεία μου εν προκειμένω προέρχονται από την Ευρωπαϊκή Έρευνα Αξιών του 2008 - την πιο πρόσφατη δυστυχώς. Περιμένω πώς και πώς την επόμενη έρευνα του 2017, στην οποία έμαθα με μεγάλη ανακούφιση ότι θα συμμετάσχει η Ελλάδα. Η σύγκριση των δύο ερευνών θα μας πει πιο πολλά για την κρίση, τα αίτια και τις επιπτώσεις της από δέκα διδακτορικά οικονομολόγων πάνω στο θέμα.

Το δείγμα της Έρευνας Αξιών είναι σταθμισμένο και αντιπροσωπευτικό: 1.208 Έλληνες άνω των 16 (η έρευνα περιλάμβανε γύρω στους 1.500 αλλά τόσοι απήντησαν στις ερωτήσεις που με απασχολούν - δείτε παρακάτω). Το ερωτηματολόγιο μπορείτε να το δείτε εδώ. Η πολιτική τοποθέτηση των ερωτηθέντων μετριέται σε κλίμακα από 1-10, όπου 1 είναι ο πιο αριστερός Έλληνας και 10 ο πιο δεξιός. Σε καμμία φάση της συνέντευξης δεν δίνεται ορισμός σε αυτές τις έννοιες. Πέρα από την ερώτηση περί πολιτικής τοποθέτησης, υπάρχουν και πολλές άλλες που εστιάζουν στις νοοτροπίες, αξίες και ιδανικά του συνεντευξιαζόμενου, αλλά και στην καταγωγή, την οικογενειακή και οικονομική κατάστασή του, και τη θέση του στην κοινωνία γενικότερα.

Η λογική είναι απλή: αν βρούμε τις νοοτροπίες, τις ιδέες και τα ιδανικά που τείνουν να ενστερνίζονται περισσότερο οι αυτοαποκαλούμενοι 'δεξιοί' από τους υπόλοιπους Έλληνες (και τα οποία τείνουν να ενστερνίζονται σε μεγαλύτερο βαθμό όσο πιο 'δεξιοί' θεωρούν ότι είναι), τότε έχουμε στα χέρια μας έναν εμπειρικό ορισμό και της δεξιάς, και της 'κεντροδεξιάς.' Και επειδή αυτό που στην πραγματικότητα αναζητούμε είναι μια σειρά από στερεότυπα, σκέφτηκα να χρησιμοποιήσω μια απλή μέθοδο - decision trees. Ουσιαστικά, η μέθοδος αυτή επιτρέπει να δοκιμάσουμε πολλές τέτοιες νοοτροπίες, ιδέες και ιδανικά, μία-μία, για να βρούμε ποιές χωρίζουν πιο ξεκάθαρα τον Ελληνικό λαό σε 'δεξιούς' και 'αριστερούς'. Μόλις βρεθεί η καλύτερη διαχωριστική γραμμή, η διαδικασία επαναλαμβάνεται για κάθε ένα ξεχωριστά από τα δύο μέρη στα οποία χωρίστηκε ο πληθυσμός με όλες τις μεταβλητές που δοκιμάσαμε και νωρίτερα - και ούτω καθεξής, μέχρι να καταλήξουμε σε υπο-ομάδες που παραείναι μικρές για να διασπαστούν παραπάνω, επειδή τα επιμέρους μέρη δεν θα μπορούσαν να συγκριθούν μεταξύ τους με στατιστικά σημαντικό τρόπο.

Εφαρμόζοντας αυτή τη λογική πάνω στο πλήρες δείγμα της έρευνας, βλέπει κανείς ότι μερικές ερωτήσεις χωρίζουν το δείγμα με ξεκάθαρο τρόπο σε περισσότερο και λιγότερο δεξιούς. Σημειώνω με (+) τους παράγοντες που σχετίζονται με πιο 'δεξιά' άτομα, και με (-) αυτούς που σχετίζονται με πιο 'αριστερά' άτομα. Τα 'επίπεδα' που σημειώνω υποδηλώνουν πόσες φορές έχει υποδιαιρεθεί ο πληθυσμός όταν εμφανίζεται για πρώτη φορά ως σημαντική διαχωριστική γραμμή μια μεταβλητή.

• Επίπεδο πρώτο: πόσο εμπιστεύεται κανείς την Εκκλησία ως θεσμό (+); 
• Επίπεδο δεύτερο: Πόση εμπιστοσύνη έχει στους δημοσίους υπαλλήλους (-) Έχει ποτέ συμματάσχει σε διαδήλωση (-); Πόση εμπιστοσύνη έχει στα εργατικά σωματεία και τους συνδικαλιστές (-); 
• Επίπεδο τρίτο: Θεωρεί αποδεκτή την έκτρωση για μια ανύπαντρη γυναίκα (-); Θεωρεί αποδεκτή συμπεριφορά το περιστασιακό σεξ με αγνώστους (-);  Θεωρεί ανεπιθύμητους ως γείτονες τους Ρομά (+); Θεωρεί επικίνδυνο το να επεμβαίνει ο άνθρωπος στο φυσικό του περιβάλλον (+); θεωρεί σημαντικό η δουλειά του να τον φέρνει σε επαφή με (ενδιαφέροντες) ανθρώπους (-); θεωρεί ότι είναι δουλειά των ιδιωτών ή του κράτους να φροντίζουν τους πιο αδύναμους; (-)

Δοκίμασα, βέβαια πολλές ακόμη ερωτήσεις που δεν αποδείχθηκαν καλές στο να ξεχωρίζουν τον πληθυσμό σε 'δεξιούς' και 'αριστερούς.' Δεν τις παραθέτω εδώ για λόγους συντομίας, αλλά περιλάμβαναν και πολλές δημογραφικού χαρακτήρα μεταβλητές όπως ηλικία, φύλο, οικογενειακό εισόδημα, καταγωγή και λοιπά. Θα προσέξετε ότι η ανάλυσή μου δεν εξετάζει την επίδραση των διαφόρων μεταβλητών ταυτόχρονα - δεν υπάρχουν controls. Οπότε δεν απαντά στο ερώτημα 'ποιές επιρροές κάνουν έναν Έλληνα δεξιό/αριστερό;' - μόνο στο ερώτημα 'τι σημαίνει στο μυαλό του Έλληνα δεξιά/αριστερά;'

Μιλήσαμε λοιπόν για το πλήρες δείγμα. Όμως και η αριστερά έχει τη 'δεξιότερη' μεριά της, και η δεξιά επίσης έχει την, αχέμ, 'δεξιότερη' μεριά της. Τι σημαίνει 'δεξιά' σε αυτό το πλαίσιο; Για να το εξηγήσουμε αυτό επαναλαμβάνουμε την ίδια ακριβώς ανάλυση, ξεχωριστά για 'δεξιούς' (6-10 στην κλίμακα αριστερά-δεξιά) και για 'αριστερούς' (1-5).

Για τους αριστερούς τα πράγματα έχουν ως εξής (τα θετικά πρόσημα υποδεικνύουν παράγοντες που σχετίζονται με την κεντροαριστερά):

• Επίπεδο πρώτο: πόσο εμπιστεύεται κανείς την Εκκλησία ως θεσμό (+); 
• Επίπεδο δεύτερο: πόσο σημαντικό μέρος της ζωής του είναι η πολιτική; (+) πόσο θεμιτό θεωρεί το να παίρνει κανείς επιδόματα πρόνοιας τα οποία τυπικά δεν δικαιούται; (-) πόσο σημαντικό θεωρεί ότι είναι για την υγεία ενός γάμου το να έχει το ζευγάρι ένα καλό σπίτι; (+); πόσο σημαντικό θεωρεί για τη ζωή του το να έχει άφθονο ελεύθερο χρόνο; (+); 
• Επίπεδο τρίτο: Θεωρεί αποδεκτή την έκτρωση για μια ανύπαντρη γυναίκα (-); πόση εμπιστοσύνη έχει στις ένοπλες δυνάμεις (+); θεωρεί σημαντικό για την υγεία ενός γάμου να έχουν οι δύο σύντροφοι ίδιες θρησκευτικές πεποιθήσεις; (+)

Για τους δεξιούς τα πράγματα έχουν ως εξής. Όπως πάντα τα θετικά πρόσημα υποδεικύουν παράγοντες που σχετίζονται με τη δεξιά, εν προκειμένω με τους αυτοχαρακτηριζόμενους ως πολύ δεξιούς ή και ακροδεξιούς. Άρα τα αρνητικά πρόσημα υποδηλώνουν συσχετισμό με την κεντροδεξιά:

• Επίπεδο πρώτο: πόσο σημαντικό θεωρεί ότι είναι για την υγεία ενός γάμου το να ζει το ζευγάρι ξεχωριστά από τους γονείς των δύο συντρόφων; (-)
• Επίπεδο δεύτερο: όταν τον ρωτάς αν η συντήρηση των φτωχότερων είναι καθήκον των ιδιωτών ή του κράτους, και όταν τον ρωτάς αν ο άνθρωπος έχει δικαίωμα να διαχειρίζεται τη φύση όπως νομίζει, απαντά με απόλυτο τρόπο (σίγουρα ναι ή σίγουρα όχι;) (+)
• Επίπεδο τρίτο: θεωρεί με απόλυτη βεβαιότητα ότι οι άντρες πρέπει να κάνουν παιδιά για να ολοκληρωθούν σαν άτομα; (+)

[Το γράφημα μου βγήκε λίγο λάθος - το διορθώνω σύντομα]

Συμπέρασμα - το 2008, οι Έλληνες θεωρούσαν 'δεξιά' μια θρησκευόμενη, κοινωνικά συντηρητική μερίδα του πληθυσμού που έβλεπε ως απειλές προς τον τρόπο ζωής της μια σειρά από επιστημονικές, κοινωνικές και γεωπολιτικές εξελίξεις και προέβαλλε ως αξία την άμυνα ενάντια σε αυτές. Η 'δεξιά' στο μυαλό του μέσου Έλληνα έβλεπε κάποιους συνανθρώπους ως ανεπιθύμητους, έβλεπε με δυσπιστία το συνδικαλισμό, τον ακτιβισμό , και είχε επιφυλάξεις απέναντι στο κοινωνικό κράτος και την πρόοδο της επιστήμης. Έβλεπε δε τη δουλειά πολύ περισσότερο ως μέσο βιοπορισμού και λιγότερο ως χώρο έκφρασης ή αυτοπραγμάτωσης.

Με βάση την ίδια λογική, οι δεξιότεροι Έλληνες θεωρούσαν 'Κεντροδεξιά' το κομμάτι της δεξιάς που φοβόταν τους δογματισμούς σε περίπλοκα ζητήματα, και έδειχνε ανοχή σε όσους αμφισβητούσαν τις δομές και αξίες της παραδοσιακής (εκτεταμένης;) οικογένειας.

Οι αριστερότεροι Έλληνες από την άλλη θεωρούσαν 'κεντροαριστερά' το κομμάτι της αριστεράς που ήταν θρησκευόμενο ή θεωρούσε την εκκλησία σημαντικό θεσμό, δεν εξέφραζε αντιμιλιταριστικές θέσεις, είχε μεσοαστικές αξιώσεις (οικονομική άνεση, πολιτική έκφραση και ελεύθερο χρόνο), και επιπλέον το ενοχλούσε η σπατάλη στις κοινωνικές δαπάνες.

Πού να είναι άραγε τώρα όλοι αυτοί οι κεντροαριστεροί και κεντροδεξιοί; Η πρώτη μου αντίδραση είναι ότι οι κεντροαριστεροί του 2008, με τις μεσοαστικές και (γιατί όχι;) υλιστικές αξίες τους, πρέπει να τσαλακώθηκαν περισσότερο από όλη την υπόλοιπη χώρα την εποχή της κρίσης και να εκφράζονται πλέον εντελώς διαφορετικά - ο χώρος τους δεν υπάρχει. Οι κεντροδεξιοί του 2008, από την άλλη, έχουν ελαφρύ ιδεολογικό στίγμα και θα μπορούσαν πλέον να ψηφίζουν ό,τιδήποτε.

Μια τελευταία σημείωση: Το 2008, από τους ερωτηθέντες που δέχτηκαν να πουν πού τοποθετούνται στην κλίμακα δεξιά-αριστερά, το 61% ήταν από κεντροαριστεροί (5) ως @conclavios (1). Το 20% προτίμησε να μην απαντήσει. Το 'κέντρο' (5-6) συγκέντρωνε το 40% της ψήφου, ανώ τα άκρα (1-2 και 9-10) το 18%.

The NHS and the sad, contradictory world of UKIP voters

In my previous life as a Twitter gladiator, I was told a number of times, by people who should have known better, that Britain’s UKIP is a libertarian party. Hell, they said to me, even their own Constitution says so.

As a new British citizen and voter I was very eager to vote for a libertarian option, and on the key issue of Europe, I could almost understand UKIP. I've seen my share of Grexit flamewars and believe strongly that the British need their long-overdue referendum on EU membership, as indeed do the Greeks.

That's not to say I want either country to leave the EU. The institutional issue of whether or not the people deserve a vote on a matter of sovereignty is, to me, quite separate from the political issue of whether they should vote yes or no. And anticipating that the people will go for the ‘wrong’ option is the worst possible reason to deny them the choice.

That said, I could never see a libertarian option in the Brexit, pints and fags brigade – or the People’s Army as they now call themselves. The personality-cult vibe, the sheer amount of power concentrated at the hands of its leadership, the borderline illiteracy and nastiness of some of its supporters, were enough to put me off from the outset. That would have been the end of it for me, despite the meteoric rise of the party, first in the polls and then in Google searches as a bewildered commentariat scrambled to keep up.

Unfortunately, as UKIP enters the mainstream of British politics and starts courting a broader demographic, the online debates are becoming louder and more absurd; and the last round regarding the future of the NHS was the last straw for me.

Craven backpedalling

Perhaps inevitably in an ageing society riddled with sticky inequalities, the NHS became a key battleground in the run-up to the Scottish referendum, and is poised to play the same role in the upcoming election. It's a major defence line for Labour, who quickly discovered in Scotland that the NHS can be used against them just as easily as against the Tories. It makes sense, therefore, that UKIP are now being challenged on their health policies as they threaten to poach Labour voters. The Labour attack line is that they want a US-style healthcare system and want to privatise the NHS, and it does rely on some pretty libertarian-sounding comments from Farage:

"Frankly, I would feel more comfortable that my money would return value if I was able to do that through the marketplace o[r] an insurance company than just us trustingly giving £100bn a year to central government and expecting them to organise the healthcare service from cradle to grave for us."

The UKIP response to the above, pathetically, did not make any attempt at a libertarian defence of these statements. In fact, in the recent past it has denounced libertarian thinking on the NHS as ‘Right-wing ultra-libertarianism.’

No, the party’s main defence of Farage’s words, beyond a tu quoque jab at New Labour’s record on privatisation, is that the comments were made ‘two years ago’, and ‘policies develop and change over time’. This is of course true, but two years make for a very quick conversion from a libertarianism strong enough to question the sacred NHS, all the way to paternalism. What exactly happened?

We'll get to that, but let's get one thing straight: UKIP are at ease with much greater contradictions. They have, for example, squared libertarianism with an obsession with the State’s right to determine who can and cannot live or work in the UK, as well as a refusal (also written into its Constitution) to enter any treaty that limits the discretion of the UK government – which presumably includes every free trade agreement ever written. You can read other, more intelligent critiques of their self-description as libertarians here, here, here and here, but please do so after reading this one through to the end.

Bad self-branding and craven backpedalling aside, I think UKIP’s libertarian credentials cannot be demolished or defended by words alone; what politicians say does not actually matter. You have to look deep into what their marginal voters say, because few populist parties, UKIP included, will take a principled stand for anything at the expense of power. It is the profile of the marginal UKIP voter, and their views of the NHS, that has changed so rapidly over two years as the party has reached out to a broader audience. One does not grow into a contender in national politics without screwing over the early faithful, who, in UKIP’s case, may well have included a lot of anti-federalist libertarians like myself.

So in order to test UKIP voters’ views, I’ve collected their responses to a number of YouGov poll results over the last two years, always on subjects other than UKIP itself, and always polls which were not used to report on the UKIP vote itself. I am doing this in order to avoid accusations of bias against YouGov, which I will not be well placed to defend against. The important thing here is that, even if YouGov is biased against including UKIPers in its polls, as they have claimed over time, I don't see how it can simultaneously exclude UKIPers and pick more fruit-cakey UKIPers over more normal ones. 

For nationalised services, but against NHS spending?

Asked to pick from a range of potential priorities for the country in mid-October 2014, Labour voters put Health first; Lib Dems ranked it second, and Conservatives and UKIPers ranked it third. And when challenged to prioritise public spending, NHS Spending was the UKIPers’ last priority, regardless of how their options were presented to them. And of course they recommended the lowest ideal average wage for doctors and nurses out of all the parties.

So on the face of it UKIPers are almost certainly less resistant to at least some NHS cuts than other voters. Part of the reason might be that UKIPpers are the most likely voters to say the NHS doesn’t serve them well, but then they say this about everything; check out their responses.

But are their budgeting priorities based on an opposition to cradle-to-grave healthcare and the nanny state? Not by the looks of it. When asked directly what things the government should have power over, UKIP supporters are clearly in favour of a public-run NHS, and barely a statistical error behind Labour supporters in calling for state control of just about anything. 84% of them believe the NHS should be publicly-run, ahead of all but Labour supporters, and, come to that, 40% of them even believe the government should have the power to dictate the price of groceries.

Or perhaps just National Socialists?

The list of UKIPpers' socialist soundbites goes on and on. 70% of UKIP supporters would rather the railways were nationalised, and for practically the same reasons cited by Labour supporters. When appraising St. Maggie Thatcher’s legacy, UKIP voters were as likely as Labour voters to cite ‘privatising utilities such as BT and British Gas’ as her biggest failures, and more likely than any other party to cite ‘deregulating Banking and the City of London’ as her greatest failure.

And make no mistake, they mean that last bit; they are decidedly against the mobility of capital, especially when it comes to takeovers of British firms, which they oppose more strongly than anyone else; in fact 69% of them would be happy if this were banned by law.

And while UKIPers rail against social engineering through government regulation elsewhere, they are as supportive of quotas for women as any other party apart from Labour; just not of quotas for ethnic minorities, which are clearly based on a very different principle (?).

The UKIPers do draw the line somewhere, though. They are the least likely to want the government to take an active role in housebuilding. They are also, incidentally, the most housing-secure voters out there, and therefore stand to lose the most from falling property prices.

What do they mean by libertarian?

Libertarianism is a pretty niche corner of the political map; it's not popular, frankly. So how did UKIP crash into us?

Well, we know UKIP supporters are the most likely out of the four major parties to agree with the phrase ‘people have a right to keep the money they earn’ as opposed to ‘people have a duty to contribute money to public services.’ They are almost as likely as the Tories to believe the state spends too much on Welfare - although more on this will follow. They are strongly in favour of assisted suicide. They believe that internet access is a human right, as much as anyone else. And they are, on the face of it, opposed to British force projection abroad, more so than other voters; they even want the West to stay out of Russia’s way in the Ukraine.

For some, their first brush with libertarianism may have been opposing the smoking ban, even though half of the UKIP faithful are now in favour of a ban on (less harmful) e-cigarettes. Even more support a ban on flavoured e-cigarettes; perhaps they remind them of shisha pipes?

Anyway, it's a start. But then again I wonder.

Migration and economics aside, I've come across many deeply un-libertarian things that UKIPers believe. Oddly, 25% of them don’t believe the right to life should be protected, perhaps due to a preoccupation with applications of this in a military context, or perhaps due to their support for euthanasia. Like Conservatives, they are much more tolerant than other voters of police power to arrest and detain without charges. And they’re definitely against gay marriage.

Speaking of this, consider their support for businesses denying service to homosexuals on grounds of religious or other persuasion (which I actually agree with). Liberal parties (Labour and Lib Dems) see support peaking when it comes to membership clubs denying service. Conservatives and UKIPers' support peaks when it comes to Bed and Breakfasts). The key ingredient being, I think, sharing a bed.

But it gets weirder. UKIP voters are almost twice as likely as others to want the media to identify people who claim to have been raped; this is actually higher than the percentage of UKIP voters who want the accused to be named (which of course is also not acceptable). I suspect some mens-rightery is at play here.

Coming back to the issue of tax, it’s fascinating that the majority of prospective UKIP voters don’t even think their party is the best placed to get taxation right; and they don’t care. According to their responses, they would much rather pay more tax and get immigration reduced. Similarly, nearly half of them believe NO ONE should be allowed into the UK from the EU regardless of the country's skills needs or economic efficiency. More proof, if any were needed, that UKIP voters don’t intend to use the party as a platform for building a libertarian society – not by a long shot.

Maybe they're Thatcherites?

Many UKIPers see themselves as Thatcherite as opposed to libertarian. A good distinction to make, but also far from an ideal description of the party faithful. Asked to name Britain’s greatest PM, UKIP supporters were more likely to go for Maggie than any other past PM, but they did so by a much smaller margin than the Conservatives.  They were more likely than voters of any other party to pick Churchill – perhaps they too see themselves at war.

To figure out what exactly made UKIPers less rabid Thatcherites than today’s remaining Tories, it’s enough to look at the margin between the two in appraising different aspects of Thatcher's legacy; the biggest difference is in assessments of her economics – with 60% believing Maggie left the UK economically better off, vs. 85% of Tories.

And though UK voters don’t seem to like force projection these days, they were the only party voters who cited ‘winning the Falklands War’ as Thatcher’s overall greatest achievement; a libertarian distinction could be built around the claim that the Falklands War was a defence of British citizens and territory. Quite how the UKIPers thought the UK came to own an archipelago on the other side of the world is beyond me, but their view of libertarianism seems to allow for very substantial initial endowments established through illiberal means, at least when they are in their favour.

Maybe they're victims

While their views on social mobility are very, very close to those of Labour supporters, UKIPers are the voters least likely to believe education affects life opportunities - perhaps they should try it. They are the least likely voters to feel capable of influence in the workplace, which as my readers know, is a very good predictor of job satisfaction; they are also more likely than voters of other parties to feel precariously employed. If this sounds a little left-leaning, then perhaps it is. Remember, 29% of today's UKIP voters would never find the Conservatives appealing as a party.

But were they left behind by the progress or otherwise of the last 20 years? Well they are more likely than even Labour voters to say that the economy was 'always' stacked against people like them. They are twice as likely to think their personal household situation will be worse in a year’s time than even Labour supporters. And they also generally believe the next generation will be worse off - more so that voters of other parties.

As if the world hadn't already been cruel enough to them, they also seem to have the least satisfying love lives. Perhaps Ken Clarke was right after all.

Maybe they've been misled

Disappointment with the world does leave on open to suggestion, but then some UKIPers would believe anything. 10% of them believe that the net number of migrants into Britain is more than 2m a year. 19% of them think more than a million EU migrants are claiming Job Seekers Allowance.

Less credibly, UKIPers are substantially more likely to believe in ghosts, and an analysis of the 2010 vote suggests that ghost-believers have generally flooded into UKIP and out of other parties.

What we do know is that they're more susceptible to dog-whistle politics. In a recent poll, YouGov tested two different versions of the Government’s personal tax statements – one with the Government’s own crude (and inflated) measure of ‘Welfare’ and one with the Institute of Fiscal Studies’ more economically literate (and more conservative) measure. The UKIPers' share of people who thought welfare spending was ‘much too high’ went up by 79% on the Government’s version of the figures, vs. 67% for the electorate as a whole.

The bottom line

Whatever the party's past, today's UKIP supporters, I think, are openly nationalist and closet socialists. Their mistrust of state intervention comes not from a preference for freedom and personal responsibility, or any concept of economic efficiency, but from mistrust of what they see as institutions infiltrated by a hostile agenda.

The UKIP supporter questions the legitimacy of policy and institutions, because they believe that both are working against the British people. But they openly welcome state intervention in other arenas where institutions still appear to them to be working towards their own goals, or where they can recall institutions of the ‘clean’ past that could still be reinstated. Hence, for example, UKIPers’ gut instinct to defund the NHS may well stem from their belief that the NHS has been subverted in order to subsidise at best jobs for the boys and girls, and at worst the weakening of the British population and the colonisation of Britain by unsavoury, mongrel races (yes many UKIPers think this way).

Maybe they're right, now and again.

Say what you will of the UKIPers, but they do have one message that resonates. On matters of economic governance and human rights the electorate is far less liberal than the parties of Westminster, and both sides know this is the case. Interestingly, the majority of UK voters believe that ‘a political class [are] clubbing together, using their mates in the media and doing anything they can to stop the UKIP charge.’ Only Lib Dem voters disagree on balance, and even 42% of those agree.

Westminster parties believe that by making a convincing economic case for something they can win people over, but on the subject of Europe and immigration the electorate would happily take a fair amount of economic hardship in exchange for getting their way. This is inconceivable to our political elite, and that's why they can't stop UKIP, for the time being. This is how they almost lost Scotland, after all. The only thing the establishment can do for now is wait until, in pursuit of power, UKIP compromises and mainstreams itself enough for its visceral message to start ringing hollow. But the disruption we could suffer in the meantime is immense.

A TRADITION OF FAILURE: SAMARAS' GREAT LEAP BACKWARDS (UPDATE)

A little-noticed excerpt from our Prime Minister's speech yesterday - addressing the Thessaloniki International Expo- has got me reaching for my datasets once again. Ignorance is bliss in Greece but there are limits to how ignorant one can be in public. Especially if they are the Prime Minister.

The original text, available here, reads thus:

Τέλος η εποχή που κάποιοι προσπαθούσαν να απαλλαγούν από την εθνική μας παράδοση κι από την πολιτιστική μας ταυτότητα, για να γίνουν τάχα «ψευτο-Ευρωπαίοι». Άλλους τους ενοχλούσε η σχολική ιστορία μας και προσπαθούσαν να την ξαναγράψουν με απίστευτες στρεβλώσεις. Άλλους του ενοχλεί η θρησκευτική παράδοση της Ορθοδοξίας. Τέλος όλα αυτά! Δεν είναι ευρωπαϊκή προσέγγιση αυτή. Οι Ευρωπαίοι σέβονται τον εαυτό τους, την Ιστορία τους και την παράδοσή τους. Παντού στον κόσμο, οι λαοί που προοδεύουν σέβονται και υπερασπίζονται την ταυτότητά τους και την εθνική τους κληρονομιά! Ενώ αυτοί που ξεχνούν ποιοι είναι, δεν προκόβουν, μένουν στο περιθώριο.

My translation:

'The times when some sought to rid themselves of our national traditions and cultural identity, so that they might become 'pseudo-European', are over. Some were annoyed by our history as taught in schools and sought to re-write it with unbelievable distortions. Others are annoyed by the religious tradition of the Orthodox (Christian) faith. Enough of all that! This is no European approach. Europeans respect themselves, their Histories and their traditions. All over the world, the peoples who progress respect and defend their identity and their national heritage! Whereas those who forget who they are, they do not prosper, they remain at the margins.'

Samaras, confident that a recovery will preserve his party in government, has gone on the offensive here (key word being 'offensive'), with some massively uneducated tripe. So I've taken the liberty of producing some pan-European figures that prove him wrong - each blue dot is a country in Europe and the near East. The red dot is Greece.

The broad gist of the figures is that both national pride and religiosity generally fall as people become more educated - both in Greece and Europe more generally. Very religious and very nationalistic countries are typically unhappy and poor places. Worse, the crucial break with 'tradition' happens not in supposedly commie-riddled Universities, but in early education.- simply finishing compulsory education makes the typical European join Samaras' nation-disowning enemies. Instead, it is the huge rump of uneducated masses that clings to Samaras' ideals, and Greece has more of those than the West. Not by accident, but by design.

Note also that University-educated people in Greece and the rest of Europe have similar levels of national pride and religiosity - it is the less educated that account for nearly all of Greece's deviation from European norms.

And what countries, I hear you ask, are furthest away from us on the nationalist/religiosity scale? Why, they are notorious hell-holes like Denmark, France and Sweden, where the majority of citizens aren't 'proud' of their nationality, less than one in six people claim that religion is 'very important' in their life, and less than 8% believe it's important to share the nation's ancestry if one is to be called Danish/French/Swedish.

Of course, some might argue that this is symptomatic of declining nations - that people in emerging economies tend to be more nationalistic and religious. Perhaps that's what Samaras himself was referring to. Never mind that emerging economies aren't good places to live - merely good places to rule. Even so, anyone arguing this would be right; the country furthest away from Greece and closest to Samaras' ideal on the religiosity/nationalism scale is none other than Turkey. If only we could join that glorious country, eh Tony? Think they would take us back?

Readers eager to know more can also check how the relationship holds for China - where nationalism increases with education as the regime's stranglehold on education works to give it legitimacy. That is one more reason not to seek to emulate this model.

All figures are 2008 figures, to ensure comparability. PPP adjusted per capita GDP Figures have been taken from here. All other figures are from my new favourite, the European Values Study. National samples are weighted to be nationally representative and based on 1,500 interviews per country (fewer for very small countries like Iceland, that has 808 responses). My full tables and all graphs are available here.

Hey, Truth Team, how did you let this speech slip past you?
Oh I forgot. You probably wrote it.

SOME FINAL NOTES

I cannot help but wonder what Samaras means by thundering 'enough of all that!' Translating less liberally (less liberally being the operant term here) he said 'an end [has/will come] to all of that!'

Is this a policy statement? Is the ersatz 'pride' of Borat's made-up Kazakh national anthem now the law of the land in Greece? Is the gay-bashing religious 'rebirth' of Russia a blueprint for Greece? Will foreign policy be guided by the prophesies of the Athonite Elders about Greece reclaiming Istanbul?

With polls suggesting the Neo-Nazi Golden Dawn would be Greece's third-largest party (with nearly 15% of the vote) if an election were held tomorrow, Samaras' electoral strategy appears to be to skim GD's penumbra of non-attached voters for himself by stressing his patriotic credentials. He's a fool to bank on them. This is a high-maintenance mafia clientele, willing to sell their vote to Neo-Nazis for a sack of potatoes or the promise of a vigilante patrol for their neighbourhood. They don't need a Prime Minister - they want a Genghis Khan style chieftain, and Tony boy will never be man enough for them.

GREEK NEO-NAZI BEACH PARTY!

If there's anyone on the Greek social media sphere who hasn't seen this yet, please do so NOW.

No more comments from me - Go to the original Vice article here. Here's a little preview though, to get your juices flowing:

(UPDATE) GREECE'S NEW FAR RIGHT - DRIVEN TO EXTREMES OR A FEW HANDOUTS SHORT OF A FASCIST?

Loyal readers may remember past posts in which I've referred to the European Values Survey of 2008 (see here and here).

2008 is an impossibly long time ago in Greece. But to me, this is an important study because, based on a large-ish, representative sample, it provides a snapshot of the values and beliefs of pre-austerity Greece, with an extensive focus on immigration, identity, politics and trust, combined with detailed personal information on interviewees and their background. In fact, you can check out the full questionnaire here.

It's a valuable tool for understanding what unseen undercurrents in Greek society may have anticipated the developments of the last few years, in particular the rise of Golden Dawn. Certainly, if you believe as I do, that austerity is not a necessary and sufficient condition for the mass emergence of fascism. Or at least if you believe in testing your hypotheses.

Which, of course, brings us to the heart of the matter. I've rarely spoken to anyone in Greece who didn't 'know' for a fact what led to the rise of GD.

To probe the matter further, I've finally managed to download the full dataset from here. It's available free of charge to people with a genuine, non-profit research interest, although unfortunately this does not extend to a licence to share the dataset with you on this website.

BEFORE WE MOVE ON - DEFINITIONS

It's hard to define fascism but here's a fantastic roundup of original, historical and contemporary uses. My working definition of a fascist is a person who believes, or acts as though they believed, all of the below:

• That he/she is part of a group, the People, who are distinct from other human beings and bound by a common nature, history and destiny.
• That the People have a metaphysical claim to particular natural or man-made resources, which is irrespective of conventional contracts and treaties.
• That categorical truth is unattainable or irrelevant except in trivial things; rather the People are endowed with a collective narrative which is superior to those of other Peoples. 
• That the People are, in their uncorrupted state, a cohesive, culturally and ideologically homogeneous group, and that deviations from this archetype are the product of corruption / perversion.
• That the objective of the State is to embody the collective will of the People and protect the People from corruption and perversion.
• That de facto power is sufficient to empower State officials to interpret the Will of the People
• That maintaining power is the best proof of State officials' continued approval by the People.
• That the ideal condition of the People is unanimity, and that unanimity is best expressed through universal compliance towards the State and acceptance of the People's narrative.
• That individual rights are a concession of the collective (the State, on behalf of the People) and thus when unanimity is impossible, they will be superseded by the needs of the collective. 
• That all conventions established by other Peoples should be used in the pursuit of the People's interest but not internalised.

FINDINGS

Part One of my analysis is essentially housekeeping - I look into the relevant data provided by the survey and summarise them into easy-to-process variables through factor analysis. The result is a short list of attitudes that determine, to a large extent, the Greek citizen's outlook towards life, politics and their fellow man. Even this preliminary stage is very interesting. Read my report into this stage here. Factor analysis tables are available here.

Yet even this exercise has something to teach us - the way concepts entwing in respondents' minds can help reveal underlying narratives that are not immediately apparent.

One of the most significant findings in this first stage of the study is that in Greece the discourse on the subject of institutions is almost completely buried under the rubble of the Greek Civil War: institutions are not seen as having value in themselves but rather as representing the 'establishment', the 'counter-establishment' or foreign power centres. This ultimately discredits all institutions.

Another significant finding is that Greece has no real liberal narrative - when it comes to politics there is the Big State narrative and the Social Market Economy narrative; there is also a broad narrative of faith in mankind, and a tension between internal and external attributions, which are common to all nations. That's mostly it.

Solidarity is a complex notion and in Greece (as well as most countries, I suspect) it comes in three flavours - a universal solidarity for mankind; a morally-driven solidarity towards the vulnerable; and a biologically-driven solidarity exclusively towards one's own family.

Finally, and regardless of the substantial and nuanced debate on the Greek work ethic, there is such as thing as an 'easy life' paradigm in Greece, or at least there was until 2008. But it's not the only one, nor is it the one that most influences Greek attitudes towards work. The dominant paradigm is towards self-fulfilment, followed by an alternative paradigm that focuses on good industrial relations and respect for employee rights.

For Part Two, I examined Greek attitudes towards immigration as expressed through a range of ten questions and tried to look at which attitudes out of the ones identified above are responsible for their views of immigrants. To ensure attitudes aren't actually acting as proxies for other variables (for instance, intolerance for age, or social liberalism for gender), I also threw in every demographic variable available through the EVS. To see which variables went into the analysis, you can download my output files for the analysis here and here.

I used CHAID analysis for this - not the pinnacle of science of course, but the easiest way of mapping a complex set of relationships and interactions. My decision trees can be downloaded as images from here and as a bonus I included an analysis of how people vote based on their attitudes.

Note that all models use unweighted data. In some, observations have been lost because not all participants responded to all of the questions involved in the model.

I will report on this analysis shortly. Watch this space.

STOP FUNDING FASCISM! (BY AN ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE)

Best way to start this post:

U know Metapedia? No? It's like wikipedia. For nazis. — Katerina Vrana (@Vranarama) April 2, 2013

Maria Margaronis is a Greek journalist.

Although we have had no one-to-one real-world dealings, and I cannot subscribe to her views on all matters, we’re FB friends and I appreciate her deeply. You can read a selection of her work for the Guardian here and for the Nation here. She’s worth following on Twitter as well.

Recently, she posted an article on FB about herself from an online resource called Metapedia, which I had not, to that date, heard of. Metapedia’s  article on Maria is reproduced below in full, with heartfelt apologies to my readers:

Maria Margaronis is a middle-class, anti-Greek, communist media propagandist, married to the Jew journalist D. D. Guttenplan.✡ They have a Jew son together, Alexander Guttenplan.✡ Margaronis operates between London, Greece and Vermont. A Europhobic agitator, she promotes the demographic genocide of Greeks and is an enemy of the people. She is a supporter of the extremist openly communist Synaspismós organisation. Along with her Jew husband, she is associated with the London branch of The Nation magazine, though her propaganda has also featured in The Guardian.

The tabs under the article very probably say more about its authors than about the subject of the article:

Categories: Gentiles with Jewish spouses | The Guardian | The Nation | BBC | Greek | Communists in Greece | Propagandists against the Golden Dawn

Think this is bad? The discussion pages behind the main article are much, much worse:

She looks very much, like a jew herself. Hu1 22:20, 10 October 2012 (CEST) 

The hook-nose and beady eyes said "Jew" to me as well, but I can't find any source that says she is. She might just be ugly. She definetly has a communist agenda in her "reporting". Basileus13:24, 11 October 2012 (CEST) 

Yes, the nose, the nose-mouth part, which is slightly ape-like, the eyes, her overall untidyness and uglyness, and the last indication is her style (and usage of presumably faked photos). If a person shows these indications, I automatically categorize her as a crypto Jew. Which Jew says openly, he is a Jew? Hu1 19:55, 11 October 2012 (CEST) 

@Hu1, @Basileus: Maybe you should start a metapedia article about which physical traits are indications for a possible jewishness? Such an article could contain many example images and may be very useful as a practical guide. What about masculine appearance for females, feminine appearance for men? And are freckles also an indication for a possible jewishness? I don't think they are, but someone once told me that. (Galileo 21:43, 11 October 2012 (CEST)).

Now, you might argue that, as with all things wiki- the crowdsourced nature of the material makes it difficult to vet in real time. Users come and go, some are anonymous, and the marginal cost of an edit is so low that persistent users can get their way for quite some time.

Except of course, the persons entirely responsible for this vile post are three users by the name of Basileus, Galileo and Hu1, all three of whom are Metapedia admins.  Hu1, as I see, specialises in the question of Gas Chambers, Galileo fancies himself as a scientist, while Basileus is the Orthodox Christian link, with his own views on orthodox supremacy.

Metapedia’s style guide, which the admins at least must be familiar with, pathetically states the following:

Language

§  Make sure to write in a neutral tone. Hard biases, exaggerations and irony don't belong in Metapedia. Take a look at other encyclopaediae to get a feeling for what the texts should look like stylistically.

This suggests to me that Metapedia admins don’t see this article as exemplifying ‘hard bias’. It’s very difficult to understand what would.

Again, I sincerely apologise for posting this filth but I think it’s important to share the nature of the beast. 

While mercifully brief, this post demonstrates the following:

1. That metapedia admins are actively involved in peddling racial hatred.

·     2.  That metapedia admins aim to monitor criticism of Golden Dawn, which they label as ‘propaganda’ and equate with ‘promoting demographic genocide of Greeks’. While I cannot prove that the admins’ purpose is to direct retaliatory action or pre-emptively discredit GD’s critics, the latter are labelled ‘enemies of the [unspecified] people’ and Syriza sympathisers, regardless of the nuances of their political attitudes.

·        
3. That metapedia admins are obsessed with ethnic and racial origin (their definition of which is extremely broad, judging from the fact that they feel compelled to list ‘Gentiles with Jewish spouses’  and try to work out the ‘Jewishness’ of individuals from their facial features.

·        
4. That metapedia admins are obsessed with Jews to the point that they need to prefix even the names of their children with ‘Jew’, as well as mark them out with a special yellow star of David icon/tab. That last bit bears re-reading. I find it chilling.

·         5. That metapedia admins have such a broad definition of communism that it can encompass Greece’s syncretic leftist cacophony, Syriza; mainstream (if culturally statist) media such as the Guardian; and the whole of Twitter itself.

6. That metapedia admins have no interest in this being an encyclopaedia or any kind of reference resource, as none of the claims in this article (for instance, the claim that Maria advocates 'demographic genocide of Greeks') are actually referenced in any way.

Now - on to my complaint. 

Metapedia solicits donations via Paypal, principally through Facebook and Twitter appeals, and has to date raised just over $4,000 from a substantial number of contributors. As a longtime user of Facebook and Paypal, I find that this grossly violates both platforms' acceptable use policy. Sadly, not that of Twitter.

From Paypal’s Acceptable Use Policy:

“You may not use the PayPal service for activities that:

1.     violate any law, statute, ordinance or regulation.

2.     relate to transactions involving […] (e) items that promote hate, violence, racial intolerance, or the financial exploitation of a crime”

From Facebook’s terms:

We do our best to keep Facebook safe, but we cannot guarantee it. We need your help to keep Facebook safe, which includes the following commitments by you: […]

6. You will not bully, intimidate, or harass any user.

7. You will not post content that: is hate speech, threatening, or pornographic; incites violence; or contains nudity or graphic or gratuitous violence.

10. You will not use Facebook to do anything unlawful, misleading, malicious, or discriminatory.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to report such groups under Twitter's terms of service and rules/guidelines, but since the Twitter posts simply direct back to FB that's not a big issue. 

Note that Metapedia is careful not to own up to its purposes on Facebook – their page explains, coyly, that they are “An alternative encyclopedia about culture, art, science, philosophy and politics.” Alternative indeed, the Nazi cowards. Similarly, Twitter repeats the above statement with no further details and posts are extremely opaque.

It is clear to me that Metapedia is a hotbed of racial hate and its fundraising activities are in violation of both Paypal’s and Facebook’s terms of use. The article in question is one of many, and is clearly not untypical of the website or the policies of its admins.

I invite you to help me kill Metapedia’s funding stream by reporting this activity to Paypal and Facebook. Let’s become ‘enemies of the people’ together. 

For details on how to report hate speech on Facebook, see here. For Twitter, see here. Their account is @metapedia

Reporting a hate group on Paypal is harder, but the best way in this case is to write to compliance@paypal.com who are supposed to be notified by any group 'collecting donations as a non-profit or charity organisation.' If Metapedia haven't done that they would be non-compliant even without all of the hate speech association. There is good precedent for Paypal withdrawing services from hate groups. Read more here for instance.   

For further information on Metapedia, see here http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metapedia

UPDATE: The Metapedia admins, spineless cowards that they are, have rewritten Maria's page thoroughly following this publication, and particularly the feature on Harry's Place here. Their racial profiling banter is gone and there is now a section on Maria's supposed 'Crimes of Hellenophobia.' This, a lamentable copy & paste job to be found elsewhere on their website, simply lists a number of crimes by non-Greeks against Greeks, with the implication that any journalist choosing to focus their writing on any other violent act committed on Greek soil is a Hellenophobe.