

## HIGHLIGHTS IN THIS ISSUE :

### **Disarmament and Disengagement** A. J. E. CRANSTOUN M.B.

In his discussion of disarmament, Colonel Cranstoun brings his survey up to the present day. His penetrating study of this difficult subject shows how foolish is the attitude of those, who approach it in an emotional frame of mind. These are the ones who are most easily duped and made to serve, without knowing it, as vehicles of Soviet propaganda.

### **New Communist Programme** H. W. HENDERSON

No man in Britain is better qualified to comment on Communism's latest manifesto than H. W. Henderson. He has given years of his life to warning his countrymen of the menace that Communism represents. As a result, he has to hand a vast mass of information on every aspect of Communist theory and practice. In this devastating critique he puts it to the best possible use.

### **Soviet Russia: The Facts** PAUL CRANE M.B.

#### 6. THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS (ii)

In this second article on the Soviet concentration camps, Father Paul Crane makes an attempt to determine the size of Russia's slave population under the present Khrushchev regime. Thousands have come out of the camps. How many remain? Would it be true to say that their population is once again on the increase?

### **Going into Europe: The Economic Aspect** J. M. JACKSON

Britain is on the move, startlingly so, towards Europe. It has all happened rather suddenly, but she is applying for membership of the Common Market. What does this mean in terms of her economic life and that of the Commonwealth? Is she running out on her old friends to seek new advantages without them? Or is she placing herself in a position to help them better? These and other questions are asked and answered by Dr. J. M. Jackson, a Catholic economist, who lectures at St. Andrew's University in Scotland.

### **Going into Europe: General Considerations** CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS

At our request, Christopher Hollis has placed in general perspective the arguments in favour of Britain going into Europe. He regards the post-war years as a time of lost opportunity in this respect. Now, we have decided to take the plunge if it can be done. Our hope must be that British entry into the Common Market will be arranged. Its ultimate justification will be measured by the ability of a United Europe to fulfil the claims of international social justice.

### **Outlook for the ETU** MICHAEL KILDARE


Communists rarely know when they are beaten. That is why their come-back in the ETU has been so strong. How long will they continue to fight the battle on this ground? How and when will they finally be dislodged from their positions? Michael Kildare places the facts before the reader.

OCTOBER 1961

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# Christian Order

## Going into Europe



CHRISTIAN ORDER OCTOBER 1961

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### IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ADDRESS :

If you are planning to change your address please let us know at least two or three weeks ahead because subscription lists are made up in advance. Send us both new and old addresses.

### Our cover photograph :

The twin spires of Cologne's Gothic Cathedral, and the newly-built Chamber of Commerce (on the left), are themselves significant of the co-operation of cultures that is Europe in the sixties. Christopher Hollis and J. M. Jackson examine the move into Europe in two special articles in this issue.

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# Christian Order

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Paul Crane SJ

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## Bread in Freedom

THE EDITOR

ON SUNDAY, JULY 31ST, Krushchev offered his people free bread. The next day this country chose bread in freedom. That is the real significance of Britain's decision to apply for membership of Europe's Common Market. It underlines in dramatic fashion the gaping difference between two ways of life struggling against each other today for the supremacy of the world.

On the one hand, the slave empire of Communism, demanding for itself the whole of each human person on the face of the earth and offering in return complete material security. Believing, as he does, that man lives by bread alone, the spokesman of Soviet Communism offers him a symbol of the Soviet paradise in the shape of a slave diet of bread. In return, there must be the total submission of all to himself as the present incarnation of Soviet Communism. One is reminded of Satan's words to Christ when he tempted him for the third time in the wilderness, "All these things I will give thee if, bowing down, thou wilt adore me." Krushchev's new-sounding promise is merely the tatty renewal of a very old temptation. It is directed far beyond his own people to the uncommitted everywhere all over the globe. And it is being heard.

Totally opposed to this Communist concept of man stands that

of a Europe pledged to uphold his freedom as an expression of his human dignity. In the mind of Europe, free bread can never be a substitute for freedom. What every man can claim in her eyes is the right, in freedom, to earn his bread as his dignity's strong support. Made by God and saved by his Son, no man can ever be another's tool. Those who promise him bread in return for the surrender of his soul attempt a bargain which is intrinsically illicit. The human dignity, which is every man's priceless gift from God, demands that he be given the opportunity to live his life in freedom and with respect for the rights of others. That is the Christian concept of man. To it, the Europe of the Six is pledged. It was to underpin it with appropriate and growing economic strength that the Treaty of Rome was signed.

Britain's application to join its signatories means not only her public adherence to a way of life having freedom for its core. It means her determination to uphold it even to the extent of sacrificing sovereignty in its regard. This country's leaders have recognised, in however hazy a fashion, that a United Europe, drawing its new dynamic from an ancient Christian past, is the only ultimate answer to Krushchev's flamboyant challenge. Like the appeal of Krushchev's recent manifesto, that of United Europe must be not merely heard but felt, if it is to be appreciated. If the present negotiations succeed, the uncommitted nations will soon feel the benefits of immense economic strength placed at the service of freedom. For them, a prosperous European community of nations will represent more than a picture of what should be. Its assistance to the uncommitted will be in their eyes a pledge of things to come; a standing invitation that they should move into freedom's heritage.

At the present moment, two ways of life, diametrically opposed to each other, dispute for the allegiance of mankind. On the one hand, the slave state, with its dole of free bread: on the other, the Christian city, with its opportunity, held out to every man, of earning his bread in freedom. The story of the remaining years of this century will be the story of a continuing and titanic struggle between the two.

**At our request, Christopher Hollis has placed in general perspective the arguments in favour of Britain going into Europe. He regards the post-war years as a time of lost opportunity in this respect. Now, we have decided to take the plunge if it can be done. Our hope must be that British entry into the Common Market will be arranged. Its ultimate justification will be measured by the ability of a United Europe to fulfil the claims of international social justice.**

## Going into Europe: General Considerations

CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS

**A**S A RESULT OF modern technological progress it is much cheaper to produce articles if they are produced *en masse*. Lovers of small units and widely distributed property may nostalgically regret this, but it is a fact that must be faced. It is only economical to produce articles on a large scale if there is a large market within which to sell them. Therefore, the day of the small national State as an economic unit is gone, and the post-war pattern showed a Europe threatened, as, a hundred years before, de Tocqueville had prophesied that it would be threatened, by the two great mass Powers of Russia and the United States to either side of it. The Europeans had no third choice; either they had to compose their differences and form some sort of union among themselves or be content to become the appanage of either Russia or the United States. There was of course—and still is—a military threat. But the more real and urgent threat was the economic threat. There were pessimists who prophesied that the national rivalries of Europeans—in particular the rivalry of France and Germany—was so deep that no effective European unity was possible. They would no more be able to unite in face of the Russians than were the Greek States able to unite in face of the Persians two thousand years ago. Much

policy—particularly much British policy—was based on this assumption that France would never join any European association from which Britain abstained, for fear of its domination by Germany. The British felt, therefore, that they could afford to drag their feet; but they overdragged them, and today the Treaty of Rome has been signed.

### **Political Unity Inevitable**

It is perfectly true that the present unity of Europe is a purely economic unity, and it is perfectly true that, so long as any rate as de Gaulle is in power in France, it is most unlikely that Europe will achieve a formal federal political unity. The American states before independence, each with little history of its own behind it, each English speaking, all with the same institutions and laws as the others, were one thing. The European, each with its thousand years of long tradition and rivalry, are quite another. Only a formalist can think that the problems of Europe are likely to be solved by an exact copying of the institutions of the United States. At the same time, though politicians may have to say so for their immediate purposes, those are equally unrealistic who imagine that an economic unit can remain a merely economic unit and no more. There are today so many ways of interfering with the free flow of trade and production by quota and restriction apart from tariffs that a free trade unit must necessarily have some judicial authority to decide what practices are fair; and the judicial authority can only keep the rules if, behind it, there is, in some form or another, a political authority which has the power to make the rules. No one can foresee in detail the shape of things to come, but it is certain that, if the movement for Western European unity succeeds at all, it will inevitably lead to some form of political unity.

### **The Policy for Britain**

The question is, then, what should be the policy of Britain. It is as impossible for Britain as it is for any of the other nation states to survive in isolation. Rhetoricians may amuse themselves by making

speeches about Britain's self-sufficiency and independence, but that is nonsense. We have already surrendered sovereignty to N.A.T.O. on matters of defence. The only real question is into what larger unit shall Britain merge herself. There are, of course, those, like Lord Attlee, who argue that the true goal is a world State and that a European unity, so far from being a step towards a world State, is an obstacle to it. Most people, I think, would accept the theoretical desirability of a world State and would agree that we can never have any real security until we have a world authority strong enough to suppress all disturbers of the peace. But, with the divisions of the world as they are, no one can suppose that there is any remotest possibility of such a generally acceptable world authority in any immediate future. It is hard then to see the relevance of this argument. In similar strain, other left-wingers argue that the Common Market does not give us European unity, but divides Europe more sharply into two along the line of the Iron Curtain. If it had been the countries of Western Europe who had for some selfish economic purpose formed themselves into a unit and barred out from it such unquestionably European nations as the Poles and the Hungarians, they would indeed have been gravely to blame, but this is so entirely opposite to what in fact has happened that, again, the argument is of little relevance. Some—but by no means all—of the agricultural interests are opposed to our joining the Common Market. The precise terms on which we are to join it are still to be seen and, doubtless, there will be some hard bargaining with the French farmers; but, rightly or wrongly, every country takes special measures to preserve its domestic agriculture and the British certainly will have the right to claim as much freedom in agricultural policy as their partners. There is no serious reason to think that, with such freedom, British agriculture cannot have a prosperous future. As in all free trade arrangements, some products will be the losers. Horticulture is likely to suffer, but others will be the gainers and there is no reason why, on balance, the gains should not outweigh the losses. It is perfectly true that we shall probably have to change the particular form of our support for agriculture. Whereas, at present,

we allow food to be sold to the consumer cheap and make up the balance to the farmer by subsidy and support payment, we shall doubtless have to cut down our subsidies to farmers and allow our food to be sold to the consumer in the shops at the same sort of price that it fetches in those of the Continent. This will mean that food will cost the English housewife somewhat more over the counter, but that her husband, the taxpayer, will have to pay less in his taxes since he no longer has to find the subsidy.

### **The Commonwealth Argument**

Yet, far the most serious criticism of Britain's proposed entry into the Common Market has come from those who, like Lord Beaverbrook and the most vocal of the Government's critics both on the Left and the Right in the recent debate, argue that Britain should indeed seek membership in a larger unit but that the unit should not be Europe but the Commonwealth. The not very adroit tactics of the Government in leaving its consultations with the Commonwealth countries to the last has resulted in a considerable volume of Commonwealth criticism of Britain's proposed step. But the point is not really a valid one. If the choice before the British Government was a choice between a Free Trade Commonwealth and a Free Trade Europe, there would indeed be much to be said for the former. Quite apart from our sentimental obligations to the Commonwealth, their economies are much more complementary to ours, while those of the European nations are largely competitive. That is to say, the European nations produce very much the same sort of goods as one another. The Commonwealth countries supply us with the raw materials in which we are deficient. But, of course, there is no such choice of alternatives. Both under the Socialists and again under the Conservatives the British Government has made an offer of Commonwealth Free Trade to the other Commonwealth countries and that offer has been rejected. Canada and Australia by no means look to an arrangement by which they supply the food and exchange it for our manufactured goods. They are determined, as they are perfectly entitled, to build up their own industries behind

their own tariff walls. Similarly, if Dr. Nkrumah has his way, the African countries of the Commonwealth, far from accepting a system of Commonwealth Free Trade, will wish to build up an African Common Market for themselves. Of course, we have obligations to the countries of the Commonwealth. To the white countries which have twice in a lifetime come to our aid we have an obligation of honour. New Zealand in particular has directed all her exports by deliberate policy to this country, and it would be a shameful act if we were suddenly to shut her out from our markets. To the non-white countries of the Commonwealth we have the obligation which all developed countries have to the underdeveloped countries. The Treaty of Rome, as it is, is riddled with Escape Clauses, and there will be no technical difficulty in getting inserted into it provisions that will enable us to perform our obligations to the Commonwealth. Whether General de Gaulle will allow such provisions to be inserted remains to be seen. Every one agrees that they are the condition without which our membership would not be possible.

### **Britain and Europe**

There is, I think, insufficient understanding in this country of the distrust with which British policy is regarded on the Continent. There have been few sorer stories in history than that of Britain's continental policy since the war. The traditional British policy was one of isolation from continental entanglements and, in a time when it was not possible to get to Britain except in a ship and when we were careful to have many more ships than anybody else, there was a great deal to be said for this policy. There was less to be said for it in this new and more uncomfortable world of the aeroplane and the guided missile. Still, if after 1945 Britain had reasserted her traditional isolationism, it would have been, if misguided, at least intelligible. It would have been equally intelligible if, accepting the logic of the new conditions, she had accepted the leadership of a United Europe which in those days she could have had on any terms that she wished. What British statesmen did was less intelligible. They took the lead

in preaching the gospel of a United Europe so long as it was a mere matter of rhetoric, and then invariably shied away from any practical scheme for bringing that union about. The Socialist Government refused to take part in the talks for the formation of the Coal and Steel Community. The Conservatives, with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Macmillan at their head, had been the leaders of the campaign for the formation of a European Army, as it was then called. They had moved the motion for it at Strasbourg. They were not then in government, but in none of their speeches was there the faintest inkling that, should such an Army be formed, Britain would not participate in it. Therefore, when the Conservatives came into power in 1951, continental opinion took it for granted that Britain would join the Army. Sir David Maxwell Fyfe went to Strasbourg and made there a speech in which there was no hint that Britain would not join. The same day at Rome, Sir Anthony Eden announced that the British Government would not join the European Army and the French were left alone to make what terms they could with the Germans. It is not surprising that the European Powers decided in the end to go ahead without the British and that the question should now be whether or not they will allow us into Europe. We could have come in on our own terms, if only at the first, we had been willing to match our deeds to our words.

### **The Ultimate Justification**

Our entry into Europe is attacked by critics on the Right on the ground that Europe is a left-wing place with large Communist Parties which may any day become dominant. It is attacked by critics on the Left on the ground that Europe is a right-wing place and that under a European Government this country will not be free to carry out Socialist experiments. It is attacked by Lord Attlee on the ground that Europe is not the world. Lord Attlee's attack is in the form in which it is made absurd. But it does of course carry a reminder that there is a possibility of the development of a European chauvinism which teaches Europeans that they are the superiors of other men and which would be as evil and as dangerous

as any of the narrow nationalisms of previous ages. Christ died for all men. Our duty must be to all men. Europe has its proud history and we Europeans have a right and a duty to take such measures as we may to make Europe secure and prosperous. But we have no right to do this for purely selfish ends. We have only the right to make ourselves prosperous in order that we may be the better able to help other men. The encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI laid down the principles of social justice within a nation. But there has been, until recently, surprisingly little Catholic teaching on the principles of international social justice. The present Pope in his latest encyclical has remedied that defect. Europe's task is to help the world. A weak and bankrupt Europe cannot perform that task, but a strong and prosperous Europe will only be justified in so far as it does perform it.

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### **WATCH FOR THESE**

Pride of place is taken in the November number of *Christian Order* by Hugh Kay's eye-witness account of his experiences in Angola. Already, he has written of those experiences in the *Catholic Herald* of which he is Assistant Editor. In *Christian Order* he will probe deeper and approach the Angola trouble from a slightly different angle. The result will be of the greatest assistance to those readers who want to get a balanced view of this prickly question.

There are other good things in a rather bright issue. Father John Murray's article on United Europe had to be held over from this month's number of *Christian Order*. It will be published in the November issue and will complete the already sound view of United Europe which readers should have gained from a careful study this month of the articles by Christopher Hollis and J. M. Jackson.

We have to hand such a mass of material for forthcoming numbers of *Christian Order* that, apart from the usual regular features, it is not dead easy to say, at this stage, what further articles there will be. There is, for example, a fascinating account of a self-build housing project in India, a rather depressing analysis of godlessness in rural Russia. There are others as well, but they cannot all go in.

Britain is on the move, startlingly so, towards Europe. It has all happened rather suddenly, but she is applying for membership of the Common Market. What does this mean in terms of her economic life and that of the Commonwealth? Is she running out on her old friends to seek new advantages without them? Or is she placing herself in a position to help them better? These and other questions are asked and answered by Dr. J. M. Jackson, a Catholic economist who lectures at St. Andrew's University in Scotland.

## Going into Europe: The Economic Aspect

J. M. JACKSON

**T**HE TREATY OF ROME was signed on March 24th, 1957, and the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) came into being. The six member countries, France, Western Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, are committed to the creation of a European Common Market and to various forms of economic co-operation that are seen as essential to its smooth working.

### The Treaty of Rome

The most important provision of the Treaty of Rome is the creation of a European Common Market, a customs union of the six member countries of E.E.C. A customs union implies at least two things. First, the members abolish tariffs and quota restrictions on each other's goods. The Treaty of Rome envisaged the establishment of complete free trade between member countries after a period of 12 to 15 years, but there is some evidence that the lowering of tariffs is being speeded up. Secondly, the members of a customs union establish a common tariff against imports from non-member countries.

It is this second feature that distinguishes the European Common Market from the European Free Trade Association formed by

Britain, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland (the original Seven) and Finland. Like E.E.C. the members of E.F.T.A. agree to the abolition of tariffs on each other's goods but not to the creation of a common tariff wall against the rest of the world.

When there is a customs union and common tariff, there can be complete freedom of trade between member countries. No complication arises, for example, if goods for the Rhineland are imported through Rotterdam and sent down the river from there, rather than imported through a German port and sent to their final destination by rail. If, on the other hand, there is no common tariff, Germany might object to goods going to the Rhineland via Rotterdam if the Netherlands had a lower tariff than Germany. To give German manufacturers the degree of protection they expect, goods crossing the Dutch-German frontier would have to pay the difference between the two tariffs. Moreover, administrative problems arise over such matters as certifying that goods crossing the frontier free of duty are in fact predominantly of domestic manufacture. It is largely because of this kind of problem that E.E.C. members were not enthusiastic about the early British proposal for a European Free Trade Area, which would have involved free trade between the members of E.E.C. and those of E.F.T.A., whilst only the six E.E.C. countries had a common tariff.

### Danger of Non-membership

We must accept the fact that the Common Market has been created. It is possible to argue that Britain would have been better off if the members of E.E.C. had not decided to co-operate in the way they have done. This is not the same as arguing that Britain ought not to join the Common Market, now that it exists. We already have a substantial trade with Europe, and as tariffs between members of E.E.C. are lowered, we will find it increasingly difficult to hold that trade. Where, in the past, we may have sold certain goods to France, for example, in successful competition with countries that are members of E.E.C., we shall find in future that

the scales are weighted against us. Our European competitors will have free entry to the French market whereas we shall have to face the common tariff imposed by all E.E.C. countries.

There is a second danger. Manufacturers inside the Common Market will have access to a vast home market, larger even than the market open to American manufacturers. The size of the American market has undoubtedly been an important factor in the success of many American industries, and similar gains by way of specialisation and economies of scale are hoped for from the Common Market. Already we are experiencing economic difficulties because our export industries are not always competitive. If we remain outside the Common Market, there is a very real danger that we shall fall still further behind.

### **Effect on British Industry**

Many workers and employers are afraid of free trade between Britain and the members of E.E.C. They fear that lower wage levels in E.E.C. countries will enable them to undercut us in our home market unless wage levels here fall.

These fears are greatly exaggerated. We need only look at the United States, where wage levels are the highest in the world. This, however, does not stop United States firms in a variety of industries from competing successfully against those in countries with lower wage levels. Competitiveness depends on the level of total costs, and when wage levels are very different there is usually a big difference in the methods of production employed. When wages are high, labour is usually assisted by a large quantity of capital per head and productivity is very high; when wages are low, less capital per head is employed and productivity is lower, so that it does not follow that total costs per unit of output are lower.

This is not to say that some British industries might not find themselves undercut by European competition. Part of the case for a Common Market is that production can be concentrated where it can be carried on most efficiently. We would stop making certain goods for ourselves if they could be produced more efficiently by

one of the other Common Market countries, and in exchange would supply that country with goods that we could produce more efficiently. As a result of this increased international specialisation, productivity and living standards would be raised all round.

On balance, we would have little to fear from increased competition, except where restrictive practices exist on one or both sides of industry. But if increased competition were to force unions and employers in this country to abolish harmful restrictive practices, this in itself would be a very considerable gain.

### **Agriculture and the Common Market**

Although one of the most commonly expressed fears about British membership of the Common Market has concerned the future of British agriculture, there is, according to some authorities, a very real possibility that in certain fields British agriculture could look forward to securing a considerable market in Europe.

At the present time, the agricultural policy of the Common Market has not been worked out. It seems probable, however, that the system that will be adopted will differ in important respects from that prevailing at present in Britain. We have chosen to make specific subsidies on the acreage devoted to certain crops or deficiency payments where the market price falls below a guaranteed level. It is probable that the Common Market countries will adopt a system that provides more incentive to specialisation and to the concentration of production where it is most efficient, as opposed to the British system which in large measure tries to compensate the farmer who is at a natural disadvantage.

The method to be adopted by the Common Market will probably seek to protect its farmers by tariffs against imports from outside the Common Market. Some suggestions have been made that the likely tariffs to be adopted by E.E.C. countries on agricultural goods will be very much higher than those now imposed by Britain. This creates a problem not so much for the British farmer, as for the industrialist, who may be faced by demands for higher wages if such tariffs increase the cost of living. To this there are two answers.



First, that the effect on the cost of living would not be all that great, and secondly, that there is provision in the Treaty of Rome for special arrangements to be made in the case of a country that has hitherto had low tariffs on important foodstuffs. The Commission (one of the administrative institutions set up by the Treaty) may "authorise any Member State to suspend, in whole or in part, the collection of the duties applicable or may grant to such Member State tariff quotas at a reduced rate of duty or duty free, provided that no serious disturbance of the market of the products concerned may result therefrom."

Britain, of course, imports foodstuffs on a much larger scale than any member of the Common Market. Since, however, the scale of British imports is in many instances such that there would be no possibility of meeting the demand from Common Market sources, it could hardly be argued that the authorisation of some special arrangement would cause "serious disturbance of the market".

### **Commonwealth and E.F.T.A.**

Britain's entry into the Common Market would mean, unless special arrangements were made, that whereas Commonwealth countries now enjoy preferential tariffs when exporting to Britain (except against members of E.F.T.A.), they would in future be discriminated against. Goods from the six member countries of E.E.C. would come in duty-free, whereas Commonwealth products would be subject to the common tariff created by E.E.C. This *might* be a serious matter for a country like New Zealand that sells a large proportion of its agricultural output on the British market, and also for some of the new African members of the Commonwealth. On the other hand, we should not be blind to the fact that imperial preference is now very largely one-sided, and is likely to become increasingly so. While it is true that a great deal of our export trade is with the Commonwealth, there is no denying the fact that there is not the slightest chance that the Commonwealth countries will give us the kind of opportunity that the Common Market will. Instead, it is likely that these countries will increasingly protect their

own growing industries against British competition. Above all, we have no cause to be particularly solicitous about the future of Canadian trade with this country, since Canada already sells here more than she buys from us, and has been only too ready to increase the degree of protection she gives her own industries when British manufacturers show signs of breaking into the Canadian market. The attitude of one prominent Australian, Lord Casey, who said, in a recent debate in the House of Lords, that the Commonwealth stands to gain more from a prosperous Britain inside the Common Market than a poor Britain outside, is altogether more sensible and responsible than the whinings of Mr. Diefenbaker.

We may hope that special arrangements may be made to protect the legitimate interests of the Commonwealth countries. On the other hand, we should not get the matter out of proportion. Even if no special arrangements are made, there can be no escape from the simple fact that Britain will remain dependent on large supplies of imported foodstuffs, and that the substitution of supplies from E.E.C. countries would only be possible to a limited extent. The worst consequence for the Commonwealth countries would be that they would have to compete in Britain on the same terms as other non-E.E.C. countries. There is certainly no reason at all why we should think of giving the Commonwealth countries a right to veto our decision to enter the Common Market, still less why we should be deterred by the objections being put forward by our own starry-eyed imperialists living in their own little dream world.

The same kind of objection springs from our relationship with our E.F.T.A. partners. These objections are not so strong since it would be relatively easy for them to follow us into the Common Market. Denmark has such a close economic link with Britain that she is almost bound to follow our lead, and, in fact, applied for membership at the same time as Britain.

### **National Sovereignty**

There are, of course, those critics who fear the loss of sovereignty that would be implied by membership of the Common Market. We

will not worry here about the very long-run possibilities of closer political integration following economic co-operation, but merely look at the extent of loss of sovereignty that arises from the Treaty of Rome as it exists today. Before doing so, however, it is worth remembering that any treaty implies a loss of sovereignty in so far as we commit ourselves to doing certain things. We limit our national sovereignty by membership of G.A.T.T., O.E.C.C., N.A.T.O. and the United Nations. The question we must ask about the Treaty of Rome is not whether joining would limit our national sovereignty but whether it would do so intolerably and without an adequate *quid pro quo*.

### **Social Policy**

The Treaty of Rome provides for the establishment of a "common social policy" on the part of the members of E.E.C. This policy would cover such matters as employment, labour legislation, social security, working conditions, vocational training, trade union rights and collective bargaining.

The establishment of free trade between the member countries would naturally tend to promote a levelling up of wages—increased specialisation and the benefits of economies of scale in a large market would ensure that the process was not one of levelling down. This levelling process would be reinforced by the increased freedom of movement of labour and capital within the Common Market. (The free movement of labour would mean that workers would have the right to enter another member country *if they had a job to do*. It does not mean that the unemployed of one country would have the right to enter another country in order *to look for a job*.) This movement of labour would naturally mean that social policies would be brought closer together, and there would have to be some reciprocity over such matters as social security. There seems little reason to suppose that the adoption of a common social policy would retard the development of social services in any country—if anything, it would force all to raise their services to the standard of the best. Nor does there seem any reason why this common policy should be carried

to the point of denying variety in the methods of providing social services. It need not rule out the continued development of state services in Britain, nor a policy of moving away from reliance on the state in this field. Moreover, increased productivity and higher living standards resulting from the Common Market should make it easier for individuals to make provision for their own welfare.

### **Further Features**

Two features of the common social policy call for special mention. First, a European Social Fund is to be established to help meet the costs of retraining and or resettling men who have to find new jobs because of the changes in the structure of industry resulting from the creation of the Common Market. We have seen already that a country might well find some of its industries losing ground to fellow members and others increasing their exports. Workers would have to transfer from one set of industries to another, and it is all to the good that there should be international co-operation in facing the problems of re-adjustment created by increased international specialisation.

Secondly, the members of E.E.C. are committed to the establishment of equal pay for men and women. This measure is sound in principle, and has been adopted already in certain fields in this country and is sought by the unions in others. There are bound to be difficulties, however. There is still a fairly rigid distinction between "men's work" and "women's work". On the average, men are paid substantially more than women, and in those fields where equal pay has been introduced, the woman either earns a great deal more than she could expect in any other field, or, where more women than men are employed, the man is paid less than he could expect to earn elsewhere. But this is a problem that is already with us as a result of the introduction of equal pay in the Civil Service and teaching, so it gives no reason for hesitation about joining the Common Market.

### **Economic Policy**

The Treaty of Rome leaves member countries free to determine

their own monetary policies, and they are responsible for their own balance of payments problems. Nevertheless, these matters are intimately connected with trade, and in practice it would not be possible for one country to go its own way, entirely regardless of the policies of the other members. Since the balance of payments has been a continual source of worry to this country since the war, and another crisis has coincided with our application for membership of the Common Market, we must ask ourselves whether membership would affect our ability to deal with such a crisis in the future.

First, we need have no fear that membership of the Common Market would itself precipitate a crisis. We need not fear that we would increase our imports from Europe more than we would increase our exports to Europe. Moreover, if the benefits of increased international specialisation and access to a large market materialise, it would improve our competitive position in world markets generally, and reduce the likelihood of such crises in future. If a crisis should occur, there are provisions in the Treaty of Rome whereby temporary help will be given to a member in serious difficulties until that member can take the necessary corrective action.

One form of corrective action is to reduce imports by raising import duties and imposing quotas. This method would be available as an emergency measure, but its indefinite retention against other members would hardly be compatible with the continued existence of the Common Market and its ideals.

The alternative is to make one's own goods more competitive. This can be done in two ways. The first is to lower the level of costs at home. In so far as this can be done by eliminating restrictive practices, it is a desirable policy. If there are inflationary tendencies in the economy, these must be eliminated by higher interest rates and or increased taxation. This policy may have to be followed, even if it means some rise in the level of unemployment. This method, however, will not work if export markets are lost because former customers are deliberately restricting their purchases from us. When this happens, the danger would be that we would have to push deflation to the point where there was mass unemployment, and

our own incomes fell so that we had to reduce our imports to the value of our exports. Again, however, this problem is one which can arise, whether we join the Common Market or not.

The other way in which we could make our goods cheaper abroad is by devaluing the pound. If the value of the pound were to fall from \$2.80 to \$2, a £1,000 car being sold in America would fall in price from \$2,800 to \$2,000 and the sales of such cars and other British goods would increase. Similarly, foreign goods would become dearer, and our imports would be checked. If necessary, this course of action could still be followed: there is nothing in the Treaty of Rome to stop us using it.

### **Local Unemployment**

One objective of the Treaty of Rome is to encourage production in those areas where it will be most efficient. It may be debatable whether policies such as Britain has adopted for steering industries to areas of relatively high unemployment would be compatible with membership of E.E.C. The Treaty of Rome does, it is true, provide for special measures to help areas of high unemployment, but whether a small country like Scotland would qualify when its unemployment is only half that of a major country like Italy is doubtful.

Nevertheless, Scotland might well gain from a British entry into the Common Market. American firms are anxious to make investments in Europe, and seeing that the Americans are confident that the Common Market will lead to economic progress for its members, it is likely that American investment will go to the Common Market countries. If Britain joins, she can expect to share in that investment and, in that event, those parts of Britain suffering from more than average unemployment will be among the areas to benefit.

Taking the picture as a whole, Britain would seem to have much to gain and very little to lose by joining the Common Market. We must hope, therefore, that the negotiations over the British application for membership will proceed smoothly to a successful and speedy conclusion.

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## Any Questions

WILLIAM LAWSON SJ

Today there is more leisure for many. How, then, is leisure to be spent? Are there any rules and what does the Church think of the use of recreation time? Are youth clubs a good thing and should Catholics only go to Catholic ones? Why is the practice of Catholicism falling off today? Or is it? Has it always seemed that way? What can the individual Catholic do to maintain progress in what is called the spiritual life? These are the questions Father Lawson has before him this month. Readers are invited to send him any others they have at the back of their minds.

### What is the Church's attitude to youth clubs?

THERE IS NO official doctrine of the Church on youth clubs, apart from her general teaching about the upbringing of the young. Everybody would agree that adolescents must be adequately provided for. In this country, the government, the Church, and all other authorities responsible for or concerned with the education and well-being of young people are seriously considering the Albemarle Report and its recommendations, many of them dealing with youth clubs.

Adolescents are neither children nor adults, and they need a place of their own where they can meet and enjoy themselves in the kind of independence which suits their intermediate status. All kinds of difficulties arise. A great many adolescents are well able to look after themselves without a special "Youth Service". They join school and college societies and use the entertainment provided for citizens in a large town. A youth club for them would be a concentration of only a part of the wide range of activities they already have. Those who need a club are more limited in their interests. The staple of their entertainment is dancing. They do not think of a club in terms of hobbies or higher education. A club which is little more than a dance hall with appendages would separate the less from the more educated.

Catholics have their own schools. Should they have their own clubs? They would not be helped by a club unless it accepted Christian standards of behaviour. Could they count on the acceptance of those standards in any but a professedly religious club? But where would the money come from? And besides, is it helpful all round to separate young Catholics from their contemporaries? Whether Catholic or not, whom is the club for? Is membership to be selective so as to exclude the more difficult and the less respectable adolescents? If that, then the clubs are barred to those who need them most. Problems are easier to find than solutions.

### What proportion of one's time can be reasonably spent on recreation?

HERE IS A question impossible to answer except, unhelpfully, in the most general of terms. I might say: "Such time as is required to re-create the powers needed for living a good life": but by that answer I provoke questions about the good life and the powers used in living it. And there is still the question: What is recreation?

Many time-tables have been drawn up as a guide to a satisfactory life—eight hours a day for sleep, eight for work, and eight for social life, and so on—but they are useless. The need for sleep changes with age and even then varies according to constitutions and occupations. The ideal duration of a day's work depends on the sort of work it is. Mental work is hardly subject to regulation and it even invades the time that should be left for sleeping. Heavy manual work should be shorter than light manual work. Trade union rules and automation cut down working hours and provide more leisure.

It is no help to substitute "pleasure" for "recreation". Work ought to be pleasurable, and some of it is.

Can we tackle the question by saying that in our working hours

we should be fully employed as long as possible? So, we take the amount of sleep that puts us in the best condition for a fully active life, we work all out to fulfil obligations to dependents and employers, we cultivate those interests which make a balanced personality, and, to avoid the tensions which diminish our power to live fully, we relax at need in games or cabbage-like passivity.

Not very precise. If you must have particular pronouncements, what about these? To play all the time is a waste of life: and to "view" just because the television is there is sub-human.

**I am told that the practice of Catholicism is falling off almost everywhere. If this is so, how do you explain the weakening hold of Catholicism in this age?**

IN ANY CATHOLIC population there is always a fraction which does not practise. In this country estimates vary of the proportion of lapsed or non-practising Catholics, but even the lowest estimate is alarming. A recent survey of French Catholicism shows some regions where those who do not practise far outnumber those who do. Reports I have heard from priests working in countries or parts of them which are counted as Catholic tell the same tale. In Italy there is still a strong faith, but many have it without bothering to frequent the sacraments. Spain has an even stronger faith, but even there a surprising number of the nominally faithful stay away from church. Parts of Catholic Germany can't be roused to anything like a fifty-per-cent rate of practising even by intense missionary activity.

The record is certainly bad. One of the general reasons for the falling off is that the world, as usual, is changing faster than the Church's measures to meet it, and the rate of change is greater than ever before. The world is always more mobile than the Church and has the advantage of motorised divisions over infantry.

Everyone knows the changes in the modern world, in communications: jet aircraft, electrified railways, cars, daily newspapers, radio and television. They can all penetrate at will the old-fashioned defences behind which religious practice used to be preserved. Families, parishes, even nations are no longer self-contained units which could shut the gates against intruders. All the means of communication spread falsehood as well as truth, bad example as well as good. They are mainly in the service of naturalism and materialism, with emphasis on material security, comfort and luxury.

St. John's counsel is more than ever necessary: Love not the world, nor the things that are in the world.

**What is meant by "progress in the spiritual life"?**

MUCH THE SAME as is meant by progress in material life—growth in stature and strength, and development of faculties and skills.

The term "spiritual life" is incorrect for the meaning given to it. Strictly it means the life of the spirit, mind and will: and progress in the spiritual life would include advance from simple arithmetic to quadratic equations. The term "supernatural life" won't do either because the whole being, spirit and matter, is supernaturalised by sanctifying grace. What is wanted is a term for the life of the supernaturalised spirit.

Sanctifying grace is a real life which joins with our natural life and makes our living supernatural. In our living of supernatural life we can be more conscious and effective, or less. Christians stay alive supernaturally, and grow, if they refrain from killing themselves by grave sin. Many are not content with that negative attitude. They make efforts to develop—to "progress in spiritual life". Experts in physical culture study anatomy and physiology, and undertake regular physical training. Those who would be at all expert in supernatural living should also study and practise.

What is supernatural life? What does it do? How is it preserved and intensified? What are faith, hope, charity, prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance, benignity, patience . . . and how are they exercised? In what special ways can examination of conscience and confession be employed to promote and control progress in spiritual life? Anybody taking supernatural living seriously would seek answers to those and similar questions. The answers are to be found, haphazard in sermons, at long intervals in retreats, but regularly and systematically by reading.

There are many excellent sources of information, authoritative and readable. I will mention only two: a book by Fr. C. W. Howell, S.J., *The Work of Our Redemption*, published at 5s. by the Catholic Social Guild; and a quarterly published from 31, Farm Street, London, W.1 at 30s. a year and called *The Way*.

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THE ENGLISH AGAIN

"It was not a very nice experience."—An English lady after having been stranded for nineteen hours in a cable car suspended between heaven and earth and liable to crash at any moment.

## CURRENT COMMENT

No man in Britain is better qualified to comment on Communism's latest manifesto than H. W. Henderson. He has given years of his life to warning his countrymen of the menace that Communism represents. As a result, he has to hand a vast mass of information on every aspect of Communist theory and practice. In this devastating critique he puts it to the best possible use.

# New Communist Programme

H. W. HENDERSON

“COMMUNISM ACCOMPLISHES THE historic mission of delivering all men from social inequality, from every form of oppression and exploitation, from the horrors of war, and proclaims peace, labour, freedom, equality and happiness for all peoples of the earth.” Such are the words that introduce the new programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, widely publicised in the Western Press at the end of July. This programme is described as the third of a series. The first programme, adopted in 1903, called for the overthrow of Capitalism and was carried out (it is claimed) by the October Revolution of 1917. The second programme, that of 1919, outlined the task of building Socialism, which has now (“completely and finally”) triumphed in the Soviet Union. The third programme, now put forward with a fanfare of trumpets, has for its object the building of a fully Communist society.

### Communism and Equality

Before examining the promises made in the new programme let us glance for a moment at the claims made in introducing it. The historic mission of Communism, we are told, is to deliver all men from social inequality, oppression and exploitation. If this is the ultimate aim of a fully fledged Communist system surely in the forty odd years of Communist rule in Russia we should have found

some evidence of progress in the direction indicated. But, so far from this being the case, it is plain that all movement has been in the opposite direction. Under Marxian Socialism, which Lenin regarded as the first step to Communism (1), social inequality grew ever greater and oppression and exploitation even more intense. Lenin's early idea of equality in wages (2) was quickly thrown overboard after the Bolsheviks came to power. Under Stalin, inequalities grew so great that only the blindest could fail to see the emergence of a new Communist ruling class oppressing and exploiting the masses more ruthlessly than the Tsars.

### Communism and Peace

The historic mission of Communism is, also, we observe, to deliver men from the horrors of war and proclaim peace, labour, freedom, equality and happiness for people everywhere. But what evidence is there that it can ever accomplish such a purpose? Communism, *in theory*, does not stand for peace. It pictures life as a constant battlefield in which the various social classes struggle for mastery; a struggle which, after long and terrible years of mortal combat, is to lead to the universal triumph of the proletariat (3). Communism, *in practice*, does not stand for peace. The Russian Communists, since their earliest days, have waged relentless war not only on all classes opposed to them, but on leaders of the working class who would not tamely toe the Communist line (4). They have invaded the peaceful territory of other States, liquidated members of the government who would not surrender to their demands, executed or imprisoned

<sup>1</sup>“The first phase of Communist society (generally called Socialist) . . .”—Lenin, *The State and Revolution*.

<sup>2</sup>“The whole of society will have become one office and one factory, with equal work and equal pay.”—Lenin, *The State and Revolution*. Lenin emphasises in half a dozen passages in this work that under Socialism the higher officials would receive no more than “workingmen's wages”.

<sup>3</sup>“The dictatorship of the proletariat is necessary, and victory over the bourgeoisie is impossible without a long, stubborn and desperate war of life and death.”—Lenin, *Left-Wing Communism*.

<sup>4</sup>For a graphic account of the Communist persecution of working class leaders in Communist dominated countries see *The Curtain Falls*, the story of the Socialists in Eastern Europe, by Denis Healey, with a foreword by Aneurin Bevan.

the workers' representatives, and cruelly persecuted the Church. To pretend that a system which has committed these and many other crimes against free men everywhere in the forty odd years of its existence—and has shown not the slightest tendency to abandon the tyrannical course on which it is set—will, in a period of twenty years more, transform itself into the most perfect system of democracy and justice the world has ever known, is to fly in the face of all experience.

### Communism and Socialism

This third programme has no more chance of succeeding than the two that preceded it. The claim that the 1903 and 1919 Communist programmes have been carried out is utterly untrue. The revolutionists who planned to overthrow Capitalism seized power largely through extraordinary good luck and the blunders of their opponents, in a predominantly peasant country. In the advanced capitalist countries where, according to Marxian theory, they should have been successful first, they were everywhere defeated. And in the one country where they were successful in seizing power, they established a system not of Socialism but of State Capitalism, with all the features of capitalist society that Lenin—before he came to power—had denounced. Whatever the Communists have done in Russia they have not established Socialism as the term is understood in the West. They have not even established Socialism as the term was understood by Marx and Engels, who imagined that after the revolution the proletariat would at last be free from exploitation(5). The failure of the Communists to achieve their earlier goals (in spite

<sup>5</sup>“All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority.”—Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*.

Marx and Engels also refer in another passage to the Socialist State as “the proletariat organised as the ruling class.” Lenin, commenting on this in *The State and Revolution*, says: “The State, i.e., the proletariat organised as the ruling class, is precisely the dictatorship of the proletariat.” But when the Communists seized power in Russia the dictatorship of the proletariat became the dictatorship of the Party over the proletariat, a system under which the common people were no longer regarded as the new ruling class. From this have stemmed all the evils of the Communist dictatorship.

of the success they undoubtedly have had in reaching others of a totally different nature), coupled with the impudent claim that they have actually reached and surpassed these goals, should act as a warning against blind acceptance of the Communist programme recently promulgated.

It is against the background of these earlier failures, brazenly represented as gigantic successes, that we now examine the latest statement of Communist aims.

### Communism and Force

As was to be expected the word *peace* is strongly featured in the new programme. Working class power is to be achieved by “peaceful means”, but there is a warning that there exists a possibility that a non-peaceful path may be “forced” on the working people by violent action on the part of the “exploiting classes”. This is a typical example of Communist double-talk. Hitherto, the Communist Party has never shown any desire to extend “working class power” and nowhere has the working class less real power than in Communist countries. From its very inception the Bolshevik (now Communist) Party has distrusted the common people and imposed upon them a system worked out by the Communist élite without democratic consultation with the masses. This dictatorial system arose out of Lenin’s distrust of working class intelligence(6) and its ultimate end—the dictatorship of a single individual possessing supreme power in the State—was foreseen by Trotsky as long ago as 1905 (7). The

<sup>6</sup>“We said that there could not yet be Social-Democratic consciousness among the workers. This consciousness could only be brought to them from without. The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness, i.e., it may itself realise the necessity for combining in unions, to fight against the employers and to strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation, etc.

“The theory of Socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical and economic theories that were elaborated by the educated representatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals. The founders of modern Scientific Socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia.”—Lenin, *What Is To Be Done*.

“Leninist methods”, said Trotsky in *Our Political Tasks*, “would lead to a situation in which ‘the organisation of the Party takes the place of the Party itself, the Central Committee takes the place of the organisation, and finally the dictator takes the place of the Central Committee’.”—Boris Souvarine, *Stalin*.

pretence that violence may be necessary to reach the final stage of Communism because of aggression by the "exploiting classes" means simply that if, in the course of this development, the Communists, seeking to extend their rule over the earth, encroach upon the rights of others, the latter, if they offer resistance to the Communists, will be held responsible for any conflict that results. In the name of universal liberation all must bow before the Communist giant. Resistance to those who represent "the will of history" is considered to be tantamount to treason against human progress. But the Communist argument is thoroughly dishonest. At no time have the Communists believed that their aims could be attained by peaceful means. Always and everywhere they have placed their faith in force(8).

### Communism and Imperialism

Equally dishonest is the Communists' pretence to be the friends of national liberation. "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union," we read, "considers fraternal alliance with the peoples who have thrown off colonial or semi-colonial tyranny to be a cornerstone of its international policy." In point of fact, as all the world knows, the Soviet Union is the greatest imperialistic nation in the world today, dominating by force ten once-free European States (9) while the Western Powers, falsely represented as the enemies of national liberation, have given freedom to greater numbers than Russia has enslaved(10).

<sup>8</sup>"The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions."—Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. "Great questions in the life of nations are settled only by force."—Lenin, *Two Tactics*.

<sup>9</sup>Since the outbreak of war in 1939 Russia has, by force and fraud, extended her rule over Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany—countries with a total population of 100 million.

<sup>10</sup>Speaking of Britain's record alone on November 26th, 1958, the Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Macmillan, said: "Never before in history has a great imperial Power transformed itself consciously and willingly into a free family of nations. Since the Second World War countries of some 600 million people have taken their place as independent nations within the Commonwealth, and this development still continues. What a contrast with the ruthless Communist empire which has devoured one independent nation after another."

### Promise and Performance

In considering what the Soviet Union now asserts it will do in the next twenty years (a matter on which we can only theorise) it is necessary—we repeat—to examine what it has actually done (and can be shown to have done) in the forty odd years of its existence. Like breeds like and, if the result of Soviet rule so far has been the imposition of a monstrous tyranny on all who have fallen beneath the Communist steam-roller, it is in the highest degree unlikely that, with the passing of time, this system of oppression will produce a life of unexampled liberty for all mankind. Under the new plan, we are told, production will go up by leaps and bounds and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union plans the following increases in total industrial output: "Within the current ten years, by approximately 150 per cent., and exceeding the contemporary level of United States industrial output; within twenty years by not less than 500 per cent. and leaving the present overall volume of United States industrial output far behind." To achieve these remarkable results productivity in industry is to be increased by more than 100 per cent. within ten years and by 300 to 350 per cent. within twenty years. All this the Communist Party plans. But to plan something and to carry it out are two very different matters. Plans of one kind or another have been formulated by the Soviet leaders for many years. One five-year plan has followed another with monotonous regularity and always the goal of catching up with America was just around the corner. But America is still ahead and has, since the end of the war, poured out her wealth to help a stricken world, while Russia has sweated her workers and plundered her satellites in the most ruthless manner(11). Even if Russia were to increase her

<sup>11</sup>Marshal Tito provided some interesting information as to what was going on when Yugoslavia broke away from the Communist empire. In 1948, he said, 72 per cent. of Yugoslavia's copper, 62 per cent. of her antimony, 59 per cent. of her lead, 97 per cent. of her zinc, 72 per cent. of her mercury, and 100 per cent. of her iron had gone to Russia and the Cominform countries.—*Daily Herald*, 28-12-48.

If the other satellite states were free to speak they could doubtless tell a similar tale of plunder. Buying commodities such as coal at less than world market prices (thus keeping down the living standards of the satellite peoples)



industrial production at the rate planned is it supposed that America would be standing still? The Soviet Union resembles a harrier who, finding himself well behind, boasts that in a short time he will have passed the leading runner; a feat he might well accomplish if the man in the lead was standing still. But the United States has no intention of marking time and her industrial effort in the Second World War shows what a free society is capable of when the need arises.

### Promise for Agriculture

Other production miracles are to be accomplished in agriculture, the sphere in which the Soviet Union is so obviously and admittedly behind. Why we have seen no sign of them so far baffles comprehension. "In order fully to satisfy the requirements of the entire population and the national economy in agricultural produce," we are told, "the task is to increase the aggregate volume of agricultural production in ten years by about 150 per cent., and in twenty years by 250 per cent." That is "the task". But how is it to be accomplished? What evidence from past performances is there that it is possible? All we get are estimates floating on air: "In the first decade the Soviet Union will outstrip the United States in output of the key agricultural products per head of the population. The aggregate grain crops will more than double in 20 years and their yielding capacity will double. The output of wheat, maize, cereal and leguminous crops will increase substantially. Livestock breeding will develop at a rapid rate . . . Productivity of labour in agriculture will rise not less than 150 per cent. in ten years, and five to sixfold in twenty years." And so the tale goes on, with the poor old U.S.A. getting left further and further behind. But what is the position today? What are the facts on which we can actually lay our hands and contrast with the theories of what may—or may not—happen in the future?

is another device that has been employed with much advantage to the Soviet economy. So has the employment of millions of helpless people on slave labour, the existence of which, over a lengthy period of time, has been proved by massive evidence.

### Agricultural Performance

A close student of Soviet affairs, Mr. Robert Conquest, has recently given us some interesting facts about the state of Soviet agricultural production<sup>(12)</sup>. Soviet planning in agriculture was a colossal failure, claiming ten million victims. During a temporary period of relaxation—necessitated by the desperate situation that resulted—no less than two-thirds of the peasantry took advantage of it to leave the collective farms (though subsequently starved back). "From the production point of view, too," says Conquest, "the collectives were not a success. The 1928 level was not reached again until the 'fifties. Only five or six years ago it was revealed by Mr. Krushchev (in his reports to the plenary meetings of the Party Central Committee in September 1953 and February 1954) that the amount of grain *per capita*, and of cattle absolutely, was less than it had been in Tsarist times." In spite of mechanisation, etc., "much the same man-power is required on the land to produce the same results as when the backward *moujik* farmed his little plot." Krushchev himself has complained that efficiency in terms of American agriculture is incomparably ahead of that of Russia; "Depending on what figures one takes, the British or American farmer is from six to twelve times more productive than his Soviet equivalent." What is the existing position? "At present," says Mr. Conquest, "Soviet meat and milk production *per capita* is not only less than a third of American and about a quarter of Danish production, but it is even below countries like Britain where only a small proportion of the population is engaged in agriculture and where the economy is based on the large-scale importation of food."

### A Soviet Warning

In 1959, the Soviet Academician, Nemchinov, warned against certain illusions about the Soviet Union achieving superiority over the capitalist world at the end of the seven-year plan (launched in January of that year). "He said that, in 1965, production of energy in Soviet Russia per head of the population would still be below

<sup>12</sup>Robert Conquest, *Common Sense About Russia*.

the present output level of the U.S.A., Canada, Britain, Belgium and Sweden. Nemchinov also stated that in 1965 Russia would produce approximately one motor car for every 1,000 inhabitants. In Britain the present level of annual production is one car per 70 inhabitants."

Figures from the Soviet satellite States also emphasise the inability of the Communist States to compete in production with the free countries of the West and the refusal of their peoples to give of their best under Communist oppression. In Poland, for example, we learn that, in October 1956, Gomulka "pointed out that in 1955, individual farms had produced 16.7 per cent. more per hectare than collectives, and 37 per cent. more than state farms", and that "when Gomulka made them voluntary, within months over 80 per cent. of the collectives disintegrated and the peasants returned to individual farming."

### **Assortment of Miracles**

In spite of all these failures, the new Communist programme boldly offers an assortment of economic miracles in the next twenty years. The whole population is to have "a high level of income and consumption," "a living standard higher than that of any of the capitalist countries". In the next ten years the national income of the Soviet Union will increase by nearly 150 per cent., and by about 400 per cent. in twenty years, with corresponding increases in the incomes of factory and office workers. Every family will have a comfortable flat as the plan develops and this will be provided rent free. In addition, there will be free public transport facilities and public amenities such as water, gas and heating will also be free. There will be a great improvement in working hours and working conditions for all. All—let us emphasise—in the next 20 years!

### **Deliberate Falsehoods**

But this is not all. "The transition to Communism," we learn, "means the fullest extension of personal freedom and rights to Soviet citizens. Socialism has granted the working people the

broadest guaranteed rights and freedoms. Communism will bring the working people further great rights and opportunities. The Party proposes to enforce strict observance of Socialist legality, to eradicate all violations of law and order, abolish crime and remove all the causes of crime."

Here, it would seem deliberate falsehood and sheer insanity are equally mixed. The assertion that "Socialism" (the present system) has granted the Russian workers "the broadest guaranteed rights and freedoms" is demonstrably untrue. The people have neither freedom of the press nor the right to political opposition. In the recent cultural agreement signed between Britain and the Soviet Union it was made clear that no book or periodical containing any idea critical of Communism would be permitted into Russia. Western broadcasts are still blacked-out.

A free trade union movement does not exist in Russia. Soviet citizens cannot emigrate to other (non-Communist) countries as they do in the West. Real religious freedom is non-existent. Krushchev's speech to the "secret session" of the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 showed what Russia had suffered under Stalin's brutal rule for more than 20 years. And Krushchev (one of Stalin's most loyal supporters) has not changed the *essential principles* of the system since he came to power. If he is not so ruthless in his dealings with the people as Stalin was, it is because he is not so strong. But Hungary, in 1956, showed what he is capable of.

### **Sheer Insanity**

So much for the falsehood. Now look at the insanity. One of the things the Russian Communists are to do in the next twenty years is to "abolish crime"! That will be a feat indeed—something that religious teachers and moral philosophers have failed to do throughout the ages. Crime in the Soviet Union is to be punished by removing the *causes* of crime. Here we have Marxist-Leninism in all its crudity. Communists believe that all the evil in the world is caused by the economic system—capitalism. Change the economic system and you change the man. Under Communism, sin, poverty,

war, lust, hatred, greed, and every other evil will rapidly disappear. Startling as this view may appear, indoctrinated Communists really believe it. While sociologists express their dismay that, in Britain's Welfare State, where we have better housing, food, clothing, and education than ever before, juvenile crime continues to increase, the Communists boldly assert that the greater improvement in social conditions which they envisage will end crime altogether. The falsity of this view is easily demonstrated. All of us have known poor people who were morally good and of wealthy people who were morally evil. There are factors in this problem which the Communists do not see. We must all support the plea for better social conditions. But only the most naive will believe that these alone will "abolish crime".

### How Much Freedom?

How much freedom will the people have under fully-fledged Communism? The programme speaks of the need for letting "millions of working people . . . learn to govern the State". To facilitate this "at least one-third of the total number of deputies to a Soviet should be elected anew each time". Leading officials of the Soviet Union, its republican and local bodies should, as a rule, be elected "for not more than three consecutive terms". Very democratic. But, surely, we note that something is missing. Nowhere is it suggested that anyone but a Communist will be elected. Any other attitude to life is simply not to be thought of. Presumably it would be too absurd to discuss and, of course, "Fascist hyenas" (the polite Soviet name for oppositionists) would simply not exist in a Socialist State where crime had been completely and finally abolished.

### Proposed Moral Code

The builders of such a system are naturally expected to conform to a high moral code which will comprise the following, among other principles:

"Humane relations and mutual respect between individuals—man is to man a friend, comrade and brother.

"Honesty and truthfulness, moral purity, modesty and guilelessness in social and private life.

"An uncompromising attitude to injustice, parasitism, dishonesty, and careerism.

"Friendship and brotherhood among all peoples of the U.S.S.R.; intolerance of national and social hatred.

"Fraternal solidarity with the working people of all countries and with all peoples.

"An uncompromising attitude to the enemies of Communism, peace and the freedom of nations."

### Moral Performance

The mind reels at the audacity of it all. For almost all these principles are the very ones the Communists have most consistently rejected ever since the 1917 revolution. "Brotherly relations," even between one Communist and another, have been conspicuously absent. The leaders of Russia's Communist Revolution murdered each other until only one "good" man was left, the murderous Stalin whose crimes were exposed by Krushchev in 1956. After this, Krushchev and his comrades murdered Beria on framed-up charges of having been a "Western Agent" since 1919! "Honesty and truthfulness" have never at any time had a place in Communist philosophy which teaches that whatever aids the cause is good—be it murder, torture, slander, or betrayal of anyone who offers resistance to the system (or even seems *capable* of doing so). "Injustice, parasitism, dishonesty, and careerism" have been greatly in evidence ever since the Bolsheviks seized the reins of government in Russia. The struggle for personal power has gone on continually, murder being resorted to repeatedly when it was necessary to remove a rival from the scene. "Friendship and brotherhood between all peoples" are presumably manifested in the crimes committed by the Soviet Union against Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary and other States that have fallen foul of Communist imperialism. "Fraternal

solidarity" with the workers of other countries no doubt refers to the imprisonment and murder of working class leaders in the countries Russia has overrun for daring to defend their people's rights.

### The Ultimate in Hypocrisy

That the Communists will adopt an "uncompromising attitude" to "the enemies of Communism" we need not doubt, and those who have experienced Communist rule know just what this means. But, for the most warlike and tyrannical nation of today to couple this with talk of the defence of peace and freedom, is surely to exceed the limit in hypocrisy and invite the laughter of free men everywhere.

This extraordinary programme, which has no relation to reality, will be the central topic of discussion in the Communist world for the next few weeks, after which it will be submitted to the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. On the surface it looks like the wildest dream of the Communist myth-addict. It is perfectly clear that it has not the faintest chance of being fulfilled. But Mr. Krushchev is not as mad as he appears. Its propaganda value, especially among millions of hungry people in Africa and Asia, will be immense.

### Stop Press

Perhaps the best commentary on the new Communist programme was provided by the following news item from the *Sunday Express* of July 30th, 1961: "A few hours before the plan for the Communist Utopia was published the East German Government admitted that the mass flight to the West is destroying its economy. It appealed to the nation to stop the mounting migration to West Berlin." Now this migration has been stopped by force.

Clearly, even with the most powerful and unscrupulous propaganda apparatus ever assembled in the hands of ruthless men, you can't fool all of the people all of the time!

## INSIDE THE UNIONS

Communists rarely know when they are beaten. That is why their come-back in the ETU has been so strong. How long will they continue to fight the battle on this ground? How and when will they finally be dislodged from their positions? Michael Kildare places the facts before the reader.

## Outlook for the ETU

MICHAEL KILDARE

IT IS FAIRLY certain that, by the time these lines are read, the Electrical Trades Union will have been disaffiliated by the Trades Union Congress and, perhaps, even by the Labour Party. At the time of writing, the Communist-controlled Executive Council of the ETU has refused to comply with the three-fold request put to it by the TUC with the implication that, if it did not do so, it faced suspension or worse. It is fairly certain that, if the decision to expel the Union is taken, other affiliated unions will support the TUC in the application of this drastic measure.

### Troubles to Come

Expulsion raises a whole host of questions, for the ETU, with its 243,000 members employed in almost every industry, is a large and important Union. Most of its members represent key personnel wherever they are employed and a stoppage of work by only a small group of them could have serious repercussions. It is felt by many that, if the ETU is expelled from the TUC, then the Union will retaliate with a series of strikes which will dislocate industry and place other trade unions in a very serious and delicate situation. On the whole, such fears can be discounted. Though the Communists

have had control of the ETU for about fourteen years, they are not very strong in the industrial and rank-and-file sections of the Union. Their strength lies in the Executive Committee and certain full-time, official positions. Only in a relatively few industrial establishments do they have, in fact, the kind of controlling or highly influential position, which enables them to call a strike more or less at will. Elsewhere, there must first be an industrial grievance to be exploited, for British trade unionists are, on the whole, opposed to the kind of strike action that is taken on political grounds. This is not to say that there will not be any industrial trouble in the event of the ETU being expelled from the Trades Union Congress. Situations could certainly arise under which industrial grievances would be more difficult to handle if the ETU had to negotiate in isolation as distinct from the company of other unions, equally concerned in a settlement, as is now the case. Again, other unions, affiliated to the TUC, will not be governed in their relationship with a disaffiliated ETU by the Bridlington Agreement, which prevents unions poaching members from each other. The Amalgamated Engineering Union, for example, can be expected to start an energetic recruiting campaign amongst ETU members and, in many areas, the campaign will meet with considerable success. This might lead to a situation where electricians—not necessarily Communists—would refuse to work with other electricians who are not members of the ETU. Thus, inter-union disputes and squabbles could arise in certain factories and they would be marked by the kind of bitterness only found in inter-union disputes.

### **Communist Grip Remains**

Since the court case, the Communists in the ETU have been trying to consolidate their position. The line of propaganda has been designed to highlight the effectiveness of the militant Communist leadership of the ETU during past years. Thus, they can point to increases of pay and improvement of conditions in the Union, its growing strength and the many campaigns conducted against the press, the "Tory" Government and "right wing reactionary elements"

in the Labour Party and TUC. It would surprise many outside the ETU to learn how effective this propaganda line has been. Branch after branch in the Union—and not by any means only those which are Communist controlled—has passed resolutions of support for Foulkes, the Communist President of the Union, and Haxell, its defeated General Secretary. To judge by appearances, the revelations of the court case have made very little impression on the rank-and-file of the union at the time of writing. The new General Secretary, John Byrne, has been called upon to resign because it is said that he was appointed by Mr. Justice Winn: what is forgotten or ignored is that, on the first day of the hearing, the ETU admitted that Haxell had not, in fact, been elected general secretary. It is also forgotten that Mr. Justice Winn declared John Byrne elected by at least 1,500 votes.

This, however, is only one aspect of the present situation. The national press makes very little impression on many active trade unionists. Particularly in the case of the ETU, the campaigns conducted by the Communist leadership against the national press have had the desired effect. It follows that the true and full facts of the case can only be got to members through union channels; which means the union journal or letters and statements issued by the Executive Council. Unfortunately, the Communist leadership controls these channels. Non-Communists, therefore, have no direct access to the Union's rank-and-file. Even at the Annual Conference, the non-Communist General Secretary, John Byrne, only spoke in secret session. The impact of his words was confined, in consequence, to approximately 360 delegates of whom 200 were his opponents.

### **Communist Claims**

Communists in the ETU have been making great play of the fact that the Union's membership has increased under their rule and that they have given better service because of the substantial increase in the number of the Union's full-time officials. What should be realised, however, is that electrical industrials and their subsidiaries have been expanding considerably over the past twenty years. This

has been particularly so during the past ten. It follows that boasted Communist increases were rendered essential by the facts of the expanding situation. Had they not occurred, the Communist leadership could justly have been charged with failure. It was, in other words, doing no more than its plain duty by its members. Admittedly, union membership has increased, but, without much doubt, the proportion of actual union members to those eligible for membership has fallen considerably. Had the union possessed sound leadership and been supported by public opinion, ETU membership would now be double what it actually is. The boasted increases of some thousands every year fade into insignificance when submitted even to this brief kind of analysis.

So far as concerns higher pay and improved conditions under Communist leadership, it is worth noting that most of the negotiations leading to these improvements have been in conjunction with other unions, who have shared like gains with the ETU. In fact, the Communist leadership would have been very poor indeed, had it been unable, since the end of the war, to improve the Union's bargaining position and the general welfare of its members.

All these points, and others, can be made. There is no doubt of their truth. The case they represent is a good one. To put it within the Union, however, is to incur the likelihood of punishment for having opposed the prevailing party line. That is one of the reasons why it is not publicly heard.

### **Is Legislation Necessary?**

Many people are now suggesting that government legislation must be taken to make sure that union elections, in future, are free from fraud or "fiddling" and that individual union members are protected from the kind of fate that has come during past years to members of the ETU. There is much to be said for this point of view. The difficulty is to see how suitable measures could be drawn up and enforced in such a way as to make them thoroughly effective. Moreover, it would be difficult to single out for this kind of treatment trade unions, as distinct from the many thousands of other voluntary

organisations in this country. Additionally, there would be heavy opposition from many trade unions whose election methods are perfectly sound. These would feel victims of a mentality which said that, because the members of one union were misbehaving in a certain way, then all unions should be penalised. Trade unionists who react in this fashion to the proposal of special legislation are perfectly willing that those found guilty of fraud in their midst should be punished. But, they say, even with government legislation, fraud will still be possible; why, therefore, pass the proposed legislation, which will have the additional disadvantage of stirring up much ill will? After all, legislation is in existence against murder and theft, but people still kill and break into houses. Those caught are punished. In the same way, let those found guilty of breaking trade union rules be punished. It is up to the unions to see to it that offenders in this respect are not merely caught, but punished adequately.

### **Apathy the Enemy**

Most of these problems could be solved if trade union members participated more actively in the affairs of their unions. Without it, one doubts whether legislation would have any really significant effect. For far too long, the few good men who are doing so much to stop the rot, have been left to carry the whole load by themselves. It is time more stirred.

Meanwhile, we can be quite certain that the Communists in the ETU will be stirring hard. They are not the ones to sit back because of what they regard as a slight setback. They will maintain their propaganda network within the Union and carry on their infiltration tactics: because they live their Communist Faith to the full, their influence will remain. There are two ways to counter it. The Communists must be opposed by an intensely active core of dedicated upholders of freedom and democracy in the Unions or else the decision must be taken, at appropriate level, to impose an official ban on them as office-holders in the unions. The first way is the best by far. The second will bear witness to nothing so much as the lazy apathy of Britain's trade unionists.

In this second article on the Soviet concentration camps, Father Paul Crane makes an attempt to determine the size of Russia's slave population under the present Krushchev regime. Thousands have come out of the camps. How many remain? Would it be true to say that their population is once again on the increase?

## Soviet Russia: The Facts

6 : THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS (ii)

PAUL CRANE SJ

### Dogs and Men

THE SOURCES ALREADY drawn on as testifying to the existence of slave camps in the Soviet Union and the size of their slave populations present us also with a very good idea of camp conditions. Amongst the official documents, which have become known to the free world despite Soviet security arrangements, are excerpts from a Russian brochure setting out regulations for the feeding of camp inmates (including domestic animals) and issued to the secret police in charge of the camps. The regulations governing supplies of food to the Ukhta-Pechora "corrective labour camps" of the NKVD occupy seventy-five pages and specify, down to the last gram of bread, the amount of food that is to be issued to the human and animal inmates of these camps. According to these regulations, whose validity we have no reason to doubt, a worker who fulfils from 75 to 80 per cent. of his norm in these camps receives 200 grams of bread a day. If he fulfils from 81 to 99 per cent. of his norm, he gets 400 grams. If he fulfils 100 per cent., he gets 600 grams. That is the human side of the picture. The same regulations show that camp dogs are better fed than the prisoners. The daily ration for dogs in this group of camps includes 250 grams of meat (prisoners receive 22 grams) and "detective" dogs, who fare even better, are issued each day with 400 grams of meat and 20 grams of animal fat. Prisoners

performing up to fifteen hours of hard labour a day exist at starvation level, being given a daily food intake which is the equivalent of 1,293 calories. Yet, the recognised daily minimum calory intake for an average man weighing 154 pounds and performing *sedentary* labour is 2,500 calories. A man engaged in heavy physical labour requires a daily intake of 4,500 calories; and these minimums apply to a temperate climate. The Ukhta-Pechora group of camps, however, is located on parallel 67, about two degrees above the Arctic Circle.

### Bodies without Souls

There is no reason for believing that the conditions obtaining in the Ukhta-Pechora group of concentration camps—as we know them from official Soviet documents—differ in any way from those prevailing elsewhere. They reveal a state of affairs in which human beings, who fall foul of the Soviet Government, are treated worse than dogs. There is, of course, a great deal of additional evidence in support of that provided by the feeding regulations which we have been examining and which were never meant to fall into the hands of representatives of the civilised world. One thinks, for example, of the group of convicts whom General Hilton, British Military Attaché in Moscow from 1947-49, saw working at railway construction. This is how he described them in his book, *Military Attaché in Moscow*: "There were, I should say, over three hundred of them, men and women, all dressed in the most filthy old rags. It was hard to guess their ages, for they all looked worn, weather-beaten and nearly at the end of their days. Their complexions were grey, and the skin on their faces was like semi-transparent parchment. They were working stolidly, with their eyes turned towards the ground. They did not look frightened, or merely tired and half-starved, but something far surpassing these ordinary degrees of misery. They looked like people whose spirits had already died, but whose bodies kept on working mechanically. Their movements were slow and lethargic, like those of half-wound clockwork toys." There are two other quotations I would like to cite in this context. One is from a Pole, who was in the camps. It appears in *The Dark Side of the Moon*.

"As for me," he said, "I am no longer a human being". The other is from a statement made by Dr. Julius Margolin, Polish-born Zionist scholar, an inmate of Soviet prisons and labour camps from June, 1940 until June, 1945. These are his words: "The prisoners live in primitive wooden barracks whose interiors are reminiscent of the famous scene in *The Lower Depths* of Gorki. About 100 prisoners live in one room, on plank beds arranged in two levels. . . . The mass of the prisoners are dressed in stinking rags and present a pitiful sight . . . an indescribable Hell to the eyes of a European. Persons who knew Polish prisons and the German Dachau of the year 1937 remembered them in the Soviet camps as a comparative paradise." There is little point in saying more. All the evidence is corroborative. Certainly in Stalin's day, the slave camps of Soviet Russia represented the ultimate in human degradation.

### **Economic Aspect of Forced Labour**

For what reason were so many in the Soviet Union of Stalin's day sent to forced labour? Originally, the idea behind the word "corrective" was to make treatment remedial instead of retributive. Prison life was to be educative instead of penal. From the start, however, the practice was very different from the idyllic descriptions given by Soviet propagandists and simple-minded visitors on their return from the Soviet Union. These claimed that the labour was voluntary. The only truth here, however, was that prisoners who refused to work were left without food. Work done when the alternative is death by starvation, can hardly be said to be voluntary. It is forced and, very soon, it was admitted to be so, even by the authorities of the Soviet Union. M. Zamorski, in the very careful work to which we have already referred in a previous article, quotes an eminent French jurist as asking whether a Russian convict who refused to embrace the principle of work would be "categorically exterminated". It was the notorious Vyshinsky himself who answered this question in the affirmative.

The abandonment of the principle of moral improvement by voluntary labour was forced, of course, by the Communist concept

of man as possessed of value only to the extent that he served the Soviet State. For the Communist, man has no value in himself. His worth is in proportion to his usefulness to the Party. If his forced labour is economically useful, then its systematic use becomes built in as a strut of the Soviet State. This is precisely what happened in Russia. The abandonment of the principle of moral improvement by voluntary labour was bound to come once it was realised, as it was early on, that convict labour was of great *economic* importance. Work was no longer seen as a means to the prisoner's re-education. The prisoner's detention very soon became the means of getting the work done. This applied particularly to heavy or dangerous work which was not very highly skilled and which could be organised, in consequence, on what you might call a plantation system. Slave labour paid. Once this was recognised it was bound to be used increasingly by a government which believed that man was of no value in himself, whose philosophy taught it that the only destiny of the citizen was to serve the State. In the Soviet Union, therefore, forced labour became a means of setting to work, at the lowest possible cost, the number of men and women it was thought desirable to employ in this fashion in the interests of the State. Very naturally, the MVD is in charge of this labour and of the camps where it is housed. It owns the slaves and hires them out at a price to other State departments in much the same way that prisoners of war were hired out as slaves to Krupps and others by the Nazi authorities during the last war. Naturally enough, as slave labour grew in importance during Stalin's day, the economic responsibilities of the MVD grew at the same time. As a result, the MVD's desire for slaves continued to grow: to fulfil its work-quota it had to obtain its labour-quota. Slavery had become part and parcel of the economic system of the Soviet Union. The slaves, in consequence, had to be found. By a kind of lunatic logic, the normal desire of police authorities in a civilised country to keep the prison population *down* was replaced by a crazy determination to keep it *up*. During the Second World War, the Central Administration of Forced Labour Camps—known as GULAG—had as its head a general of the



NKVD (formerly the MVD) whose name was Nedosekin. He was receiving constant demands from Stalin, Beria (head of the NKVD) and Molotov to supply forced labour contingents to meet the demands of various war industries. One day he complained to Kravchenko, author of *I Chose Freedom*: "What are we to do? The fact is that we haven't as yet fulfilled our plans for imprisonments. Demand is greater than supply."

### Slave Camps and Terror

Those words show as well as any I know the extent to which slave labour became built into the Soviet economic system. It was underpinned by a legal apparatus which served the double purpose of making slaves easily obtainable and, at the same time, terrorising the citizenry of the Soviet Union into servile acceptance of a totalitarian régime. One need only remember that, by the infamous decree of November 5th, 1934, Soviet citizens could be summarily judged and sent to a concentration camp if they were merely regarded, in the eyes of authority, as "socially dangerous". The possibilities open to those requiring an ever-increasing flow of forced labour are obvious enough. At the same time, it would be wrong to think that the motive behind the slave camps was solely economic. Their populations were full of those whose primary fault was that they were opposed to the régime. These it imprisoned out of revenge and in order to strike fear into the hearts of those of its subjects who still retained a nominal freedom. We are back at an old and familiar point. Totalitarianism cannot brook opposition, which means that no totalitarian government can live without terror. It is as an instrument of terror that the concentration camp comes into its own in any totalitarian régime. The threat of the dreadful fate it represents suffices to keep a whole population quietly submissive. Those not content to be so are sent there to disappear. Their "intransigence" no longer bothers the régime they dared to contradict. Meanwhile, they provide it with a most useful supply of cheap labour well suited to its economic purposes.

### Relaxation and Revolt

One question remains to be asked and answered to the best of our ability. It is this: Has any change taken place in the Soviet Union's system of slavery since Stalin's death in 1953? Most authorities are agreed that there has been a change, in that the population of the slave camps is now less than it was in Stalin's day. How much less it is difficult to say. Neither can it be said with any degree of certainty that the camp population will be retained in perpetuity at its present lower level. However, there has been a decrease in the number of slaves in the Soviet Union. The reason for this would appear to be twofold. In the first place, it was beginning to be realised a year or two before Stalin's death that slave labour was no longer the economic proposition it had once been. You can, in fact, get to a point in your treatment of slave labour where it is no longer willing to work, where it prefers to lie down and die. From the point of view of the Soviet Union's brutal utilitarian standards, slave labour, in this sort of physical and mental condition, is wasteful. Consequently, it pays to relax the harshness of prevailing conditions in order to improve output. Moreover, there is added reason for doing this when a country's economy passes over from a primitive early stage of industrialisation into one requiring more mechanical equipment. You can substitute slaves for a horse, yoke them to a plough and lash them along. You cannot, however, drive tractors with slaves. Unless you raise their physical strength to the point where they are mentally alert, they will be unable to cope with an increasingly mechanical industrial order.

In the Soviet Union, that order had long passed the point of its first appearance three years before Stalin's death. That is why, out of purely utilitarian motives, the physical condition of the slaves was improved. It was accompanied by a restoration of mental alertness sufficient to produce in 1950 and 1951 a totally unexpected outbreak of prisoners' strikes in a number of camps as far apart as Vorkuta inside the Arctic Circle and Karaganda in Central Asia. The strikes were brutally repressed. No word of them was given to the outside world. A precedent, however, had been set, an opinion created in the

camps to which any new Soviet Government would have to pay attention once it was decided not to carry repression to the brutal lengths to which Stalin was prepared to go. That Government came when Stalin died. Totalitarian though it was, it was not prepared to go to Stalin's repressive lengths against the Soviet people. It did not dare do so because it had experienced that repression itself and, more importantly, had felt the wave of relief mixed with hate which rose round it on Stalin's death. The people of the Soviet Union were demanding relief. To survive, Stalin's successors had to grant it—to the slaves in the camps as well as to the so-called free citizens of the Soviet Union. There was nothing else that Krushchev and his friends could do.

### Wave of Strikes

David J. Dallin, the foremost authority on the Soviet slave camps, notes that, after Stalin's death, there was an increase in the protests and demands of the inmates. "The result," he writes,<sup>1</sup> "was a wave of strikes in the corrective labour camps at various times in 1953, 1954, 1955. A strike at Norylsk started in May 1953, was broken off, and then resumed in August of the same year; it was suppressed by military force. According to reports from Norylsk, the number of dead and wounded reached 1,500 out of 2,500 prisoners. In the camps of Karaganda the first strikes occurred in 1952 and others between the 15th and 17th of May, 1954; about 200 were killed and 140 wounded.

"In Kinguir (Kazakhstan) strikes broke out in the summer of 1954. On the island of Sakhalin, too, strikes broke out during 1953-1955; in the camps of Taishet (Siberian railroad) in May 1955. Of great importance were the repeated strikes in the extensive Vorkuta camps, where a large mass of political prisoners had been concentrated; the strikes occurred in the summer of 1953, the fall of 1954 and the summer of 1955; large numbers of Vorkuta prisoners were killed by guards in the fighting. The Kolyma camps, with more than

<sup>1</sup>Cf. his "Crime and Punishment under the Soviet Regime" in the *Handbook on World Communism*; Praeger, New York, 1960.

150,000 inmates, revolted in May 1954; 200 were killed and 180 wounded by guards."

### How Many Slaves Now?

In the face of these widespread rebellions, which caused great uneasiness in Moscow where the new ruling junta possessed neither the power nor the ruthlessness which Stalin once wielded, it was decided to make some improvements in the camps. That, however, was as far as the concessions went. The system of forced labour was not abolished. It was retained, but on a smaller scale. It seems that a good many prisoners were released. One should not, however, take too much for granted: the testimony of a former Norwegian Communist, Otto Larsen, liberated from a Soviet slave camp in July, 1953, is interesting in this context: "When you go home," one of the Russian camp inmates said to him, "the Russians may easily announce that all political prisoners have been freed and that this kind of thing has ended. Don't believe it. Don't let anyone believe it. You can only believe it if and when the workers of the capitalist countries are allowed to travel here and go about the country. And, even more important, when the ordinary Russian workers are allowed to travel anywhere in the capitalist countries. That's the *only* way the world can learn the truth about Russia. And don't you listen either to the rubbish delegations will tell you after they have been in Russia—wining and dining and being treated to the best. They are the most dangerous people of the lot. . . ."<sup>2</sup>

In May of the same year that Otto Larsen published the extremely wise words of his prisoner friend, the Deputy Prosecutor-General of the Soviet Union, P. I. Kudryavtsev, told Professor Berman of Harvard University that as many as 70 per cent. of Soviet Russia's slaves had been set free since March, 1953. The West would be extremely wise to take these words with a large grain of salt. Even if true, it should be remembered that, in view of the fact that the slave population of the Soviet Union cannot have been less than 2½-3 million in Stalin's last years, we are still left with three quarters

<sup>2</sup>*Nightmare of the Innocents* by Otto Larsen, Philosophical Library, New York, 1957.

of a million people shut up in the concentration camps of the Soviet Union. In January 1959 the forecast of Larsen's fellow prisoner came true. Vice-Premier Mikoyan announced in an interview in the United States that there were no political prisoners in the Soviet Union. "Both statements," writes David Dallin in his article in the *Handbook on World Communism*, "were made to foreigners; they were not reported in the Soviet press, and cannot be considered entirely reliable." I would think Dallin's statement entirely reliable. It receives support from some words written by Paul Barton in his *L'Institution Concentrationnaire en Russie, 1930-57*, published at Paris in 1959 by the Librairie Plon. "Actually," he writes, "there is no reason to believe that the system of concentration camps is on the way to being abolished, although the numbers have diminished. There are 'colonies' which correspond to the old (concentration) camps and there are others which are the equivalent of the old 'colonies', where only a change of name has been made."

At this point in his book Barton was citing the testimony of German and Japanese prisoners of war returning home in 1956 and 1957. Recently his words appear to have been borne out by the decree of June, 1961, which empowered the equivalent of people's courts summarily to banish "parasites" to special work colonies. One is entitled to assume in the light of this evidence that, in Krushchev's Russia, the camps still exist, though with reduced populations. Very recently, however, measures have been taken which seem only too likely to increase the number of their unfortunate inhabitants. It may be that Krushchev, having consolidated his power, is beginning to increase the severities of his régime. Stalin did exactly the same thing.

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In his discussion of disarmament, Colonel Cranstoun brings his survey up to the present day. His penetrating study of this difficult subject shows how foolish is the attitude of those, who approach it in an emotional frame of mind. These are the ones who are most easily duped and made to serve, without knowing it, as vehicles of Soviet propaganda.

## Disarmament and Disengagement: 2

Lt.-Col. A. J. E. Cranstoun, M.C.

IN 1957, EMPHASIS in the disarmament discussions began to shift from comprehensive to partial schemes. Comprehensive disarmament remained the ultimate goal, but the Western Powers, notably Britain, began to believe in the possibility that this might be reached eventually by gradual stages. The likelihood seemed the more apparent in view of the fact of agreement having been reached that a start should be made on the disarmament problem in itself and independently of political considerations.

### Total Disarmament

In November of the same year, the Soviet Union combined a refusal to work in the United Nations Disarmament Commission with a proposal for a summit meeting between the heads of the Great Powers. As a result, the disarmament discussions were raised to a new and higher level, that of the heads of States. There, the discussions remained until the collapse of the summit hopes in May, 1960, which followed the shooting down by the Soviet Union of the American U2 plane. During this period, the Soviet Union advanced once more its plea for total disarmament. This was made by Mr. Krushchev in his address to the United Nations Assembly during his visit to the United States in September, 1959. In the course of his speech, he proposed total disarmament inside four years. He was vague, however, as to how it was to be achieved and the degree of

international inspection he was prepared to accept. As a result of this vagueness, discussion of the plan ended without any real progress having been made. As a propaganda operation in the Cold War, Krushchev's proposals may well have served their purpose of presenting the Soviet Union and its satellites as champions of peace, thereby confusing the judgment of certain elements in the West.

### **The Baruch Plan**

Partial disarmament was discussed in the United Nations Disarmament Commission under the heading of nuclear and conventional weapons. The original plan for partial disarmament in the nuclear field was the Baruch Plan of 1946. If the Soviet Union had accepted this plan, it would have achieved the nuclear disarmament of the West, whilst leaving its own superior, conventional armament intact. This the Soviet Union failed to do. As a result, it lost the prize for which it has since been struggling at every disarmament conference; a dismantling of western, nuclear superiority, which would leave the Soviet Union free, at the same time, to maintain intact its own conventional armaments. This, in fact, was what the Red Army needed if it was to carry out the role laid down for it by Lenin as the protector and tutor of revolutions. According to Lenin, it was not meant to wage aggressive war in the narrow sense, but to encourage subversive elements by providing training and arms. In the event of armed revolt in a country, it was to hold the ring against western, imperialistic intervention and, in the last instance, go to the rescue of the revolutionary elements in order to ensure their success. This policy could only be carried out without undue risk so long as the Soviet Union possessed an obvious superiority in military strength and the Soviet Motherland itself was immune to western counter-action. So long, however, as the American Strategic Air Command remained in being with its chain of bases and western nuclear military resources were superior or retained effective second-strike capability over and against the Soviet Union, the conditions essential to make a reality of Lenin's concept of the Red Army could not be held to exist.

### **The 1957 Plans**

In 1957, plans for nuclear disarmament were put forward by the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain.

The United States plan provided for the controlled transfer of new and old fissionable material to peaceful uses. Provided this was satisfactorily effected, there would follow the limitation and ultimate cessation of nuclear tests. Provisions were made also for reductions in conventional arms in accordance with recommendations made in earlier comprehensive disarmament proposals, international control of space projectiles, air and ground inspection against surprise attack.

The Soviet representative objected to the American plan on the ground that the registration of tests amounted to the legalisation of atomic weapons. He then put forward his own plan in April, 1957. Its main features were a demand for the immediate suspension of nuclear tests and the immediate banning of nuclear weapons. Perhaps for propaganda reasons the Soviet representative accepted the need for aerial inspection as well as that on the ground. This concession on his part gave great encouragement to the West.

In May, the British produced their plan which consisted of three recommendations. The first recommended registration of tests as proposed by Canada, Japan, Norway at the Geneva Assembly, with limited international observation. The second proposed the composition of a group of experts, who should consider the limitation and control of nuclear tests. The third suggested that the cessation of tests should follow the prohibition of fissionable material for military purposes as part of a general agreement on disarmament.

### **Suspension of Tests**

The Soviet Union objected to the British plan on the same grounds that it had raised against that of the United States. Weeks of argument followed. In June, the Soviet representative accepted the western contention that control was necessary. He proposed a two to three year suspension of tests under the supervision of an international commission that should be answerable to the Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations. The proposed commission would

have control posts in the territories of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. In July, the Western Powers accepted the Soviet proposal, subject to precise agreement on the duration and suspension of tests, the establishment and location of control posts and the relationship of this measure to the other provisions of the first stage of the (comprehensive) disarmament agreement. These provisions covered the initial reductions in conventional arms and forces as well as the ending of the production of fissionable material for military purposes. A group of experts was to be set up to begin work on a test-control system and a sub-committee was to be appointed to proceed with the other matters mentioned.

The argument now developed as to whether the suspension of tests should precede the working out of a control system, as the Soviet Government maintained, or wait on the entry into force of the first part of the (comprehensive) disarmament agreement. No agreement on this point having been reached by November, the Soviet representative walked out of the Commission and refused to continue working with it.

### Question of Control

The year 1958 saw the shifting of disarmament negotiations, on Soviet initiative, from the United Nations Commission to the Heads of government of the Great Powers; what you might call the summit level. In the correspondence that followed the Soviet Government asked for a declaration of renunciation of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all overseas bases and the establishment of an "atom free" zone in Europe. For its part, the West was concerned throughout the correspondence with the working out of an effective control system.

On March 31st, 1958, the Soviet Government, after completing an intensive test programme, declared a unilateral suspension of tests. On Britain's suggestion, it agreed finally to take part in a conference of experts to study the suspension and control of tests. The Committee met in Geneva on July 1st, 1958. By 1961 a draft treaty had been prepared consisting of a preamble, twenty-four articles and three

annexes. Of these, the preamble, seventeen articles and two of the annexes were agreed to by the participants. The preamble states that it is the treaty's object to check the arms race and make a practical and effective contribution towards disarmament. It adds that this can only be possible through the adherence of all countries to it and the establishment of an effective control system. It is on this question of effective control that agreement is so hard to get. Both East and West see their security as directly affected by the way in which the problem of control is solved.

### East-West Fears

For its part, the Soviet Union, now a nuclear power possessed of first and second strike capability, is still conscious of its limitations in the nuclear field. As a revolutionary power, it is fearful that foreign observers might well learn too much not only of its intentions, but also of its internal stresses and strains. Finally, it is fearful—perhaps without ground—that foreign inspection would enable the West to exploit its advantage of being deployed on exterior lines (the overseas bases) to mount a surprise or pre-empt attack, should it suspect that the Soviet Union was preparing a new aggression.

Meanwhile, the West, very conscious of its inferiority in conventional forces and that it no longer enjoys a clear superiority in nuclear ones, is only too well aware that its security depends on accurate and timely intelligence as to the intentions of the Soviet Union. Anxious to preserve the present order, the West is on the defensive. That is why it has had to allow the initiative to pass to the Soviet. By its compact dispositions and centralised organisation, that power is particularly well disposed to launch a sudden and decisive attack, wherever it sees a weakness outside its borders or the chance of an easy success. Unless and until the Soviet Union abandons its object of world revolution or the West loses its morale under the strain of the Cold War and capitulates, it is impossible to see how either side can modify its attitude to the all-important subject of disarmament. The reason is that it affects directly the success of the grand strategies of both opposed sets of powers.

## Conventional Disarmament

At the present time, nuclear arms, as the new and largely untried weapon, have managed to capture the popular imagination. In an age of science fiction and strip cartoons, their alleged potentialities have been stressed and their very great limitations almost overlooked. As a result, the nuclear bomb has turned into a most important weapon of psychological warfare. It has been termed the ultimate weapon, a means of snatching strategic victory out of the teeth of conventional, tactical defeat. It is natural, therefore, that the search for a measure of nuclear disarmament has tended to overshadow that which is being pursued towards a reduction of conventional weapons.

The West first put forward a joint plan for conventional partial disarmament in August, 1957. The western proposals, which covered both nuclear and conventional forces, contained eight provisions. In the first place, conventional armed forces were to be reduced, in the first instance, to the following levels: France and Britain were to be allowed 750,000 and the Soviet Union and the United States, 2,500,000. Secondly, information on military expenditure was to be supplied by the powers involved to a control organisation. Thirdly, there was to be an undertaking to use nuclear weapons only in self-defence. Fourthly, once the inspection organisation was organised, all new fissionable material was to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and existing stocks were to be transferred to it in agreed instalments. Fifthly, there was to be a suspension of tests for twelve months, provided that an effective control organisation was in existence; there was to be a suspension for a further twelve months, provided that satisfactory progress had been made in the "cut-off" of fissionable material. Sixthly, there were to be studies with regard to the design of inspection machinery to ensure the exclusively peaceful use of outer space. Seventhly, there was to be co-operation with regard to the establishment of an inspection system to prevent surprise attack. Eighthly, all obligations in the agreement were to be dependent on the functioning of an effective control and inspection system.

The Soviet Union rejected this plan. After the rejection, in its turn,

by the Assembly of the Soviet Union's proposal to expand the twelve-nation Disarmament Commission to one on which all eighty-two members of the United Nations would sit, the Soviet representative walked out, as noted above, and refused to have any more dealings with the Commission. It was Soviet objections to the establishment of any effective system of inspection or control that led it to reject the western plan. This, despite the fact that the levels of conventional forces proposed by the plan were favourable to the U.S.S.R., enjoying, as she now does, a central position round the periphery of which western forces have to be deployed in order to provide local security against surprise attack and subversion. Efficient and effective control and inspection systems were essential to the security of the West against attacks by both conventional and nuclear forces.

## Disengagement

Disengagement, as a method of guarding against the outbreak of war through misadventure or frontier incident, was first mooted by Sir Anthony Eden, as he then was, at the Geneva summit meeting of 1955. Disengagement was to form part of a comprehensive agreement covering the reunification of Germany and providing for a demilitarised belt along both sides of the Iron Curtain. The idea of a demilitarised zone in Central Europe was put forward once more in December 1956, this time by Mr. Gaitskell in Parliament. At a press interview early in 1957, Mr. Krushchev gave his interpretation of the Gaitskell plan. According to him, it meant, first, that all Soviet troops would be withdrawn within their national frontiers. Secondly, all troops of the western allies would be withdrawn within their own national territories. Thirdly, American troops would leave Europe and Asia for the United States and their bases overseas would be dismantled. Clearly, acceptance of this Soviet interpretation of the Gaitskell plan would have left Western Europe at the mercy of the Soviet Union. The forces defending it would have been split up into small national contingents widely separated by distance and, in the case of the British, by sea from its frontiers. Their strongest ally would be three thousand miles away across the Atlantic Ocean. At the same

time, the forces of the Soviet Union would remain concentrated a mere six hundred land miles from the probable theatre of military operations.

### **The Rapacki Plan**

The Rapacki Plan, first put before the United Nations in October, 1957, by Mr. Rapacki, the Polish Foreign Minister, has been the first disengagement plan to arouse the widest world interest. It still finds support amongst some military commentators. The plan advocated the formation of an atom-free zone in Central Europe. Its main provisions were two. In the first place, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany were to agree to ban the stockpiling of nuclear arms in their territories and to forswear their manufacture. Secondly, the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States were not to station atomic weapons in the territories of the above-mentioned States; they were to withdraw weapons of this sort already deployed there. Finally, they were to undertake not to equip armies stationed in these areas with nuclear weapons. The plan was accepted readily by East Germany and Czechoslovakia, but rejected by the West as not providing sufficient safeguards for its security.

At this time, it should be remembered, the Soviet Union had not undertaken any important reduction in its operational units, though there had been a considerable and much publicised reduction of the number of men in uniform. The reduction, in fact, had been in ancillary units, such as labour battalions, headquarters staffs and internal security units. The Soviet order of battle opposed to UNO forces still listed one hundred and seventy-five operational divisions, supported by sixty satellite divisions in varying degrees of readiness. NATO forces deployed in the vital, Central European area numbered twenty-one and a half divisions, a number approximately eight below the thirty estimated as the lowest level compatible with safety. At the time, two French divisions had been withdrawn for service in Algeria, whilst German mobilisation had been slower than expected; only seven out of Germany's twelve agreed divisions were present in the order of battle. To compensate for their great inferiority in

manpower, the NATO countries relied upon nuclear tactical weapons in which they were still considered superior. Acceptance of the Rapacki Plan would have robbed NATO of its only reply to Soviet numerical superiority and left West Germany very much at the mercy of its more heavily armed eastern rival.

### **Mr. Kennan's Suggestions**

Mr. George Kennan, a former American ambassador to Russia, proposed a further plan for disengagement in his B.B.C. Reith Lectures, which were delivered in November and December, 1957. His plan followed the same line as that of Rapacki. It advocated, in the first place, that East and West should withdraw their forces from Germany. (Incidentally, Mr. Kennan suggested that the West should reconsider its attitude to German reunification and not insist on free elections or take into account the resulting political régime in that country, when reunited.) Secondly, the West was asked to recognise that the indefinite retention of American forces in Europe might turn out to be more of a political liability than military asset. Thirdly, he called for the geographical separation of the armed forces of the Great Powers. Fourthly, he asked that the Great Powers, who manufactured nuclear weapons, should not supply their allies with them. It can be said without hesitation that the recommendations of the Kennan plan were more prejudicial to the security of the West than those of Rapacki.

Disengagement has lost support in the West, as it has come to be recognised increasingly as the modern Communist version of the Trojan Horse. The reasons are clear enough. It gives no guarantee against the infiltration of the neutralised area by subversive elements and the development of a revolutionary war on the pattern of South-East Asia under the watchful and sympathetic eye of the Red Army deployed across the frontier. The Red Army, it should be remembered, exists and is trained to assist revolution everywhere as a means to the establishment of world Communism. Against this background of Red Army purpose it is clear that, for disengagement to succeed, very real concessions are required from the Soviet Government.

## Arms Control

Meanwhile, the Disarmament Conference continues to drag along at Geneva. The Soviet Union views it as a useful propaganda vehicle. The West are prepared to keep the talks going, partly for fear of the effect of failure on public opinion and partly in the hope that, so long as they continue, the war will remain cold. Additionally, there is the faint hope that some internal change in the Soviet Union may alter radically the whole international scene.

At this stage, the powers are directing their attention towards arms control; a control based not so much on solemn international undertakings, but, rather, on respect for the harm each can do the other. Soviet Russia, because it possesses a forward and aggressive policy, holds the initiative and is able, in consequence, to decide both the time, the place and the form of any attack it chooses to make against the Western Allies. This is most unlikely to take the form of an all-out offensive with nuclear arms, for the Soviet Union is well aware that western deterrent forces are both sufficient in strength and too varied and widely dispersed to be knocked out by even a massive surprise attack. The casualties resulting from any western nuclear riposte might well be more than Russia could ever afford to accept. The thirty million casualties suffered in the Second World War have left their mark on the morale of the Russian people, if not on that of the Soviet Communist Party. Under these circumstances, the form of attack undertaken by Russia against the West is more likely to be one of attrition undertaken by local revolutionary movements protected by Soviet ground forces and having behind them the ultimate threat of Soviet nuclear power. This policy favours the Government of a Soviet Russia that is becoming increasingly industrialised and, in consequence, more and more dependent on skilled manpower. In January, 1960, Mr. Krushchev announced a large cut in military manpower, this time affecting operational units of the Red Army. It does not follow that the Soviet forces became any weaker as a result of this cut; the demobilised men were replaced by missiles of more than equivalent fire-power.

## Soviet Shortage of Men

Krushchev did, in fact, claim at the time that this switch was evidence of the Soviet Union's pacific intentions. No country preparing for aggressive war, he said, would consider bombarding with nuclear weapons areas into which it was about to advance with a view to occupation. This cut in the Soviet ground forces may not have been completely one of choice, however. The classes now being called to the colours in Russia are the depleted wartime ones. Demands on manpower in that country are now becoming heavier as the rising standard of living combines with increased military production to demand the presence of more and more men in the factories. At the same time, the opening up of new agricultural lands makes reinforcements of agricultural labour essential. For the first time in her history, Russia is beginning to feel the need to economise in her use of manpower.

Though Soviet difficulties of this sort are a legitimate source of comfort for the West, the war of attrition, which Russia has imposed upon her, is one which will test all her physical and moral resources. Because it is perpetually on the defensive, the West must be ready to counter any blow wherever it is placed by the cold war enemy. During the days of its nuclear monopoly, the West could always threaten massive retaliation with nuclear weapons. Now, however, such an act would bring down on it a Soviet second strike. Under such circumstances, the answer to Soviet aggressiveness is increased conventional forces of all types so as to provide adequate overseas garrisons to deal with minor incidents and check incipient major aggressions pending the arrival of reinforcements from strategic reserves. The next few months will probably see great efforts made to do this. Despite the urgent necessity for doing so, the enormous importance of the nuclear deterrent must never be forgotten. Without a strong and credible nuclear shield to cover their deployment, western ground forces would be destroyed before they could engage the enemy and the home populations behind them shattered or forced to capitulate.



The debate stirred up by Britain's application for membership of the Common Market will last for many months. If she is successful in her application, the consequences may well be momentous for herself and for the world. Father Crane recommends some good reading that should prove helpful to those wishing to discuss this subject with their friends. Later, he reviews some useful pamphlet literature dealing with a variety of subjects.

## The Great Debate

BRITAIN'S HISTORIC DECISION to apply for membership of the Common Market will be the subject of discussion and debate for months to come. Already, reactions to it have produced the strangest of bedfellows. Whoever would have thought, for example, that Lord Hinchingbrooke and Mr. Michael Foot would have appeared together on Panorama, united in their opposition to United Europe. Motives, of course, are different. There are Labour supporters who oppose Britain's decision to go into Europe because they fear it will pull from under them the neutral perch, which they have been trying to cut out for this country for years. The last thing they want is to be mixed up in any European commitment against Communism. Their desire is to avoid all involvement of this sort; to let the Red tide pass them by in the forlorn hope that it will not turn and drown them. Such was the mood of the nuclear disarmers, cock-a-hoop a year ago at Scarborough and now, thank God, discredited.

There are those others who see, quite rightly, that involvement in Europe means the end in this country of Socialist Planning; that, in choosing Europe, this Conservative Government has opted, in fact, for the open society; that it has abandoned the always forlorn attempt to reconcile its own brand of Conservo-Socialism with this country's pressing need to revitalise its flagging economy. There are a good many who resent the diminution of sovereignty implicit in

such a move. They think, further, that any such diminution means the end of the Commonwealth.

Nevertheless, by a massive majority of 308, the House of Commons supported, on August 3rd, the Government's decision to make its approach to Europe. The first step has been taken with full support. There is still, however, a long way to go. Meanwhile, at all levels of social life, the debate will be continued.

Intelligent participation in it is made possible by several publications. One of the best is Anthony Nutting's, *Europe Will Not Wait*. Published last year by Hollis and Carter at 12s. 6d., its hundred and twenty pages are compact and clear. The approach is historical and charts, with regret, the failure of this country since the end of the Second World War, to respond to Europe's repeated invitations in the direction of unity. A great deal can be learnt from Mr. Nutting's account of these proceedings. His book provides the essential background against which the present negotiations can best be set. It is extremely readable.

Another approach is provided by two publications of Barbara Ward. The first is a pamphlet entitled *Forty Years On* and was published in 1959 at 1s. 6d. by the Federal Trust for Education and Research. There is an excellent chapter in this clear piece of writing entitled "A Western Community". It goes well into the economic difficulties, real and supposed, attendant on Britain's entry into the Common Market. It deals very clearly with the way in which such a move would affect this country's relationship to the Commonwealth. Finally, by way of acquiring what might be termed the ideological background to this question, few books will be found to surpass another publication of Miss Ward. I refer to *Faith and Freedom*, which was first published a year or so ago by Hamish Hamilton at sixteen shillings. It is a really remarkable book which shows at its best the author's great ability to confront the reader, in the clearest possible language, with the major issues of our time.

### BRIEFS

Four smaller publications dealing with a variety of important

subjects have recently come our way. Space allows only a brief mention of each. We have no hesitation in recommending all four to our readers.

Father Raymond Griffin's excellent *Where is the Truth?* has recently gone through a third printing. The job has been very well done by the Tanganyika Mission Press. Consignments of the book have now reached this country from East Africa. Copies are obtainable from the Bookshop, St. Joseph's College, Mill Hill, N.W.7. The price is 4s. Every conceivable kind of subject ranging from Communism to Polygamy is dealt with in handy, question-and-answer fashion. The book should prove particularly useful to those in frequent contact with inquisitive and friendly non-Catholics of every type. Father Patrick Rorke's *Through Parents to Christ* (Birchley Hall Press, Billinge, nr. Wigan, Lancs.; 4s.) is attractively set out and covers most effectively the very delicate ground that concerns the relationship of parents to children. Parents, of course, cannot give their children the whole of everything that they need. Wise ones amongst them will direct their children towards the kind of grouping that will bring out the best in them and, at the same time, set their energies in the service of the Faith. This need is met by the Sodality groups as they exist now in Britain. A guide to the dynamic that moves them is found in Father Bernard Basset's *Spirit of the Sodalities* (Southwell House, 39 Fitzjohn's Avenue, London, N.W.3; 3s. 6d.). Of particular usefulness are pages 46-66 which deal with the technique of running a weekly meeting. All who wish to get some dynamism into Catholic Action in this country should read and act on the extremely wise guidance given therein.

Finally, Burns and Oates have published at 8s. 6d. an invaluable "Faith and Fact" book (No. 128 in the series). It is entitled *Nuclear Physics in Peace and War* and has been written by Dr. P. E. Hodgson. The book should prove extremely useful to those who are worried understandably by the moral aspect of nuclear war. They will find in this book an intelligent appraisal of the scientific side of the question, which should prove of great use to them in their investigations.



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