Environmental law after a year of catastrophe

The government is undertaking a review of one of our central pieces of environmental law, the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Protection Act. They have a facility for quick comments of up to 300 words, as well as traditional submission (thanks to the Australian Conservation Foundation for the link). Here’s my 300 words

The catastrophes that have afflicted Australia and the rest of the world over the last year, including coral bleaching, unprecedented wildfires and the coronavirus pandemic point up the need for a radical reconsideration of existing approaches to environmental protection.

Far from achieving a sustainable balance between economic, social and environmental values, recent Australian policy has focused on protecting sectional interests and amplifying second-order issues such as the effect of environmental policy on energy costs.

The disasters of the past year show that the risks of widespread species extinction are far greater than has previously been assumed. As well as reflecting specific risks associated with exploitation of wild animal species for food and other uses, the Covid-19 pandemic has dramatically illustrated the folly of the presumption that, since previous potential disasters have not materialised or have been successfully, managed, the threat of environmental catastrophe can safely be ignored or deferred for the future.

In terms of the EPBC act, the key implications are:

  • a much stronger weight on preventing further loss of biodiversity
  • consideration of all effects of proposed developments, notably including Scope 3 emissions of coal, oil and gas projects

Flattening the curve vs (near) eradication

Here are some comments I’ve written in a rapid response to Brendan Murphy’s recent press conference. (I haven’t yet seen even the summary of the modelling that has apparently been released, just a picture of flattened curves.)

The idea of “flattening the curve” is fundamentally misleading, since it implies that most people will be infected until herd immunity is achieved, while the number of cases remains within the capacity of the health system. But assuming spare capacity of 2 beds per 1000 people, and 20 per cent of patients requiring treatment, we would need at least five years for herd immunity to be achieved. Optimal policy is to aim for near-complete eradication, then maintain sufficient distancing to ensure local outbreaks don’t spread. We will need quarantine for international arrivals until vaccination is general, or until other countries achieve near-complete eradication.


The main insight from economics is derived from option value concept. Better to adopt stringent measures early and relax if they turn out to be excessive than to move slowly and risk widespread community transmission.

Australia’s post-war recovery program provides clues as to how to get out of this

I’m running behind, but here’s my latest piece in the Conversation. Although the situation is very different from that of 194t, this, from the White Paper on Full Employment is as relevant as ever

Despite the need for more houses, food, equipment and every other type of product, before the war, not all those available for work were able to find employment or to feel a sense of security in their future.

On the average during the twenty years between 1919 and 1939 more than one tenth of the men and women desiring work were unemployed. In the worst period of the depression, well over 25% were left in unproductive idleness.

By contrast, during the war no financial or other obstacles have been allowed to prevent the need for extra production being satisfied to the limit of our resources.

Under emergency conditions, all sorts of things that were said to be impossible are suddenly found to be necessary, and the objections raised against them turn out to have been excuses for serving the interests of the well off. That’s the case for both Universal Basic Income and a Job Guarantee, both of which now exist in embryonic form.

Dump inflation targeting

Yesterday, I pointed out that the first instalment of the rescue package could be financed by cancelling the Stage 3 income tax cuts legislated for 2024-25. Today, the same suggestion is on the front page of the SMH. Morrison is apparently resisting the idea, but that can’t last long.

Trying to keep one day ahead, I’ve turned my mind to how the Reserve Bank should operate during and after the crisis. The first step is to abandon inflation targeting once and for all. The policy of using small interest rate adjustments to keep inflation in a range of 2-3 per cent made sense in the policy context of the (spurious) Great Moderation, when the target appeared consistent with maintaining unemployment at a stable level of 5 per cent or so, assumed to be the lowest the economy could sustain.

That all fell to pieces with the GFC. Inflation targeting, which did nothing to stop asset price bubbles, was a significant contributor to the crisis. Various ideas to address this problem were floated, but it ended up in the too-hard basket.

In the aftermath of the GFC, most central banks pushed their key interest rates down to zero. Even where this didn’t happen, as in Australia, inflation remained persistently below the target range, a problem that hadn’t been contemplated when the policy was first introduced in the 1990s, and the big concern was a resurgence of the inflation of the 1970s and 1980s.

It’s now obvious that we will never return to a world where inflation targeting makes sense. But what should replace it?

The first step should be a re-ordering of the Reserve Bank’s objectives to focus primarily on full employment rather than price stability. One way to implement this would be to target the level and growth rate of nominal income. My suggested target would be a 7 per cent rate of nominal growth, ideally made up of 3 per cent real growth* and 4 per cent inflation. The idea of the nominal target is that, if real growth falls below the target, the Reserve Bank loosens monetary policy and accepts higher inflation.

A 7 per cent growth rate would imply a doubling of nominal income over a decade. That in turn means that if we end the crisis with, say, debt equal to 60 per cent of national income, and balance the budget (on average) after that, the debt to income ration would fall to 30 per cent by 2030.

  • In the longer term we should be looking at taking the benefits of technological growth in the form of more leisure rather than more output. But I haven’t had time to do the analysis on that.

Renationalisation in Australia

I got a message from a student asking about examples of renationalisation in Australia. Here’s my response

There hasn’t been much explicit renationalisation of business enterprises in Australia. What we have seen is


(a) Public private partnerships (PPPs) being wound up and returned to the public sector. As well as Port Macquarie, some others are mentioned herehttps://grattan.edu.au/news/public-private-hospital-partnerships-are-risky-business/
and here on private prisons
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/mar/26/queensland-to-end-private-jails-experiment-after-scathing-report
and social housing
http://www.newleafcommunities.com.au/


(b) The government has also re-entered areas of business it had previously privatised. The most important example is the NBN, but there is also the big Tesla battery in SA  https://hornsdalepowerreserve.com.au/ and other interventions by the state government there. The Federal governments proposed Snowy 2.0 is another example

How to pay for the rescue

I was asked by a journalist about the long-term fiscal effects of the government response to the crisis. Here’s what I said

 In simple accounting terms the cost of the intervention so far can mostly be offset simply by cancelling the Stage 3 tax cuts legislated in advance for 2024-25 (this also happened when the Keating Labor government legislated for future tax cuts in the 1990s). These are projected to cost $95 billion over the five years to 2029-30
so the saving would easily offset the crisis intervention over 10 years.

That’s assuming that the crisis ends quickly and everything returns to the way it was before. I think we will end up with a substantially larger role for government, and therefore a permanent increase in the public sector share of national income, which means higher taxes.