The UK Decision on Syria 6, January 2016
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Random, Syria, UK.Tags: Bombing ISIS, Bombing Syria, Syria, UK, UK decision to bomb Syria
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The following article was published by King’s College London’s Defence in Depth blog back in early December 2015.
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An outline of a modus vivendi with Russia is required if there is to be any progress in the fight against Da’esh. Otherwise, the vaunted 70,000 strong ‘moderate’ forces promised by the likes of UK Prime Minister David Cameron to help coalition forces combat Da’esh will continue to be attacked by Russia. Indeed, their bombing campaign to date has been almost exclusively focused on forces other than those of the Da’esh and the Assad regime.
Of equal importance is persuading this 70,000 – or as many of them as possible – that they must concentrate on Da’esh and not the Assad regime. Presently, reports emerging from representatives of these forces claim quite the opposite: that the Assad regime is their primary enemy. As long as this is the case, Russia will continue to attack them and they will be of little use to Cameron and others seeking to primarily attack Da’esh.
On paper, at least, it looks like there is a deal to be done here.
Russia does, in fact, at some stage, want to counter Da’esh. This motley group killed hundreds of its citizens in the Sinai plane attack, and it has released a propaganda video of the execution of a Russian citizen. But Russia wants to guarantee its role in a future Syrian scenario too. This is the primary reason that it is so eagerly fighting the array of extremists and moderates ranged against Assad: it is protecting the Syrian regime.
Similarly, these moderates want Assad to go above all else. They – rightly – see him as the ultimate cause of the Syrian civil war and the one who indirectly founded Da’esh through policies actively stoking extremism. But this will simply not happen as long as Russia supports the Syrian regime. This statement of basic geopolitical fact needs to be relayed to these groups and driven home.
The deal is, therefore, quite obvious. The bulk of the Assad regime remains in place – Russia will not have it any other way – but Assad himself is scheduled to pass on power in a designated timetable. For this concession, Assad is saved from prosecution, Russia gets a say in the future government to guarantee its interests, the 70,000 and those they represent get rid of Assad and can have some (likely minor) say in a future government, and everyone can concentrate on dismantling Da’esh.
Doubtless, an approximation of this bargain is being discussed. But the fundamental problem is the fractured nature of the opposition groups. Persuading the dozens of militias and fronts that make up this 70,000 grouping of relatively moderate fighters to sign up to such a plan will be likely be near-impossibly difficult. In the end, Cameron and his allies will likely have to support and work with far fewer local forces.
The overarching ‘solution’ to this crisis is, then, political and involves a range of distasteful compromises. That British fighter-jets are now attacking targets a few hundred miles west from their current zone of operations in Iraq will not – cannot possibly – make any wider, strategic difference.
But it can, of course, make a tactical difference. Well targeted attacks can slowly degrade Da’esh capabilities. Especially in conjunction with allied support, it is plausible to suggest that the group’s abilities to operate in parts of Syria could be hampered.
Ultimately, the success or failure of this vote and of the resulting campaign depends on what its goals are. Destroying Da’esh is an absurd, impossible aim. It is an insidious franchise that can demonstrate that it has ‘won’ (i.e. not been wiped out) by any individual anywhere on earth with a flag, a camera, and an internet connection, to say nothing of its resilience in the great lawless swathes Syria, Iraq, Libya, or Nigeria.
The hope, then, is that this move by the British government is more important for its symbolic value signalling a new era of concerned international political alignment and pressure, than for its kinetic impact on the ground in Syria.
Palmyra and the logic of loss 25, May 2015
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Syria.Tags: BBC, Da'esh, IS, ISIS, Palmyra, Syria
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The following article was published by the BBC on 23 May 2015.
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In Syria alone, the Great Mosque and the Citadel in Aleppo, the castle of every child’s imagination at Crac des Chevaliers, and the ancient city of Bosra have been damaged or destroyed. Arguably Syria’s most impressive and arresting site, the sprawling ruins at Palmyra (Tadmur to Syrians), is now under Islamic State control and many fear the worst.
Having visited Palmyra and these other sites while studying Arabic at Damascus University back in 2007, I am far from alone in feeling that something truly terrible is happening. That these symbols from a bygone era might be destroyed by modern-day barbarian forces when they have survived for hundreds or even thousands of years seems somehow deeply offensive and wrong.
Nevertheless, while I feel an acute sadness at the loss of these sites, I understand those who may feel a certain sense of unease at the outpouring of grief and anguish over their desecration. From this perspective, Palmyra is, after all, a collection of stone; albeit stone exquisitely carved and impressively presented, imbued with huge historical import. And compared to the staggering loss of life and widespread humanitarian disaster afflicting the Syrian people, bemoaning the loss of a historic tourist site seems crass.
But there are cogent arguments, of course, suggesting that sites like Palmyra are far more significant than that.
Important cultural sites are often pointed to as focal points that can be used to (re)unify a people. Sites can act as potent symbols of a united past that may cross ethnic, tribal, linguistic, or cultural lines. In essence, their importance can be seen and used as a low common denominator to promote reconciliation in a post-conflict environment.
Most famously, the reconstruction of the old bridge in Mostar in Bosnia-Hercegovina acted as a focal point of wider metaphorical bridge-building between Serbs, Bosniaks (Muslims) and Croats after the civil war in the 1990s when the bridge was demolished. In Syria, too, there have already been tentative attempts towards this kind of a goal, with meetings between regime and opposition officials nominally in charge of antiquities.
Similarly, the sheer barbarism of IS, exemplified in its brutality against people and against shared cultural monuments, could be a foil to coax more unity among the dispersed opposition groups and factions.
Moreover, these kinds of sites are the heritage and birthright not just of this generation of Syrians so adversely affected by the conflict, but of all Syrians henceforth. As such, focusing on the protection of sites of great historical concern is just, it can be argued, given that the ultimate goal is to preserve and protect the essential character of a people for hundreds of years to come.
Some may find it distasteful that many seem to be increasingly inured to the human toll in Syria, while interest is piqued by attacks on historical sites. Doubtless, they might prefer that some of the yardage given over to glossy pictures of Palmyra in its glory days be given over to reporting of the day-to-day devastation faced and experienced by ordinary people. On the same theme, one can hope and advocate for better, longer, more in-depth pieces or more funding for foreign reporters.
A righteous lament this may be, but it is an ineffectual one. The numbing reality is that if these were the types of stories that were demanded, more news services would answer the call. It must also be remembered that there are rarely mutually exclusive choices here. The words written and arguments elucidated over the importance of saving cultural heritage sites are also a part of wider discussions and pressure to cobble together anything approaching a meaningful plan to intervene or otherwise halt the worst excesses of the violence in Syria.
The takeover of Palmyra has generated a unique media storm, flinging the Syrian conflict back to wider consciousness. If that can be harnessed in the uphill struggle to galvanise a plan going forward, then no-one will complain.
Whatever the intellectual or moral merits of focusing on such examples of historical desecration, the fact remains that, for me – and I doubt I’m alone – there remains a unique sadness in the loss of such sites. The abstract and horrifying numbers of deaths that the conflict has produced are not undermined or further ignored, as it were, by the focus on the fate of the likes of Palmyra. The loss of Syria’s cultural heritage represents the loss of far more than some tourist attractions, but the loss of connection between multiple generations.
As with all things, politics is but the art of the possible. So leveraging the fate of these magnificent and important monuments in the wider hope of incrementally building a pressure to bear on the powers that be is a just and vital thing.
Jabhat al-Nusra rejects overtures to abandon al-Qaeda 10, March 2015
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Qatar.Tags: Jabhat al Nusra, Qatar, qatar jabhat, Syria, terrorist groups
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That Jabhat al-Nusra, the mostly Syrian-based al-Qaeda affiliated jihadi group, has vehemently denied that it is seeking to ‘come in from the cold’ or otherwise abandon its al-Qaeda affiliation, is not hugely surprising. Their twitter site
completely denies reports of a break-up with Al-Qaeda
and in particular that the group had ever had
a meeting with Qatari or other intelligence services or seeking Qatari or Gulf funding, as this is contrary to the principles on which Al-Nusra has been based from the start.
Though Qatar may offer the prospect of, say, significant funding, this immediate, emphatic denial hints at the difficulty that the state will face peeling away anything like a significant chunk of the group. Doubtless Jabhat’s ranks are filled with some who would be willing to form a new, likely well renumerated group, but the group – as one – is never going to switch. It will fracture and split.
The question remains, therefore, how Qatar can persuade a significant chunk to abandon Jabhat’s original goals, and whether whatever rump that forms some new group retains any real capability. The efficacy of Jabhat is, after all, the central reason that Qatar appears to have been interacting with the group over the years.
A sober cost-benefit analysis of this whole venture is still stacked against Qatar, particularly if one factors in the bad PR that inevitably comes with Qatar dabbling with these groups. But Qatar – like everyone else in the international community – seems to be out of answers, leaving these kinds of risky plans all that remains.
Is Qatar bringing the Nusra front in from the cold? 7, March 2015
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Qatar.Tags: Al Jolani, Al Nusra, Jabhat al Nusra, Qatar, Qatar hostages, Syria
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The following article was published by the BBC on 6 March 2015 and can be found here.
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It has been frequently claimed that Qatar has relatively close ties, probably through intermediaries, with the Nusra Front. The Qatar foreign ministry has denied this, and proof is, unsurprisingly, difficult to find. But such an accusation has increasingly cropped up, particularly in terms of Qatar’s prolific record of resolving hostage situations in Syria. Thirteen Greek orthodox nuns, an American journalist, and 45 Fijian peacekeepers are just some who have been released in the last 18 months with Qatar’s and, it appears, often the Nusra Front’s help.
In the melange of designated terrorist and jihadist groups at play in Syria and Iraq, there is a vast spectrum ranging from the deranged like Islamic State (IS) to the more moderate groups like (the now defunct) Harakat Hazm that was supported by, among others, America. Being a directly affiliated al-Qaeda group, the Nusra Front is nearer the IS end of the spectrum.
Yet, while the Qatari relationship with the Nusra Front appears to be far from straightforward with some of the state’s initiatives failing, indicating some distance between the two, according to recent reports, Qatar appears to want to reform this relationship. This begs the question of why Qatar would want even loosely to associate itself with a group like the Nusra Front.
Firstly, there are no “good choices” in Syria today. Qatar has surmised, it seems, that supporting or transforming the Nusra Front, is one of the “least worst” options.
Secondly, the Nusra Front has pledged to concentrate its efforts on removing the Bashar al-Assad government, as opposed to attacking the “far enemy” (ie Western states). On this point, the Nusra Front is aligned tightly with Qatar, which also is implacably against the government and fundamentally believes that the situation in Syria will only improve if he is removed. This idea is also reflected in the Nusra Front’s composition, which is far more Syrian-dominated than the foreign jihadist-magnet that is IS.
Thirdly, with this goal in mind, and perhaps most crucially, the Nusra Front group is widely seen as one of the most effective groups operating in Syria against a wider backdrop of splintered groups whose powers are highly limited. The potential creation of an effective fighting force against IS (or the Syrian regime) is a significant draw for Qatar.
Fourthly, Qatar possesses a small, young foreign ministry and it does not have a foreign intelligence service. Though far from alone on this issue, the state struggles to map the dynamic conflict and finds it difficult to plot the shifting actors. Instead, it seems that Qatar prefers to continue to support the people or groups with whom it already has relations. As the conflict inexorably deteriorated and groups became more and more extreme, it seems that Qatar, unable to chop and change support easily and wanting to retain relevance, maintained relations with its contacts in Syria, some of whom appear to have close affiliations with the Nusra Front.
Nevertheless, the low-level Qatari contacts with this group (if, indeed, they do exist) are not sufficient to turn the tide in Syria, and rumours of such existing contacts have added fuel to the media frenzy that has alighted on Qatar and its allegedly nefarious links in recent years.
This is why Qatar is hoping to bring the Nusra Front in from the cold. If the state can get the group to eschew its al-Qaeda affiliation and adhere to a broadly moderate Islamist platform, Qatar can officially commence, with Western blessing, the supply of one of the most effective fighting forces in Syria. Not an easy sell, but the promise of Qatar supplying a potential tsunami of support will prove to be a powerful negotiating tactic.
Once again, the silence from Doha on this matter encourages speculation inferring that Qatar has some kind of a genuine sympathy with the goals of the likes of the Nusra Front. But the fact remains that Qatar is a key Western ally. It hosts a critical US military base, it grafted US and UK higher-education institutions and ideas onto its education system, and has long promoted the Middle East’s most visible and powerful woman, Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser al-Missned, the Emir’s mother. These are transparently not the policies of a state with sympathies for the likes of IS or al-Qaeda. Indeed, there is no chance that Qatar is doing this alone: the US and UK governments will certainly be involved in or at least apprised of Qatar’s plans. And, with increasing desperation in the face of IS and Bashar al-Assad’s resilience, a reformed, effective fighting force would be welcomed by the West. Indeed, the UN special envoy to Syria, Staffan de Mistura, recently said that he would speak to anyone, including the Nusra Front, in the effort to save lives.
Qatar is not the first state to reason that it is time to talk to groups that are unpalatable and extreme, but who are, nevertheless, influential. But the ultimate judgement on this emerging policy will rest on how well Qatar can manage this transition and if this new fighting force can alter the balance of power. The recent assassination of the Nusra Front’s central military commander, Abu Hammam al-Shami, in Idlib, Syria, indicates the fluid nature of the conflict. Whether he was killed because of an internal disagreement about the putative negotiations to eschew the Nusra Front’s al-Qaeda affiliation or not, this assassination indicates the daily changes at the tactical level that can have potentially profound strategic effects. In such a changeable, fractured operating environment, Qatar will not be able to engineer a clean break of the Nusra Front from al-Qaeda. But, in a context where the best that can be hoped for is the “least worst” solution, Qatar’s plan is as viable as any other.
On Cameron’s defeat in Parliament over Syria 30, August 2013
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Syria, UK.Tags: Assad chemical weapons, Cameron defeated, Chemical weapons, Miliband, Syria, UK vote on action in syria
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By a margin of 13 votes British Prime Minister David Cameron lost a vote that would have led to the UK joining in punitive military action against Syrian President Bashar Al Assad for his presumed use of chemical weapons.
This defeat despite the difficulties being telegraphed beforehand with Labor Leader Ed Milliband’s intransigence clear to all came as something of a shock and many columnists have seized upon it to tout a range of apocalyptic headlines. Some say that this is a huge blow to the US-UK ‘special relationship’, others see this as the UK abrogating its role as a world power, while others are heaping derision on Cameron emphasizing how this is humiliating for the Prime Minister.
I disagree with much of the commentary. I think much of it stinks of journalists cooped up in Westminster for hours on end and getting caught up in the emotion and adrenalin of one of the most extraordinary nights in British politics for many years.
Democracy
…is alive and well in the UK. Nice to see. Whatever the reasons (and many of them are far from pure, judicious deliberations of the matters at hand) Parliament stopped a powerful Prime Minister from making a key policy decision. Given the carnage that a modicum of democracy spurred on in parts of the Middle East, this is not a facet of British political life that we should take lightly.
Ed Miliband
…is playing a dirty kind of politics. I personally fear that his decision to stand against the motion to punish Assad had far more to do with political posturing and point scoring than with the facts on the ground, such as we know them. I think it was a spineless, short-term decision that will embolden Assad and his ilk and will do no good to the UK’s position in the world. I was tempted to switch to Labour at the next election from the Lib Dems: no longer.
Britain’s role as a ‘world power’
…is concept that has now truly seen its day. For decades now the UK has not had anything like the power and influence of a true world power, but part of the British establishment nevertheless thought that by virtue of our language, the soft power of the UK and modest but still potent military power the UK’s role still far outstripped what one might expect from a country with the UK’s typical metrics. However, this decision not to intervene, to stand back and not to protect a central implicit rule of the international system – not to use chemical weapons – indicates that British Parliamentarians do not feel – by a small majority – that this kind of thing falls on the UK to enforce. This, it strikes me, is perhaps a seminal moment in this context; of the UK finally coming to terms with its middling power status, on whom the arduous burdens of enforcing tacitly understood laws in the international community does not fall.
The special relationship
…hasn’t been hugely special for a long time now. Nevertheless, the UK and the US were very close allies before the vote and will remain very close allies after the vote. While this leaves the US almost alone in potentially taking action, there can hardly be a bitter retort towards the UK: this action was taken by the British Parliament and is what we’re all about in the West…you know, democracy.
Arab indignation
…that castigates the UK for failing to help Syrians and for tacitly supporting Bashar Al Assad needs to redirected quickly, for it is getting increasingly irksome. The UAE and Saudi Arabia, for example, have over 250 top-line combat aircraft positioned in many ways in a far better location to be effective against Bashar. Though doubtless some exists, I have seen precisely no commentary whatsoever or call for Arab nations to actually do something meaningful. Moreover, this is a resolutely a situation in the heart of the Middle East; one might think that the Arab world would feel more obliged to actually do something [and I’ll not even start on Yemen: a catastrophic situation on the very doorstep of many of the richest nations on earth but which is nevertheless failing spectacularly]. Say what you will about Qatar and its efforts in Syria, but at least it was trying as opposed to much of the rest of the Arab world that cowers away, bleating sporadically against and then for the West to ‘do something’ as the mood dictates.
The chemical attack
…was most likely carried out by the regime. Though the motivations are difficult to fathom, it seems unlikely that anyone else could have procured the necessary tons of chemicals and found a way to deliver them effectively. This, as far as I see it, is the top and the bottom of the case. Add to this panicked intercepted communications among the Assad forces, and the case appears to be relatively clear: it was the regime that carried out the attack. Whether it was ordered by Assad himself I think is a secondary consideration; he is the leader and he bears the responsibility for what his Government and forces do.
Reprisals
…are justified in my opinion. I think that they – if they ever come – will be extremely limited. Empty army and intelligence headquarters will be destroyed as well as (hopefully) aircraft, helicopters and tanks that have been to regularly used to attack civilian neighborhoods. This strikes me as entirely reasonable. Not only will this retard to some degree Assad’s ability to kill his people, but it will not force him from power and leave a vacuum. Also it will indicate that – eventually – the use of chemical weapons is punished. This is a taboo that is worth keeping taboo.
Syria: borders and international issues 22, July 2012
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Syria.Tags: Iran Syria, Russia Syria, Syria, Syria's borders, Syrian borders
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Twenty-four hours after a bomb killed three of the most important regime hardliners in Damascus, rebel forces took over the main border crossings to Turkey and Iraq. Though the current state of affairs is murky, latest reports indicate that the rebels still control all the Iraqi border crossings.
Importance of the Borders
Two weeks ago the rebels managed to take a Turkish border crossing briefly but not only was it retaken by Syrian forces but the Turks closed the crossing when it was under rebel control, so these recent events are not unique. Nevertheless, coming in the aftermath of the rebel surge that began with Operation Damascus Volcano, these incidents highlight that the rebels are gaining in strength relative to the Syrian armed forces.
Holding a border crossing is important. Theoretically, it could facilitate far easier the shipping of money, weapons, goods, and people into Syria. Yet Syria’s 2200km of land and sea borders have been porous for months. It has been the explicit policy of Qatar and Saudi Arabia at least to supply the rebels with some combination of money and arms since February and though uncovering concrete evidence of money trails or weapons shipments is notoriously difficult, it is reasonable to conclude that they have been true to their word.[1]
Indeed, one can observe the number and size of the weapons belonging to the ‘Free Syrian Army’ increasing steadily and it seems likely that their recent successes would be fuelled by some form of significant support, be it in terms of money, weaponry, or training.[2]
The international community is well aware of just how porous the Iraqi-Syrian and Turkish-Syrian borders are. It is with Turkish connivance that their border area is seemingly awash with supplies and Special Forces of all stripes while one of the key tribes living across the Iraqi-Syrian border is the Al Shammar. Not only was the mother of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia an Al Shammari but one of his many wives is from that tribal confederation too; the links are strong along the Euphrates for Saudi Arabia.
If the rebels can take, hold, and consolidate control of significant chunks of land in Syria, ideally abutting a neighbouring country as most of the more transient ‘zones’ have been thus far, then this is potentially of huge strategic significance.
In the Libyan operation the fact that the rebels so early on had a significant base from which to operate – Bengazi and its environs – was key. This meant that there was an area in which the rebels could congregate and begin to undertake a meaningful assessment of their inventory and capabilities. Moreover, these safe areas were critical to the influx of foreign support. The Special Forces of Qatar, for example, that played an important role in Libya,[3] are understandably risk averse: seeing one of their soldiers captured by loyal Government forces would be devastating. Yet if there are reasonable guarantees of a safe zone in which to operate, then one can expect more support from countries such as Qatar.
Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah: ignoring political realities
Nevertheless, Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah will not give up. Thus far this triumvirate has done its utmost to ignore the reality of the situation, disregarding the brutal humanitarian crackdown, in the vain hope that somehow Syria will return to the status quo ante bellum. At the beginning, from a cold, realpolitik point of view, there was a chance that Assad could have nipped the rebellion in the bud and their stance would – from their point of view – have been vindicated. Yet this is not what has happened and for some months now the three have continued their sunk cost accounting; ploughing on heedless of the genuine change in the status quo in Syria.
Hamas made the tactically astute move some months ago of distancing itself from Syria,[4] despite the support that it offered over the years. But only a day after the devastating rebel attack on Syria’s elite, Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, gave a defiant, resoundingly pro-regime speech as a desperate attempt, it seems, to forestall the inevitable demise of the Assad regime.[5] He sought to remind his followers of Syria’s critical role in supporting and arming the group in their struggle against Israel. By raising the spectre of Israel he is not very subtly trying to use the Middle East’s perennial political distraction to divert attention from Assad’s brutality. For once, he will surely fail.
Rational political calculus would dictate that Russia and Iran are working on a Plan B. Their forlorn goal of Assad staying in power is no longer viable. Their options for retaining a significant say in the future of Syria; access to the Mediterranean and checking Turkey’s influence (for Russia); and access to the Levant (for Iran) are slim to non-existent. Any kind of a candidate that could offer Iran and Russia such promises after the bloodletting brought on by Assad would be unacceptable to any future Syrian alliance. Indeed, it appears that Russia and Iran have almost guaranteed their estrangement from a future political arrangement by virtue of their political and material support for (and indifference to) Assad’s brutality.
While they may realise the futility of their position, without a viable exit plan they may feel they have no option but to carry on regardless. Better to accept their position in Syria is lost than accept this reality and be humiliated in a policy reversal.
Iran will react to this by upping their efforts to destabilise any transition in favour of palatable candidates that they will support. Given the make-up of the polity in Syria and their levels of penetration over the years, Iran may be able to retain limited operational capacity in a future Syria, even if it pales in comparison to their prized role in past.
Russia’s reaction, meanwhile, is more difficult to assess for they are engaging in a significant gamble. Clearly, Russia is largely unfazed about alienating swathes of the Middle East not to mention the majority of Syrians, believing that in time their position can be reasserted reasoning that states in the region will always need a counterbalance to the West, either diplomatically (security council votes), politically (backing certain politicians), economically (lucrative contracts or sanctions busting), or militarily (selling otherwise unavailable weaponry). Aside from the concern of taking a resolutely cold war mindset and applying its logic to the Syrian uprising in the midst of the Arab Spring in 2012 in an era of rising Asian powers, there is a potential hamartia in this plan.
Russia would do well not to underestimate the depth of the hatred it is fostering. Certainly, the next political class in Syria may see the advantages of engaging with Russia for one reason or another, but the public in Syria as elsewhere throughout the Arab World are no longer passive in politics and may not countenance such a move. Certainly, if Assad is foolish enough to use chemical weapons and were Russia still to play its perennial blocking role as one might expect, talk of an embargo of Russia across the Middle East would doubtless surface at the very least.
Western and Arab States cannot merely berate Russia and Iran; instead, they need to – as unpalatable as it may be – deal with their stance and try to find a way for these key states to deescalate their positions. If this were the 1940s, then the great powers would slide a note across the table to Russia, noting that they could retain x% influence over the future Syria, as Churchill did to Greece and other European nations in Moscow in 1944. But in a vastly different age where no such agreement could be enforced or countenanced, there are no obvious options available.
One alternative would be to cut Russia in particular out of discussions; bypass the UN Security Council entirely, while trying to mitigate their pernicious influence in Syria by upping the levels of military support using the new zones and suggesting and equipping an assault on the Russian port of Tartus to block off a key transit point for Russia’s reinforcements. This kind of bitterly difficult calculation would rely on the logic of greater losses of life in the immediate term for saving lives in the longer term and can only be conceived after deep deliberation not only of the logic of supplying of weapons but of the post-Assad Syria political makeup.
[1] http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/saudi-qatari-plans-to-arm-syrian-rebels-risk-overtaking-cautious-approach-favored-by-us/2012/03/01/gIQArWQflR_story.html
Bloody days ahead as the Assad regime is decapitated 20, July 2012
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Syria.Tags: Assad, Damascus, Damascus attack, Syria
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I wrote the following article with Michael Stephens for RUSI.
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On the afternoon of 18 July a bomb blast in central Damascus striking at the heart of the regime of Bashar al-Assad did more to turn the conflict on its head in a few short seconds than months of fighting between the Syrian Army and the ‘Free Syrian Army’ or deliberations in the Security Council. The rule of the Assad dynasty in Syria is now facing the most testing period of its forty-one year reign. Four of Assad’s top advisors, Defence Minister Gen Dawud Rajha, Deputy Defence Minister and also brother in law of President Assad, General Assaf Shawkat, Deputy Vice President Gen Hassan Turkomani are dead, and Interior Minister Mohammed Ibrahim al-Shaar has reportedly also been killed . The national security headquarters in Rawda which collates information from peripheral centres around the country lies in ruins.
A tactical master stroke
News of the attack initially stated that Rajha and Shawkat had been killed. These two men were in the trusted inner circle of President Bashar Assad and their loss represents a profound blow to the regime. Both Shawkat and Rajha held extensive sway over the operations of the armed forces, they knew the urban battlefields well, and were ruthless in exploiting weaknesses among rebel forces. Even though a new Defence Minister – General Fahad Jassim al-Furayj – was soon named, these central figures with decades of contacts and experience are not that easy to replace. But before the regime had time to digest the magnitude of the loss, both Turkomani and al-Shaar also reportedly died of their injuries.
Initially thought to be a suicide attack, it then emerged from various sources claiming it was a remotely detonated device with suggestions that the attack had been planned for up to two months, with explosives being slowly smuggled into the building. On the day itself, apparently during a meeting in Shawkat’s office, the device was triggered killing the four key players.
The attack proved to be a tactical master-stroke. Not only did it shake the regime – perhaps fatally – to its core, but it more than achieved its immediate strategic effect, while filling the ‘Free Syrian Army’ with hope and celebration and rallying support. It also demonstrated a level of tactical cunning that had not been expected from the motley temporary band of confederates that are loosely referred to as the ‘Free Syrian Army’.
That a bomb was both smuggled into and detonated inside one of the most heavily defended buildings in one of the most heavily defended areas of Damascus raises questions as to the loyalty of Assad’s closest circle and those entrusted with their security. While the regime will pretend outwardly that all is well, the remaining key advisors will be nervously looking over their shoulders and keenly searching for signs of treachery around every corner. Cohesiveness among the remaining core of Assad loyalists will surely be tested in the coming days and the prevention of dissent and internecine conflict will be high on the agenda for Syria’s beleaguered President.
Tactical worries for the regime
Aside from tactical questions regarding the effect that this will have on Assad deploying his forces, arguably the more salient issue is the effect that this will have on the level of desertion in the Syrian Armed Forces. Estimates suggest that in addition to the twenty generals that have defected to Turkey they are joined by around one hundred soldiers per week. This rate shot up in the aftermath of this attack. In Idlib unconfirmed reports suggested that two and a half thousand soldiers had crossed the line while other reports suggested that 120 tanks had defected elsewhere, in addition to reports of defections across Syria.
If these reports prove to be correct and this trend continues, it is difficult to see how President Assad could regain momentum with his Armed Forces being riven with fear and the hugely buoyed ‘Free Syrian Army’ having their ranks swelled not only in manpower but potentially with heavier weapons.
This key attack was a part of Operation Damascus Volcano, the bombastically named assault on Damascus launched by the ‘Free Syrian Army’. Aside from a swift upsurge in attacks in the Damascene suburbs the day before, the army barracks overlooking President Assad’s Palace in the hills above Damascus was set ablaze the night before: a visual cue of what was to come.
The initial reaction of the Assad regime appears to have been to give their thug militia, the Shabiha, licence to storm into what are believed to be ‘rebel supporting’ districts of Damascus to exact revenge. Unfortunately, it seems that a stream of horror stories of brutality will be emerging from this specific incident in the days ahead, and cities all around the country will suffer as Assad exacts a brutal and unforgiving revenge.
Indeed, within hours of the explosion regime forces launched aggressive counterattacks in the neighbourhoods of Jaber, Mezzeh, Kafar Soseh, Qaboon, and Al Qadam. The rebels for their part have bedded into the mazy streets of the city but they will need to conserve ammunition, ensure supply lines remain open and well-defended, and maintain morale if their swift advances into the heart of Damascus are not to be tempered by an equally swift retreat.
One must not forget the salutary lesson from Yemen where, even after a near-fatal attack on President Saleh himself – leading to several months recuperation in Saudi Arabia -he was nevertheless still not ousted from power. Nevertheless, it appears that barring a major reversal of fortune, Assad’s downfall is to be measured in days or possibly weeks as opposed to months.
Yet this only enters Syria into the next chapter. One thing that unites all Syria analysts and watchers is a deep fear of a bloodbath of revenge as and when the Assad regime falls. Government attacks and ones that they have sponsored have been deeply brutal and have torn the social fabric of Syria asunder, profoundly polarising communities.
The role of the international community
The international community needs to move swiftly towards a plan that can be implemented to prevent deep purges taking place as and when the Assad regime finally falls. The Security Council whose deliberations were halted following the news of the attack will now sit later in the week to discuss a radically different situation. The Americans will look to seize the initiative and push through a strong resolution empowering the UN monitors to place the final clamps on the regime by bringing it financially to its knees if it engages in further violence against its citizens, which the regime surely must do to survive. These discussions will no doubt sit along with proposing a role for an international peacekeeping force to enter Syria post haste to ensure calm should Assad’s regime suddenly topple.
But for this to happen much will depend on Russia whose government has steadfastly stood by its increasingly beleaguered ally. But the corridors of the Kremlin will be filled with worried brows as a critical blow has been struck that may well signal the beginning of the end for Assad and for Russia’s strategic position in the region. If a diplomatic solution cannot be worked out before the regime fails Russia risks being faced with a hostile Syrian government comprised of opposition groups and those who have long suffered at the hands of Assad and his henchman. Such a result would be catastrophic for Moscow.
It remains to be seen of the Russians can break out of their dogmatic position on Syria and show some flexibility in the coming days, for the risks for the Kremlin in continuing to tow its obstinate path are high. Much will need to be considered as to how best they play out the coming end game, for Assad will now surely fall; the question is not if, but when.
The Times of London breaking news story: 28, May 2010
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Syria.Tags: Hezbollah, Syria, Syria support for Hezbollah, The Times
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Syria accused of arming Hezbollah from secret bases
Hezbollah is running weapons, including surface-to-surface missiles, from secret arms depots in Syria to its bases in Lebanon, according to security sources.
You don’t say?
Qatar to increase Syrian investment 31, January 2010
Posted by thegulfblog.com in Qatar, Syria.Tags: Flip Syria, Qatar, Qatar's investment, Syria
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Ever reliable (…) MEMRI reports that Qatar’s Al Sharq suggests that Qatar-Syrian relations will be increasing significantly in the coming years and that Qatar will be investing some $12billion in Syria in the coming few years. Can this be attributed to the notion of Qatar contributing the Sunni half of the Gulf (read Saudi) seeking to ‘flip’ Syria away from the Iranian camp? Or is that too simplistic?
