27th June 2012: On Academic Freedoms

 

Mary-Helen Ward tweeted this morning about academic redundancies at Australian National University, La Trobe University and the University of Sydney. Ward points out that ‘academic freedom’ is often equated with a ‘job for life’ ethos that other industries do not have. “Redundancies are always about money. Managers have to manage with what they’re given. Where is academic freedom?” she asks, responding to a tweet from Thesis Whisperer, Dr. Inger Mewburn.

 

An older cohort of academics cite academic freedom as an essential part of their university’s social contract. For them, academic freedom is comparable to political ‘freedom of speech’ and to safely critiquing institutional politics and power. Academic tenure — or a ‘job for life’ — has been the institutional mechanism through which academic freedoms are purportedly secured and protected. ANU’s Rohan Pitchford has argued strongly that the University of Sydney’s academic redundancies will undermine institutional tenure and thus academic freedoms. Richard Hil and his complainant interviewees also express this view in the new book Whackademia, as does critical press coverage that focuses on the interaction of Federal Government policies, university senior management, and job markets.

 

I was studying Terra Firma Capital Partners‘ private equity deal for the music label EMI when University of Sydney announced their redundancies. I could see direct parallels between Terra Firma, GE’s ‘Neutron’ Jack Welch, and university management decisions. I had also been through similar experiences in publishing and university research/administration. I then wrote a blog post on what people could do to deal with University of Sydney’s decision rules. In the months that followed, this led to further posts on disruptive innovation in higher education; academic entrepreneurssuperstar economics; mailroom jobs; trading insights; academic skills externalities; and the academic-productivity debate. I sympathise with former mentors like Dr. Geoff Mayer at La Trobe University who are being made redundant. (Mayer’s class on the film noir In A Lonely Place gave me plenty of personal insights after a first relationship break-up: the kind of real-life experience not captured in a promotions committee assessment.)

 

Younger academics and administrators may have a different view on the link between institutional tenure and academic freedoms. Many in this cohort are in casual or administrative roles that do not have the same benefits that full-time academics receive. They have possibly gone through career changes and may not have the same expectation of a ‘job for life’ (or even for the next five years). They have found their freedoms in forums that are outside universities or that are marginalised in academia. They see professors with managerial skills who are promoted into management and other professors who don’t engage with the university community at all. They see Orwellian ‘freedoms’ like the ‘publish or perish’ norm that you assign your intellectual property to a profit-making international publishing conglomerate — or you don’t get promoted. They are in a ‘winner-takes-all’ workplace in which a small group either meet productivity benchmarks in the workload model or ‘game’ the system. And usually the people who benefit from this are the more established academics and elites.

 

This is why mentorship in universities for younger academics is so important. Yet it varies depending on how important it is to the senior academic or professor. The difference between the professoriate and younger academics can be likened to the shift from defined benefit pension plans to defined contribution pension plans in superannuation and private wealth management. Making institutional tenure the underpinning of academic freedom means assuming that universities will maintain your academic, high-paying role forever. As Ward points out, that doesn’t happen in other industries (Margin Call anyone?) and certainly not in a time of changes to government funding, sectoral hyper-competition, and economic uncertainty. It also allows some mid-career and senior academics to drift and to ‘game’ the system whilst their younger colleagues face tougher productivity demands.

 

There is plenty to question and debate in the recent redundancy decisions at several universities. The University of Sydney raised issues about decision rules, due process, fairness, transparency, and budget scrutiny. Other questions: What criteria underpinned the financial forecasts? What risk management systems were in place to meet specific financial targets, and why did they fail? Can the financial forecast estimates be revised? Are the performance goals in university strategic plans really feasible or are they just ‘strategy through inflation’? (Richard Rumelt raises this flaw about strategic planning in his book Good Strategy, Bad Strategy). Will the strategic plans survive their Clausewitzean contact with competitive ‘friction’? (No, Clausewitz argues they never do, no matter how well-meaning the strategic planners are – Henry Mintzberg‘s influential book The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning also deals with this.) Is the strategic plan really unique or are our competitors thinking about the same positioning and value creation? Are we making budget and planning decisions that are really due to ‘institutional capture’ or outdated ‘images of the future’? Is senior management just reacting to short-term fluctuations in student numbers that will detrimentally affect our university expertise? What is the appropriate use and also the potential institutional misuse of research bibliometrics? What psychological support and employment outplacement services are being provided to those who accept or are forced to take redundancies? What are the ‘undiscussables’? What are the possible, preferable and potential futures that we are not exploring? (Maree Conway and Rowena Morrow have insights.) What will be the second- and third-order effects of our decisions, and over time? You can probably think of many other angles and questions that could be raised, debated and constructively explored.

 

Maybe there’s a vigorous debate in a professoriate forum that I’m not privy to. But I don’t see it in the public forums I have attended.

 

For a contrast to universities consider money manager Ray Dalio. He runs Bridgewater Associates which is the world’s biggest hedge fund (as defined by assets under management). Dalio is famous for his Principles (PDF) which outlines his personal management and investment philosophy. Dalio has given recent interviews to The Economist and Barron’s. He has given in-depth interviews in recent books by Maneet Ahuja (The Alpha Masters) and Jack D. Schwager (Hedge Fund Market Wizards) about Bridewater’s work culture. In Bridgewater, every management meeting is taped and made available to employees, who are incentivised to provide critical performance feedback to managers and directly, face-to-face to each-other. This is designed to thwart cognitive biases and decision heuristics that are critical to investment decision-making — I recommend Daniel Kahneman‘s book Thinking, Fast and Slow as a good primer. The debate is often around the computerised decision rules and mental models that Bridgewater uses to make over 100 investments in 15 uncorrelated revenue streams. Dalio’s employees don’t necessarily have the freedom to publicly debate Bridgewater’s investment decisions — but they appear to have more freedom within the organisation to help shape daily decision-making and culture.

 

Universities — senior management, professioriate, and younger academics — all clearly have a lot of catching up to do.

 

(Just look at how Google adapted Stanford’s academic workload model to its ’80/20′ time for innovation projects.)

24th March 2012: European Commission Antitrust Investigation on EMI

Vivendi SA (Universal Music Group)

I’m working on an academic journal article about Terra Firma‘s unsuccessful private equity acquisition of EMI. Terra Firma defaulted to Citigroup, which agreed to sell EMI’s record labels in November 2011 to Universal Music Group (Vivendi SA) and EMI’s publishing to a Sony-led consortium. Now, the European Commission will investigate Universal’s acquisition for antitrust implications, given the planned market size of the combined group. Vivendi SA’s shares traded sideways in a choppy market on Friday, 23rd March 2012, possibly in relation to the antitrust announcement and the possibility of regulatory arbitrage on the Universal-EMI deal.

15th March 2010: Breaking the Taboo on Targeting Civilians

Morning meeting: get people face-to-face on sensitive issues, avoid escalation by email, and remove roadblocks. Some interesting anecdotes on what really happens on an overseas consultancy.

Late afternoon meeting over tea and donuts with collaborator Ben Eltham in Melbourne’s Nicholas Building. Discussion: EMI’s troubles; how ERA will affect two articles we are working on; Australian academic and zine maven Anna Poletti; why journal workshops have bad percolator coffee; sick buildings; and the psychological impact of glass desks in offices.

Evening: PhD ‘background research’ viewing the first episode of Gwynne Dyer‘s mid-1980s series ‘War’: archival footage of World War I nationalist mania, the Western Front trenches, machine guns, German zeppelin raids, and World War II aerial bombings, ending in the Trinity nuclear test and Hiroshima. The nationalist mania, and generals’ decision that led to the sacrifice of 60,000 English in one day to German machine guns and no-man’s land, are examples of George Gurdjieff‘s ‘terror of the situation’.

An insight whilst viewing Dyer’s series: the Napoleonic innovation of national conscripts and total war, and German air-raids, broke the taboo on targeting civilians. Prior to this, 19th century Russian anarchists usually targeted police and political leaders. After this, many groups acted on the taboo, for different reasons: anti-colonialist and nationalist revolutions, radicalisation in the shadow of the Vietnam War and other conflicts, strategic tactics such as during hijack negotiations, and religiously motivated violence. This hypothesis appears to be a close fit to David Rapoport‘s waves thesis and to Mark Juergensmeyer‘s research program. Is this testable using the Correlates of War data-sets?

CPRF08 Paper: Disruptive Innovation, Radiohead & Nine Inch Nails

I recently blogged about a presentation the 2008 Communications Policy Research Forum in Sydney on disruptive innovation in the music industry.

You can now download an Adobe PDF version of the PowerPoint slides here.

The refereed paper has been published in the Proceedings of the Communications Policy Research Forum 2008 (pp. 155-175 or PDF file pp. 179-199).  You can also download a local copy of the paper here.

The paper’s case study examines why Radiohead and Nine Inch Nails released their new albums as digital downloads.  I suggest a major reason why, and one that was overlooked by Web 2.0 pundits, is that each artist was in the ‘label shopping phase’ of a new contract and defected after negotiation problems with their major labels.  This fits a pattern in mergers and acquisitions: the major labels lost artists due to integration problems in a merger or acquisition.  Terra Firma Capital Partners has since partially confirmed this hypothesis: the private equity firm endures more post-acquisition integration problems with EMI and is fighting against government regulation of Great Britain’s financial services sector.

The paper’s data appendices contrast the artists’ strategies with signficant events and innovations in music industry contracts, conglomerate mergers and deal structures.  Somehow I missed U2‘s March 2008 deal with Live Nation: I found out about it in an October 2008 announcementGuns n’ Roses also finally released Chinese Democracy (MySpace audio stream): a new album that has taken 15 years, a rumoured US$14 million budget and 14 recording studios in New York, Los Angeles, Las Vegas and London.  I may write a paper on it . . .

CPRF08 Presentation: Disruptive Innovation, Radiohead & Nine Inch Nails

I recently spoke at the 2008 Communications Policy Research Forum in Sydney on disruptive innovation in the music industry.  My presentation looked at the reasons for why Radiohead and Nine Inch Nails pursued online release strategies for their respective albums In Rainbows (2007) and The Slip (2008), and evolved from some initial thoughts here. The reasons suggested in media coverage – Web 2.0 experiments, disruptive innovation and freeconomics – were ‘true yet partial’ explanations.  They overlooked two significant facts: (1) both artists were in the ‘label shopping’ phase near the end of their contracts; and (2) both artists were frustrated with their respective labels EMI and UMG, who each triggered artist defections due to post-merger integration problems.  The presentation also discusses the role of Disruptive Innovation Markets, the Disruptive Information Revelation principle, and lessons for journalists, new media theorists, policymakers and valuation analysts.  Thanks to the Network Insight Institute team (Mark Armstrong, Cristina Abad and Mark Armstrong) and the two anonymous reviewers for their help.

Anvil! The Story of Anvil & Prospect Theory

Music lasts forever . . . and sometimes the debt does too!
– Steve ‘Lips’ Kudlow, Anvil

Sacha Gervasi‘s Anvil! The Story of Anvil (2008) is more than a documentary on the Canadian heavy metal band Anvil: it’s one of the most poignant films yet on how our beliefs and emotions affect our decision-making abilities.

Gervasi’s film begins with Anvil’s triumph: a support set at Super Rock ’84 Japan where lead guitarist/vocalist Steve ‘Lips’ Kudlow wears bondage gear and plays a guitar solo with a dildo whilst drummer Robb Reiner unleashes fast blast beats.  Anvil’s albums Metal on Metal (1982) and Forged in Fire (1983) combine two different strands of heavy metal music: the New Wave of British Heavy Metal movement of the early 1980s that Def Leppard and Iron Maiden popularised, and outrageous tactics that Motley Crue and other Los Angeles bands would adopt in the mid-1980s.  The other bands at Super Rock ’84 sold millions of albums: Scorpions, MSG (Michael Schenker Group), Whitesnake, and Bon Jovi.

But Anvil didn’t and Gervasi explores why.

Anvil’s peers offer several explanations.  Metallica‘s Lars Ulrich suggests Anvil’s Toronto home disadvantaged them compared to the US heavy metal subcultures in Los Angeles and New York.  Motorhead‘s Lemmy Kilmister believes Anvil’s original lineup had talented musicians who never received their due recognition.  Slash the iconic guitarist from Guns ‘n’ Roses and Velvet Revolver contends that other bands took what Anvil did well and just ripped them off.  Anthrax guitarist Scott Ian just wonders where did Anvil go in the past 25 years?

Gervasi tracks down Kudlow and Reiner who are Anvil’s sole original members to Toronto.  Kudlow’s day job is a driver for Choice Children’s Catering whilst Reiner is a sandblaster.  Bassist Glen Five and guitarist Ivan Hurd struggle to survive.  Anvil’s only gigs are at a local sports bar.  They have no management, no producer, no record label contract and will rely on luck and perseverence to get to the ‘next level’ of their careers.

Anvil! documents Kudlow and Reiner’s attempts to achieve the heights of their Super Rock ’84 Japan success: a disastrous European tour and the recording sessions for This is Thirteen (2007).  Gervasi captures Kudlow and Reiner’s decisions during this process, their rationalisations when things go wrong, and the reactions of other band members, friends and collaborators.  Anvil! is thus less a mockumentary like Bad News (1983) and Spinal Tap (1984) and closer to a great case study in Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman‘s Prospect Theory: decision-making about risk where there are differences, known outcomes and unconscious biases.  Despite the improbability of achieving the rockstar dream after 30 years Kudlow and Reiner continue to strive because of their ‘Loser Take All’ passion and self-image, their early success at Super Rock ’84 Japan and the path dependence of their past decisions.

The European tour becomes a series of bad decisions: the tour manager doesn’t book train tickets for transport, Kudlow and Reiner fight with a club owner to pay a gig when only seven people turn up (‘We aren’t getting paid!’), and only 174 people turn up to a Transylvanian heavy metal festival in a 10,000-capacity venue (‘How much love could one person put into something?’).  The tour manager expresses remorse due to hindsight bias, falls in love with and then marries guitarist Ivan Hurd who leaves Anvil in 2007.  Kudlow and Reiner also have to fend against adverse selection when lawyers and others cluster around to take Anvil’s money.  Kudlow takes five weeks off work for the tour in which Anvil makes no money: ‘When we’re on tour we’re on vacation’ he tells Gervasi.

In the tour’s aftermath Kudlow admits to Gervasi why Anvil have not succeeded: they made bad decisions early on in their career, have no management to promote them, the past few albums have poor material and no production, and the band was ripped off by ‘indie’ record labels who never payed their artists (‘99.9% of bands never get paid’).

Kudlow’s solution is to approach producer Chris Tsangarides who worked with Anvil to record a new album.  Kudlow struggles to raise the $13,000 that Tsangarides requests: he lasts eight hours at a telemarketing job run by Anvil’s fan club president before turning to his sister who is a successful businesswoman and gives him the money.  The band decamps to Tsangarides’ studio in Dover, England, to write, record and mix This Is Thirteen
(2007).  The studio appears to consist of a band gear room, a vocalist room, and an audio engineering room with Protools software and a small mixing desk.  (Although Gervasi doesn’t explore it further the studio shots suggest that Tsangarides is also down on his luck and that his surface altruism hides the more pragmatic motive of generating income from any source to survive and trading on his past with Black Sabbath and Judas Priest).  Reiner argues with Kudlow over the lyrics and poor takes, and storms out.  Kudlow apologises and tries to bring Reiner back with a reminder about their teenage pact whilst Tsangarides tries to de-escalate the conflict and deal with the inevitable group tensions during the recording process.  Kudlow and Reiner reconcile during a Stonehenge visit.

Afterwards, Kudlow uses guerrilla marketing tactics to visit the offices of US record companies, and receives no interest after two weeks.  Kudlow then visits EMI Canada’s officer where an A&R manager turns off This is Thirteen after hearing Kudlow’s over-the-top vocals.  Gervasi ends Anvil! with an unlikely triumph when a Japanese promoter who saw Anvil on their European tour books the band to play a Tokyo festival.  Kudlow and Reiner worry backstage about if anyone will turn up and emerge to find the room full of thousands of fans who remember their Super Rock ’84 Japan performance.

Tversky and Kahneman’s work on Prospect Theory is central to Anvil!‘s narrative about Anvil’s tours and album recording sessions.  Kudlow’s nostalgia about Super Rock ’84 Japan highlights why he has an emotional overinvestment in Anvil’s self-image and appears stuck in a time-warp.  Others share this: bassist Glen Five is an Anvil fan whose belongings are in a garage because he can’t afford a house, the European tour manager has plenty of love and passion but fails in strategic execution, and Kudlow’s wife admits near the film’s end that because of her interest in 1980s heavy metal music and lifestyles she had wanted Anvil to succeed commercially in a moment that has passed.  Kudlow is overconfident about Anvil’s chances, he manages risks through the affect heuristic of immediate problems rather than consequences, and illustrates the knowing-doing problem of knowing what the barriers are and yet not developing mitigative strategies to bypass them.  Gervasi hints that Anvil might have pursued other options, from doing children’s parties at Kudlow’s catering firm to Reiner’s private collection of landscape paintings.  Luckily, Anvil!’s success has opened up new possibilities for Anvil including a MySpace page and street team.

Anvil frequently make comparisons between themselves and the successful bands at Super Rock ’84 Japan.  This is a self-narrative that illustrates Tversky and Kahneman’s anchoring a  cognitive bias which focuses on specific information in decision-making.  Anvil! would be even more interesting if it contrasted Anvil’s underdog failure with the comparison bands who have all run into major problems yet survived due to business savvy managers and major label support: albums recorded for tax purposes (Anthrax), management problems and hostile fans (Metallica and its managers QPrime), lineup, recording and tour problems (Anthrax, Black Sabbath, Guns ‘n’ Roses, Iron Maiden, Judas Priest, Motorhead, Velvet Revolver), and peaks and troughs in their careers (Anthrax, Black Sabbath, Bon Jovi, Iron Maiden, Metallica, Motorhead, Scorpions).  Nor are the costs of these ‘sucesses’ explored: on the first date of Anvil’s European tour Kudlow reunites with Twisted Sister guitarist Eddie Ojeda who looks to be a drugged, emaciated mess.

If that’s heavy metal ‘success’ then Anvil’s hometown longevity, label independence, lifelong friends and supportive family may have been a better long-term choice.