Confronting The Unthinkable

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After 'It Happened Here'

'Far too often in the nineties there was a gulf between mandate and means. Partly as a result, thousands of people died.'

— William Shawcross[1]

'Analysts are servants of policy, not merely objective observers of events and trends.'

— Paul Seabury[2]

'All acts of terrorism represent an intelligence failure.'

— Dennis Richardson[3]

Policy-makers and politicians have called for reform of the United States (US) intelligence community (IC) after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The US-based Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) faced intensive scrutiny for its failure to discover and forewarn the American public about the al-Qaeda attacks on New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This mini-cycle was repeated in Australia when diplomatic cables from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) were examined in the wake of the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002. The operational failure to locate and destroy Saddam Hussein's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) fuelled an acrimonious public debate throughout the first half of 2003. The disturbing conclusion reached by many journalists was that raw intelligence data was misused by the US and British governments as public justification for 'regime change' in Iraq. The reaction to

the September 11 terrorist attacks in these three Western democracies was quick and wide-ranging.

US Congress approved the PATRIOT Act[4] on 25 October 2001 and President George W. Bush signed the Act into law the following day. Bush also authorized the creation of a Department of Homeland Security for counter-terrorism and threat analyses.[5] These two events were the most wide-ranging changes to US security policy in a quarter century. The Bush Administration also adopted in its *National Security Statement*[6] the Pre-emption Doctrine, formulated by neo-conservative strategists Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld in the early 1990s.[7] This provided the theoretical underpinning for incursions into Afghanistan to end Taliban rule and to depose the Iraqi Hussein dictatorship.

The Blair Government of the UK aligned itself with the Bush Administration against dissenting voices from the French and German governments within the European Union (EU). Debate largely centred on the status of *Third Way* politics on a post-September 11 world, and whether the nebulous 'War on Terror' would be a unilateral 'pre-emptive strike' or a multi-lateral coalition. The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002)[8] also became a political flashpoint for activists who sought a connection between counter-terrorism and human rights issues.

The Howard Government of Australia had reflected aspects of the US and UK responses. But after the Bali bombings the debate shifted from unilateral support of the US to concerns about Australia's defence capabilities and its troubled relationship with

Southeast Asia. Immigration had been a 'hot-button' issue during the preceding months. The 'Tampa' incident of 26 August 2001 exposed limitations in the emergency response capabilities of the Australian Coastal Surveillance alert system.[9] The 'Pacific Solution', to deport illegal asylum seekers to Nauru and other Pacific islands, shifted the problem from Australia to the United Nations. The ASIO Legislation Amendment Terrorism Bill (2002),[10] which granted wide-ranging PATRIOT-style interrogation capabilities to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation,[11] proved to be so politically divisive that it created a yearlong debate, before a second reading was passed on 19 June 2003. The Australian Government's 2003 Budget allocated $A411 million increased funding for domestic security agencies.[12] Rather than pursue the 'China'[13] or 'Pacific Century' scenarios for regional development, the Howard Government also prioritised negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with the United States.

'Anxious' Foresight and Futures Studies

In the post-September 11 era Ulrich Beck's 'world risk society' became the norm.[14] Robert Kaplan counselled that foreign policy in the 21st century should be redefined as 'the art, rather than the science, of permanent crisis management.'[15] Analysts who forewarned policy-makers of coming crises were left in a Cassandra-like double bind. Hence foreign policy was also be 'the art of intelligently organizing what information can be foreseen.'[16] 'Trained' instinctual judgments were needed to cope with information overload.[17] The link between the US normative tradition of Futures Studies and intelligence work has been very clear. As Eliot Cohen quoted, '[t]he job is to make

comments about the future.'[18]

Kaplan's analysis is the latest in a Machiavellian tradition of 'anxious foresight.'[19] This Machiavellian tradition is especially relevant to the psychology of intelligence for one crucial reason. 'Intelligence services are necessarily combative,' wrote Richard Hall, 'they are *always* fighting a war, albeit an undeclared one.'[20] This undeclared war has usually been against subversion and sabotage, Politically Motivated Violence (PMV) and communal fighting, or external threats including counterintelligence and terrorism. The 1984 Royal Commission into Intelligence Services listed three threat levels (high, medium and low).[21] ASIO's submission to the Senate inquiry into threats to Australians between the September 11 attacks and the Bali bombings listed six threat levels and descriptions.[22]

In this context intelligence agencies function as *de facto* 'Institutes of Foresight'. ASIO's role, for example, requires 'some foreknowledge of violent activity' even when this information is passed on to law enforcement officials for action.[23] Whilst ASIO 'has access to special powers' in relation to security-vetting of Australian Government staff and contractors, it does not have arrest powers.[24] (US military intelligence agencies and the FBI do under their respective jurisdictions.) Nor can forewarning be a justification for 'the use of intrusive intelligence collection techniques.'[25] Rather, the role of effective intelligence agencies is pre-emptive, where possible, and anticipatory in nature.

Intelligence analysts and collectors, Roy Godson noted, 'use models or theories to decide

what facts are relevant, whether they are conscious of it or not.'[26] Part of their function is to make explicit the premises, frameworks, worldviews and conclusions that form their analysis. The frameworks chosen 'will suggest questions or hypotheses to guide the collectors.'[27] The scientific method influenced Godson's perspective on the CIA's generic intelligence cycle. He compared analysts to theoretical scientists who created hypotheses. Collections specialists were experimental scientists who considered how the hypotheses could be field-tested. Counterintelligence analysts 'would help screen both the hypotheses and collection methods for deception.'[28] Current innovations in the Futures Studies field—including 'layered methods', Critical Realist philosophy and the schools of Critical and Integral Futures—have contributed to the Faustian promises of 'new techniques for mathematical inference, more flexible computerized aids for exploring hypotheses and patterns, more interpretive guidelines from visitors and émigrés, and new analysts trained by those who produced the critical insights of the past.'[29]

Hermann Kahn described Futures Studies as a tool for policy-makers to 'think about the unthinkable.' Within a Cold War intelligence context the normative tradition of Futures Studies helped US analysts to understand Soviet military planners. 'The Soviets believe military science really is a science,' Roy Godson observed.[30] 'Kremlinology' has declined as a science but the need for 'anxious foresight' remains. Intelligence work requires a form of 'constructive pessimism': to glimpse the very worst outcomes, and to make sure these outcomes never eventuate. Today intelligence analysts and policy-makers do not have Kahn's luxury of think-tank detachment. They must 'confront the

unthinkable'.

The Spectre of 'September 11 Opportunism'

At a policy level the responses by the US, UK and Australian governments to the post-September 11 world were attempts to 'bound' geopolitical uncertainty. However some initiatives, the US PATRIOT legislation in particular, were used as 'September 11 opportunism' by policy-makers to seize executive control of judicial and legislative powers.[31] Harvard University law professor Alan Dershowitz criticised US Attorney General John Ashcroft for equating public dissent against the Bush Administration's policies with support for al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks:

> Among the most important of these non-governmental checks are a free press, a zealous defense bar, an independent religious leadership, and a critical professoriate and student body. No emergency requires any compromise with the right to dissent.[32]

Dershowitz's observation also hints at an underlying 'visioning' problem. The debates between these different stakeholders have revealed a fragmented outlook for the 21st century. Governments have reacted with sophisticated crisis management strategies. The IC has examined resource management issues. Lawyers have deliberated on risks to civil liberties. Activists have formed inter-group alliances. An effective and multidimensional response for cultural recovery would acknowledge the interrelationships between these

stakeholders. Dershowitz believed this was important for the rights of future generations.[33]

However the overriding response has often been to enforce what Daniel Hillis called the sphere of 'legitimate consensus'. In the weeks after the September 11 attacks, the United States experienced an upsurge in patriotism that morphed into a wave of vulgar commercialism and domestic censorship.[34] Consensus also underpinned the deployment of 'embedded journalists' during the Iraq 'regime change'.[35] Whilst maintaining 'operational security' was important the press coverage in both the Gulf War and the Iraq 'regime change' was patriotic rather than independent.[36] This short-term strategy resulted in public mistrust when the euphoria fades away.

Andrew Wilkie's resignation from the Office of National Assessments[37] in protest at the Australian Government's jockeying for post-war reconstruction contracts, was a rare public assertion of moral self-responsibility.[38] After joining the US-led Coalition of the Willing, the Government was possibly using ONA's 'opportunity-oriented analysis' to identify suitable reconstruction projects for Australian companies. Roy Godson said of this analysis that it 'would focus on the strategic and tactical vulnerabilities of foreign leaders, parties, and/or movements.'[39] Wilkie's problem was that this 'Iraq regime change' opportunism clashed with the role the intelligence had originally been designed for.

Public Mistrust at *Ground Zero*

The film *Ground Zero* (1987) evoked this public mistrust. The film centred on a contemporary Royal Commission investigating the British nuclear tests at Maralinga, and which uncovers footage revealing the mistreatment of indigenous Aboriginal people. *Ground Zero* played self-consciously with the pop culture misunderstandings of ASIO and the D-Notice bans on media outlets. The 'White Australia' policy, the Maralinga tests, and a fictionalised ASIO cover-up were meme-spliced into a 'ghost nation' mythology of unresolved traumata. The reality was that a driving force behind ASIO's creation was British defence pressure to upgrade security capabilities for the Woomera missile range and the Maralinga test site.[40] ASIO historian Frank Cain is even more forceful. Cain argued that ASIO was formed, after the Venona decrypts, to convince US defence analysts 'to share its high technology defence information with Britain, and to lift its ban on the transfer of information to Australia.' This post-World War II geopolitical *realpolitik* would have significant ramifications for ASIO as it evolved. A more limited reason was that ASIO could 'provide a specialized intelligence-gathering unit which would concentrate on possible Soviet espionage.'[41]

It was no accident that *Ground Zero* depicted a contemporary Royal Commission as the epicentre of this historical amnesia. While US analysts dubbed the 1980s the 'decade of the spy' (after a series of high-profile intelligence failures and defections) the Australian experience was perhaps closer to the 'decade of Royal Commissions.' Justice Robert Marsden Hope spearheaded two Royal Commissions into the Australian intelligence

community.[42] He also investigated the Combe-Ivanov affair (which unmasked a KGB

operative in the process of forming intimate links with the newly-elected Hawke

Government),[43] and 'lamentable' incident that occurred at the Sheraton Hotel on 30

November 1983 (when an Australian Security Intelligence Service training exercise went

out-of-control).[44] Justice Hope's magisterial findings led to important reforms and the

'professionalising' of Australian intelligence and security forces.

Yet Justice Hope never made the kind of critique that the Church Commission, led by

Senator Frank Church (D–Idaho), levelled against the Central Intelligence Agency's

(CIA) assassination and covert action programs in 1975. *Ground Zero*'s scepticism was

closer to the media-driven Inquiry into the 1978 Sydney Hilton bombing that 'stacked the

deck' against three suspects who belonged to the Ananda Marga sect.[45] Justice Hope

censored specific operational details while making generic information on intelligence

procedures available. In contrast the US Supreme Court has actively fought the

perception that the judiciary should prevent the public dissemination of national security

intelligence.[46]

Harvey Barnett, ASIO's chief executive from 1981 to 1986, counselled that Australian

governments often used Royal Commissions as issues and perception management tools

on a national scale. The Royal Commission 'effectively removes political debate on to

another, and higher plane, placing the matter to be investigated in limbo,' Barnett

observed.[47] The spectre of 'September 11 opportunism' has reawakened this earlier

concern about the transparency of governance in the Westminster political system. One

of the most contentious, emotive and misunderstood discussions has been about the role of intelligence and security agencies, and their jurisdictional effects on human rights and immigration legislation. Creating legislative safeguards that are equivalent to the US Bill of Rights and Constitutional Amendments are a start.

Pop Geopolitics and 'Sound-bite Scenarios'

The dark side of the Cold War, observed Robert Kaplan was that it 'entailed vast covert operations and nuclear weapons systems.'[48] Explicitly naming George Orwell's *1984* as a model dystopia, Mary Kaldor made the case that the Cold War was a 'total war' that 'kept alive the idea of war, while avoiding its reality.'[49] The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) caught many geopolitical analysts by surprise. As a consequence, several meta-theories of geopolitics flourished in the post-Cold War environment. In their populist form they were 'pop geopolitics.'   As a war of different ideas and scanning frames, 'pop geopolitics' writings contributed concepts and public literacy of strategic geography—provided one remembers that the pundits always had other aims in mind.

Four geopolitical theories dominated popular discourse. Each was a synthesis of personal experience and intellectual traditions; each was also grasped as a 'sound-bite scenario'. Francis Fukuyama's 'end of history' hypothesis proclaimed Western liberal democracy as the ideal form of the nation-state.[50] Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' model applied Toynbee's macrohistory to unfolding events, and warned of emerging 'fault-line

wars'.[51] Thomas Friedman's writings intuited the rise of geo-economics and trans-national monetary flows as the defining feature of Western globalization.[52] Robert Kaplan's reportage captured the implosion of several nation-states into chaos and the emergence of 'gated' communities as a stratagem to restore order.[53]

The popularity of these 'sound-bite scenarios' revealed aspects of the post-Cold War environment, but not the Hegelian Overmind. Fukuyama's reformulation of realist Manifest Destiny, and Friedman's breathless embrace of trans-national monetarism were both critiqued by liberal and anti-globalist theorists. Huntington's 'clash' recreated the Cold War conflicts 'on a cultural rather than an ideological basis.'[54] His macrohistory also established what Huntington claimed was the 'inevitable' looming conflict between Judeo-Christian and Islamic civilizations: a framework that prompted many writers to describe the September 11 terrorist attacks as a 'first-strike' in the battle. Kaplan's tour of the Balkans and Somalia imbued his writings with a gritty experience. Yet they also created an 'essentially determinist' model that did not 'envisage alternative forms of authority at a global level.'[55] Each of these authors made an important contribution. None wisely offered a totalizing 'theory of everything.'

The Limits of 'Ancient Ethnic Hatreds'

Sometimes these writings complicated and obscured the very problems they claimed to shed insight upon. The popular explanation of the 1990s Balkans conflict was the resurgence of 'ancient ethnic hatreds' as a malignant form of identity politics between

Bosnians, Croatians and Serbians. This argument was further underpinned by a reliance on the 'failed' or 'imploding' nation-state, because identity politics self-corrected for traditional forms of social legitimacy that neared collapse. Media coverage defined the Balkans conflict as ethnic cleansing, in which the militias used rape as a 'deliberate strategy.'[56]

The aftermath revealed a far more complex and ambiguous picture. William Shawcross noted that the Balkans, and subsequent Rwandan auto-genocide 'may have had historical ethnic components, but it also had political drivers.' Shawcross concluded, in contrast to 'ancient ethnic hatreds', that politicians (for their own chthonic ends) were manipulating these historical events and symbols. 'Violence was not inevitable, it was chosen,'[57] he wrote. The 'hatreds' explanation supported 'backward-looking political projects,' Mary Kaldor explained, that manifested 'in the vacuum created by the absence of forward-looking projects.'[58] An early indicator of the potential of a society to slide into civil war and auto-genocide will be the imagery used in political rhetoric and its future outlook.

The importance of this temporal dimension was overlooked in a debate where unresolved historical traumas were used to justify the West's initial policy of non-intervention. If the dominant cause were 'ancient ethnic hatreds' then present-day intervention would be problematic. Yet this explanation obscured the important roles played by different sub-state actors. Arms dealers supplied weapons to paramilitary forces and kept the conflict being waged. Long-term support and financial networks were provided by 'expatriate nationalist groups . . . who find solace in fantasies about their origins which are often far

removed from reality.'[59] Kaldor argued that by distancing themselves from the populace, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaigns revealed that Western planners had 'not yet come to terms with the concept of a common human community.'[60]

Finally, there are some intriguing if speculative connections. General Radovan Karadzic, the final Defense Minister of Yugoslavia, may have learnt counterinsurgency tactics at West Point Military Academy, although it 'was only a minor part of the curriculum there, and other JNA officers had also studied in the United States.'[61] Officers of the Yugoslav People's Army appeared to have studied the lessons learned from the Phoenix Program in Vietnam[62] and 1980s low-intensity conflicts.

Re-evaluating the 'CNN Effect'

Few geopolitical debates were immune from these simplistic explanations. One way to critique the debates in greater depth is to ask which theory was being used and whom the theory benefited. The 'CNN Effect', defined by scholar Piers Robinsons as the power of the global news media 'to provoke major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to both global and national events,' was such an alternate construct.[63] Famines in Ethiopia and Somalia, and the video-game coverage of the Gulf War, gave the theory an immediacy that made its conclusions self-evident.[64] It became popular amongst policy-makers as an explanation to hide the complexities of party deals and political action collectives. The 'CNN Effect' annointed the global media as the 'poor

man's intelligence service.'[65]

The 'Black Hawk Down' incident on 3 October 1993 was interpreted by 'CNN Effect' proponents as proof of their theory, and later became a best-selling book and feature film.[66] US President Bill Clinton's non-interventionist doctrine of not 'crossing the Mogadishu line' had a far more disturbing outcome. The skirmish in Somalia paralysed US strategists, and despite foresight, prevented an effective intervention to prevent the 'auto-genocide' in Somalia. 'The terror was perhaps "unimaginable",' Shawcross wrote, 'but it was also undeniable, and manifest almost from the start.'[67]

To-date the 'pop geopolitics' pundits have been largely silent on the negative policy consequences of their writings. An over-reliance on the 'CNN Effect', for example, 'makes cruelty easier to accomplish, as we enter an abstract realm of pure strategy and deception carrying few psychological risks.'[68] This cruelty is embedded into the very economics of media institutions and what editorial staff will prioritize as coverage. 'Many crises call for attention, but there are only limited resources and limited desire to meet them,' Shawcross noted.[69] Charities, who did have the attention span to focus on the crises, were also motivated by self-interest: 'they lobby for intervention in areas where they are active, rather than in others where they are less so.'[70] The CIA found its perception management skills had atrophied in some key counter-intelligence areas.[71]

Ethics and personal philosophy, as the underpinnings of moral engagement with these crises, becomes crucial. The same tactical media stratagems that can be used to

document human rights atrocities can also be used for perception management. The

media is also reliant on its relationship with the nation-state's government. One short-

term benefit of authoritarian societies like China, Russia and North Korea was that their

state control of the media to prevent favourable news coverage of terrorist acts.[72] 'On the

one known occasion when a Soviet citizen was killed by a terrorist,' B. Hugh Tovar

observed, 'Soviet retaliation was apparently immediate, brutal, and effective, uninhibited

by the sensitivities that make it so difficult for the United States to deal directly with

terrorists.'[73] Favorable coverage by the Western media enhanced the Palestinian

Liberation Organization's stature during the 1970s. This coverage made it difficult for

the terrorists and their supporters to be 'collectively punished.'[74]

Reconsidering 'The Detritus of Post-modernism'

'Pop geopolitics' had one further important outcome: it recognized the role of cultural

imagery in shaping collective visions of the future. Throughout the late 1990s much of

this imagery became what Richard Slaughter described, in his critique of the late

Australian magazine *21C*, as 'the detritus of post-modernism'. In particular, Slaughter

criticized 'the realm of postmodern gurus, technological breakthroughs, media and,

especially, the world of the internet.'[75]

The relativistic excesses of 1990s postmodernism have been thoroughly critiqued by

Slaughter and others, but condemning the detritus totally is too harsh for several reasons.

J.G. Ballard, whose writings held an intense fascination for the chroniclers of postmodern

detritus, also foresaw the interrelationships between global media, 'institutionalized disaster areas' and psychological estrangement that defined the 1990s 'humanitarian intervention' debate.[76] Focused cultural analyses such as Mark Dery's study of the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, highlighted broad contexts that typical intelligence briefs had overlooked.[77]

For the subculture reader such 'terminal literature' provided a conceptual distance from the host society. But for the counter-terrorist specialist such detritus, like a collection of militant Islamic propaganda or an environmental scan of extremist literature,[78] had a different value entirely. As a source of 'open source' research this information would, if delivered in a timely fashion, have provided insights into terrorist mind-sets and freed resources to be focused elsewhere. Scanning the detritus had its own history. Fringe analysts had been monitoring *The Turner Diaries* for several years before the book formed the template for the Oklahoma City Bombing.[79] Daniel Pipes, echoing Richard Hofstadter, warned that paranoid thinking underpinned the 'counter-conspiracies' of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia.[80]

Nor were Futures Studies concepts untouched by this subculture-driven 'blowback'.[81] Senior members of the Aum Shinrikyo sect were directly inspired by Isaac Asimov's *Foundation* series and sought to adapt his macrohistorical concept of psychohistory to their organisational structure, technological research, and religiopolitical iconography.[82] The utopian visions of 1970s 'futurology' also underpinned the public emergence of the Raelian new religious movement. Rael's claims of human cloning, which gave stem cell

advocates and health policy-makers nightmares throughout 2002, showed exactly why

these 'paranoid style' sub-currents surged up and briefly influenced public discourse.

They may be details in a much broader picture. Peter Schwartz's experience with

monitoring UFO fringe groups worth considering. 'Ultimately, they offered no insights

about the future,'[83] Schwartz noted. However the imagery of fringe groups that have

tapped into the Jungian collective consciousness have been used operationally as a covert

psychological warfare technique to influence susceptible targets.[84]

Detritus, Sub-currents and Threat Assessments

Publishers and scholars never made this *de facto* environmental scanning operational in

an intelligence-gathering framework. The Raelians and Aum Shinrikyo both showed,

however, that supranormal impulses could influence contemporary history. For

intelligence officers these groups provide opportunities to test skills in emerging issues

analysis and environmental scanning. Aum Shinrikyo is regularly cited, along with

Hamas and al Qaeda, as a contemporary case study in terrorist group dynamics. Since

these groups mix truths and falsehoods into their public stance, their public statements

may also be used as 'simulation' groups in training exercises on counterintelligence and

threat assessment of groups. Counterintelligence staff should be 'sensitised' to having

their attention and resources misdirected 'in directions they wish us to pursue—and away

from others.'[85] Resource and time limits need to be established beforehand and adhered

to, because obsessive monitoring could lead to a dead end.

Within some intelligence circles the analysis of fringe documents for the purpose of identifying subversive individuals and violent groups has also been a norm. Richard Hall, an early critic of ASIO, labelled their intelligence reports on subversive activities as 'pseudo-scholarship' and compared their worldview to 19th century anti-Masonic writings by paranoid Roman Catholics.[86] In contrast to CIA analysts, Hall contended, the ASIO analysts were 'hard-liners' who made over-simplistic comparisons between Aboriginal political activism and the Black Panthers, or predicted that the Vietnam Moratorium movement would engage in urban warfare operations. Their briefs were 'predicated on extremist assumptions divorced from political realities.'[87] However, in all fairness, Hall's portrayal must be understood as the Antipodean equivalent of the 1970s CIA critiques penned by Philip Agee and Miles Copeland.[88] ASIO management were very clear, during the second Hope Royal Commission, that 'the Organization should not become involved in what are described as 'mass issues', even when a promotion of a particular views upon those issues results in violence.'[89]

The occupational danger of scanning postmodern detritus or 'paranoid style' sub-currents is that the analyst may suffer 'analytic overload' or have a psychotic break. The *X-Files* stereotype has some operational truth to it. The analyst must be simultaneously able to be immersed in the raw intelligence and the worldviews yet also remain subjectively apart from it. At an organization level, two outcomes are operationally flawed intelligence and a work-culture shift from mainstream society.[90] Hence the in-progress analysis must be compared and contrasted with other sources and counter-factual 'what if?' scenarios. Professional training in cognitive and depth psychologies, and self-exposure to a diversity

of worldviews, is also paramount. The experiences and skills learned from scanning detritus and sub-currents can, in another context, be applied to terrorist profiling.

Terrorism Profiling

Profiling violent groups is a domestic security function closely related to terrorist profiling. The premise of terrorism profiling is that by close analysis of autobiographical literature and other sources, 'it would also be possible to ascertain certain vulnerabilities within the group by pinpointing its sensitivities, internal disagreements, and moral weaknesses.'[91] Once identified these vulnerabilities could be targeted through propaganda campaigns and covert psychological warfare.[92] The 1999 *US Government Report on Profiling Terrorists* recommended targeted propaganda to 'at-risk' youth who may affiliate with terrorist cells.[93]

Roy Godson points out a link between terrorist profiling and counter-intelligence, where 'analysts are required to understand the values, doctrines, decision-making procedures, and perceptions of foreigners, as well as their capabilities,' This framework is common in politico-military studies of international relations,[94] and the emerging school of anthropological Futures Studies has much to offer the counter-intelligence field. Yet ironically the 'concept of the terrorism mindset has not received more attention by terrorism specialists.'[95] Understanding the mindsets 'is an essential mode of analysis for assessing the threat posed by a group.'[96] The same techniques can also be used, when combined with scenarios and wild cards methodologies, to pre-empt attacks on visiting

dignitaries and violent protests.

Effective profiling must distinguish between the 'content' of different mindsets and the 'structure' of different worldviews. The failure to make the 'content' versus 'structure' distinction has characterised the 'paranoid style' sub-currents discussed above. In the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, scholars Don Edward Beck and Chris Cowan wrote a paper on terrorism mindsets, circulated within the US State Department.[97] The paper combined insights from Muzafer Sherif on 'social judgment' and Clare W. Graves on 'levels of existence' psychological research. The Gravesian approach described 'a vertical continuum of increasingly complex thinking systems.'[98] This added a 'human ecology' perspective that went beyond the psychoanalytic or personality type models of political studies, and that could be readily adapted to operational use. Regrettably many of the latter-day analyses of current geopolitical events using the Gravesian approach have been flawed by their authors' unexamined presumptions and failure to conduct field research and literature reviews of primary sources. Few match the lucid insights of Beck & Cowan's original paper.

Sherif's 'assimilation-contrast' effect, originally developed to study group dynamics and stereotypes, also clarified 'the spectrum of subversive activities.' Justice Hope commented that this spectrum ranged from 'revolutionary violence to overthrow the constitutional government' to 'political activity which is entirely proper within a democratic society.'[99] Sherif's insights into how stereotypes and group dynamics fed escalating conflict was also relevant to the Politically-Motivated Violence (PMV) sub-

definition of terrorism that has defined ASIO's charter.[100]

'Loose Nukes' and Superterrorism

The populist embrace of 'pop geoplitics' had its counter-parts within counter-terrorist and intelligence circles. Alvin Toffler's 'third wave' theories and the 'revolution in military affairs' were amongst the most prominent ideas to be discussed throughout the mid-1990s.[101] Solutions such as the National Missile Defence shield[102] were revivals of earlier policies during the early 1980s debates on the Strategic Defence Initiative and the neutron bomb.[103] National security issues in the Clinton Administration were defined in purely economic terms.[104] After Aum Shinrikyo's sarin gas attack and the Oklahoma City bombing, the focus shifted to 'superterrorism' waged by sub-state actors and rogue states.

Alvin Toffler's status as an influential American futurist prompted a debate about the possibility of an information warfare attack on critical infrastructure facilities.[105] For the Pentagon this accelerated collaborations with, and reliance on, civilian computer experts. The 'war-gaming' of probable attacks initiated a re-examination of covert operations capabilities within the CIA and Defence Intelligence Agency.[106] A secondary problem is likely to be the proliferation of secure encryption technologies and their use by criminal and terrorist networks.[107]

Throughout the 1990s counter-terrorism also focused on low-probability high-impact

events like 'loose nukes' and the hunt for WMDs.[108] The possibility that imploding

nation-states or sub-actor groups could obtain a WMD created a panic industry.[109] The

WMD scenario created a 'ticking bomb' argument in legal circles that was used to justify

the PATRIOT Act's expansion of investigative and law enforcement powers.[110] The

scenario paralleled the 'humanitarian intervention' debate and US policymakers' fears

that terrorists would emerge from imploding or failed nation-states.[111]

For Robert Kaplan, scenario 'driving forces' and wild cards (which he calls 'side-

swipes') are the skeleton of creating a 21st century outlook.[112] The way that abstract

scenarios and wild card methodologies were used in this context, whilst useful,

sometimes uncoupled the intelligence process from what was actually developing in the

external environment. The use of wild cards such as the WMD scenario requires formal

training in the methodology and practitioner awareness of how cognitive biases and

emotional states can affect the outputs.[113]

Such outputs will have unanticipated consequences on the general populace if they

remain unaware that the scenarios are being deployed for strategic reasons. The Russian

'loose nukes' scenario, for example, may have been promoted widely in the media to

ensure that facilities were tightly controlled, while the apparent availability of 'loose

nukes' was used to target terrorists in undercover operations.[114] Complicating matters

even further was the possibility that the Aum Shinrikyo apocalyptic sect tried to obtain

WMDs from Russian military sources.[115]

Rogue States and Freelance Terrorists

The WMD scenario was frequently linked to discussions of 'rogue' states like Iraq and North Korea.[116] For counter-terrorism analysts the 'rogue' state was the catalyst for a new generation of terrorists. The mode of terrorist leadership shifted from contractor to freelancer.[117] Abu Nidal signified the former, while Ahmed Ramzi Yousef, Omar Abdul Rahman and Osama Bin Laden signified the latter.[118] Contractors were closely attached to client nation-states or carried out covert actions for foreign intelligence agencies. Freelancers worked for sub-state actors, religiopolitical movements and paramilitary groups. Both gained status as 'corporate and military oligarchs' in emerging city-states that bordered unstable regions.[119]

In some extreme situations, like the collapse of Sierra Leone, contract and freelance mercenaries were needed to impose a semblance of social order.[120] What separated the contract mercenary from the freelance terrorist was that the former respected the Leviathan-like nature of the nation-state and used violence with targeted precision against social transgressors, while the latter used fear to destroy the social contract and was indiscriminate with violence.

The Prehistory of Fixing Intelligence Failures

The failure to provide adequate security forces, despite forewarning, meant the United Nations was unable to prevent a wave of violence (created by Indonesian militias) that swept East Timor's 1999 referendum. 'In its startling lack of foresight, weak planning, and chaotic implementation,' Kaplan summed up, 'the U.N.'s exercise in democracy lacked Machiavellian virtue.'[121] Professional security forces and civil defence programs were crucial in the Peruvian government's counter-offensive against the Shining Path guerrillas and Tupac Amaru terrorists.[122] In Australia the relationship between intelligence and security forces had fused, in two earlier intelligence failures, and one controversial success, which anticipated the post-September 11 soul-searching. Past traumatic events can be a precursor, within institutions, to present–day politicization that has interfered with the intelligence cycle in the past.[123]

Failure: The Ustasha Terrorist Network and the Murphy 'Raid'

ASIO's critics believed that the security agency did not prevent Croatian Ustasha extremists from establishing financial networks in Australia during the early 1970s. A series of bombings in Australia and elsewhere were attributed to militant Communist activists. The surface reason was that ASIO 'empathised with its anti-communist outlook.'[124] For vocal critic Richard Hall, acknowledgement of these terrorist acts by ASIO 'was to concede that anti-communists could do wrong.'[125] However an alternate explanation was that ASIO was monitoring the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood's

possible links with Soviet Russia. Harvey Barnett claimed that Yugoslav Government political pressure meant ASIO had to monitor the Croatians and also remain vigilant for Yugoslave-sponsored violence in Australia.[126] In any event, the perceived inaction of ASIO's investigation soon led to tension with the Australian Federal Police. The flashpoint came on 16 February 1970 when Superintendent Kerry Milte, head of the Commonwealth Police Crime Intelligence Bureau, interviewed Croatian extremist leader Srecko Rover. As the interview began, Rover suggested to Milte he 'should phone ASIO, implying they would obtain an automatic clearance for Rover.'[127]

This stalemate led Attorney-General Lionel Murphy to 'raid' ASIO's Melbourne offices on 17 March 1973 and discover what the intelligence organization had on the Ustasha terrorist network. Milte and Murphy 'scrutinized certain files on Croatians.'[128] The 'raid' sent shockwaves through the Australian intelligence community. ASIO officials hired the Melbourne law firm Owen Dixon Chambers and circulated a memorandum dated 28 March 1973 on their need for independence.[129] These escalating events ultimately led to the Hope Royal Commissions and creation of oversight bodies like the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.[130] For historian Frank Cain, the Ustasha episode 'provides an apt lesson in how the uncritical and unthinking embrace of anti-Communism' distorted the intelligence process.[131] Justice Hope observed in 1983 that the Murphy 'raid', while unsettling to ASIO, was a reminder 'that the Director-General was subject in all respects to ministerial direction and control.'[132]

Failure: The Sydney Hilton Bombing

The Sydney Hilton bombing, on 13 February 1978, also became an organizational trauma for ASIO. Daryl Dellora's documentary *Conspiracy* (1994) contended, through interviews and reconstructions, ASIO and Special Branch forces planned to stage the defusing of a 'jumping jack' mine, which had been stolen from the Australian Army barracks weeks before, at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Sydney.[133] Dellora's film outlined, denied, and then re-examined this conspiracy theory as a Special Operation that fell apart because of a delay in relaying the receipt of the bomb warning call to authorities. The alleged motive was to gain increased funding from the Federal Budget. When this occurred ASIO's critics interpreted this as proof of their hypothesis. Harvey Barnett revealed the increased funding had actually come in response to the first Hope Royal Commission.[134]

What became very clear in the film was that ASIO, like the CIA, has had conspiratorial motives attributed to it because it is the most public of Australian intelligence agencies, and because fears of 'secret police' feed into the perceptions of 'single-issue' parties and trade unionists.[135] As an historical precursor to the intelligence agencies debate after September 11 and the Bali bombings, the Sydney Hilton bombing was used to justify an increase in security powers. Hall stressed that the limits of surveillance were 'if violence has occurred or if there is reasonable apprehension of violence.'[136]

Dellora's film opened with an intriguing sequence, of a security officer making a

desperate sprint to the Sydney Hilton entrance, complete with Sydney 'indie' surf music blaring over the soundtrack. What this sequence evoked was the 'naïve realist' innocence that Australians had about terrorist attacks before the Sydney Hilton bombing. The sequence captured Harvey Barnett's observation that Australians are 'happy-go-lucky innocents, to whom the rules of the real world often do not apply. This is a peculiar form of arrogance, based on ignorance and isolation.'[137] And it was this mixture of happy-go-lucky innocence and arrogance that was targeted, in a symbolic sense, by al Qaeda's bombings in Bali's nightclub district on 12 October 2002.

Success: The Combe—Ivanov Affair

The intelligence 'success' was the identification in 1983 of Soviet diplomat Valeriy Ivanov as a KGB spy. ASIO contended that Ivanov had attempted to 'cultivate' the lobbyist David Combe for high-level access to the newly elected Hawke Government. ASIO officers labelled Ivanov an 'agent of influence'. Justice Hope elaborated on this during the 1984 Royal Commission when he defined the 'agent of influence' as 'an asset of some status who wittingly or unwittingly utilizes his position to influence public opinion or decision making to produce a result beneficial to the country whose intelligence service operates him.'[138] The media interpreted the 'agent of influence' label as ASIO's tactic to publicly harass a Labor political lobbyist. Only later did Harvey Barnett, ASIO's Director-General during the Combe—Ivanov Affair, outline the evidence collected by ASIO analysts regarding Ivanov. The evidence included Ivanov's connection in Canberra with other known intelligence officers, and his initial posting in

the United Kingdom to familiarize himself with Western culture.[139]

This case was Australia's contribution to the 1980s as the 'decade of the spy.' The 'flashpoint' for this affair was a dinner meeting on 4 March 1983 at Ivanov's Canberra house that was bugged by ASIO technical staff.[140] Combe's media profile and political connections shaped the public opinion of his innocence until Justice Hope released the meeting's transcript.[141] What made the dinner meeting so damning for Barnett, was that 'target' personality Combe 'was racing down the track, virtually recruiting himself,' to Ivanov. The transcript revealed Combe's hopes and fears, his high-level access to the Hawke Government, and his desire for quick financial gain.[142] Here was a rare public glimpse into the KGB's *modus operandi*.

Media coverage emphasised bugging, surveillance, and other technology and law enforcement strategies. However ASIO, like other Western agencies, used a number of techniques including field reports (human source, telephone/technical intercept and surveillance), ASIO interviews with or unsolicited information from the general public, sources from government agencies and liaison services, and 'open source' publicly available material.[143] Justice Hope's 1983 Royal Commission into Combe detailed many of these methods. This point alone had implications and offered the KGB an invaluable case study of a counterintelligence stratagem that failed.

An interesting parallel occurred during the mid-1980s when James Bamford's book *The Puzzle Palace* exposed the history and tradecraft of the US-based National Security Agency. Bamford's book was used by the Soviet embassy in Washington to vet NSA defector Ronald Pelton, who avoided the FBI's detection.[144] But such events did not deter Justice Hope, who also explored the process by which ASIO officers reached their conclusions from personal experience, information from other Western countries, and threat indicators. 'Only rarely will facts satisfying a single criterion establish conclusively that a Soviet diplomat is a KGB officer,' he stated. 'More usually, a combination of facts satisfying numerous criteria justifies the conclusion.'[145]

Before the Combe—Ivanov affair the public was sceptical of the Soviet threat. One reason was the 'naïve realist' innocence that had been shattered by the Sydney Hilton bombing. Barnett felt the hostile media coverage of ASIO during the Combe—Ivanov Affair, which 'reinforced the fact of our national remoteness from a real world where genuine threats to a nation's security can develop,' had repeated the pattern established before the Sydney Hilton bombing.[146] The second, held by certain academics and trade unionists, was that the threat of Soviet spying in Australia was sometimes used for policy changes. This threat was intertwined with ASIO's genesis because US officials used the Venona decrypt's allegations of a Soviet spying ring in Australia to deny British and Australian access to 'missile technology or missile range-measuring equipment.'[147]

Fellow Travelers: ASIO and the FBI

After the Hope Royal Commission many still remained suspicious or were apologists for Combe.[148] The Combe—Ivanov case has assumed a new importance in the post-September 11 world. The techniques that the FBI and other intelligence agencies have used in the past—telephone intercepts, informants and interrogations—will not necessarily work on contractors or religiously motivated terrorists. Yet these are the techniques that underpinned the PATRIOT-style legislation. Developing the pre-emptive capability of Machiavellian "anxious foresight" within organizations may be more effective than post-event law enforcement powers. The Combe—Ivanov cases was a forewarning from the future that contractor terrorists would, like KGB spies, be well trained and have significant financial resources behind them.[149]

The 1954 defection of Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, the single most important historical event in ASIO's history, was also considered the catalyst for its purported shift in the 1950s to a more US-oriented stance.[150] These events influenced how Australian Labor governments dealt with their US counterparts. The tension was also between a Western 'middle' power whose economic boom had been regionally eclipsed by the Southeast Asian 'tigers', and a Western superpower. For the Labor governments, 'the changing moods of the US government had to be monitored at all times,' historian Frank Cain observed.[151]

The geopolitical prospect was that the interests of Australia and its partners, particularly

in business intelligence, 'would not always coincide.'[152] If so the events have

disappeared from the historical record. ASIO shifted closer to FBI analysts throughout

the 1950s and 1960s, Richard Hall claimed, while the Australian Secret Intelligence

Service had closer ties with MI6.[153] ASIO certainly 'benchmarked' FBI and Canadian

Royal Mounted Police Service guidelines on threat assessments in the early 1980s.[154]

Whether these links are true now remains debatable, as ASIO and ASIS have both

established close links with many different agencies, and their operational success in the

post-September 11 world will demand new information-sharing alliances with foreign

agencies. The extent of the FBI's foreknowledge of the September 11 attacks is now

worth examining.

Post-September 11 Reforms

The failure of the Intelligence Community to prevent the September 11 attacks

highlighted the long overdue need for institutional reforms. William Odom, former

National Security Agency director, and others have detailed the many US legislative

hearings throughout the 1970s and 1980s that should have led to institutional reforms but

that were blocked by policy-making gridlock.[155] The post-September 11 consequence

was PATRIOT-style legislation to counteract terrorism. However legal analysts have

raised concerns that the PATRIOT legislation eroded the US safeguards on civil liberties.

The PATRIOT Act overrode the US Constitution's demand for greater oversight of

military tribunals during wartime prosecutions.[156] Although the PATRIOT Act contained

sunset provision, two initiatives—'the pen-register and trap-and-trace amendments'—

were ignored. Unless repealed by new legislation these powers 'will remain in effect indefinitely, with no obligatory congressional reassessment.'[157]

PATRIOT-style initiatives have meant the post-September 11 reforms are framed in law enforcement terms. In response the public has been watchful for the emergence of a new 'security state' and other similar descriptions. While both raise well-meaning points both viewpoints have ignored, in a 'naïve' realist sense, the institutional problems that contributed to the September 11 'intelligence failure.' The fundamental problem was one of effective Knowledge Management (KM) and inter-agency co-ordination during the intelligence cycle. The failure was 'our inability to understand the information we had.'[158] The 'zero-sum' nature of the inter-agency budgeting process also stifled knowledge sharing.[159]

Justice Hope anticipated the KM explanation when he wrote in the 1984 Royal Commission after examining ASIO's files that 'a lot of files I have seen are larger than they need to be and reflect little considered review and assessment of the information that they hold.'[160] Justice Hope made this assessment just as ASIO was making the transition to a computer-based archival system. However these problems still remain today. 'Recent efforts to enhance staffing, computer functions, and analytic capability will mitigate this problem,' Stephen Schulhofer wrote after September 11, 'but not if they are counterbalanced by equivalent growth in the raw volume of raw data collected.'[161]

The grim fate of 'maverick' FBI agent John O'Neill, who had been tracking al Qaeda

after the bombings of the World Trade Center (1993) and the USS Cole (2000), remains one of the most poignant examples of Machiavellian "anxious foresight" blocked by the 'knowing—doing' gap.[162] O'Neill's battle to overcome interference in his investigations from US diplomats and other law enforcement agencies showed how field agents could be undermined by their support staff. Both the O'Neill incident and the defection of Robert Hanssen compromised the FBI.[163] They showed that leaders and organizational culture were significant and overlooked factors in most intelligence failures.[164]

The incidents 'surfaced' broader institutional problems. For Alan Dershowitz these included outdated computer systems to manage field analysis, turf wars between jealous agencies, and partisan agendas.[165] Two specific 'blind-spots' identified in the US, UK and Australia were the lack of information on militant Islamic groups and inadequate airport security procedures.[166] In a sober analysis, William Odom traced the roots of US inter-agency turf wars 'to the reforms under the 1947 National Security Act.'[167]

Terrorism Information Awareness and the Covert Action Option

One proposal that dealt with the inter-agency KM problem became almost as famous in the US as the PATRIOT legislation. The Defence Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) proposed a scalable and responsive counter-terrorism information system. Known as the Total Information Awareness project,[168] the system was designed to provide data-mining and pattern recognition capabilities for the intelligence cycle. TIA was also to provide 'decision support' for testing hypotheses and scenarios.

Within weeks of its announcement TIA came under sustained public attack from civil liberties experts and social activists who were concerned the system could be used for COINTELPRO-style monitoring.[169] *SF Weekly* columnist Matt Smith 'culture jammed' TIA head John Poindexter by posting his personal details to the Internet.[170] Behind Smith's prank was a genuine fear that TIA's 'data-mining' capabilities would be misused for personal surveillance. This was also despite the fact that systems for TIA's preliminary functions—environmental scanning, KM and scenario modelling—have been commercially available for several years. What made the TIA proposal different was its synergy of these different systems in a counterintelligence context. TIA was, in many respects, the logical extension of the Intelligence Augmentation (IA) field.[171]

The real danger was not simply the technology itself. Rather, it was the potential for misuse in certain operational contexts, and the risk that organizational processes and safeguards would be inadequate. In the past ASIO and other agencies had distinguished between *suspects* (individuals and groups under 'preliminary inquiry or general investigation') and *targets* (individuals and groups judged, after considerable intelligence-gathering and debate, to be subversive).[172] TIA threatened to replace this model (which would lead to a COINTELPRO scenario), and, furthermore, to make the intelligence cycle more reliant on signals and technical intelligence.

But if used appropriately and with care, TIA also held great promise in a counterintelligence context that was largely overlooked by its critics. TIA would be a

potential sidestep to the difficulties of placing an agent into a hostile intelligence service or terrorist organization. It was also a step toward the promise of 'multidisciplinary counterintelligence,' a revolution in collection affairs, to replace the current fragmented and inter-agency approach.[173] William Odom further suggests the US create a National Counterintelligence Service that assimilates the FBI's counterintelligence function.[174]

Its critics were also concerned that TIA head John Poindexter was connected with the Iran/Contra affair of the 1980s. Iran/Contra was part of a popular lexicon, which included the 1951 Iran and 1973 Chile coup d'etats, of covert operations and foreign interventions that failed. These events led to 'blowback' against the United States, according to one 'pop geopolitics' theory.[175] Because the Reagan Administration had bypassed 'its own covert action and congressional oversight procedures,' the Iran/Contra hearings resurrected the debate within intelligence circles about covert action capabilities.[176]

The Iran/Contra hearings were a reminder that an abstract higher authority like 'the National Interest' or 'the Crown,' could become a manipulative ideology. A thought-provoking parallel for Australian intelligence historians was the influence of right-wing private armies, which flourished in the Depression-era 1930s. The armies rejected the British parliament and Westminster system in favor of the Monarchy. They may have had a formative influence on the first generation of ASIO officers in the 1950s.[177] For Alan Dershowitz, events like Watergate and Iran/Contra showed why 'off-the-book actions can produce terrible consequences.'[178]

Covert action has a role in certain operational circumstances. However its abuse in the Iran/Contra affair was a step toward the dystopian state that Dershowitz has envisioned. If oversight controls are abolished, many of the post-September 11 initiatives, Dershowitz warned, could form the basis of a dystopian state. Such a state would conduct assassinations and covert action programs against the terrorists, establish secret tribunals under military control, censor dissent and enhance domestic surveillance.[179]

Closing the Capability Gap

The Intelligence Community enters the 21st century with new threats and a volatile geopolitical environment. 'Pop geopolitics' and 'sound-bite scenarios' have catapulted the language of strategic geography into the popular consciousness in a highly simplified form. A litany of problems—'loose nukes', 'rogue' states, contract terrorists—has spawned a mini-publishing industry. The US debate about the PATRIOT Act and similar legislative initiatives has continued to unfold.[180] Initiatives to enhance the capabilities of the Intelligence Community to pre-empt and respond to future threats have been countered by fears of Dershowitz's dystopian state, and reminders of the past failures of covert action policies.

The 'capability gaps' that shaped the failures to prevent the September 11 terrorist attacks and Bali bombings were not new. US policy-makers had noted several of the contributing problems in the late 1980s. Bureaucratic gridlock and a lack of political will

prevented long-term change from being taken at an institutional level. By the mid-1980s

the Western intelligence agencies had passed through their formative years.

[2011 note: conclusion section unfinished.]

Unused Notes

'The Organization has long since outgrown the 'family' style of organization, under strong personal leadership, that marked its early years. It is now a medium-sized organization that is still coming to terms with the changes in management style and procedures, at all levels, that this requires. After RCIS ASIO made a start in recognizing and facing up to some of the demands facing it and the way it ran. In recent times it has made a further attempt to face up to those problems.' (1984 report, 27).

'An academic noted that although there is a problem finding certain language skills in American society, the intelligence community has been unwilling at times to use those skills that do exist. He cited the example of United States failing to fill posts dealing with a key country with officers who speak Spanish—a language millions of Americans speak well. He also added that this is not a new problem, as the need for language-qualified case officers was prominently noted in the 1970s and 1980s.' (Godson 68).

"*We are the interpreters of foreign cultures and alien problems.*" (Godson 74).
"Our job is to support decision makers." (Godson 75).

'But more pervasive, and even more pernicious, is the phenomenon of mirror imaging by intelligence analysts. The problem may seem obvious and concern about it antique, but it merits some exploration, for mirror imaging infiltrates and corrupts analysis by circuitous and often scarcely visible paths. It is a varied and subtle phenomenon and can afflict those who pride themselves on their hardheaded realpolitik as much as it does those who take a sunnier view of international relations.' (Godson 77).

'But above all, strategic planners need intelligence on the otherness of the enemy—intelligence that will reveal the enemy's methods of operation, internal disputes, and ways of doing business, as well as the ways in which the enemy differs from the United States.' (Godson 82).

'In addition to language skills, the ideal strategic intelligence analyst would know a great deal about history, particularly military and diplomatic history. . . . More narrowly, however, the trainee would benefit from immersion in case studies—the more recent usually, though not always, the better—of intelligence gone awry.' (Godson 91).

[1 July 1977 and 1 July 1983] 'During the period, ASIO improved its recruitment processes and attracted large numbers of graduates for whom it devised a 'generalist intelligence officer' career program, involving training and experience throughout the Organization. This recruitment process has given ASIO staffing a noticeable 'new look'.' (1984 report, 7).

'The fact is that some (probably half) of the analysts in the CIA have on the order of only five to ten years of experience. . . . New analysts had to be hired to replace those who departed. Additionally, there was significant growth in the size of the analytical directorate. The result of these factors was a substantial number of relatively new analysts with the attendant loss of experience and institutional memory.' (Robert Gates, in Godson 112).

'One factor that cannot be overlooked is that, as a consequence of the large influx of graduates in recent years, the initial responsibility for assessing intelligence quite often falls on relatively young, inexperienced officers. This may be unavoidable but it is a factor which places a premium on proper supervision and procedures for verifying the quality of assessments particularly in significant matters.' (1984 report, 171).

'The greatest challenge ASIO faced was its training of new agents, said Barnett. 'It takes five years, in my view, to develop a well-rounded intelligence officer.'[181]

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[84] For an example, see Alex Burns' 'Weird Science', 21C Magazine ('The Unafesto'), 4/1996, pp. 54—59. Viewed 11 June 2003, http://www.disinfo.com/admin/pages/article/id773/pg1/. Further discussion in Jacques Vallee's books *Messengers of Deception: UFO Contacts and Cults* (Ronin Publishing, Los Angeles, 1978) and *Revelations: Alien Contact and Human Deception* (Ballantine Books, New York, 1991).

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