

CHAPTER IV

Mass Movement: Mao's Socialist Strategy for Change

with Deng-yuan Hsu

Under Mao Zedong's leadership, China had one unique experience during the socialist transition: the Communist Party of China (CPC) sponsored a sequence of mass movements during the period between 1949 and 1978. Mass movements accompanied all major changes during this period: the land reform, the "three-anti" and the "five-anti" movements, the anti-rightist movement in the early 1950s, the Great Leap Forward in 1958, and the Cultural Revolution in 1966–1976. The analysis in this essay focuses on how and why mass movement was a socialist strategy for change during the first three decades of the People's Republic.

There have been two opposing views on the issue of mass movements during these decades. One view regarded the mass movements as events artificially and deliberately agitated by Mao in order to discredit his opponents. It regarded the mass movements as wasted time and energy, which should have been spent developing China's productive forces. This view was held and publicized by the current regime in China. Since Deng Xiaoping and his supporters began their "reform" (i.e., revisionist policies) in 1979, they suspended all Party-sponsored mass movements. On the contrary, we believe that Party-sponsored mass movements in the past helped maintain the link between the CPC and the masses. Each mass movement gave expression to the principal contradiction at the time within Chinese society, and at the same time, it was a process to resolve that contradiction.¹ When the CPC mobilized the masses in movements for the resolution of contradictions, the Party became the agent for continual change in the transformation of the society. Participation in movements raised the consciousness of workers and peasants and helped them imbibe the new ideology. All major economic, political and ideological changes in China between 1949 and 1978 were accompanied by mass movements. In addition, the implementation of major government policies was repeatedly tested in movements among the workers and peasants for their validation.

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We believe any mass movement sponsored by the Party in power is unusual because the authority fears not only that the movements might end in chaos, but also that the authorities themselves might become the targets of mass action. Moreover, mass movements proved to be a viable vehicle for socialist democracy, and it was the only countervailing force that existed to challenge the structural rigidity of China's bureaucracy. This essay will present an analysis from this perspective.

Since Deng and his supporters seized power in 1979, they have steadfastly pushed forward a set of projects that fitted well together in the broad framework of the so-called Reform. All these projects were capitalistic in nature,² and have been carried out by passing legislation and issuing decrees and administrative orders—that is, by legal action imposed on the masses from above. In 1979, the “reformers” (i.e., China's revisionists) amended the Constitution and abolished the workers' right to strike and the right of freedom of expression.³ Later, the reformers passed the Contract Labor Law to legally abolish the permanent employment system in state enterprises.⁴

Thus, Deng's reform created many new contradictions in Chinese society. Above all, the contradiction between the Party bureaucrats and the masses stood out as the principal one. Without a mass movement, these contradictions had no outlet for expression, much less resolution. In the spring of 1989, these contradictions reached such a high degree that students began to demonstrate in China's major cities. Many millions of urban residents also joined to express their discontent and voice their complaints. When the Deng-led regime decided that such direct confrontation could no longer be tolerated, it ordered the troops to move in—ending the protests with the June 4th Tiananmen massacre.

Years after the massacre, the abuse of power and privileges by the bureaucrats, who were the main target of the demonstration, has not only continued but has worsened despite repeated reassurances in Chinese mass media that those who commit economic crimes would be duly punished by law. People in China are well aware that only those accused of minor crimes are prosecuted and punished (if they are unlucky enough not to have any high-level backers), while major cases of corruption involving the embezzlement of public funds worth billions of RMB are covered up and the guilty officials shielded from punishment.

The material base of the mass movement

The ways to examine a post-revolutionary society are not different from the ways to examine any other society. Mao wrote about the two different world outlooks concerning the law of development: the metaphysical world outlook and the materialist-dialectical world outlook. In the beginning of the essay, “On Contradiction,” he explained:

They [those carrying the metaphysical outlook] contend that a thing can only keep on repeating itself as the same kind of thing and cannot change into anything different. In their opinion, capitalist exploitation, capitalist competition, the individualist ideology of capitalist society, and so on, can all

be found in ancient slave society, or even in primitive society, and will exist forever unchanged.⁵

On the other hand, the materialist-dialectical world outlook sees development as a unity of opposites. In other words, contradiction exists in the process of the development of all things. While the opposites of a contradiction continually transform themselves, a new process emerges from the transformation. This new process is not a repetition of the old, but rather, a qualitative change. Mao explains further:

This dialectical world outlook teaches us primarily how to observe and analyze the movement of opposites in different things and, on the basis of such analysis, to indicate the methods for resolving contradiction. It is therefore most important for us to understand the law of contradiction in things in a concrete way.⁶

Contradictions in post-revolutionary China after 1949 were the material base of the mass movement, which in turn is a socialist strategy to resolve these contradictions. What were the contradictions in China after 1949? And, among these contradictions, what was the principal contradiction during different stages of development? After seizing power, the CPC immediately faced these important questions. In the analysis of post-revolutionary China and the CPC's role, Mao on one hand and Liu Shiaoqi and Deng Xiaoping on the other hand had fundamental differences.

After the CPC came to power and transferred the means of production to the State, Liu and Deng viewed the principal contradiction to be between the "advanced social system" and the "backward social productive forces," as expressed in the "Resolution of the Eighth National Congress of the CPC" in 1956.⁷ Therefore, according to Liu (and later Deng), after the ownership of the means of production was legally transferred to the State, the main task of the CPC was to devote itself to the development of the productive forces.

Mao, on the other hand, believed that the social system (including the relations of production) was far from being advanced, and contradictions existed within the economic base as well as between the economic base and the superstructure.⁸ Even though feudal ideology had lost its economic base after the land reform, Mao believed that it still possessed staying power; if left unchallenged, it could easily lodge itself in the new economic base. Liu (and later Deng) implemented, or attempted to implement, policies that regarded the productive forces as the dominant aspect in the contradiction between relations of production and productive forces.⁹ Mao criticized this mechanical conception:

In the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the productive forces are the principal aspect; in the contradiction between theory and practice, practice is the principal aspect; in the contradiction between economic base and the superstructure, the economic base is the principal aspect; and there is no change in their respective positions. This is the mechanical-materialist conception, not the dialectical-materialist conception. True, the productive forces, practice and the economic base generally play the principal and decisive role, whoever denies this is not a materialist, but it must

also be admitted that under certain conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory and superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role. When it is impossible for the productive forces to develop without a change in the relations of production, then the change in the relations of production plays the principal and decisive role.¹⁰

Mao did not believe that with the transfer of ownership of production, the change in the economic base (and the relations of production within the economic base) became complete or "advanced". Rather, he saw that contradiction existed within the economic base as well as between the economic base and the superstructure. Within the economic base, he believed that the relations of production at times could be the principal aspect of the contradiction; without further changes in the relations of production, productive forces could not be developed. He also saw that the transformation of Chinese society involved struggle on all fronts: economic, political and ideological, each of which would play a dominant role at different times. It was through resolving these contradictions that the productive forces developed.

Mao's conception of socialist construction was not so different from his conception of revolutionary war. During the long period of the CPC-led people's war, Mao never thought that final victory would be determined by those who had superior firearms. Rather, military victory depended on careful and patient work on the political, economic and ideological fronts; the soldiers had to understand the reasons behind the revolution before they became revolutionaries. Similarly, during the period of socialist construction, Mao did not believe economic development could be separated from political and ideological struggles. Only when working people understood the aims and reasons behind their efforts would they devote themselves to the long hard struggle of building the economy.

One example illustrates the difference between the views of Mao and Liu on the development of Chinese society: the nature of the relationship between collectivization and mechanization of agriculture, including the question of which should come first.

As Liu saw it, all efforts should be devoted to the development of productive forces. Thus, in his view, conditions for agricultural collectivization could mature only on the basis of mechanization, when China could produce enough steel to make tractors and other agricultural machinery and equipment. Therefore, Liu asserted, any attempt to collectivize farms before China had more advanced productive forces would be doomed to fail.

Mao, on the other hand, believed that it was possible to collectivize farms without an advanced development of productive forces. Mao saw the energy and enthusiasm of Chinese working people as the engine for future development. When peasants were mobilized and their consciousness raised beyond that of small producers, the possibility opened up for organized production on a larger scale. When elementary co-ops progressed to advanced co-ops, which in turn later led to the formation of people's communes, peasants were able to bring together their small pieces of land and build infrastructure on the land in preparation for mechanization.¹¹ The accumulation fund, which the peasants' production teams saved every year from their joint labor, enabled them to buy machinery

and equipment from the State. Based on the worker-peasant alliance, the production of agricultural machinery was given high priority in the industrial development plan. The worker-peasant alliance expressed the CPC's clear class stand. Without this class stand, industrial development would have been directed toward more profitable projects rather than agricultural machinery, as we have witnessed during the many years under Deng's reform. In the process of collectivization, the poor and lower-middle peasants took control of their lives. In the contradiction between the poor and lower-middle peasants, on one hand, and the upper-middle and rich peasants, on the other hand, the power of the poor and lower-middle peasants grew and transformed itself into the principal aspect, while that of the rich and upper-middle peasants became the non-dominant aspect. Each aspect of the contradiction transformed into the other, and as a result, a new process of development emerged in society.

These two fundamentally different analyses of Chinese society determined how Mao and Liu viewed the CPC's role.

From Liu's perspective, the CPC's main task was to develop the productive forces. To speed up such development, he believed, the CPC should create a stable environment for economic growth and promote the development of new technology, relying on the expertise of technical personnel for this task. However, to ensure the spirit of communism, members of the Communist Party should "purify" themselves by following a set of standard moral principles, as contained in some works of Liu.¹²

On the contrary, Mao regarded the masses as the creators of history and their enthusiasm as the driving force for resolving contradictions and transforming the society. To be the catalyst for change, the CPC had to keep in close touch with the masses and mobilize them as well as direct their energy and enthusiasm toward resolving the contradictions in society. Mao believed that Party members could not transform themselves unless they involved themselves in struggles, interacted with the masses, and accepted mass criticism. In Mao's view, if Party members were to become an elite group above the masses, the Party would lose its credibility and cease to be the agent for change along the mass line. Then, even if the CPC could pursue policies to advance the productive forces and develop the economy, it would no longer be the vanguard of the proletariat. Moreover, the CPC's representation of the workers and peasants would become mere lip service, unless the CPC could continually initiate changes that would promote the class interests of the workers and peasants.

Mass movements: concrete cases

Mao was able to point out the principal contradiction at different points in time. He worked out the appropriate strategy and tactics to resolve each principal contradiction throughout the three decades of post-liberation development, as he had done during the period of revolutionary war.

Soon after liberation, Mao wrote the essay, "Don't Hit Out in All Directions" (June 6, 1950), in which he warned that since the agrarian reform had not yet been completed, the remnant Kuomintang forces, secret agents, and other reactionary forces still remained. The principal contradiction was still between the Chinese people and the landlord class and other remaining reactionary elements. Thus, it was not yet time to attack the national capitalists and make them enemies. Land reform gradually resolved the contradiction between the small number of landlords and the majority of land-poor peasants and hired farm hands, and thus strengthened the worker-peasant alliance. Two years later, at the completion of land reform, Mao wrote: "With the overthrow of the landlord class and the bureaucrat-capitalist class, the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie has become the principal contradiction in China; therefore the national bourgeoisie should no longer be defined as an intermediate class."¹³

In the cities, after the CPC confiscated Kuomintang bureaucrat capital in 1949, it was able to nationalize 80 percent of the productive assets in industry, mining, transportation and communication. The new people's government still had to rely on the tens of thousands of bureaucrats at different levels to run the daily business of the government. Former Kuomintang officials, however, were notorious for their corruption and abuse of power, and were strongly resented by the masses. Moreover, there were reported cases of corruption and waste among high-level Party officials. If this were allowed to continue, Party members, who had just tasted real power, could easily become new bourgeois bureaucrats, abusing power and clutching on to it.

In response, the Party launched the "three-antis" movement that targeted corruption, waste and bureaucracy. The movement mobilized all levels of government personnel and the broad masses in the cities to expose bribery and other corruption. Those who had committed crimes were duly punished according to the seriousness of their crimes. Among those punished were two high-level Party officials, Liu Chinshen and Zhang Zishan who had made great contributions in the anti-Japanese-war and the liberation war. They embezzled large amounts of public funds by taking large kickbacks from construction and other dealings. Despite their high positions and previous contributions, Liu and Zhang received no protection from the government and were both put to death.¹⁴

Since public corruption could not be committed without the participation of private capitalists, the "three-antis" movement also exposed the collaboration between corrupt government officials and the private sector in stealing public property and other economic crimes. Some private capitalists seized the opportunity provided by the Korean War to make illegal profits by cheating on government contracts; they were able to bribe government officials to get what they wanted. Immediately following the "three-antis" movement, the Party launched the "five-antis" movement, which targeted bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing economic information. These campaigns were necessary and timely to make a clean break with the past as private capital was soon to join the state-owned enterprises, which required closer cooperation between state bureaucrats and private capitalists. At this point, the contradiction between the Chinese people, on one hand, and the corrupt officials and capitalists who violated state laws, on the other hand, was the principal contradiction. It was not possible to proceed to nationalization until this contradiction was resolved. In

these movements, the corrupt officials and the criminal elements among the capitalists were set up as the opposites.

It may be helpful at this point to explain the meaning of "setting up an opposite" in a mass movement. According to Mao, a mass movement was to resolve major contradictions in society. Both sides of every contradiction in society existed objectively. Mao explained: "The rightists exist in our society. Whether we want to set them up as an opposite is a matter of policy. If we decide to set them up [in a movement] and let the masses to speak up against them and debate with them, their power will decrease." And he continued to explain that "the other opposite does not exist in the objective world but the material conditions to set it up exist. For example, the waterfall exists in the natural world. Without setting up an opposite, one cannot create something from the waterfall. Building a dam is setting up an opposite to the waterfall. Then, energy can be created to generate electricity."¹⁵

Similarly, setting up the opposite in a mass movement can direct the energy and the enthusiasm for social change. Without the opposite or when the opposite is not well focused, energy created in a mass movement is often diverted to different directions and eventually dissipated, as we have witnessed in the many spontaneous mass movements in the past several decades in Western societies.

The corrupt officials and criminal capitalists and the resentment and anger from the masses existed objectively in society. These were not imagined or dreamed up. The mass movements created the climate for the masses to participate in making changes. Without them, people would have felt powerless to do anything about the situation, and their resentment and anger would have turned into disappointment and despair.

Almost four million people participated in the "three-antis" movement by writing letters and revealing what they knew, thus exposing the corruption, waste, and bureaucratization of government officials.¹⁶ The masses became enthusiastic when they involved themselves in solving the problems. The "three-antis" and "five-antis" movements demonstrated that, with the help of the masses, the new government could exercise firm control. Setting the precedent, the Party forced government officials and private capitalists to be mindful of the watchful eyes of the masses, and to recognize that they would be held accountable for their actions:

Moreover, in their contradiction with the people, government officials (and their merchant collaborators) were historically always the principal or dominant aspect of the contradiction. The mass movements transformed the government officials into the non-principal or subordinate side, and at the same time transformed the people into the principal or dominant side. As a result, an entirely new ideology emerged and persisted to this day borne of the many years of experience by the people in joining mass movements. It was the same urgent need felt by the students and the working masses to speak up against the abuse of power by high-level government officials that spurred the demonstrations in Beijing and other major cities in China in the spring and summer of 1989.

Setting up opposites in a mass movement requires a thorough understanding of the principal contradiction as well as the skill of translating such understanding into practice at an operational level. It is an extremely difficult task. As Chinese society developed economically, different interest groups began to appear among the masses. Therefore, other sets of contradictions (though minor compared to the principal contradiction) became very important to these groups with opposing interests—for example, contradictions between rich and poor communes, among the production brigades within the communes, between workers and peasants, and between workers and intellectuals. Therefore, the struggle became more sophisticated and the task of setting up the opposite also became increasingly difficult. This partially explains why factionalism developed to such an extent during the latter part of the Cultural Revolution. When factionalism developed, group interests were placed above class interests, which distracted the movement from its main course.

The land reform program, as carried out in China, was not simply an economic policy of land redistribution by the State taking the land deeds from landlords and handing them out to the peasants. Rather, it was a mass movement led by the CPC for economic, political and ideological change.¹⁷ The CPC mobilized the peasantry, mostly the poor and lower-middle peasants, and organized them to seize the land from the class enemy—the landlords and, to a limited extent, the rich peasants—and to expose their crimes. The enthusiasm of the peasants, who were the main actors in the land reform, swept across the countryside. Land reform turned passive peasants into active participants, and eventually their actions went beyond land reform to the cooperative movement that followed.

Throughout the land reform, the peasants adopted a new ideology. While the pre-Liberation Chinese peasantry always experienced exploitation and suffering, these were justified by the ideology of feudalism—as ideologies of other exploitative societies have always done. In articulating and adopting the new ideology, the mass movement turned the old ideology upside down. The new ideology taught that it was wrong for landlords and rich peasants to seize the products of labor of poor and lower-middle peasants, and it was wrong for a privileged and powerful few to enslave and abuse the underprivileged majority. Land reform created the trend and the atmosphere that encouraged the poor peasants to express themselves for the first time in their lives. With peasants finally daring to speak their minds, serious crimes committed by some landlords were exposed. Land expropriation changed the dominant-dominated economic relationship between landlord and peasant; the adoption of the new ideology reversed the master-serf (or superordinate-subordinate) relationship between landlord and peasant.¹⁸ Mass participation in the land reform strengthened the determination of landless peasants to right past wrongs, sparked their enthusiasm, and empowered them to carry the land reform program to its completion and beyond.

The above analysis gives only sketches of the three mass movements that occurred during the early years of the People's Republic. More careful and detailed studies are needed for a better understanding of these movements. Moreover, we need to study and analyze the two most important and most controversial mass movements during the People's Republic's first two decades: the Great Leap Forward and the Great Cultural Revolution.

From Liu's and Deng's perspective, the Great Leap Forward was a total disaster, and the Cultural Revolution destroyed China's opportunity to become an economic superpower. In a recent conversation, a high-level manager in a joint-venture enterprise in China expressed his frustration in managing the workers. He said that if there had been no Cultural Revolution, Chinese workers would be as obedient as their counterparts in Japan, and the managers would be able to push for higher productivity, doubling the current production per worker. We, on the other hand, believe that without the Great Leap Forward, there was little chance for the cooperative movement to continue and lead to the formation of the communes. Moreover, we believe that if there had not been the Cultural Revolution, Deng's reforms would have been implemented in the 1960s, and with little resistance. If that had been the case, the opportunity to reverse the capitalist transition would have been forever lost.

Mass movement: the socialist strategy for change

During the decades of armed struggle, the CPC worked very closely with the masses; it was with the full support of the workers and the peasants that China's new-democratic revolution won nationwide victory in 1949. Grasping the analogy of fish being able to survive, swim and thrive so long as they remained in water, the people's army was able to survive, fight on, and ultimately win because it remained immersed among the masses.

After the CPC seized power, its survival (at least in the short run) no longer depended directly on the masses. The CPC had acquired such high prestige that its members could have enjoyed as many privileges as those who seized power and established new dynasties in China's long feudal history. Mao saw that the only way the CPC could maintain close links with the masses and continue to be the agent for change was through mass movements. Moreover, the mass movement provided an open forum where the masses could voice their opinions and express their discontent, criticizing Party members for any wrongdoing or abuse of power. The mass movement also provided a test to check whether Party members and others in authority actually practiced the mass line.

The mass line, as expressed by the slogan "from the masses, to the masses," meant that cadres should do their best to find out the thoughts and concerns of the masses. Cadres were urged to talk with the masses, conduct surveys or even live among them for periods of time. Their findings helped the CPC to study and analyze social conditions and determine the principal contradiction at the time. Policies could then be formulated to resolve the contradiction. To implement the policies, the cadres were again urged to spread out among the masses and explain these policies. The process of policy implementation involved a mass movement where new ideas were propagated and important issues debated. If the policies truly promoted the interests of the masses, according to the mass line principle, the masses would eventually adopt them. Mass movements in the past provided the only opportunity to validate government policies. Policies so validated by the masses had a better chance of success. However, the practice of "from the masses, to the masses" very often did not match the ideal as described. Instead of soliciting opinions and ideas from

the masses, cadres often saw themselves as carrying out orders from above. This attitude of the cadres helped promote commandism and bureaucratism.

The participation of workers and peasants in movements, where important political, economic and social issues were openly discussed and debated, was a very important form of democracy in China during the transition. In the mass movement, the four *da's* were practiced as the socialist form of democracy: *damin* (great voice), *dafang* (great openness), *dabianlun* (great debate), and *dazibao* (great-character posters). The masses had the opportunity to openly express themselves in these four ways during the mass movement.

The popular Western view on Chinese mass movements during that time often emphasized the suppression of ideas and opinions. This view is not entirely incorrect; ideas and opinions that were not in favor of the masses were often suppressed during the periods of mass movements. For example, during the land reform, when the landlord class was under attack, praising the good deeds of certain individual landlords was considered detrimental to the movement. (However, the Party continued to draw distinctions between good and bad landlords; only those who committed serious crimes were punished.) As stated earlier, during the mass movement, the two sides of a contradiction transformed into the other. The creation of a new ideology played an important role in this transformation. It is a myth that an ideology can be neutral in terms of its class stand. The class stand of the toiling masses fighting for their interests fueled the creation and adoption of the ideology favoring the working class. This was crucial in raising the class consciousness of workers and peasants and the reproduction of these classes.

It is important, however, to address the issue of using mass movements to adopt ideology. Critics charge that during mass movements, ideas were often imposed on the masses from the top, and that such ideas had little relevance to the problems and concerns of the masses. This is a valid criticism. The worker and peasant masses had a hard time grasping the meaning of ideas that were detached from reality, let alone adopting or owning these as their own. Such situations happened during the latter part of the Cultural Revolution and possibly happened in other mass movements as well. When it did happen, open discussion and debate disappeared and indoctrination set in, while the practice of "from the masses, to the masses" was discarded. Interpretation of Marxism and Leninism became dogmatic. However, one can hardly conclude that to avoid the same mistakes, mass movements should be avoided altogether. The only way workers and peasants can learn from these mistakes is through practice and struggle. It is through repeated practice and struggle that the workers and peasants gain a better understanding of the objective world.

Since the Reform began in 1979, the reformers have adopted their own "new" ideology. They have promoted ideas such as "Eating from a big pot breeds laziness," "The iron rice bowl creates inefficiency," and "Let a few get rich first." Later, when the reformers were pushing for the adoption of the contract-labor system, the *People's Daily* highly praised this new system, with the official line saying that it would motivate workers to work harder by creating a sense of crisis and insecurity among them. These notions are obviously insulting to Chinese workers, such that the reformers have not promoted them

through a mass movement where ideas can be discussed and debated. Rather, such notions have been promoted through the Party-controlled media, which served as its propaganda machine. Just as Deng's reform policies were pushed through the legal processes and not validated by the mass movement, the Reform's propagandized ideology could not be accepted by the masses. In response, common folk in China have circulated among themselves many interesting verses and rhymes that more honestly reflect what the masses think. The ideology reflected in these modern folk verses and rhymes is directly opposite to that of the official propaganda.

One of the utmost concerns of the students and urban residents who demonstrated in the spring of 1989 was the corruption among high-level government officials. The Reform opened up new opportunities for corruption because officials in individual enterprises were given more autonomy to manage their own affairs. Many bureaucrats seized this opportunity to reward themselves with "profits" made in "their" enterprises, thus turning their managerial power into material wealth. Moreover, some high government officials converted state properties into their own private companies—set up in their relatives' names—and thus reaped even larger sums of money. High officials also made extra "profits" by taking advantage of the multi-tier prices to sell their products illegally, above the regulated prices.

A very important component of the Reform has been "opening up" China's economy to foreign trade and foreign investment. Individual enterprises were also encouraged to take the initiative in exploring export opportunities and forming joint ventures with foreign capital. To encourage exports, enterprises with export plans were allowed access to foreign exchange at official rates for importing necessary equipment and raw materials. This two-tier (and sometimes three-tier or more) pricing system and the multiple exchange rates have provided fertile ground for bribery and profiteering. However, only those in power could take advantage of these opportunities to enrich themselves and their relatives. Such practices have created deep resentments among university students, who do not see nepotism as fair play even as they themselves belong to a privileged group.

Without a mass movement geared to launch anti-corruption campaigns such as what flourished during the Mao era, there is little possibility at present that government will be rid of corruption. It is usually the lower-level government workers who know about the bribery, embezzlement of public funds, favoritism and tax evasions. It is well known among the public, especially in the urban centers, that managers in enterprises keep two sets of account books: one for the central government's tax assessment and another for their own use. These managers also keep a special account (called "the little gold mine" by the workers) in which to stash their own discretionary funds. In the past, a mass movement would have been able to expose these corrupt bureaucrats because lower-level workers and common folk would have dared to speak up against them. Any mass movement today, however, would greatly threaten those in power. Thus, the current regime has not organized any mass movement and in fact has suppressed any grassroots movement organized from below.

The most crucial issue during socialist transition is whether direct producers will gain more control over the means of production. In an underdeveloped country like

China, the issue also includes whether the worker-peasant alliance will be consolidated. Party-sponsored mass movements are part of this crucial issue because, in the past, these movements played a key role in the socialist strategy to push for policies that gave workers more representation and instituted policies that consolidated the worker-peasant alliance. Without the mass movements, Liu and Deng would have been successful in implementing their capitalist projects long before 1979. The CPC, under Mao's leadership, sponsored a series of mass movements, which continually resolved the contradictions in China between 1949 and 1976, resulting in fundamental and qualitative changes in Chinese society. These changes have made the "reformers" uneasy because of the workers' and peasants' persistent resistance to their reform. After the uprisings in the cities were put down by violent force in 1989, there have been many open rebellions in China's countryside. As the Reform "deepens," it will create more contradictions. The principal contradiction will reveal itself as being the one between the small number of high-level Party officials and government bureaucrats and the vast masses of Chinese people.

Notes

1. "There are many contradictions in the process of development of a complex thing, and one of them is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determines or influences the existence and development of the other contradictions." He used an example to further explain, "For instance, in capitalist society the two forces in contradiction, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, form the principal contradiction. The other contradictions, such as those between the remnant feudal class and the bourgeoisie, between the peasant petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, between the proletariat and the peasant petty bourgeoisie, between the non-monopoly capitalist and the monopoly capitalists, between bourgeois democracy and bourgeois fascism, among the capitalist countries and between imperialism and the colonies, are all determined or influenced by this principal contradiction." See Mao Zedong, "On Contradiction," *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Vol. 1, 331.
2. For capitalist projects, see Footnote No. 1 in Chapter III, "Labor Reform: Mao vs. Liu and Deng."
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*
5. Mao, *op. cit.*, 312.
6. *Ibid.*, 315.
7. "Resolution of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China," in the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party, 16.
8. Mao Zedong, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," in *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Vol. 5, 394-395.
9. Mao wrote about the two aspects of a contradiction. He said, "Of the two contradictory aspects, one must be the principal and the other secondary. The principal aspect is the one playing the leading role in the contradiction. The nature of a thing is determined mainly by the principal aspect of a contradiction, the aspect which has gained the dominant position." Then, he continues, but this situation is not static; the principal and non-principal aspects of a contradiction transform themselves into each other and the nature of the thing changes accordingly. In a given process or at a given stage in the development of a contradiction, A is the principal aspect and B is the non-principal aspect; at another stage or in another process the roles are reversed—a change determined by the extent of the increase or decrease in the force of each aspect in its struggle against the other in the course of the development of a thing." See Mao's "On Contradiction," *Ibid.*, 333.
10. *Ibid.*, 336.
11. See William Hinton, *Shenfan*, Part III (New York: Random House, 1983).
12. Liu Shaoqi, "On the Moral Principles of the Communist," a speech made by Liu in 1937, then published in 1939 in *Liberation*: No. 81 to 84. It was published into a book in 1962 by the People's Publishing House.
13. "The Contradiction between the Working Class and the Bourgeoisie is the Principal Contradiction in China," (June 6, 1952) *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung* (The People's Publishing House, 1977), Vol. 5, 77.
14. Bo Yibo, *My Memoir of Many Important Policy Decisions* (Chinese Communist Party School Publisher, 1991), Vol. 1, 148-151.

15. From an article that collected Mao Zedong's comments and lectures on dialectical materialism in *Long Live Mao Zedong's Thought*, 1967 (Hongkong: I Shan Book Store, 1975), 130.
16. *Ibid.*, 144.
17. See William Hinton, *Fanshen, A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966).
18. Furthermore, members of the landlord class lost their right to vote, and thus were denied their political participation. Therefore, like in the case of any other movement, the struggle was on all three fronts: economic, political and ideological.

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