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
# PEACE DOSSIER

# 2

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## WHY WE HAVE A WAR TO STOP

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*They include 'The Self-managing Environment' (London, Allison and Busby), and 'Preparing to Fight a Nuclear War' (Arena, No. 57). The latter article develops at greater length some of the themes treated here.*

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## 1. The end of the stalemate

'As I walked along, the horrible things I saw became more and more extreme and more and more intolerable. And at a certain point I must have become more or less saturated, so that I became no longer sensitive, in fact insensitive, to what I saw around me.'

This was said by a Japanese physicist who survived the Hiroshima bomb. Simply reading about the nuclear weapons of today, and the horrors they portend, can leave us similarly numb. But this is a risk we must run, if we are to understand the war now being prepared — enough, at least, to play a part in stopping it.

We live now in the fourth decade in which nuclear weapons have existed without being used. This long respite might seem reassuring, if four decades of nuclear peace, why not five, six, a century?

The short answer is: because the era of 'deterrence' is over. The reasons for this are essentially political, and technical developments are discussed only briefly in what follows.

## 2. The war we may experience

Let us first remind ourselves of the weapons waiting to be used in a nuclear war, and the sort of damage they can inflict.

Towards the end of the Second World War, Allied planes were dropping especially large bombs on German cities. They each contained ten tons of high explosive, and were known with some reason as 'block-busters'. The power of nuclear bombs can be visualised using the block-buster as a yardstick.

The explosive effect of a single nuclear device is now most conveniently measured in millions of tons of TNT equivalent, or 'megatons'. Thus a 1-megaton bomb has the blast energy of 100,000 block-busters. Such a bomb will destroy all ordinary buildings for over four miles in every direction, an area of about 50 square miles. But if it is split up into 10 separate warheads exploding independently, its area of destruction can increase to over 125 square miles; for this reason, among others, a single rocket will now usually deliver up to 10 independently-targetable warheads (the 'MIRV' technique).

The heat effects have a longer range: the 1-megaton bomb will cause second-degree burns and ignite fires up to 8 miles away — or 10, if conditions are suitable. Once again, MIRV-ing will increase the damage. With bombs of the current size, immediate fatalities from the bomb's radiation dosage will not be important; within the lethal radiation area, everyone will be dead already from blast and heat.

These are the immediate effects, but what can follow is on no lesser scale. Winds of up to 200 miles per hour accompany the fireball's progress. Depending on how much burnable material the city contains, a firestorm can result, raging far beyond the original burn area and consuming all the oxygen. The importance of this effect was seen at Hiroshima where, with a bomb tiny by current standards (less than a sixtieth of a megaton), the firestorm totally destroyed 4.4 square miles, well over twice the immediate burn area.

The debris and dust scooped up by the explosion will be intensely radioactive; much of it will 'fall out' over the ensuing hours and days. If prevailing winds carry it over nearby populated areas, where 'nearby' may mean a hundred miles away, the resulting deaths can boost fatalities up to perhaps double the number killed immediately.

These primary effects by no means give the whole balance-sheet for the bomb's damage. It cannot be expected, for example, that fires will be fought as usual. (In Hiroshima, only 20% of firemen were available for duty — for obvious reasons.) The large number of casualties suffering from severe burns will not find treatment available, and many will die in a particularly agonising way.

However, in calculating the number of bombs needed to inflict 'unacceptable damage' on the USSR, only the immediate effects are relied upon. These are required to destroy 70% of Soviet industry, and 35% of the population. Such destruction would result — it was estimated long ago, in the 1960s — from 400 delivered megatons. The total damage would be greater, not only through the 'secondary' effects mentioned, but also because of the more effective, smaller packages in which it would now be delivered. The corresponding figure for a Soviet strike on US cities is of the same order.

Compare this figure of 400 megatons with the actual amounts the USA and the Soviet Union can now deliver: about 5,000 and 13,000 megatons respectively. Despite its lower stockpile figure, the USA disposes of more warheads (about 13,000 to the Soviet's 7,000), since its weapons have been more widely 'MIRV'-ed and have an average yield only about a quarter of the Soviet's; each US megaton is in smaller packages and thus more effective.

The degree of overkill is evident. The USA and the USSR would cease to exist as functioning societies, if only 5% of their stockpiles were used in a nuclear exchange. And the figures above relate only to the so-called 'strategic' weapons — they do not take into account, for instance, the 7,000 warheads of the US 'theatre nuclear force' stationed in Europe, or the Soviet's intermediate-range missiles pointing at Western Europe and able to hit any of its capitals.

With such inconceivable destructive power poised on both sides, it might be supposed that the 'nuclear stalemate' must continue in force. But this is not so. As the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (a far from alarmist body) noted in its director's 1980 Annual Report:

'Utterly catastrophic though a nuclear war would be, its probability is steadily increasing . . . Scientists are developing weapons which seem more suitable for fighting than for deterring a nuclear war.'

Indeed, as we will see, the activity in the strategic weapons sphere can only be described as feverish. Thousands of superbly-trained workers toil night and day to make the flames of hell even hotter; fantastic, wasteful and horrifying, the world of nuclear systems is a nightmare combination of Alice's Wonderland, Ptolemy's Egypt and Himmler's Auschwitz. Can we make any sense of this rush to destruction? We should at least try.

## 3. Armed forces: what are they for?

Over the next few years, the US will replace its strategic missiles with the new, improved 'MX' type. The original

project for their installation, in which they would be mobile and undetectable, was costed at up to \$100 billion — costs are usually underestimated in this field. This represents \$100 for each one of the poorest billion people in the world; thus, if rationally used, it could eliminate a significant part of the world's misery. And yet it is the cost of only *one* 'improvement' in *one* aspect of *one* nation's strategic nuclear force — a force which itself takes only a fraction of that nation's military spending.

Points like this are only too familiar, but are still worth making. They help to emphasise how irrational and unacceptable is the world we live in, and to criticise it in the light of humanist values. The fact that these values are generally agreed to — even if contradicted so cynically in practice — is itself a vital factor that keeps alive the hope for a better world.

However, we cannot stop at this contrast between war spending and welfare budgets, if what we are after is to understand the world we live in. We need to ask a simple-minded question: what after all, are armed forces for?

We all know the embarrassing pap that serves as 'common-sense reality' here: if a nation is a 'goodie', then its armed forces are of course for 'defence' — if it is a 'baddie', then its purposes are darker and may even be for 'aggression'. If the propagandists are serving — as they usually do — one of the sides in the super-power confrontation, our intelligence is insulted even more deeply, when they simply assume that the US, or the Soviet Union, knows no other motive but that of defending its borders. The best answer to such puerile 'analysis' would probably be given, not by lengthy argument, but in unconsented street interviews with citizens of Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Afghanistan or Poland.

The plain fact is that bodies of armed force are created to serve the nation's politics; their purposes are the purposes of that politics, and are no less various. Certainly these purposes can include to preserve the nation's territorial integrity ('defence'), or to dissuade a potential enemy from attacking it ('deterrence'); but it would be difficult to find a 'pure' case in which a nation rigidly confined its armies to these sole purposes, and did not allow them to serve its other aims also.

We could note a variety of other ends which can be assigned to the armed forces as, for example, to defend an existing class structure when it is threatened by insurrection, to extend the boundaries of the nation to take in a neighbour's territory, to assert control by violence over a distant region (colonisation) or to coerce a smaller neighbour into one's sphere of influence. Each of these ends is familiar from history, and each when adopted must influence the size, structure and composition of the armed forces maintained, to make them suitable for the ends envisaged.

These uses range well beyond simply defending a nation's borders, or deterring an attacker. Anti-militarists often fail to appreciate this wide range of 'usefulness', and see waste and irrationality where they do not really exist. It cannot of course be denied, that the spending on armed forces is wasteful and irrational by any standards which are even remotely humanist. But humanist standards are not those which guide the behaviour of any existing national-state, and we are wrong if we think the 'defence' budgets of the world are so much money down the drain.

Of course, military spenders can be 'inefficient' and

make 'mistakes'. An economic lobby may be over-influential, a ruling clique willfully prejudiced, a top adviser a charlatan. But the structure of the armed forces as a whole is not determined by mistake; it is created, and created with some efficiency overall, to serve the politics of the nation and achieve the aims its policy designates. (Going one step further, we can usually say more about the people who actually make that policy in a given country, and find — not to our surprise — that it fits its own interests, which are identified with the 'nation's'.

To serve the aims of foreign policy, an element of armed force does not need to be in steady use, or even in use at all. To command respect as town marshal, Wyatt Earp had no need to fire his shotgun semi-continuously into people's backs; it was enough that he had once done it, and that he still owned a shotgun. Even if it remained undischarged for many years, the investment of capital it represented still paid handsome dividends.

Similarly, we might find ships of the US Navy, for instance, which completed their span of life, from keel-laying to decommissioning, without firing a shot in anger. Meanwhile, thousands of children died from malnutrition diseases which the money spent on those ships could have prevented. But those ships cannot be regarded as simply useless adornments; quite probably, they gave good service in advancing the aims of United States foreign policy, aims to which the sanctity of human life is basically irrelevant.

Nations which wish to exert influence in regions of the world distant from their borders — and their ranks extend well beyond the few labelled as 'super-powers' — need armed force which can credibly assert itself as a factor in the region of interests. Actual armed intervention may be a rarity, but the *capacity* to intervene is a permanent argument for their interests. So is the ability, conferred by those armed forces, to give military assistance and advice to friendly governments or potentially friendly insurgents.

If a government or opposition anywhere contemplates action inimical to US interests, it would be unwise to overlook certain relevant factors, such as the existence of the giant transport planes (C-5A, C-141, C-140), able to shift upwards of 60,000 men over thousands of miles in a matter of hours. Soviet transports (An-12, An-22, Il-76) now have a similar capability and pose themselves as a similar factor in regional decisions. The presence of the US Navy — and now, of the Soviet Navy — in every ocean of the world likewise cannot be ignored, and helps to shape the configuration of forces within the political life of a nation.

It would be tedious to detail all the ways in which a nation's armed forces serve as a continuous back-up to its foreign policy, and in particular to its overseas investments (in the case of capitalist countries especially) and the economic influence and even control that these give rise to. The point should be clear enough: money spent on the armed forces is not the sheer waste that it may at first seem. (And this is without even considering the role they play in domestic politics, as a tool for actual or potential social control.)

But if, in general, an appropriate amount of political bang is won for every military buck, there is one enormous and frustrating exception. Alone among the major weapons systems of the advanced countries, these tangible rewarms have *not* flowed, to anything like the proper extent, from the money spent on *nuclear arms*.

#### 4. Nuclear bombs have not earned their keep

Even during the four years (August 1945 to August 1949) in which the US enjoyed a monopoly of the nuclear bomb, its awesome power failed to bring the expected dividends. As long ago as 1957, Henry Kissinger was looking back wistfully at this monopoly period and complaining that 'we never succeeded in translating our military superiority into a political advantage.'

This 1957 book of Kissinger's, **Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy**, devotes much attention to the virtues of *limited* nuclear war, as an instrument for attaining diplomatic ends. An aim he piously declared was, of course, to avoid the catastrophe of an all-out, cities-destroying nuclear holocaust. But, in the context of such other views as that quoted above, another interpretation is hard to overlook: Kissinger wanted to see an 'important weapon system fulfil its proper role, as an instrument of policy' — he wanted the money spent on nuclear arms to return political dividends as did other weapons.

Such dividends were still lacking, for a simple reason: the existence of **two** major stockpiles made each of them only a threat of mutual suicide. For if only 5% of the enemy's force survived a sudden strike, the attacker in his turn would be destroyed.

'Solutions' to this problem were soon offered. If the city-destroying power of the bomb is incapable of serving diplomacy's day-to-day needs, perhaps it can usefully assist in a less apocalyptic mode. Suppose it is not the enemy's cities which are threatened with destruction, but selected portions of his military apparatus — in particular, though not exclusively, his nuclear installations. Would not such a threat be credible? And could it not be planned in such a way that the ultimate spasm of mutual suicide was avoided? Confronted with such an ultimatum, might not the adversary reconsider some provocative move, or cut off his support to a hostile third party, perhaps even co-operate in preserving a zones-of-influence arrangement threatened by unruly popular movements?

This concept came to be known as 'counterforce'; a milestone in its development was reached in June 1962, when Kennedy's Defense Secretary McNamara publicly unveiled it as official US policy. Referring to 'controlled responses', and proposing an alternative to immediate destruction of cities, this official adoption of 'counterforce' strategy could present a good PR image. That it was in fact a first-strike policy — that is, the USA would be the first to use nuclear weapons — had, of course, to be glossed over.

But it was an empty policy. Nuclear-weapon systems lacked the neat packaging, the intelligence information, the command abilities and (above all) the precision needed for such 'flexible' use. Nor had things changed so much by 1974, when Defence Secretary Schlesinger announced the Nixon Administration's 'new' policy. This (allegedly novel) strategy would 'enable the nation to fight a limited nuclear war — something less than the all-out holocaust of reciprocal annihilation on which US nuclear strategy has been based for 25 years.'

But the weapons available, though improved, were still not up to the job, and neither was the target data precise enough. Limited by the means at hand, advocates of 'counterforce' diplomacy still had to take the wish for the deed. Schlesinger had only shown once again how ardent

was that wish.

#### 5. The troubles at the top

Can a nation's leaders be satisfied with the 'deterrent' role of a nuclear system? No. Or (if we have 'baddies' in mind) can they approve it because, one day, it might be suitable for an all-out, first-strike attack? Again, no. We need to appreciate the day-to-day worries of the people who run states. The pressing problems are those of today, decisions must be made at once, and an instrument is little regarded if it cannot help *now*. If the rebels are gaining in El Salvador and US States interests are threatened, if a business slump is deepened by the weakening of one's politico-economic control in overseas countries, if ominous cracks are appearing in the bloc of East European satellites — then it is these questions which make up the agenda for today's meeting, and any instrument will be judged by the help it gives in finding solutions.

Appreciating the cost and the potential power of the nuclear weapon, the masters of war cannot see it as satisfactorily pulling its weight, so long as it stands aloof from the pressing tasks of the moment and can promise no more than a possible use at some future time. And this remains true whether its future value is supposed to lie in 'detering' or in 'conquering'.

When a 'world power' strives to extend or maintain its dominance, no resource is neglected: economic 'aid', covert operations, the subsidising or even creation of friendly organisations, the multifarious assistance of its armed forces. But one possible instrument, a bottomless sink that has drained off hundreds of billions of dollars over the last thirty years, gives in return almost nothing but future promises — and yet it is the strongest weapon of all... There is only one word to describe such a situation: it is intolerable.

And indeed they have not tolerated it. They would not be acting rationally (within their own terms), they would not be faithful to their national goals (as they see them), if they had stinted the money or the brainpower consecrated in this mission: to convert the unwieldy monster into a creature of their diplomatic service, to translate nuclear power into policy.

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The mere existence of the nuclear stockpiles has always prompted warnings, by no means alarmist, of the accidental factors which could now trigger off an unplanned holocaust: faults in the warning systems, a crazed general, proliferation to an 'irresponsible' country. Such possibilities still remain. But a much more likely path to armageddon is now visible, and we are already on it.

Our guides are not incompetent technicians or General Jack Rippers or Colonel Gaddafi. They are, in the main, sane and capable men without megalomaniac illusions and with no mastering urge to blot out half the world from the pages of history, or to risk their country's existence on one desperate throw of the dice. They merely wish to preserve or to advance the interests they conceive as those of their nation and their system; in this task, and recognising the imperatives of real-politik, they could not justify failure to employ a new instrument to hand. (What if the enemy stole a march on them?) They are confident of their ability to handle the instruments, whatever they may be, with moderation and proper care.

Step by step, each supported by the logic their

assumptions dictate, but with no sign of appreciating the lessons of two world wars, these men are leading us towards a third but far more horrendous cataclysm. For they have a new instrument, out of the research phase and well into development in its various forms, which will be in their diplomatic armory well before the decade is out. The troublesome exception is now almost brought into line, the massive technological drive has paid off. 'Counterforce' weapons are about to enter the operational stage, and on both sides nuclear power is at last to be translated into policy.

#### 6. The bomb: new, improved, no longer ultimate

The specific role which nuclear weapons are to play in day-to-day international politics is now clear in outline. Made 'flexible' enough to be directed with confidence at the enemy's weapons installations while avoiding his cities, they will provide diplomatic negotiators with a new and credible threat backing up their arguments, compelling an opponent's attention in a manner similar to the nearby presence of an aircraft carrier or the known capability for quick troop despatch. If he does not properly respond, a graduated and measured strike can then be delivered to prove one's determination and capacity.

The number of warheads available to either side is now more than sufficient for the purpose. The USSR lags here, with upwards of 7,000 compared to the 13,000 or so of the USA; but they have a faster building program scheduled for the current period, more delivery vehicles and a considerably higher (more than four-fold) average explosive power. Even a few hundred expended in a counterforce operation would not seriously reduce the stockpile of either.

The yield-to-weight ratio, which decides how much explosive effect can be achieved for a given delivery-vehicle power, has steadily improved over the years. As an example: the US MX missile, which will be operational in mid-1986 as the replacement for Minuteman-3, is only two-and-a-half times the overall weight of its predecessor but throws four times as much in its warhead and throws it further.

Since missile installations are 'hardened' (i.e., fortified against blast by perhaps a two-foot thickness of concrete and three-eighth-inch sheet steel), even a nuclear explosion will not crumble them unless it occurs within a few hundred feet. Thus the old missiles, with their accuracies of perhaps a mile or two, were no great threat to a missile silo. But steady and multifarious improvements over the years have now brought the required accuracies: the current Soviet generation of missiles (particularly the improved version of the SS-19) is estimated to land half the time within a distance from its target of about 700 feet — a similar figure to that for Minuteman-3. The new MX will be even more accurate than this last; moreover, since the spectacular improvement already achieved did not stem from any great single break-through but from a host of expectable engineering refinements, this precision will steadily improve.

The Cruise missile achieves in one stroke all the accuracy needed for counterforce operations: at a range of up to 2500 kilometres, it will hit within a few tens of metres of the target. With its own guidance system inbuilt, and so cheap that well over a hundred can be got for the price of a single MX missile, each delivers ten times the explosive strength of the Hiroshima bomb. The first squadron of Cruise-carrying B52s is to be in service by the end of 1982; the MX begins deployment in 1986.

As for targeting intelligence — knowing precisely where enemy weapons are located in order to aim counter-weapons with precision — this is now supplied in the required detail by satellites. With cameras able to resolve two objects eight inches apart — from a height of 150 kilometres — or to penetrate camouflage by distinguishing dead from live foliage, satellites of the Big Bird or Keyhole type have no problem in mapping where the silo launching platforms are at any given moment.

Other technical needs — like a fully reliable communications and control system — are either already satisfied, or on the point of being met. The US defence forces understand where the big money will be going in the next decade, and the sort of performance that must be promised in order to get it. The magic words are 'hard-target kill capability'. Each of the three services offers to contribute, even the Navy, whose SLBMs (sub missiles) have long been treated as too inaccurate to be useful against targets other than cities, is now claiming a piece of the action.

Three different up-grading programs are now under way, all designed to reduce the SLBM error to about 750 feet. Further improvements will be required for increased accuracy necessary in the next generation Trident missile if hard target kill capability is to be achieved. Inertial systems will need to be improved in the stellar inertial system... a new generation of accelerometer... solid state sensors in the optics... Money is being lavished on efforts in dozens of different fields; the Ph.D.s are hard at work as you read this.

#### 7. The balance of counterforces

If the details of weapons technology sketched above are drawn mainly, though not exclusively, from US achievements and projects, this is simply due to their greater accessibility, and should not be taken to imply a sharp asymmetry between US and Soviet nuclear policies. As an American analyst noted nearly twenty years ago:

'Now there is growing evidence that they [the USSR] have responded to the provocative doctrine we have adopted by increasing their missile procurement and developing very large nuclear weapons — both are abandonment of the limited deterrent stance and both are consistent with the adoption of a counterforce policy of their own.'

Indeed, their most recent procurement moves have given some grounds for US spokesmen to raise a new clamour about a pending 'missile gap'.

The period between now and the mid-1980s when the US will be substantially inferior to the USSR in strategic weapons capabilities is being described in various terms to the Legislative Branch and to the American public. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David C. Jones, called it the "window of vulnerability".

This clamour should be treated with some caution: what is in debate is in fact the relative degrees of total overkill on the two sides, and the calculations tend to omit such other factors as the 7,000 nuclear warheads (not 'strategic') in Western Europe. This last despite the fact that —

'There is a blurring of the distinction of strategic or intercontinental forces and theater nuclear forces, according to SAC [Strategic Air Command] officers.'

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Even more revealingly, US spokesmen quickly move away from the pious 'deterrence' myth, and talk about the real dividends to be expected from the new systems. Listen to General Richard H. Ellis, commander-in-chief of Strategic Air Command and director of the Joint Strategic Target Planning staff:

"The US failed to fully exploit its great technological lead in the 1970s to help offset the growing momentum of the Soviet military machine and, perhaps of even more serious consequence, to lessen America's dependence on foreign sources of energy and raw materials."

This could hardly be clearer. The public-relations scenarios of virtuous 'deterrence' are far behind us; Ellis is talking about the real world, the world of the present and its problems, where whole nations and their peoples are seen as nothing but a resource to serve US (or Soviet) needs. This is the world which is now to welcome a new protagonist, in which a hoped-for technological lead (this is the head of the nuclear-bomber force talking) will allow nuclear weapons to play their fitting role, so long deferred, in ensuring control of Middle East oil, African uranium, cheap Asian labour.

In these very years we are about to enter, then, the USA will be laying its nuclear bets. But of course, the USSR already knows this, and we can assume that it too is arranging to draw cards of advantage in the counterforce

game. It is all too possible that the USA, believing that its lead is adequate to the task, will issue its challenge, and that the USSR, unconvinced of the need to retreat, will call its bluff. This is a familiar pattern preceding the outbreak of actual hostilities; the difference now is that the first skirmish will be fought with a weapon that, dropped eight miles from a school, will burn the skin away from the children's faces as they turn to look.

## 8. The risk and the response

Reviewing the years since 1945, then, we see that humanity's coexistence with nuclear weapons can be roughly divided into three periods.

In the first period, which ended with the Soviet Union's test explosion in 1949, the United States had a monopoly, but too small a stockpile to ensure its victory in a general war.

The second period was marked by the rapid (and expensive) accumulation of huge stockpiles on either side, sufficiently in step with each other to guarantee 'mutual assured destruction'. But in this era of 'deterrence', the inflexibility of nuclear weapons was increasingly resented by the great powers, and no effort was spared to develop the technical means which would make them a credible day-to-day instrument in foreign policy, rather than just a costly insurance against a distant future that might or might not arrive.

We are now living in the third and most ominous period: the technical means for flexible use of the weapon have largely been achieved. Huge stockpiles, far exceeding the needs of any deterrence policy, are available for selective strikes, or warning blows; US spokesmen in particular conceive of nuclear wars which are limited, winnable, survivable. Few will share their illusion that massive escalation into a worldwide catastrophe would not soon follow such 'limited' uses.

The 'logic' of the superpowers' confrontation thus points towards a horrifying conclusion, fortunately, they are not getting everything their own way, each has had some spectacular failures, in trying to prop up aggressive local cliques against challenges from popular local forces, on the periphery of its empire. Vietnam, Nicaragua and Afghanistan are the most clear-cut examples. In Central America today, as in Eastern Europe, opposition and dissident groups are making it increasingly costly for the superpower's client to keep the lid down. And each of the superpowers is under growing political and economic challenge from other states, the US from its allies in Western Europe and Japan, the USSR particularly from its one-time ally, China.

Indeed, one reason why the superpowers are so heavily committed to military competition, and especially to making their nuclear weapons usable, is that their leadership in non-military areas is slipping.

Moreover, the increasing assertiveness of the superpowers is generating a whole series of new responses — and it is here that hope lies. In Western Europe a powerful new peace movement has come into existence, directly responding to a series of NATO decisions which reflect the strategies of escalation. Millions of West Europeans have taken to the

streets in protest against the Cruise and Pershing II missiles which are to be sited in their midst, and against the American plans for neutron bombs in Europe. In Eastern Europe the peace aspect of the challenge to Soviet domination remains muffled, but several governments (East German and Romanian in particular) have sensed a need to respond positively to the new anti-nuclear mood.

The anti-nuclear movement in Australia lags behind that of Western Europe — and lags unpardonably. For the neutron bomb, the Cruise missiles and the Pershing II can be touted as the great protection for Europe (although in fact their use would guarantee its destruction). But here in Australia, no such 'protective' role can even be claimed for nuclear weapons — and yet we are deeply and dangerously involved in a nuclear system.

Satellite information — needed for targeting — is relayed to the US from the bases at Pine Gap and Nurrungur. North West Cape communicates with and controls US nuclear-missile submarines. From Darwin, B 52 bombers will soon be able to fly north and release Cruise missiles deep into the Soviet Union.

All this makes Australia an active partner in nuclear counterforce strategy, with all the dangers to us that this implies. In the sorts of 'nuclear exchanges' which are increasingly likely, Australian bases and even cities could be as much in danger as any pawn in a chess game.

Stirred into massive action by their own peril, the European peoples have shown forcefully how repugnant they find the roles assigned to them in the coming tragedy — as bit players supplying the terrain and the corpses. They are giving a lesson to us here in Australia, showing how we can protect ourselves, and help to protect the world, by refusing to tolerate any longer the bases that stain our soil.

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