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EDITORIAL

The Journal of Eurasian Affairs is a new international journal founded by the Russian NGO International Social Movement "Eurasian Movement". It is dedicated to different issues such as Eurasianism in its different aspects (from philosophy to integration process on post-Soviet space), geopolitics, international relations, war and peace studies, globalization, multipolarity and new emerging theories in fields of politics and humanitarian sciences.

Because of its title covered themes are about processes in Eurasia, but not limited by continental boundaries. Eurasia as an idea and Eurasianism as an outlook are international by its essence.

In some sense the Journal of Eurasian Affairs is a interdisciplinary one where ideas cross from different schools, trends and sets that makes it a broad platform for discussion and forum for meetings of academic researchers, political activists, philosophers, independent scholars, experts and decision makers.

The red line of the Journal of Eurasian Affairs is a critical approach to (neo)liberalism and its derivatives manifested in realpolitik as well as in large scale of activities dealing with the human being itself. The need to develop an alternative is the second task, put before the founders of the Journal and core thinkers of the "Eurasian Movement".

We believe that writers from all over the globe will join us for the development (and revival) of these kind of ideas that will promote and establish a new model of global affairs and of political systems paying respect to all nations, peoples, groups, beliefs, cultures and traditions.

The Journal of Eurasian Affairs invites contributors to send articles, essays and reviews.

Leonid Savin, Editor.



Alexander Dugin

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MULTIPOLARISM AS AN OPEN PROJECT

Alexander Dugin

I. MULTIPOLARISM AND "LAND POWER"

Geopolitics of the Land in the Global World

In the previous part we discussed the subject of globalism, globalization, and mondialism in a view considered to be generally accepted and "conventional". Geopolitical analysis of the phenomenon of the subject of globalism, globalization, and mondialism has showed that in the modern globalism we only deal with one of the two geopolitical powers, namely, with a thalassocracy, a "Sea Power" that from now on claims for uniqueness, totality, and normativeness and strives to pretend to be the only possible civilization, sociological and geopolitical condition of the world.

Therewith, the philosophy of globalism is based upon the internal surety with universalism of exactly the Western-European value system thought to be the summary of all the diverse experience of the human cultures on all stages of their history.

And finally, in its roots, globalization has an active ideology (mondialism) and power structures that spread and bring this ideology into use. If taking into account that the latter are the most authoritative intellectual US centers (such as CFR and neoconservatives), structures of the US Supreme Military Command and their analysts (Owens, Sibrowsky, Barnett, Garstka), international oligarchs (such as George Soros), a number of international organizations (The Bilderberg Club, Trilateral Commission, etc.), and innumerable amount of analysts, politicians, journalists, scientists, economists, people of culture and art, and IT sector employees spread all over the world, we can understand the reason why this ideology seems to be something that goes without saying for us. That we sometimes take globalization as an "objective process" is the result of a huge manipulation with public opinion and the fruit of a total information war.

Therefore, the picture of global processes we described is an affirmation of the real state of affairs just in part. In such a description, there is a significant share of a normative and imperative volitional (ideological) wish that everything should be quite so, which means, it is based upon wrenches and, to some extent, striving to represent our wishful thinking as reality.

In this part, we will describe an absolutely different point of view on globalization and globalism that is impossible from inside the "Sea Power", i.e. out of the environment of the nominal "Global World". Such a view is not taken into account either in antiglobalism or in alterglobalism because it refuses from the most fundamental philosophical and ideological grounds of Eurocentrism. Such a view rejects the faith in:

- universalism of the Western values, that Western societies, in their history, have passed the only possible way all the other countries are expected to pass;

- progress as an indisputable forwardness of historical and social development;
- that it is limitless technical, economical, and material development, which is the answer for the most vital needs of all humankind;
- that people of all cultures, religions, civilizations, and ethnoses are principally the same as the people of the West and they are governed by the same anthropological motives;
- absolute superiority of capitalism over other socio-political formations;
- absence of any alternative for market economy;
- that liberal democracy is the only acceptable form of political organization of the society;
- individual freedom and individual identity as the superior value of human being;
- liberalism as a historically inevitable, higher-priority, and optimal ideology.

In other words, we proceed to the position of the “Land Power” and consider the present moment of the world history from the point of view of Geopolitics-2, or the thalassocratic geopolitics as an episode of the “Great Continent War”, not as its conclusion.

Of course, it is difficult to refuse that the present moment of historical development demonstrates a number of unique features that, if desired, can be interpreted as the ultimate victory of the Sea over the Land, Carthage over Rome and Leviathan over Behemoth. Indeed, never in history the “Sea Power” was such a serious success and stretched might and influence of its paradigm in such a scale. Of course, Geopolitics-2 acknowledges this fact and the consequences included. But it clearly realizes that globalization can be also interpreted otherwise, namely, as a series of victories in combats and battles, not as the ultimate win in the war.

Here, a historical analogy suggests itself: when German troops were approaching to Moscow in 1941, one could think that everything was lost and the end of the USSR was foredoomed. The Nazi propaganda commented the course of the war quiet so: the “New Order” is created in the occupied territory, the authorities work, economical and political hierarchy is created, and the social life

is organized. But the Soviet people kept on violently resisting — at all the fronts as well as in the rear of the enemy, while systematically moving to their goal and their victory.

Now, there is precisely this moment in the geopolitical stand of the Sea and the Land. Information policy inside the “Sea Power” is built so as no-one has any doubt that globalism is an accomplished fact and the global society has come about in its essential features, that all the obstacles from now on are of a technical character. But from certain conceptual, philosophical, sociological, and geopolitical positions, all of it can be challenged by suggesting an absolutely different vision of the situation. All the point is in *interpretation*. Historical facts make no sense without interpretation. Likewise in geopolitics: any state of affairs in the field of geopolitics only makes sense in one or another interpretation. Globalism is interpreted today almost exclusively in the Atlantist meaning and, thus, the “sea” sense is put into it. A view from the Land’s position doesn’t change the state of affairs but it does change its sense. And this, in many cases, is of fundamental importance.

Further, we will represent the view on globalization and globalism from the Land’s position — geopolitical, sociological, philosophical, and strategical.

FOUNDATIONS FOR EXISTENCE OF GEOPOLITICS-2 IN THE GLOBAL WORLD

How can we substantiate the very possibility of a view on globalization on the part of the Land, assuming that the structure of the global world, as we have shown, presupposes marginalization and fragmentation of the Land?

There are several grounds for this.

1. *The human spirit (conscience, will, faith) is always capable to formulate its attitude to any ambient phenomenon* and even if this phenomenon is presented as invincible, integral, and “objective”, it is possible to take it in a different way — accept or reject, justify or condemn. This is the superior dignity of man and his difference from animal species. And if man rejects and condemns something, he has the right to build strategies to overcome it in any, most difficult and insuperable, situations and conditions. The advance of the global society can be accepted and approved but it can be rejected and condemned as well. In the former case, we float adrift the history, in the latter

one — we seek a “fulcrum” to stop this process. History is made by people and the spirit plays the central part here. Hence, there is a theoretical possibility to create a theory radically opposite to the views that are built on the base of the “Sea Power” and accept basic paradigms of the Western view on the things, course of history, and logic of changing sociopolitical structures.

2. *The geopolitical method allows to identify globalization as a subjective process* connected with a success of one of the two global powers. Be the Land ever so “marginal and fragmentized», it has serious historical grounds behind itself, traditions, experience, sociological and civilization background. The Land’s geopolitics is not built on a void place; this is a tradition that generalizes some fundamental historical, geographical, and strategical trends. Therefore, even on the theoretical level, estimation of globalization from the position of Geopolitics-2 is absolutely relevant. Just as well as there is the “subject” of globalization in its center (mondialism and its structures), the Land Power can and does have its own subjective embodiment. In spite of a huge scale and massive forms of the historical polemics of civilizations, we, first of all, deal with a stand of minds, ideas, concepts, theories, and only then — with that of material things, devices, technologies, finances, weapons, etc.
3. *The process of desovereignization of national states has not yet become nonreversible*, and the elements of the Westphalian system are still being partly preserved. That means that a whole range of national states, by virtue of certain consideration, can still bank on realization of the land strategy, i.e. they can completely or partially reject globalization and the “Sea Power’s” paradigm. China is an example of it; it balances between globalization and its own land identity, strictly observing that the general balance is kept and that only what consolidates China as a sovereign geopolitical formation is borrowed from the global strategies. The same can be also said about the states the US have equaled to the “Axis of Evil” — Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Venezuela, Syria, etc. Of course, the threat of a direct intrusion of US troops hangs over these countries like the sword of Damocles (on the model of Iraq or Afghanistan), and they are continuously subject to more politic network attacks from inside. However, at the moment their sovereignty is preserved what makes them
4. And, finally, the most general. — *The present state of Heartland*. The world dominance, as we know, and thus, reality or evanescence of monopolar globalization depends on it. In 1980-90-s, Heartland fundamentally reduced its influence area. Two geopolitical belts — Eastern Europe (whose countries were within the “Socialist Block”, “Warsaw Pact», Comecon, etc.) and the Federative Republics of the USSR consistently withdrew from it. By the mid 1990-s, a bloody testing for a possibility of further breakdown of Russia into “national republics” had started in Chechnya. This fragmentation of Heartland, down to a mosaic of marionette dependent states in place of Russia, had to become the final accord of construction of the global world and the “end of history”, after which it would be much more difficult to speak about the Land and Geopolitics-2. Heartland is of central importance in the possibility of strategical consolidation of all Eurasia and, thus, the “Land Power”. If the processes that took place in Russia in 1990-s had moved in a groove and its disintegration kept on, it would be much more difficult to challenge globalization. But since late 1990-s — early 2000-s, a turning-point has taken place in Russia, disintegration was stopped; moreover, the federal authorities have restored control over the rebellious Chechnya. Then V. Putin implemented a legal reform of the Federation subjects (excision of the article about “sovereignty”, governors’ appointment, etc.) that has consolidated the power vertical all over Russia. The CCI integration processes have started gathering pace. In August 2008, in the course of the five-day conflict of Russia with Georgia, Russia took its direct control over territories beyond the borders of the Russian Federation (Southern Ossetia, Abkhazia), and acknowledged their independence, in spite of a huge support of Georgia on the part of the US and the NATO countries and pressure of the international public opinion. Generally, since early 2000-s Russia as Heartland has ceased the processes of its self-disintegration, has reinforced its energetics, has

normalized the issues of energy supply abroad, has refused from the practice of unilateral reduction of armaments, having preserved its nuclear potential. Whereby, influence of the network of geopolitical agents of Atlantism and Mondialism on the political authority and strategical decision making has qualitatively diminished, consolidation of the sovereignty has been understood as the top-priority issue, and integration of Russia into a number of globalist structures menacing its independence has been ceased. In a word, Heartland keeps on remaining the foundation of Eurasia, its "Core" — weakened, suffered very serious losses, but still existing, independent, sovereign, and capable to pursue a policy, if not on a global scale, then on a regional one. In its history, Russia has several times fallen yet lower: the Domain Fragmentation on the turn of the 13th century, The Time of Troubles, and the events of 1917-1918 show us Heartland in a yet more deplorable and weakened condition. But every time, in some period, Russia revived and returned to the orbit of its geopolitical history again. The present state of Russia is difficult to recognize brilliant or even satisfactory from the geopolitical (Eurasian) point of view. Yet in general — Heartland does exist, it is relatively independent, and therefore, we have both a theoretical and practical base to consolidate and bring to life all the pre-conditions for development of a response to the phenomenon of monopolar globalization on the part of the Land.

Such an answer of the Land to the challenge of globalization (as a triumph of the "Sea Power") is *Multipolarism*, as a theory, philosophy, strategy, policy, and practice.

MULTIPOLARISM AS A PROJECT OF THE WORLD ORDER FROM THE LAND'S POSITION

Multipolarism represents a summary of Geopolitics-2 in actual conditions of the global process evolution. This is an extraordinarily capacious concept that demands a through consideration.

Multipolarism is *a real antithesis for monopolarity* in all its aspects: *hard* (imperialism, neocons, direct US domination), *soft* (multilateralism) and *critical* (alterglobalism, postmodernism, and neo-Marxism) ones.

The hard monopolarity version (radical American imperialism) is based upon the idea that the US represents the last citadel of the world order, prosperity, comfort,

safety, and development surrounded by a chaos of underdeveloped societies. Multipolarism states the directly opposite: the US is a national state that exists among many others, its values are doubtful (or, at least, relative), its claims are disproportional, its appetites are excessive, methods of conducting its foreign policy are unacceptable, and its technological messianism is disastrous for the culture and ecology of the whole world. In this regard, the multipolar project is a hard antithesis to the US as an instance that methodically builds a unipolar world, and it is aimed to strongly disallow, break up, and prevent this construction.

The soft monopolarity version does not only act on behalf of the US, but on behalf of "humanity", exclusively understanding it as the West and the societies that agree with universalism of Western values. *Soft monopolarity* does not claim to press by force, but persuade, not to compel, but explain profits peoples and countries will obtain from entering into globalization. Here the pole is not a single national state (the US), but Western civilization as a whole, as a quintessence of all the humanity.

Such, as it is sometimes called, "*multilateral*" *monopolarity* (multilateralism, multilateralization) is rejected by *Multipolarism* that considers Western culture and Western values to represent merely one axiological composition among many others, one culture among different other cultures, and cultures and value systems based on some absolutely different principles to have the full right for existence. Consequently, the West in a whole and those sharing its values, have no grounds to insist on universalism of democracy, human rights, market, individualism, individual freedom, secularity, etc. and build a global society on the base of these guidelines.

Against *alterglobalism* and *postmodern antiglobalism*, *Multipolarism* advances a thesis that a capitalist phase of development and construction of worldwide global capitalism is not a necessary phase of society development, that it is despotism and an ambition to dictate different societies some kind of single history scenario. In the meantime, confusion of mankind into the single global proletariat is not a way to a better future, but an incidental and absolutely negative aspect of the global capitalism, which does not open any new prospects and only leads to degradation of cultures, societies, and traditions. If peoples do have a chance to organize effective resistance to the global capitalism, it is only where Socialist ideas are combined with elements of a traditional society (archaic, agricultural, ethnical, etc.),

as it was in the history of the USSR, China, North Korea, Vietnam and takes place today in some Latin-American countries (e. g., in Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, etc.).


Multipolarism represents a normative and imperative view on the present situation in the world on the part of the Land and it qualitatively differs from the model predominated in the Yalta World in the period of the “Cold War”.


The Bipolar World was constructed under the ideological principle, where two ideologies — Capitalism and Socialism — acted as poles. Socialism as an ideology did not challenge universalism of the West-European culture and represented a sociocultural and political tradition that threw back to the European Enlightenment. In a certain sense, Capitalism and Socialism competed with each other as two versions of Enlightenment, two versions of progress, two versions of universalism, two versions of the West-European sociopolitical idea.

Socialism and Marxism entered into a resonance with certain parameters of the “Land Power”, and therefore they did not win where Marx had supposed, but where he excluded this possibility — in an agricultural country with the predominant way of life of a traditional society and imperial organization of the political field. Another case of an (independent) victory of Socialism — China — also represented an agricultural, traditional society.

Multipolarism does not oppose monopolarity from the position of a single ideology that could claim for the second pole, but it does from the position of many ideologies, a plenty of cultures, world-views and religions that (each for its own reasons) have nothing in common with the Western liberal capitalism. In a situation, when the Sea has a unified ideological aspect (however, ever more going to the sphere of subauditions, not explicit declarations), and the Land itself doesn't, representing itself as several different world-view and civilization ensembles, Multipolarism suggests creating a united front of the Land against the Sea.

Further, Multipolarism is an absolutely different view on the space of land than bipolarity, a bipolar world.





Multipolarism is different from both the conservative project of conservation and reinforcement of national states. On the one hand, national states in both colonial and post-colonial period reflect the West-European understanding of a normative political organization (that ignores any religious, social, ethnical, and cultural features of specific societies) in their structures, i.e. the nations themselves are partially products of globalization. And on the other hand, it is only a minor part of the two hundred fifty-six countries officially itemized in the UN list today that are, if necessary, capable to defend their sovereignty by themselves, without entering into a block or alliance with other countries. It means that not each nominal sovereign state can be considered a pole, as the degree of strategical freedom of the vast majority of the countries acknowledged is negligible. Therefore, reinforcement of the Westphalian system that still mechanically exists today is not an issue of Multipolarism.

Being the opposition of monopolarity, Multipolarism does not call to either return to the bipolar world on the base of ideology or to fasten the order of national states, or to merely preserve the status quo. All these strategies will only play in hands of globalization and monopolarity centers, as they have a project, a plan, a goal, and a ra-

tional route of movement to future; and all the scenarios enumerated are at best an appeal to a delay of the globalization process, and at worst (restoration of bipolarity on the base of ideology) look like irresponsible fantasy and nostalgia.

Multipolarism is a vector of the Land's geopolitics directed to the future. It is based upon a sociological paradigm whose consistency is historically proven in the past and which realistically takes into account the state of affairs existing in the modern world and basic trends and force lines of its probable transformations. But Multipolarism is constructed on this basis as a project, as a plan of the world order we yet only expect to create.

2 MULTIPOLARISM AND ITS THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

The absence of the Multipolarism Theory

In spite of the fact that the term "Multipolarism" is quite often used in political and international discussions recently, its meaning is rather diffuse and inconcrete. Different circles and separate analysts and politicians insert their own sense in it. Well-founded researches and solid scientific monographs devoted to Multipolarism

can be counted on fingers¹. Even serious articles on this topic are quite rare². The reason for this is well understood: as the US and Western countries set the parameters of the normative political and ideological discourse in a global scale today, according to these rules, whatever you want can be discussed but the sharpest and most painful questions. Even those considering unipolarity to have been just a "moment"³ in the 1990-s and a transfer to some new indefinite model to be taking place now are ready to discuss any versions but the "multipolar" one. Thus, for example, the modern head of CFR Richard Haass tells about "Non-Polarity" meaning such stage of globalization where necessity in presence of a rigid center falls off by itself⁴. Such wiles are explained by the fact that one of the aims of globalization is, as we have seen, marginalization of the "Land Power". And as far as Multipolarism can only be a form of an active strategy of the "Land Power" in the new conditions, any reference to it is not welcome by the West that sets the trend in the structure of political analysis in the general global context. Still less one should expect that conventional ideologies of the West take up development of the Multipolarism Theory.

It would be logical to assume that the Multipolarism Theory will be developed in the countries that explicitly declare orientation upon a multipolar world as the general vector of their foreign policy. The number of such countries includes Russia, China, India, and some others. Besides, the address to Multipolarism can be encountered in texts and documents of some European political actors (e.g., former French minister of Foreign Affairs

¹ Murray D., Brown D. (eds.) *Multipolarity in the 21st Century. A New World Order*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010; Ambrosio Th. *Challenging America global Preeminence: Russian Quest for Multipolarity*. Chippenheim, Wiltshire: Anthony Rose, 2005; Peral L. (ed.) *Global Security in a Multi-polar World*. Chaillot

Paper. Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, 2009; Hiro D. *After Empire: The Birth of a Multipolar World*. Yale: Nation Books, 2009.

² Turner Susan. *Russia, China and the Multipolar World Order: the danger in the undefined// Asian Perspective*. 2009. Vol. 33, No. 1. C. 159-184; Higgott Richard *Multi-Polarity and Trans-Atlantic Relations: Normative Aspirations and Practical Limits of EU Foreign Policy*. — www.garnet-eu.org. 2010. [Electronic resource] URL: http://www.garnet-eu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/7610.pdf (дата обращения 28.08.2010); Katz M. *Primakov Redux. Putin's Pursuit of «Multipolarism» in Asia//Demokratizatsya*. 2006. vol.14 № 4. C.144-152.

³ Krauthammer Ch. *The Unipolar Moment// Foreign Affairs*. 1990 / 1991 Winter. Vol. 70, No 1. C. 23-33.

⁴ Haass R. *The Age of Non-polarity: What will follow US Dominance?//Foreign Affairs*.2008. 87 (3). C. 44-56.

Hubert Vidrine⁵). But at the moment, we can as well hardly find something more than materials of several symposiums and conferences with rather vague phrases in this field. One has to state that the topic of Multipolarism is not properly conceptualized also in the countries that proclaim it as their strategical goal, not to mention the absence a distinct and integral theory of Multipolarism.

Nevertheless, on the base of the geopolitical method from the position of the "Land Power" and with due account for the analysis of a phenomenon called globalism, it is quite possible to formulate some absolute principles that must underlie the Multipolarism Theory when the matter comes to its more systemized and expanded development.

Multipolarism: Geopolitics and Meta-Ideology

Let's blueprint some theoretical sources, on whose base a valuable theory of Multipolarism must be built.

It is only geopolitics that can be the base for this theory in the actual conditions. At the moment, no religious, economical, political, social, cultural or economical ideology is capable to pull together the critical mass of the countries and societies that refer to the "Land Power" in a single planetary front necessary to make a serious and effective antithesis to globalism and the unipolar world. This is the specificity of the historical moment ("The Unipolar Moment"⁶): the dominating ideology (the global liberalism/post-liberalism) has no symmetrical opposition on its own level. Hence, it is necessary to directly appeal to geopolitics by taking the principle of the Land, the Land Power, instead of the opposing ideology. It is only possible in the case if the sociological, philosophical, and civilization dimensions of geopolitics are realized to the full extent.

The "Sea Power" will serve us as a proof for this statement. We have seen that the very matrix of this civilization does not only occur in the Modern Period, but also in thalassocratic empires of the Antiquity (e.g., in Carthage), in the ancient Athens or in the Republic of Venice. And within the Modern World itself atlantism and liberalism do not as well find complete predomi-

⁵ Déclaration de M. Hubert Védrine, ministre des affaires étrangères sur la reprise d'une dialogue approfondie entre la France et l'Hinde: les enjeux de la resistance a l'uniformisation culturelle et aux exces du monde unipolaire. New Delhi — 1 lesdiscours.vie-publique.fr/pdf/003000733.pdf

⁶ Krauthammer Ch. *The Unipolar Moment*. Op.cit.

nance over the other trends at once. And nevertheless, we can trace the conceptual sequence through a series of social formations: the “Sea Power” (as a geopolitical category) moves through history taking various forms till it finds its most complete and absolute aspect in the global world where its internal precepts become predominant in a planetary scale. In other words, ideology of the modern mondialism is only a historical form of a more common geopolitical paradigm. But there is a direct relation between this (probably, most absolute) form and the geopolitical matrix.

There is no such direct symmetry in case of the “Land Power”. The Communism ideology just partly (heroism, collectivism, antiliberalism) resonated with geopolitical precepts of the “ground” society (and this just in the concrete form of the Eurasian USSR and, to a lesser degree, of China), as the other aspects of this ideology (progressism, technology, materialism) fitted badly in the axiological structure of the “Land Power”. And today, even in theory, Communism cannot perform the mobilizing ideological function it used to perform in the 20th century in a planetary scale. From the ideological point of view the Land is really split into fragments and, in the nearest future, we can hardly expect some new ideology capable to symmetrically withstand the liberal globalism to appear. But the very geopolitical principle of the Land does not lose anything in its paradigmatic structure. It is this principle that must be taken as a foundation for construction of the Multipolarism Theory. This theory must address directly to geopolitics, draw principles, ideas, methods and terms out of it. This will allow to otherwise take both the wide range of existing non-globalist and counter-globalist ideologies, religions, cultures, and social trends. It is absolutely unnecessary to shape them to transform into something unified and systematized. They can well remain local or regional but be integrated into a front of common stand against globalization and “Western Civilization’s” domination on the meta-ideological level, on the paradigmatic level of Geopolitics-2 and this moment — plurality of ideologies — is already laid in the very term “Multi-polarism” (not only within the strategical space, but also in the field of the ideological, cultural, religious, social, and economical one).

Multipolarism is nothing but extension of Geopolitics-2 (geopolitics of the Land) into a new environment characterized with the advance of globalism (as atlantism) on a qualitatively new level and in qualitatively new proportions. Multipolarism has no other sense.

Geopolitics of the Land and its general vectors projected upon the modern conditions are the axis of the Multipolarism Theory, on which all the other aspects of this theory are threaded. These aspects constitute philosophical, sociological, axiological, economical, and ethical parts of this theory. But all of them are anyway conjugated with the acknowledged — in an extendedly sociological way — structure of the “Land Power” and with the direct sense of the very concept of “Multipolarism” that refers us to the principles of plurality, diversity, non-universalism, and variety.

3 MULTIPOLARISM AND NEO-EURASIANISM

Neo-Eurasianism as Weltanschauung

Neo-Eurasianism is positioned nearest to the theory of Multipolarism. This concept roots in geopolitics and operates par excellence with the formula of “Russia-Eurasia” (as Heartland) but at the same time develops a wide range of ideological, philosophical, sociological and politological fields, instead of being only limited with geostrategy and application analysis.

What is in the term of “Neo-Eurasianism” can be illustrated with fragments of the Manifesto of the International “Eurasian Movement” “Eurasian Mission»¹. Its authors point out five levels in Neo-Eurasianism allowing to interpret it in a different way depending on a concrete context.

Eurasianism is a Weltanschauung.

According to the authors of the Manifesto, the term “Eurasianism” “is applied to a certain *Weltanschauung*, a certain political philosophy that combines in itself tradition, modernity and even elements of postmodern in an original manner. The philosophy of Eurasianism proceeds from priority of values of the traditional society, acknowledges the imperative of technical and social modernization (but without breaking off cultural roots), and strives to adapt its ideal program to the situation of a post-industrial, information society called “postmodern”.

The formal opposition between tradition and modernity is removed in postmodern. However, postmodernism in the atlantist aspect levels them from the position of indifference and exhaustiveness of contents. The Eurasian postmodern, on the contrary, considers the

¹ Евразийская миссия. Манифест Международного «Евразийского Движения». М.: Международное Евразийское Движение, 2005.

possibility for an alliance of tradition with modernity to be a creative, optimistic energetic impulse that induces imagination and development.

In the Eurasianism philosophy, the realities superseded by the period of Enlightenment obtain a legitimate place — these are religion, ethnos, empire, cult, legend, etc. In the same time, a technological breakthrough, economical development, social fairness, labour liberation, etc. are taken from the Modern. The oppositions are overcome by merging into a single harmonious and original theory that arouses fresh ideas and new decisions for eternal problems of humankind. (...)

The philosophy of Eurasianism is an open philosophy, it is free from any forms of dogmatism. It can be appended by diversified areas — history, religion, sociological and ethnological discoveries, geopolitics, economics, regional geography, culturology, various types of strategical and politological researches, etc. Moreover, Eurasianism as a philosophy assumes an original development in each concrete cultural and linguistic context: Eurasianism of the Russians will inevitably differ from Eurasianism of the French or Germans, Eurasianism of the Turks from Eurasianism of the Iranians; Eurasianism of the Arabs from Eurasianism of the Chinese, etc. Whereby, the main force lines of this philosophy will, in a whole, be preserved unalterable.(...)

The following items can be called general reference points of the Eurasianism philosophy:

- differentialism, pluralism of value systems against obligatory domination of a single ideology (in our case and first of all, of the American liberal democracy);
- traditionalism against destruction of cultures, beliefs and rites of the traditional society;
- a world-state, continent-state against both bourgeois national states and “the world government”;
- rights of nations against omnipotence of “the Golden Billion” and neo-colonial hegemony of “the Rich North”;
- an ethnos as a value and subject of history against depersonalization of nations and their alienation in artificial sociopolitical constructions;

- social fairness and solidarity of labour people against exploitation, logic of coarse gain, and humiliation of man by man.»¹

Neo-Eurasianism as a Planetary Trend

On the second level: *Neo-Eurasianism is a planetary trend*. The authors of the Manifesto explain:

«Eurasianism on the level of a planetary trend is a global, revolutionary, civilization concept that is, by gradually improving, addressed to become a new ideological platform of mutual understanding and cooperation for a vast conglomerate of different forces, states, nations, cultures, and confessions that refuse from the Atlantic globalization.

It is worth carefully reading the statements of the most diverse powers all over the world: politicians, philosophers, and intellectuals and we will make sure that Eurasianists constitute the vast majority. Mentality of many nations, societies, confession, and states is, though they may not suspect about it themselves, Eurasianist.

If thinking about this multitude of different cultures, religions, confessions, and countries discordant with “the end of history” we are imposed by atlantism, our courage will grow up and the seriousness of risks of realization of the American 21st century strategical security concept related with a unipolar world establishment will sharply increase.

Eurasianism is an aggregate of all natural and artificial, objective and subjective obstacles on the way of unipolar globalization, whereby it is elevated from a mere negation to a positive project, a creative alternative. While these obstacles exist discretely and chaotically, the globalists deal with them separately. But it is worth just integrating, pulling them together in a single, consistent Weltanschauung of a planetary character and the chances for victory of Eurasianism all over the world will be very serious.»²

Neo-Eurasianism as an Integration Project

On the next level, Neo-Eurasianism is treated as *a project of strategical integration of the Eurasian Continent*:

“The concept “the Old World” usually defining Europe can be considered much wider. This huge

¹ Ibid

² Ibid.

multicivilization space populated with nations, states, cultures, ethnoses and confessions connected between each other historically and spatially by the community of dialectical destiny. The Old World is a product of organic development of human history.

The Old World is usually set against the New World, i.e. the American continent that was discovered by the Europeans and has become a platform for construction of an artificial civilization where the European projects of the Modern, the period of Enlightenment have taken shape. (...)

In the 20th century Europe realized its original essence and had gradually been moving to integration of all the European states into a single Union capable to provide all this space with sovereignty, independence, security, and freedom.

Creation of the European Union was the greatest milestone in the mission of Europe's return in history. This was the response of "the Old World" to the exorbitant demands of the "New" one. If considering the alliance between the US and Western Europe — with US domination — to be the Atlantist vector of European development, then the integration of European nations themselves with predomination of the continental countries (France-Germany) can be considered Eurasianism in relation to Europe.

It becomes especially illustrative, if taking into account the theories that Europe geopolitically stretches from the Atlantic to the Urals (Ch. de Gaulle) or to Vladivostok. In other words, the interminable spaces of Russia are also valuably included in the field of the Old World subject to integration.

(...) Eurasianism in this context can be defined as a project of strategical, geopolitical, economical integration of the North of the Eurasian Continent realized as the cradle of European history, matrix of nations and cultures closely interlaced between each other.

And since Russia itself (like, by the way, the ancestors of many Europeans as well) is related in a large measure with the Turkish, Mongolian world, with Caucasian nations, through Russia — and in a parallel way through Turkey — does the integrating Europe as the Old World already acquire the Eurasianism dimension to full extent; and in this case, not only in symbolic sense, but also in

geographical one. Here Eurasianism can be synonymically identified with Continentalism.¹»

These three most general definitions of Neo-Eurasianism demonstrate that here we deal with a preparatory basis for construction of the Multipolarism Theory. This is the ground view on the sharpest challenges of modernity and attempt to give an adjust response to them taking into account geopolitical, civilization, sociological, historical and philosophical regularities.

¹ Ibid.



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EURASIAN DOCTRINE OF KAZAKH PRESIDENT NURSULTAN NAZARBAYEV: “THINKING SPACE”

Sergey Biryukov

Kazakhstan becomes a nodal point of the post-Soviet space today. In this context it should be considered not as an ordinary state, balancing between global “centers of power”, but as a key element of the great intercivilizational zone stretching through the whole of Eurasia. Whether the zone stays what it was for centuries — the “inner corridor” of Eurasia, separating or linking its civilizations, depends on the Kazakhstan’s fate. That fact brings us inevitably to the geopolitical problems.

It should be noted that for many years Central Asia has been the object of interest for geopoliticians. From the point of view of traditional geopolitics Eurasia is not just a “gap” between “Great Europe” and “Great Asia” — but it is a special cultural and civilizational world, a self-organizing “great space.”

It should be observed that the debate about the nature and purpose of space in modern geopolitical thought is far from being over. Positivist science of political geography focuses on the phenomena of “objective” external character: the balance of weapons, geographical location of transit infrastructures, etc.

Traditional geography and geopolitics are based on the idea of ontological heterogeneity of terrestrial space, on the prevalence of anthropological, civilizational, religious and spiritual factors in determination of the fate and vocation of many nations.

For example, modern French researchers do not like to call themselves “geopoliticians”, but consider themselves most likely as geographers working at the intersections of geography and history. These sciences, in particular, express their deep surprise that in Germany they still speak about the “Space” (“Raum”) or the “Big space» (“Grossraum”) in the geopolitical discourse.

The concept of “space” is considered “empty” or “abstract” by French researchers, who consequently prefer speaking about the “territory” which they link to the interests of a certain community and a “collective identity formation”. As a result, according to the French approach the geopolitics itself is defined as the “analysis of contradictions among different types of power institutes of the territory” [1], which narrows the object to geopolitical study, replacing it actually with political geography.

At the same time, within the Eurasian geopolitical research school the desired synthesis has been carried out, and as a result the category of “space” has acquired human, historical, cultural and civilizational contents. That synthesis was embodied in the concept of “local development” which denotes the inseparable connection of space with history and destiny of individuals, societies and nations, with the unique cultural characteristics of the civilization.

As an example of such a “local development” (a model of political, social and economic development which character is defined by country or region location) can be considered as Eurasia in general, so Kazakhstan with its great strategic power as the integral part of “Eurasian space”. What does “to think space” mean, for the founders of states and prominent public figures in this context?

From the author’s point of view it means, first of all, the possibility to correlate spatial, cultural, civilizational and socio-economic characteristics of the states they head with the logic of their history and contemporary political process, and the possibility to draw up the domestic and foreign policy course according to the long-term national, regional and global political trends.

One of the founding fathers of classical geopolitics theory K. Haushofer has the same point of view on the “Big space” concept. Speaking on formation of continental alliance connecting European and Asian continents he supposes that “every considerable formations and structures don’t appear ready from the head of some great statesman like the famous Greek goddess of war in her stately spiritual image. A competent person knows that the creation of such formations is a long-term process. I am pleased to admit young colleagues-geographers that I must produce evidence on the formation of a new Euro-Asian continental policy perhaps, more than any other senior representative of the geographical science”. [2]

The fullest realization of “thinking space” tendency has been found in eurasianism — the movement of Russian intellectuals emigrant groups connected on the first place with the attempt of understanding the origins and consequences of the October Revolution. The movement itself appeared in 1921 in Prague and Sofia, and was founded by four young emigrants from Belorussia — P. Savitsky, geographer, P. Suvchinsky, musicologist, N. Trubetskoy, philologist and Slavist, Father G. Florovsky, religious philosopher and publicist. Among them there were such prominent Eurasians as religious thinker L.P. Karsavin, famous historian G.V. Vernadsky, lawyer and political scientist Nikolai Alekseev, orientalist V. Nikitin, writer V. N. Ivanov.

Much has been said on strong and weak sides of Eurasianism in the historiographical literature. It is admitted that Eurasianism is one of the most significant political theories of the twentieth century bringing up the question on determination of Eurasia’s place in the world. The fact that Eurasians find grounds for necessity of harmonious coexistence of Slavic and Turkish people,

Orthodox Christianity, Islam and Buddhism, as a guarantee of integrity and stability of the post-Soviet space are also very important.

In parallel the negative sides of the Eurasian doctrine are accentuated. It’s pretty clear that when taken to the extreme Eurasianism can act as an ideology justifying totalitarian and autarchic model, causing isolation from the West.

How do the subsequent interpretation of this doctrine reproduce and (or) overcome the disadvantages of the “classical Eurasianism”? Perhaps the biggest scientific interpreter of the Eurasianism ideology is Lev Gumilev (1912 — 1992) — a famous Russian historian, anthropologist and philosopher, author of the original teaching about the nature and life of ethnic groups — ethnology. His decade stay at the camp with one of the founders of Eurasianism Peter Saviysky influenced much on his views formation.

Actually there were three main ideas of Gumilev’s “Eurasian conception”: the first two were adopted, the third was original. The first of them considers the Russian Empire and the USSR historical forms of Eurasian statehood, coming from the empire of Genghis Khan. The second defines the Turkic and Muslim Eurasian peoples as Russian natural allies in their fight against West expansion, as it is equally fatal to any of the “Eurasian power” to unite with it. [3]

However, despite the original and profound Gumilev’s interpretation of Russian history, Eurasianism remained for him mainly a geopolitical metaphor. The prominent Russian historian and ethnologist has not formulated yet his specific proposals to arrange the political and socio-economic life of Eurasian countries and peoples. It took time to perceive deeply and completely his ideas.

And the time has come. 1990s was the time of large-scale policy changes related to political self-determination and self-assertion in the post-emerging new nation-states, with special and important place occupied by Kazakhstan. At the same time, the 1990s was the period of an increasing interest to the Eurasianism and the conception of underestimated outstanding scientist L. Gumilev.

To bring the key imperatives of Eurasianism to life its entirely new interpretation has been required, as well as the escape from the “mythopoetic” shade, specification of its cultural and civilizational imperatives. This

kind of a “modernization” of the Eurasian studies could be used for searching for the most appropriate model of economic and political organization of the post-Soviet space.

Thereupon it is no mere chance that the most active and consistent supporter of the Eurasian concept concerning modern political realities is the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev. The leader of a young and dynamic state saw its realization in his project of the Eurasian Union, subsequently implemented in practice in the model of the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), and the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus founded in 2010.

The Eurasian Union project declared in the mid 1990s yet, was supposed to unite new independent CIS states (conserving their political sovereignty) into a common economic space. A little later, N. Nazarbayev repeated his offer with a new meaning — he proposed the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union. This project, as experience has shown, had the fundamental political, historical and cultural base as a result of the Kazakhstan’s specificity as a Eurasian power. The ideology of Eurasianism was officially recognized in Kazakhstan, and one of Kazakhstan’s leading universities — the Eurasian National University in Astana — was named after a prominent ideologist of Eurasianism Lev Gumilev.

In general we can distinguish following basic features of the “Eurasian concept” by President Nursultan Nazarbayev. In the author’s opinion, they consist in a firm compliance with the following principles:

- 1) A realistic character, absence of “the ideology primacy”;
- 2) The tendency to connect firmly the idea of “Eurasian integration” in the post-Soviet space with the purposes and objectives of modernization;
- 3) Focus on the priority of interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan as a sovereign independent State;
- 4) Realistic reflection of the current state of “the post-Soviet space” and main trends of its development.
- 5) Review of the prospects of “Eurasian integration” in the context of a multidirectional strategy adopted by the Kazakh government.
- 6) The tendency to close coordination of the economic and political integration.

7) consulting not only Kazakh and Russian interests within the “Integration Project,” but the interests of Central Asian states as well. [4]

What factors ensure the success of the geopolitical position of Kazakhstan? Firstly, as Kazakh experts noted, Kazakhstan, represented by the leader Nursultan Nazarbayev, has a strong political will. Secondly, after years of independence Kazakhstan has practically implemented its will in the unique economic, social, political and humanitarian projects of modernization. Thirdly, the Republic of Kazakhstan is the heir of the centuries-old nomadic culture, which passionarity has strongly affected the global world formation since ancient times. Today this passionarity has been realized in proposing a number of initiatives answering the meaning and the essence interpreted in the frames of the contemporary Eurasian doctrine.

It is president Nazarbayev who has consistently been reinforcing the status of Kazakhstan as the leader country of the Central Asian region, who seeks to carry out in practice Eurasian principles interpreted in a modern key without confirming to politics or economics. Nursultan Nazarbayev is also an author of cultural and civilizational initiatives (World and traditional religions forum) in the contemporary crisis of the world and is trying to strengthen the dialogue between countries, civilizations and continents. Kazakhstan, a member of the main important institutions of post-Soviet space (CSTO, EurAsEC, Customs Union) and international organizations (the Organization “the Islamic Conference”), expanding its cooperation with the European countries within the OSCE, can play a very important role in establishment and realization of the multilateral partnership.

All these achievements and efforts could not stay unnoticed by western and eastern leaders. In this context it is not surprising that for the past several years, many states, representing those cultural civilizational “worlds”, seek the partnership with Kazakhstan as a promising economic partner and a key political actor in the complex and little predictable Central Asian region.

Due to the realization of complex strategies by the leader of the nation modern Kazakhstan successively transforms into the Eurasian hub, one of the most dynamic and stable states in the territory of the CIS. At the same time, it serves a good example of inter-ethnic and religious tolerance, moderate Muslim country that has become a sort of a “bridge between East and West.”

Domestic policy strategy of Kazakhstan answers the Eurasian imperatives, particularly in the field of nation-building politics. Over the centuries destinies of many people with different cultures, religions and traditions crossed on the historical Kazakh land. So the unique situation was created in when representatives of 140 ethnic groups and 40 confessions live peacefully together with the Kazakhs. Meanwhile a long-term cohabitation of different ethnic groups has formed a strong tradition of tolerance in the society.

Thus, today there are all necessary foundations for leaders, elites and peoples of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus to make a new decisive and qualitative step to the "Eurasian integration" — the orientation founded in the early 1990s by the national leader, president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has updated and is filled in the ideology of Eurasianism with a modern and concrete meaning.

Translated by Natalia Biryukova.

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EURASIAN UNION: SUBSTANCE AND THE SUBTEXT

Gulshan Dietl

The Eurasian Union has come to the present stage in its evolution within a remarkably compressed time-frame. Although the idea was first mooted by the Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbaev in 1994, it hibernated for long years.¹ It was only in late 2011 that Vladimir Putin revived the idea; visualised it as one of the major centres of economic power alongside the EU, the US, China and APEC; and initiated the process of its implementation. In November 2011, the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed an agreement to establish the Eurasian Economic Space (EES) that would graduate towards the Eurasian Union. The EES came into existence on 1 January 2012. The paper proposes to examine the origin of the idea and assess its implementation to date with an analysis of the substance and subtext of the organization.

EURASIAN UNION: THE ORIGINS

On 3 October 2011, Vladimir Putin published a signed article in the daily newspaper *Izvestia* titled “New Integration Project in Eurasia: Making the Future Today.” Putin was the Russian Prime Minister at that time and set to take over the Russian Presidency. The article can thus be interpreted as the assignment he set for himself in his second tenure. On the ground, the “Treaty on the Creation of a Union State of Russia and Belarus” already existed. The Treaty envisaged a federation between the two countries with a common constitution, flag, national anthem, citizenship, currency, president, parliament and army. On 26 January 2000, the Treaty came into effect after the due ratifications by the Russian Duma and the Belarus Assembly. It provided for political union of the two, creating a single political entity. Whether the Treaty laid down a proto Eurasian Union remains to be seen.

The European Union (EU) announcement in 2008 of its Eastern Partnership Programme (EPP) may also have inspired the Russian drive towards reintegration of the Eurasian space. The EPP was initiated to improve political and economic relations between the EU and six “strategic” post-Soviet states — Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine — in the core areas of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, the promotion of a market economy, and sustainable development.² There was much debate over whether to include Belarus, whose authoritarian dictatorship disqualified it. The eventual invitation to Belarus was the concern over an excessive Russian influence in that country.

The US plan to deploy the NATO missile defence system in Poland and Czech Republic was already a source of concern for the Russians. China was emerging

¹ The Kazakh people like to point out that Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan Nazabaev was the first leader to propose the Eurasian Union in 1994. Chinara Esengul, “Regional Cooperation”, March 27, 2012. <http://www.asiathways-adbi.org/2012/03/does-the-eurasian-union-have-a-future/>

² Kambiz Behi and Daniel Wagner, “Russia’s Growing Economic Influence in Europe and beyond”, 23 July 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kambiz-behi/russias-growing-economic-influence_b_1696304.html

as a serious player in the region through its heavy investments in energy and infrastructure. The Russian determination to keep the post-Soviet states away from the US, the EU and China made the Eurasian project a priority in its foreign policy. The Treaty between Russia and Belarus intended to keep the latter into the Russian fold.¹

EURASIANISM: THE IDEA

Eurasianism as an idea predates the Soviet Union. The Russian identity has been contested by the Occidentalists, the Slavophiles and the Eurasianists. The latter claim Russia as the core of the Eurasian civilization. Today, the former Soviet states accept the Russian centrality but not the core-periphery division bet Russia and the rest.

Within Russia itself, the Eurasianists always considered the Soviet Union to be a Greater Russia. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Eurasian political project is to reunite the Russians from the former Soviet territories and ultimately to establish a Russian state for all the Russians. Aleksander Dugin is an ideologue and activist for neo-Eurasianism in Russia. His political activities are directed at restoring the Soviet space and unification of the Russian-speaking people. The South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity is a sworn Eurasianist himself and eager to make his country a part of Russia.

ORGANIZATION AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), the governing body of the EES is set up in Moscow for the time being. Kazakhstan has already staked its claim to host its permanent headquarters. The formula under which the 350-member body would be filled allots Russians 84 percent of staff, the Kazakhs 10 percent and the Belarusians a mere 6 percent. The formula has been worked out on the basis of the population in the three countries. The expenses towards accommodation and infrastructure would be borne by Russia.

The EEC will be eligible to make decisions with regard to customs policies, as also the issues relating to macro-economics, regulation of economic competition, energy policy, and financial policy. The Commission will also be involved in government procurement and labour migra-

¹ On 30 September 2011, Belarus withdrew from the EU initiative citing discrimination and substitution of the founding principles. Three days thereafter, it refuted its decision to withdraw. The EU-Russia competition was obviously at work in quick turnarounds in Belarusian position.

tion control.² The right of the EEC to sign contracts on behalf of all of them is contested.

The Supreme Eurasian Union Council will be the apex body of the group. The vice- premiers of the three countries would be leading their countries' delegations in this body. There are differing opinions on the powers of its apex body.

Eurasian Union is an economic grouping. Its objective is to expand markets and rebuild some of the manufacturing chains destroyed by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus had set the process toward this goal and the Eurasian Union is a continuation of the same process.³

The EEC has made some progress, in the meantime. It has simplified the trade rules, eliminated border customs and facilitated free movement of goods, services and capital. It has also encouraged migration of labour among its signatories. The trade among the three is estimated to have gone up by forty percent last year alone. Russia has benefitted from cheaper products and labour force from the rest of the two and several hundred Russian enterprises have re-registered in Kazakhstan to avail cheaper tax rates. Kazakhs and Belarusians have found a large market for their products in Russia.

Major hurdles still remain. A common currency has not been agreed to. The pace of economic integration is yet another point of debate among the three. Belarus would not be comfortable with market integration, which would require economic reforms. Eventually, the economic reforms could lead to political reforms and even changes in political system. Belarus is least prepared for such an eventuality.

RUSSIA, BELARUS AND KAZAKHSTAN

Within Russia, the Eurasianism still holds an appeal; and not just among the marginal groups. The Eurasian Union is perceived as an expression of Eurasianism that would lead to the state of Russia for all Russians. There are calls to invite countries like Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Finland and even China and Mongolia to join the Eurasian Union. At the leadership level, Putin may

² Retrieved from news.mail.ru and kremlin.ru in Russian. Quoted in Wikipedia, "Eurasian Union".

³ The Customs Union came into existence on 1 January 2010. Removing the customs barriers among them, the countries took the first step towards economic integration.

also prefer ruling over an expanded space encompassing the entire or most of the former Soviet territory.

The Russian *raison d'état* for the Eurasian Union cannot be traced to such feelings alone. The missionary zeal to reach out to the neighbours involves subsidizing them. As a general rule, economic integration must necessarily involve mutual benefits for all the parties — even when the benefits are not in equal measure. An economic arrangement does not only eliminate tariffs and other restrictive trade barriers among the signatories, it also formulates and implements tariffs and trade barriers against the non-signatories. Facilitating trade among themselves and restricting trade with the outsiders is the dual track of any economic group.

As regional integration proceeds in much of the world (not just through the EU but also via NAFTA, ASEAN and Washington's proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership, among others), the post-Soviet space remains largely on the sidelines. A lack of horizontal trading links and isolation from global markets contribute to the region's persistent underdevelopment. By reorienting members' economies to focus on the post-Soviet space, a Eurasian Union would create new barriers between member states and the outside world.¹ Russia is particularly worried about the Chinese forays into its neighbourhood. And the EU Eastern Partnership Programme threatens to encroach into the space that Moscow considers its own sphere of influence.

A second powerful reason for Russia to reach out to its neighbors is that the neighbors are steadily making Russia their home. The influx of migrants from the former Soviet territories has generated a lot of resentment and will soon become a serious political issue. In the circumstances, helping to improve the economic situation beyond the Russian borders and assimilate the new arrivals in a common citizenship is being considered. The then president Dmitry Medvedev explicitly linked the issue of immigrants to the expansion of the state borders. He spoke of the time when the giant state had to comprise different nationalities that created "Soviet People". "We should not be shy when bringing back the ideas of ethnic unity. Yes, we are all different but we have common values and a desire to live in a single big state," he said.²

¹ Jeffrey Mankoff, "What a Eurasian Union Means for Washington", *National Interest* <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/what-eurasian-union-means-washington-6821>

² Gleb Bryanski, "Putin, Medvedev Praise Values of the Soviet Union", *Reuters*, 17 November 2011, <http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/11/17/idINIndia-60590820111117>

Russia is not single-mindedly committed to the Eurasian Union. It has initiated and nurtured several other multi-lateral organizations and become a member of scores of others initiated by others. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) consisting of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan³ is one such. So is the Commonwealth of Independent States comprising most of the post-Soviet countries. It is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that is clearly a China-led group. The Quadrilateral Forum comprising Russia, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan is a Russian project.

It has not shied away from making deals with the EU, either. In 2003, it entered into an agreement with the EU to create four common spaces: 1. of freedom, security and justice; 2. cooperation in the field of external security; 3. economy; and 4. research, education and cultural exchange. Since the formalisation of the Customs Union, Putin has insisted that the EU formalise its relations with the Customs Union before a new basic treaty between the EU and Russia could be formalised. At the EU-Russia Summit in June 2012, he also sought the EU support for the Kazakh and Belarusian bids to join the WTO.⁴

Kazakhstan has formulated and pursued a "multivector" foreign policy since independence. It seeks good relations with its two large neighbours as also with the West. Its operational idiom, therefore, is "diversify, diversify and diversify".

Its relations with the US are centred on counter-terrorism. In Central Asia, it is now the most favoured US partner in the war on terror. It has welcomed the US-sponsored New Silk Road. The Aktau Sea port is expected to emerge as the capital city on this cross-Caspian Road as the central point for transportation, regional educational cooperation and tourism. The Transportation and Logistics Centre is being developed in the city. Aktau hopes to play a role within the New Silk Road that Samarkand played in the Old Silk Road.⁵

Its relations with Europe are as good. Its bilateral cooperation with the EU dates back to 1999, when

³ In June 2012, Uzbekistan decided to suspend its membership of the CSTO.

⁴ <http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/putin-promotes-eurasian-union-eu-news-513123> "Putin Promotes Eurasian Union at the EU Summit", 5 June 2012

⁵ "Kazakhstan: U S Interest in Global Hub on the Caspian", <http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/kazakhstan-aktau-united-states-caspian-sea-caucasus-trade-afghanistan-silk-road-strategy>

it entered into the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with it. The European Commission has agreed to support its application for membership of the WTO. On 1 January 2010, Kazakhstan became the first post-Soviet state to assume the chairmanship of the 56-member Vienna-based Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its trade with the EU accounts for as much as the trade of all the Central Asian countries put together. France has a trade agreement with it that is worth \$2 billion under which France would help build a space station and cooperate on nuclear development.

It is its close ties — in fact, too close ties — with China that explains its active membership of the Eurasian Union. China's presence in the country is pervasive. In 2005, the Asatu-Alashanku oil pipeline between the two countries went into use. The second stage of the same from Kenkyiak to Kumkol is already in works. A gas pipeline is being discussed. In the same year, China bought Petrokazakhstan that was the former Soviet Union's largest independent oil company. At \$4.18 billion, it was the largest foreign purchase ever by a Chinese company. In 2009, it gained a stake in the MangistauMunaiGas, a subsidiary of the KazMunaiGas, which is the Kazakh national upstream and downstream operator representing the interests of the state in the petroleum sector. Even as economic ties get stronger, there could be a point of friction between the two regarding the Uighur-based East Turkestan Islamic Movement in the Xinjiang province of China. There are 180,000 Kazakhs of Uighur descent, which is a source of discomfort to China.

Belarus is a landlocked country and dependent on Russia for import of raw materials and export to the foreign markets. Its dependence on Russia is aggravated by the fact that the US has passed the "Belarus Democracy Act", which authorizes funding for pro-democracy Belarusian NGOs and prevents loans to the government. The EU has imposed a visa ban on its president Alexander Lukashenko. Even as the Belarus's dependence on Russia is overwhelming, their bilateral relations have gone through severe frictions. In 2004, there was a gas dispute as Russia stopped the gas supply for six months before a compromise on the price was worked out.

In 2009, the two fought what has come to be called "milk wars". Moscow banned import of Belarusian dairy products, claiming that they did not meet Russian packaging standards, a non-tariff measure allowed

under the common customs code. The disagreement cost Belarus approximately \$1 billion. The real problem was that Belarusian farmers were heavily subsidized, meaning that the cost of milk production in Belarus was substantially lower than that in Russia. As a result, Russian dairy producers were on the verge of bankruptcy and looked to their government for support. In response to Russian action, Belarus introduced a ban on the purchase of Russian agricultural machinery, accusing Russia of not providing leasing for Belarusian tractors (a major source of income for Belarus).¹

DESTINATION UKRAINE?

Ukraine is the *raison d'être* for the entire Eurasian project, according to many. "Once past the verbal hype, it becomes clear that in fact it [Eurasian Union] has nothing to do with Eurasia and has everything to do with a single country, which, incidentally, is situated in Europe of all places: Ukraine," according to an analyst.² Its key task is to draw Kiev into the integration project.

The primary reason for Russian stake in Ukraine is the Ukraine-Russia-Turkmen gas pipeline. Till the break-up of the Soviet Union, it was a domestic grid. Today, the gas trade between Turkmenistan, Russia and Ukraine is not just a commercial proposition, but an illustration of triangular dependencies of the three countries. The key issues in terms of transit are that all Turkmenistan's gas exports outside Central Asia pass through Russia, which puts the latter in complete control of around three-quarters of Turkmenistan's exports. Russia's position vis-à-vis Ukraine is extremely vulnerable in that more than ninety percent of its gas exports to Europe pass through that country.

Thus, Ukraine is the transit point as well as the choke point of the Turkmen and Russian exports. It has also been a leaking point of the deliveries. In early 1990s, there were serious disruptions as Ukraine pilfered the gas for its own domestic use. Since then the gas deliveries have become an important issue in the political and security relationship between Russia and Ukraine, having featured in the package of agreements which have included issues such as the future of the Black Sea Fleet and Ukrainian nuclear weapons. There was a serious stand-off between the two in 2009, when

¹ Behi and Wagner, n. 2

² Fyodor Lukyanov, *gazeta.ru*. 17 September 2012. Quoted in <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/opinion/9548428/eurasian-union-explanation.html>

the Russians cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine over price dispute. A compromise was reached only after Ukraine agreed to pay more for the gas that was, till then, subsidised.¹

The second most important Russian stake in Ukraine is that Ukraine's Crimea peninsula hosts a Russian navy base whose lease term was extended for twenty-five years in 2010 by a special agreement between Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Viktor Yanukovich, despite an unresolved gas dispute. This facility provides Moscow with strategic military capabilities in an area that Russia once considered crucial for the security of its southwestern borders and its geopolitical influence near the "warm seas."² In return for the extension of the lease, Russia agreed to a thirty percent drop in the price of natural gas it sold to Ukraine.

A third reason for Russian interest in Ukraine could be that the latter represents a promising market of 45 million potential consumers, in the context where Russia seeks to diversify its own economy and export destinations.

Russian diplomacy to retain control over Ukraine and the US diplomacy to extend its control over the same have repeatedly to come to a clash. Till recently, Ukraine was pointedly excluded from both the EU and the NATO expansions³; as also from the list of possible invitees. Since the "Orange Revolution", the situation has radically changed. How the energy pipeline politics plays out in the changed circumstances remains to be seen.

For its part, Ukraine has not closed its options between the EU and the Eurasian Union. Its prime minister Mykola Azarov, speaking at a meeting to discuss "Ukraine at the Crossroads: The EU and/or the Eurasian Union: Benefits and Challenges" said, "Ukraine has never contrasted one economic organization with the other and we cannot do that from many points of view. We are in 'between' and we must have friends both here and there."⁴

¹ The Ukrainian prime minister at that time, Yulia Tomashenko, has since been sentenced to seven years in prison for abusing the authority and signing the deal.

² Georgiy Voloshin, "Russia's Eurasian Union: A Bid for Hegemony?"; <http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russias-eurasian-union-a-bid-for-hegemony-4730>

³ Putin was reported to have declared at the NATO-Russian Summit in 2008 that if Ukraine were to join the NATO, he would consider annexing the Eastern Ukraine and Crimea in retaliation.

⁴ <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/azarov-ukraine-never-contrasted-eu-with-eurasian-u-1-127756.html> Kyivpost, 17 May 2012.

Conclusions

There is no Eurasian Union today. And yet, it has been the subject of intense scholarly scrutiny as also of prescriptive analysis. Its future membership, the direction of its evolution and the gamut of its activities must remain speculative in the meanwhile.

In lieu of the final conclusions, some tentative recapitulation of the above is in order. The Russians aim to retain the former Soviet space within their own sphere of influence, seeking to diminish the US, Chinese and the EU presence out of it to the extent possible. The Kazakhs are keeping all their options open: seeking a central role in the US-sponsored war on terror and the New Silk Road, permitting pervasive Chinese presence in their economy, promoting bilateral and institutional ties with the EU, and becoming a member of the Eurasian Union. "Diversify" is the name of the Kazakh game. Belarus is landlocked and dependent on Russia for its trade exports and imports, and the Belarus president is persona non grata in much of the West. Under the circumstances, the Eurasian Union is a solution to much of its problems.

Ukraine has signed a Memorandum of Understanding on trade cooperation with Eurasian Economic Commission. Much will depend on whether and when Ukraine decides to join the Eurasian Union.

ANALYSIS OF POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA'S OIL & GAS PIPELINE ISSUES

Vladislav V. Savin
Cherng-Shin Ouyang

Post-Soviet Central Asia is one of the new frontiers in world geological survey and mineral development¹. Boasting huge hydrocarbon potentials, it offers enormous appeal to global players, both for countries adjacent to the Caspian Sea and far beyond. According to British Petroleum data (BP, 2009), proved oil reserves of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, totaled 48.0 bbl (billion barrel), or 6.4 mmt (million metric tonnes) at the end of 2008, or 3.80% of the world's known reserve; that of natural gas totaled 12.55 tcm (trillion cubic metres) or 6.8% of the world. Kazakhstan, respectively, Turkmenistan are distinguished by much higher R/P ratios and hence brighter prospect in oil and natural gas production than most traditional exporters of the world².

Notwithstanding, it is one thing to exercise command over new found wealth after independence, but quite another to forge an effective energy development strategy, taking into account geographically awkward position of Central Asian countries as landlocked and wavering status between vassal and sovereign states, shifting market as well as power relations. To simplify exposition, in what follows Central Asian geopolitical and energy game could be divided into two phases (Round-I and -II), taking 9/11 as the date for demarcating the chain of interactive events that unfold overtime. The New Great Game in the region differs from the old one of the 19th century, as it involves more actors, more objects are under focus, and it is also geographically more extended. This New Great Game, after the emergence of the "Arab spring" 2011, becomes even quasi-chaotic, which nevertheless didn't change its two-tiers nature.

HISTORY, GEOPOLITICS, AND PIPELINE MAPPINGS

Retrospectively, Central Asia was home to the legendary Silk Road and an unending stream of tumultuous, complex, and fascinating history. In the last millennium, recurrent waves of warring nomads of diverse origins conquered the vast Eurasia steppes, established Khanates, then perished in perpetual cycle. This had been taking place and at times involving the more stable civilizations bordering Central Asia — be it Chinese, Persian, or Arabian — till the end of 19th century when

¹ Post-Soviet Central Asia is generally considered as the region comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In this study Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are not considered as they are both resource poor and disconnected with the region's pipelines system. Azerbaijan, on the other side, will be taken up due to the significant part it plays in both production and Europe-bound pipeline transportation of oil and natural gas.

² The R/P ratio is a common measure showing the "resource abundance" / "resource scarcity"; it is reserves that remain divided by annual production in a given year, the result is the number of years remaining reserves would last (provided production continues at current rate). At yearend 2008, Kazakhstan's R/P of oil stood at 70, against world average of 42, and Turkmenistan's natural gas more than 100 against 37.4 of the world's average. As will be discussed in main text, estimated reserve of the single largest find of the last three decades in the world — Kashagan oilfield of Kazakhstan — tops 13 bbl. With ongoing prospecting and mining of hydrocarbon deposits, the recoverable crude is bound to increase in Kazakhstan as well in other countries in the region.



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imperial Russia took hold of the whole region. At that time, from Khiva to Bukhara, one after the other all Khanates fell into the hands of the economically and militarily more advanced Russia¹, and only upon breakup of the Soviet Union did history start to reset the button of power and market relations of Eurasia. But the world scene has already been radically transformed concomitant with marked reshuffling of the Caspian energy map. Unlike, however, the century-spanning classical rivalry between the Russian empire and the British empire in and around Afghanistan (see e.g. (Johnson, 2006) & (Meyer & Brysac, 2006)), now there are basically four poles — named as “first tier” countries — joking for supremacy: Russia, China, USA and EU, whereas the Central Asian republics play host for the new Great Game ((Weitz, 2006), (Walsh, 1993)). Together with selected west Caspian (and/or Caucasus) transit hubs they are named as “second tier” countries.


Central Asia has abundant natural resources (i.e. hydrocarbons) but the region's place in the middle of Eurasia has created problems for marketing and transporting them. In fact, the two problems are one and the same: to overcome “isolation” and thus economic backwardness of the region it is necessary to build not only transport networks that facilitate trade but also to build it in ways that optimize transnational trade flows. So, in Central Asia, the situation is more complicated, than can be adduced from purely engineering considerations (i.e. constructing oil & gas pipelines²).

From the standpoint of transport logistics (let's speak from here on about pipelines), there is no easy route linking Caspian oil and gas with maritime shipping lanes leading to world major consumers (US, EU, China). To head directly west necessitates either skirting the Caspian, greatly increasing the length of any pipeline, or building underwater pipeline, which greatly increases the cost of the project, not to mention the fact that, for nearly two decades, division of the Caspian seabed has been under heated dispute among its five littoral states (see Figure 1). Heading east towards the Pacific Ocean is technically feasible (and since 2009 the gas pipeline Central Asia — China (CACGP) from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and since 2005

the oil pipeline Kazakhstan — China (KCP) are functioning), but there is well over 10,000km of distance to travel which raises the question of commercial viability. Running southeast towards the Indian Ocean through also feasible means traversing the Hindu Kush mountains of the war-torn Afghanistan.

Next comes the question of changes in the spatial setting of pipelines. Within the unified space of the former Soviet Union construction of Eurasian pipelines was primarily an issue of technical feasibility, balancing regional development against internal politics. By contrast, in post-Soviet Central Asia there is not a single rule-setting authority but a multiplicity of decision-making centers corresponding to the number of sovereign states in the region; their interests and preferences do not necessarily converge. Second, mapping of pipelines tends to be strongly influenced by outside forces, predominantly

Figure 1: Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian Sea Area
Source: “Storm in a Precious Teacup,” *The Economist*, August 2 cit. based on <http://www.payvand.com/news/09/sep/1102.html>



¹ See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Central_Asia, last modified on 9 April 2013.

² Depending on the types of trade flows there is a wide range of modes of transport to be selected. For oil and natural gas, pipeline is generally considered as the most secure and efficient mean, especially for long haulage, overland delivery volume of which exceeds certain threshold level and lasts over an extended time-horizon.

the quadrilateral poles formed of the US, the European Union, Russia, and China as well as the enterprises originating wherefrom, respectively.

Vying for control over the planned routes of pipelines much as geopolitical superiority, US-led "western" giants (US and EU) have established an united front for continuous advance into the Caspian, on top of what they have already mustered in the last century. Their strategic rival in this context emerged to be the Sino-Russian partnership which — based on common strategic goals — seeks to withstand if not to expel the incursion of any other power in the region. But there is no lack of scope for reconciliation and collaboration between all four poles with regard to specific issues as there is potential for conflicts among US and EU, and among Russia and China. As such the pipeline "power" game is characterized by a spectrum of competitive-cooperative relations among the poles and local actors hosting the game.

Thirdly, through a much broader perspective, the order of priority of promising pipelines to be built shifts in accordance with changes in regional tensions, world energy market, interstate power, climate, etc. Resurgence of the dual threat—pan-Islamism (Amineh, 2002) and pan-Turkism (Wang, 1998) — combined with cross territorial claims in post-Soviet Central Asia also pose challenge to the construction of transnational pipelines (ICG, 2002). Even if the sources of tensions are quashed, each country through which a pipeline passes can still obstruct the flow for any reason — from (geo)political to (geo)economic. In order to build cross-border pipelines, treaties and agreements must be signed and financial arrangements made, often with numerous interest groups competing. Signing such agreements involves two or more governments which is again politically sensitive, as may be exemplified by the sanctions imposed by the U.S. on Iran in 1996 and later (Katzman, 2009). In consequence EU failed to incorporate the most lucrative Iranian reserves into the proposed Nabucco gas project (Reuters, 2009). Complicating the matter further, pipelines are usually built by consortiums of governments and oil companies, and the views of Public do not always match those of Private.

As an offshoot of the territorial disputes, controversy over the legal rights to the Caspian and its seabed is equally disturbing. The respective claims (Bahman, 2009) over the seabed mineral wealth comes down actually to whether the Caspian should be classified as a lake or a sea (Oxmen, 1986) under the United Nation's

Convention on the Law of the Sea. As a lake, each littoral state would be entitled to an exclusive zone for a distance counting from the coast of the state in question to where it meets with the respective claims of adjacent countries—as defined by the "modified median principle" (MDF), the center of the Caspian would be a shared zone for all littoral states. If declared a sea, the entire Caspian would be divided up according to each state's length of coastline. In general, Russia and Iran consider it as a lake; Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan prefer a sea definition, while Turkmenistan's attitude is indecisive. According to estimates, Kazakhstan owns the largest share of seabed (30%), which is located mainly in the fossil-rich north Caspian, followed by Azerbaijan (20%), Russia (20%), Turkmenistan (17%), and Iran (13%) (Bahman, 2006). The differences in the outcome in dividing Caspian seabed between equal share- and MDF-principles are shown in Figure 1.

COUNTRY POSITIONS SURVEY

Russia: Historically, Central Asian oil and gas flowed through Russian pipelines. Keeping this arrangement intact, as Moscow always wanted, means that Russia will receive sizable transit fees, attain price markup by reselling the fuels it buys from Central Asia to third countries through Russian or Russia controlled pipelines, as well as have more oil and gas with which to secure greater leverage in international politics. Yet Russia's energy strategy in Central Asia is an integral part of that instituted and implemented globally, both have undergone significant changes in the context of radical economic restructuring in the last two decades. Over the same period, the fundamental rationales — under which activities of Russia's domestic energy sector are organized — two diametrically-opposed phases stand out: that of decentralized neo-liberalism in Yeltsin's Russia, neglecting broadly the resource-rich Central Asia, and the phase of renationalization emphasizing state control of all strategic sectors¹, notably oil and natural gas, during Putin's reign. In parallel, there were two major events which strongly shaped Kremlin's energy strategy on Central Asia and the world: the 9/11-event and the sudden and persistent upsurge of world oil price since 2003 as the watershed triggering Kremlin's determination to reclaim its traditional sphere of influence.

¹ To safeguard Russia's geopolitical and national economic interest, Vladimir Putin pushed hard for reconsolidating federal power on strategic sectors only towards the end of his first-term presidency.

It may be noted, in the first place, that after Soviet Union dissolution the centre-periphery relation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has changed from one based on hierarchy to that of equal partners. But Kremlin's aspiration in keeping Central Asia as its traditional sphere of influence hardly dissipates. The upheavals that took place on and after 9/11 have sent shockwaves across the world and broke the delicate balance of power also in Central Asia. To uproot the Taliban that supposedly sheltered Osama bin Laden — the necessary villain held as having set ablaze the WTC twin towers in New York leaving a pile of ashes behind — Bush-junior declared the so called "war on terror" and launched full-scale attack on Afghanistan without delay¹. Massive buildup of military facilities and airspace bases in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan resumed, after the US-led invasion and occupation of Afghanistan back in 1997. Russia as a supreme arbiter of all ex-Soviet affairs began to feel the impinge as never before — especially in its vulnerable South. Perception of increased security threats has reinforced Kremlin's determination to draw a bottom line: firstly, to maintain Russia's relative geopolitical superiority in the thinly-veiled new Central Asian Great Game waged by US, and secondly to defend and expand the energy base of Russia's economy in Central Asia and the Caspian, insofar as the energy complex is the paramount muscle-building machine of Russia, and thirdly, Russian oil and gas monopolists believed that it would be better to "allow" the delivery of energy resources to China than to "break" the delivery monopoly towards Europe through Russian territory or pipelines controlled by Russia; the Eastern direction of exports of Central Asian resources did not violate the transportation monopoly of resources through Russia in a westerly direction. The objectives are interconnected: revival of Russia's power and prestige are conditional upon control of Central Asia's underground mineral wealth much as enhanced geo-economic lever would be instrumental in securing access to energy and mapping of the Central Asian pipeline network.

Moscow's main political goal is to maintain a wide range of influence in the former Soviet Republics, which it labels as "near abroad" ("ближнее зарубежье"). In

¹ "War against terrorism? Not really. Reminder: it's all about oil". So contends (Escobar, 2002). "It's no coincidence" the author continues, "that the map of terror in the Middle East and Central Asia is practically interchangeable with the map of oil". In fact, the Afghan war was decided long before 9/11; September 11 merely precipitated events. The object was the golden future portrayed by "pipelineistan": the US\$5 trillion of oil and gas in the Caspian and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.

addition to build and institutionalize relations with Central Asian political leaders, Russian government also employs legal and commercial means deemed necessary (a) in ensuring that Russian firms participate in developing the region's natural resources and that Central Asian oil and gas exporters continue to use Russian pipelines, (b) in minimizing the involvement of US and European companies in joint ventures formed with their Central Asian counterparts, (c) in scaring off potential competitors by announcing or constructing alternative pipelines conducive to Russia dominated overland energy transport², (d) in splitting "western" power through energy diplomacy thus augmenting the energy dependence of the European Union upon Russia and less on the US, (e) as a complement to (d) in fostering selective bilateral ties with Central Asian governments within the setting of comprehensive multilateral security umbrella³ and so on.

Apart from the above, there are also events of force majeure in origin with outcomes that neutralize endeavor aiming at divert energy transport routes away from Russia. The 5-day conflict in 2008 over the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia revealed the insecurity of the transit corridor through Georgia with detrimental effects on Central Asia's balanced diplomacy initiative (Vlassov, 2008) and on Kazakhstan's pipedream (Kassenova, 2009) of which as a result the collective endeavor to chart westbound crude export corridor — the Kazakhstan Caspian Transport System (KCTS) — other than the Russian controlled routes suffered, due to the incalculable investment and transport risks involved⁴.

² To strengthen its grip on European gas markets and head off a US-backed pipeline project, Nabucco, that would bypass Russia, Moscow wants to use "North Stream", the 1200 km twin pipeline that would carry a total of 55 bcm from Russia's port of Vyborg to the German port of Greifswald. Construction of the euro 7.4 billion started in 2010, with the first pipeline ready for delivery in 2011. This pipeline is built without crossing Ukraine and Poland, the transit countries with which Moscow has had odds for years over Russian gas destined for the European market. For example, in January 2009 Moscow cut off gas supply via Ukraine for two weeks and caused uproar. A mirror project "South Stream" will be built as a rival to ward off Nabucco. See (Rising, 2009).

³ Several regional organizations have been formed which include: militarily — the "Collective Security Treaty Organization" (CSTO), economically — the "Eurasian Economic Community" (EurAsEc), and the functionally more hybrid "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" (SCO) in which China takes part as the key condominium partner.

⁴ Russian controlled routes include the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) connecting Tengiz oil field with the Black Sea terminal Novorossiysk, the onshore pipeline Prikaspiyskiy, and the planned South Stream.

At present, Russian firms and business groups control much of the transportation infrastructure for Central Asia's oil, gas, and electricity towards north and west. Lukoil, Gazprom, Transneft and Inter-RAO-EES have invested heavily in various energy production and transportation projects in Central Asia. The abrupt cutoff in January 2006 of Russian natural gas deliveries to Ukraine — to force a price rise — demonstrates how the Russian government can use its control over these enterprises to curtail oil and especially gas deliveries from both Russia and Central Asia to recalcitrant purchasers. Since then disruptions in the Euro-bound gas pipeline have caused alarm to entities on both ends of the supply chain and those in between. Along the chain all parties are concerned with energy security but the term has different meaning to those affected, whether they act as exporter, importer, transit country, or a combination of the above, respectively.

Russia, unifying all the above three roles in one, would be strongly motivated to buy oil and natural gas from the Central Asian producers, resell at large mark-up price to distant consumers in Europe and Asia. For the European importers Russia can also exploit its pipeline monopoly to prevent supplier countries from exporting energy products, as Gazprom did in 1997 with Turkmenistan's natural gas. Even the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline which bypasses Russian territory, is unlikely to threaten the political and economic influence Russia derives from its pivotal role in Central Asia's energy networks directed towards Europe. Although Russia's diminished economic and military resources make it unlikely that it will soon recover the hegemonic status Moscow enjoyed in Central Asia during the Soviet era, there is a variety of instruments which may be employed to promote its regional objectives and to remain the most important actor in the Greater Central Asian region.

China: Being one of the four poles, China made a powerful entry onto Brzezinski's "grand chessboard" (Brzezinski, 1998), together with other world majors in oil and gas business since the early 1990s'. The heartland of the keenly-contested chessboard is Central Asia. Chinese government first saw opportunities in the geopolitical vacuum left over by Kremlin, but soon realized that it had to confront the resurgence of competing interests of regional actors: such as Turkey and Iran, — and growing American presence (Bates & Oresman, 2003). However, US involvement in the region has not been viewed entirely skeptically. For example, in the eyes of Beijing and Moscow "war on terror" launched by Bush-

junior after 9/11 coincides with one of the expressed aims of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) co-chaired by the two, in particular to fight "extremism, separatism, and terrorism" in Eurasia, but that is perhaps the only common ground they share with Washington. For the rest, principally the US "monopoly in world affairs" (De Haas, 2008), continued intrigue in toppling the Central Asian rulers, in establishing permanent US-military presence in the region¹, in usurping Tbilisi as the frontline anti-Russia platform in South Caucasus, etc.

To compromise the diverse aspirations of major players and their local agents Beijing has taken a measured step centering upon deepening energy as well as economic cooperation with its Central Asian counterparts. Premier Li Pong, on his maiden visits to four Central Asian capitals in April, 1994, coined "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination"² as the hallmark for building friendly relations at two levels, bilateral as well as multilateral. In essence, this and subsequent chains of official statements on regional and world issues are reminiscent of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence" originally set forth by premier Zhou Enlai at the first Conference of Non-Allied Movement convened in 1954 in Bandung, Indonesia³. To silence widespread and largely fabricated fear of "China threat", notably after the new century, Beijing reverted instead to "Peaceful Rise" as the official position on China's development path.

Tempted by lucrative trade with China, Central Asian republics cede increasing mineral rights to China's state-owned enterprises: such as state-owned CNPC and Sinopec, — and agree to build cross-border pipelines (Ong, 2005). To shed light on this topic there are numerous cases meriting close examination. In what follows reference is made only to some limited aspects of the widely-discussed pipeline project Beijing collaborated with Astana.

¹ US-Russia relations are strained over more issues including the deployment of an American missile-defense system in Central Europe and NATO-supported military and political penetration in the Middle East and Northern Africa.

² For details see <http://news.xinhuanet.com>, "Four Guidelines and Six Points".

³ The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence were: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) non-aggression; (3) non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. These were originally derived from talks between Zhou Enlai and Nehru (Geneva) on June 28, 1954, in the signing of a joint statement on the principles on which relations between China and India were to be based. See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asian-African_Conference>.

In 1997 China and Kazakhstan concluded a pact forming the Sino-Kazakh Oil Pipeline Co. Ltd. (KCP), a joint venture between CNPC and KazMunaiGas which had, as its declared goal, a pipeline running from the Caspian Sea to Xinjiang (Xinhua, 2005). The eastern section first started pumping oil in May 2005 from the Kumkol field of the Aktobe region, making it the first pipeline to transmit crude directly into China. On October 27, 2005, China made its first major foray into the Central Asian oil industry when the CNPC purchased the Canadian-based PetroKazakhstan Inc., owner of the Kumkol field (Chinese Embassy, 2005) but China paid well over market value and was forced to sell a third of its holdings in the Kazakh state oil company KazMunaiGaz back to the government as part of the deal (Pala, 2006).

When completed at the end of 2009, the Sino-Kazakh pipeline has ultimately 20 millions ton/year capacity, about 10% of China's total crude imports 2009. Crossing the border at Khorgos the pipeline carries crude to a refinery at Dushanzi 246 km away. KCP was also designed to transport Russian crude, thus laying the base for tri-lateral pipeline cooperation. The question is whether LUKoil, owner of half of North Kumkol's exploration and production license acquired from the Kazakhstani government in 1995, would use "oil weapon" to further state interest. By the end of 2006 LUKoil managed to own the legal rights of the entire area of Kumkol North after first using litigation to drain CNPC tens of millions of dollars. Russia's geopolitical lever matters for China for two reasons: first, Kumkol field is the primary local supply source feeding the Atasu — Alashankou pipeline (i.e. prior to completion of the entire KCP running from the shore of Caspian to China); second, the Shymkent (or Chimkent) refinery that is associated with the Kumkol field is connected to the Soviet-era Omsk-Pavlodar pipeline, officially named as Central Pipeline Consortium/CPC, controlled by Russia's Transneft. This means that Transneft combined with LUKoil have the option to regulate the volume of crude movement between CPC and KCP (Marten, 2007). After all Russia did not oppose the construction of the "Sino-Kazakh Pipeline" (Sheives, 2006) virtually because it has only symbolic meaning not palatable damage on its grip on Central Asian pipeline. On the other hand, Washington saw China's advance as a threat but less harmful as long as it reduces Russia's domination on pipeline¹.

¹ Interview of the US ambassador in Kazakhstan (2004-2008) John M. Ordway, see <http://www.usembassy.kz>.

Dismissing conceivable Russian sabotage, at bilateral level, the major advantage accruing to both Kazakhstan and China may be seen in the fact that: a) KCP provides a direct transport route between two neighbors devoid of border disputes (completely resolved in 1997); b) there is no charge on transit fees; c) no third country can hold Kazakhstan's oil hostage by arbitrarily raising fees or blocking the pipeline; d) Kazakhstan is guaranteed a reliable export outlet for its superabundant oil reserve much as China a stable supply to sustain its high growth momentum. Nevertheless, there are minor disadvantages as well. On this pipeline China acts as a monopsony; the majority of the oil comes from the Caspian fields or even the massive Kashagan field, a high-pressure field with large quantities of poisonous hydrogen sulfide located in the shallow northern Caspian Sea which freezes in winter (EIU, 2007, p. 28), so China could not avoid the temptation of pressing prices down. On the other side also Kazakh government, having regained majority control on Kashagan from the ex-operator Agip KCO led by the Italian company ENI, is free to mediate oil flows to China at buyer's risks. The majority of the other Caspian fields such as Tengiz, owned by TengizChevroil, a joint venture between the Kazakh government and Chevron, might be under pressure to sell its crude through American-sponsored BTC or via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), of which it is also a shareholder (Fishelson, 2007). For both Beijing and Astana, the interesting question to ask would be whether their "strategic partnership" can survive insecurity consciousness, especially for Astana.

Sino-Kazakh energy cooperation has been taking place according to the terms set out in the official framework agreement, coordinated by enterprises of the two countries responsible for project initiation and execution. In reality pure bilateralism may not stand on its own. Astana prefers seeing all encroaching powers, China included, play off against each other, so as to withstand being taken hostage or save the transaction costs required in warding off potential external security threat. Irrefutably, to unravel what could lie behind the Kazakhstan's balanced "multi-vector diplomacy" tight conceptual scrutiny² is called for. As a mirror image, incoming powers may also intentionally balance out their own influence with each other into a multilateral cooperative-competitive framework. In theory, this

² But as (Vlassov, 2008) states, "Playing on the contradictions between major players is possible only when all the participants in the game follow the same code of rules. Any aggravation inevitably leads to chaos and to dropping clear principles of interaction, and this may deal a blow to Tashkent, Baku and Astana that have grown unaccustomed to force majeure situations".

presupposes that the collective positive gain would be greater provided neither of the two (Russia and China) adopts interest maximizing energy diplomacy disregarding the interests of its competitor¹.

On natural gas, China has separately and jointly reached agreement with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in building cross-border pipeline. The result is the "Sino-Turkmenistan" pipeline or more accurately the "Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline" (CACGP). The project was first discussed between Chinese President Hu Jintao with his Kazakh counterpart on his visit to Astana in June 2003, joined by framework agreement signed with Turkmenistan (2006) for long-term gas supply and pipeline construction, and with Uzbekistan for (2007) on building the Uzbek section of the pipeline².

USA: Twenty years after the end of Cold War, the United States is still the lone superpower capable of striking at remote villages anywhere around the globe. It is also in disposal of considerable political and economic leverage in shaping world financial market, charting borderlines, redrawing the energy map and pipelines, etc. However, onto the southern fringe of Central Asia and Caucasus—the vulnerable underbelly of Russia — it has met resistance; the shared perception of security threat posed by the US has prompted Beijing and Moscow to coordinate their policies with local allies. Sharpening standoff among the quadrilateral poles surfaced as a result, attended by the interplay of a multiplicity of second-tier powers of varying mindset in Eurasia. In geopolitical terms, policy makers in Washington were unambiguous in their support for building multiple pipelines for Caspian oil and gas and for supporting American energy groups playing a significant role in the

¹ According to the logic of Cournot competition (see e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cournot_competition) — that could be easily used not only for producing firms, but also for oil consuming countries — the players (firms, buyers, states etc.) have an incentive to tacitly collude, effectively turning the consumer Cournot model into a monopoly.

² On 30 August 2007, the construction of the 188 kilometers long Turkmen section of the pipeline begun. This section was built by Stroytransgaz, a subsidiary of Gazprom. Main contractors were China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau, China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation, and Zeromax. Construction of the Uzbek section started on 30 June 2008. It was built by AsiaTransGas, a joint venture of Uzbekneftegas and CNPC. Construction works of the Kazakh section started on 9 July 2008 and the first stage was finished in July 2009. It was built by Asian Gas Pipeline company, a joint venture of CNPC and KazMunayGas. The main contractors of this section were KazStroyService and China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation. The first of two parallel lines was completed early November 2009 and the second line was completed by the end of 2010.

Caspian. The strategic goals which propel growing US presence in the region are self-evident: to excel in the "collective game" over its rivals, real or imaginary.

With a view to fill up the power vacuum after Russia's unprecedented retreat, U.S. president George Bush and his three successors mounted large scale expansion all the way from Iraq (1990, 2003), Caucasus (1994), Balkan (1997), to South and Central Asia (1997, 2001, 2009), along the crescent-shaped beltway encircling what British political geographer (Mackinder, 1904) dubbed as the "geopolitical pivot of Eurasia"³. The situation didn't change much under the reign of Barack Obama who is prosecuting the same policy, but with "smiling face" and trying to do all the "dirty" jobs with someone else's hands. As the 9/11-event unfolded, overtime Washington's hegemonic design on Central Asia became all the more apparent. The year 2001 witnessed Pentagon's renewed endeavor in smashing Taliban (heralded by Northern Alliance forces) after firstly invaded and occupied Afghanistan back in 1997 (in retaliation of Al-Qaeda's suspect bombing of the American embassy in Kenya and Tanzania (Escobar, 2002)). This and the chain of prior military and diplomatic maneuver ultimately brought the U.S. as a distant maritime power to the gateway of Central Asia. Needless to say, these efforts can be justified only for one reason: the subjective desperate desire to remedy one of its fatal loopholes in accessing energy resources: "geography" (Olcott, 2005, p. 332).

Short of direct military intervention, to attain its strategic goals the U.S. has all measures for subduing the Central Asian rulers. One of the standard practices of the U.S. intelligence services is to sponsor "democratic" reforms through the so-called "color revolutions" in what it sees as authoritarian regimes and replace them with pro-US proxies. Counting on their local agents for navigating regime change is the rule. In so doing it aims also at eliminating the influence of Russia and containing the growth of China (Weitz, 2006, p. 161). The "tulip revolution" in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 was the first to touch the nerve of the ruling house in the region. Other potentially subversive tactics include the use of tying aid, intelligence and military collaboration, media,

³ Geographical Pivot of History was an article submitted by Halford John Mackinder in 1904 to the Royal Geographical Society that advanced his Heartland Theory. According to the theory, "[t]he Heartland lay at the centre of the world island, stretching from the Volga to the Yangtze and from the Himalayas to the Arctic". Mackinder's Heartland was the area ruled by the Russian Empire and then by the Soviet Union, minus the area around Vladivostok. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Geographical_Pivot_of_History.

humanitarian programs, education, NGOs, etc. These are viewed with suspicion to some extent by locals, with aggressive "democracy" promotion regarded as "the greater threat to the region's ruling elites, who fear that they are targets for ouster" (Olcott, 2005, p. 331)¹. But there is one area which receives overwhelming support from Central Asia: pipeline diversification. The answer was the US\$4 Billion, 1,760 km BTC oil pipeline.

"Inaugurated in July 2006 after the project's initial conception in 1999", Piskur (Piskur, 2006) writes, "the BTC is the world's most expensive and second-longest pipeline. It runs through American-ally Azerbaijan and post-"rose revolution" Georgia (both GUAM members), proceeds around Russian ally Armenia, passes near six ongoing or potential war zones, before ending at the Turkish port of Ceyhan, just besides the American airbase at Incirlik" (Escobar, 2006, p. 42ff.)². For natural gas, the U.S. is working hard to ensure that a new transport route — the Nabucco Pipeline — initiated by OMV of Austria and BOTAŞ of Turkey in 2002 will materialize (see Figure 2). Aimed at breaking Russia's monopoly, this equally costly project (estimated at US\$ 12.3 billion, (Reuters, 2008)) is designed to carry natural gas from Shah Deniz field of Azerbaijan to Baumgarten of Austria; it travels over a total length of 3,400 km and trespasses six countries en route. Nabucco is rated highly by the European Union for two reasons: on the one hand, it is a diversion from the traditional troublesome Northern route via Ukraine and Poland — which still pumps about 80% of the gas EU imported from Russia — and hence immune from possible disruptions in gas supply to consumers in Europe; on the other, because major gas producers as Iran, Iraq, Turkmenistan, and Egypt

¹ Failure to understand those facts resulted in Tashkent (with SCO support) imposing, in July 2005, a six-month deadline on the US to leave the Kashi-Khanabad (K2) airbase in Uzbekistan. That was following "the United States' critical response to the Uzbek government's excessive use of force to suppress a violent uprising in the city of Andijan in May 2005", which was "the final straw that broke the back of U.S.-Uzbek relations". See (Rumer, 2006).

² Piskur (Piskur, 2006) continues "[t]he BTC pipeline was designed to challenge Russian hegemony over energy in the Caspian Sea region". For that reason, it bypasses competing (but cheaper, safer and more practical) routes through Russia and Iran. Because the BTC "doesn't make much sense in economic terms" (Escobar, 2006, p. 46), or security terms for that matter, it is a perfect example of where the line between economics, security and geopolitics begin to blur in Central Asia.

may be included as new sources of supply³. But so far the outlook of this project is not entirely clear; "western" powers (EU and US) have been unable to organize a united front capable of withstanding the multifaceted pressure from Moscow. U.S. vulnerability, in particular, may be accessed through several perspectives.

Back to the game Round-II (time after 9/11)⁴, it is worth noting that the lack of an integrated framework under US leadership to combat terrorism has compelled the U.S. to rely exclusively on bilateral ties, therefore limiting the scope of region-wide cooperation (Rumer, 2006, p. 150). Revolting against NATO's presence, during the SCO summit in 2005, Russia and China helped nudge Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to demand that the North-Americans close their Afghan-supplying bases in each country. Uzbekistan followed through, kicking the US out of K2 base, but Kyrgyzstan let the US stay at Manas. Sensing that the SCO was gathering traction, Washington had sought observer status at its summit meeting in July 2006, but was turned down. The SCO has also been employed by its members, and its observers (Iran), as a forum to criticize the U.S. foreign policy, especially regarding democracy promotion and missile defense systems in Eastern Europe. Needless to say, the Sino-Russian partnership, the growing importance of the SCO and its consolidating control over Central Asian energy policy is deeply worrying political leaders in Washington⁵. Nevertheless, the United States have still made significant incursions into Central Asian geopolitics and geoeconomics.

At the energy level, the Russia wasted no time in leveling counter-attack to both the BTC pipeline and the planned

³ Understandably, Azerbaijan does not have enough gas to feed the pipeline; to make Nabucco commercially viable it is necessary to fill up the pipe with input from other supplier. Recent estimates of the new Yolotan-Osman gas field to between 4 to 14 tcm made by the British auditing firm GCA immediately lifts Turkmenistan's reserve to the fourth place in the world. To the elation of Europe this new find would lessen the tensions among the receiving ends of the Caspian gas and is likely to keep Nabucco afloat (see e.g. (EDM, 2008) & (Cutler, 2009)).

⁴ It is quite possible that outbreak of the "Arab spring" in 2011 signals that the US intelligence is no more interested in the establishment of "their" regimes in the countries of Eurasia, but in creating on the big "chessboard" the maximum possible chaos.

⁵ Nevertheless, the reason US is not overly concerned about the SCO's intentions is because the group lacks cohesion and therefore the strong geo-political and geo-economical capabilities. Next, Russia desires to dominate its former vessels and China wants them as markets, energy supplies. These two goals could clash. Lastly, the tangible presence of NATO and the US in Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, along with its diplomatic ties and financial assistance are out of the control of the SCO.

Nabucco. Various offensive measures have been outlined or undertaken in frustrating the US attempt to dictate the primacy of the transportation route. To the "western" industrialized countries the most provocative agenda ever proposed by Putin's Russia was the creation of an Energy Club within SCO in 2006 and an OPEC-type world gas cartel in 2007 (Blagov, 2007), now called Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). Whereas these do not pose any immediate real threat to energy security of the US, EU, and also China, their undertone is unmistakable: Kremlin is still capable of launching full-scale energy pressure with extensive detrimental consequences: before Medvedev's 4-years lasted "i-phone-mania" Russia's gas giant Gazprom was rapidly consolidating its control on the gas industries in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan.

To summarize, US influence in Central Asia has increased over the last several years but still is very limited in terms of support it receives from local leaders. This may be attributed to the "geopolitical context, the authoritarian nature of the local regimes, cultural norms and historical legacies that are very different from the US and the lack of structures favorable to the penetration of capitalism" (Boyer, 2006, p. 97ff.). It shows, at least in the short, that aggressive democracy promotion in Central Asia would both fail and harm U.S. interests (Weitz, 2006, p. 161). In fact, the lesson learned from the "color revolutions" from Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan is negative. Some authors argue, therefore, that local regimes have used the entrenched bilateral relationship in the "war on terror" by "exaggerating the terrorist threat" to justify "repressive measures" on their population (Boyer, 2006, p. 101f.). The result is counterproductive especially when the issue of power succession is taken into account because it is exactly one of the biggest political challenges to Central Asian leaders since their rise to power (Rumer, 2006, p. 148f.). The possibility of anti-US axis taking place around the Sino-Russian strategic partnership spells out the fact that the lone superpower is unable to achieve its goals on its own, at least if it follows its current approach.

Central Asia States and Azerbaijan: In modern era, the significance of Central Asia may be appraised either from the perspective of geopolitics, or of geoeconomics, or of both. Russia and China, are in a way partially Central Asian states, and both have regions inhabited by Turkic- and Persian-speaking minorities. Geopolitical considerations warrant the inclusion into Greater Central Asia such secondary or peripheral state actors as Afghanistan, Caucasus countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia) and Mongolia, regional powers such as Turkey and Iran

that are culturally and linguistically tied to the region, even India and Pakistan, as the most populous but fossil poor states in the South, could be regarded as partially Central Asian states. Understandably, not all the above listed countries claim significance in both geopolitics and energy supply; further, only a handful of them are thematically linked with and home to the twisted quadrilateral game Round-II (after 9/11-events till now). They are countries of the «second tier». Survey of these selected few continues as below starting with Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan. At the dawn of independence, Kazak President Nazarbayev opted straightforwardly for a "multi-vector" approach in foreign policy stressing diversification in the export outlet of liquid fossil (Nurbekov, 2009). Kazakhstan's leadership in Central Asia and thus ambitions for sovereignty have been boosted by its rich oil and gas reserves. In fact, Astana regards itself as a major regional player, attracts investments, and creates new partnerships for moving crude oil bypassing Russia (EIU, 2006, p. 20). Note in this connection that at the beginning of Kazakhstan's independence, all of its oil was transported to Russia via the transnational CPC (Caspian Pipeline Consortium) pipeline—a decade and a half later, about 80% of its oil goes into the Russian pipeline system, and the rest — to China via the Atasu — Alashankou pipeline. Blueprints on transporting oil to Europe (via the Russian-controlled TBP, Trans-Balkan Pipeline) and to Iran (via Turkmenistan) are under negotiation. Kazakhstan has also declared its intention to export Kashagan oil to BTC after 2013 (EU News, 2009). Parallel plans for transporting gas to Europe (via the Russian-controlled South Stream), to Europe (via the US-controlled Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP)), to Turkey (via South Caucasus Pipeline), and to Russia (via the Russian-controlled Prikaspiyskiy Pipeline for connecting the South Stream) are being discussed as well, where South Stream and TCGP are in direct competition with each other¹.

Turkmenistan. The recently-completed gas pipeline linking Turkmenistan with China clearly indicates that Ashgabat is equally enthusiastic in pushing for market diversification as Astana. Between Nabucco proposed by Austria as an alternative to the Russia's gas pipeline South Stream, President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedow shows some preferences for

¹ See (Kassenova, 2009) for a review of the various pipeline shipping routes from Kazakhstani oil fields.

Nabucco through Azerbaijan¹ and to the Iranian port of Neka. Turkmenistan, as a neutral state guaranteed by UN resolution, adheres consistently to non-alliance principle in foreign policy. In selecting foreign partners for tapping its huge fossil riches and in fixing the routes for export, Ashghabat has adopted the same balanced approach as Astana². These outcomes have thus far kept Moscow in jeopardy, despite that at least in the short-run it remains to be the dominant force in dictating the development of the pipeline system originating from Caspian Central Asia (EIU, 2006, p. 16). For a comparison of the planned route of Nabucco and the South Stream, see Figure 2.

Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, managed to involve more US interests in prospecting and drilling of hydrocarbon resources immediately after independence³. Due to its unique geographical location, Baku has to a large extent been insulated from the frictions between Kremlin and its Central Asian junior brothers on the issue of routing of pipelines⁴. There is also an added advantage, it has accumulated century old experiences in hosting foreign ventures, both on land and offshore, in commercial excavation of oil (Yergin, 1993), thus contributing to rapid depletion of unexplored reserves (EIA, 2009). The newest test of political orientation to Baku is of course Nabucco.

From the viewpoint of transport logistics, whether Nabucco finally emerges, the gate-keeping role of Azerbaijan surely has to be reckoned with. But so far Baku has refrained from making a decision because it is not yet prepared to face possible backlashes from Moscow and Teheran by siding with the US and/or EU. Its reluctance is compounded by the fact that Moscow has proposed a logistically much superior rival pipeline known as South Stream (Gazprom, 2009). Decision

¹ With designed annual capacity of 30bcm, the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline is in every sense of the term a trans-Asian gas pipeline as it traverses the territories of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan before reaching the border town Horgos (Xinjiang). Across the border, TCGP meets China's second "East-West Pipeline", which extends all the way to Shanghai and Guangzhou on the southeast coast of China. This pipeline is the longest pipeline in the world (over 10 tsd km).

² Following a policy of "positive neutrality", Turkmenistan is just an observer state in the CIS, and is not a member of any other post-Soviet organization..

³ Located on the west bank of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan is traditionally the most important transit country along the East-West energy corridor leading to southern Europe through Turkey and the Mediterranean.

⁴ Evicting Russia temporarily before the October Revolution in Russian Empire (1917~20), Azerbaijan was reabsorbed into the Soviet Union and renamed thereafter as Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan.

makers in Baku are caught in a paradox because they always want to strengthen military ties with the US, acquire EU membership, but hardly find it necessary to annoy Moscow. Second, Nabucco, like BTC, is primarily a political undertaking which ranks low commercially compared to the Russian-proposed South Stream (Ismayilova, 2008). Third, the plan to build Prikaspiskiy pipeline, a feeder line linking gas supply of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan with Russia (see e.g. (Gorst, 2007), (Lucian, 2007)), has been formally rectified (Reuters, 2009) as an alternative to the EU-sponsored underwater Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP), (Ismayilov, 2007). Fourth, Moscow repeatedly assures Central Asian exporters it will buy all their gas at market price for delivery through Russia-controlled pipeline to the EU (Bhadrakumar, 2008), the exporters' profits are guaranteed. And finally, Moscow is hinting at possible concession (at least on paper) to Baku's position on the Karabakh conflict, if Azerbaijan modifies the US-orientation of its foreign policy and energy export (EDM, 2008).

Turkey. One equally important actor on the Caspian energy transport corridor is Turkey. For both BTC and Nabucco the role of Turkey as an indispensable transit country is most obvious. Ankara entered into a pipeline transit agreement on Nabucco with the EU in 2009. Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria — designated as transit countries — also signed the agreement after years of delay due to a policy dilemma involving Moscow (Katik, 2006), giving the 7.9 billion euro project a major boost. For Turkey, strengthening its bargaining lever as an energy hub for the EU and enhance its EU membership bid sounds plausible. Nevertheless, no concrete supply deals have yet been signed for Nabucco, which plans to pump 31 bcm to Europe by 2015. So this project still has to face the problem of finding sufficient throughput for the pipeline.

Iran, India, Pakistan: The description of the New Great Game and its two tiers would be not fulfilled, if such countries as Iran, India and Pakistan would not be shortly mentioned.

Iran. Sitting on enormous mine fields Iran owns 15.8% of the world proven gas reserves (29.61 trillion cubic meters). Some geological studies suggest that an extra 9 trillion cubic meters finding to be confirmed. In terms of proven gas reserves, the country takes the 2nd place in the world, yielding only Russia. Iran is also a major natural gas exporter but lack of investments due to US sanctions since 1995 (under Clinton presidency) which

have curtailed both production and export. Yet it belongs to the group of so called "gas energy balance" countries where the share of natural gas in total primary energy consumption is about 50-80%. Surrounded by Caspian Sea, Central Asia, and Persian Gulf, on the hand, and between the principal Eurasian energy consumers (European Union and China) on the other, this country is superbly located both geographically and strategically. The country not only has the possibility of shortest connections to traditional and emerging energy markets, but also can become important transport knot for the Central Asia's gas stream.

India. India is one of world's fastest growing economies at present. Over the last decade India's GDP grew over an annual average of 6~7%. And for the very same reason India takes the fifth place in the world on energy consumption, and by 2030 is expected to consume more than Japan. At the same time India has very small amount of energy resources (end of 2009: 0.4% of world's proven oil reserves, 0.6% of world's proved natural gas). In 2008, Indian Minister of Petroleum and Natural gas signed up for the Turkmenistan gas pipeline — i.e. the "Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India" (TAP or TAPI with Indian participation) — after watching for well over a decade and resisting all inducements to join it, even the blandishments of the US. But so far TAPI looks more like a pipe-dream as anticipated. The same happened to "Iran-Pakistan-India" (IPI) or "Peace Pipeline" (see Fig.2) as well for reasons that are not totally incomprehensible: (a) Delhi is currently developing LNG and nuclear projects at home through Russian technical assistance; (b) India's long, strong alliance with Russia allows for Indian investment in gas blocs in Siberia, such as Sakhalin-I, (c) it has to be careful of the sensitivities of Russia's preference on pipeline options between TAPI and IPI (Latha, 2008); and (d) Indian government also has serious reservations about the viability of TAPI due to differences of opinion on tariffs of gas and transit fees charged, credibility of Turkmenistan's gas reserve, and security of transport through rebel-controlled territories in Afghanistan and Pakistan. So although India has not officially quit the project it is uncertain if the one or the other pipeline will be back on the agenda.

Pakistan. Like India, Pakistan's domestic gas production is falling and import dependence growing tremendously. According to one report, in Pakistan only 60% of households have electricity and 18% access to pipeline gas for heating. Energy demand is expected to increase 250% over the next 20 years. For this reason,

Pakistan is working hard to address the issue. In 2008, President Zardari negotiated with the Chinese on hydel projects in underdeveloped areas of the north. It is in the meantime intent on moving forward with the IPI, IP (without India), or IPC (China replaces India) (see Fig.2) regardless of pressure from the US. As planned, the IPI is expected to run over 2,775 kilometers from the Persian Gulf in Iran, through Baluchistan to a port in Karachi and then north to New Delhi. The gas-pipeline project—the (TAPI) carrying gas from Daulatabad in Turkmenistan via Herat and Kandahar in Afghanistan to Multan in central Pakistan is one such alternative and not entirely a competitive or rival project.

Pipelineistan: An unforeseen twist in the East-West relation took place following spontaneous and unexpected breakup of the former Soviet Union. As a result the thinly-veiled fault line that used to exhibit relative tranquility in the region began to undergo dramatic changes together with revival of the Great Game. The heart of the matter is "pipelineistan", a term invented by Escobar for describing "the golden future (for world oil majors, authors): a paradise of opportunity in the form of US\$5 trillion of oil and gas in the Caspian basin and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia" (Escobar, 2002). From land-locked Central Asia pipelines are the only technically viable means for transporting liquid fossils to the world market. Great fortune await the age of Pipelineistan especially for Iran and energy-starving Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and other countries of the region. Rivalry between Kremlin and US-backed vassals in the Caucasus intensified in the wake of Soviet demise and consequential strategic vacuum in the region. The golden opportunities arising from growing intra- as well as extra-ethnic tensions fueled by centrifugal forces from ex-Soviet republics were exploited by an assertive US administration which resulted in an unending stream of man-made disasters, from Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Fergana valley, Armenia, Azerbaijan Chechnya, Georgia all the way to former Yugoslavia¹. In the meantime Pentagon and oil conglomerates collaborated and mounted a devastating organized crime targeting the Muslim world, camouflaged under the "war against terror", "Infinite Justice", "enduring freedom", and now "Arab spring". It is of no coincidence to find that the asserted "map of terror" in Central Asia (and Middle East) is practically interchangeable with the map of oil and gas and

¹ The new frontier involving multipolar rivalry extends at least as far as Macedonia in the west to Afghanistan and Chechnya (McFarlane, 2008).

Figure 2: Planned Route of TAP, IPI PipelinesSource: *Journal of Energy Security*, 2010

very close connected to gas and oil pipeline transportation networks. A quick look at the map is all it takes¹.

A SYNTHESIS

Post-Soviet Central Asia suffers from the threat of a host of turbulences of diverse origins: localized conflicts,

¹ Similar views are as follow: According to one British news media, the "war against terrorism is a fraud...Bush's concealed agenda is to exploit the oil and gas reserves in the Caspian basin, the greatest source of untapped fossil fuel on earth". Citing Ahmed Rashid's authoritative book (Rashid, 2010), George Monbiot states "the U.S. oil company Unocal Corp. had been negotiating with the Taliban since 1995 to build "oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan and into Pakistani ports on the Arabian sea." "The invasion of Afghanistan", he continues "may also be a late colonial adventure." Ranjit Devraj writes in *Asia Times*, "Just as the Gulf War in 1991 was about oil, the new conflict in South and Central Asia is no less about access to the region's abundant petroleum resources," (Monbiot, 2002). In addition, "if one looks at the map of the big American bases created for the war in Afghanistan, one is struck by the fact that they are completely identical to the route of the projected oil pipelines to the Indian Ocean," says Uri Averyn, a former member of the Israeli Knesset, writing in the daily *Ma'ariv* in Israel. See (Talbot, 2003).

uneven economic distress, drugs and arms trafficking, environmental disasters. Ethnic tensions, in particular, simmer beneath many «fault lines», leaving the region susceptible to instability and encroachment of forces that have root in «separatism, radicalism, and extremism»². Akin to the shadow of the classical tournament this region is now plagued by tensions arising from increasing power buildup, both within and beyond.

The new "Great Game" in Central Asia has been going on for nearly two decades among a broad spectrum of state and non-state actors. Of the four poles, China and Russia correspond with each other the most, however, covering a variety of regional policies for one important reason: they are pregnant with the vision of multipolarity in world affairs (Walsh, 1993, p. 273f.). Oil and gas loom as the cornerstone of their common initiatives, even if they have different or even competing goals in the region (see e.g. (Jonson & Allison, 2001); (Bates

² Based on the communiqué of the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, 2006).

& Oresman, 2003)). By contrast, the European Union expresses greater interest in energy security than how it may be satisfied, intend on including Iran as potential gas supplier through Caspian pipelines that bypass Russia, a position Washington objects strongly. To perpetuate its hegemony the US is strongly motivated to liquidate Russia's rule in Central Asia, , restructure Eurasian space according to own interests preventing China's or Europe's rule there, build military bases, progressively tighten their grips on Central Asian minerals and the pipeline infrastructures, aim at eventually crowding out Russia's influences and curbing China's rise.

The four poles (Russia, China, US, and EU) are actors of the "first tier". They are interacting with actors of the "second tier" formed of hydrocarbon exporters or transit nations the latter are mainly located in the west of the Caspian Sea. Depending on the routes of pipeline, transit nations have different bargaining power with respect to the options available. Of the south-eastern route, Azerbaijan and Turkey stand out after Iran as logistically the most critical gate-keeper that may block or accelerate the flow of oil and gas to Europe¹. Turkmenistan is enthusiastic in pushing the diversification of markets for its energy. For pipelines going east or north, Kazakhstan guards all transport corridors to China and Russia in addition to the great promise it holds as a major oil producer and exporter.

In the course of our analysis, we hope, the problems of Central Asian energy exports (oil and gas) became much clearer: they have to come in into a pipeline network world where some fluid balances have persisted since the Soviet Union era and their coming will undoubtedly change these old balances. Also, much clearer became the fact that the actual problem of the envisaged pipeline network entering is not the absence of pipelines, but the absence of energy resources themselves. Not the question: how the energy resources will be transported, — but the question: who will get the Central Asian energy resources, — is the main question to understand and to solve. This is the actual problem of Central Asia: who will get its rich energy resources.

¹ Without US sanction, superbly located Iran (Reuters, 2009) would be the best choice for delivering Central Asian oil and gas to the world market, not Europe alone. According to (Karimi, 1998, p. 4), "Considering the excellent security existed in Iran, and also because of the short distance between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf and the lack of natural obstacles and high talent in the oil industries, Iran route is the best way for building oil and gas pipelines in order to transmit hydrocarbon materials of the Caspian area to the world".

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EURASIAN STATE AND ITS ADMINISTRATION

Marius Vacarelu

1. Eurasian state can be created. In fact, somehow we can say that its basics was created many years ago, when some clever people looks on the world map and realized a new kind of interpretation of history and geography: as in Moliere, Eurasia exists century before scientist understand its existence.

However, in the 21st century, if we want to create a state, we must organize it very well, because the lack of economic and administrative efficiency destroy any potential idea. Today only the effective results for citizens can offer their support for politicians. At the moment when the famous social contract is violated by politicians weaknesses, the consequence is their replacement and, sometimes, even revolutions.

Anyway, in our text we start from the hypothesis of soon existence for an Eurasian state. On this time, we must describe what are the main problems and main conditions to create a coherent state, a functional one.

As I wrote in another text¹, legislative context for state creates loyalties of the microbe of destruction: if the general legal state settlement is bad, sooner or later the end is unstoppable, just the consequences are different and the number of politicians who disappear will be huge.

Eurasia means an immense territory, which cannot be easy imagined being functional, because:

Where is the capital?

Where are situated the main political institutions (President, Parliament, and Government)?

Where is the Supreme Court of Justice of Eurasia?

What is the only one currency of Eurasia (because, without a single currency, all debate about an Eurasian state is sterile, without any other comments)?

What quantity of gold is available to guarantee the Eurasian single currency?

What is the single language used to develop a real administration and education for Eurasia? The simple existence of a second official language (which is possible to be different, depending by region) means in the fact that the state cannot have a real national administration from center to periphery. If a state is not able to impose a single language for its educational system and for its public administration, sooner or later it will be separated, no matter army or special police acts against separatist tendencies.

¹ <http://www.geopolitica.ru/node/1639#.UU8BDFdhrAu>

2. Eurasian state must answer to these questions and not only for these — I presented also the problem of real geographic limits of this entity — and any political project who wants to fulfill this state construction must analyze all these problems I presented.

In fact, without a real analyze, is better to stop the project; what is good: to start fast something and to have a great failure, or to make a correct analyze, understand conclusion and act with slow speed, but without any obstacles made by the analyses' missing.

Festina lente, this is the Latin proverb, and history proved us too many times that the speed provoke more problems on the state administration, which is translated into suspicious relations between state rulers (the center, as generally term) and local administration, between public servants and citizens, between businessmen and politicians, between different ethnic groups from the state, which will be finished — after local protests, for sure, with a separation (more or less bloody).

In any case, the European Union represents a model to watch, to analyze and to not repeat its mistakes. In fact, Winston Churchill said that humanity will never do the same mistakes who led to the World War II, but, for sure, the stupidity is too big in politics, so, it will be new mistakes (who are able to lead to the World War III).

Thus, we must watch some aspects related to European Union administration, which are possible to be done in the construction of Eurasian state — a scientist must present the truth, and the politicians must adopt the last decisions. In this equation, if politicians will act without reading main analyses about new chessboards, the result will be the same — negative — but it will be faster and they don't need to blame universities or intellectuals — they made their job, is their mission to understand scientific products and to respect them (and their authors).

3. In fact, the first steps who must be made to fulfill the Eurasian project, after it will offered a correct answer to main question (see section 1.) Any state, after its creation, must have a Constitution and a public administration. Without them, the efficiency is 0!

Speaking about the Constitution, we must settled a lot of things, from the fundamental rights to the fundamental obligations; a flag able to symbolize something for all Eurasian inhabitants, an anthem — who must be

created — who must be able to replace all other national anthems and to create loyalty for the new kind of state.

Of course, the separation of powers is compulsory, because we must imagine who are the real powers of the ministers and president inside such a big state: it can be also some regional ministers, but the hierarchic principle cannot be replaced and its consequences are very important.

Eurasia means a big territory, so, it will be necessary to understand how much degrees of jurisdictions must be. Because of this dimension, some characteristics of judiciary system must be presented in Constitution. Here it must be created a clear system between Eurasian judiciary institutions, because the legal system and law appliance must be predictable.

Having a national Eurasian justice, we must add two special instances:

a) Constitutional Court of Eurasia, because every law and every act must respect the Constitution;

b) Administrative Tribunals, because they must be capable to solve some special litigations, which have the main subject administrative institutions and their relations with citizens and private actors (companies, NGOs and citizens). If this kind of tribunals will not be created, the justice will be suffocated by the huge number of cases, the real justice — understood as the process to punish the bad people and to recompense the good ones — being delayed, and this will not create the real confidence and trust between state, state authorities and citizens.

4. In the same time, we must underline some problems who will appear from the beginnings of the new Eurasian state. This kind of state — by its dimension — cannot be created by politicians, it must be created by citizens.

To explain this idea, we must underline that the national states are very old in region — their history is more that 2000 years in most cases, so — it appeared a national identity and an national loyalty inside every state; more than that — there is also a regional identity inside every national state who must unite now into Eurasian state.

So, here is not enough the political wish and the presence of police to control the society — and to protect against criminals. A state without citizen's trust — today, on the internet age — is not resisting, because the mutual

confidence miss and people will see the police not as an social institution create by state to fight against criminals, but an institution create by state to watch citizens, to control their public voice and to forbid social and political rights.

5. The second idea who must be solved inside new Eurasian state is the internal frontiers and transport. An Eurasian state must be efficient on internal economy and, much more, in its commercial relations with other states, because without a normal comfort — a good level (as average) of life for every citizens — the trust in state authorities will decrease strongly.

In this paradigm, we must note that the freedom of transport must increase, because merchandises must be transported fast, inside internal market. A big state means a good transport framework, a strong link between big towns by train and highways, to decrease the costs of goods inside the country. Without this, it will appear big differences on the supply chain and the social tensions will appear.

In the same time, an Eurasian state means also the freedom to travel for every citizens, less administrative barriers, no passports and cheaper transport, because there are no taxes inside state. So, this freedom is useful for everyone, to can go on every town he wanted to work or to study, or, for sure, for holidays.

In the same time, there are two more problems, consequence of this natural freedom of travel — who is impossible to be prohibited by any administrative measures, the social pressure will be so huge and even the strongest politician cannot accept this risk for his career:

The main problem inside Eurasia will be the internal migration from the poorest regions to the richest ones, who is able to create a lot of locative problems and not only. In this case, we must note that Eurasia is a very complex system of populations and languages, which are quite complicates to be understood. More than that, there are always tensions between immigrants and the people from rich towns who see the new guests, and for this the social climate of towns will be affected. The differences will increase and will be stronger, being quite complicate for local administrations to solve all internal migration problems; medical services will receive a special pressure too from the born rate of immigrants.

The criminals will use very well this liberty of travel, because a good part of police controls will disappear — no

borders, no control — only something by routine on highways and speed roads traffic. In this case, for sure drugs will increase their position on the main towns, the young generation being more affected by this lack of borders. This reality must be correlated with the linguistic ones — if the criminal gangs will be structured on the linguistic / regional / former nations criteria, it will be very complicate for police to fight against them, because now whole Eurasia is their limit of action (criminals), but not for police, who is structured by administrative circumscriptions, who creates more internal barriers for the police than for criminals.

6. The Eurasian state administration will be quite decentralized, in a good part of its actions. But this is not very good and efficient for the Eurasian capital and its political structures. In fact, there is a danger, to not let the provinces too strong, creating a power competition between state level and local administrative level.

What it can be the solution in this case?

First of all, a special Administrative code, where the main actions and main attributions of state, its institutions and for sure of local administration will be settled into a coherent system, because any lack in this legal construction will cost much more administrative decision appliance, with bad consequences for mutual trust between public institutions and citizens.

In the second time, the politics of local autonomies inside Eurasia must be very correct settled, because this is the key of central regime — without local autonomies, is impossible to rule in an efficient way; if these autonomies are too develop, it appear the danger of internal separation.

Apparently is not complicate to create this system of autonomies, but the practice is different, there are economic differences, old and historic rivalries between regions and populations, different level of infrastructure development who made some regions more attractive than others, changing — by internal migration — the social structures, and local authorities will have — or not — possibilities to solve problems — depending by the administrative competences offered by central legislation (the Constitution of Eurasia and Eurasian Administrative Code).

7. The main issue for a real and coherent Eurasian state is the rule of law. Without rule of law, the state will be menaced by the same internal conditions who attacked

the Soviet Union and few others more, because the 21st century is the money century — and not of the idealism.

In fact, to protect not only the citizens, but also the center of state by local pressures and local administration by the center political and administrative powers, is compulsory that the rule of law must be strongly implemented.

Rule of law and democracy are both desirable attributes of a political system. Scholars writing of democratic transitions from authoritarian rule usually argue that the goal of such a transition is the establishment of democracy with the rule of law, implying that both may be achieved simultaneously. Perhaps that is so. What is often meant by rule of law is no more than the notion that government should work its will through general legislation, legislation to which the governors themselves are subject, rather than through irregular decrees and ad hominem proclamations¹.

But rule of law may require more than this: it may require that people are able to foresee accurately the legal consequences of their actions and not be subject to sudden surprises whether or not these take the form of legislation, or perhaps that the law contain, or at least not violate, certain substantive principles and rights².

Democratic rule minimally requires government by the people or their representatives, elected on a broad franchise. But, in some conceptions, it too may require more than that. Clearly, the more capacious definitions of democracy and rule of law, as values or aspirations, can bring them into conflict with one another.

Moreover, democracy and rule of law are embodied in distinct institutional systems. Democracy principally concerns electoral institutions, governments, and legislatures. Law operates through courts, police, and lawyers. To be sure, there is an intersection — the legislature, and perhaps the jury trial — where democracy and law come into close contact.

CONCLUSIONS

Eurasian state can exist, but it must be done to function well, without many tensions inside. For this, just the political wishes are not enough, because politics is made

¹ J. M. Maravall, A. Przeworki: *Democracy and the Rule of Law*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 242

² E. Balan: *Institutiile administrative / Administrative institutions*, C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2008, p. 38

on big buildings with condition air, but the reality “on street” is different — poorness is the main enemy of every political project.

For a good level of Eurasian public administration, it must be created coherent system of institutions and a real rule of law system. Without them, the main conditions for an efficient social contract between citizens and Eurasian state rulers will be violated, who means that internal coherence will miss. And, for sure, as always history teach us (*historia, magistra vitae*, as always Latin said), this lack of mutual trust is solved only by internal wars or state separation. And, in this equation, who pay the costs?



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ÁLVARO GARCÍA LINERA: PEOPLE'S POWER AND BOLIVIAN INDIGENISM¹

by Luis Hernández Navarro

LHN — You have governed Bolivia for six years. Has progress towards decolonization of the state really been accomplished?

AGL — In Bolivia, the fundamental fact we have experienced has been the change in role of the people making up the demographic majority in the past and today — the indigenous peoples. Previously, because of the brutality of the [European] invasion and the burden from centuries of domination, which permeated the outlook of both the ruling classes and the subservient classes, indigenous peoples were condemned to be peasants, toilers, informal artisans, porters or waiters. Now they are ministers (both men and women), deputies, senators, directors of public companies, constitution writers, supreme court magistrates, governors, and president.

Decolonization is a process of dismantling the institutional, social, cultural, and symbolic structures that tied peoples' daily activities to the interests, hierarchies, and narratives imposed by external powers. Colonialism means territorial domination imposed by force that over time becomes "second nature." It becomes etched into "normal" behavior, daily routine, and the mundane perceptions of the dominated peoples. Therefore, dismantling the machinery of domination requires a lot of time. In particular, time is needed to modify domination that has come to be the common outlook, to modify the cultural habits of people.

The organizational forms of the contemporary indigenous movement — communal, agrarian, and union — with their style of assembly deliberation, traditional rotation of posts, and, in some cases, common control of means of production, are today the centers of political decision making and a good part of the economy in Bolivia.

Today, to influence the state budget or to know the government agenda, it does not at all help to rub shoulders with senior officials of the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, or U.S. and European embassies. Today the state power circuits pass through the debates and decisions of indigenous, worker and neighborhood assemblies.

The subjects of politics and the real institutions of power are now found in the indigenous, plebian arena. Today, the real power of the state is located within what were once called "conflict scenarios" such as trade unions and communities. And those previously condemned to be silent subaltern subjects are today's policy makers.

¹ Álvaro García Linera is Vice-President of Multinational State of Bolivia. Interview republished from Axis of Logic under permission of the Embassy of Bolivia in Moscow.

This opening-up of the horizon of historical possibility to indigenous peoples — so they can be farmers, laborers, bricklayers, house workers, but also foreign ministers, senators, ministers or justices — is the greatest and most egalitarian social revolution in Bolivia since its founding. The displaced noble ruling classes use an arid and derogatory phrase to designate the “holocaust” of these last six years: “Indians in power.”

LHN — How should the economic model that has been implemented be characterized? Is it an expression of 21st century socialism? Is it a form of post-neoliberalism?

AGL — Basically, it is a post-neoliberal model, a post-capitalist transition. Led by the indigenous movement, it has involved regaining control of natural resources that were in foreign hands (gas, oil, some minerals, water, electricity) and putting them in state hands, while other resources such as government lands, large estates, and forests have come under community control of indigenous peoples and farmers.

Today the state is the main wealth generator in the country. That wealth is not valorized as capital; it is redistributed throughout society through bonuses, rents, direct social benefits to the population, the freezing of utility rates and basic fuel prices, and subsidies to agricultural production. We try to prioritize wealth as use value over exchange value. In this regard, the state does not behave as a collective capitalist in the state-capitalist sense, but acts as a redistributor of collective wealth among the working classes and as a facilitator of the material, technical and associative capacities of farmer, community, and urban craft production modes. We place our hope of moving beyond capitalism in this expansion of agrarian and urban communitarianism, knowing that this is a universal task, not just that of a single country.

LHN — How does the process of regional integration appear to you in Bolivia? What role do the United States and Spain play? What influence do China, Russia, and Iran have?

AGL —The Latin American continent is going through an exceptional historical cycle. Many of the governments are revolutionary and progressive. Neoliberal governments tend to appear as reactionary. And at the same time, the Latin American economy has undertaken internal initiatives that are enabling it to vigorously address the effects of the global crisis. In particular, the importance

of regional markets and links with Asia has defined a new kind of continental economic architecture. We must concentrate on deepening this regional articulation through projecting, if possible, a kind of regional state composed of states and nations. Let’s act as a regional state with respect to utilization and global negotiation of the great strategic wealth we possess (oil, minerals, lithium, water, agriculture, biodiversity, light industry, a young and skilled workforce). Internally, let’s act with respect for state sovereignty and the regional national identities found on the continent. Only then can we have our own voice and force in the course of the dynamic globalization of social life.

LHN — Is Washington actively sabotaging the ongoing transformation in Bolivia?

AGL — The U.S. government has never accepted that Latin American nations define their own destiny because it has always considered us as part of its area of political influence regarding its territorial security, and as its catchment basin of natural and social wealth. It reacts to any dissent with this colonial approach by targeting the insurgent nation. The sovereignty of the people is the number one enemy of U.S. policy.

This has happened to Bolivia over these last six years. We have nothing against the U.S. government or its people. But no one — absolutely no one — should come here and tell us what to do, say or think. We cannot accept that. And when, as a government of social movements, we began to lay the material foundations of state sovereignty with the nationalization of gas, when we broke the embarrassing influence of the embassies in ministerial decisions, when we defined a policy of national unity to confront the openly separatist tendencies latent in regional oligarchies, the U.S. embassy not only financially supported the conservative forces, but organized and led them politically, brutally interfering in our internal affairs. That forced us to expel the ambassador and later that country’s drug enforcement agency (DEA).

Since then conspiracy mechanisms have become more sophisticated: they use non-governmental organizations, infiltrate indigenous groups through third parties, and try to divide the popular sectors, while projecting parallel leaderships. This was recently demonstrated by the flurry of calls from the [U.S.] embassy itself to some indigenous leaders of the Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécore (TIPNIS — Isiboro Sécore Indigenous Territory and National Park) march last year.

Come what may, we seek respectful diplomatic relations, but we are also on guard to repel foreign intervention, whether “high” or “low” intensity.

LHN — Some sectors on the left have argued that the conservative bloc has managed to regroup and take the offensive, while the social movement that brought the MAS to power has been absorbed by institutional politics. Is this a correct assessment?

AGL — Today’s conservative bloc, comprised of foreign-oriented oligarchies, has no alternative project for society, no project capable of articulating a general will to power. The current Bolivian political horizon is marked by a virtuous tripod — plurinationality (indigenous peoples and nations in command of the state), autonomy (territorial devolution of power), and a pluralist economy (state-articulated coexistence of various modes of production).

With the temporary defeat of the right-wing neoliberal economic and social project, what today characterizes Bolivian politics is the emergence of “creative tensions” within the national-popular bloc actually in power. After the great moments of mass ascendancy, during which a universal ideal of great transformations was launched, the social movement in some cases is now undergoing a process of corporative retreat. For a time local interests tend to prevail over national concerns, or organizations get caught up in internal struggles for control of public posts. But new, unforeseen themes on how to lead the revolutionary process also emerge. Such is the case with the issue of defending the rights of Mother Earth where tensions arise in relation to popular demands to industrialize natural resource use.

As you see, it’s a matter of contradictions among the people, of tensions that yield to collective debate on how to carry forward revolutionary changes. And that is healthy, it is democratic, and it is the fulcrum for life-giving renewal of action by social movements. Even though these contradictions could be used by imperialism and the lurking rightist forces that in a transvestite ventriloquist style project their long-term interests through some popular subjects and through discourse that is seemingly anti-globalization and environmental.

LHN — In September last year, the march of indigenous peoples in defense of TIPNIS and against building a road was repressed by the police. This was presented to the pub-

lic as a loss of indigenous support for the government of Evo Morales. It was stated that the Bolivian government persisted in building the road because it had received financial support from the Brazilian oil firm OAS. Is this true?

AGL — The indigenous peoples of Bolivia, as in Guatemala, are a majority of the inhabitants. Sixty-two percent of Bolivians are indigenous peoples. The main indigenous nations are the Aymara and Quechua, with about six million people located mainly in the highlands, valleys, the Yungas zones, and also in the lowlands. Other indigenous nations are the Guarani, Moxenos, Yuracare, Tsimane, Ayoreos, and another 29 who live in the lowlands of the Amazon, Chaco, and Chiquitania regions. The total population of these low-lying nations is estimated at between 250,000 and 300,000 people.

The conflict over TIPNIS has involved some indigenous peoples of the lowlands, but the government retains support from indigenous peoples of the highlands and valleys, who make up 95 percent of Bolivia’s indigenous population. And most of the mobilized indigenous people were leaders from other regions, not actually from TIPNIS. They have systematic support of environmental NGOs, many of them funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), plus the backing of the major private television communication networks, owned by old members of the separatist oligarchy — networks that have a strong influence on the formation of middle-class public opinion. More recently, another march has arrived in La Paz, also comprised of lowland indigenous people and a larger number of TIPNIS inhabitants. They are demanding the construction of the highway through the park, arguing that it is not possible that they be sidelined without their rights to health, education, and transport, which they can today access only after days of walking.

The problem is complex. Entangled in it are issues specific to revolutionary debate, with themes such as the delicate balance between respect for Mother Earth and the urgent need to link the country together after centuries in which its regions have been isolated. It involves the discussion of the highland indigenous people’s organic relation with, and their leadership in, the plurinational state — which is different from the still ambiguous relationship the lowlands indigenous peoples have with the plurinational state.

But what is also involved is the regional strategy of the Santa Cruz oligarchy to prevent this road, which would

[once in operation] deprive them of corporate control of economic activity throughout the Amazon region. The U.S. is interested in controlling the Amazon as its reservoir of water and biodiversity, and in promoting divisions between indigenous leaders in order to create conditions for expelling indigenous peoples from state power. There is also the interest of some NGOs that are accustomed to using the parks for large private businesses.

In any case, in the midst of this tangle of interests, we as a government must be able to democratically resolve internal tensions, and to uncover and neutralize counter-revolutionary interests that often dress in pseudo-revolutionary costume.

LHN — Why build this road despite the opposition of a portion of the population?

AGL — For three reasons. First, to ensure that the indigenous population of the park has access to constitutional rights and guarantees: to safe water so that children do not die from stomach infections; to schools with teachers who teach in their language, preserving their culture and enriching it with other cultures. To provide access to markets for their produce without having to navigate on rafts for a week to be able to sell their rice or to buy salt at ten times the price charged in any neighborhood convenience store.

The second reason is that the road will for the first time link the Amazon region, a third of Bolivia, with other regions of the valleys and highlands. Bolivia has kept a third of its territory isolated. That has allowed state sovereignty to be replaced by the power of landlords, foreign logging firms, or drug dealers.

And the third reason is geopolitical. The separatist tendencies of the oligarchy, who were about to split apart Bolivia in 2008, were contained because they were defeated politically during the September coup that year, and because some of its material agro-industrial base was taken over by the state.

However, the reactionary separatist tendencies still have one last economic pillar, the control of the Amazonian economy. In order to reach the rest of the country, Amazonians must rely on processing and financing by firms under the control of oligarchs based in Santa Cruz. A road that directly links the Amazon with the valleys and highlands would radically reconfigure the structure of regional economic power, breaking down the last

material base of the separatists and leading to a new geo-economic axis for the state. The paradox of this is that history has placed some leftists in the position of becoming the best and most vocal advocates for the most conservative and reactionary interests in the country.

LHN — Some argue that Bolivia remains a supplier of raw materials in the international market and that the development model in practice (which some analysts have termed 'extractive') does not question this role. Is this true? Does it involve a phase of accumulation that is accompanied by a redistribution of income?

AGL — Neither the extractive or non-extractive approach, nor industrialism is a vaccine against injustice, exploitation, and inequality. In themselves, they are neither productive modes nor ways of managing wealth. They are technical systems for processing nature through labor. And depending on how they use these technical systems, on how they manage wealth thus produced, economic regimes may have more or less justice, with or without labor exploitation.

Translated by Felipe Stuart Cournoyer.



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BRITISH AND ISRAELI ASSISTANCE TO U.S. STRATEGIES OF TORTURE AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN CENTRAL AND LATIN AMERICA, 1967-96: AN ARGUMENT AGAINST COMPLEXIFICATION¹

Ian Almond

Although the role of the U.S. in supporting the anti-democratic, counter-revolutionary movements, governments, and dictatorships that flourished in Latin America from the 1960s to the 1990s is well known, this article examines the support provided to the U.S. by other countries. Principally this support was provided by Israel and the United Kingdom, but other countries were also involved, such as South Africa, Taiwan, France, and even Saudi Arabia. The article argues that a clear material framework underlies the assistance given by these countries. It also identifies a number of cultural and historical reasons why anti-democratic governments in Latin America found particular political empathy in Israel.

In the truly massive loss of civilian life accompanying the various U.S.-backed counter-insurgency campaigns that took place in Latin American countries such as Chile, Colombia and Guatemala during the 1970s and 1980s, remarkably underreported is the significant participation of other countries alongside the U.S. — namely Israel and the UK, but also France, Taiwan, South Africa and even Saudi Arabia. It is the multiply-centered nature of this relationship which forms the focus of this article. I argue that it was the collusion of aims and arms, or what one Reagan spokesman called “a convergence of interests”, which brought together Israeli, South African, British and American strategies in line with the desires of Latin American military and financial elites.

Although ‘complexification’ describes any act or process which makes a situation more complex, I have decided to re-employ the word more cynically in this article. ‘Complexification’ here refers to any approach that exhibits the following characteristics in its analysis of a conflict:

- It gathers together an extensive range of different factors and variables.
- It levels or greatly diminishes any degree of relative importance between the many factors cited.
- It concludes from the plethora of factors examined that no single, overarching cause or culpable party can be identified.

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My use of the verb 'to complexify', therefore, refers to a de-politicising process, which becomes so metaphysically overwhelmed with an abundance of detail, context and individual actors that it fails — or does not wish to see — profounder, palimpsest-like patterns beneath the web of perspectives¹.

The opposite of 'complexification' is not 'simplification' or 'monocausal explication', but rather a more careful understanding of linkage within the delineation of complexities. Throughout the 1980s, the fact that the Guatemalan Right referred to indigenous uprisings as the "Palestinianisation" of rural regions illustrates not the irony of the metaphor, but the very real assistance that Israel provided the Guatemalan military in their repression of the rebellions (Black, 1984, p. 154). When leftist guerrillas in El Salvador kidnapped the South African ambassador in 1979, amongst their demands was a severance of ties with Tel Aviv and Capetown, and a recognition of the PLO (Bahbah, 1986, p. 149)². When British mercenaries fought alongside South African soldiers in Angola in the 1970s, many of the Israeli military advisors who trained them would later reappear in the military workshops and parade-grounds of Central America, educating officers and soldiers from a variety of Latin American countries in techniques of torture, firearm use and general counter-insurgency tactics. This plethora of different national actors does not constitute a hopelessly intractable web of complexities, but rather a range of phenomena that nonetheless observes an overall definite and substantive pattern.

SIMPLISTIC EXPLANATIONS OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

A simplistic explanation for the above examples would be a vulgar Marxist one: First-world capitalist nations and the pariah-states they support enthusiastically work together with the wealthy elites of developing countries in order to militarise their infrastructures whenever the proletariat in these regions threaten to de-stabilise the plutocracies which international capital finds so

¹ Take for example David Stoll (1993, p. 313), who sees the people of Nebaj as resisting "not just the Guatemalan army ... capitalism and colonialism but violence itself ... the mimetic contest in which Right and Left, counterinsurgent and insurgent, try to remake an entire society in their own starkly polarized images". Even the otherwise excellent study of Virginia Garrard-Burnett (2010, p. 178) feels obliged to end the work with the words of former director of Amnesty International USA, William Schulz: "Human rights violators are not born, but made ... It's a combination of social context, leadership, and political opportunity that often leads people astray".

² See also *Indiana Gazette*, 10 October 1980.

amenable. Such a formulation, however, inevitably encounters difficulties in the negotiation of at least four complicating factors.

Firstly, there are enough examples of tension between social democratic nation-states during this period³ to show that, far from working harmoniously together, relations between capitalist economies, and even Cold War allies, were difficult and on occasion even hostile. Ideological similarity was no automatic guarantee of political collaboration. This could also be extended to Latin American countries: Galtieri and Pinochet's parallel persecution of the Left in their respective countries did not prevent them from planning military action against one another. Nor did generous finance and military support from the U.S. prevent the nationalism of Guatemalan generals such as Victores and Montt from expressing itself in moments of anti-Americanism (Black, 1984, p. 6).

Secondly, each of these players contained mechanisms of dissent and factionalism. Pace Chomsky (1996), the differences between the Reagan and Carter administrations in their attitude towards Central America, for example, were still significant. To speak of countries such as Guatemala or the United Kingdom as monolithic entities is to overlook the considerable complexities within their structures. The internal military disputes that provoked Guatemala's sequence of coups — Lucas Garcia, Montt, and Victores — attests to a series of tensions not easily summed up by the blanket term 'regime'. Likewise, it fails to register the various wranglings within the British Labour party over arms sales to Latin America, or the leftist Israeli representatives who went to meet the new Sandinista government in Nicaragua (Phythian, 2000, p. 107 ff; Klich, 1990, pp. 69-74). These instances problematise the demonisation of supposedly homogenous entities such as 'British' or 'Israeli' actors.

Thirdly, reductionist attempts to divide conflicts into groups of 'oppressors' and 'oppressed' encounter difficulties when the latter reveal themselves to be internally fractured and divided. South African forces fought alongside one Angolan group (UNITA) against another (MPLA); in Colombia, anti-government guerrillas were split into at least three main factions (FARC, ELN, M-19), whilst Guatemala's considerable indigenous population probably offers the most striking example of problematic notions of victimhood, with tensions

³ For example, consider American disapproval over British arms sales to Chile (Phythian, 2000, pp. 128-9), or the deteriorating relations between the British Wilson government and South Africa.

not only evident between the Mayans and Ladinos in the resistance movement, but also in the role played by indigenous soldiers in the atrocities of the Guatemalan military (Schirmer, 1998, pp. 81-103; Garrard-Burnett, 2010, pp. 98-107).

A fourth factor which might complicate simple notions of 'capitalist states' colluding with one another would be an insistence on the purely monetary dimension of the weapons training or arms sales. In the case of Israel, this would mean pointing out not only how the Israeli state seemed willing to sell arms to almost anyone — the People's Republic of China was one of its largest customers throughout the 1980s (Beit-Hallahmi, 1987, pp. 36-7) — but more importantly how a sizeable proportion of the training and assistance given was on a mercenary basis, through figures such as the infamous Yair Klein and his company Spearhead Ltd, which trained paramilitary death squads in Colombia in the early 1980s. The presence of mercenaries in at least some of these countries' conflicts — Angola, Guatemala, Colombia — would suggest a series of individual, commercial ventures, rather than an alliance of 'capitalist nations' working to crush an insurgent, global proletariat.

Despite the relative validity of these four complicating factors, I will argue that they do not fundamentally disrupt an overall pattern of convergent interests in the examination of British and Israeli military assistance to U.S. strategies in countries such as Guatemala, Colombia and Chile. The complexities these four factors bring to the analysis are substantial; their incorporation is a precondition for understanding how a term such as 'global oppression' works at all. Nevertheless, the surprising, and at times even extraordinary, extent to which weapons and militaries from these different countries could be found operating next to one another seems to reinforce a larger picture of capitalist social democracies, working with local elites, to prevent the apparatus of international capital from being disrupted by whatever version of the proletariat was threatening to disrupt it — whether that be Palestinians, Namibians, indigenous peasants, or labor unions. In the following sections, we detail some of these moments.

BRITISH MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO REGIMES IN CENTRAL AND LATIN AMERICA

When it comes to foreign interventions in Latin America, the U.S. has had such a prominent and visible role in the undermining of 'unsuitable' governments and the

financing of alternative regimes that a definite lack of attention can be seen with regards to other countries' interests in the continent, such as those of Israel and the U.K. Most followers of such histories will be aware of, for example, the central role Kissinger and the CIA played in the overthrow of Allende's socialist government and the bombing of the presidential palace in Santiago, all of which served to install the U.S. backed dictator, Augusto Pinochet, in 1973. However, relatively few historians will be aware that, in the murderous bombing of Moneda Palace, British Hunter aircraft played a vital part in the assault (Beckett, 2003, pp. 90-1).

Great Britain, both as a state but also less officially as a supplier of mercenaries and arms, has played a considerable role in the establishment and maintenance of military dictatorships in post-war Central and Latin America (Phythian, 2000, p. 105). As we shall see in the next section, we have reports of British mercenaries training paramilitaries in Colombia (Castano, 2001, p. 12).¹ Up until the 1982 war with Argentina, both Labour and Conservative governments were enthusiastic suppliers of Sea Cat missiles and naval destroyers to the Argentine military regime. Indeed, the final sale took place ten days before the outbreak of war (Phythian, 2000, pp. 123, 125). Brazil, a country which saw a US-backed coup in 1964 and a dictatorship which continued in effect until 1985, was the largest purchaser of British arms during the 1970s, buying three times more than either Argentina or Chile (Phythian, 2000, p. 135). We even have an all-too-rare instance of popular outcry from British churches, unions and the media preventing the sale of military equipment to a right-wing dictatorship — this time El Salvador, which in 1977 attempted to buy a dozen armoured Saladin vehicles from the U.K., but found the British government unable to supply them due to intense public pressure (ibid, pp. 137-40).

The case of Britain's relationship with Chile, however, is probably the only example of British interest in Latin America that a wider audience would know about, primarily because of the judicially unprecedented arrest of Pinochet in the U.K. in 1998. The arms historian Mark Phythian has been the most effective chronicler of the Anglo-Chilean relationship during the 1970s and 1980s, charting an evolving sequence of deals, denials, collusion and internal tensions whose history basically teaches us three things. Firstly, it reveals that the assistance Britain offered Pinochet's dictatorship was not only state-

¹ I am grateful to Staffan Lofving's article (2004) for drawing my attention to this text.

implemented, but also endorsed at every level all the way up to the office of the Prime Minister him/herself. In the year 1974 alone, by which time the newly-installed dictatorship had already murdered or 'disappeared' two thousand people (Wright, 2007, p. 55), 53 officers from the Chilean Navy and 223 ordinary seamen visited Britain for naval training courses (Phythian, 2000, p. 114). Air force bases such as RAF Bracknell were used to give training to Chilean pilots. In the early 1980s, so much weaponry was being flown to Chile that Luton Airport (in the U.K.) had a special 'Chilean depot'. British aircraft were flown to Belize, and then re-painted with Chilean Air Force insignia to fly reconnaissance missions over Argentina (ibid., 116). Apart from these substantial arms sales (the U.K. had supplied effectively the bulk of the Chilean Navy) and training of military personnel, the British government's active collaboration with Pinochet's dictatorship did not merely agree to exercise moral self-denial, but also actively co-operated with the very worst of the regime's atrocities. Barely three months after the unmarked graves of over 600 dead had been found in Santiago cemetery, the British foreign minister claimed that the human rights situation was improving (ibid., 114). Even worse, telegrams from the British Embassy to the Foreign Office indicated that a deal had been done: Pinochet would allow the British SAS to set up airbases on Chilean soil, and in return the British government would supply more weapons, silence its human rights criticism, and actively work to undermine the UN investigation into the tortures and disappearances proliferating under the regime.

A second point that emerges from this mini-history is the extent to which British businesses worked to lubricate the UK's relationship with Pinochet. In 1975, Britain was the largest creditor to Chile after the U.S., to the tune of ?14 million (ibid, p. 110). As Phythian (2000) points out, the visit of the British Trade Minister Cecil Parkinson in 1980 foreshadowed the Reagan administration's own warming of business and military relations after the Carter Ban was lifted (ibid, p. 116). Two years later, when Pinochet's DINA (the Chilean secret police) had murdered over a thousand people, another British trade delegation would declare Chile to be "a moderate and stabilising force" (ibid, p. 118; see also Wright, 2007, p. 80).¹ A 1987 diary entry belonging to the British Trade Minister, Alan Clark, succinctly expresses how concerned the British government was about the torture and abuses of the Pinochet regime:

¹ For more on DINA, see Lawson (2004, p. 183ff.)

Earlier today a creepy official, who is "in charge" (Heaven help us) of South America, came over to brief me ahead of my trip to Chile. All crap about human rights. Not one word about the UK interest. (Quoted in Phythian, 2000, p. 122)

The story of how Chile's U.S.-backed dictatorship ushered in an era of neo-liberal economic policies has been told numerous times (most recently, Klein, 2007). Set against this background — that is, the apparent use of dictatorships to clear the way for free-market economic projects — the famous friendship between Pinochet and Thatcher was not merely one of realpolitik, as Thatcher often claimed, but also one born of ideological affinity. Although the latter point became less true as Chile's relations with the U.S. in the 1980s deteriorated — and its rapport with the U.K. strengthened because of the Falklands conflict with Argentina — it is fair to see economic interests, mostly in the realm of significant arms sales, as a driving force in the manufacture of intimacy between these two right-wing governments.

However, what the 'creepy official' in Alan Clark's diary passage also reveals is the existence of significant internal tensions within both Labour and Conservative governments regarding the sale of military equipment and weapons training to brutal dictatorships. Emerging most clearly from the various cables between internal elements within the British government — the Foreign Office and the British embassy — is a degree of anxiety about supplying such regimes, more than any genuine ethical reservations. At the outbreak of the Falklands conflict, British newspaper editors were asked by the government not to mention the U.K.'s rapidly developing relationship with Chile (Phythian, 2000, p. 110). The attempted purchase of 300 Centaur armoured vehicles by Pinochet's regime in 1984 caused unusual consternation, as it coincided at the time with a new wave of repression towards leftists, students and labour unions. A British Conservative MP visiting Chile that year insisted, in a press statement which almost seemed to be trying to convince himself as much as his audience, that

The Chileans told me they wanted it for use in the northern desert and the boggy areas in the south and not for use against their own people ... the Centaur is simply a truck; it is certainly nothing like that dreadful AMAC riot vehicle which the Government banned from being sold to Chile. (Quoted in Phythian, 2000, p. 120)

Although the Centaur sale never went through, a vehicle based closely on the design was seen a year later on

the streets of Santiago, being “used to kill students who were taking part in ... demonstration[s]” (Hansard, 24 July 1986, cols. 830-1 cited in Phythian, 2000, p. 120). The British MP’s words seem to be an example of what the philosopher Žižek would call “fetishist disavowal” (Žižek, 2006, p. 353): a semantic disowning of torture and murder, whilst simultaneously facilitating the very process of the thing disavowed. This cynical observation of a distance between sign and act — a desire to perform a series of superficial gestures, whilst secretly pursuing a very different sequence of actions — can be seen in most of the British government’s attitudes towards cultivating its public relationship with the Chilean government throughout the 1980s. Phythian quotes the amusing memo the British Foreign Office circulated in response to the considerable criticism arising in the British press, as well as from Church figures such as Cardinal Basil Hume. Headed “Possibilities for Curtailments of Relations”, the document considered and dismissed various bans and boycotts the U.K. could inflict on Chile as punishment for its human rights abuses, concluding with its final resolution: a ban on cocktail parties at the Chilean Embassy.

We might consider a Ministerial and senior official boycott of Chilean embassy social occasions. This could either be confined to FCO contacts or be extended to the wider range of business between Whitehall and the Chilean embassy. (Phythian, 2000, p. 119)

Of course, we are now fully in the realm of satire. If the satirical, however, implies an ironic sense of distance between how things should be and how they are, then many of the evasions which the U.S., Guatemalan, British and Israeli governments employed to describe their behaviour had an element of the potentially satirical about them. This we shall see when we come to Guatemala, which re-branded the camps of forced labour it ran for landless peasants it had dispossessed as “Poles of Development” (Pollos de desarrollo).

Although Britain was one of the principal arms suppliers and military allies of Chile, it was certainly not the only one. Quite apart from the U.S., other countries also helped Pinochet’s regime strengthen itself by acquiring military expertise and equipment. France not only sold them sixteen Mirage fighter jets, but also trained their pilots (Phythian, 2000, p. 114). Throughout the 1970s Israel sold Chile huge amount of weaponry: Shafir air-to-air missiles, Reshef patrol boats, and not to mention Chile’s fleet of M-51 Israeli tanks, which the British

government tried to supply its V-8 Condor engines for (Bahbah, 1986, p. 74; Phythian, 2000, p. 119). It was Britain, however, acting out of a mixture of business and geopolitical interests, coupled after 1979 with an increasing ideological compatibility, which seems to have had the least qualms in publicly declaring its support for a regime which, by 1990, was responsible for over 3,000 deaths and as many as 30,000 cases of torture.

ISRAELI MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO REGIMES IN CENTRAL AND LATIN AMERICA

“Treat the Indians like we treat the Palestinians — don’t trust any of them” — Israeli military advisors to Guatemalan trainees. (Jamail and Gutierrez, 1990, p. 141)

The breadth and depth of Israeli military assistance to regimes in South America is striking: Galil assault rifles and Uzi submachine guns to murder villagers in Guatemala, Israeli-made napalm to drop on top of them in El Salvador, torture workshops in Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala to train interrogators in the most efficient methods, computer technology to help compile ‘death-lists’ of subversives, and training in Israel itself for the creme-de-la-creme of the military elites. This military exchange even dates back to the very beginning of modern Israel’s history, when the Nicaraguan Somoza dictatorship agreed to ship arms to Jewish militias such as the Haganah in their fight against the British for control over historical Palestine (Aviel, 1990, p. 14).

Although the Nicaraguan dictator, Somoza, visited Jerusalem in 1961 (Klich, 1990, p. 44), the first real military exchanges between Israel and central America begin in 1964 when training courses are offered in Israel to the Guatemalan military. In the years between 1964 and 1971, over 160 visits to Israeli military bases are made by Guatemalan, Brazilian, and Bolivian military personnel, all subsidised by the U.S. (Cockburn, 1991, p. 218). What develops over the next thirty years is an extraordinary panoply of influences — military, technical, political, and even agricultural. These influences emerge against a changing background of U.S. administrations, and spanning a truly enormous geographical range — from Guatemalan regimes and the training of the Nicaraguan contras, through to the counterinsurgency operations in Colombia and Peru, to lending direct military assistance to regimes in Santiago and Buenos Aires.

The purpose of this brief section is neither to examine the reasons for Israel’s presence in Latin American affairs

(‘special credit’ with the U.S., the Carter Ban, reciprocal agreements, ideological commonalities or simple economic motivation), nor to give an exhaustive account of it, but rather to highlight six characteristics which relate to some of the ‘complexities’ mentioned at the outset of the article.

First, the extent to which Israel’s intervention in Latin American situations developed in harmony with the U.S. needs to be stressed. It contrasts with the sometimes-tense relations Britain and France experienced with the U.S. when trying to sell arms to Latin American countries (which U.S. administrations tend to view as their ‘backyard’). The CIA, for example, used former Israeli army officers such as Emil Saada to help train death squads in Honduras: by 1984, over 250 people in the country had been murdered. American-Israeli arms firms such as Sherwood International helped supply counterrevolutionary forces with arms (Cockburn, 1991, p. 225). U.S. National security advisors such as Robert McFarlane discussed with the director of Mossad how best to use Israel as a third party to arm and train the Contras (ibid., p. 230). Israel’s role as a ‘dirty-work’ contractor increased in the moments Congress cut off aid to such terrorist groups, particularly during the Carter ban. One consequence of the generally harmonious U.S.- Israeli interaction in Latin America was that it made Israel doubly attractive to Latin American regimes as a supplier of arms — purchasing weapons and training from Israel or Israeli companies bought, for countries such as Guatemala or Colombia, “special relationship credits” with the U.S. (Jamail and Gutierrez, 1986, pp. 16, 18; Bahbah, 1986, p. 98).

Second, the statistical extent to which Israel features in Latin American counterinsurgency — and to which Latin American regimes such as Colombia and Guatemala have featured in Israel’s arms exports — seems to suggest an unusual amount of reciprocal attention between these governments, rather than merely being ‘business as usual’. In 1980, a third of Israel’s arms sales went to Argentina and El Salvador alone (Bahbah, 1986, p. 61). For Argentina, this meant 17% of its arms imports. Latin America in general, by 1986, accounted for half of all Israeli arms sales (Jamail and Gutierrez, 1986, p. 15). Victor Perera estimates over half of the 45,000 Mayan Indians killed in Guatemala between 1978 and 1985 died at the hands of Israeli Galil and Uzi machine guns (quoted in Hunter, 1987, p. 36). Israel’s significant interaction with U.S. strategies to protect economic interests in Central and Latin American countries, far from being the stuff

of conspiracy theories or the artful selection of arbitrary data, is significantly reflected in arms sales statistics.

A third interesting feature is the extent to which Israeli intervention in central America involved other countries, including both the militaries of other rightwing countries (such as Argentina), as well as more distant countries such as the U.K., Taiwan and even Saudi Arabia (which gave an estimated \$32 million in aid to the U.S. Contra program [Klich, 1990, p. 51]). We have already mentioned how, in Israel itself, extensive training was provided in all kinds of techniques for Latin American militaries. The Colombian paramilitant, Castano, describes one such school, four hours drive outside Tel Aviv, where in 1983 he met Chileans, Argentinians, Spaniards and Mexicans (Castano, 2001, p. 109). In countries such as Guatemala, in particular, Israelis seem to have worked in close co-operation with counter-insurgents from other Latin American countries such as Argentina, Chile and El Salvador. The infamous Guatemalan army intelligence agency G-2 (called ‘La Dos’) was equipped and trained not only by Israelis, but also in conjunction with Argentina, Colombian, Chilean and Taiwanese expertise (Schirmer, 1998, p. 152). The Israeli embassy in Guatemalan City was used as a regular point of contact between Israelis, the U.S. and counterrevolutionary Nicaraguan Contras (Jamail and Gutierrez, 1990, p. 130). Torture workshops, it appears, were a frequent point of international collaboration (Landau, 1993, pp. 182-183). The scholar Israel Shahak describes, in a 1981 report, how:

An especially important item of Israeli export are the so-called ‘anti-terror’ Israeli specialists. Those are really experts in torture, especially in the more sophisticated methods of torture, such as inflict maximum amount of pain without killing. The Israeli ‘specialists’ who return home, blame very much the ‘local torturers’ for ‘being emotional’ and so ‘killing too early’, and in their opinion, ‘unnecessarily’. Guatemala has become the centre for training of torturers by Israeli ‘experts’ in this trade, and for other states as well. The case of El Salvador where the Orden people are trained by Israelis in Guatemala has been known for some time. (Shahak, cited in Rubenberg, 1990, pp. 114-5)

Israelis were helping Argentines to train Cuban and Nicaraguan Contras at U.S. Army bases in Honduras and counter-revolutionary El Salvadorans in Guatemala, while Argentinian planes transporting Israeli arms to Guatemala (see Aviel, 1990, p. 33; and Bahbah, 1986,

p. 186)¹. What emerges here is not a single-country initiative, or simple case of Israel offering to do a one-time favour to strengthen the U.S. relationship, but rather a consistent network of anti-revolutionary alliances, overcoming local divides to fight against a groundswell of indigenous mobilisation, organized labour and armed leftist resistance. The close relationship between the Israeli state and the 'independent' arms dealers and mercenaries it tried, in response to human rights concerns, to distance itself from, is another interesting factor in these activities. The intimacy that existed between the Israeli government, arms firms and the ex-military personnel that supplied and trained death squads and drug cartels, further complicates the notion of state sovereignty as being based on the exclusion of non-state actors. It shows how political decisions in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem were taken in collusion with allegedly independent actors. Of course, state figures such as Peres and Sharon openly visited and contributed to regimes such as those in Nicaragua and Honduras (Shimon Peres in 1957, Ariel Sharon in 1984 [Aviel, 1990, pp. 31, 15]). However in many other ways, the Israeli state supported the whole spectrum of legal and illegal activities in Latin America, from the use of El Al planes to deliver shipments of arms to the regime in Managua (Jamail and Gutierrez, 1990, p. 128), to the Israeli industry minister who told Argentina there might be "difficulties" in meat imports from Buenos Aires if the Argentinian government didn't go ahead with the purchase of six Arava transporters (Bahbah, 1986, p. 95).

Israeli arms firms enjoyed a special relationship with their government. Even today, Israel has one of the most nationalised arms industries in the world, with three of its four largest defence companies (IMI, Rafael, IAI) completely owned by the state (Lifshitz, 2010, p. 271). Arms firms from the 1970s and 1980s such as GeoMilTech and Sherwood International enjoyed a privileged status. They had well-located offices in Tel Aviv and Washington, and special access to captured Soviet weaponry in the Israeli-Lebanon conflict (Cockburn, 1991, pp. 227, 234). However, the most striking aspect of this intimacy is the extent to which some of the most notorious gunrunners and mercenaries involved — such as Mike Harari, Pesakh Ben Or, and Yair Klein — were directly connected with the highest echelons of the Israeli establishment. The trainer of paramilitaries in Colombia and South Africa, Yair Klein, operated under an official Israeli government license; Colonel Leo Gleser, a former Israeli commando,

¹ The involvement of U.S. training in these death squads has been detailed by Gill (2004, pp. 83-4).

sold arms to Honduras through an Israeli firm (ISDS) publicised by the Israeli Ministry of Defence (*ibid.*, p. 225); and former Mossad operator Mike Harari, who sold guns to the Panama regime in the 1980s, was the brother-in-law of Israel's attorney general, Dorith Beinisch (*ibid.*, p. 259). Israeli mercenaries, in other words, were not rogue outlaws, but rather semi-autonomous agents who could not have operated as efficiently as they did without the backing and the endorsement of the Israeli state.

A fifth point concerns the way Israeli influence in Central America was not merely limited to weapons supply, training activities, military expertise, or assisting the establishment of computer systems designed to detect and organise information on subversives. It was also manifested more subtly in the post-massacre re-organisation of the landscape and permanent fragmentation of communities. In Guatemala, hundreds of thousands of refugees, mostly indigenous, had fled their homes during the worst periods of massacres. The 'poles of development' were forced re-settlements of displaced indigenous in highly controlled and tightly regulated units. Their inspiration was taken from, to a significant degree, the principles of Jewish kibbutzes and moshav agricultural collectivities in an attempt to regain control, both physical as well as ideological, of the rural population (one observer called them "a distorted replica of rural Israel" [Perera, quoted in Hunter, 1987, p. 42]). One of the architects of the scheme, a Guatemalan Air Force Colonel called Eduardo Wohlers, was trained in Israel.

These schemes — new village plans where forcibly resettled refugees bought all their food from military stores and were constantly supervised by resident soldiers and the police — created local patrols of villagers who were encouraged to take up arms and police their own communities. Jennifer Schirmer, in her classic study of the Guatemalan military project, shows in some detail how "nowhere else in Latin America has an army managed to mobilize and divide an indigenous population against itself" (1998, p. 81). Ideas of private ownership were systematically developed in the peasants of these resettlement camps as 'insurance' against future subversion. Conscripted in these village militias was sometimes violent: when Mayan Indians refused to join such civilian patrols, entire villages were massacred to "teach them a lesson" (*ibid.*, p. 83). In a policy which, according to one counterinsurgency expert, was 60% Guatemalan, 20% inspired by U.S. experience in Vietnam and 20% by Israeli and Taiwanese operations, a

confusing impression of civil war — of peasants fighting revolutionaries — was deliberately cultivated by the military in order to confuse human rights organisations and foreign observers (ibid., p. 59). Indeed, by extending the use of civil patrols throughout the male peasant population, forced indigenous complicity in violent killings resulted in a convenient dispersion of responsibility. In other words, the involvement of locals in individual killings was so successful that even indigenous communities felt threatened by the presence of human rights investigators.

One final point to emerge from any study of Israel's involvement in Central and Latin America is the degree of internal dissent within Israel regarding, in this case, Shimon Pere's support for Nicaragua's autocratic dictatorship and, once it was overthrown, the U.S. backed *contras* who were trying to restore it. Israeli leftists and trade unionists — mostly from the Mapam party — displayed a show of solidarity with the left-wing Sandinistas, attempting to pass a 1982 bill that would have vetoed Israel's arm sales to El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. As Ignacio Klich (1990, p. 68) points out, party-to-party ties between Israel's Mapam and the Nicaraguan FSLN developed, with the Knesset leader Haika Grossman even visiting Nicaragua at the invitation of the Sandinistas in 1984. Internal dissent also came about, for somewhat different reasons, when it was revealed how, between 1976 and 1979, over a thousand Argentinian Jews (mostly leftists) had been abducted and tortured by the very same Argentinian military the Israeli government was arming and training.¹ Although this degree of dissent was never significant enough to change policy, it certainly deserves mention.

CULTURAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS: POSITIVE LATIN AMERICAN IMAGES OF ISRAEL

Even a small range of texts — the memoirs of a Guatemalan diplomat, interviews with a Colombian paramilitant, articles from a Guatemalan military journal — show how non-material factors facilitated what otherwise might have seemed an unlikely alliance: namely, the collusion of the Jewish state with right-wing

¹ For an interesting history of anti-Semitism in the Argentine Right, particularly the widespread association of Jews with the Argentine Left, see McGee Deutsch (1986, pp.

¹¹³⁻³⁴).

and neo-fascist Latin American regimes.² The categories of Latin American admiration for Israel are fourfold: anti-colonial, biblical, Enlightenment, and what may be termed 'Nietzschean'.

Anti-colonial sympathy for Israel from countries such as Guatemala and Nicaragua emerged in the very early days of the Israeli state (although it is resurrected in Somoza's 1980 memoirs [see Somoza and Cox, 1980, p. 156]). It stems from Latin Americans' sense of solidarity with a young, fledgling nation, newly-emergent from an independence struggle against the British — a situation some observers saw as historically analogous to the nineteenth-century independence struggles of Latin American nations against their Spanish overlords. One of the members of the 1947 UN Special Committee on Palestine was a Guatemalan liberal, Jorge Garcia Granados, and immediately after the experience of visiting the British Mandate of Palestine he wrote a book about it, *The Birth of Israel* (1948). Anti-colonial sympathy for the Jewish settlers in Palestine is a sentiment that pervades the book from beginning to end. In Granados' various disputes with the European delegates over the activity of Jewish resistance groups, the Guatemalan tells his colleagues: "For us Latin Americans ... you English have forgotten what it is to be stirred by revolutionary feelings" (ibid, p. 54). At the very start of the book, Granados states even more explicitly:

I was to find many parallels, both political and sociological, between Palestine and Guatemala ... Palestine had emerged from the yoke of the Ottoman Empire to find itself the victim of tremendous political and social pressures. Guatemala had been forged on a like anvil. For centuries Guatemala, from the time of the conquistadors in 1524, had suffered under Spanish absolutism.

Some of Palestine's problems appeared not dissimilar to those of Guatemala. Both are essentially agricultural countries with large masses of backward, ignorant peasantry. In Guatemala this peasantry, exploited by a small, rich, landed upperclass, represents fully two-thirds of the population. Vast areas of the country lie waste, and there is a desperate need for utilizing modern technology to raise the standard of living. (Granados, 1948, p. 17).

² As Chomsky (1996, p. 203) points out, some of these regimes openly admired Nazism in their pronouncements and publications.

¹⁰ On the relationship between mysticism and violence, see Zizek (2003, pp. 23-4). For an unusually lucid update on paramilitary and narco-trafficker violence in today's Colombia, see Wilkinson (2011, pp. 38-42). On the incorporation of paramilitarism into the U.S.'s overall strategy in Colombia, see Stokes (2005).

There are some curious manoeuvres here. In his empathy for the anti-colonial struggle of the Haganah and admiration for the Hatikvah (Jewish national anthem), Granados airbrushes out the Palestinians from the picture. (In the same way, it is tempting to suggest, certain Latin American histories airbrushed the indigenous out from their own independence struggles). Granados is not cruelly indifferent to the Palestinians — in the book, he does acknowledge Palestinian losses of land and the difficulties they are encountering — but this never quite displaces the Jewish/Bolivarian struggle against British-Ottoman/Spanish rule that underlies the ultimate framing of the book.

A second factor in Latin American sympathies towards Israel lies in a biblical series of connotations which, however strange it may sound, do appear to have operated as a facilitating factor in certain Catholic right-wing nationalisms (not to mention the evangelical Protestantism of Rios Montt). It clearly features in Granados' visit to Palestine. As soon as he arrived, he writes, "I was all eyes for Biblical landscapes" (ibid., p.31). Repeated references to "the Jews [who] had never forgotten their ancient homeland" (ibid., p. 63), "the land which is sacred to millions of human beings" (ibid., p. 30), show how the Guatemalan diplomat's Christian background played a role in his privileging of the needs of Jewish settlers over Palestinian inhabitants. This bias also manifests itself in the most unlikely of places. Take, for instance, the words of Carlos Castano, a Colombian paramilitary leader and narco-trafficker responsible for countless atrocities, including the murder of journalist Jaime Garzon. He speaks of his yearlong stay in Israel for military training at the age of eighteen as a life-changing experience. The religious aspect of this visit was by no means incidental:

The history of Israel is delightful and illuminating. You should start by taking a shekel in the hand, just like receiving Christ ... I admire the Jews for their courage in the face of anti-Semitism, for their strategy in the Diaspora, for the resolve of their Zionism, their mysticism, religion and, above all, their nationalism.

While living in Israel, I won a few friends, including an old man whom I loved to go and listen to whilst he sang or recited poetry in Hebrew, his native tongue, the language of the Bible itself. It was so moving. (Castano, 2001, pp. 108, 110 — translation is my own)

Castano's violent life as leader of the AUC finds an uncanny co-existence alongside his homage to the profound spirituality of the Holy Land, with the surreal image of the future paramilitary, listening to Hebrew recitations of the Psalms. There is no time here to dwell on the relationship between mysticism and violence, although it is difficult not to see an element of Charles Maurras in the mystical inspiration of so violent a paramilitary.

What is clear, however, is the extent to which Castano's Christian background assisted his Israeli military training. Given the Guatemalan General Rios Montt's own fervent religiosity and interaction with American evangelicals during the worst years of the massacres, it is difficult not to see this Christian recognition of the biblical identity of Israel as playing some part, however small, in the extensive collaboration between Israel and Guatemala during this period.

Apart from biblical and anti-colonial sympathies, a third factor would be an admiration of Israel as a civilising, colonising, first-world power: an outpost of progress forever threatened by a deluge of indigenous fanaticism and backwardness. Analogous to Israel's own relationship with South Africa (Sharon seeing the ANC as an African version of the PLO, for example [see Polakow-Suransky, 2010, p. 8]), a definite Enlightenment sympathy for a fellow outpost of modernity can be detected in some of the ways the Guatemalan military wrote about Israel. "Israel is a small country who is doing a massive job", said one Guatemalan general to the newspaper *Ma'ariv* in 1981. "We see the Israeli as the best soldier in the world today, and we look to him as a model and an example for us" (quoted in Shahak, 1982, p. 48). In the 1977 issue of the military journal, *Revista Militar*, we find an outline of events in the Israeli-Palestine conflicts of 1948-1977. The picture presented is one of a developed nation, surrounded by envious Arab foes. The timeline begins not with the displacement of thousands of Palestinians by Jewish militias in 1947, but with the "Arab countries invading Palestine" in 1948 (Asturias, 1977, pp. 51-58). The Palestinians are repeatedly referred to as "terroristas" (p. 51), and emerge along with their Arab neighbours as consistently aggressive and "subversive", with Israel's actions largely being seen as retaliatory. In another 1984 issue of the same journal, the position of Israel as an island of modernity in a sea of barbarism is underlined by the reproduction of a series of conservative Argentinian newspaper articles on the Middle East, with severe portraits of Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi and Ayatollah Khomeini ("un

fanatico medieval" [Ronen, 1984, p. 109]), alongside several photographs of explosions and mushroom clouds, generally presenting a Middle Eastern landscape of feudalism, violence and volatility.

The final factor in sympathetic Latin American responses to Israel I have decided to term 'Nietzschean', as it involves — as Nietzsche endorsed in *Genealogy of Morals* — an admiration for those who are not ashamed of exercising their power and, indeed, who embrace and affirm their aggression. This admiration is best expressed in Castano:

There I became convinced that it was possible to defeat the guerrillas in Colombia. I began to see how a people could defend themselves against the whole world ... In fact, the concept of armed self-defense I copied from the Israelis, every citizen of this nation is a potential soldier.

In Israel managed to open my mind ... I learned from other wars and already possessed a panoramic vision of the country. I tried to absorb as much knowledge as possible of the Jews, a wonderful people of God, who have always lived in war and for thousands of years have been in the mode of defending themselves, invading and winning territory. The trip to the Holy Land was a momentous occasion in my life. (Castano, pp. 108, 111 — my own translation)

Israel's performance in the Lebanon War impressed many Latin American observers in the military, and was a central factor in the successful arms sales of the period. The four factors we have cited here do not necessarily sit easily next to one another. Indeed, a liberal such as Granados has little in common with a murderer like Castano. The extent to which such factors caused, facilitated, or merely resulted from the concrete assistance Israel gave to such regimes and paramilitaries in the 1970s and 1980s remains disputable and probably incalculable. What the above array of quotations does show, however, is that Israeli assistance to the (para)militaries of Guatemala and Colombia was no straightforward series of ideologically-neutral transactions, but rather an ongoing intervention coloured by a variety of different affinities — religious, political and colonial.

In their classic work, *Empire*, Hardt and Negri (2000, p. 46) consider some of the "real alternatives and the potential for liberation that exist within Empire". They suggest that globalisation, far from being the source of all our woes, may contain within it positive emancipatory possibilities, ones which express "the power of the

global multitude" (ibid., p. 47). Any study of British and Israeli involvement in Latin America during this time period suggests, at least, the need for some reservations. In the pre-digital world of the 1970s and 1980s, what is striking is the speed with which reactionary forces could bring all manner of assistance — economic, military, political, ideological, and cultural — to their counterparts, employing an appalling dexterity of common interest and, in the moments of most sublime co-operation, a terrifying sense of harmony. Here is not the place to contest Hardt and Negri's conviction that the globality of capital may well prove to be its undoing — indeed, current events across the world at the time of writing may well be reinforcing their thesis — but it is instructive to bear in mind that the assistance which sympathetic Middle Eastern and North African leaders like Muammar Gaddafi and the PLO offered leftist movements such as the Sandinistas began in earnest over fifteen years after Israel had delivered its first arms shipment to Nicaragua.

The international support of military dictatorships, brutal governments, and paramilitary networks in Latin America during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s belonged to a pattern. It was not a pattern of perfect symmetry, not a mathematical model that could be used to predict future developments, and certainly not a paradigm free of any deviations, variations and spontaneous idiosyncrasies. It was a pattern, however, which produced phenomena — the displacement of peasants, the murder of indigenous peoples, the torture and disappearance of activists and labour organisers — which could be found as far afield as the hills of Oaxaca, the forests of Ixil, the streets of Bogota, the police stations of Santiago and the underground garages of Buenos Aires. In the boardrooms of New York, London and Chicago, a certain familiar logic of preference for capital over people was cultivated, whose effects would echo themselves in endless command centres and training schools, and re-echo themselves in the elite clubrooms and closed offices of practically every Latin American country. The sad complexity of this plutocracy-preserving process, which would draw dollars, weapons and aid from Saudi sheikhs, Israeli ministers, Taiwanese officers, British businesses and South African generals, is not baffling but depressing; not enigmatic or impenetrable, but dark and profound.

A Latin American Nuremberg is called for. During the period in question, hundreds of thousands of human beings were not merely executed but literally strangled, gutted, skinned, electrocuted, disembowelled or physically beaten to death. Over thirty years have passed

since the worst of the atrocities considered in this brief study. Obvious candidates for war crimes tribunals — such as the former U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger, the former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, or the former Guatemalan president Efraim Rios Montt — are by now too old for any effective trial to take place. And although in Argentina and Chile some progress is now being made in identifying and prosecuting war criminals, a vast array of British, U.S. and Israeli senior officers and politicians — who were wholly supportive of the very worst massacres, abductions and torture programmes and participated, directly or indirectly, in their implementation — remain untouched by any form of judicial retribution. These include defence officials from all three governments; military officials who gave, allowed and organised training to perpetrators of the massacres; diplomatic staff, even up to the office of the Ambassador him/herself, who knowingly facilitated military instruction or aid to the perpetrators; government offices and their secretaries and staff who endorsed sales of arms to obvious human rights abusers; British, U.S. and Israeli lobbyists who helped to circumvent already extant structures of control and regulation — either to enable equipment and aid to be delivered, or to actively stifle news of atrocities from being widely disseminated. The relative paucity of international judicial attention to such glaring crimes not only acts as a moral indictment of the West, but also encourages suspected war criminals such as Otto Perez Molina (the newly-elected president of Guatemala) to continue their political careers unperturbed.

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RESTRUCTURING THE WORLD BY NORMATIVE MEANS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR RUSSIA

Alexandra Shapovalova

In the light of global crisis lasting for almost five years the traditional advantages of the West in world politics have turned obviously relative. Its military power is ever more costly and ever less effective for imposing stable order in strategically important regions. Its economy is creeping and prospects of its growth are still obscure. And with resurfacing deep societal imbalances Western ideational leadership is also fading away. In many respects the West finds itself excessively dependent upon foreign markets including those of rising powers which strive to retain and expand their political autonomy.

This means that the gap between the West and the Rest cannot be sustained by usual power instruments and in several years it can be narrowed to a dangerous and irreversible extent. Such perspective prompts the United States as well as the European countries to exert urgent efforts in order to prevent imminent assault on Western leadership in the global system.

The strategy to be deployed for this purpose has crystallized in the last two years and consists in promoting major realignments of global and regional powers around the newly consolidated Western community. This strategy has as its main vehicle the normative influence wielded through redefining economic and political rules within and outside that community. And its practical implementation proceeds along two initiatives presented as a centrepiece of Barack Obama second presidency — Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP or 'Economic NATO') and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

These projects are intended to form an exclusive circle of countries with close political proximity and high-level normative convergence. Within these frameworks new basic socioeconomic rules could be agreed that would further be extrapolated outwards to the markets of alien regions. Economically this circle would benefit from revitalized capital flows leading to essential reindustrialization of its economies, while normative expansion to third countries, spurred by their aspirations to have an access to the core zone, would enable the renewed West to shape external markets according to the own needs. Rising powers remaining outside the core, first of all China and Russia, would have to adapt to the new rules and make strategic concessions. Thus the centre-periphery structure of world economy and hence of world politics would be secured and Western leadership reasserted.

This strategy of economic and normative consolidation may be quite logical outcome of the tendencies unfolded in recent years where consensus on global rules is hardly attainable, and the economic weight of rising powers makes the increase of their formal representation and political influence in the global institutions inescapable. Perhaps normative impact is actually the only potentially efficient and not so costly leverage at the West's disposal now. But in

political sense it is quite risky and may bring destabilizing outcomes in no less scope than military force. In addition, its implementation is far from unproblematic given the trends dominating the transatlantic relations as well as in US interaction with Asian states over the past years.

PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTATION

Despite widely spread idea that crisis may generate radical renovation of domestic and foreign policies, the key global players demonstrate the opposite inclination towards sticking to decades-old reliable methods and ties. In this vein, after several not very convincing attempts at opening to the 'new horizons' Washington again returned to traditional alliances and partnerships that underpinned its international posture after the Second World War. Though shattered by centrifugal forces due to inevitable differentiation of interests, these alliances seem more promising in the sense of resource sharing and political solidarity in times when going-it-alone is not a viable option any more. Leaving aside an even more intricate constellation in the Trans-Pacific dimension of US policy let's focus upon its transatlantic component.

The European states still remain the closest allies for the US since, as Simon Serfaty argues, no other two poles in the world may form a more complete partnership than the US and the EU¹. But the situation looks not so unequivocal from the vantage point of the EU interests and priorities.

On the one hand, since the beginning of 2000s the EU has persistently aspired to forge a new quality of transatlantic partnership in order to maintain American security engagement in the European continent and retain own position and influence in transatlantic compact. But at the same time, European capitals exhibited little enthusiasm to the prospect of being drawn into American strategy of military interventions outside Europe. Ensuing indifference on the part of Washington generated anxiety over possible 'transatlantic divorce'. Election of Barack Obama raised far-reaching hopes in this regard and led to amelioration of political atmosphere between the two shores of the Atlantic. But the actual shifts in relationship turned rather ambiguous, and the clear common vision of the future global order

¹ Serfaty S. The West in a World Recast // *Survival*. — 2012. — Vol. 54, No. 6. — P. 33

as well as of major international issues has not emerged², due to reasons not dissimilar to those of George W. Bush era. The kind of conceptual stalemate was aggravated by disagreements over anti-crisis measures and US announced 'pivot to Asia' threatening to further reduce American engagement in Europe.

On the other hand, in the post-bipolar era the European Union managed to accumulate important assets which however modest as they may seem provide it with a capability to pursue own strategy in the international scene. In the economic dimension the EU has long turned into US competitor allowing the analyst to speak about 'transatlantic bipolarity' in trade matters³. It also elaborated a full-fledged normative basis and consistently employs it as a power leverage in interactions with third countries precisely in the way the US envisage for TTIP. At last, in the past decade the EU built up its own web of relationships with neighbouring and remote regions which although not extremely influential lays the ground for its political autonomy, and renouncing it for the sake of supporting US global strategy looks fairly unreasonable.

Certainly, Washington put forward potent arguments behind its ambitious proposal. It portrays it as a last resort means that can avert EU economic stagnation and political downscaling and, in general, keep alive the euro zone and the European integration as a whole. Its appeal may be even greater if combined with substantial political benefits for particular member states, first of all Germany and Great Britain or for communitarian institutions like the European Commission.

But the real implications of this project should be assessed more carefully. The economic benefits of a suggested free trade area for both sides seem disputable and much depending upon its concrete parameters. Even in the best case the foreseen growth rate does not exceed 0,5 % of the EU's GDP provided the complete opening of markets, which is far from guaranteed.

No more clarity is there in political and institutional side of the matter. Here the main challenge stem from the prospect that streamlined transatlantic integration may really absorb the European project and thus put a brake

² Alessandri E. Transatlantic Relations Four Years Later: The Elusive Quest for a Strategic Vision // *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*. — 2012. — Vol. 47, No. 3. — P. 20-36.

³ van Oudenaren J. Transatlantic Bipolarity and the End of Multilateralism // *Political Science Quarterly*. — 2005. — Vol. 120, No. 1. — P. 1-32.

upon its movement towards a kind of federal model. The recent history already witnessed such a shift when EU-NATO cooperation forestalled essential deepening of European defence integration as was predicted by Hanna Ojanen¹.

An even more significant problem emanates from the process of converging of regulatory rules and eliminating non-tariff barriers. Up to now the EU rejected to make its normative basis subject to negotiations with a third state and it is hard to imagine how it may compromise it this time especially when several major agreements with solid normative components are underway with neighbouring countries.

The matter is complicated by the fact that the conceptual ground for such convergence is also out of sight. It is an open secret that the US and European practices of economic regulation and state-society relations differ to a serious degree. In essence, consolidation inside the supposed core circle may prove no easier to carry out than potentially projecting it outwards after that.

Apparently, all the above mentioned problems may find more or less satisfying solution provided sufficient political will. Initially there was abundant voluntarism on the part of the EU institutions to strike a lucrative trade deal but as far as the issue is discussed by foreign ministries in the course of setting the mandate for negotiations, numerous reservations arise which can postpone reaching agreement within the EU. And the calendar of the project is rather pressing — American side urges to sign the deal in 2015 and the European Commission dared to set the deadline even earlier in 2014 before the elections to the European Parliament. But these terms are hardly realistic.

Another serious nuance must be mentioned in this context. The post-bipolar era unleashed a process of rediscovering mental, societal and cultural divergences between US and the EU. Together with generational shifts in the United States away from Cold War mass affinity with Europe it produces a context where transatlantic proximity is not taken as granted by European and American public. Such considerations stipulate a necessity in blurring distinctions and reinforcing societal solidarity between the two shores of the Atlantic while accentuating the divergences and gaps with non-

¹ Ojanen H. The EU and NATO: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy // *Journal of Common Market Studies*. — 2006. — Vol. 44, No 1. — P. 57-76.

Western societies. Ostensibly, a recent wave of same-sex marriage campaign is an integral part of such tactics and it actually contributed to further cultural fence-mending with the outer world.

In sum, the key transatlantic question today is whether the US manages to impose China threat on the EU to an extent justifying economic and normative subordination like it managed to impose Soviet threat to subordinate it strategically sixty years ago. But the EU should realize that agreeing to the US proposal amounts to agreeing to the global strategy it promulgates, a strategy where there would be scarcely an autonomous role for the EU.

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL RISKS

Normative strategies as such — and the EU has amply experienced it elsewhere — are accompanied by a range of problems starting from the problem of indirect political effect due to which normative influence in each concrete case depends on the reaction of the recipients. But the US 'two-rings'² strategy contains even more serious risks for global governance that cannot be voluntarily dispelled.

As many observers pointed out, it threatens to subvert current multilateral order where general political compromise by all stakeholders is the imperative conditions for progress. In the first turn it will challenge global trade and development institutions, notably the WTO. For the EU that has ever been a protagonist of effective multilateralism inscribed even in its security strategy assuming its failure and contributing to it is a rather confusing political step³. It has ever constructed its foreign policy identity in terms of 'the other West' acting in contrast to US exceptionalism and arrogance to smooth the disproportions of world development. In fact, its 'normative power Europe' pretence is founded upon contrasting its international posture with that of US⁴.

But the weakening of global institutions is only part of the problem. Their functionality is already fading and the time when their reforming alone could be sufficient for

² Доктрина Обамы. Властелин двух колец / Авторский коллектив: С.М. Рогов, П.А. Шариков, С.Н. Бабич, И.А. Петрова, Н.В. Степанова http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=1783#top

³ Laidi Z. Le multilatéralisme en berne <http://www.telos-eu.com/fr/globalisation/politique-internationale/le-multilatéralisme-en-berne.html>

⁴ Duke, Simon 'Misplaced 'other' and normative pretence in transatlantic relations' // *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*. — 2010. — Vol. 8, No. 4. — P. 315-336.

adjusting world power balance is over. But substituting them with bilateral deals is by no means an optimal solution. Preferring bilateral bargaining over multilateral compromise in order to sustain the power asymmetries may engender new round of balancing unchecked by any universal claims. It should be born in mind that asymmetry even on cooperative terms may endure only when recognised and accepted by both sides, otherwise it produces only exacerbation and desire to vindicate own status. In present day multipolar world it is not the case. Artificial fixing of global hierarchy through arbitrary limiting the range of countries participating in elaboration of economic rules will lead to antagonizing rising powers, entrenching polarization of the global system and setting a new overwhelming conflicting structure.

Perhaps for somebody conflicting structure may seem quite pertinent and even attractive owing to its disciplining effects but there are no reasons to deem that in such structure the West will be able to retain its pre-eminence indefinitely. Unilateral escalating tension and rising stakes would create significant pressure for the West itself which not all of its participators would be willing to withhold. Burden sharing has always been a delicate issue for transatlantic community ever containing an essential element of free-riding. Can Washington this time throw behind its design sufficient weight to bind its partners and simultaneously to impose necessary concessions on its rivals? The answer is far from obvious.

Moving global competition into normative realm is hardly a stabilizing development. Norms and values are deeply interlinked with societal worldviews and the rifts they promote elicit highly emotional reactions in the public-at-large. Instead of intended delaying the shaping of already crystallized multipolar landscape, normative differentiation may catalyze its emergence in an explosive balance-of-power mode deprived of meaningful multilateral restraints.

RUSSIA: HOW TO WIN THE GAME WITHOUT PARTICIPATING IN IT

The role of Russia in the US normative strategy is clearly defined as an outsider that at a certain stage will be compelled to accept the Western terms due to economic or strategic reasons. But even if the task of 'coercion into cooperation' of Russia is somehow secondary for this policy in comparison to containing China, Russian front nevertheless is important for elaborating and sophisti-

cating the Western normative toolbox. Russia and East European states are primary objects of the EU normative strategy developed under Eastern Partnership programme which is wholly supported by Washington. And recent trends demonstrate a new round of intentional bringing of normative differences to the fore of the US and EU's Russia policy.

Russia's response to those trends is two-fold. On the one hand, Moscow adopted the tactics of overt rejecting Western allegations against its normative pitfalls and voices public criticism at the Western values and their practices that sometimes bring about the ever more visible societal distortions and imbalances. On the other hand, Russia embarked on creating an own normative platform within the framework of Customs / Eurasian Union. Such steps are useful though their implementation as for now looks clumsy and hardly improving Russian international and domestic profile.

But the game that is unfolding in world politics does not allow for purely defensive strategies. Normative fence-mending by the West cannot be matched by symmetrical fence-mending by Russia not least because Russian capabilities for that are below the necessary scope. What is more telling, for Russia trying to build own fences means playing the US game and pouring water at the mill of American projects. Russia is gradually getting entangled in normative competition over values, standards and worldviews before producing an alternative she can come up with.

That competition in itself is highly unfavourable for Russia forcing upon it a choice of either norm-contender role that she is yet not apt for, or norm-taker status that she cannot and should not reconcile itself with. Russia needs an own normative strategy which can be projected outwards and its shaping is currently underway but lacks two essential elements that constitute the principal underpinning of Western normative power — firstly, a pretended universal legitimacy of its norms and, secondly, high living standards of its society.

Russia will not gain much from simply criticizing Western norms or creating a set of technical rules relevant for restricted Eurasian space. No more will it benefit from adopting a staunch anti-Western posture. Delimiting mental and cultural distinctions from the West makes sense only with subsequent formulation of an own universal message and worldview upheld with perceptible improvement of socioeconomic situation in own society.

Russian potential ability to offer such a message for its direct environment as well as for the world as a whole emerges its key political advantage in comparison to other rising powers. But proceeding from a defensive stance Russia will hardly be able to formulate it. To that end much can be drawn from its XIX century strategy of promoting universal value of Russian culture¹.

Of course, such normative strategy should proceed along adequate political and economic efforts aimed at preventing the disruption of the existing multilateral world order and emphasising the risks of such disruption together with the progress that can be achieved through multilateral consensus-building process. But under present circumstances relevant normative positioning is indispensable for successful pursuing of the likewise policy line.

¹ Почепцов Г.Г. Смыслові війни в сучасному світі <http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/material/17967>

THE DARK SIDE OF GLOBALIZATION

Leonid Savin

Despite the fact that research on globalization has been ongoing for decades, a clear definition of the phenomenon, accepted by the entire international scientific community does not exist. Further, it is not possible to think about globalization in only one particular field of science or discipline in isolation, because of its interconnected and complex nature.

Axel Dreher has proposed looking globalization in three ways:

Economic globalization: characterized by the long-distance flow of goods, capital, and services, as well as the information and perceptions that accompany these market exchanges;

Political globalization: characterized by a diffusion of government policies;

Social globalization: expressed as the spread of ideas, information, images, and people¹.

UNESCO's 2001 Annual Report states that, "globalization can be defined as a set of economic, social, technological, political and cultural structures and processes arising from the changing character of the production, consumption and trade of goods and assets that comprise the base of the international political economy"².

Promoters of globalization share many common perceptions.

Zygmunt Bauman, for example, attempts to determine the mechanisms of interaction between states and nations, proposing a transformation from existing "inter-national" organizations to what he sees as truly universal and global institutions. He no longer has any interest in the social institution of the 'state', but, instead, envisions a 'social planet'³. Many others scholars and politicians who similarly promote globalization in its current form are full of joy and optimism about the future. However, some critique is required for an objective assessment of the phenomenon.

Jacques Derrida said many years ago that the ideal or euphoric image of globalization as a process of opening the borders that makes the world more homogeneous must be challenged with absolute seriousness and vigilance. Not only because this homogenization, where it was made in reality or assumption has both positive and negative sides, but also because any



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¹ Dreher A. Does Globalization Affect Growth? Empirical Evidence from a New Index. Applied Economics 38 (10), 2006. P. 1091-1110.

² United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), MOST Annual Report 2001, see http://www.unesco.org/most/most_ar_part1c.pdf.

³ Zygmunt Bauman. From Agora to Marketplace, and where to from Here? //Journal of Globalization Studies Vol. 2, Num. 1, May. 2011, p.13-14.

apparent homogenization often hides the old or new forms of social inequality or hegemony. Josef Stiglitz, who has been intimately involved in the globalization process from within, has also produced numerous works critiquing globalization since leaving the World Bank.

As a whole, the process of globalization is very abstract, and so requires an assessment from within and between various discrete fields of the social sciences. David Harvey notes that "...if the word 'globalization' signifies anything about our recent historical geography, it is most likely to be a new phase of exactly the same underlying process of the capitalist production of space"¹. Anthony G. McGrew, a professor of International Relations at Southampton University, describes globalization as "a process which generates flows and connections, not simply across nation-states and national territorial boundaries, but between global regions, continents and civilizations. This invites a definition of globalization as: 'an historical process which engenders a significant shift in the spatial reach of networks and systems of social relations to transcontinental or interregional patterns of human organization, activity and the exercise of power'².

It's very important to note that in many definitions of globalization we can see the primacy of economics, particularly of neoliberal capitalism, as well as the distribution of power that thus flows and its influence worldwide. Faster, more flexible and more robust nodes of such economic power have an advantage in spreading their own flows of the production and exchange of ideas and knowledge, in effect, a normative and reality-defining process. They make globalization in their own image.

It is also necessary to understand the hybrid nature of globalization, comprising a global market economy, technological development, and societal transformation and global homogenization.

David Steingard and Dale Fitzgibbons, in a scholarly critique of global capitalism as driving the process of glo-

¹ David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), p. 54

² Anthony G. McGrew, "Global Legal Interaction and Present-Day Patterns of Globalization", in V. Gessner and A. C. Budak (eds.), *Emerging Legal Certainty: Empirical Studies on the Globalization of Law* (Ashgate: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1998), p. 327

balization, defined globalization "as an ideological construct devised to satisfy capitalism's need for new markets and labour sources and propelled by the uncritical 'sycophancy' of the international academic business community"³. However, globalization has also been conceived as a discursive practice. In this sense, it is not the result of 'real' forces of markets and technology, but rather is a rhetorical and discursive construct, formed by practices and ideologies which some groups are imposing on others for political and economic gain⁴. Globally prestigious educational institutions, such as Harvard, the LSE, and Columbia University are incubators for a transnational political and economic elite institutionalized with a neoliberal ideological agenda. Thus they provide neoliberalism as the driving and defining force of globalization with 'intellectual legitimacy' and an academic facade.

New possibilities to communicate faster and network with more people are not only good for personal and professional interrelations, but sharing and collaboration on scientific experiments, academics, lessons learned, and best practices. In this sense, "globalization must be understood as the condition whereby localizing strategies become systematically connected to global concerns...Thus, globalization appears as a dialectical (and therefore contradictory) process: what is being globalized is the tendency to stress 'locality' and 'difference', yet 'locality' and 'difference' presuppose the very development of worldwide dynamics of institutional communication and legitimation"⁵.

In parallel of globalization it can be noted that, "broad economic, technological, and scientific trends that directly affect higher education and are largely inevitable in the contemporary world. These phenomena include information technology in its various manifestations, the use of a common language

³ David Steingard and Dale Fitzgibbons, "Challenging the Juggernaut of Globalization: A Manifesto for Academic Praxis", *Journal of Organizational Change Management*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1995, pp. 30-54

⁴ C. Walck and D. Bilimoria, "Editorial: Challenging 'Globalization' Discourses", *Journal of Organizational Change Management*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1995, pp. 3-5.

⁵ Cesare Poppi, "Wider Horizons with Larger Details: Subjectivity, Ethnicity and Globalization", in Alan Scott (ed.), *The Limits of Globalization: Cases and Arguments* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 285.

for scientific communication, and the imperatives of society's mass demand for higher education..."¹.

In other words, new scientific language promoted by winners of globalization level the cultural differences and undermine traditional and regional aspects which include, but are not limited to religious, historical, cultural and philosophical features of the world's peoples. It can also be said that globalization through the exchange of ideas also threatens the institution of the sovereign state. How? Both the independent exchange of ideas and the formal institution of public education is key not just for human development, but for the institutionalization, norm creation, and legitimacy formation of the state. People, as 'human capital, are developed and utilized by the modern state as any other natural resource at its disposal.² If a government is not involved in the process of public and special education, there are external powers that will act to fill this void. As result, the human capital potential and stability of any given state will be decreased.

We can also attempt to see this aspect of hegemony from other cultures' point of view. The process of globalization suggests simultaneously two images of culture. "The first image entails the extension outwards of a particular culture to its limit, the globe. Heterogeneous cultures become incorporated and integrated into a dominant culture which eventually covers the whole world. The second image points to the compression of cultures. Things formerly held apart are now brought into contact and juxtaposition"³.

I do not think it controversial to characterize the current globally dominant culture as a mass-pseudo-ersatz culture produced in the U.S. and promoted by worldwide consumerism as the fruit of liberal ideology.

Liberalism itself is a synthetic creation of the Western-dominated global power structure, a humanitarian facade behind which the dirty work of policing the world can go on uninterrupted by idealistic spasms in the

¹ Philip G. Altbach, "Globalization and the University: Realities in an Unequal World", Occasional Papers on Globalization, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2005, Globalization Research Center, University of South Florida, see <http://www.cas.usf.edu/globalresearch/PDFs/Altbach.pdf>.

² Volker H. Schmidt. *Modernity, East Asia's modernization and the New World Order* P. 115. <https://ap3.fas.nus.edu.sg/>

³ Mike Featherstone, *Undoing Culture, Globalization, Postmodernism and Identity* (London: Sage, 1995), pp. 6-7

body politic⁴. So in a radical sense "globalization is what we in the Third World have for several centuries called colonization"⁵.

Finally, we come to the question of values. Globalization is occurring in a paradigm of post-modern values⁶. In this way it rejects traditional values and traditional education systems, because the logic of postmodernism is the absence of a center, absolute principle. It a priori is prejudiced against all other cultures and ideas, and, as well, for the carriers of these ideas. It seeks to reduce to all other cultures to a hollow and harmless caricature and cliché that can be easily digested and regurgitated within the context of global consumer culture. It is impossible for the dominant global neoliberal culture to co-exist and harmonize with traditional cultures and create an artificial single type of global citizenship without essential damage to these peoples and societies. Thus globalization becomes a process of cultural destruction and forced homogenization.

The only way to remedy the process of globalization is the leveling of the disparity of global power and the establishment of a new international order based on genuine multipolarity, where will be several civilizations centers capable of projecting power regionally. This will preserve civilization-based cultural and educational-scientific paradigms, connected with the peoples' will, values, and heritage, yet at the same time remain open to international cooperation and discourse, but built on a platform of trust, mutual aid, respect for cultural difference, and of the right for each societies own historical and developmental path looking to the future.

In Russia we can see the beginning of some attempts to theorize and build the precursors of a new system of education as an answer to the dark miracles of post-modernism. Professor Alexander Dugin from Moscow State University has proposed the idea of a Eurasian educational framework that reflects the contemporary global situation and interdependence of countries and

⁴ Eric Norden, "The Tender Tyranny of American Liberalism," *The Realist*, June 1966, 1-6, <http://www.ep.tc/realist/a-b-set/09.html>

⁵ J. A. Scholte, "The Globalization of World Politics", in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 15.

⁶ Endre Kiss. *The dialectics of Modernity. A theoretical Interpretation of globalization*//*Journal of Globalization Studies* Vol. 1, Num. 2, Nov. 2010, p. 16

nations, as well as recognizing the necessity to keep our traditions alive and to protect our peoples from the creative destruction promoted by Western liberalism.

Joint efforts with scholar, experts, analysts and activists from Third and Second World as well as academic critics from core of industrial developed countries known as founders of contemporary neo-liberalism and capitalism itself will be very useful for first steps to draw new scientific paradigm and basis for non-western international relations that will promote to establish Newest and more adequate World System than actual one.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AFTER THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT XI JINPING TO RUSSIA

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INTRODUCTION

In 2013 President Xi Jinping, as the core of the new generation of the Chinese leadership, makes debut on the international stage. In the new complex international context, China — which already became the second largest economy of the world — will answer the questions about what is it the “Chinese dream”? To carry this work a step forward, not only Chinese, but also international patterns should be carefully investigated. Although it is obvious that China’s foreign strategy will have a relatively stable trend, but at the same time international environment and the Chinese environment itself went last time through numerous changes, so the Chinese foreign strategy also has to undergo corresponding adjustments. Certainly, this will exercise an important influence on the future development of the world politics patterns.

For Chinese foreign policy, Russia has always been a very important factor; the trend of Sino-Russian relations is important not only for both countries themselves, but also for Eurasian continent and even for the whole world. From the fact that Xi Jinping, only one week after his official appointment, visited Russia as the first state on his first many states international visit, is a very good start for the future; from many points of view this makes even more favorable the constructive development of Sino-Russian relations and will help in many complex issues.

USEFULNESS OF COMMONLY SECURE ENVIRONMENT CREATION

China’s current diplomatic guidelines stress the “great powers are the key, borders are primary, developing countries are foundation, multilateral politics is the main stage of play”, at the same time Chinese leadership emphasizes the following orientation of its international pattern: “all-round, wide-area, multi-level diplomatic setup”. Using this core idea, China tries in highest degree to harmonize its own state interests in the framework of multi-angle multi-level all-round cooperation towards world’s great powers, and of course towards its most important neighbor, Russia. At the same time, despite China’s economic output has reached the status of the world’s second largest economy (in absolute numbers), but it is obvious that China’s international image is lagging behind its total economic growth, so China’s national image could need some support from Russia’s, as China’s strategic partner, and so attain the level of the internationally recognized ethical power. At the same time, the security environment on the Chinese borders continues to worsen, also there is necessity to jointly cope with the pressing problems emerging from the U.S. financial crisis in Europe and its consequences, this all even more makes necessary deeper strategic cooperation between Russia and China, and both countries could win on the international stage even more dignity.

In some important matters directly related to China's national unity and security Russia has been playing an important role, especially in the aerospace, military and the field of energy, Russia cannot be substituted as the most important partner for China. The recent visit of President Xi to Russia, as Taiwanese scholars emphasized, continues the active development of Sino-Russian relations, with particular emphasis on China and Russia in-depth cooperation in the military field, this will probably change the existing situation on the two coasts of the Taiwan strait, also further deepening of the Sino-Russian strategic cooperation will have a big impact on many aspects of the whole East Asian region, for example, will directly affect the Chinese territorial waters disputes with Japan and other East Asian countries, and also will influence the selection of the variants for the Chinese strategic behavior.

If speaking from the Russian perspective, Russia following the China's state strength development, not very deliberately changed its attitude on "looking down upon" towards China's thinking standards, Russia changed its orientation because of China's active development, but still there are areas where the Sino-Russian cooperation could become deeper. Meanwhile, having as background many changes on international stage, for Russia's foreign strategic layout it is obvious that coordinating with China's international policy could have positive effects. Besides, if looking on the Russia's internal economic development and understanding that its many trials to achieve a long-term sustainable development based on the "conception of the great power" led to serious budget shortfalls, so having now as the background the international financial crisis, it is quite understandable that Russia needs to increase the cooperation with China to achieve a new momentum.

THE COMMON STRATEGIC COOPERATION IMPROVES SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Freely, the crystallization and development of the China's strategic cooperation relations to Russia as a starting point is connected to common needs for favorable internal development, but at the same time pressure from external source, the United States, has been an important stimulating factor for Sino-Russian relations. Following the US implemented "strategic transfer into Asian-Pacific" which is US strategy for the Eurasian continent and goes together with the US "new balance" policy, looking on policy, economic, military,

diplomatic multi-level composite, both China and Russia have jointly felt pressure from the United States and tried to build a jointly positive strategic environment; at the same time, USA created in Afghanistan the so called international tug-of-war "field" situation, which makes from Afghanistan a kind of black hole, the involvement of world's great powers energies not only didn't solve the original problem, but contrary exacerbated drug problems, following this the problem of terrorism became even more complex, this escalated risks for regional security. Russia's and China's direct security interests have been threatened. In recent years USA also tried to divide China and Russia by persuading China come along with USA, so weakening or even regressing to tensions Sino-Russian relations, however, necessity to deal with the US pressure once again return China and Russia to cooperation a common attitude. In the context of a common willingness for cooperation necessary to deal with the challenges coming from the United States, China and Russia are most concerned about the anti-missile issue, the problem of conventional disarmament in Europe, the problem of borders security, democracy and human rights issues, between Russia and China constantly exist deep mutual understanding of necessity to maintain the greatest degree of tacit cooperation; through China is more concerned about the North Korean nuclear issue and some other issues, China and Russia try to maintain a maximum degree of uniformity. Besides, because of the recently by USA created pressure environment, in response to international disputes, China and Russia again choose to fight side by side against these threats, for example there was a good orchestra-like coordination in the Syria question, though because of internal disagreements in Russia there was not so good coordination between Russia and China in the Libya question, but nevertheless also in the Libya question the US interests suffered one of the biggest changes.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND QUESTIONS

As contrast to the good cooperation between China and Russia on the highest political level, the Russian-Chinese cooperation on the lower levels, between public and ordinary people (civil level of cooperation), through continuously developing, still obviously has deficit of moving forces (deficit of impetus). Freely the research institutes of both countries has a many centuries including history of mutual research, but in the reality in both countries the deficit of mutual understanding on the level of public and ordinary

people is existing, ideologically subjective speculations and often unconscious prejudices could be realized, the deficits in mutual perception, lack of a common code of conduct, this all creates bridge and deep limits for cooperation between Russia's and China's public and ordinary people. How is it possible to give impulse for overcome these barriers? During Xi's visit to Russia, both President Putin and President Xi stressed the necessity to overcome the deficits of the cooperation in the humanitarian sphere, especially, to improve the contacts and mutual understanding between young people of both countries. Some scholars express the meaning that using the benefits of good relations between governments, the implementation of the NGO of both countries could promote the cultural, public welfare multifaceted cooperation and exchanges; this could really breathe a new life to the real long-term cooperation and let it accumulate a reserves of good will for the future.

Besides, in the world of now, on the one hand the Internet mass-media could go out of borders of governments control possibilities, on the other hand China's — Russia's mass-media regarding the improvement of China-Russia relations could play an important role, but still don't do this. The contrast between the ways Chinese and Russian mass-media are speaking about news is obvious. In contrast to the comprehensive tracking reports of China's mass-media speaking on President Xi's visit to Russia, Russia's mass-media coverage regarding President Xi's visit was slightly lower. For example, during the President Xi's visit to Russia, because Russia's economic benefits were strongly linked to Cyprus banking system crises, Russia's major mass-media basically focused on this, at the same time issues regarding President Xi's visit to Russia were covered with much weaker weight, the information about President Xi's visit in the Russia's mass-media was presented as an ordinary event, together with the information about currency swap between the BRIC countries, as well as the internationalization of RMB. The Russia's mass-media covering, to emphasize for the ordinary audience the good image of China, reported a lot about First Lady of China. If it is impossible to effectively inspire more vigor and attention from the media, which then deliver more qualitative information, the non-governmental transfer of information and mutual understanding between Russia's and China's public and ordinary people are then inevitably restricted.

During President Xi's visit to Russia, Russia's and China's multi-domain multi-level cooperation intentions come together in one, there is necessity for step by step improvement of coordination based on common strategy and pragmatic interests. Top strategic cooperative partnership platform already established good environment for the political cooperation between Russia's and China's governments, but also for civil, economic and cultural cooperation. In this framework, if both sides will really give impulse to the young people of both countries to be a driving force for deep cultural exchange, if will really give impulse to the mass-media to pay more attention to the real and important part of other's country life, this will add a new spirit and truly benefit both countries' long-term sustainable development.

CONCLUSIONS

In fact, if China and Russia want to have truly good mutual interactions and sound development, they need to look more directly on the existing problems, and also pragmatically take collective action to address them. For example, because of the issues in the economic cooperation between Russia and China, Russia often makes from economic problems political question, at the same time the mass-media's judgments (especially Internet blogs) were based on prejudices, have had not positive influence on the real Russia-China cooperation. In fact, as long as there is economic cooperation, having problems is normal. Like during President Xi Jinping's visit to Russia were clearly and with high importance discussed practical aspects of cooperation issues, so economic cooperation needs further moving forward, speed and rhythm of it could be correspondingly adjusted. Regarding Central Asia, many scholars estimate they could become the beginning of Russian-Chinese contradictions and conflicts, this point of view echoes to certain degree already existing difficulties, but at the same time the seriousness of them is to high degree exaggerated. At the moment many Chinese scholars also discuss how rationally improve the growing China — Central Asia economic cooperation and preserve Russia's dignity and benefits. For the solution of Chinese-Russian issues, China's position needs to be in some ways and means adjusted, at the same time Russia's position adjustment must be rather of psychological nature. In the framework of deep and many levels including cooperation between China and Russia, China often hoped that after the discussion of specific issues they would be solved, but Russia's attitude of continuous

adjustment is difficult and lacks of stability, this makes a lot of unofficial level cooperation between China and Russia necessary, and makes progress become slow or become not pleasant.

Overall, on the one hand, we can see the importance of Sino-Russian relations, at the same time, between China and Russia exist many specific problems to be solved. Between China and Russia existing issues are not easy to look at, but these issues are not so that they are irreconcilable, these issues also are not confrontational. Diverse perspectives exist on issues in Sino-Russian relations, so it is reasonable and legitimate to take specific issues and step by step solve them, this will be a great blessing for the Sino-Russian strategic partnership as well as the entire world.

Translated by Vladislav Savin.

GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE INFORMATION WARFARE IN THE NORTHWEST CAUCASUS

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The postbipolar world, preserving its former tools for conducting ordinary wars (military operations) and economic wars, to an increasing degree put emphasis on so called “information” and “network” warfare. Their distinctive feature is the circumstance of being conducted globally and totally — against enemies, neutrals and fighting partners, both in the period of war and in the period of peace. The award for this permanent struggle is world domination, which is called in recent years by the Americans “global leadership”.

The characteristic features of the latest two National Security Strategies of the USA became strengthening of hegemonic tendencies and “ideologization” of the foreign policy of the United States of America. The main criteria of appraisal of prospects of developing relationship between the USA and foreign countries became the “behavior” of one or another country, to be more accurate — wherever it complies or not with the American understanding of democracy and needs for the fight against “global evil” including undesirable regimes. Thereby Washington appropriated an exclusive right to interpret the concept of democracy¹ and to appoint successive “whipping boys”, destroying and crushing whereby the remnants of the Westphalian system of international relations. The examples connected with the events in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and now also in Syria are the plain evidence of it.

Crucially important that in contrast to the existed in 2002 practice of ascribing one or another country to “the axis of evil” on the basis of accusation of supporting international terrorism, in the latest Strategy the main criteria for selection of applicants for being added to the American “black list” have become their political order not corresponding to the USA’s understanding of “true democracy”. Herewith for justification its claims to world dominance the American elite adopts abstraction of increasingly high order (such as global struggle of “the good against the global evil”, “protection of freedom”, “democracy advancement” etc.), without specifying regions and countries, which can become their application objects, they become known practically just before the beginning of military operations. As regards Russian and China which are the main geopolitical competitors of the United States, in recent years Washington strengthened its critics towards them, accusing them of democracy principles and human rights violation, and of authoritarianism. In other words, China and Russia are the main geopolitical rivals of the USA.

The essence of neoexpansion policy being pursued by the USA is consists in the fact, that Washington legitimates and justifies the necessity of providing

¹ Цветов А.И. Эволюция внешней политики США: от Джеймса Монро до Джорджа Буша-младшего // Политика в XXI веке: вызовы и реалии: Аналитический альманах / Под ред. Е.М. Кожокина; Рос. Ин-т стратегич. исслед. — М.: РИСИ, 2007. — № 7 (17). — С. 46.

security of the USA, their confederates and partners, open and/ or concealed invasion of the most important spheres of vital activities of sovereign states, violating international principles of sovereignty and independence of the countries being members of UN. This is the essence of the present-time geopolitics of the United States practically in all the world areas, as the all of them, without exclusion, are declared to be the zone of the vital interests of this superpower. One of such macroregions is "the Big Near East" (BNE), which is already being fundamentally restructured by the USA within the context of their geopolitical interests. Caucasus, in its turn, serves as a subregion of BNE.

The American geopolitical megaproject in the Caucasus (North and South) is realized not only by way of reinforcement of their own geostrategic and geoeconomical positions by the USA, but also by means of manipulating and controlling the other participant of the geopolitical play in the region by Washington. Immediate military cooperation is developed with Georgia and Azerbaijan. With the participation of American military specialists a fundamental reform of the Georgian armed forces have been carried out, new, well equipped and prepared units and formation have been created, and a considerable part of the state budget of Georgia is used for reimbursement of military costs. New conditions for creation of military bases are formed in Georgia and in Azerbaijan. For example, two American radar stations already operate in the North and in the South of Azerbaijan, several airdromes for using them in the interests of air forces of the USA are prepared, and as specialists suppose — for eventual conduct of military actions, principally against Iran. Such activity in Georgia is carried out much more widely.

Simultaneously geoeconomical projects aimed at goal-oriented economical forcing out of Russia out of the region are implemented. That means, in the first instance, commissioning of the main export pipeline Baku — Tbilisi — Ceihan, and lobbying other pro-Western projects like Nabukko.

Except these directions, being realized by the Americans in the spirit of the classical geopolitics (military aspects) and new geopolitics (economical projects), as previously mentioned, best practices in the sphere of the newest geopolitics (geopolitics of information era or geopolitics of postmodernity) are used. American "soft power" is successfully specialized in organizing "flower revolutions", networks of any form of dissidence

and pseudo opposition, from wahhabism to anarchism in many regions of the world¹. Particularly, hundreds and perhaps thousands of different nongovernmental organizations, funds, centers and other structures, being financed and supported by many foreign and international organizations act in Caucasus. Certainly, all these structures are tools for conducting network-centric operations (network warfare), as a local kind of them so called "flower revolutions" serve. These are pro-Western (more often pro-American) take-overs, carrying out in one or another country or region in the interests of the West (USA) using network warfare toolkit. It is well known, that all these "revolutions" are planned and implemented within the frameworks of the American-centric Strategy of globalization and unipolar world order.

A seamless part of Caucasus, the Northwest Caucasus is one of the platforms for the network warfare being conducted against Russia, and the situation of the region in whole demonstrates typical network approach: the Americans use absolutely different, it should seem, not connected with each other forces in their own interests. It is natural, that network warfare (wars of the information era) do not abolish any geopolitical models of the past. In the channel of the traditional geopolitics armed force is used, and geoeconomics put emphasis on the implementation one or another economical projects. However the leading actors of global and regional politics in the modern world primarily use information and network capabilities, which are supported with economical projects, and only in case of emergency other military forces and capitals are used. All this is realized in the spirit of time, taking into account economy of force, because implementation of information wars is many times cheaper, than economical or, all the more, military operations. Besides, "bloodless" wars are essentially more effective than real ones, which are accompanied with great destruction and death of a great number of people. The destiny of the Soviet Union can serve as an outstanding example. This state 20 years ago became history without any nuclear-missile attacks, about which in the proper time the Soviet leaders of pro-Gorbachev era were so apprehensive.

For the purpose of conducting information wars and network-centric operations newsworthy events are needed. Such events can be real or constructed. One of such events for the Northwest Caucasus are the

¹ Тхагапсоев Х. Страсти политологов по Кавказу // Кабардино-Балкарская правда, 06.02.2010.

Olympics, which must be conducted in 2014 in the territory of Sochi and Krasnaya Polyana. The case is the events passed almost 150 years ago, the development and the results of the Caucasian War (1818-1864). Blowing things out of proportion regarding the events of long-ago, geopolitical enemies of Russia strive to drive a wedge between the different nations living in our country, to deepen the crisis of identities, to slow the process of establishment and development of united Russian civil society, united Russian civil nation.

The Caucasian War in the Northwest Caucasus inhabited predominantly by numerous Adyghe tribes in opposition to the Northeast Caucasus (Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia), did not have the nature of "ghazawat" (military jihad) and was generally based on the relations of ethnic solidarity. It is recognized, that the mentioned war was over just in the Northwest Caucasus on May 21, 1864, when in the territory of present-time Krasnaya Polyana, where the 2014 Olympics are planned to be conducted, a parade of the czar's troops was organized. Before that the Ubykhs, representatives of the Adyghe, lived there. A part of them died in the course of the war, and the major part emigrated to the Ottoman Empire in consequence of so called "Muhajirun" (emigration).

Their tragic destiny nowadays became an object of the focused attention of oversea guardians of "human rights", who in all appearances forget that in the base of construction of the United States as a state two basic sins lie: almost full extirpation of the autochthonic population (the American Indians), slave trade and slave owning. However at the present time they get a successive occasion for accusing Russia of that long-ago events and for creation of false representation of the present-time Russian policy in the Northwest Caucasus to the world community (as they say "people who live in glass houses should not throw stones"). Primarily different organizations of the Great Britain and the United States, especially nongovernmental ones, brought to public discourse of the world scientific community an idea of formation of an independent Adyghe state, for the purpose of which opened the floor for the representatives of Adyghe non-governmental organisations, which construct the most different separatist projects.

In the course of information warfare against Russia different American and several Western funds, organizations and structures are used. Thus, American "Jamestown Foundation" established in 1980 and

having close relationship with the government of the USA and with CIA, as one of the main spheres of activity has chosen critics of Russian policy implemented in the North Caucasus. For example, on May 21, 2007 at the a conference conducted by this fund in Washington an idea of creation of an independent Adyghe state was sounded. In accordance to the idea the state must unite the territories of Adyghe, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and so called Black Sea Shapsugia. The same idea was developed during a conference, conducted on April 8, 2009 in Harvard University (USA), where one of the contributors emphasized, that implementation of the project of a Circassian Republic will allow the Circassians to win independence from Russia. A similar thesis was sounded during the annual conference in Columbia University (USA) in April of 2009, where some representatives of foreign Adyghe diaspors made a proposal of formation of a government of Circassia in exile, which would have its representative body in the General Headquarters of EC, and also in the USA and in Turkey.

Former ambassador of the USA in NATO Kurt Walker in an article published on May 25, 2010 in The Washington Post newspaper declared expressly, that the 2014 Olympics in Sochi can be boycotted by the most of the Western countries. To his opinion, presence of the representatives of the governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia at the Olympic Games, which "intent upon positioning themselves on equal terms with the leaders of other countries make the Olympics a politically disputable arrangement".

Within the context of widening separatist projects for reconstruction of the Northwest Caucasus it is reasonable to mention briefly the evolution of the forwarded project of so called "Circassian Republic". Calling for restoration of "historical justice" some activists of radical Adyghe nongovernmental organizations in the recent years have been insistently declaring about formation of a new monoethnic constituent unit of the Russian Federation, which would unite the territories of historical habitation of the Adyghe — Adyghe, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia. In particular, the idea of creating a Circassian (Adyghe) republic was sounded at the Special congress of the Circassian nation of Karachay-Cherkess Republic, conducted on November 23, 2008 in Cherkessk. One year on it was included into "the Resolution of the Forum of Circassian (Adyghe) youths", which also took place in Cherkessk on September 12, 2009, and already on November 5, 2009 on www.elot.com.

ru web-site an appeal of "The Youth's Adyghe Khase of Karachay-Cherkess Republic" organization to the Chief of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation S.Y. Naryshkin and to the Plenipotentiary of the President of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal district V.V. Ustinov, in which it was declared about the intention of raising the question of self determination of the Circassian nation.

As you can see, it is spoken in Russia and at the state level about the intention of creating a Circassian republic within the Russian Federation, and at foreign forums — about construction of an independent Adyghe state. The difference is evident, isn't it? Such a discrepancy is just in the spirit of geopolitical views of the Russia's enemies, dreaming about its partition.

Georgia became almost the main platform, from which new impulses of information warfare are received. Its president M. Saakashvili hard on the heels of of its military gamble failure in August of 2008 proceeded to development of its new North Caucasian policy. The dynamics of its development can be traced by means of studying the following foreign policy initiatives of Georgian government:

- In December of 2009 in the Parliament of Georgia the Group of friendship with the parliaments of the North Caucasus was formed, which in the Spring of 2010 addressed official letters to the members of legislative bodies of the Republics of the North Caucasus. However this initiative by evident reasons did not meet a response expected by official Tbilisi.
- In January of 2010 in Georgia "The First Caucasian" TV-channel was opened. It was declared, that the aim of the channel is providing the North Caucasus with objective information about any events taking place in Georgia. At the present time the channel broadcasts only in the Internet, because "Eutelsat" French company refused its satellite service providing. It should be noted that in July 2010 "The First Caucasian" TV-channel was devoted 7 million lari from the reserve fund of the Government of Georgia.
- The question of "the Circassian genocide" is fundamentally mooted. In March 2010 in Tbilisi an international conference on a topic "Concealed nations, continuing crimes: the Circassians and the nations of the North Caucasus between the Past

and the Future" took place. The conference was organized by Washington Jamestown Fund and the International School for Caucasian Researches of Ilia Chavchavadze Tbilisi State University. Being provoked by the Georgian party representatives of the Circassian diaspora present at the conference appealed to the Parliament of Georgia with a request for recognition of the "Circassian nation Genocide", which is supposed to be implemented in XIX century by the Russian Empire. In April of the same year the Georgian deputies declared, the the Parliament is ready to explore and discuss the question of the Circassian "genocide".

- On September 23, 2010, appearing at the 65th session of the UN General Assembly the president of Georgia M. Saakashvili put forward an initiative of creating "Caucasian Confederation". The speech of the Georgian leader is qualified by the experts as a claim of official Tbilisi for conducting activated, especially within 2010-2011, new North Caucasian policy. It is absolutely clear that the goal of the Georgian project of the "Confederation" is an attempt of the isolation from the North Caucasus with simultaneous support of the anti-Russian separatist movement existing there, restoration of the leading role of Georgia in the region. It is also absolutely clear that the idea of creating the confederation has a character of separation from life realities, and its implementation is impossible in practice.
- On October 11, 2010 the Ministry of internal affairs of Georgia published the decision of the Government of Georgia of introduction visa-free regime for the citizens of seven North Caucasian constituent units of the Russian Federation. The mentioned decision came into effect on October 13 of the same year. According to the press-speaker of the President of Georgia, the waiver shall be considered in the context of the "United Caucasus", mentioned by Mikheil Saakashvili from the rostrum of UN.
- In the end of November 2010 the Parliament of Georgia established the Commission for preventing of conduction of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. The Commission plans to develop an information campaign against the Olympics in international mass media, preparation of the appeals of Georgian refugees from Abkhazia and well-known sportsmen to IOC, organizing protest actions abroad, in the course of which the question of feasibility of conducting the

Olympic Games in Sochi and their reestablishment in another country will be raised.

- And, finally, in May 2011, three years before the opening of the Olympics, the Parliament of Georgia risked to recognize the Circassian "genocide" within the years of the Caucasian War official.

It is typical that the Caucasian policy of Saakashvili is actively supported by the West — by the USA, NATO and EC. At the same time, probably, it should be recalled that Georgia had already lost not only its territorial integrity, but the sovereignty long ago, because it is in reality under the external control of the USA, and wider — of the West.

Alongside this the acts of provocation organized by Georgia and by the forces supporting it contradict to the decisions of the International Olympic committee (IOC) of "Encouragement and development of culture, based on the spirit of the Olympic truce". The periods of "cold war", when was used as a tool for putting pressure on one or another opposing party ended almost two decades ago. Just for the purpose of protecting the Olympic movement from any backslides of the Past articles about the obligations of national Olympic committees concerning the necessity of participation in the Olympic Games were included in the Olympic Charter. Any country declared boycott to the Olympics will be subject to serious sanctions — up to it exclusion from the international movement.

From the point of view of the ethical code of IOC, Georgia is hardly to be considered as one of the countries, adhering to the humanitarian and moral character of the Olympic values. Furthermore, Georgia is one of the countries looking forward to join the united Europe, the country, which had already used the Olympic Games for concealment of its aggressive actions. The matter is that just on the day of the opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing on August 8, 2008 Georgian aggressors began an onslaught on Tskhinval and planned an attack against Abkhazia. Therefore the UN Charter was cynically offended, especially as on the threshold of the Olympics in Beijing the UN General Assembly had adopted a resolution making a call for a global cease fire for the period of conducting the Olympic Games.

However even at the present time the regime does not want to recognize new realities in the Caucasian macroregion, in Georgia a process of demilitarization is

traced, what witnesses that official Tbilisi did not drop their plans for reestablishing its "territorial integrity in a heavy-handed way", which, it goes without saying, can not be accepted by Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia.

Alongside with that, it must be emphasized that the Olympics in Sochi is very important for all the Caucasian states and nations including Georgians. Clamoring against conducting the Olympics in Sochi, Georgia pursues its opportunistic political aims, which do not meet the interests of the international and, particularly, the regional society. Support of Georgia's initiative for boycotting the Olympic Games can cause a new aggravation of the situation in Caucasus, sow discord within the international sport activity, jeopardize the relationship with the Russian Federation.

That is why the scientific society of Russia and other friendly states should not separate themselves from the actions of information warfare being conducted by geopolitical enemies, adopting an active attitude meeting the real and multidimensional interests of our countries. The Caucasian War is a part of our common history, and we are not able to change it. However we can and must think about the future. Certainly, the own history should not be forgotten, it should be taken into account preventing the repeat of that tragic events. However it also should not be politicized in the present conditions laying the responsibility for the events passed one and half century ago on the present generations, because it will mean the only thing — capitulation in front of the enemies of Russia.

The leaders of some foreign Adyghe societies also take a disputable point of view in relation to so called "Circassian problem", the position of which is rather often supported by their radically oriented Russian like-minded persons. The activists of some Adyghe nongovernmental organizations actively propagate an idea of restoring so called "historical justice" concerning the Adyghe nations. To their opinion it is necessary for its implementation that the Russian Federation recognizes the "genocide" of the Adyghe, which is supposed to take place in the course of the Caucasian War of the XIX century and after its end. Within the recent years this position is represented in the public. For example "The Circassian Congress" social movement twice applied (on 01.07.2005 and 24.10.2005) to the State Duma of the Russian Federation with a demand of recognition of the Adyghe nation genocide. On October 11, 2006 the Adyghe organizations of nine countries (Russia,

Turkey, Israel, Jordan, USA, Belgium, Canada, Germany and Syria) appealed to the president of the European Parliament D. Fonteles with a request for recognition of the genocide of the Adyghe. In Russia this appeal as supported by "The Circassian Congress" (Adygei), "The Circassian Congress" (Karachay-Cherkessia) and "The Kabardian Congress" (Kabardino-Balkaria). On May 18, 2009 an appeal of the leaders of "Adyghe Khase" of Adygei, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria and the Shapsugs to the President of the Russian Federation was placed on www.elot.ru. The appeal contains a call to the nations of the North Caucasus to make a special declaration on the occasion of the 135th anniversary of the completion of the Caucasian War and to give a relevant estimate "to the monstrous crime of the czarist autocracy".

The decision of the International Olympic committee (IOC) of conducting the 2014 Olympics in Sochi became a successive cause for accusations against the Russian Federation. Thus, in March 2010 the above mentioned "Jamestown Fund" appealed to IOC with a request not to conduct the Olympics in Sochi giving as the reason that they consider incorrect to conduct the Games at the place of tragic events of the Caucasian War of XIX century. According to the information of AIF, a special group named "No Sochi 2014" was organized. The group uniting a range of Circassian nongovernmental organizations appealed to IOC with a request to change the place of conducting the Olympic Games.

At the same time some Adyghe community leaders made a stand against conducting the XXII Winter Olympic Games in 2014 in Sochi under the pretext of the fact that the Games would be conducted on the native Circassian land and supposedly offend the memory of "the victims of genocide". For the purposes of attracting the attention of the world community they intended to conduct in 2012 after the Summer Olympic Games in London, the Summer world Circassian Olympic Goodwill Games (so called "Circassiad"). After while they abandoned their plans, however they made their contribution to increasing the degree of the informational confrontation. On May 18, 2009 in the above mentioned appeal of the leaders of "Adyghe Khase" and the Shapsugs to the President of the Russian Federation it was noted that the Olympics in Sochi would be conducted on the 150th anniversary of the end of the war in Krasnaya Polyana, where on May 21, 1864 "the czar's troops conducted "the victory parade" infamous among the Adyghe"¹.

¹ www.elot.ru

General director of KavkazWeb.net and Adyga.org Osman Mazukabzov emphasised that "recently Adyga.org web-site has begun signatures collection in support of the appeal to IOC, in which the Circassians declare about the necessity of the involving the Circassians into the process of planning and conducting of the Games.... Instead of calls to overthrow of power, separation from Russia and other extremist declarations, the appeal to IOC contains concrete and justified demands regarding the inclusion of the Circassians into the process of planning and conducting of the Olympic Games". However further as the text goes Mazukabzov sounds absolutely different expectations: "In the near future the American parliamentarians will approve the resolution for recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Even Russia recognized that genocide. So everything is possible..." After all, the main problem, which worries Mazukabzov and his like-minded persons are "recognition of the genocide committed towards the Circassians 150 years ago".²

However the most of the Adyghe organizations and reputable community leaders take more moderate, bottom-line positions. Particularly, on February 27, 2010 during the meeting of the International Circassian Association (ICA), at which delegations of the Adyghe diaspora from the USA, Europe, Syria, Jordan and Turkey were present, an appeal to the President of Russia D. Medvedev was stated, in which it was declared that the Organising committee of the Olympics in Sochi "ignores the history and the culture of the indigenous population of the Black Sea region — the Circassians (Adyghe)". In this regard ICA intends to ask the President to provide publication of any information concerning the forthcoming Olympics "taking into account the history and the culture of the Adyghe"³. The State Council — Khase of Adygei (the Parliament of the Republic of Adygei) overlooked the problem neither, having approved in the end of March 2010 an appeal to the Olympic committee of Russia and to the Committee of the XXII Olympic and Paralympic Games concerning participation of the Circassians in organizing and cultural arrangements of the 2014 Olympics. In this appeal, particularly, it is noticed that "in the course of preparation for the 2014 Olympics state and nongovernmental structures, unfortunately, totally ignore the history and the culture of the Circassians (Adyghe)". "We are sure that inclusion of Adyghe motives into the complex of the Olympic arrangements, paying attention to the

² <http://www.KavkazWeb.net>. 2010. — 9th of March.

³ <http://kavkaz.memo.ru>

history and to the culture of the indigenous population of the Black Sea region — the Circassians (Adyghes) will have a positive bearing on the atmosphere of the Games and will be considered by the collective consciousness of Russian and foreign Circassians as the respect for their national feelings and the exercise of good will... We propose within the frameworks of the informational and cultural program of the forthcoming Olympics to the full extent take into account the history and the culture of the Circassian (Adyghes) nation as an indigenous ethnic group of the Russian Black Sea region. We, the deputies of the State Council — Khase of the Republic of Adygei kindly ask you to consider the possibility of solving the mentioned issue having an important social and political significance and in full measure corresponding to the state interests of Russia.¹ Seemingly, it is rather reasonable and acceptable proposal“.

However the government have only made a decision in accordance to to which the “Memorial of Memory and Solidarity“ dedicated to the victims of the Caucasian War² will be built in the center of Maykop (the capital of Adygei). There are no any other official initiatives. Nevertheless, different reasonable proposals are received from individual persons. For example, yet in 2007 one of the authors proposed to “draw a line“ under the Caucasian War and by the example of many of the European countries “to build in the territory of Krasnaya Polyana a monument to the Adyghes and the Russian warriors“ fallen on the field of battle during that war. This symbolic action, as the author of the article supposes, “will be positively appreciated by the public mind in Caucasus...“³

Thus, the problem exists, it has internal and external measure and is not to be concealed. The geopolitical enemies of Russia parasite upon it, and this means that the information warfare will be only developed progressively as the day of the opening of the Olympic Games approaches, to an increasing degree drawing in the whirligig different forces, organizations, personalities. Any negative information, it would seem, should be countered with own informational capabilities of Russia based on real actions and achievements aimed at elimination of the internal conflict potential. However it is not enough too, as for effective prevention of any destructive tendencies in the Caucasus and upholding

of the national interests of RF in the region it is necessary, in the first instance, to fight against the main player of the modern “Great Game“ (USA), foresee its successive moves, implement a system of measures for prevention and control of ethnic and religious conflicts. After all potential zones of conflicts and fault lines are activated not in themselves, but in the course of thought out well-weighted geopolitical operations of the general and active participant of the Caucasian geopolitics in whole, that is the USA. Responding only to the consequences of this global strategy Russia in future the future will have to retreat and gradually give ground as before. The only way to win is to take an active stand in the “Great Game“ having understood previously its conditions, content, system of interrelationship and conformity.

¹ <http://www.KavkazWeb.net>. — 2010. — 31st of March.

² Интерфакс. — 2010. — 18th of March.

³ Манкиев М. Не подведенные итоги Кавказской войны и Олимпиада 2014 в Сочи //

<http://www.fondsk.ru>



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THE SOCIAL “BIG BANG” OF THE 21st CENTURY TURKEY: FROM ATLANTIC TO EURASIA

Semih Koray

There are two important aspects of the nation-wide uprising in Turkey centered at the Taksim Square in İstanbul that deserve emphasis. First and foremost, it is an unprecedented social “big bang” of the 21st century Turkey. Secondly, the extreme hostility of the stance of the Erdoğan regime against this protest movement is equally unseen.

The Taksim Square represents the uprising of the Turkish Nation against the Erdoğan Administration, who arrogantly attempted to trample on the Turkish Nation and the values of the Atatürk Republic. The main symbol that unites millions of people who have been filling the squares all over Turkey for about three weeks now and facing police violence everywhere is the Turkish flag. The nation-wide common slogan these masses are chanting everywhere is “Tayyip resign! Government resign! Dictator resign!”. If this movement is to be connected to something in the past, its roots clearly lie in the Kemalist Revolution.

HOW IT BEGAN?

Protests were started by a small group of activists as a reaction to the demolition of the Gezi Park in Taksim, to rebuild the “historic” Taksim Military Barracks, which was also planned to house a shopping mall. The construction company had started to demolish the wall of Gezi Park and cut down the trees, when the protestors stood up to prevent any further demolition. Then the police intervened with tear gas. More people joined the activists to start a sit-in act and a night watch in the Gezi Park. The police attacked once more and more violently with tear gas and water cannons to drive the protestors out of the Park. The outcome of this sequence of “more protestors-more police violence” was that the resistance grew very quickly and spread over the whole country covering millions of people in hundreds of protest rallies. All the demonstrations were met with police violence, tear gas, water cannons, plastic bullets. The target of the demonstrators went far beyond stopping the project of the government concerning the Gezi Park. They started to unanimously demand the resignation of Erdogan and the government. By now, there are four people killed, thousands injured, including many who are heavily injured by tear gas shells and plastic bullets.

Before analyzing the background and reasons that led to the mobilization of masses to such an unseen extent, it might be telling to shortly look into the reasons of Erdoğan’s insistence on the project concerning the Gezi Park. This project is two-legged. One leg is concerned with the history of the Military Barracks that are to be rebuilt. After the 1908 Revolution led to the establishment of the Constitutional Monarchy in the Ottoman State, a reactionary rising was staged on the 31st of March in 1909 in İstanbul demanding to go back to an absolutist regime based on religious principles again. The rising was started

in the Taksim Barracks, which was then turned into the headquarters of this reactionary rebellion. The rising was suppressed by the Movement Army which came from Thessaloniki to İstanbul and whose staff officer was Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). It is thus only natural that those who desperately wish to take the revenge of the Kemalist Revolution today insist on rebuilding these Barracks as a symbol of their own stance.

The second leg of the project is that the rebuilt Barracks are planned to house a shopping mall. I think it will be no exaggeration to regard “shopping malls” as symbols of a lifestyle imposed by the global capitalist system to the entire world. Thus the project itself is nothing but a synthesis of Ottomanism and global capitalism, reflecting the current alliance between the imperialistic system and the medieval forces in Turkey.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE TAKSIM RESISTANCE

If the question is whether the social outburst in Turkey triggered by the resistance against Erdoğan’s Gezi Park project was something expected or not, the answer is both yes and no. The first thing to be noted in that regard is that, for the last decade, the political and social tensions in Turkey have been growing since Erdoğan came into power, along with this process being especially accelerated within the last few years. Prior to the Taksim Resistance, the potential energy accumulated within the society had already started to turn into kinetic energy in the form of big mass demonstrations within the last one year. Large numbers of demonstrators became familiar with tear gas, water cannons and police violence during these struggles. It was this militant rise of the people’s movement, which paved the way to the current resistance. That is what underlies the answer “yes”. Due to the stochastic nature of social phenomena, however, it usually is not possible to precisely forecast the time, place and scale of social outbursts, as was also the case with the Taksim Resistance.

The bans and limitations introduced by the Erdoğan government last year concerning the celebration of national holidays was met with big anger among the citizens. The Youth Union of Turkey (Türkiye Gençlik Birliği) made a call for a demonstration in İstanbul on May 19, 2012, in which more than 200 thousand citizens took part. The 19th of May is the date when Mustafa Kemal landed in Samsun in 1919 to start the National Liberation Movement and is celebrated as a national holiday dedicated to the youth in Turkey. 19 May 2012

witnessed the first big mass demonstration in Turkey in the aftermath of the Republic Meetings in 2007, which had been held in Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir and several other cities with the participation of millions of citizens. On 29 October 2012 — the Anniversary of the Foundation of the Turkish Republic — hundreds of thousands of people gathered in Ulus (Ankara) in front of the First Turkish Grand National Assembly Building under the leadership of Workers’ Party (Turkey) (İşçi Partisi — Türkiye) and the Youth Union of Turkey. The police tried to prevent the gathering by attacking the crowd with tear gas and water cannons and by setting up barricades between groups that were coming to the square from different directions. Neither the police raids nor the barricades could prevent the people from gathering at the Ulus Square, from where they marched several kilometers to reach Atatürk’s Mausoleum. 19 May 2012 acted as the sparkler, and 29 October 2012 was the turning point in the rising wave of the people’s movement in Turkey.

Hatay is one of the Southern provinces of Turkey bordering with Syria, where several “refugee camps” are located. As most of these are acting as “mercenary camps” from where terror is being “exported” to Syria under the patronage of the Erdoğan administration, several big mass demonstrations were held in Hatay starting as of September 2012, demanding the shutdown of these terror camps and calling for solidarity and friendship with the Syrian people. It seems also worthwhile to emphasize that these demands united people of different ethnic origins and religious beliefs in Hatay and neighboring provinces along the border with Syria.

The trials of the so-called Ergenekon Case are being held in a prison compound near Silivri. The very fact that Silivri is a town about 100 km distant from İstanbul, while the natural location of the court in charge of this case is in Beşiktaş — a central district of İstanbul —, may give everyone some idea about how “open” these trials are to the public. The summary accusation is that the suspects of this trial (including leaders of political parties, former rectors and several academicians, journalists, retired generals and officers) have formed a secret organization called Ergenekon to overthrow the government, although many of them got to know each other well only in prison. Dr. Doğu Perinçek who is still the chairman of Workers’ Party (Turkey) is among the suspects and has now been under arrest for more than five years. The common feature that unites almost all the suspects is that they are all patriotic figures who have struggled against the US plans concerning Turkey

and the Middle East and have defended the Kemalist Revolution. The “Ergenekon Case” itself is a US plot implemented by the Erdogan Administration not only against the suspects, but against Turkey as a whole. Thus, it comprises along with other similar “cases” one of the most important sources of political and social tension underlying the current social outburst. There have been two big mass demonstrations (along with several other smaller ones) in Silivri in front of the court within the last year, one on December 13, 2012, and the other on April 8, 2013, both including about 100 000 participants, who had to face barricades, tear gas and water cannons. The citizens, however, insisted on staying in front of the court until the trial was over, thereby also defending the principle of the “openness of the trials to the public”.

These are just some chosen incidences to exemplify the background of the current nation-wide resistance. It should thus be no wonder any more to anyone who sees this picture how come these young people of all ages, these women and men of Turkey have been struggling day and night all over the country for so long.

Having gone through the source of human energy of the Taksim uprising, let us turn to the architecture of the political and social tensions in Turkey and the factors behind them. This is quite important as the people’s movement in Turkey will continue to rise in waves with outcomes that will not stay confined only to Turkey itself, but will have an impact upon the entire region.

ERDOĞAN’S FOREIGN POLICY IS TIGHTLY BOUND TO THE US AND NATO

It might be best to start with the foreign policy that the Erdoğan Administration has been following since it came into power in 2002 with a focus on the Syrian issue.

Tayyip Erdoğan — the Prime Minister of Turkey — is known to have himself publicly declared more than 30 times that he is acting as one of the Co-Chairs of the Great Middle East Project of the USA. Abdullah Gül — the President of Turkey is known to have admitted himself that he signed a secret “two-page, nine-item” agreement with Colin Powell in 2003, when he was the Foreign Minister of Turkey. Ahmet Davutoğlu — the present Foreign Minister of Turkey — is known to have written a book entitled “Strategic Depth” whose main message can be summarized as “Align your policies with those of big powers, if you wish to become a regional

leader.” This provides a clear picture of the framework that has been shaping the foreign policy of the Erdoğan Administration.

Erdoğan is known to be the world champion of hostility against Beshar Esad in Syria. He is supporting the so-called “Syrian Free Army” and other terror groups against Esad logistically by all means, which include the provision of safe bases behind the front to these mercenaries in Turkey under the guise of “refugee camps”. As a consequence of this policy, the control of Turkish security forces on the border with Syria was practically lifted so that the mercenaries could cross the border freely in either direction. The displeasure aroused thereby among the inhabitants in cities and towns near the border was made visible by mass demonstrations in Hatay and other places as mentioned above.

The terror that was exported to Syria under the patronage of the Erdoğan regime struck back Turkey itself violently. On 11 February 2013, a car bomb exploded at Cilvegözü Bordergate killing 13 people including both Syrians and Turks. The second and more tragic incidence of terror took place on 11 May 2013 in Reyhanlı, a town in Turkey very near to Cilvegözü Bordergate, when two car bombs exploded in the town center killing more than 50 people and injuring hundreds of them. Erdoğan could go to Reyhanlı only one week after the incidence and made a speech to a crowd supposedly collected together from other regions because he was afraid of the fury of the people from Reyhanlı. These two tragic events only added to the great fury of the Turkish people who demand peace with the neighbor and peace at neighbor’s home.

The Taksim Resistance in Turkey and the opposition of the Turkish people to Erdoğan’s hostile stance against Syria combined with the inevitable tightening of the control on the Syrian border by Turkish security forces after the Reyhanlı bombs seem to have recently contributed to the Syrian Administration headed by Beshar Esad in combatting terror at home.

The relationship between Obama’s and Erdoğan’s stances concerning the Syrian issue might look puzzling at first glance, as Erdoğan seems to be the one who is ready to do everything to overthrow Esad, while Obama looks as if he were dragging his feet in this regard. It is, however, doubtless that the patent of Erdoğan’s policy concerning Syria belongs to the US. Initially, he was driven against Beshar Esad by the US in an unbridled

way in expectation of an easy and quick victory. When this plan failed, however, Erdoğan found himself in the midst of a mined ground, while Obama still could use the relative manoeuvre space he had secured for himself by having let someone else jump to the mined ground on his behalf. It should be noted here that the “good times” between Erdoğan and Esad, the climax of which was reached by holding joint government meetings very shortly before Erdoğan’s sharp turn from “extreme friendship” to “extreme hostility”, were not a product of Turkey either.

After Obama came into office in the US, Davutoğlu became the Foreign Minister in Turkey.

In the first term (2002-2007) of AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi — Justice and Development Party), “membership to the European Union” had been the major keyword of Turkish foreign policy. The rationale behind this policy, whose patent again belongs to the US, was to keep Turkey bound to the door of the EU in order to prevent it from seeking other alternatives and forming closer ties with Eurasia. In AKP’s second term (2007-2011), however, the keyword “EU” entirely disappeared from the scene, and Davutoğlu replaced it first by “zero-problem-with-the neighbors” and then by “New Ottomanism”.

In order to understand the rationale behind this change, let us remember the main components of the Obama doctrine, which can be summarized as (I) making more effective use of diplomatic, political and cultural channels, (II) letting the “allies” share the burden by getting them do some of the jobs on behalf of the US rather than the US itself directly, and (III) shifting the center of weight from regular warfare to special warfare in reshaping the world. It is the implementation of the second and third items that we presently witness in Syria.

As for the first item, the USA was lacking direct diplomatic, political and cultural channels with the Islamic World whose effective use would help the creation of political and social footholds that would internalize the US plans and thus be useful in implementing them. So, the need was for a country which owned such channels and was ready to use them on behalf of the US. This country was not only to look socially and culturally Islamic, but also should introduce a reinterpretation of Islam that would get rid of all obstacles in Islam to integration with the global capitalistic market. Finally, for

such a country to be influential in the Islamic World, it should not act like a proxy of the US. All this is actually nothing but what is meant by “Moderate Islam”, represented by the AKP Administration in Turkey.

Davutoğlu’s formula of “zero-problem-with-the neighbors” as well as Erdoğan’s “one-minute-show” in Davos against Israel followed by his stance in the Mavi Marmara Incidence are to be evaluated within this framework. The “golden times” with Syria were not an indication of a shift of axis of the Erdoğan Administration from the West to the East, but were part of a scenario aiming at softening and weakening Syria from inside. But the difficulty that USA and the West have been facing in producing an effective opposition to Beshar Esad in the Syrian issue now clearly shows that the task of creating an effective political and social foothold on behalf of the US was not succeeded.

The firm resistance of Syria under Esad’s leadership against the dirty war initiated by the US using the Erdoğan Administration as an instrument gained the sound support of a “Eurasian hinterland”. Esad’s resistance, the international support it gained and the strong opposition of the Turkish people to Erdoğan’s stance concerning Syria left Erdoğan in a cumbersome position. When the inability of the US and the West due to the big difficulties they are going through because of the global economic crisis was added to that, the claim to regional leadership or equivalently “New Ottomanism” collapsed before it even started. We can hardly deny the importance of the role this

collapse played in the rise of the people’s movement in Turkey and thus in the Taksim Uprising. Conversely, the strength of the nation’s opposition now renders Erdoğan more unable than ever concerning Syria as well as in other major issues.

THE SECOND ISRAEL = “FREE KURDISTAN” IS AN INVARIANT OF THE GREAT MIDDLE EAST PROJECT

One of the invariants of the US policy concerning the Middle East is to turn Northern Iraq into a permanent base of its own, or equivalently into a second Israel. This target can be reached by founding a “Free Kurdistan”. The territory of the Kurdistan Regional Government is by itself not adequate for the sustainability of such a state. Sustainability requires expansion of the territory to the North into Turkey and an opening to the Mediterranean via a “Kurdish Corridor” in Northern Syria. A possible ex-

pansion to the East into Iran is also desirable. The competence and accumulation needed for founding and running such a state is owned by the PKK. This collection of statements depicts the framework within which the USA considers the “Kurdish factor” in the Middle East.

Turkey is now going through a so-called “peace process” with the PKK, the roadmap of which has been drawn by the US. The US authorities had been advocating for quite some time that the PKK should be taken as a negotiation partner by the Turkish Government. To cope with circumstances under which the acceptance of the PKK as a formal negotiation partner would be politically untenable for a government, the advice was that the parliamentary deputies of the BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi — Peace and Democracy Party) serve as interlocutor in negotiations. The Erdoğan Administration has followed this advice to such an extent that the current position of Öcalan and the PKK is factually far beyond that of a negotiation partner. A description that would fit the present situation best is to refer to them as “coalition partners” of the Erdoğan Administration. The process was carried out under the pretense that this was the only feasible way of liquidating the PKK. The consequence was, however, the legitimization of the PKK, rendering this separatist force stronger than ever.

“Peace at home” is naturally the common demand of all Turkish citizens irrespective of their ethnic origins. As now the continuation of “cease fire” is made dependent upon the well-treatment of the PKK so that it continues to comply with cease fire, the social engineering behind the “peace process” is the utilization of this common demand of the people for peace by blackmailing them with the PKK terror. The success of this blackmail naturally requires a strong PKK, rather than one that has entered a liquidation process.

The next stop of the roadmap is the change of the Constitution accordingly, the essence of which can be summarized as to remove the “Turkish Nation” along with all values of the Atatürk Republic from the Constitution. The estimation that has been rendered vacuous by the uprising of the nation was that the same blackmailing by the PKK would be useful in making these changes acceptable to the nation and carrying it to the brink of fragmentation.

Having noted that a “Free Kurdistan” lies at the core of the Great Middle East Project and the PKK is indispensable for the US in that regard, it would be an illusion to even think

that the USA would allow the Erdoğan Administration to liquidate the PKK. The US plan is, in fact, to let the PKK and the Turkish Army to fight together in Syria and Iraq against the territorial integrities of these two countries when the time ripens for that.

TURKEY IS DROWNING IN THE ATLANTIC SYSTEM: BACK TO THE ROUTE OF THE KEMALIST REVOLUTION IN EURASIA

The conquest of the state apparatus by the counter-revolutionary forces was mainly completed in 2007, when Abdullah Gül became the President. It was then that they started the operation against the members of the Turkish Army and the leaders of the patriotic forces in Turkey, who had been opposing Turkey getting turned into an instrument of the USA, under the guise of legal cases as Ergenekon, Balyoz and several others. In the meantime, they also were able to tighten their control on the judiciary. The next item on their agenda was to start the liquidation of the Kemalist Revolution from within the social life.

The Kemalist Revolution had replaced “religion” by “nation” as the source of power. What naturally accompanied that process was the substitution of “reason and science” for “dogma”. In an attempt to reverse this process, the AKP Administration is now trying to replace “nation” by “religion” again and substitute “dogma” for “reason and science”. This revival of the medieval approach is in compliance with the attempt of the imperialistic system to dissolve the national states of the Oppressed and Developing World.

The reversal attempted by the Erdoğan Regime, however, required on its part to intervene more and more not only into social life, but also into individual lives. It is precisely this increasing intervention what is now especially being met with fury by broad masses. Thus, it is no wonder that the youth and women formed the overwhelming majority in the Taksim Uprising so far.

There is another very important process going on in Turkey, in parallel with the rise of the people’s movement, one of whose main slogans is “we will win by uniting”. Namely, it is the construction of a united national front with the Workers’ Party (Turkey) in its center, with the aim of carrying a national government to power. To indicate how successful this movement is proceeding, it might suffice to quote Erdoğan who said about a month ago that “the Chair of Workers’ Party (Dr. Doğu Perinçek) is giving direction from prison to CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk

Partisi — Republican People’s Party) with his left finger and to MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi — Nationalist Movement Party) with his right finger”.

The summary conclusion that from now on everyone has to take into account is that the rising movement of the nation has invalidated all equations concerning Turkey that do not contain the nation itself as the biggest source of power.

Everything said in this article points at the fact that Turkey is drowning in the Atlantic System. The unique framework that will allow Turkey to live and develop embracing all its people as equal citizens irrespective of their ethnic origins or religious beliefs is the Atatürk Republic. The only geography in which Turkey can set itself back to the route of the Kemalist Revolution and complete it in order to go beyond is nothing but Eurasia.



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RUSSIA AND THE MUSLIM WORLD¹

Eric Walberg

In the days of the Russian empire, Russia's relations with the Islamic world were very different from the West's, being defined by Russia's own imperial expansionist logic. The Kazan khanate was already conquered by Russia by the sixteenth century. With the decline of the Safavid dynasty in Persia in the eighteenth century, Russia was able to easily move in and occupy Azerbaijan, Dagestan, the Kazakh steppe, and finally Turkestan (present-day Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). Crimea was seized from the Ottomans at that time as well. The Caucasus tribes were more resistant, and it was not till the mid-nineteenth century that they were quelled.

Afghanistan became Russia's southern flank, and British-Russian imperial rivalry there prompted Britain to initiate two wars in attempts to subdue Afghanistan in the nineteenth century to keep Russia at bay, finally allowing the British to control Afghanistan's foreign affairs. Just to make sure, the British signed a treaty with the Russians on the northern boundary in 1887 (no need to worry about the amir).

Under the influence of British-Russian intrigues, from the 1890s on, both Central Asia and Afghanistan modernized somewhat. Muslims were by then a significant part of the Russian empire, but were treated brutally. When the Russian revolution happened in 1917, even the atheist communists looked good in comparison. And indeed, after a few decades of repression of all religions, the fruits of socialism came to Soviet Muslims and Christians alike, with economic well-being far exceeding that of the Muslim world under the imperialist yoke.

The socialist revolution in Afghanistan in 1978 must be seen in this context. Until its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union, after briefly flirting with the newly created Jewish state of Israel in 1948, was a solid ally of the Arab world in its fight against Israel, and was welcomed as an ally by the peoples of Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Palestine. Afghan leftists did not fear Soviet influence (most studied in Moscow at the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University) and by the 1970s looked on enviously at the high standards of living, education and culture next door, without a thought for how shaky the foundation for an 'Afghan Soviet Republic' might be. Confirming this generally positive relationship with Muslims in post-Stalinist times, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Muslim majority 'republics' voted overwhelmingly in a referendum by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to maintain the union, as the orphan Afghan Socialist Republic desperately fought off the western-backed mujahideen.

Looking back, it is only too clear how painful the legacy of these 'Great Games' played in the Muslim world by the West (including Russia and the Soviet Union) was for Islamic civilization, leaving a trail of tribal and linguistic divisions, trade routes disrupted, and local leaders as dictators with opportunistic allegiances.

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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has had to rethink its relations with the Middle East and Central Asia. So far, considering its much reduced state as an ex-superpower, no grand strategy is evident, other than non-interference and good neighborly relations, though there are hints of a new constellation of forces.

What has been accomplished by Russia is some modest institution-building with its 'near abroad', both in competition and cooperation with the US.

- Russia and China founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 1996, which includes Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and four observers—India, Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia.
- The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was formed in 2002, bringing together Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, as well as Armenia and Belarus, though Uzbekistan's prickly dictator Islam Karimov unceremoniously withdrew last year.
- The newly reinstated President Vladimir Putin campaigned on his ambitious plan to build a Eurasian Union, which has broad backing and is moving ahead, building on the customs union already in place among Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus.

There is strong official Russian reluctance to embrace the winds of change in the Middle East proper—the Arab Spring, which Russia sees as being manipulated by particularly the US. The West's invasion of Libya and financing of the insurgency in Syria revived the specter of British/ French/ Italian/ US imperialism on Africa's north coast and has proved a fertile breeding ground for al-Qaeda types. Rajab Safarov, director of the Center for Modern Iranian Research in Moscow, argues that Russia's policies towards the Muslim world are a direct reaction to America's attempts to reconstruct the Middle East. "The US managed to organize the chaos that followed the Arab Spring, creating a region that has no place for Russian influence. Color revolts [US-sponsored regime change in Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Ukraine in the 2000s] were just a rehearsal. Now, Washington is trying to apply the same strategy to the Middle East."

Russia also has domestic political concerns arising from the recent uprisings sweeping the Middle East, both within the federation and with its ex-Soviet 'near abroad' neighbors, including its 'near abroad' Muslims in Central Asia. The immediate result was the 'White Revolution' in

Russia itself, which reached a white-hot peak during the parliamentary elections of December 2011, though its challenge to Putin and his United Russia has so far been quelled.

But Russia is even more worried about the spillover effect of a reawakening Muslim world in its restive Caucasus region, where separatists in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan and Tatarstan continue their terrorist attacks, despite the impossibility of ever realizing independent Islamic states there. After two gruesome wars in Chechnya, the Kremlin declared "mission accomplished" in 2009, pulling most of its forces out of the tiny 'republic', and leaving it under the control of local strongman Ramzan Kadyrov. Since then there have been sporadic terrorist incidents: the worst being the 2010 Moscow subway bombings that killed 40; the latest, the 2012 assassination of Dagestan's most revered Muslim scholar Sheikh Said Afandi and Tatarstan deputy chair of the Spiritual Board of Muslims Valiulla Yakupov.

Just as the Russia state is determined to keep its Muslim regions part of the Federation, it is also determined not to let Afghan Taliban, whose earlier incarnation arguably brought the entire Soviet Union crashing down, back into power. The brittle regimes in Central Asia would be in danger of Talibanization, in the view of Russian political strategists, with dire implications for all of Eurasia.

RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, THE LEVANT, NORTH AFRICA, IRAN

While Russia has been trying to reassemble some form of union with its Central Asian republics, and is working with China and Iran on Eurasian matters, it is more in reactive mode in the Middle East proper, cautious of the fluid situation, striving to put a cap on unpredictable change. Until the crisis in Syria blew up, where Turkey has lined up with the Saudi-Gulf-NATO attempt to speed up regime change, Russia was attempting to move with Turkey towards a new axis that would provide a credible alternative to US hegemony in the Middle East, agreeing on visa-free travel, building the massive South Stream gas pipeline to Europe, commencing construction of Turkey's first nuclear power station, with ambitious trade and investment plans (denominated in rubles and lira).

Russia maintains relations with Palestine's Hamas (which went so far as to recognize Russian-backed newly independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and, as a member of the so-called quartet of Middle East

negotiators (along with the EU, the US and the UN), insists that Israel freeze expansion of settlements in the Occupied Territories as a condition of further talks. It appears to be trying to regain some of the goodwill that existed between the Soviet Union and Arab states, supporting the UN Goldstone Report which accused Israel of war crimes in its 2008 invasion of Gaza. Its relations with Egypt have been weak since president Anwar Sadat kicked the Russians out in 1972, and have not improved with the February 2012 revolution and the ascent to power of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is technically illegal in Russia, classified as a terrorist group. Russia's relations with Saudi Arabia are correct but wary, turning a blind eye to (what is hoped is) past support for Chechen rebels, with a Russian railway supposedly under construction as part of Saudi Arabia's economic expansion plans.

Russia embarked on a diplomatic offensive with Arab states in 2008, offering Syria and Egypt nuclear power stations, and is re-establishing a military presence in the Mediterranean at the Syrian port Tartus, though this is now on hold given Syria's current civil war, with Russia and Iran lined up against the West and the Arab states.

There are many reasons for Russian refusal to jump on the regime-change bandwagon in Syria, but western attempts to portray Russia as the power-hungry bad guy in Syria do not hold water. The small Russian naval facility at Tartus has more symbolic than real significance. Damascus has a poor record on repaying its debt, which will have to be mostly forgiven whatever happens now. Russia's economic interest in Syria is modest compared to economic cooperation with Turkey. The real reasons for Russia refusal to join the West against Syria are:

- Russia does not approve of outside attempts at regime change, which is what the battle in Syria has turned into. After NATO's 'success' in Libya, Russia is concerned about NATO making R2P (responsibility to protect) the new imperial catch-phrase. It is genuinely concerned about heightened civil war in an evenly divided population, with rebel groups openly armed by the Syrian regime's Arab and western foes.
- Whatever the Turkish/ Arab motives are in supporting the Syrian rebels (there are many conflicting ones) the US/ Israeli desire to replace the current regime in Syria is because Syria is a gateway to their joint obsession—Iran, and its regional allies Hezbollah

and Hamas. "If Iran falls, Washington will tighten the noose around the neck of the Russian regime. A pro-western Iran will mean Russia is surrounded by US military bases," argues Safarov.

- The collapse of the Assad regime would be another confirmation to both Russian liberals and Russia's Muslim peoples, that there is no longer any 'politics as usual', and that Putin's autocratic style and the Russian Federation itself can be reversed. If it leads to an attack on Iran, the consequences for Russia and the Eurasia Union would be catastrophic.

Since the mid-1980s, a million-odd Russians have emigrated to Israel. The importance of Jewish financial and economic interests in post-Soviet Russia—both the banking and industrial oligarchs and the Kasher Nostra mafia—ensures that Israel gets a sympathetic hearing from Russian leaders. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman is a Russian Jew who emigrated from the Soviet Union in 1978. Russia now has its very own well-funded Israel Lobby; many Russians are dual Israeli citizens, enjoying a visa-free regime with Israel. Of course, the US benefits from Israeli pressures on Russia. This is a key feature of the current Great Game, where the US and Israel act as the new imperial "centre".

However, the Russian Israelis are not necessarily a Lieberman-like Achilles Heel for Russia. A third of them are scornfully dismissed as not being racially Jewish enough, and could be a serious problem for a state that is founded solely on racial purity. Many have returned to Russia or managed to move on to greener pastures in Europe and America. Already, such prominent right-wing politicians as Moshe Arens, political patron of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, are considering a one-state solution. Perhaps these Russian immigrants will produce a Frederik de Klerk to re-enact the dismantling of South African apartheid. Russia has been able to flex its own economic muscles in Israel, with Gazprom's deal to market Israeli Mediterranean liquefied natural gas starting in 2017, which was signed in February 2013.

Russia holds another intriguing key to peace in the Middle East. Zionism from the start was a secular socialist movement, with religious conservative Jews strongly opposed, a situation that continues even today, despite the defection of many under blandishments from the likes of Ben Gurion and Netanyahu. Like

the Palestinians, True Torah Jews don't recognize the "Jewish state".

But wait! There is a legitimate Jewish state, a secular one set up in Birobidjan Russia, in accordance with Soviet secular nationalities policies. There is nothing stopping the entire population of Israeli Jews, orthodox and secular alike, from decamping to this Jewish homeland, blessed with abundant raw materials, truly Golda Meir's "a land without a people for a people without a land". It has taken on a new lease on life since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russian president Dmitri Medvedev made an unprecedented visit there in 2010, the first ever of a Russian (or Soviet) leader and pointed out the strong Russian state support it has as a Jewish homeland where Yiddish, the secular language of European Jews (not sacred Hebrew), is the state language.

Given Turkey's historic links with Turkestan via the Ottoman Caliphate and Russia's links with Turkestan via the Soviet secular 'caliphate', the long-term scenario for Russian strategists is probably to develop a strong Russian-Turkish axis. Whatever happens in Syria, given its strong economy and aggressive leadership, Turkey will be the new strongman in the Middle East proper. Together, Russia and Turkey have far more justification as Middle Eastern "hegemons" than the British-American-Israeli usurpers. In a delicious irony, invasions by the US and Israel in the Middle East and Eurasia (Afghanistan, Iraq, Gaza, threats to Iran) have not cowed the countries affected, but emboldened them to work together, creating the basis for a new alignment of forces, including Russia, Turkey, Iraq and Iran.

Russia has long been working closely with Iran. The new constellation of Russia, Iran and China in Eurasia is taking shape as the US withdraws from the region. Russia continues to veto any overt attack on Iran and is handing over complete control of Iran's nuclear power stations this year. Both Russia and Iran support the current Afghan government against the Taliban. In fact, in case US State Department and Pentagon officials haven't noticed the obvious, the main beneficiary of the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq has been Iran, by definition. The invasion brought to power the ethnic Persian Tajiks in Afghanistan, and the invasion of Iraq set up a Shia-dominated government there. Just as Russia and Turkey are creating an alliance in the Middle East proper, Russia and Iran have forged a long-term

alliance in Central Asia with implications for Eurasia as a whole.

A NEW ROLE FOR RUSSIA

Russia is still struggling to leave its own tragic civil war in Chechnya behind, and to make sure there's a place at the table for its Muslims. With its 16–20 million Muslims (about 12 per cent of the population), not to mention the largely pro-Russian populations of former Soviet republics, it has a natural interest in joining the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Predominantly Muslim Tatarstan is an example to the Muslim world of the Russian tolerance of Islam. The Tatar president, Mintimer Shaimiev, joined deputy chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church Vsevolod Chaplin at a religious conference in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in November 2008. President Shaimiev read a greeting from Medvedev that stressed: "Russia intends to stick firmly to its course to expand active interaction with the Islamic world." Chaplin said, "Russia is inseparable from the Islamic world, as many millions of Muslims live there, and the Islamic world is inseparable from the Russian and Orthodox world, whose members live in so many Muslim countries."

Contrast the attitudes of the United States and Russia towards the OIC. In 2008, US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, speaking at a reception in Washington to introduce Sada Cumber, the first US special envoy to the OIC, said: "The notion that the United States is at war with Islam, as we sometimes hear, is simply propagated by violent extremists who seek to divide Muslim communities against themselves." Cumber, a smooth Pakistani-born businessman from Texas, later admitted that he hadn't made much headway at the OIC conference in persuading people of the truth of Rice's claim. In contrast, Russia actually wants to join the OIC—its Muslim population is larger than that of several Asian and African Muslim states—"to enhance co-operation with Islamic nations", according to Russian ambassador at large Veniamin Popov. Russia continues to work within international bodies and observe international laws, while the US continues to deny its responsibility for the terrible situation in the Middle East and to bully the world to follow one of its many "roadmaps".

Russia inherits fond memories across the Middle East region as the anti-Zionist Soviet Union's successor. It now has the chance to gain long term credibility as a principled partner not only in the Middle East but to

non-aligned countries everywhere, and should hold the fort, the anti-imperial one, against what's left of empire.

As for Russia's domestic dilemmas, good relations with the various Muslim Brotherhoods across the region will be the best 'vaccine' against the jihadi terrorists who continue to plague the Caucasus and occasionally Russia-proper now. Egypt's Sinai border incident in August 2012 when 16 guards were killed has forced the Egyptian MB to come down hard on such terrorists, and it will be eager to help Russia deal with its own, as terrorism knows no boundaries anymore.

From a US point of view, Russia, Central Asia and the new-old Middle East are much of a kind—lesser, weaker powers, strategically located, with lots of oil and other goodies. Farsighted Russian strategists should be making common cause with the new Islamist forces, as they face the same foes (imperialism and terrorists). They can only advance if they work together.

The germ of such a re-alignment is taking shape in Russia's alliances with Turkey, Iran and various groupings—the SCO, CSTO, and others outside the Muslim world, such as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China). The tragedies of Syria and Afghanistan will require difficult compromise from all sides, but Russia cannot be accused of Machiavellian intrigues in either country.

WESTERN USE OF ISLAMISM

Claudio Mutti

In his famous book "The Clash of Civilizations" Samuel Huntington affirms that the true problem of western world is not the Islamic fundamentalism, but Islam itself. The American ideologist explains that Islam is a strategical enemy of the West, because the confrontation between the two is an existential conflict between secularist values and religious ones, Human Rights and Divine Rights, Democracy and Theocracy. Therefore, until Islam remains Islam and the West remains the West, the conflict will mark their mutual relations.

Huntington's assertion indicates not only the strategic enemy of the West, but also its tactical ally, that is the Islamic fundamentalism. However in 1996, when "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" was published, such a tactical alliance was already existing.

An Arabian ex-ambassador, who had been accredited to the United States and Great Britain, writes: "It is a fact that the USA have stipulated alliances with the Muslim Brothers in order to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan and that since then the USA have courted the Islamist current, supporting its propagation through the Muslim world. Towards the Islamists, most of western States have followed the example of their major ally and have adopted an attitude going from the benevolent neutrality to the resolved connivance" (1).

The western support to the so-called Islamic integralism or fundamentalism did not start in Afghanistan in 1979, where six month before the Soviet intervention the US intelligence had begun to aid the Afghan guerrilla (as the ex director of CIA Robert writes in his book *From the Shadows*). This support dates back to the fifties and the sixties of the last century, when Great Britain and USA, considering the Nasserian Egypt as the main obstacle to the western hegemony in the Mediterranean region, gave their aid to the Muslim Brothers. A son-in-law of the movement's founder, Sa'id Ramadan, who created an important Islamic centre in Munich, received money and instructions from the CIA agent Bob Dreher. According the project explained by Sa'id Ramadan to Arthur Schlesinger Jr.: "When the enemy is armed with a totalitarian ideology and served by regiments of devoted believers, those with opposing policies must compete at the popular level of action and the essence of their tactics must be counter-faith and counter-devotion. Only popular forces, genuinely involved and genuinely reacting on their own behalf, can meet the infiltrating threat of Communism" (2).

The exploitation of the Islamist movements useful to the Atlantic strategy did not finish with the Red Army's retreat from Afghanistan. The aid granted by Clinton's administration to the Bosnian and Kosovar separatism, the US and English support to wahhabi terror in Caucasian region, Brzezinski's patronage to fundamentalist movements in Central Asia, the intervention in Libya and Syria are episodes of a war waged against Eurasia, in which the North Americans and their allies have turned to the Islamist collaboration.



Claudio Mutti

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Rachid Ghannouchi, who in 1991 received George Bush's praise for the role he had played in mediating the agreement among the Afghan factions, has tried to justify the Islamist collaborationism, sketching an idyllic picture of the relations between the USA and the Muslim world. Speaking with a French journalist who asked him if he considered the North Americans more conciliatory than Europeans towards the Muslims, the founder of An-Nahda replied in the affirmative, because "an American colonialism never existed in the Muslim countries; no Crusades, no war, no history"; moreover, Ghannouchi recalled the common struggle of North Americans, Britains and Islamists against the bolshevist enemy (3).

THE "NOBLE SALAFIST TRADITION"

As an Italian orientalist writes, the Islamist current represented by Rachid Ghannouchi "refers to the noble salafist tradition of Muhammad Abduh and has had a more modern version in the Muslim Brothers' movement" (4).

To return to the pure Islam of the "pious ancestors" (*as-salaf as-salihin*) and to make a clean sweep of the tradition originated by the Quran and the Prophet's Sunnah in the course of the centuries: this is the program of the reformist current whose starters were Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905).

Al-Afghani, who in 1883 founded the Salafiyya Society, in 1878 had been initiated in a Masonic lodge of Scottish rite in Cairo. He introduced his disciples into the Masonry; among them, Muhammad Abduh became the Mufti of Egypt in 1899 with the consent of British authorities.

"They deserve all the encouragement and support which can be given to them. They are the natural allies of the western reformer" (5). This explicit acknowledgment of the role played by the reformers Muhammad Abduh and Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1889) was given by Lord Cromer (1841-1917), one of the main architects of British imperialism in the Muslim world. Indeed Ahmad Khan stated that "the British domination in India is the most beautiful thing ever seen by the world" and that "it is not islamically lawful to rebel against the English until they respect Islam and the Muslims are allowed to practise the religion", while Muhammad Abduh transmitted the rationalist and scientist ideas of the West to the Muslim milieu. According to Abduh, in the modern civilization there is nothing contrasting with Islam (he identified the jinns with the microbes and was persuaded that Darwin's

evolutionist theory is contained in the Quran); hence the necessity of revising and correcting the traditional doctrine, submitting it to the judgment of the reason and welcoming the scientific and cultural contributions of the modern thought.

After Abduh, the leader of the Salafist current was Rashid Rida, who after the end of the Ottoman Caliphate planned the birth of a "progressive Islamic party" being able to create a new Caliphate. In 1897 Rashid Rida had founded a review, "Al Manar", which was diffused in the Arabian world and also elsewhere; after Rida's death, its publisher was another representative of Islamic reformism, Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), the founder of the Muslim Brothers.

While Rashid Rida theorized the birth of a new, reformed Islamic State, in the Arabian Peninsula was born the Saudi Kingdom, ruled by another reformist ideology: Wahhabism.

THE WAHHABI SECT

The name of the Wahhabi sect comes from the patronymic of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), a follower of the Hanbali school who became enthusiastic over the texts of the literalist jurist Taqi ad-din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328). An interpreter of Quranic symbols from an anthropomorphic viewpoint and a mortal enemy of Sufism, Ibn Taymiyya was frequently accused of heterodoxy and has deserved the definition of "father of Salafist movements" (6). Following his teachings, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the Wahhabis condemned as idolatrous polytheism (*shirk*) the faith in the intercession of prophets and saints, so that they considered "polytheist" (*mushrik*) also the devout believer invoking the Holy Prophet or praying God next to the shrine of a shaykh.

The Wahhabis attacked the holy towns of Shiites, sacking their mosques; after taking possession of Mecca and Madina, they demolished the tombs of Companions and martyrs and even violated the grave of Prophet Muhammad; they banned the initiatic organizations and the Sufi practises, abolished the celebration of the Holy Prophet's birthday, extorted money from the pilgrims, suspended the Pilgrimage to the Holy House of God, issued the oddest and queerest prohibitions.

After being defeated by the Ottoman army, the Wahhabis separated supporting two rival dynasties (Saud and Rashid) and during a century their civil wars

covered with blood the Arabian Peninsula, until Ibn Saud (1882-1953) changed the condition of the sect. Being supported by Great Britain, which in 1915 had instated official relations with him and had made the Sultanate of Najd a "quasi protectorate" (7), Ibn Saud occupied Mecca in 1924 and Madina in 1925. This way he became "King of Hejaz and Najd and its dependencies", according to the title decerned to him by Great Britain in Jeddah's treaty of May 1927.

"His victories — a famous orientalist writes — have made him the most powerful sovereign in Arabia. His dominions reach Irak, Palestine, Syria, Red Sea and Persian Gulf. His prominent personality has imposed itself through the creation of the Ikhwan, i.e. the Brothers: a brotherhood of activist Wahhabis that English Philby has called 'a new Masonry'" (8).

The quoted Philby was Harry St. John Bridger Philby (1885-1960), the organizer of the Arabian anti-Ottoman revolt, who "in Ibn Saud's court occupied the seat of the deceased Shakespeare" (9), as hyperbolically wrote another orientalist. This new Shakespeare exposed his project to Winston Churchill, George V, Baron Rothschild and Chaim Weizmann: a Saudi kingdom usurping the custody of the Holy Places (traditionally due to the Hashemite dynasty) would be able to unify the Arabian Peninsula and to control the seaway Suez-Aden-Mumbai on behalf of England.

After the Second World War, during which Saudi Arabia had observed a pro-English neutrality, the British patronage was gradually replaced by the North American one. On March 1st 1945, on the board of the Quincy, Roosevelt had an historical meeting with Ibn Saud, who "has ever been a great admirer of America, preferred by him to even to England" (10), as proudly observed by a fellow-countryman of the US President. Indeed since 1933 the Saudi monarchy had granted the oil concession to Standard Oil Company of California and since 1934 the US company Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate held the monopoly of the gold digging and mining.

THE MUSLIM BROTHERS

In order to contain the nasserian panarabism, the baathist national-socialism and — after the Islamic Revolution in Iran — the shiite influence, the neo-royal family of Saud needed an "International" as support for its hegemony in the Muslim world. Therefore the Muslim Brothers put at

the disposal of Riyadh their militant network, which was strengthened by Saudi funds. "After 1973 the improving incomes deriving from the oil market are assigned to Africa and to the Muslim communities in the West, where a not well established Islam run the risk of opening the door to the Iranian influence" (11). However the synergy between the Wahhabi monarchy and the movement founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) is based on a common ideological ground, because the Muslim Brothers are "direct heirs, even if not always strictly faithful, of Muhammad Abduh's salafiyah" (12) and bear in their DNA the tendency to accept the modern western civilization, with all the due reservations.

Tariq Ramadan, Hasan al-Banna's grandson and representative of the reformist Muslim intelligentsia, interprets the thought of the movement's founder: "Like all the reformists who preceeded him, Hasan al-Banna never demonized the West. (...) The West has permitted the mankind to make great strides since the Renaissance, with the beginning of a wide process of secularization (a positive contribution, considering the speciality of Christian religion and clerical institution)" (13). The reformist intellectual remembers that his grandfather, performing the activity of school teacher, drew his inspiration from the most recent pedagogical theories of the West and reports a significant passage written by him: "From the western schools and their programs we must take the constant interest for the modern education, their way of facing the requirements and the preparation to learning (...) We must take advantage of all that, without being shy: science is a right of everyone" (14).

The so-called "Arabian Spring" has proved that the Muslim Brothers, supported by USA in Libya, in Tunisia, in Egypt and in Syria, are willing to accept those western ideological main points which — as Huntington has underlined — clash with Islam. The Egyptian party "Freedom and Justice", born on the initiative of the Brotherhood and controlled by it, appeals to the Human Rights, champions the democratic doctrine, supports the capitalist economy, does not refuse the loans of the international usurocratic institutions. The Muslim Brother become Egyptian President has studied in USA, where he was assistant lecturer at the California State University; two of his children are American citizens. He has immediately declared that Egypt will observe all the treaties stipulated with other countries (included the Jewish State); he has paid his first official visit to Saudi Arabia and has declared his will of strengthening the

Egyptian relations with Riyadh; he has proclaimed an “ethic duty” the support to the armed opposition struggling against the Syrian government.

If the thesis upheld by Huntington about Islam and Islamism needed a proof, it seems that it has been given by the Muslim Brothers.

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THE BANDOG OF THE WEST. GERMANY'S POLITICS TOWARDS SYRIA

Manuel Ochsenreiter



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It was in 2010. A group of German businessmen and politicians step out of a plane in the Syrian capital Damascus. The sun is shining, they are smiling. In their suitcases they carry big plans. And they are in a positive mood. They want to get into deep business relations with Syria, earning money and much more money tomorrow. Syria opened its gates for the big business and the Germans step through these open doors. A "young progressive president", as per the mainstream media and politics, reforms his state. He says good bye to planned economy and welcomes the free market, of course in small and careful steps. Journalists and politicians in Berlin are happy. German newspapers write: "The political process is important. The economic reforms of Syria will automatically turn into political reforms. And those reforms will be good for peace in the Middle East." The German delegation shakes hands with that young progressive president; they sign contracts and found a "German-Syrian Business Council" together with Syrian partners. After their return to Germany, they give reports about the great visit to Damascus, about the chances of the future and the big business. Newspapers and magazines report positively about the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, the "young intelligent doctor" and his wife Asma, the "desert flower". Both are "well educated" the German yellow press audience is informed. A couple of months later the so called "Arab Spring" starts — game over. Overnight the "young progressive president" turns into the "butcher from Damascus" and his reforms into dictatorship.

The same politicians who were shaking his hand now all of the sudden say: This evil president goes on a war against his own people. And it is a bloody war with massacres; the term "genocide" appears in German media. Within weeks the German government becomes one of the turbo motors of the aggressive EU-politics against Syria.

How is such a political "U-turn" possible? How can it take place with almost no media echo? How can the most powerful economic giant in the EU — Germany, be so changeable? What is the geopolitical mission of Berlin, and is there any?

Germany's official position towards Damascus shows nothing else than the complete absence of an own geopolitical program. The homeland of the general, geographer and geopolitician Karl Haushofer became a state without any autonomous idea of world politics. It became the "Bandog" of Washington.

Back to the German business mission in 2010. The permission for the German-Syrian diplomatic approach came from Washington. US-president Barack Obama tried to get closer to Damascus and to establish in small steps again diplomatic ties to the Syrian government in that time, a time we don't talk about anymore today. Berlin followed Washington in 2010. And when the crisis broke out in spring 2011, Berlin followed Washington again.

Within weeks Germany became the European front-state against Syria. Berlin started war-politics against Damascus in all traditional levels: economic, propagandistic, diplomatic and in terms of intelligence and military actions against the "enemy" — Syria.

The destructive economic war against Syria began in Summer 2011. Germany pushed an EU oil embargo against Damascus. Before the oil embargo, Syria sold nearly two-thirds of its exports to Italy and Germany with almost all of the rest going to France, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain and Turkey. The idea of the embargo was to cut off a major source of foreign currency "that helps to finance the security apparatus and restrict funds at Assad's disposal to reward loyalists", as per the mainstream media. What the media didn't mention was the fact that Syria uses its income of the oil business to finance not just its security forces but also the whole civil sector as police, education, and health system. The idea of the oil embargo was the idea of a crackdown of the Syrian state. Neither German politicians nor the mainstream media realized that such an embargo causes harm especially to the Syrian civilians.

The Syrian president Bashar al-Assad reacted with a statement that the West was pressuring Syria "to sell out which will not happen because the Syrian people have chosen to have an independent will". The west didn't take into account that Damascus could also export its oil to other countries that don't support the embargo. So the effect of the embargo politics against Syria wasn't as destructive as Brussels and Berlin expected. But the economic war against Syria unleashed also by Germany has many other levels than just an oil embargo. Syrian businessmen and politicians are blacklisted and not anymore allowed to enter EU countries; a lot of goods especially high technology products are banned from import to Syria. The western theory that this might weaken the Syrian government is disproved every day in Syria. The inflation of the Syrian Pound hits the whole population. Electricity cuts, before the crisis almost unknown in Syria, forced especially the small shops and businesses in the country to buy diesel generators. The population is strangulated, not just the government. And by the way, this is not surprising. The experience of long term embargo politics for example against Iraq and Iran proved already that the effect will not be a collapse of the government but more solidarity among the civilians against such a the foreign interference.

To justify those rude economic measures against Syria, especially German state media unrolled the full scale of classical so called "grey" and "black" war propaganda against Damascus. Grey propaganda is propaganda without any identifiable source or author. A major application of grey propaganda is making enemies believe falsehood using straw arguments. Black propaganda is false information and material that purports to be from a source on one side of a conflict, but is actually from the opposing side. It is typically used to vilify, embarrass, or misrepresent the enemy.

Almost every day German state TV presented in the prime time news Youtube-videos of the rebel side with alleged war crimes committed by the Syrian security forces. German state TV journalists claimed it is "not possible" for foreign media to cover the conflict from inside the country although at the same time plenty of foreign journalists were officially accredited in Damascus. A German state TV journalist presented from the Jordanian-Syrian border a video which shows security forces hitting civilians with bats. He claimed this video was "smuggled" out of Syria and shows Syrian security forces. Later on it came out that the video was already published in 2007 and shows a violent scene in Iraq. Examples like that are uncountable.

The biggest propaganda coup took place in early June 2012 when on German state TV channel a talk show was presented with the title "Assad lets kill children — how long will we stand on the sideline?" The content of this show was based on the so called Hula-massacre from May 25 2012 where 108 people were killed including many children. Although there was neither a proof nor any criminal evidence that this massacre was committed by the Syrian government forces, German politics and media followed the Washington interpretation. The German audience was "informed" that a bloody dictator slaughters down even little children. The west should "react".

Especially the German state TV seemed to "push" German politics. Before the investigations on the Hula-massacre were finished Germany expelled the Syrian ambassador as diplomatic punishment. The German minister for foreign affairs, Guido Westerwelle, said: "It is appalling that the Syrian regime does not put an end to the brutal violence against its own people. Those responsible for this crime must be punished." When later the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported that the Hula victims came all from

two pro-Government families and that the chance that pro government forces would kill their own supporters are very small, it was already too late. Germany didn't take back the diplomatic aggravation against Damascus until today.

The diplomatic war against Syria enrolled by Germany became more and more aggressive. From January until July 2012 the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) invited the so called "Syrian opposition activists" to Berlin to "develop principles, goals and recommendations for a Syria after the demise of the Bashar al-Assad regime". This conference was hosted not just by the German SWP but also by the US think-tank, United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Both the SWP and the USIP are official institutes of the governments of Germany and USA. At the end of the meeting the participants presented a paper called "The Day After" , a plan how to rule Syria after the regime change.

Since January 2013 Germany goes on war against Syria also in the most traditional way, the military one. German Patriot missiles have been put in combat duty in Turkey's southeastern province of Kahramanmarash. The NATO command has activated the surface-to-air missile systems that are now monitoring the Syria-Turkey border. 350 German troops arrived in Turkey to work on the missile site and maintain the systems. Also the US is beginning to deploy its Patriot missiles in Turkey's Gaziantep province.

Meanwhile the German government ignores the bloody facts about the war in Syria. It is the NATO-partner Turkey who behaves aggressive against the Syrian neighbor. Turkey gives shelter to terrorist gangs infiltrating into Syria. Ankara provides training camps and medical care for the armed gangs fighting in Syria not just against the army forces but also against the civilians. At the same time Turkey is an accomplice in the robbery of industrial facilities especially in Aleppo area. The aggression comes from Turkey, not from Syria. The facts are sometimes easy to understand but obviously not in Berlin.

The German politics towards Syria prove how much Berlin depends on the so called "western community", on NATO, and on Washington's political guidelines. The Berlin-Damascus relations show something else. The German politics don't serve German interests, and of course not Syrian interests.

The politics of Berlin show how far the established politicians in these days are from the ideas of geopolitics and especially from the knowledge of Karl Haushofer. Geopolitics is the method of foreign policy analysis which seeks to understand, explain, and predict international political behavior primarily in terms of geographical variables. In the actual case of the Middle East it would mean to understand the complex correlations between the different religious groups, their traditional geographic areas, their history, and traditional attitude towards state power. It would also mean to understand the complicated spider web of different geopolitical interests in the Middle East: the struggle of dominance between the wahabi monarchy of Saudi-Arabia and the shia Islamic Republic of Iran who is an ally of Syria, the role of Russia as a traditional close friend of Syria until back to the times of the Soviet Union. All these important geopolitical effects are ignored in Berlin until today.

This ignorance of facts will be very costly in the future. Germany traditionally used to have a brilliant reputation not just in Syria but in the Arab world in general. This good reputation bases on the historical fact that Germany never appeared as a colonial power in the region as opposed to France, UK, and US. The Berlin politics of today contradicts this "good" tradition in a harsh way and damages its reputation. Germany as an export nation of high technology also benefits of stable trade partners, not of failed states and political chaos as well as economical chaos. After the downfall of Libya, Germany was one of the big political and economical losers of the bloody regime change in Tripoli. The same would happen in Syria in case of a disintegration of the state which will lead for sure to a region controlled by warlords and their militias. Germany's politics bites the hand that feeds the country for the sake of the so called "better" of the western community. Haushofer would turn in his grave because of such a self-destructive politics.

The image of the German-Syrian relations shows precisely the limits of today's Berlin foreign politics. Nothing will be done that might disturb the relations to Washington. It is a necessity to escape from the western "embrace" and to start an independent politics without asking for US or EU officials' permission. The first and most important step would be to develop the relations with Moscow in a much better way than today. Russia and Germany share a lot of common interests especially when it comes to the Middle East region. It is also in the national interest of Russia to establish stability in the

region which has an important strategic meaning to Moscow, not just because of the Tartus military Base of the Russian naval forces.

It is not a coincidence that Karl Haushofer is well known in Moscow while in Berlin they even don't know anymore how to spell his name. The theories of geopolitics are developed and improved for the 21st century by Russians like Prof. Alexandr Dugin who are aware of the future challenges. Maybe the next generation of German leaders should study in Moscow where they can learn more about German interests and politics than at the pro-western liberal Otto-Suhr-Institut in Berlin. At the end Germany could play again a positive role in world politics and act as a peace power instead of being the NATO's warhead of the NATO. The Germans would be as thankful as the Syrians and all the other nations that will be in the backsight of Washington in the future.

ANALYSES OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS AND THE ROLE OF PARTIES INVOLVED

Ali Mansour



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Two years have passed since the Syrian crisis has started, and up to day nobody knows where this will lead to! On the one hand we have the United States and their allies who believe that Assad's regime will collapse, and from time to time they postpone the date of the Assad defeat. On the other hand, we have the Assad himself supported by the Syrian Army, Hezbollah, Iran and Russia, that they continue to repeat: there's no military solution for the Syrian crisis.

Two different versions, one unique question: to whom we must to believe?

We should take into consideration many aspects of the Middle East geopolitical situation if we would really want to believe one of the two parties in conflict. And the first question we should answer is: why Syria?

In what they called "the Arab Spring" we have never seen many countries, fight together by putting pulling together heavy resources in order to change a regime! Except in Libya, where there was a military intervention to defeat Ghaddafi regime! But Libya is much more different than Syria; it's important yes as a country but not as essential as Syria for Russia, Iran and others.

Syria has never signed any agreement with Israel, because Syria pretends the restitution of Golan Heights before any peace agreement, Syria is therefore the only Arab country who support clearly all the resistance movement in the area and host the heads of Palestinian resistance movements on its ground, Syria also provides weapons to the Lebanese resistance movement, Hezbollah. Syria has also an extraordinary army with more than 320,000 professional soldiers, all well trained and equipped. After the disintegration of the Iraqi army, the Syrian army became the only real challenge for Israel! Syria has a strategic alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran and has granted a permanent naval base to the Russian army — the only Russian base in the Middle East. That's why winning the war in Syria for the United States and their allies means the followings:

Impose their condition to solve the Israeli — Arabs conflict; in other words, deny forever the rights of the Palestinian refugee to return to their lands and propose Jordan and Egypt as the alternative lands.

Isolate Iran and force it to accept the condition of the west countries regarding its nuclear program.

Cut the chances of Hezbollah, to have military equipment in the event of a war against Israel, and put the party in the strategically perilous position where he will be surrounded on the south by Israel, with Syria on the North while the Sunni extremists of Jabhat Al-Nusra will constitute another head of the enemy war triangle from inside Lebanon.

Contain the Russian ambitions to assert its growing role as a decisive player on the chessboard of world politics.

Have control of energy resources in order to force China to adapt to the interests of the West; and forget forever its dream to become the first economic power in the world.

That is why Syria is so important for each of the parties in conflict. Winning the war in Syria means to manage the Middle East for the next 20 years. This also means having a very significant advantage in the imminent battle to control Asia.

Russia, Iran and Hezbollah will never permit that Syria fall in enemy hands, and the leader of Hezbollah Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah was very clear recently when he said "Syria has very real friends, and they will use every effort to avoid that enemies reach their goals". Many analysts admit the very important role of Hezbollah to balance the power in Syria; at the same time they don't deny the professionalism and quality of the Syrian Army fighter. But the kind of ongoing conflict, where there are very experienced fighters, such as the Chechens and the Afghans, encourage the involvement of Hezbollah fighters to assist the Syrian army to win the war. In fact, the militants in Syria fear the direct involvement of Hezbollah, because they know well the long experience the party has gained over the last few years fighting the Israeli army.

And knowing that when Hezbollah will decide to put all its powers in Syria, Assad regime will survive and probably win the war, the militants accuse Hezbollah of fighting to defend the Alawite regime. These charges against Hezbollah have one specific objective: to put it in a position whereby it will have to face the anger of the Sunni Muslims, because they know that Hezbollah will do everything to prevent a Sunni — Shia conflict! By so doing, they plot to force Hezbollah to change its pro-Assad policy and let Assad face alone his fate. But they are wrong, because Hezbollah has declared: Syria will never fall and we will fight in this direction. Why this decision?

Syria is considered by the leaders of the party as the strategic area of resistance against Israel. Lebanon has two border lines, one with Israel and one with Syria, so to receive army support and logistic assistance, Syria is essential !! In addition, thousands of its fighters are prepared on Syrian soil, and maybe a few people know that

since the 1990s Hezbollah has built military bases and administrative offices in Syria. Nasrallah himself once said; "Hezbollah missiles are manufactured in Syria". This confirms that the alliance between Hezbollah and the Syrian army is strategic and vital for both. So Hezbollah is fighting against those who want to transform Syria from a very important allied country to enemy an country. Hezbollah also, has no doubt that the day after the fall of Assad's regime, the militants will attack its bases and fighters in Lebanon. In effects, the leaders of the so-called "Free Syrian Army" have declared many time their intention to attack Hezbollah once Assad regime is defeated.

The decision taken by Hezbollah to enter the war on the side of Syria has the followings objectives:

- Fight the war in Syria means not to allow the militants to organize themselves to move into Lebanon;
- Protect the holy places of the Shiites in order to avoid the increase in tensions between the Sunni and the Shia; tensions that will probably lead to a direct conflict in the case where the jihadists of al-Qaeda destroy the mausoleum of "Zainab" in Damascus;
- Prevent Syria from falling into enemy hands.

The United States, Israel and their allies on the one hand; Russia, Iran and Hezbollah on the other hand are all each party involved in the conflict in Syria. Each of them fight for very important reasons and will save no efforts to reach their goals or to improve their comparative strategically assets, before the Putin — Obama meeting in June. So, in the coming weeks, we will probably experience the fiercest fighting and attacks in Syria and neighboring countries, such as Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. It's too crystal clear for one not to see that the ongoing war in Syria will change the face of our world.

MUSINGS OF A EURASIAN FUTURE

Jurgen Branckaert

When I was asked to write this contribution, I had just come back from a trip to mythical, but nevertheless vibrating Moscow, a city, much more than Rome or other capitals of tired and seemingly off-course Europe, in fact the only city that deserves the epithet “Eternal City” nowadays.

The “Third Rome” of earlier generations of political exponents is still today a truly imperial city, radiating out of every fibre the ambition of the regained centre of the Eurasian space. Not that the excessive gaudiness of the endless storefronts and their ditto visitors were not an unenviable side of the case, but we shall not tackle that subject in this essay.

Throughout the discussions about the historical role of Vladimir Putin and the development opportunities of the Eurasian Union, we again and again came upon the question of the identity of Russia.

The age-old debate: European or Asian? Eurasian space or large solitary white power centre auf verlorenem Posten in North Asia?

These are questions which, as I wrote above, are not new and, in my humble opinion, never will be settled for good.

Maybe that is the hybrid nature of what the soul-forgotten West calls rather lazy-romanticizing “the Russian soul”: the soul of an originally East Slavic-Finno-Ugric-Scandinavian state, which was vigorously overrun in its full medieval development and culturally imbued by the descendants of the great Khan, to dedicate itself from the 16th century onwards to its historic mission, which is the integration of the countries of the Great Steppe and adjacent areas into a continuous whole, culminating in the ambition to lift this Empire one step higher to a world power with an unprecedented appeal to the rest of the world, suffering under the yoke of the big money. Or at least parts of this world.

In those parts, which — politically, militarily, economically — mattered and still, albeit to a lesser extent than they did half a century ago, matter, this appeal was much smaller: the so-called West — read: the U.S. and the rest of the Anglosphere, supplemented by the losers of the two World Wars, Europe and Japan.

You read that right: the losers of the two World Wars, certainly not only Germany, Japan and their occasional allies. The “winners” France and the United Kingdom, and the dozen smaller European states and ministates.

And the Soviet Union, yes, the Soviet Union paid a very huge price, and certainly has seen its steep ascent after the Second World War crippled, to the large, clandestine satisfaction of its competitors across the Atlantic.



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Or was it all as planned? Did the financiers of Wall Street actually play a decisive role in the implosion and revolutionizing of the Russian Empire, and of the other empires of Old Europe?

Conspiracy theories are always popular with the susceptible parts of the population, but not with those who take themselves seriously. Ahem.

Whatever they are, such slaughters still have consequences generations after they happened.

See that in the bigger picture of the European civil war between 1914 and 1945 — some call it the Second Thirty Years' War — and the human and cultural cost is still terrible.

Russian history of this era shows a particularly wretched image: after the slaughter in the trenches of the First World War, with an army full of ostentatious officers and soldiers who were sometimes only armed with wooden sticks, there were the atrocities of the Civil War between Whites and Reds, catchily described in the still haunting memoirs of the former German prisoner of war and subsequent national-revolutionary Edwin Erich Dwinger, *Zwischen Rot und Wei?. Eine russische Tragodie 1919-1920*.

After a period of renewed courage and revolutionary experiments it is Stalin's turn to thoroughly disrupt what still remains of the old structures and put the much vaunted Russian soul to the test. Almost every family in the former Soviet Union can testify about that period from its own experience.

Though we do not want to view every act of the Father of the Peoples in a negative way. His mobilization of all forces in Soviet society after an initial phase of despair after the German invasion, continues to force respect. His buildup of Soviet power into a geopolitical and military giant equally does.

There are many aspects about the former Soviet generalissimus that are often too little discussed in the West.

But guess what?

Despite the atrocities that were committed by the forces of Nazi Germany, despite the revenge taken by Soviet soldiers on the population of, among others, East Prussia and Berlin, despite the frequent, deep-seated wounds,

the Germans remain the people which, of all European nations, are best capable of translating, interpreting and re-formulating the Russian soul to a skeptical, individualistic Western European audience.

I must confess that my image of Russia was primarily influenced by the German image of Russia. Or, rather, by the positive image of Russia, that of many of those Germans and Austrians who, whether or not interspersed with personal experiences of war and other times, have described that magical world of mystery and infinity in the sweetest possible terms.

Not the image of Russia belonging to those other Germans, the Germans from the atlanticist tradition — Hitler first of them all — for whom the Russian space is a despotically ruled alien planet. Or worse.

That Germany is unfortunately still existant, and I would dare say that even in the year 2013, albeit in a "sanitized", non-racist version, it is still a significant part of the German elite.

That official Germany, from the Atlantik-Brücke to the journalistic violence of the Springerpresse, with few exceptions to the unfortunate rule.

It prefers to see Germany itself as the best European apprentice in the service of the grand masters of international capital, than being the heart of a self-conscious and tradition-oriented Europe.

Back to our image of Russia.

The question is what that positive image exactly describes: an image of Russia as a national state of the Russians or an image of the Eurasian space, roughly the former Russian Empire or the Soviet Union, that mysterious area of steppe, taiga, tundra and deserts, that Vielvolkerreich, to the words of Andreas Kappeler, that, more than a nation state in the (Western) European sense of the word, has been a model of a state-bearing people — the Russians, or see the briefly outlined genealogy above — which, surfing on its own erupting passionarity — dixit Lev Gumilev — transcends itself as a multicolored butterfly emerging as an Empire people integrating its constituent national peoples by unity in diversity to a new identity layer, the Eurasian from the Eurasianists' political discourse.

All this without losing its own national Russian identity, or questioning that of the other constituent peoples. Or more or less.

And even more than the sum of its constituent parts, and more than a strong geopolitical reality, Eurasia, based on its rich cultural traditions, is the Empire of the Geist, a realm of the Earth, of Quality, which opposes the Empire of the Sea, of fluidity, mass and quantity. The Empire of Order against that of chaos. The Empire of St. George against the realm of the dragon, the devil.

The Russian double-headed eagle with its arms speaks volumes in this regard and it is incredibly significant that the Russian State has restored this emblem to its full honour.

It fully summarizes its ambition.

It is in the Russian soul, which, through historical experience and intercultural exchange with mostly Turco-Mongol peoples, became man in the Eurasian, that we as Western Europeans have a glimpse of what man in his ties with the world should once again become: a man bound in Tradition, in Order.

But: merely a glimpse is not enough for the Europeans: there must be an alternative to the current situation. An alternative that takes into account the fact that the civilisational subject of the Eurasian cannot simply be transposed to individualistic Western and Central Europe, with its own cultural and historical experiences.

It is a beautiful example, but Europeans should find their own interpretation of the return to Tradition.

Only a return to that Tradition, and, consequently, an aversion to matter, to modernity in all its forms, to liberalism in all its manifestations, can do to lay the foundations for a political and economic partnership with the rest of Eurasia, and with the Russian space in particular.

An economic or even political unification, is only the culmination of something much more fundamental than everyday economics or politics.

A free trade area from Lisbon to Vladivostok, and from Reykjavik to Delhi is only the logical consequence of a mental, even metaphysical unification based on the rejection of (post-) modernity.

This way, and that is clear, will not lead on a bed of roses.

There is one huge problem — alongside other, more mundane issues such as geopolitical and economic self-interest of nation states.

To reach the right starting point, Europeans must break with what remains of greatness in their own history, they must, in other words, undergo an almost ritual purification.

Because, let's be honest, it's all nice that the rest of the world chastens the West, and Europe in particular, because of its colonial past and all following cultural phenomena — not least the Eurocentric view of the sciences. That does not eliminate the fact that the, in the eyes of the rest of the world despicable, history is also part of European identity and how it is experienced.

In other words, if Alexander Dugin correctly argues, in his Fourth Political Theory, for an alliance of all anti-modern forces in the world, including Europe, he must realize that, apart from some political edge cases — “identitarians” and other politclowns, who are manipulated by Western intelligence services — he will never get in touch with what the masses in Europe feel and how they want to evolve in these uncertain times into something like a bright future for the Europeans.

Dugin's analysis of modernity is correct and commendable, but it is tailored to Russians, Chinese, Latin Americans, etc., but much less tailored to the Europeans themselves, because Dugin's analysis is, in the case of Europeans, simultaneously a kind of diagnosis where the healing in many eyes is tantamount to euthanasia.

Europeans must get a real alternative before there is a real chance to convince them of the need to change their course and avoid the neoliberal abyss threatening itself and the rest of the world.

That alternative should take into account the cultural identity of the Europeans, and must not make the mistake to be founded on a cultural-historical humiliation and uprooting of Europeans. Modernity itself has already done its “best” in European societies for that matter.

This alternative should also take into account the fact that the relationship between an Orthodox Russian and a Muslim Tatar has grown differently than that between an uprooted, secularized European and an uprooted, but

still Muslim North African from the mass migration. To name but one example.

Let us be honest: alliances with African and Latin American partners are all very well and commendable, that doesn't even touch hyperpower America's small toe. And even less that of the international financial groups behind Uncle Sam. A couple of drones or a few targeted attacks, and the problem is off.

It is only when Europeans join the global alliance against the forces of modernity, that this alliance has a chance of enduring success.

And who says Europe says in the first place — let us be frank — Germany.

It is precisely that country, that not so long ago was described by its own Finance Minister Schäuble as a country which had not been sovereign since the capitulation of the Wehrmacht in 1945, that, more than other European countries, is to be freed from the atlanticist neoliberal clique which is about to push the country and its people back into the abyss, with their Europe-wide blind austerity and 1 euro jobs.

We refer to the growing anti-German mood, not only in the European Union.

It is precisely Germany that can build the bridge with the Eurasian space, more so than France with its many descendants of Russian emigrants and its russophile Gaullism, more than Italy with its many anti-capitalist sympathizers of the Eurasian case, more than sober Sweden with its geographical and mental proximity, and even more than the Slavic brothers in the west, which all too often make common cause with the geopolitical interests of the U.S. out of short-sightedness and unresolved historical trauma.

The officer-adventurer Oskar von Niedermayer and his ideological mentor, Ernst Niekisch, protagonist of the German National-Bolsheviks, were right: it is the Prussian aspect in Germany — which was officially abolished in its state form by the Allies in 1947 — the spirit of Tauroggen that incorporates the true mental bridge between Europe as a whole and the Eurasian space.

Pity the GDR did not sufficiently meet the expectations during the Cold War in that respect!

Just as the Austrian element can build the bridge between Western Europe and the Turkish space and the Middle East.

Both former Germanic powers — in the words of the Austrian general and geopolitician Heinrich Jordis von Lohausen — once were the cornerstones of the European order — now only surviving in a limited form in certain state traditions of their successor states — and are essential for the psychological linkage which I mentioned.

Both elements are essential to the rest of Europe to lead the way to a Eurasia, and, by extension, a world where postmodernism and post-liberalism cannot continue to evolve into the sole human condition, which is then no longer considered as an ideology but perceived as "natural", God-given.

How should the Eurasian future actually look like, after the victory over the forces of modernity, that want to make out of the Eurasian continent — not only out of Russia but also out of Europe, China and India — a huge colony of raw and human resources?

In this Great Eurasia as a wholesale space from Lisbon to Vladivostok, as *volkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte*, to use the words of the legendary Carl Schmitt, the central position — in all respects — is to be occupied by the Russian Federation as the core of the former Soviet space — the space of the former Soviet Union or Eurasia in the sense of the *evrazii* and as a bridge between Europe and Asia proper — with on its flanks strong and reliable allies such as Germany, Sweden, Italy and France in the west — whether or not in a reformed European Union — and Iran, India, Turkey and China in the south and east. Regarding the Turkish world and the Chinese world, crystallized around Turkey and China respectively, the future will show what their place in the whole will be.

The Turkic peoples in the Russian Federation and the highway of the Great Steppe offer of course a direct link with Turkey via the Eurasianist ideology — we refer to the pioneering work of the above mentioned brilliant historian and ethnologist Lev Gumilev — but history shows us that the (Anatolian) Turks often, even always have been geopolitical enemies of Europe and Russia. Moreover, on a geocivilisational level, Turan always stands in opposition to Iran, the Turco-Mongol tradition throughout history, despite intercultural interaction,

stands in opposition to the Indo-European tradition. But it is still possible to reach a settlement.

Especially as a promising country like Kazakhstan, the pearl of the Eurasian Steppe, should take the lead.

The same goes for China. It seems to me that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is primarily an alliance serving in the first place the interests of China and gives it the necessary breathing space in the global struggle against American hegemony.

We are curious to see to what extent China will push its population surplus in the future only to the distant lands of the south — Australia in the first place -, and will not want to take the vast country north of the Amur. I think this is a danger over which most evrazii pass too lightly, and upon which — maybe for once — our look in the West is more sober. But time will tell. A long-term strategic settlement with China is not out of the question either.

However, the strategy in which we must work together with all these and many other actors from Asia, Latin America and Africa, is in our rejection of postmodernity, of neoliberalism, of the clash of civilizations rhetoric and of the break with Tradition, and in our shared commitment to a multi-polar world, which puts forward the complementarity of cultures that have respect for each other's individuality and for the Tradition that connects us all.



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EUROPEAN UNION AGAINST EUROPE

Boris Nad

Right after putsch of 5th October 2000, which ousted President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic, Serbian new government is formed and it starts very openly to proclaim its foreign policy priorities: guidance Serbia into "Euro-Atlantic integration", "partnership" with the EU and the USA, neglect traditional relations with Russia, and a newly established with the China... For the condition of all conditions, *conditio sine qua non*, immediately is declared a "road to Europe", the EU accession. That goal — especially in one layer of Serbian society — got almost mystical significance. "Becoming part of the European family" meant, in effect, become part of the "modern Western world", integration into western empire, even at the cost of denying own identity, in that join with the winner.

EUROPE AS OXYGEN

Zoran Djindjic, Serbia's new Prime minister, made a number of unequivocal statements which were more or less consistently implemented in the practice: "My priority is to remove all obstacles that lead against rapid return of the country to Europe, without thinking are those obstacles are set in the justified or in unjustified manner".

The rhetoric of the new government, especially of new Prime Minister, was uncompromising and fanatic: "Our goal is, and we see our country in 2004 year as an official candidate for the European Union, and in the 2010 as an equal member of the European Union. Any obstacles on the way we will remove, even if they called Milosevic, or constitutions, or be called laws. There is no obstacle that can stop us in this way. As the man which was kept under the water fifty years, in his desire to breathe, to the oxygen, and Serbia cannot be stopped on its way to the oxygen, which is Europe, which is a family of democratic, modern, developed countries".

The first "democratic", "colored" revolution from the very beginning had a clear geopolitical orientation, but there was no strategy which with it be able to achieve the declared goals. It is characteristic that the debate about the European Union in the Serbian media, from October 2000, has never been conducted; in the stead of it was a choir, orchestrated campaign, with dubious effects. The question of Serbia's accession to the EU (according to the established practice in all countries which were candidates) has never become the subject of referendum. Thus, the "first democratic Prime minister of Serbia", after the elections in December 2000, even in an atmosphere of emergency — "the `democratic` atmosphere of crisis staffs, lynch of opposition, media blackout, that would not be recorded in the darkest periods of Milosevic's dictatorship" (Mario Kalik: "Myths of Zoran Djindjic") — managed to win „the ninety percent of the government, power, with barely fifteen percent support of the electorate."

TO THE NAMELESS TERRITORY

Over the next ten years, Serbia, mostly unsuccessfully, and as a rule, with the damage on its own interests, leaving the decisions of all important matters to the Brussels administration, followed the path outlined by Zoran Djindjic. In practice, this has meant brutal inserting of the liberal model, in till predominantly socialistic economy and complete submission to the dictates of Washington and Brussels, in domestic and foreign policy sphere.

Some of the consequences of policies that "Europe has no alternative" it is difficult to assess: it is the case with the introduction of European standards in the legislation, which has been reduced to a mechanical adoption of "European laws", even when they were unenforceable in the practice. Elsewhere, again, the damage was obvious and measurable: the unilateral acceptance of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement was cause of the loss of millions in already collapsed Serbian economy. The real goal, however, was a much deeper: to change the mentality of the people, as was discussed in government circles, which needed to become like a "normal nations" (read: Western European nations), by using the methods of social engineering and ignoring whole history and tradition.

Today, a decade after the death of Zoran Djindjic, the goals are as elusive as were in the beginning of his "democratic revolution". The negotiations (which failed) conducted in Brussels with Pristina authorities, under the auspices of the EU and with the strong control of Washington, finally confirmed that the cost of joining the EU and, presumably, the NATO, is the dissolution of territory which belongs to Serbia — as the condition has not so far set to no one candidate country (nor any other country accepted it). In addition, Serbia today provides image of the de-industrialized, impoverished, politically unstable country, with very large unemployment.

In fact, the "European Serbia" from the very beginning was doomed to fail, except at the cost of converting the Serbia in the territory without a name, with an equally vague population. Serbia, in the final, was deprived of the armed forces (the remains of it is assimilated by the NATO standards, for its future participation in military interventions around the world and a subsequent, potentially connection with the Alliance), and was also devoid of autonomous political will and ability to respond to the current challenges. The perspective is new tearing of its

territory, on a number of autonomous and completely independent "European regions", according to the principles, the pattern which were introduced, for Serbia only, by Yugoslavia dictator Tito.

Zoran Djindjic was assassinated in March of 2003. Meanwhile, about his personality is created a real cult. He was elevated to a symbol of the pro-Western, "European Serbia", its true icon. His followers use the incendiary rhetoric of the nineties, rejecting discussion and rational arguments. They claim how "Djindjic's vision" will be achieved (the term "Djindjic's vision" was coined after his assassination), if only he has not died under such tragic circumstances, and these claims just do not correspond to the reality: events were not developed in that direction. Djindjic's successor list, ending with Boris Tadic, is made up from the people of very different abilities, but they all were equally committed and equally unsuccessful, in their works and efforts toward the "Euro-Atlantic integration of Serbia".

ELITA WITHOUT IDEA

Faced with the failure of the "European Serbia" and the deep crisis that just discomfort European Union political elite act by inertia, pointing their eyes to Brussels. The truth is that they do not have any other program, concept or idea. In the meantime, these new circumstances were pushed and Zbigniew Brzezinski to fundamentally revise his views, and even Hillary Clinton was preferred to speak of "multilateralism". But, Serbian elite not changed even its language, and is the question how much they are aware of the dramatic changes in the world's relations.

Serbian political elite cannot be compared with any other layer of the society. And it has no any particular properties or characteristics, intellectual, mental, moral, or ethical. It is not social class or stratum, not elite, not even a closed club. Do not stand out with its education or knowledge, has no precise idea of the challenges with which is faced country and has no awareness of its own friends or enemies, or the ability to detect them. Hence, glides easily from an error in the second error, from one defeat to another defeat. Same was, more or less, and in the second half of the XX century, especially during Tito's time. Contemporary political elite in Serbia, with rare exceptions, is derived from the class of faceless officials, "the socio-political workers" of Tito era.

Serbian political elite does not represent its own people, nation and was not rooted in it. It does not know the history, despise its own heritage and tradition, easily accepting any abstract concept, Marxism or self-management, Yugoslavia or the market economy, liberal or model of European integration. Despite all this, it has no idea or ideology, but use all on pragmatism and cynical way, manner, only for its own purposes.

UNITED STATES OF EUROPE

The EU is the result of different, sometimes quite contradictory efforts of Western countries to resolve the challenges of the Cold War, and then and challenges of the unipolar world. Today, it is an instrument of Westernization and has nothing in common with traditional European values, with its heritage and culture, it is, in fact, their negation in favor of "new" and "liberal Europe". Today's EU is a totalitarian, bureaucratic structure, which implements a very rigid ideological option, one liberal, and in the foreign policy openly follows pro-Atlantic policy, and that is clearly demonstrated during the war in the Balkans, Iraq, Libya, Syria...

In other words, on the both plans, the EU appears to be a trans-oceanic province, periphery or colony of the United States, an extension of the America on the Eurasian continent

In geopolitical terms, Europe is not constituted as separate "big space". Paradoxically, it not made even political union, while remaining firmly integrated into the transatlantic structures such as NATO. The question is whether it will ever succeed to be politically united. It's position makes it ambiguous and contradictory. Europe simply does not have the strength to be formed as a separate factor, as an independent political entity other than the United States. As noted French philosopher Alain de Benoist: "The European Union has created from the start as opposed to common sense. We wanted to start with the economy and trade, instead of taking as start point the politics and culture. We wanted to create Europe from above, giving all the powers to the Commission in Brussels, which has no democratic legitimacy, rather than to go from the bottom, i.e. of communities regions and nations". Such as it is, the EU is a relict of the Cold War and a unipolar world, although, in reality, the European strategic and geopolitical interests are fundamentally different from the U.S interests. In

short: "Europe is today the body without sovereignty, which hit and weakness and paralysis" (Alan de Benoist).

The whole project of "European unity" needs to be revised, and the EU itself must be fundamentally reformed. The crisis that was just hits it, the deepest one, since its establishment, make highly uncertain and survival of the EU, and there is no doubt that the crisis is closely linked with the decline of American empire and with the rise of new centers of power. We can remind how financial and economic crisis, which was began 2008 in the U.S., was very fast spilled over the European Union.

In other words, the EU has never become more than a "common market". It does not present any unique cultural, political and even military factor. Its possible breakup scenario is therefore more certain. And with the insistence on such, the liberal concept of the EU raises the prospect of EU disintegration into several distinct geopolitical blocks. However, all hope for the establishment of a "Great Europe", represented by the European Union, are now buried. It is only an instrument of the unipolar world, led by America.

WEST AGAINST THE „REST OF THE WORLD“

Creating of Eurasia Alliance, in our opinion, is a decisive stage in the creation of future multipolar world. Without the Eurasian Union, as a new pole "polar point" in the multipolar world, all that might not have been possible. EU member states, each of them will have to decide, to determine about this fact: they will, either, like the U.S., set them self as not hostile, trying in every way to prevent the creation of a new geopolitical pole, or will be, like China, for cooperation.

Creating of the Eurasia alliance is a key step. According to this new fact will have to be determined and countries such is Serbia, located in the transition zone — the area of Eastern Europe, between Western Europe and Eurasia.

Serbia's position in such reality is in many ways paradoxical. It is, regardless of the change at the top of political power — although we accept the arrival of Tomislav Nikolic as president of Serbia as a welcome development — but Serbia received that moment as totally unprepared. The political elite in Serbia has no any alternative geopolitical project, and so far is not ready for a radical turn, although it is obvious that its accession to the European Union finally came into the "blind alley".

This question will, in our opinion, in the very near future become crucial to Serbia. On it will go up or down the new political elite. Waiver of "European integration" and turning to the Eurasian Union emerging today as imperative, if Serbia wants to preserve its sovereignty and independence, its identity and territorial integrity. The President of the Republic of Srpska Milorad Dodik is perfectly summed up here, really non-existent, the dilemma: "Why we need Europe if we do not have state?" President Dodik conclusion is unequivocal: "Serbia needs to strengthen its capacities and turn them over to the East. After all, it seems, that's start to do and Europe. The same West has pushed us into very rapid privatization, which has as effect devastated economy. Steeled our economy by buying our companies for `next to nothing`, they now would take and our state, with the impose of EU directives (...) But, is enough of that fanaticism and belief that we cannot live without the EU".

We can agree with the statement that we are now entering into phase of global instability, a phase of dramatic change, the inevitable redistribution of global power. It can be considered a third world war, regardless of whether the conflict remain regional, or we really can get into a nuclear superpowers confrontation. It is a struggle between the West globalization and multipolarism, among Western powers, led by the U.S., against the "rest of the world," against Eurasia. In that conflict, Serbia cannot stand idly by, nor will it be able to maintain a neutral position. The present position of Serbia and the dynamics of the conflict drives Serbia today to abandon EU integration and to take the first steps toward membership in the Customs Union, to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization, in order to become a full part of tomorrow Eurasian Union.

Translated by Vesna S. Disic.



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TAJIK CINEMA AFTER DISINTEGRATION OF USSR: IDENTITY SEARCH, TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVES

Sharofat Arabova

Cinema of every country has its unique image that deeply rooted in certain irreproducible culture. By definition of identity of cinema we will imply the overall film image that takes form under influences of policy and main ideological line, social condition, economic issues related to film production and to film market, certain artistic trends and aesthetic influences of one particular filmmaker. While looking at films one can't ignore the mentioned issues, because cinema is created on the cross lines of many related fields, like a pattern that is woven with some lines more bold and prominent, and some — thin, delicate and almost invisible that always lies under the top layer. It relates not only towards a subtext of the film, but also the context the film was made in.

Cinema of every country of Central Asia after the disintegration of USSR experiences difficulties and trying to overcome them and their nowadays success depends on how much it was developed in Soviet period, what was the previous level of excellence and how many filmmakers started their carrier during Perestroika and thus represent the old generation of film masters, creating the basis for cinema of new states. Some of them, graduated from central VGIK (State All-Union Film Institute), continue to work and make films that get appreciation at international film festivals today. New filmmakers that started their carrier after 2000 are either in search of a professional film education or self-taught people of natural gifts working independently.

Faced with serious social, economical and political problems, the arts are not the top priority of most of these new governments. Today creative filmmakers of the autonomous Central Asian countries are looking towards the West for finances and recognition. The biggest drawback to the development of the national cinemas, however, is the lack of money. As the eminent Kyrgyz writer and philosopher Chingiz Aitmatov aptly stresses, "The ideological censorship of the Soviet Union is now replaced with the censorship through money which is the reason behind the domination of the Western culture" [1].

Cinema itself as a global medium in the contemporary world has drawn towards attribution to bigger dimensioned spaces. Its nature is collective, and soviet filmmakers were already habituated to shift from one film studio of Soviet Republic to another, or when the screenplay written, for example, on a Baltic film studio was forwarded to Central Asian film studio for a shoot: the characters were getting local names and the cultural flavor was added, but the essential structure and the storyline remained the same. Representatives of culture of every Soviet Republic would be called as 'Soviet filmmaker', 'Soviet director', 'Soviet actress' etc. in most of the books, encyclopedias, magazines and journals related to cinema. Perhaps due to our previous experience of being cells of national cinemas of Soviet Republics within a bigger organism of Soviet

cinema, Central Asian filmmakers while working with foreign coproduction can't refer their cinema neither to their national country nor only to a coproduced country, creating a new category of films we can call 'Eurasian'.

One of the good examples of filmmakers of Tajik origin working abroad is Bakhtiyar Khudoijnazarov. His second feature film 'Kosh ba Kosh' was awarded by a Silver Lion on Venice Film Festival in 1993. Set against the backdrop of a civil war in Tajikistan it's a surreal tale about two young people, who are careless of war, but once falling in love they realize their fear and responsibility for each other. The director divides the cinematic space into two parts — 'City of God' and 'Earthly City' where the war rages and only an old cableway is the transition that people use to come down to Earth. The harsh reality wakes the dreaming lovers up. This film of Bakhtiyar Khudoijnazarov continues achievements found in his debut film called 'Bratan' ('Bro') in 1991. Both of his early films have tendency to a constructed stylized world that was realized the most later on in his 'Luna Papa' ('Moon Papa', 1999) in a genre of magical realism.

'My work can't be classified as Tajik cinema. It is my film, a film for my friends, my roots, my parents who live in Tajikistan. My work is not first about Tadjikistan, but about Central Asia. I want to take up themes that deal with Europe, Asia, Central Asia... [2]. I'm Eurasian. I would have liked to live in Soviet Union but what to do, it no longer exists' [3]. Bakhtier Khudoynazarov as a Russian filmmaker had premiered his new film 'Waiting for the sea' (being a part of his so called 'Eurasian trilogy') at VII Roman Film Festival. The film is a coproduction between Ukraine, Germany, France, Belgium, Russia and Kazakhstan. But the reviewer of 'Hollywood reporter' called 'Waiting for the sea' somehow a big budget Tajikistan fable [4]. The film was dedicated to Aral Sea problem and it was shot in Mangistau area of Kazakhstan. 'This part of Kazakhstan is special to me. The entire Central Asia intertwines here,' — says Khudoynazarov [5].

The scope for film shootings exists within Tajikistan itself. The film city was going to be built in the north of Tajikistan in the ancient city of Isfara during Soviet time. Renowned Russian filmmaker Andrei Tarkovsky was going to shoot his legendary film 'Stalker' in Isfara, but due to earthquake that happened there in 1977 they had to search for a new location. The mentioned film 'Luna Papa' was also shot in Isfara. The reason why the filmmakers use opportunities to shoot outside of the country when the story is set in Tajikistan is due to

weak material-technical basis, absence of professional technicians who can be hired along with equipment. Otherwise the equipment and stuff for a shoot has to get transported to Tajikistan that becomes costly. The majority of shoots supposed to be set in Afghanistan or Tajikistan is shot in Kazakhstan where filmmakers get more opportunities and have choice.

Most of the scholars divide Tajik cinema of Post-Soviet period into two types: Tajik cinema that produced and shot within the country and the cinema in 'emigration' produced abroad and sometimes shot in Tajikistan. Search of Tajik identity can be traced in a question regarding belonging of cinema 'in emigration' produced by foreign producers and shot by foreign professionals to Tajik culture. There are a lot of professionals from all around Soviet Union used to participate in making of Tajik, Uzbek, Kyrgyz films and that question wasn't highlighted because everyone was making a Soviet film. One can't deny excellent examples of national cinema created at that time in Turkmenfilm, Kyrgysfilm, Georgiafilm, Armenfilm and others. But the situation had changes and attention is drawn on self-determination of formed states. The cinema of contemporary world is mostly transnational and when it's limited by much narrowed geopolitical borders it leads to a lot of confusions. Thus, contemporary filmmakers working in foreign lands can be called, for example, as French (Djamshed Usmonov), Russian filmmakers (Bakhtiyar Khudoijnazarov) of Tajik origin.

The reason of present situation the Tajik cinema is in now is seen by us in absence of strong core created in Soviet period. There were 2-3 generations of Tajik filmmakers graduated in 1930-1940-th, 1960-1970-th and 1980-th from central filmschools like main VGIK training and Higher Postgraduate 2 years course also in VGIK. The second wave of filmmakers presented such filmmakers like Marat Aripov, Davlat Khudonazarov, Mayram Yusupova, Baqo Sadikov, Yunus Yusupov, Anvar Turaev that created number of significant works for Tajik Soviet cinema. Some of them continue to work in the Post-Soviet period. The third generation presents filmmakers like Bakhtiyar Khudoijnazarov, Djamshed Usmonov, Orzu Sharipov, Safarbek Soliev, Gulbahor Mirzoeva who also continue to make films. As it was mentioned above Russian filmmakers used to be sent to Tajikfilm studio for certain productions to supervise scripts, read lectures on filmmaking, train local technicians, who didn't have access to a professional film education. They used to assist them and learn on practice. Thus in an official Report

of the Director of Stalinabad Film studio (old name for Tajikfilm) is written that there were '8 Tajiks out of 77 people who overall worked on the studio in 1953. By 1958 their number increased: out of 313 people — 63 people were Tajik' [6]. Russian staff used to participate on all stages of film production. But after the disintegration of USSR and involvement of Tajikistan into a civil war, majority of film professionals started leaving the country for their Motherlands or the countries they could get chance to work in. The filmmakers that didn't leave the country survived the war, trying to build a new building of Tajik cinema in a critically difficult situation, but their attempts remain single and don't create a movement, that could become a Renaissance. The filmmakers that work outside of Tajikistan are more successful in their attempt.

Certain efforts of rehabilitation and supervision of cinema were done by the Tajik Government in a Tajik Law about cinema that was passed in 2004. The Article #3 of it is dedicated to a Category of a National film: The film can be considered to be National if 'its content and theme reflects most important principles of development of Tajik culture, its national characteristics and traditions; the producer of the film is a citizen of Republic of Tajikistan or a juridical person, including a foreign one, that is registered in Republic of Tajikistan; not less than 50% of the film production budget, distribution and demonstration of the film is done by film organizations of Republic of Tajikistan; main creators of the film (screenplaywriter, director, cinematographer, composer, production designer) are citizens of Republic of Tajikistan or people having double citizenship, physical personalities leaving in Republic of Tajikistan, registered juridical personalities...Film has to be dubbed on Tajik language [7].

Films that were shot in Tajikistan, including coproduction projects, explore themes like an effect of Civil war in Tajikistan, labor migration and criminal dominance, being mostly of social drama genre. The most acclaimed films of Post-Soviet period include such films as mentioned 'Kosh ba Kosh' by Bakhtiyar Khudoynazarov, 'Prisutstvie' (Presence) by Tolib Khamidov, selected for a Berlin Film festival Forum in 1996 and Rotterdam Film festival in main program in 1997, 'Parvozi zanbur' (Flight of a bee, 1998) and 'Farishtai kifti rost' (Angel on the right, 2002) by Djamshed Usmonov. There are significant films that were produced within Tajikistan for the past 10 years like 'Istinij polden' (True noon, 2009) by Nosir Saidov, 'Mujassamai Ishq' (Statue of Love, 2003) by Umed

Mirzoshirinov, Ovora ('Wanderer', 2005) by Gulandom Muhabatova and Daler Rakhmatov, 'Taquimi Intizori' ('Calendar of expectations', 2005) by Safarбек Soliev and etc.

Kazakh film critic Gulnara Abikeyeva noticed a tendency in Post-Soviet Central Asian films like absence of heroes-males, instead of whom old age men-aksakals become family and house supporters, who can be called as 'Fathers of nation'. They were incarnations of strength and wisdom of people, their 'pillars'. Unfortunately, there are almost no films in Central Asian cinema of this particular period, where happy families are portrayed. Mainly we deal with the films with incomplete family or a family, whose members are forcefully separated from each other, with families with a tragic fate; and only the positive image is a complete, but artificially formed family. As a result most of the children in films grow without fathers. They are brought up by mothers and grandmothers. In this case the image of an unhappy, disjoined and disintegrated family — statement of symptoms of the disease of the society [8].

The image of an absent father can be associated with the lost identity of former Soviet Republics. It happens as a result of identity crisis that takes place in a society undergoing radical transition from one stage to another, when old identities get lost and the new ones have not been created [9].

The self-determination of each Central Asian State is different. According to modern scholars, there are four competing identity alternatives: first, Western identity through membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as part of it falls in Europe, or the European-Western identity adopted by virtue of joining the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); second, ethnically defined identity broadly corresponding to the dominant ethnic group within its boundaries like Uzbek, Tajik, Kazakh, Kyrgyz; third, extended identity through ethno-cultural and linguistic connections like Turkic or Iranian or cultural historical linkages with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China or other neighboring areas; and fourth, Islamic linkages with a world of Islam at large [10].

There are opinions in film critic circle about trends of further development of Tajik cinema that not only belongs to Iranian civilization, but also to Central Asian and Post-Soviet cultural spaces. The development of Tajik cinema and culture overall depends on the

identity that will dominate: it will be either Postsoviet, Iranian, Transasian or Indianized cinema.

The attempt to reunite filmmakers of former Soviet Republics was done by organizing annual Forum of National Cinemas in 'Belie stolbi' ('White poles') near Moscow. Renowned filmmakers from around countries of CIS and Baltic used to conduct round table discussions and seminars about the ways to overcome the crisis in cinemas that took place after the disintegration of USSR and managing the film process. Not only recent works of film masters were shown during Forum, but also the films of young generation of filmmakers — the beginners. Taking into attention one of the main problems for young filmmakers as absence of opportunity to study in a Film Institute, organizers of Forum in 2007 took an initiative to conduct workshops on four streams for four young filmmakers from each of former Soviet Republic during the main program of Forum: on Direction, Scriptwriting, Production, Film criticism. From 2008 the mentioned workshops turned into a short course Filmschool of countries of CIS and Baltic, where some of young filmmakers of Central Asian countries took their inputs by professionals that used to teach in VGIK. Unfortunately the Forum of National Cinemas stopped taking its place in 2011 and 2012.

Iranian influence on Tajik cinema can be traced from the time of appearance of renowned Iranian filmmaker Mokhsen Makhmalbaf in Tajikistan, who stood in opposition to present Government of Iran and had to leave the country. Mokhsen Makhmalbaf, presently based in France, shot two films in Tajikistan: 'Sukut' (Silence, 1998) and 'Sex and Philosophy' (2005). Makhmalbaf used to conduct workshops for Tajik students in a small Filmschool organized in 'Kinoversive' production house in Dushanbe. Some of the Tajik filmmakers used to assist him and the Tajik artists took part in his films. The bounds between Tajik and Iranian filmmakers became tighter with passing of time. Works of Iranian and Afghani filmmakers are always in the program of Didor International Film Festival taking place once in two years in Tajikistan. There are Iranian professionals: documentary directors and editors, who shifted from Iran to Tajikistan to shoot their projects in there because they get more creative freedom, than in Iran. Similar situation is with Afghani filmmakers also speaking 'dari'. The Encyclopedia of Tajik Cinema that was published in 2012 in Dushanbe was divided into three parts: History of Tajik Cinema and its personalities and short history

of Iranian and Afghani Cinema. The influence of Iranian world in present day Tajik culture seems to be strong.

Western influence in Tajik cinema can be seen from the range of topics that dominate. First, Tajik cinema doesn't get commercial release and is oriented on the small screen of International Film Festivals whose focus also keeps changing every year. Second, the producers of so called art documentaries, short and feature films are International Foundations (European and American) that accredited in Central Asia. To compete in getting grants the filmmakers have to revolve their stories around relevant issues of the region. It's a market demand trend.

For example, when the film 'Angel on the right' participated in a main competition of Kinoshok Film Festival in Anapa (South Russia), the head of the jury writer Viktor Erofeev gave his two voices (that he owned by the status) to the Tajik film, explaining his position by geo-cultural consideration. Thus 'Angel on the right' won in the main competition. International film screenings can be called as Vanity fairs and ambitions not the filmmakers-creators, but mostly the states-participants [11].

Bollywood influence in Tajik films can be seen, first, in their musicality, and second, in the melodramatic collisions on the story. For example, there is a scene in the Tajik film 'True noon', where two lovers are separated by a boarder that divided former Soviet Republics. They meet every day in long musical montages and walk along the barbwire trying to hold each other hands. It's seen in the sensitivity and lyricism of the scene, the discourse into a world of their emotional experience that makes the cinematic time unnoticeably compressed. The example of an influence of Indian parallel cinema is noticeable in the film 'Flight of a bee'. It was highly inspired by master of Indian cinema Satyajit Ray. The director Djamshed Usmonov dedicated him 'Flight of a bee' in the opening title and had used a music composed by Indian master as a background score.

Noteworthy the term used by Kazakh film critic Gulnara Abikeyeva about new generation of young filmmakers of Central Asia. She calls them 'Children of Independence' because they're 25 to 27 years old and they really don't remember what the Soviet Union was. What I want to say about Children of Independence is they're not afraid. They're sure they can do it. They're not afraid to shoot without money and without any large sponsor. They don't fear official censorship because they understand

that if it won't be shown in the cinema, it will be shown somewhere abroad in festivals. And I think the Children of Independence are first, very educated; second, talented like any generation; and third, fearless' [12].

Young Central Asian filmmakers are indeed trying hard to get a professional education not only within their home country, but to join VGIK in Moscow, London Film school, Film and Television Institute of India (FTII), participate in a number of film programs like Cannes Residence, Asian Film Academy in Korea and etc. There was a discussion as part of a 'round table' during V-th Didor Film Festival about a form Central Asian cinema takes now. Russian film critic Sergei Anashkin took an example of the young filmmakers, studying outside of their home countries and presented their first works at the festival. After spending 3-5 years of study in a different environment and culture, getting inputs from foreign filmmakers, experiencing an influence of different type of cinema, it's natural that their works fall under influence of a different filmmaking style. And that's a question whether this cinema still to be Tajik or Kyrgyz or Kazakh and can be called so. One of the presented Iranian journalists and critics pointed out that every new generation destined to deny whatever was created by their predecessors.

Summarizing the abovementioned, Post-Soviet Tajik cinema is in transition influenced by geo-political motives of countries interested in the region. The Tajik cinema promotes certain ideas, that are screened within the country mainly on TV channels, forming the outlook and values of ordinary people, and outside of the country on the film festivals, forming the image of Tajikistan on the international arena. Soviet in past, with more deeply rooted pre-Islamic Iranian elements that are shown today in the tight contacts with Iranian and Afghani cinema, and Muslim culture overall that monitors the range of topics, based on the traditional values, Tajik cinema from 1991 onwards is in search of its own path.

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