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Examining 'Latinidad' in Latin America: Race, 'Latinidad' and the Decolonial Option

Eugenia Demuro
Visiting Fellow, School of Language Studies, College of Arts and Social Sciences, Australian National University

This article provides a critical account of the idea of race, conceived of and derived from European colonisers in the New World. The paper argues that race became a crucial category to the colonising projects of the New World, and in particular in the distribution of power during colonialism. The paper further examines how the notion of Latinidad (Latinity), entrenched in the term Latin America, continued to enact a discourse of racial superiority/inferiority even after the battles for Independence had taken place. Employing the critical vocabulary and framework of Decolonial theory, the paper introduces key arguments against Western European universality, and calls for a re-reading of the processes that structure privilege across racial and ethnic lines.

Introduction

Following the conquest and colonisation of the Americas, the concept of race, as a category, became instrumental to social organisation and, significantly, continues to be a powerful stratagem today. This is clearly evident in the idea of *Latinidad* (Latinity) that underscores the nomenclature 'Latin America', which continues to elevate European heritage to the detriment of all other racial or ethnic groups. We can see this, for example, in the fact that whilst an Aymaran Amerindian from Bolivia may not share much with an Afro-Cuban from Santiago, or with a *porteño* from Buenos Aires, or a Mexican from Tijuana, each is deemed to be Latin American. Given the cultural heterogeneity of the region, it seems imprecise to speak of Latin America as though there were no marked differences between the nations, regions, cultures and peoples of the huge landmass that extends from the south of Río Grande to Tierra del Fuego. It is difficult to employ the term *Latin America*

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with any validity for a number of reasons: to reiterate, it is the referent of an incredibly vast and heterogeneous region; additionally, the term emerged as the result of conflicts between imperial nations and was hence applied to the region from *outside* (see Mignolo 2005); and, most importantly, the very idea of *Latinidad* functions to define Latin American identity in relation to the European heritages, and erases and marginalises the racial and cultural diversity of people residing in Latin America. For these reasons, the term Latin America and its continued usage must be seen as part of a larger program of coloniality that began with the inception of the Americas as the New World in the 15th century, and that continues today through global, Western capitalism and its accompanying epistemology. In Latin America, the colonial project that began with the arrival of Europeans did not end with the cessation of Spanish and Portuguese colonial rule. In fact, coloniality persists today and is evident in the distribution of wealth and resources across the region and the globe.

In an attempt to define contemporary *Latin America*, Fernández Moreno has compiled an inventory of ten characteristics common to the nations and people of the region. He defines it thus:

1. A certain pre-Columbian culture.
2. The military, political, and economic conquest of these cultures by the West, represented in the majority of the cases by Spain and Portugal.
3. The correlative imposition of a language and a religion.
4. The total or partial deculturation of the pre-Columbian populations.
5. The arrival of African slaves.
6. An independence movement in the nineteenth century, strongly influenced by British policy.
7. Beginning in the middle of that same century, the arrival of new contingents of immigrants from all over the world.
8. Cultural interaction among all the coexisting human elements.
9. A relative backwardness in the process of industrialisation, which permits the localised or generalised maintenance of the serious conditions of poverty, contrasting with the wealth of Anglo-Saxon America and thus providing a paradigmatic example of the worldwide North-South economic polarity.
10. At the end of the second world war, the culmination of a process of transference of political and economic power in the region from Great Britain to the United States.

Differences between the nations of Latin America can be accounted for "by their different […] gradations of the ten elements indicated" (Fernández Moreno 1980: 12). Although this descriptive account does a relatively good job of capturing the cultural, economic and political shifts of power in the region over some 500 years, it does not account for a more fundamental notion of what lies at the heart of Latin America, and specifically the fact that, from the first point of contact with colonisers, the region has been defined as Europe's subordinate. In fact, this is perhaps the most important factor in determining what Latin America is today and what historical contingencies

have led us here. As Arturo Arias has described it, since contact with Europe, Latin America has been placed "in an asymmetrical relationship of power to the West, politically, economically and culturally" (2003: 27). It is the development of this relationship that is examined here within the contexts of *race* and *Latinidad.*

Historical Overview

The conquest of America constitutes an extensive historical process: Columbus travelled to the *Indias Occidentales*—or West Indies—four times in all (1492, 1493, 1498 and 1502), though exploratory travels were still taking place as late as 1519. There are three discernible phases to the conquest: the initial exploratory phase from 1492 to 1519; the second from 1519 to 1535, which characterises the conquest of the great Andean and Mesoamerican civilisations, and the third and final stage, consisting of the conquest of the so-called 'marginal territories', which lasted until 1580 (Vilaboy 2004: 41).

Prior to Columbus arriving, the indigenous cultures of the continent were multiple and varied, a fact profoundly obscured by the colonisers' use of the term *Indio* (Indian) to refer to them. Indigenous societies were vast and complex formations, diverse in population and spread across the continent. The Olmecs, Mayas, Teotihuacans, Zapotecs and, in most recent pre-Columbian history, the Mexica or Aztecs, occupied Mesoamerica; the Tawantisuyo empire (or the Incan) was the last of many civilisations of the Andean region, including the Horizon, the Nazca, the Moche and the Tiwanaku; in other regions there existed mid-sized societies such as the Taino population of the Caribbean, the Guaraní in southern South America, and various Tupi-speaking groups of eastern Brazil (Restrepo 2003: 48). Beyond those areas under the control of vast indigenous empires—those of Mesoamerica and modern-day Peru—there was a huge proliferation of smaller groups and societies. By some estimates the indigenous population of Latin America before the arrival of Europeans was between thirty and forty million, although there are also claims that this number may be as low as twelve million, or as high as fifty-seven million (Vilaboy 2004: 48, 64).

Genocide began as soon as the Spanish settled in the Caribbean, shortly after Columbus' arrival. The Arawak and Taino populations of the Antilles declined steeply after first-contact with the Europeans. The Taino population decreased from well over one million at the end of the 15th century, to just a few thousand within the first decades of Spanish colonial rule (Restrepo 2003: 49). This pattern was to be repeated as the colonising mission expanded throughout the continent and the great pre-Columbian empires that ruled over modern-day Mexico and Peru were conquered. By some estimates, the total indigenous population declined to as little as twelve per cent of what it had been in 1500 (Restrepo 2003: 51). Despite resistance, by the end of the 16th century the Iberian colonial powers of Spain and Portugal had gained a stronghold over the central areas.

The Emergence of *Race*

For Europe, the so-called *discovery* of America opened vast territories to be appropriated, riches to be extracted, and inhabitants to be indoctrinated into European culture and Catholicism. For the indigenous peoples of the New World, the conquest and colonisation meant complete domination, and went hand-in-hand with slavery, serfdom, genocide and the overall destruction of previously existing social formations. It goes without saying that the destruction of culture also meant the destruction of knowledge/s and worldviews that differed from that of the Europeans. The legitimising discourse of this enterprise, based on the supposed superiority of the European colonisers and the supposed inferiority of the dominated, rested on a newly emergent notion of race.

The classification *Indio* to refer to the vast numbers of societies and civilisations not only obscured the differences *between* the groups which inhabited the region, it served as the construction of an identity whose main purpose was to differentiate the indigenous from the colonisers. The term summarised a category that was entirely negative and inferior. The same process was repeated when it came to the people transported as slaves from Africa, although they came from different regions and belonged to different groups—Ashantis, Yorubas, Congos, etc.—in the colonial period they became *Negros* (Quijano 2000: 551-2). Both *Indios* and *Negros* were conceived as inferior identities to their European counterparts, and this inferiority was defined specifically in terms of their race. These identities became configured in asymmetrical relations of power within the new colonial system; they had a corresponding place within the colonial hierarchies, the organisation of labour, and corresponding social roles. Both *Indios* and *Negros* existed outside the domain of *civilised* society, as a repository of labour to be exploited for the advantage of Europeans. Interestingly, *race* became associated with colour, perhaps as one of the most salient differences of phenotype, and social organisation and privilege can be traced to a gradient of colour: the darker the subject the lesser freedom they exercised and possessed.

In this way, the concept of race was instrumental to conquest and colonisation: there is a direct link between the idea of race that emerged at the onset of the conquest of the Americas—and that was later spread around the world—and the division and organisation of labour. From the beginning, the distribution of wealth, power, domination and resources was established in terms of the newly invented categories of identity that the concept of race facilitated—Indio, Negro, Mestizo, Spanish, Portuguese, European. It is difficult to overstate the significance of this emergence of *race* as a new mode of power, efficiently employed as a means to codify the relationship between the conquerors and the conquered, and to justify the atrocities, and the violence, that the conquest and colonial enterprise entailed.

The relationship instituted at the time of conquest not only drastically changed the region today known as Latin America, but it also dramatically

changed how the Western hemisphere was to be conceived, and alongside this, the entire trajectory of Western civilisation (Chomsky 1999: 10). Some critics Enrique Dussel (1994) and Walter Mignolo (2005; 2011) amongst them, equate the conquest of the Americas with the inception of Western Modernity; it was from this point forward that Europe assumed a position as the *centre* of culture and knowledge, and positioned other cultures at its periphery. 'Western modernity' refers to the expansion and imposition of western culture, knowledge, values and institutions to the rest of the world. This includes the imposition of religious beliefs through Christianity; the organisation of gender and sexuality through patriarchy; the organisation of labour through slavery, serfdom, wage-labour and the development of capitalism; the belief in science and the supremacy of scientific rationality following the Enlightenment; and so forth. Fundamental to Western modernity, is its belief in the racial superiority of Western Europe, and its cultural and social apparatuses, in relation to the non-Western world.

As Dussel argues, the conquest and colonisation of the Americas, attributable to the first phase of Western expansion, marks the inception of Modernity:

> Provincial Europe and Renaissance Europe, Mediterranean Europe, is transformed into the 'centre' of the world: into 'modern' Europe. To give a 'European' vision of Modernity […] is to not understand that European Modernity constructs all other cultures as its 'Periphery.' It is about trying to provide a 'global' definition of Modernity (in which the Other to Europe will be negated and obliged to follow its model of 'modernisation' […]). And this is why Modernity is born strictly, historically and existentially (as a 'concept' and not as a 'myth') from approximately 1502 (1994: 32).[1]

The expansion of European colonialism to the rest of the world that followed the conquest and colonisation of the Americas spread, globally, the European belief in its own racial superiority. The logic and legitimisation of exploitation was attained through the creation and consolidation of an entirely Eurocentric body of knowledge which naturalised *race* as a marker of superiority/inferiority. Dichotomous constructions codified the inter-subjective and cultural relations of Europe to the rest of the colonised world within a set of new categories, which included, "East-West, primitive-civilized, magic/mythic-scientific, irrational-rational, traditional-modern—Europe and not Europe" (Quijano 2000: 542). Thus was born the European vantage that defined everything outside its field of vision as Other and inferior; and that,

[1] In Spanish: 'La Europa provinciana y renacentista, mediterránea, se transforma en la Europa 'centro' del mundo: en la Europa 'moderna'. Dar una definición 'europea' de la Modernidad - como hace Habermas, por ejemplo,- es no entender que la Modernidad de Europa constituye a todas las otras culturas como su 'Periferia'. Se trata de llegar a una definición 'mundial' de la Modernidad (en la que el Otro de Europa será negado y obligado a seguir un proceso de 'modernización', que no es lo mismo que 'Modernidad'). Y es por esto que aquí nace estricta e histórica-existencialmente la Modernidad (como 'concepto', y no como 'mito'), desde el 1502, aproximadamente.'

beginning with the conquest of the New World, marked a shift in Europe's notion of itself.[2]

In 1547, the Spaniard Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda made a case for the right of Spain to colonise and conquer the *barbarians* of the New World, claiming that "nothing more healthy could have occurred to these barbarians than to be subjected to the empire of those whose prudence, virtue and religion shall convert the barbarians, who hardly deserve the name of human beings, into civilised men, as far as they can become so" (in Fuentes 1992: 126). European colonisers produced an entire body of knowledge about indigenous Latin America that justified the atrocities of the conquest. Galeano has compiled a summary of some of the prevalent views about the peoples of the New World:

> Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda […] argued that they deserved the treatment they got because their sins and idolatries were an offence to God. The Count de Buffon, a French naturalist, noted that Indians were cold and weak creatures in whom 'no activity of the soul' could be observed. The Abbe De Paw invented a Latin America where degenerate Indians lived side by side with dogs that couldn't bark, cows that couldn't be eaten, and impotent camels. Voltaire's Latin America was inhabited by Indians who were lazy and stupid, pigs with navels in their backs, and bald and cowardly lions. Bacon, De Maistre, Montesquieu, Hume, and Bodin declined to recognise the 'degraded men' of the New World as fellow humans. Hegel spoke of Latin America's physical and spiritual impotence and said the Indians died when Europe merely breathed on them. (1997: 41)

The construction of the indigenous subject as barbaric justified the European right to exploit land, resources and peoples of the New World; and, as already

[2] In Edward Said, this constitutes the "unchallenged centrality" of a "sovereign Western consciousness" (Said 1978: 8). In *Orientalism*, Said argues that European Orientalism is structured through an unequal relation of power that defined the Occident as superior, and this is of more importance than the validity of the comments about the Orient: "Orientalism is more particularly valuable as a sign of European-Atlantic power over the Orient than it is as a veridic discourse about the Orient" (Said 1978: 6). Said reiterates the importance of Orientalism as a discourse in the service of Europe's centrality. Significantly, though, as discussed by Mignolo, Western Modernity has three discernible 'cumulative' (though not successive) faces: "the Iberian and Catholic face, led by Spain and Portugal (1500-1700, approximately); the "heart of Europe" (Hegel) face, led by England, France, and Germany (1750-1945); and the U.S. American face, led by the United States (1945-2000)" (2011: 7). Importantly, whilst Said's analysis focuses on the French, British and German face (which followed the decline of the Iberian peninsula), Dussel and Mignolo examine the Iberian 'face' of Western Modernity. Notwithstanding this shift, both Said's postcolonial analysis and the decolonial analysis of Mignolo and Dussel, show the supposed superiority of the white Western European (initially Spanish and Portuguese and subsequently British, French and German) as fundamental in its construction of an inferior racialised Other. The unequal relation of power between a conquering, exploitative and genocidial Western European civilisation, and the subjugated, exploited and colonised, rests on the supposed superiority of Europe, defined principally in terms of *race.*

stated, the racial inferiority of the *barbarians* structured civil rights and privilege across racial lines. In Dussel's words, Latin America was constructed, effectively, as "the *first periphery* of modern Europe" (1993: 67).

This discourse of racial inferiority continued to be prevalent throughout the colonial period and, importantly, even after the battles for Independence through institutionalised forms of internal colonialism. A paradigmatic example is the Argentine Domingo F. Sarmiento, who became president of Argentina and is still today thought of as a national hero, and who vehemently argued, in his seminal work *Facundo*: *Civilization and Barbarism* (1845), that Argentina should follow the tenets of European civilisation and simultaneously tame the barbaric indigenous and Afro-descendant populations. For Sarmiento, the division of the national territory between civilisation and barbarism was a malady that ravaged Argentina and which could only be overcome by following the models of France, England and the United States; only in this way could progress and civilisation be assured.

Throughout the colonial period and following the battles for independence, Latin America was invented and continued to be imagined as immature; the indigenous subject continued to be defined as incapable of dominating his or her environment. Latin America was a world at the margins of development, a condition that could only be resolved if it were to follow and emulate the supposed universality of the West (Quijano 2000; Dussel 1993). This represents one of the foundational myths of Modernity: the belief that it provides the model to which all other cultures and peoples must aspire. This itself, is based on a linear reading of History which places Modern Europe as the utmost point of development; "[t]he fallacy of developmentalism consists in thinking that the path of Europe's modern development must be followed unilaterally by every other culture" (Dussel 1993: 67-8).

The concept of *Latinidad* and the denomination of the region as *Latin America* which emerged were instrumental in consolidating the supremacy of the West and the 'fallacy of developmentalism'—an ideology that is still in vogue today. The term Latin America began to be employed in the mid-nineteenth century to bolster the connections between South America and continental Europe. There are two important aspects of this process worth noting: first, the idea of *Latinidad* was "the consequence of imperial and colonial conflicts in the nineteenth century" (Mignolo 2005: 89). The term was first employed by French intellectuals and politicians as a way to assert the territory belonging to Latin empires, and in opposition to the expansion of the US to the south and the influence of British policy in South America at the time. Second, the usage of this term had the effects of both providing a postcolonial identity to a post-independence creole ruling elite who wanted to identify with European civilisation, further degrading the position of non-white peoples in Latin America (see Mignolo 2005: 58).

Ingrained within the concept and nomenclature *Latin America* is the concept of race that first dictated the interaction between Europe and the New World

at the initial point of contact. In the same way that the creation of the identity-categories *Indio* and *Negro* functioned to dictate social hierarchies and domination (through labour relations) in the colonies, the creation of *Latinidad* gave the newly independent ruling elite—consisting of Creole and Mestizos/as—recourse to a European heritage. This established a dynamic of *internal colonialism* as a constitutive element of these societies. As Mignolo persuasively asserts:

> "Latinidad" contributed to disguise the internal colonial difference under a historical and cultural identity that apparently included all while, in reality, […] producing a new type of invisibility for Indians and for people of African descent in "Latin" America. (2005: 89)

Although the political and social organisation of Latin America has undergone vast changes throughout more than 500 years of history since conquest, the concept of race instituted at the point of first-contact has been instrumental to its entire history and development. At its core, is the proposition that Western European culture is the universal model to which other cultures and peoples must aspire. This has come to encapsulate all facets of existence: social, political and economic organisation; cultural production as well as the production of knowledge and epistemology. In short, this is coloniality at work: "[t]he racial axis has a colonial origin and character, but it has proven to be more durable and stable than the colonialism in whose matrix it was established" (Quijano 2000: 533). So, while colonialism may have long since passed in most of the colonised world, the fallacy of developmentalism, the universality of Western epistemology and its account of Modernity, and the idea of European/white superiority, remain at the forefront of how we understand the world. Though the struggle against colonialism may have been won, the struggle against coloniality, and its corresponding matrixes of power, continues.

Conclusion

In order to extricate ourselves from coloniality, it is imperative that our understanding of the conquest of the Americas moves beyond the fact of the colonisation of the continent, to identify the mechanisms by which Western discourse became universal. For example, Edmundo O'Gorman has contended that Latin America was not *discovered* but *invented* (Chiampi 1983: 127; Fuentes 1992: 125; Mignolo 2005: 3). Whilst these two accounts refer to the same process, asserting the invention of Latin America introduces a unique critical site. The conquest as *discovery* legitimises European hegemony, while the *invention* of Latin America is a clear form of decolonial resistance. As Mignolo says:

> [T]he first [account] presupposes the triumphant European and imperial perspective on world history, an achievement that was described as 'modernity,' whilst the second [account] reflects the critical perspective of those who have been placed behind, who are expected to follow the ascending progress of a history to which they have the feeling of not belonging (2005: 4).

The assertion that Latin America was *invented* operates as a necessary shift that facilitates a critical revision of the historical validity of the conquest, and a simultaneous re-evaluation of the ways in which indigenous cultures were, and are still today, defined. This includes the concept of *Latinidad*, and the idea of *Latin America*, which continues to marginalise those who do not fit within its vision. It is clear that what is required is a radical break and departure from this: "[D]ecolonization today will come from the actors that have been left out of the Eurocentric idea of 'latinidad'. Delinking from that concept and building an 'after-(Latin)' America is one of the steps being taken by Indians, Afros, women of color, gays and lesbians. Leadership is coming from the energy of each locality" (Mignolo 2005: 101).

The *invention* of Latin America as an outcome of European expansion constitutes the problem of defining Latin America. As has been the case in discussions from and about Latin America (whether in pursuit of an elusive progress, development or civilisation—concepts defined in European terms—or in discussions against these models—in search of an 'authentic' Latin American subject set against universal Western forms) it would seem inevitable to project European models onto Latin America. However, the flaw with existing accounts is that they perpetually reinvent the unequal distribution of power between Europe and Latin America without resolving it, being unable to imagine Latin America without conjuring Europe – a problem that is not true in the reverse order. In other words, they reify the power relations of coloniality.

It is clear that Latin America's post-colonial condition cannot be resolved while the solutions emanate from the perspective of coloniality, wherein the world is understood from a particular geo-political knowledge which has consolidated European and Western supremacy against all other cultures. In this respect, the attempt to define Latin America with reference to Europe marks the continuing success of the colonial project. To overcome this, new ways of understanding Latin America that do not rely on Europe and Western epistemology for legitimacy, are required. As Linda Martín Alcoff explains:

> […] we need a more extensive period of epistemological reflection. We need to develop a decolonial critical theory that will be more thoroughly delinked from the contemporary variants of the modern imperial designs of the recent past. The fact that language, space, time, and history have all been colonized through the colonization of knowledge must give us pause before we borrow the founding concepts of Eurocentric thought, such as centre/periphery, tradition/modernity, and primitive/civilized, or *the very evaluative binary structure that grounds these* (2007: 86 *my emphasis*).

The task at hand is thus to step outside the hegemonic normative ways of thinking and of being, which give validity and support the idea of Western universality and its epistemology. Instead we need to re-think a world where identities, knowledge/s, cultures and ways of being are not positioned within hierarchical dualisms but where pluriversality is a reality.

Although the conquest of Latin America was total and complete, indigenous cultures have survived the arrival of Europeans. At present, there are vast numbers of indigenous peoples, principally in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Bolivia and Northern Argentina. Not surprisingly, the social, political and cultural organisation of the region bears no resemblance to those of pre-Columbian times. The conquest achieved the imposition of alien legal and governmental systems; it imposed new languages; indoctrinated the population into Catholicism; and in the last one-hundred and fifty years has resulted in the implementation and expansion of the Western capitalist system (Eakin 2007: 2). Today, the nation-states of Latin America bear the full brunt of an exploitative, global economic system built on the back of the *discovery* of the New World. It has been my aim to show how the concept of race has been a key factor in this development. As Quijano states, "[t]he racial axis […] has proven to be more durable and stable than the colonialism in whose matrix it was established" (2000: 533). This process of domination irrefutably began when Columbus first set foot in the *Indias Occidentales* and undoubtedly continues to the present day.

Author Note

Dr E. Demuro was awarded her Ph.D. from the University of Sydney (2010). She researches and writes across the areas of sociology, literature and Latin American studies and translation. At present, she is working on the geopolitics of Decoloniality and on decolonial aesthetics. Dr Demuro is a Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University.

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Adoption, Surrogacy and Swedish Exceptionalism

Johanna Gondouin
Department of Media Studies, Section for Cinema Studies, Stockholm University

This article deals with the current discussion on transnational surrogacy and adoption in Sweden. The ethical problems pertaining to new assisted reproductive technologies (ART) that are now the subject of intense debate share common ground with the predicaments of transnational adoption, but this is seldom recognized. By bringing these reproductive methods together, this article sets out to discuss the decidedly intersectional character of the new reproduction, analyzed in terms of "stratified reproduction" (Colen 1995). One parallel that this article considers is the association in Sweden of both adoption and surrogacy with the struggle for gay rights. RFSL (The Swedish Federation for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Rights) is a driving force in the present political rapprochement to surrogacy. This echoes the situation ten years ago when the opening up of Swedish adoptive legislation to same-sex couples coincided with a turbulent debate on adoption. The article examines the intersectional dynamics that characterize the Swedish context, according to which different power relations are played out against each other. Another aspect that is focused on is how the discussion on transnational adoption and surrogacy expose "Swedish exceptionalism", a concept designating a widespread belief of Sweden as untouched by colonial legacies, positing Swedish whiteness as innocent regarding racial matters. The television series Barn till varje pris? (Children at all Costs?, 2011) will be analyzed as a case in point. Through this example I will examine the mediational aspects of the Swedish discussion, in which film and television play key roles.

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Introduction

Declining birth rates, intensified processes of globalisation, and new assisted reproductive technologies (ART) are dominant factors in a contemporary redefinition of motherhood, in which the biological aspects (i.e., child bearing) are separated from its social aspects (i.e., child raising). Yet despite this separation (and as feminist research on the politics of reproduction has long pointed out), reproduction – in its biological and social sense – is inextricably connected to the production of culture and nation, and as such, is a site of intense dispute. Although a change in reproductive patterns may be liberating, it may also entail the sedimentation and aggravation of already existing inequalities among women (Ginsburg & Rapp 1995; Ragoné & Winddance Twine 2000).

These alterations in reproductive arrangements underpin a decision, on March 14th 2012, by the Swedish parliament to undertake an Official Government Report (SOU) on surrogacy, which in the Swedish political process represents a first step towards legalisation. This decision was preceded by several years of debate, in which the RFSL (The Swedish Federation for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Rights) has been a driving force, working for legalisation of surrogacy since 2008. Due to restrictive domestic legislation on ART, the last years have witnessed a growing number of Swedish fertility tourists. The most common fertility trip has been that of single women travelling to Denmark (but also the Baltic countries) for insemination. Most recently, the number of Swedish couples contracting a surrogate mother in India has grown considerably.

In this article I will discuss some of the issues evoked by the present debate on surrogacy, and I place the move towards surrogacy in a relation to the previous dominance in Sweden of transnational adoption, which until the coming of ART was the main response in Sweden to involuntary childlessness. Comparing surrogacy and transnational adoption renders visible some of the power relations that structure this new mode of family formation, and highlights the "international division of reproductive labor" (Tolentino 2009: 433). A key concept in my analysis is the notion of "stratified reproduction" (Colen 1995), which designates "the social and economic circumstances that compel some women to relinquish their children, while others can 'choose' to adopt them or be paid to foster them" (Yngvesson 2010: 25). Transnational adoption (and indeed surrogacy) participate in a stratified reproductive system, where hierarchies based on class, race, ethnicity, sex, position in the global economy and migration status regulate which people are likely to birth children, and which people are likely to raise them.

In order to elaborate this claim as to the connections between transnational surrogacy and adoption, this article will explore three interrelated aspects of these practices: 1) The relation of fertility tourism to notions of Swedish whiteness and Sweden's role in the postcolonial legacy – what is here referred to as "Swedish exceptionalism" (Keskinen et al 2009; Habel 2011), 2) the

intersectional dynamics which I argue make up a particularly striking dimension of the Swedish context, where adoption and surrogacy are closely linked to gender equality and sexual identity politics, and 3), the key role that film and television play in rendering intelligible particular understandings of surrogacy and adoption.

On Swedish Exceptionalism

Alongside gender equality and social justice, anti-racism is a key value in Swedish national identity, and this self-image has also been internationally embraced. As the American cultural geographer Allan Pred puts it in his examination of Swedish contemporary history; "Sweden is a country long stereotyped by Western Intellectuals as an international champion of social justice, as the very model of solidarity and equality, as the world's capital of good intentions and civilized behaviour towards others" (2000: 6). Swedish anti-racism is closely linked to the construction of the Swedish welfare state and to the social and political movements of the 1960's and 1970's, when Sweden emerged on the international scene as a leading proponent and western ally of the decolonising and anti-apartheid movements.

However, this self-image has a longer history, which the Swedish cultural geographer Katarina Schough (2008) has demonstrated in her work on the Swedish geography discipline, where she discerns "hyperborea" as central for how Sweden imagines its place in the world. Hyperborea (greek for "land of the north") is a Nordic version of eurocentrism, designating an idea of Sweden and the Nordic as morally and culturally superior and as a peaceful disseminator of culture. It has its roots in the 17th Century, when Sweden was one of the great European powers, controlling significant areas around the Baltic Sea. Hyperborea determined the way Sweden positioned itself in relation to colonialism. When travelling on colonialised lands, Schough argues, the hyperborean considered himself as an impartial explorer in the name of science and culture. She characterizes the hyperborean traveller as a participating observer, a coloniser without personal responsibility. Although taking advantage of the infrastructure of imperialism - which made possible his mobility in the first place - the Swedish traveller distances himself from his colonising counterparts, as Schough notes:

> The position of the observer—besides being the whitest of the White, and hence out of reach for the racist rating of the colonial power – bestows the Hyperborean a double moral advantage. As a participator in the colonial project, the Swede is self-evidently superior to the natives, but moreover, he is morally superior to the colonizer, whose dirty craft he can condemn when it appears too degenerated. Therefore, the shadow of colonization's cruel consequences will not darken the traveler brothers' consciences. (52 [my translation])

As Schough points out, in the untouchable position of the hyperborean, cultural superiority is conflated with physical superiority. It is thus an entitlement connected to Swedish whiteness as the elite of whiteness, and this appears to be a crucial aspect of Swedish exceptionalism.

According to the scientific discourse on race at the time (which positioned the white race as the crown of mankind), the Swedes enjoyed a privileged position, as the world's purest, most homogenous white population. Scandinavia was considered to be the cradle of the Germanic people. Swedish scientists made notable contributions to this race science, with Carl Linneus giving the first modern scientific system for race classification in the mid 18th century, and Anders Retzius inventing the cephalic index in the 1850's (Broberg 1995). In the early 1920's the Swedish institute for Race Biology – the first of its kind in the world – was founded by the Swedish Government, focusing on racial hygiene (Lundmark 2002: 134), which resulted in the world's most effective sterilization program, with strong eugenic motives. When the program was closed down in the mid 1970's, more than 60 000 people had been sterilised. Previous research has highlighted the intertwinings of race and class in the sterilisation policy, and the specific targeting of Travellers (tattare) (Hagerman 2006: 391-393). Another group suffering from the consequences of not being considered racially at par with the Swedes in a national context were the Saamis, Scandinavia's indigenous population. In his work on the treatment of the Saamis by the Swedish state, Lennart Lundmark (2002) shows how racial arguments mixed with paternalistic attitudes and economical considerations determined the state politics from the 19th century to the 1950's.

As such, whilst Sweden may not have been a necessarily impressive colonial power, it played a significant role in colonization, whether that be by contributing to scientific racism, or in the Swedish colony St Barhelemy and its role in the slave trade (Sjöström 1999). As Schough (2008: 17) and Habel (2011:101) argue, the hyperborean thought complex has contributed to Sweden's forgetfulness of its own part in the colonial project and its belief not to be a part of colonial and postcolonial social dynamics. The notion of Swedish exceptionalism designates this idea of innocence regarding the colonial and racist legacies, inspired by the work on Nordic exceptionalism done by the research network "Postcolonialism in the Nordic Countries" (Habel 2011: 100; Keskinen et al 2009).

In the present, Swedish exceptionalism is being challenged, not the least by the entry into the parliament of the racist party Sweden Democrats in 2010 (Hübinette & Lundström 2011). This issue has been explored by a growing number of intersectionally oriented researchers (SOU 2005: 41; Habel 2011; Pred 2000; Hübinette & Lundström 2011), and previous research that has shown that there is no substantial difference between Sweden and other western countries regarding discriminatory patterns against migrants and their descendants. In fact, in certain areas, Sweden actually distinguishes itself as extremely segregated and discriminating, such as when it comes to housing (Molina 1997) and the over-qualification of immigrants, known as "domestic brain-drain" (see "The Brain Drain", 2008).

”The Swedish Model for Family Care” and Transnational Adoption

As mentioned earlier, Swedish legislation is restrictive when it comes to assisted reproductive technologies, and this is motivated by recourse to notions of the child’s ‘best interests’, which in Swedish legislation equates to knowledge of one’s biological origin (Jonsson Malm 2011: 161). Biological bonds between the child and not only one, but two parents, is considered crucial. Even by international standards, Sweden distinguishes itself by its extensive support and high valorisation of the biological bonds between child and parent. This has resulted in ”The swedish model for family care”, which was implemented in 1980, prescribing foster care rather than adoption, even if the parents refuse to take care of the child and it is their wish that the child be adopted. This is also why domestic adoption has practically ceased today. Indeed, far reaching measures are taken in order to avoid adoption for children born in Sweden. Even in severe cases of child abuse the child is placed in foster care, and considerable effort is done to establish good relations with the birth family. Domestically adopted children in Sweden is an extremely small group. In 2010, 19 children were adopted, compared to approximately 650 transnationally adopted children. The authority in charge, The National Board of Health and Welfare, has developed an ambitious, far reaching support program, and there are continuous efforts being made to improve the functioning in order to strengthen the child’s relationship to its biological family.

The dramatic decline of children available for domestic adoption in the late 1960’s was countered with the expansion of transnational adoption. American anthropologist Barbara Yngvesson (2010) notes that Swedish adoption policy is inconsistent in this respect: “The relationship of a child to its birth parent or birth family is prioritized in the Swedish domestic context (in that foster care is regarded as preferable to adoption) whereas adoption and its required cut-off from the birth family is privileged over foster care in a transnational context” (24). As an adoptive country, Sweden has the world’s largest number of transnationally adopted individuals proportionally, with approximately 50 000 children brought into the country since the 1950’s (Hübinette & Tigervall 2008: 290).

As the Swedish adoption scholar Tobias Hübinette (2005) has pointed out, given the value accorded to biological bonds in Sweden, and its self-image of being the world’s most anti-racist and progressive nation, one might expect Sweden to be leading the way also when it comes to defending the rights of adoptive children. Today everyone that has reached lawful age has the right to know the identity of one’s birth parents. However, when it comes to transnational adoptees, there is an official policy which actively denies this right. This issue was brought up by the Adoption debate in 2002, which I will discuss in more detail later.

Another difficulty facing adoptees is that there is no authority in charge of contacts with birth parents. In the absence of a developed post-adoption

service, this responsibility lies on the adoptive parents and the adoptive agencies. In Adoptionscentrum, for example, which is the world's second biggest adoption agency after Holt International in USA, the Vietnamese birth mothers are often known (Vietnam is one of the biggest sending countries), but nothing is done to facilitate contact. And relying on adoptive parents as information gatherers is risky, as they are often under cultural and emotional turmoil during their stay in the relinquishing country, and often do not speak the language of that country (*Utsatta barn – om adoption i Sverige* 2002).

The treatment of the adopted child's birth identity in the Swedish national register, in particular regarding name, date and place of birth, as well as information on the birth parents, represent another problem in the Swedish setting. Swedish legislation concerning the registration of biological parenthood is unambiguous: if the biological parents are known they must be given legal status as such by being registered. It is considered self evident to record the names of the biological parents of domestically adopted children in the national register. In fact, Sweden is quite extreme when it comes to the efforts being made in establishing fatherhood. Men are taken in for paternity tests with police escort. But in the case of transnational adoption, the responsibility lies entirely on the adoptive parents, and in almost 95% of all cases no names are registered, largely the result of an official request from the adoption agencies not to do so, allegedly to protect the birth parents.

The 2002 Adoption Debate

Until the early 2000's, Swedish research described a successful, happy-ending narrative of transnational adoption. In 2002 this image was severely challenged by the publication of new research (Hjern et al 2002) and by a series of radio and television documentaries (radio: *Varför är jag här?* 2002; *Utsatta barn – om adoption i Sverige* 2002; TV: *En gång var jag korean* 2002; *Dokument inifrån: Sveket mot de adopterade* 2002; *Dokument inifrån: Barn till varje pris* 2002). A very different picture emerged, according to which adopted adults face severe problems when trying to establish themselves in Swedish society. The problems concerned major areas such as higher education, getting an adequate job, and forming a family. It was also shown that Swedish adoptees had a high risk for severe mental health problems and social maladjustment. They were dramatically overrepresented when it came to suicide, psychiatric disorder, and different kinds of abuse. The national debate that followed is interesting in its exposal of the underlying assumptions regarding transnational adoption. It was characterised by a highly emotional tone – several complaints of partiality were filed to the Swedish authority in charge – where the actual facts were rarely addressed, and where a recurrent maneuver when this did occur was to disqualify the premises of the research, arguing that the adequate frame for evaluating adoption was to compare the adoptees present life with what it would have turned out like had he or she stayed in their birth country ("Kärlek tjockare än blod" 2002). Another common explanation was that the problems of adoptees originated in experiences prior to the adoption (Weigl 2002). A number of

adult adoptees participated, the majority pleading loyalty and gratefulness for having been adopted and identifying themselves completely as Swedes (Hansson 2002; Hagström 2002). In an article co-authored by a number of prominent Korean adoptees, seeing oneself to be entirely Swedish became an indication of success and self-esteem, as opposed to the adoptees portrayed in the documentaries, whose interest in Korea was interpreted as psychological instability (Lifvendahl et al. 2002).

Tobias Hübinette has argued that the failure to address the apparent difficulties that many adoptees face is due to the challenge that this poses to Swedish exceptionalism. The problem exposed in the situation of many adoptees is highly provocative, as it puts into doubt the prevailing view of Sweden as an exceptionally tolerant, anti-racist, egalitarian and colour blind country. Swedish exceptionalism seems to be a plausible explanation of some of the oddities in the debate, for instance of how questions of discrimination and exclusions are handled by being individualised and put at a distance: as dependent on individual adoptees lacking the capacity to adapt, or located to traumatic experiences prior to adoption.

One circumstance that I believe had considerable impact on how the debate turned out was the concurrent opening up of Swedish adoption legislation to same-sex couples in the beginning of 2003. In this context, criticizing adoption meant risking accusations of homophobia. There seems to be interesting similarities between the Swedish situation and the Australian debate on gay adoption, and as Damien Riggs (2009) points out, making adoption a question of adult's rights means limiting the scope to the competing interests of different groups of privileged adults. It blocks a broader discussion on adoption in regards to the economic inequalities that make children adoptable in the first place.

Similarly, the Official Government Report that constituted the basis for the eventual change to adoption legislation (SOU 2001:10) has been criticised for a biased promotion of the rights of adults to having children (Jonsson Malm 2011; Andersson 2010; Hübinette 2005). As a response to this critique, another Official Governement Report was appointed (SOU 2003:49), which found serious flaws in Swedish adoption policy, but this has not resulted in any considerable changes (Hübinette 2005).

Children at All Costs?

In the present debate on surrogacy, audiovisual media play a dominant role. I will now turn to the TV series *Children at All Costs?*, which was broadcast on Swedish public service television, in September and October 2011.[1] This TV series is one out of a number of initiatives that have been taken recently to discuss new reproductive possibilities in Sweden. Parallel to *Children at All Costs?* TV3, a Swedish commercial channel broadcast a similar series,

[1] I wish to thank Mette Friberg at SVT for lending me the DVDs.

Drömmen om ett barn (The Dream of a Child 2011). *Children at All Costs?* depicts the growing number of Swedish fertility tourists, mostly single women who travel to other northern European countries such as Denmark, Latvia and Poland, where insemination, IVF and embryo transplantation are being performed. *Children at All Costs?* is presented as a documentary series composed of six episodes of approximately fifty minutes each. We get to follow a number of "real" couples and single individuals in their struggle to have children, including a heterosexual couple where the man is infertile, a single woman going to Denmark for insemination, a heterosexual couple with one child who want to adopt a sibling, and a male same-sex couple utilizing surrogacy services in India. The program is hosted by Swedish actress Pia Johansson. As a popular participant in different television shows, she is a well-known face to Swedish television viewers. Her personal experience of involuntary childlessness is an important ingredient in the program. The framing is personal and playful: episodes with the hostess interacting with kids, visiting a sperm bank in Denmark, and investigating sex selection in Cypres are paralleled with sequences about the persons that exemplify the different reproductive methods. This is mixed with an obvious ambition to inform. In each episode three experts – either as professionals (scientists, writers), or as individuals with personal experience – are invited to the hostess' for further discussion. *Children at All Costs?* Aims at being both personal and informative, entertaining and serious.

The program was scheduled for a broad audience, broadcast on Mondays at 8:00 p.m., on the channel SVT 1. It was accompanied by an ambitious website and the series was available on SVT Play, the webchannel of Swedish public service. The program attracted considerable attention and was praised by critics. It was also widely discussed on different blogs. The general opinion was that it managed to deal with urgent and complex topics from many angles, with respect and without simplifications (e.g. Skogkär 2011; Näslund 2011). In an interview for a news program, Pia Johansson commented upon the power of personal testimony, which the program relies heavily on. The aim, she suggested, was to stimulate a debate on questions that are taboo, since giving birth to a child is still the norm. She recounted how seeing the actual people behind different controversial methods can make you less judgmental, thus underscoring the persuasive, rhetorical power of the personal.

In its focus on the personal, *Children at All Costs?* shares significant features with reality television. The different formats that go under this label display a general tendency in contemporary media towards the personal and the intimate (Jerslev 2004), in what has been called the "post-documentary culture" (Corner 2002, quoted in Biressi & Nunn 2005:2). The British media scholar Jon Dovey speaks of contemporary television as a first person medium where the personal becomes the guaranty for authenticity. The first person address has an intimate, confessional tone, that creates a new regime of truth in the Foucaldian sense "based upon the foregrounding of individual subjective experience at the expense of more general truth claims" (Dovey

2000: 25; Renov 2004). In contrast to the feminist exposure of the private in the 1970's – aiming to expose the political charge in the private – the private in contemporary media culture affirms itself as decidedly singular (Jerslev 2004: 20-21). Reality TV corresponds to an aesthetic of transparent, unmediated prescence, accomplished by aesthetic strategies such as close-ups and emphasis on bodily gesture. In its most refined form it features a person speaking of himself in monologic form, in a way that does not invite argumentation and analysis, but appears to be the testimony of a personal truth strictly limited to that particular individual (Jerlsev 2004: 24). This shift in media culture is framed by larger processes in society, interconnected with neoliberalism and what has been conceptualised as the "postpolitical", designating a process in which specific areas and questions that were formerly considered as belonging to the political are depolitized and transformed into individual and moral problems (Tesfahuney & Dahlstedt 2008).

In the following sections I demonstrate how the show's emphasis on the personal and its attachment to individual people's struggles, is highly problematic, by focusing in turn on the families represented as formed through first adoption and then surrogacy.

Adoption

The discussion on transnational adoption within the program is relatively brief, which is perhaps not surprising given the program also covers new and potentially more controversial reproductive technologies. In a short historical exposé the background of transnational adoption in Sweden is given. It focuses on the 1970's when adoption flourished and was considered an act of solidarity with the third world, and the declining number of adoptions in the present. The report continues with a visit at the earlier mentioned Adoptionscentrum, where the focus lies on the lengthiness and complicated nature of the adoption process and its bureaucratic aspects.

In the story of the family that represents transnational adoption in the series, Camilla and Linus, living on a farm in the Swedish countryside with their five year old biological son Sebastian, emphasis is given to the protraction of the adoption process. Camilla has given adoption a lot of thought, we are told, and she has come to the conclusion that adoption in general is wrong, but that does not prevent her from adopting herself: she wants another child and she will not share it with anybody else (a possessive desire echoed by the gay couple who intend to be parents through surrogacy, as discussed in the next section). It is not up to her to save the world, Camilla argues. Removing a child from everything that it knows and putting it into a completely new environment is brutal, she elaborates, but she is also convinced that the new life that she has to offer is better than the earlier one. Being a parent, she concludes, is something that one deserves to be, because of one's actions, and not simply a matter of genetics. The visual narrative, showing idyllic scenes with their children playing around in their countryside farm, seems to

accord with her position. Yet what it sidesteps is the fact that parenthood is a privilege that can hardly be said to have been earned.

But apart from that, adoption is above all described as a long and troublesome procedure: a disappointment as they initially considered it to be a "fun" way of building a family and thought it would be easy. We are informed that it took over four years for Camilla and Linus to finally get their adopted child. And the blame for this long and torturous process is attributed to the birth parents. The couple, we are told, was first appointed a child whose biological mother withdrew her consent to adoption in the last minute, when all the practical arrangements had already been done, and Sebastian had been told that he was going to get a younger brother. Also, we find out that they had been communicating by Skype with the boy once a month, and so Camilla motivates her disappointment and outrage with concern for the boy; how this change could damage his development. After a while, however, they are appointed a new child, but once again the birth parents are present, playing the role as threats. This time the birth father does not show up in court as required, and so the adoption has to be postponed. No information about the surrounding circumstances that might explain this behavior is given. As a result, birth parents are seen only as obstacles. In fact, their allegedly frivolous mood swings (this is in fact the impression that is created, as no explanation of their behavior is given) poses direct dangers to the wellbeing of the children. This image of a bad birth parent serves to legitimise the adoption, by making the adoptive parent the responsible ones, the ones who see to the best interest of the child. So, according to the way of reasoning that Camilla expressed earlier, she really deserves to be a parent. The construction of this opposition between good adoptive parents and bad birth parents is an important ingredient of the prevailing notion of transnational adoption (Trenka et al 2006; Riggs 2009: 168-170).

Notably, Camilla and Linus' story is not complemented by any other perspective that might challenge or contextualise their presentation of adoption. In contrast to the other methods discussed in the series, no serious critique of adoption is formulated. The depiction of birth parents is thus remarkable in a context where parenthood and biological origin is ascribed such irreplaceable value. The series is an example of how transnational adoption and other alternative reproductive methods are kept apart in this respect. With a few exceptions, transnational adoption is not included in the recurrent discussions on the valuing of genetic bonds. As reproductive methods, adoption and surrogacy distinguish themselves by their transnational character, and by typically involving parties of unequal power. But whereas risks of exploitation and baby trade are considered in regard to surrogacy (as discussed below), they are never mentioned as risks in adoption, although child trafficking, corruption and coercive arrangements are major challenges to transnational adoption (see e.g. Briggs 2012; SOU 2003: 49) and that this was one of the central motives for the conception of the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption (Smolin 2010). On the other hand, the widespread notion of transnational adoption as an altruistic

rescue from poverty is expressed at various points in the program, and not the least by constituting the very frame of the program's dealings with transnational adoption, the recurrent question being whether adoption is a less egoistic method than others. However, the complex and problematical character of the "politics of rescue" (Davies 2011) is never seriously considered.

Surrogacy

As mentioned earlier, a significant circumstance in the Swedish context is the association of both transnational adoption and surrogacy with identity politics. In the series, surrogacy is represented by a male same-sex couple - Andreas and John - and their Indian surrogate Geeta. It is an example of gestational commercial surrogacy, that is, there is no genetic connection between the child and the surrogate mother. The egg that has been fertilised by one of the men has been bought from a Georgian dentist. The story of the Swedish same-sex couple contracting an Indian woman to make their all white child is representative of how the situation looks internationally. Transnational gestational surrogacy is a booming sector of the reproductive tourism industry. In this particular Indian fertility clinic clients are mainly coming from Australia, the US, Canada and European countries such as Sweden and Norway, and approximately forty percent are same-sex couples.

As I've already suggested, the emphasis on the personal in *Children at All Costs?* may be understod through the framework of reality television. Consider, for instance, the way that the couple's own narration is mediated. Although *Children at All Costs?* does not show the interviewer or let the spectator hear the questions asked, it is often obvious that Andreas and John are addressing a third person - other than the viewer - when speaking. And in certain cases they are clearly responding to particular topics. But on the other hand, their discourse is never interrupted or challenged by questions of how and why. However, in contrast to the frequent use of close-ups employed in reality television for creating the impression of unmediated presence, *Children at All Costs?* combines close-ups and distanced shots that display the context.

Andreas and John are given the possibility to present their life story and their motives behind their use of surrogacy. They speak of their experiences as gay men excluded from the conventional family forming options, and they elaborate on the emotional strain that the process has put on them, appearing to be at once sensitive and insightful people. The personal approach makes critique more difficult. As the French media scholar Dominique Mehl (quoted in Jerslev 2004: 17) points out, you cannot argue with a witness. Following the example of reality television, the discourse concentrates on a person's feeling in a particular situation, aspiring to subjectivity and the "emotional truth".

The host introduces the couple by speaking of surrogacy as a controversial method, but thereafter the couples' choice is represented as legitimate. This is above all, I suggest, done by constructing the couple as vulnerable and innocent, a process in which the above described personal take is crucial. In this case the loyalty with the gay couple's perspective has decisive consequences for how the different power relations involved in reproduction are represented. The male same-sex couple and the surrogate are constructed as each other's opposites, which I will show turns out to the advantage of the former.

The first time that we encounter the couple they are telling John's grandmother about the happy news that a heart is beating for them in India, and the whole series ends with Andreas and John skyping with the grandmother, holding the newborn baby girl in their arms. Family and relatives are given an important role when they describe their lives. They are depicted as loving and valuing their family. So controversy is embedded into conventions and traditions. Nevertheless, as homosexual men they are disadvantaged: being gay not only excludes them from the conventional ways of building a family, but they are also discriminated by the legal system that does not recognize the surrogacy arrangements. Furthermore, they are presented as financially vulnerable. Without wealthy families to support them, they have indebted themselves in order to build the house of their dreams. Their solid middleclass position – Andreas being a doctor and John a project leader – is mentioned on the website but not in the program. A final component of the innocence and vulnerability attributed to them is their generosity, giving the surrogate Geeta more than they are formally obliged to. The image that is conveyed in the program is that of ordinary, decent people who are forced by the circumstances to use extreme methods.

As a contrast, Geeta is presented as a rational agent driven by self interest: an individual who has made a free and calculated choice in order to improve her situation. This is the liberal and emancipatory argument that is often mobilised by advocates of commercial surrogacy (Winddance Twine 2010: 6). But this way of putting things obliterates the coercive aspects of most surrogate arrangements, a point made by intersectional feminist research on commercial surrogacy, here in the words of American feminist philosopher Alison Bailey:

> The single-pointed focus on 'choice' occidentalizes Indian surrogacy work: it makes it difficult to raise questions about the kind of life a woman has to lead to make this work count as a 'good choice.' It obscures the injustice behind these choices: the reality that, for many women, contract pregnancy is one of the few routes to attaining basic social goods such as housing, food, clean water, education and medical care (Bailey 2011: 722).

Here Bailey also points to how this focus on choice implies an ethnocentric understanding that fails to account for the reality of indian surrogate workers. In the ethnographic fiedwork of the Indian sociologist Amrita Pande on commercial surrogacy in Anand, Gujarat, the surrogate mothers themselves

tend to downplay choice, interestingly enough, as proponents of surrogacy make women's right to decide over their own bodies a main argument. This is the surrogate Salma's story:

> Who would choose to do this? I have had a lifetime's worth of injections pumped into me. Some big ones in my hips hurt so much. In the beginning I had about 20-25 pills almost every day. I feel bloated all the time. But I know I have to do it for my children's future.
> This is not work, this is *majboori* (a compulsion). Where we are now, it can't possibly get any worse. […] In our village we don't have a hut to live in or crops in our farm. This work is not ethical – it's just something we *have* to do to survive. When we heard of the surrogacy business, we didn't have any clothes to wear after the rain – just one pair that used to get wet – and our house had fallen down. What were we to do? […] [I]f your family is starving, what will you do with respect? Prestige won't fill an empty stomach. (Pande 2009: 160-161)

In *Children at All Costs?*, dominant threads in the narrative present surrogacy as a business transaction between equal parties. And Geeta is indeed depicted as a winner in this win-win situation: the financial compensation equals five to six yearly incomes and permits her to buy a house for her family. This is something that is emphasised repeatedly throughout the series. So instead of regarding her decision as a result of social and economic inequalities, Geeta is shown as a beneficiary of a system that she would not otherwise have had access to. And as an important building block in this picture, Geeta is said to be calm, confident and in control, which is opposed to the strong emotions that Andreas and John display. They are the ones that have emotions, fears and suffer from exposure.

The program puts into play two contrasting paradigms: on the one hand, there are considerable efforts given to establish an economic paradigm, characterised by circularity and reciprocity. But this is underpinned by the behaviour and attitude of Andreas and John, and by notions such as gift and help through which another paradigm is introduced (Derrida 1991). There is an ambivalence here in the TV series' design. On the one hand, Geeta is presented as an equal partner, someone that has made an independent and free choice, and on the other hand there is an emphasis on Geeta's and India's poverty. This underlining of poverty problematises the image of the business arrangement, but even more, it assigns Andreas and John the role of benevolence. This manoeuvre recurs in other stories on surrogacy, as in that of the Korean-American couple who are interviewed in the book *The Indian Surrogate*: "Of the four surrogate mothers who were matched up to us, we chose a widow who really needs the money for the family. Her husband died a year ago from cancer and she has three kids — 14, nine and five — so they're really young. I feel for them." "If we get a baby, our lives will really be changed. We want to make a difference in their lives as well" (Nurluqman et al: 34). So instead of putting into doubt the image of surrogacy as an economic transaction, it positions the Swedish couple as benefactors. Interestingly enough, it is Geeta who gets to represent the economic mindset,

while notions of giving and helping are located with Andreas and John: to them, money is really, as John puts it, a secondary matter.

However, this particular reproductive method is not only a privileging of white male same-sex couples from the middle class. From a perspective that not only looks at the immediate effects of surrogacy but also takes a long view of medical harm, contract pregnancy may be seen as direct deprivileging of the bodies of women who are already medically vulnerable. This medical exposure manifests itself in high rates of maternal death, India having two of the world's highest rates of maternal mortality and morbidity related to pregnancy. According to The Center for Reproductive Right's (CRR), almost twenty five percent of the annual worldwide maternal deaths occur in India. The major causes for the maternal deaths in India are education, social status and poverty, which apply to seventy percent of the female population in the country (Bailey 2011: 729). And while any pregnany represents a health risk, it is women whose bodies are already medically endangered that carry the risks of a pregancy and its aftermath, as well as the supplementary risks pertaining to ART's, that research suggest are not insignificant: the extensive treatments that IVF and embryotransplantation requires can lead to cancer and infertility In addition, the fact that the vast majority of contract pregnancies in India are delivered with caeserian represent yet another significant exposure (Riggs & Due 2010).

One of the women interviewed by Amrita Pande concisely explains the meaning of there being no laws regulating surrogacy in India: "We were told that if anything happens to the child, it's not our responsibility, but if anything happens to me, we can't hold anyone responsible" (Pande 2010: 977). It is a summing up of a situation for which Alison Bailey's concern seems well-founded: "If surrogates have no legal protection, and if clinics pregnancy rates can be increased by passing on additional risks to surrogacy workers, then we should be concerned that these risks are borne exclusively by some of the most vulnerable people in the world – poor women with extremely limited long-term access to health care" (Bailey 2011: 732). Becoming a surrogate exposes the body to considerable danger and it is not likely to be done by anyone who can afford to consider money a side issue.

In *Children at All Costs?*, the loyalty with the couple's perspective is reinforced by other aspects of the visual narrative, for instance in the editing, and not the least by what the host actually says. One example is the way that the problem of exploitation is dealt with. In the first episode, the disclosure of a baby farm in Thailand using trafficked women from Vietnam that made the headlines in international media in February 2011 is brought up. The story is exposed as grossly exaggerated in the program, with reference to Nicolas Lainez from the non-profit organisation Allliance Anti Traffic Asia (AAT), who claims that a majority of the women involved were not victims of trafficking, but were actually there by their own free will.[2] When surrogacy is discussed,

[2] http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2011/04/30/2003502026/2

and one of the invited experts points to the expanding surrogate industry involving women being locked up, the host responds by asking if any of the invited experts has actually seen this with their own eyes, the aim clearly being putting the existence of such places into doubt, followed by a cut over to a sequence from India and Andreas and John. In the last episode the host clearly shows how she considers stories of locked up women in baby farms as mere rumours when, in a discussion of ectogenesis, she claims that one day our fears for ectogenesis might be dismissed as mere prejudice in the same way that fears of baby farms have been exposed as mere fabrications in the present. Baby farms are horror stories that lack real background. She seems to equate exploitation as a whole with baby farms, operating with only two alternatives, either baby farms or free will, and by dismissing baby farms as an irrelevant problem to transnational surrogacy, the ethical misgivings are solved.

In this particular case the host presents herself as an unprejudiced, progressive person, with an unsentimental outlook on matters. Other times she appeals to emotions and feelings. In response to the critical question about whether it is the story of a economic transaction that one wants to give to a child, she responds that it may also be presented as a question of love: "We loved you so much that we went to another mother in India." After these words, as an illustration, there is a cut to India and the story of Andreas and John. In response to questions of limits and ethics regarding particular reproductive methods, she answers with emotional arguments. This echoes John's comment on the trafficking scandal, his view being that this represents perversions and that because they put their entire hearts and souls into having a child, these accusations seem unfair (as if the emotional investment would make them immune to critique). For the hostess, love is the predominant factor: regardless of the method chosen, children need loving parents, she argues. And at the end of the day it's about where *you* feel the line should be drawn, she concludes. This seems to be the moral of the program.

But this individualisation of reproductive choices is problematic, because it risks transforming critique into a question of being against particular people. To my mind, the commitment to do justice to the longing and struggle of Andreas and John to be parents limits the perspective to a group of people who – however disadvantaged in a local context – are nevertheless privileged on a global level. The critical perspective that I find missing is formulated by Damien Riggs, who, focusing very similar concerns in an Australian context, emphasises the importance of, "Locating ourselves as not simply non-heterosexuals who experience discrimination, but more transparently as *white* non-heterosexual people who also experience privilege…" (Riggs 2009: 173).

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http://studyinthailand.org/forums/topic/7287-should-commercial-surrogacy-be-legalised/

For a survey of the media coverage, see ftp://ftp2.allianceantitrafic.org/alliancea/000%20Surrogate%20mothers%20case%20in%20Vietnam%20and%20Thailand/

In this particular case, it's not about individuals and their subjective experiences and emotions, but about groups and structures on a global level.

The innocence ascribed to Andreas and John is, I suggest, characteristic of Swedish exceptionalism. They are taking advantage of a global system without fully assuming the responsibility it entails. Their own use of transnational surrogacy is separated from other, perverted uses that have nothing to do with their situation. There is a righteousness about how they describe their acting, which is treated as an expression of high morals, when in fact it can also be seen as a question of privilege. Being in the position to give and be generous in the first place is a privilege, and a question of power.

Conclusion

Bringing together transnational adoption and transnational surrogacy is an attempt to visualize and address some of the ethical challenges of modern reproductive technology. In a general way I believe that this comparison make comprehensible the intersectional and stratified character of global motherhood. I have also wanted to deal with a more specific problem, related to the idea of Swedish exceptionalism, for which adoption and surrogacy are vital arenas of articulation. Although not unchallenged, Swedish exceptionalism remains a major obstacle to serious engagements with racism in today's Sweden.

The high valuing of biological belonging featuring in current debates on assisted reproductive technologies points to the inconsistency of swedish child care policy; how biological origin is considered differently according to where the child is born. Furthermore, the absence of adoption in discussions of ethical issues surrounding surrogacy indicates the underlying assumption of adoption as an unambiguous good. I have pointed out Swedish exceptionalism and the struggle for gay rights as two reasons for why more critical takes on adoption have been so readily dismissed.

For similar reasons I suggest that dominant discourses on surrogacy have failed to address the global issues at stake in reproductive tourism, as illustrated by *Children at All Costs?* In *Children at All Costs?* the intimisation of current media culture interplays with swedish exceptionalism. The dominant pro-surrogacy discourse in Sweden is structured round the possibility of "good" surrogacy in which all exploitative practices are banned by legislation. There is a tendency to isolate the Swedish situation, positioning it as an exception to the global market and its "perversions".[3]

[3] See for instance the debate between Kajsa Ekis Ekman, one of the leading voices against surrogacy in Sweden and author of a book that equates surrogacy with prostitution (Ekman 2010), and the president of RFSL, Ulrika Westergren in the femininst revue *Bang*: (http://www.bang.se/sok/?query=Ekman&search=S%C3%B6k).

Contrary to this, I wish to stress the importance of recognizing our participation in a global network that produces the differences that offer some people the possibility to hire a surrogate and others the role of being a surrogate. Surrogacy is not a question of ”reproductive justice”,[4] but the privilege of a global elite, entitling certain groups to reproduce, whilst the procreation of other groups are limited. The question of the American feminist and legal scholar Dorothy Roberts is challenging and relevant *even in Sweden*: ””What does it mean that we live in a country in which white women disproportionately use expensive technologies to enable them to bear children, while black women disproportionately undergo surgery that prevents them from being able to bear any?” (Roberts 1996: 944) This kind of generalizing perspective is obscured by making reproduction a question of individual choices.

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Author Note

Johanna holds a Ph.D. in Comparative Literature and a postdoctoral research fellowship (funded by the Swedish Research Council), at the Department of Media Studies, Stockholm University. She is currently working on representations of globalisation and reproductive technologies in a Swedish media context. Her new research project – *Mediating Global Motherhood. Gender, race and sexuality in swedish media representations of transnational surrogacy and transnational adoption (*funded by the Swedish Research Council 2013-2015), will be hosted by the Department of Ethnology, History of Religions and Gender Studies.

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[4] Here, the notion of ”reproductive justice” is not to be confounded with the conceptualisations of the reproductive justice movement (see Bailey 2011).

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SPECIAL ISSUE: Directions and Intersections

Interest Convergence in Australian Education

Jacinta Maxwell
University of Southern Queensland

This paper utilises the late Derrick Bell's (1980) theory of interest convergence as an explanatory tool to understand Queensland secondary schools' lack of consultation with Indigenous communities. Past education initiatives are analysed through a lens of interest convergence theory in order to provide an alternative reading of some moments in policy history, particularly those related to community consultation. These analyses also provide the conceptual context in which the findings of a recent research project can be understood. This recent study explored the capacity of teachers of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies to engage in consultation. These analyses suggest that Bell's theory warrants further investigation as to its relevance in an Australian education context, and its usefulness to critical scholars in this field.

Introduction

Research conducted into the consultative relationships between Indigenous communities and schools has tended to be critical of a perceived lack of effort on the part of either community members or school staff – specifically teachers and principals (Ngarritjan-Kessaris 1997; Sarra 2006). The literature that acknowledges the role that school-related structures might play in the frequent failure of consultation is negligible, limited to a few sentences in a handful of publications (Department of Education, Training & the Arts (DETA) 2006; Irving 2005; Schwab & Sutherland 2001). Scholars have instead been inclined to investigate the issue through a lens of cultural relativism – identifying cultural differences between Indigenous communities and predominantly non-Indigenous school staff as key barriers to consultation (McConaghy 2000). Such a narrow focus is problematic as the structures that give meaning to cultural differences tend to remain unexamined. It is not,

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however, an aim of this paper to dismiss or attempt to discredit such studies, but rather to utilise critical race theory so that we may gain another insight into the experiences of teachers within a broader context.

Curricula in Australian schools have been overwhelmingly mono-cultural since their introduction in New South Wales in the late 1790s (Bubacz 2007; Patterson 2007). In the past few decades, however, governments have expressed an increasing desire for teachers to engage in consultation with Indigenous community members (Board of Studies NSW 2008; Department of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Policy and Development 2000; Department of Education, Training and the Arts (DETA) 2006; Queensland Indigenous Education Consultative Body (QIECB) 2008; Queensland Studies Authority (QSA) 2010). Governments have developed a greater awareness of the need for consultation within the broader school community (QSA 2010). Consultation between communities and schools is, however, yet to become a common practice. The late Derrick Bell (1980: 518-533) maintained that such phenomena can be explained by his theory of interest convergence. This paper explores several historical Australian educative initiatives with through a lens of interest convergence, and then employs the theory as an 'explanatory tool' (Alemán & Alemán 2010: 5) to understand the phenomenon of under-consultation.

Consultation is a complex term; here consultation refers to a process that extends beyond "one-way communication in 'meetings' in which talking heads drone on, poorly explaining complex information and concluding by asking: 'Everyone agree?'" (Bauman 2007: 13). Consultation involves extensive, ongoing discussions between school staff and community members, may involve joint planning of curricula, co-teaching, and the seeking of advice and feedback at the conclusion of programs (QSA 2009). Heslop (1997) offers four models of consultation or "school-community partnerships" which range from assimilation, through integration and delegation, to autonomy. Anecdotal data suggest that some school staff continue to work within an assimilation model (Bond 2004; Sarra 2006), where non-Indigenous people pay no attention to the needs of Indigenous communities, believe that they "know what is best for Indigenous people" and subsequently make decisions for Indigenous people (Heslop 1997: 275). Subject handbooks and guidelines suggest an official invitation to move into an integration model "where Indigenous community advisory committees are established, but control is still exercised by and from within the non-Indigenous community" (Heslop 1997: 275). Much of the government literature has been produced by Indigenous consultative groups and most champion the development of similar groups to advise school staff on educational matters. Although teachers are increasingly being required to incorporate "Indigenous perspectives" into their teaching (National Curriculum Board 2009; QSA 2008), there is no enforceable requirement to consult with Indigenous people during any stage of curriculum development. It is quite possible, therefore, for school staff to have a consultation guidebook and still work from an assimilation standpoint. Examples of Heslop's delegation and autonomous models are few, and limited

to small, independent schools (see for example Blackman 2009; Aboriginal Independent Community Schools 2009). Although government departments use the language of self determination and empowerment, the literature around the reality of practice in schools suggests that schools and communities are encountering barriers to consultation that tether education to outdated models. 'Community' is used in this context to refer to a group of Aboriginal people or Torres Strait Islanders who have links to a particular area. Community members may reside in the area or have cultural, spiritual or historic links to that place (Peters-Little 2000).

Interest Convergence

Derrick Bell's (1980: 518-33) theory of interest convergence is an important principal of critical race theory which arose out of critical legal scholarship. Interest convergence theory asserts that majority groups or institutions will "tolerate advances for racial justice and greater equity only when such advances suit the self-interests of the majority group" (Castagno & Lee 2007: 4). Bell (1992: 364) observes that courts "only *periodically and unpredictably* serv[e] as a refuge of oppressed people" (emphasis added). Thus, the provision of 'refuge', according to the principles of interest convergence, occurs not to meet the needs of minority groups, but only if the outcomes of a policy are politically beneficial for the dominant group. The outcome of this decision making process for non-white people will be either 'racial sacrifice' or 'racial fortuity' (Bell 2004). Racial sacrifice, the most commonly experienced outcome for non-white people, refers to the process of policy making whereby in order to "settle potentially costly differences between two opposing groups of whites, a compromise is effected that depends on the involuntary sacrifice of black rights or interests" (Bell 2004: 29). This principle also suggests that neither past policy decisions, nor the merits of a case for equality are indicators of likely success of a social justice initiative. Instead, the benefits Aboriginal people or Torres Strait Islanders might receive as the result of policy decisions are most likely to be the result of racial fortuity – positive outcomes for non-white people despite the intended benefits being primarily for white people. Bell (2004) refers to legal cases in which a person who is disadvantaged by the withdrawal of an object or a program may only seek compensation if they were the *intended* beneficiary; if they only happened to benefit fortuitously or incidentally, they have no recourse. Bell maintains that even when a policy results in benefits for non-white people, those benefits tend to be fortuitous rather than intended.

Bell has been criticised for his pessimism, because he maintained that racism is a permanent feature of US society and that the white power bloc will only allow minorities to gain political and legal successes if whites will benefit (Clark 1995). This view is considered by some to be counterproductive, with little to offer but an "undermining and destructive" critique of white actions (Clark 1995: 50). Clark (1995) proposes that charges such as those made by Bell can only result in their own fulfilment, namely that if white people are accused of being unalterably racist, then racist they will be. Bell's works raise

several issues that, while not necessarily rejecting the label of pessimism, assert that the acknowledgement of the permanency of racism is a vital step in the fight against it. While Bell (1991) acknowledges that there is a degree of pessimism in his work, he maintains that an acceptance of the reality of racism is necessary if anything more than token gains are to result from the labours of civil rights activists. Clark's (1995) critique of Bell's work as being pessimistic may be apt, but the conclusion he draws - that the effects of such pessimism are bound to be destructive - is disputable.

Bell's theories (1980; 1991; 1992; 2004) have been used as both analytical and strategic tools by those fighting for equitable treatment within racist institutions. Those who use interest convergence as a strategic tool attempt to avoid a race and racism focus, instead seeking instances when various groups can find common aspirations (Alemán & Alemán 2010). When interest convergence is employed in this manner, however, it is unable to undermine fundamentally flawed institutions because it relies on convincing the powerful that social change will not lead to any sacrifice on their part. When employed as an explanatory tool, by contrast, interest convergence theory provides analysts with opportunities to examine the race-based foundations of inequity and to develop new and innovative methods of bringing about change (Bell 1992).

With few exceptions (Bond 2004; Irving 2005; Schwab & Sutherland 2001) the existing literature related to school and community consultation lacks a focus on the role of institutional structures that may impede progress. Despite some discussions about adjustments that need to be made by schools - such as the extension of the role of schools to better facilitate community participation (Schwab & Sutherland 2001) and enabling Elders to play a greater role in decision making (Bond 2004) - changes to fundamental components of the institution remain largely unchallenged. Irving (2005: 2) does challenge all teachers to "interrogate any organisational structures that seem to block progress in the area of Indigenous education", but discussions do not go beyond this point. Research has often been conducted using atheoretical ethnographic and phenomenological methods, particularly interviews, observations and focus groups (Craven 2005). While these methods have been successful in collecting data about the experiences of stakeholders, no significant work has focussed on how these findings can be realistically applied within the context of contemporary teacher practice. The employment of critical race theory enables the school system to be critiqued as an institution, and requires that research outcomes be practical and applicable.

Besides universities (Coram 2009), Australian educational institutions have received little attention from scholars fitted with the lenses of interest convergence theory. As a result, the power relationships that dominate the processes within the systems remain largely unchallenged within the literature. Indigenous parents and community members, on the other hand have been analysed, critiqued, criticised and had judgement passed on them

for centuries. There is a body of academic work exploring the influences of gender and class on teachers' work (Connell 1977). The 'race' of teachers has been investigated on and off according to various theoretical frameworks, but only when those teachers are teaching students who are racial others (Hickey & Austin 2006). And while the foreignness of the Australian education system has frequently been raised, the possibility that it retains elements of white supremacy to this day remains largely uninterrogated by researchers.

Interest Convergence and Indigenous Education after 1788

Early 'Experiments': Bennelong and Colbey and the Native Institution

Those involved in the early colonial education of Aboriginal people demonstrated a lack of concern for Indigenous peoples' interests, and made little attempt to disguise the selfish nature of these early endeavours. The education of Bennelong and Colbey are obvious examples of the fulfilment of a colonial desire to learn about local peoples by way of English-speaking informants (Fullagar 2009). That Bennelong and Colbey were "taken by force" at the behest of Governor Phillip after initial invitations to come into the colonial fold were rebuffed suggests that these early attempts at education were not prompted by a convergence of Indigenous and British interests, but rather the unashamed self-interest of the invaders (Macarthur 1971 as cited in Fullagar 2009: 33). However, as many colonists held the view that Indigenous people would benefit from exposure to 'civilisation', an argument could be made that the kidnappers and educators of Aboriginal people considered their actions to be mutually advantageous. Either way there is no evidence that early colonial education was attempted selflessly. The interests of the invaders clearly outweighed those of the people indigenous to that place.

The reluctance of many Indigenous adults to embrace the values and ideals of this new culture was widely reported, and the British thus considered Aboriginal children to be the most likely means of disseminating desirable elements of British culture within their communities. It was expected that, upon receiving a British education, children would return to their homes and have a 'civilising' influence (Cleverley 1971). Samuel Butler, schoolmaster of the Parramatta Native Institution, maintained that it was vital that the student body include

> some Children of the principal Chiefs at Parramatta. Those who have been there for any length of time, do not seem like the same persons when they return. They lose much of the wildness and ferocity of their manners, and become more strongly attached to the English people. (Church Missionary Society 1821: 79)

As evidenced in the above statement, from the document that enabled the founding of the school, the interests of the white community around Parramatta were paramount and the interests of the students and their families appeared as somewhat of an afterthought:

> With a view therefore to effect the Civilization of the Aborigines of New South Wales and to render their habits more domesticated and industrious, His Excellency the Governor as well from motives of humanity as of that policy which affords a reasonable hope of producing such an improvement in their condition as may eventually contribute to render them not only more happy in themselves, but also in some degree useful to the community (Campbell 1814: 1).

The education of Aboriginal children at Parramatta was to serve several purposes, most of which were beneficial to the non-Indigenous population. From the school would come a civilising force made up of Aboriginal children who could "carry to the homes of their families the germs of civilization, which cannot fail to produce good results" (de Freycinet 1819, as cited in Brook & Kohen 1991). It was also expected that the boys would be less likely to engage in acts of warfare, which were becoming more common, and consequently be of benefit to the wider community when trained as "Labourers in Agricultural Employ or among the lower Class of Mechanics" (Macquarie 1814, as cited in Brook & Kohen 1991).

It is difficult to determine the interests of local Indigenous people during this period, although the meagre number of children sent to the school may be some indication of the lack of confidence in this new mode of education. Considering the escalation of violence in the previous years, it is possible that some people, however, sought the protection of the Native Institution, in both a physical and social sense. It could be expected that the students would be somewhat safer from explicit settler violence and that they would likely be more accepted by the invaders if they learnt to adapt to the new culture. There were opportunities to discuss the expectations and desires of dozens of local Aboriginal families who attended the first Parramatta Conference. Governor Macquarie, however, appeared content to spend the meeting outlining his plan for the town and school, which included his suggestions for the reconfiguration of 'Tribes' into 'District Tribes', the introduction of chiefs, and a ban on the removal of students from the school once enrolled (Brook & Kohen 1991: 65).

These early colonial experiments in Indigenous education illustrate Bell's notion of interest convergence theory as a "two-sided coin" of racial fortuity and sacrifice (Bell 2004: 9). While some interests of Bennelong, Colbey and Native Institute students may have been met as a result of the provision of colonial education, this was not the primary aim of the British. The main concern for those instigating these programs was the benefits that could flow to the white community; Aboriginal people may have gained from them but they were not intended to be the primary beneficiaries of the new policies. When such educational forays became uneconomical or unpopular in white society, they could be abandoned without much ado.

Salvaging a Nation's Pride

Gough Whitlam's Prime Ministership in the 1970's is generally characterised as a particularly progressive one, that implemented various policies directed at improving rights of and outcomes for Indigenous peoples. Several significant education policies were implemented during the time, including federal support for bilingual education in the Northern Territory and Aboriginal teacher aides in various states. At the same time, the Government was seeking to re-engage Australia with the world and cultivate the nation's image as a capable participant in international politics and trade (Whitlam 1985). This internationalist agenda affected Indigenous policy development due to the recognition that neglected domestic issues, such as education, negatively impacted on how Australia was regarded by international bodies such as the United Nations (Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, March 1 1967):

> What the world sees about Australia is that we have an Aboriginal population with the highest infant mortality rate on earth...the whole world believes that our immigration policy is based on colour...the combination of such policies leans heavily indeed on the world's goodwill and on Australia's credibility (Whitlam 1971, as cited in Whitlam 1985).

Whitlam regarded racism as the "ultimate violence" but rather than framing the end of racism as an inherently worthwhile task, he sought to convince the nation of the need to abolish it by repeatedly highlighting the trade and security benefits for a predominantly white country in an Asian region (Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives April 20 1972).

Whitlam's policy statements and speeches demonstrate the use of interest convergence as a strategic tool, "a tactic for swaying majority opinion to support racial remedies" (Alemán & Alemán 2010: 6). While this has been the modus operandi for liberal politicians and law makers for decades, it generally has detrimental outcomes for non-whites – in this case, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (Alemán & Alemán 2010; Bell 1980; 2004). The negative implications of using interest convergence as a strategy stem from its reliance on the political expediency of policies to the white majority; there is consequently no impetus to disrupt white supremacy. The adoption of such a political strategy is almost counterproductive to the aim of anti-racism as it serves to legitimise a system that consistently undermines the rights of non-whites.

Mutual Responsibility

Shared Responsibility Agreements (SRAs) were officially launched in 2005 after several years of trial agreements and provide another example of attempts to create convergences between the interests of Aboriginal communities and governments. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) had been abolished in 2004 due to a perception that it was unrepresentative of Indigenous people and because then Prime Minister,

John Howard, also believed that the organisation had focused too heavily on "symbolic issues" (Commonwealth of Australia, Senate, December 7, 2004). SRAs were promoted as providing a new, more representative, strategy for developing government partnerships with Indigenous communities (Strakosch 2009). In a policy shift towards mutual obligation, Indigenous communities received services and resources in return for behaviour modifications, for example the building of a pool with access linked to school attendance. SRAs were widely criticised at their inception, with claims that they harkened back to an outmoded paternalistic era and forced communities to "sit up and beg" for essential infrastructure (Martin quoted in Donald 2004: 1; Sullivan 2005).

SRAs devolve responsibility for educational outcomes to communities without requiring governments to provide the expertise or infrastructure required for success. In the Northern Territory community of Wadeye for example, 600 students went to school in the first term when an SRA resulted in a school pool, but there were not enough "desks, teachers or classrooms" provided (de Plevitz 2006: 17). Student enrolments dropped from close to 1000 to 100 by the end of the year. Policies in Indigenous affairs during the Howard Prime Ministership, such as SRAs, revolved around notions of 'practical reconciliation'. Programs were required to have quantifiable outcomes if they were to be implemented (Strakosch 2009). The focus on attendance in Wadeye ensured blame would fall on students and their families for poor educational outcomes, despite the wealth of literature linking other factors - such as culturally appropriate education - to improved outcomes (de Plevitz 2006). SRAs effectively absolved the government of responsibility for making any meaningful adjustments to the education system in the target communities – they just had to ensure that pools and petrol bowsers were delivered. Bell's two fundamental rules of interest convergence are clearly present here; governments gain political brownie points from a public "increasingly convinced of Aboriginal irresponsibility" as "the media celebrates the gift of yet another facility to the native population" (Sullivan 2005: 6). Not only are SRAs beneficial for governments, but they also remove any impetus to significantly adapt schools to suit their students.

Contemporary Initiatives: Community Consultation in High Schools

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies is a senior subject for Indigenous and non-Indigenous students that was introduced into the Queensland secondary curriculum in 2001. The subject seeks to enable students to develop an understanding of, and respect for, the diverse Indigenous cultures of Australia and a knowledge of the varied histories of Indigenous Australia (QSA 2009). Teachers of *senior Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies* are required to develop their curriculum in conjunction with Indigenous community members and to ensure that this relationship is maintained (QSA 2009). The syllabus writers acknowledge the importance of localised pedagogy, and adaptation of the syllabus in order to meet the needs of students, the school, and community is encouraged (QSA 2009). Similarly, there is an expectation that students will engage in learning that is grounded

in Indigenous epistemologies. Not only are students required to learn about topics ignored in previous syllabi, but the impacts of Eurocentric, colonial education on the knowledge of teachers are also recognised. Professional development is consequently recommended for all school staff in order to provide students with a supportive environment in which to conduct their studies. Although there is a strong push for extensive consultation in the syllabus and other supporting documents, there is little advice about how this might be carried out effectively within a busy teacher timetable and the many, competing demands of Indigenous communities. It is important to note the organisation whose staff authored the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies syllabus documents is the QSA, while Education Queensland (EQ) is the employer of state high school teachers.

I recently completed a study that explored current experiences of consultation of Queensland secondary teachers of *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies*. Teachers in state schools were invited to take part in the project, and participants completed an online survey that consisted primarily of open-ended questions. All respondents were then invited to participate in phone interviews which lasted between twenty and thirty minutes. Finally, all participants received a copy of the 'Findings' chapter via e-mail in order to ensure that their contributions were accurately represented in the study.

In 2010 there were 13 teachers of *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies* in Queensland state high schools. Four completed the survey and participated in interviews at the beginning of 2011. Although the total number of interviewees is small, almost a third of the pool of possible participants contributed to the research.

All teachers who were interviewed for the project asserted that consultation is an important part of their work and that the factors that enable the most effective consultation with community members are strong relationships between school staff, students, families and the broader community. These relationships help to facilitate more respectful and appropriate interactions as a result of the teachers having a clearer understanding of the appropriate people to talk to and the protocols related to various topics. The outcomes of consultation are generally more successful as a result as they are demonstrably supported by all stakeholders. The development of those relationships takes time, as participants acknowledged in the *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies Syllabus*. All cited a lack of time as a major impediment affecting their capacity to participate effectively in community consultation. 'Time' referred to a lack of guaranteed opportunities to meet with community members, timetable clashes, or the lengthy process of completing paperwork. Although one teacher suggested that consultation often occurs on project based work for her classes, all participants said that they would like to engage in consultation more often.

> I don't do enough of it because I don't have time. But I believe that I wouldn't have even done as much as I've done if I didn't have that community link

> myself. You know I think it's very hard for people that don't have Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander friends, or know local people. I mean, if I was teaching down in Brisbane and had to get to know the Indigenous peoples of the Brisbane area, I don't know where I'd start. (Shannon)

It is widely acknowledged that community members, teachers and other professionals need to devote considerable amounts of time to the establishment of community relationships if consultation is to be successful (Bauman 2007; Hendricks, et al 2008). The workload of teachers, however, is likely to negatively impact on the capacity of educators to engage in appropriate levels of community consultation (Gardner & Williamson 2006; Howe 2006). Full time high school teachers working in Queensland state schools are paid to work 25 hours per week. Of this time, 210 minutes are set aside for preparation and correction time (Queensland Industrial Relations Commission 2009). Research conducted in Australia over the past decade has reported that many teachers work more than twice the amount of time they are paid for (Howe 2005; Timms, et al 2007). Howe (2005: 257-74) invited teachers within the state school system to record their working hours in a time diary and participate in focus groups. He reported that "the majority of teachers in the sample worked either long [41-49] or very long [50+] hours" (Howe 2005: 260). A similar study of teachers employed in the Queensland independent sector found that *all* teachers worked more than 40 hours, with most working 50-60 hours per week (Timms, et al 2007: 575). A frequently cited reason for this high rate of unpaid overtime is an ever-increasing workload (Gardner & Williamson 2006; Howe 2005; Probert, et al 2000; Timms, et al 2007).

Studies show that teachers view time as a finite and limited resource and one that is highly prized, often above all others (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2005). In a publication by the Australian Education Union's Federal Aboriginal Education Officer, the expectation that teachers should volunteer to do additional work outside of their regular hours is briefly alluded to (Moyle 2004). Moyle (2004: 6) also reports that when additional tasks are voluntary and the work is unpaid, teachers discern a lack of commitment to the project by their employers. One of the research participants in my project suggested that although an organisation may publish multiple documents in support of an initiative or implement changes at an administrative level, commitment to a policy is more readily recognised by teachers when changes impact their work, such as when the curriculum changes:

> Um, I think QSA does [value consultation] and I say that because of everything thats coming through in all the syllabus materials. I mean, obviously, it's a great thing that they're running this as a senior subject and I know there aren't equivalent subjects in every state... But, in all of the subjects there are those specific references to embedding Indigenous perspectives, incorporating Indigenous history or Indigenous literature so I think the QSA is *trying* to do something. Ah, Ed[ucation]. Queensland as a whole, I mean we do have things like EATSIPs [Embedding Aboriginal and

> Torres Strait Islander Perspectives], we do have people at District Offices and Regional Offices talking a lot of talk about, I know that the stuff that's been mentioned across District and Regional Offices about what they call the Principal's Report Card, where they expect the Principal to know every Indigenous student in the school and they're doing all these things, and keeping an eye on the Principals and so on. But, from my perspective on the ground, I see that as a lot of talk, I don't see a lot of follow through on those sort of things. And I think too often that's the case, that there's a lot of rhetoric that comes through from the Central and District Offices and nowhere near enough follow through. (Brian)

There are multiple benefits that result when teachers are supported, rather than directed, to implement policy changes. Praxis is likely to be more closely aligned with department-driven, best practice expectations if teachers feel supported by their school, which may be demonstrated by increasing the flexibility of timetables and/or the provision of paid overtime (Moyle 2004; Surdin 2007).

Several decades ago, Connell (1985) reported teachers' concerns about their capacity to implement school reforms successfully, despite a desire to do so. More recent studies suggest that increasing workloads are exacerbating this problem (Howe 2006; Timms, et al 2007). Time consuming activities that are optional are particularly vulnerable to marginalisation, particularly if teachers or schools do not understand or value them (Ingvarson, et al 2005). Although time should be quarantined for planning and marking, comments by participants in this study suggest that this is not always the case:

> ...it's hard to find time in schools you know, we've got our spare periods but when we've got super[vision]s as well it's often hard to book something into one of your spares because you don't necessarily know if you're going to get a supervision. (Brian)

Experiences of university staff involved in the provision of Aboriginal Studies in pre-service teacher training suggest similar challenges exist across all levels of education (Craven, et al 2005). Successful programs are those that benefit from wide-ranging support from governments, staff at all levels, and communities (Craven, et al 2005).

School deadlines can also impede the results of consultation, such as assessment tasks based on community events.

> ...we have our deadlines and we need to have stuff done by now but that's not always the way that communities work...You know, it's no use embarking on a local area study thinking maybe you can do it in a term because sometimes it takes longer than that to arrange a meeting with some of the people that you might want to talk to. (Kathy)

Timetables also pose problems once consultation has been engaged in and events planned. It can be difficult to take students into the community if it means that they will miss other classes. Similarly, major school events can

run aground if they are seen to impinge on regular classes, "...we used to do a big NAIDOC celebration at the school. We're lucky if you even hear the term 'NAIDOC' on NAIDOC week...People didn't want kids missing classes and being out all day" (Shannon). Decisions to abandon these kinds of events provide insight into an institution's values. Such moves hardly suggest that schools and communities both stand to benefit from consultative partnerships.

The Queensland Department of Education, Training and the Arts (DETA) has acknowledged that "timetable constraints can often impede the inclusion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander perspectives within the school environment" (DETA 2006: 17) and "the issue of timetabling and workload of teachers…is well understood" (Education Queensland, personal communication, February 24 2011). Given that the education department is clearly aware of many of the barriers that teachers face, it seems curious that there remains little practical advice about how teachers' workloads or timetables should be adjusted to enable consultation to occur. The application of interest convergence suggests that the main reason why activities such as consultation are expected but not mandated, and are written into policy but not included in the development of teacher workloads, is that the provision of culturally sound, equitable education is not the main goal of these policies. The syllabus authors may have had such a goal in mind when the document was developed. However, when the syllabus is enacted and comes into contact with other aspects of the institution of schooling the original intent of the document is trumped by less time consuming factors with broader appeal. If equity and social justice were the goals of the enacted syllabus, the administrative barriers to that goal that teachers, community members, researchers and the education department itself have identified, would be addressed.

One of the participants in the study emphasised the need to ensure teachers are enabled to develop *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies* in consultation with local community members, especially given the 'living' character of the subject:

> …there is no textbook for this subject and there can't be because we're studying living cultures and living history and the resources are the people in the communities. And they're things that are constantly evolving and changing and we're not, yes we are looking at historical documents and historical policies, but a major focus has to be the contemporary stuff and because it's contemporary, it's constantly changing and constantly evolving and you can't just rely on going to a textbook or going to a handout booklet that someone did up five years ago and just be able to recycle that because even something that was done two years ago there'll be a lot of new information to add to it and a whole lot of stuff that now becomes obsolete. Yeah, I don't think you can survive in this subject without talking to people.

Conclusions

With the introduction of *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies* in Queensland, education appears to have come a long way since the kidnapping of Bennelong and Colbey. In particular, there is significant evidence in the literature that governments recognise the need for consultation around issues of education. However, little research has been published on the topic of how teachers and community members experience consultation. Government publications suggest a desire to move towards a model similar to Heslop's (1997) delegation or even self-determination. Existing literature suggests, however, that little is being done outside of policy rhetoric to enable movement away from the assimilation model.

There is some literature that investigates general relationships between communities and school staff, however the current works tend to lay the blame for a lack of community consultation between schools and Indigenous communities on teachers or community members, either as groups or as individuals. The impacts of structural deficits on consultation, however, have attracted less attention. There exists extensive academic support for the introduction (or continuation) of consultative relationships but a significant silence on the issue of how teachers are to scale the workload wall in order to engage successfully with communities. Despite the publication of research that clearly connects the high teacher workloads to a disinclination to integrate additional or optional work into everyday practice, teachers' workloads continue to increase.

The literature around the institutional racism present in Australia's education system is scant. There is an acknowledgement of the impact of colonial educative practices on Indigenous peoples, but little recognition of the maintenance of white privilege in today's school system. As a result, the research around consultation has focused on individuals and groups in school communities, and the proposed solutions have been piecemeal. Critical race theory offers an opportunity to investigate the issues of consultation within the broader scope of institutions and systems, which should enable solutions that are practical at all levels. There is a need for such research to occur if teachers and communities are to be enabled to develop solid, productive consultative relationships. Any investigation into relationships between Indigenous communities and a largely non-Indigenous institution must include a critique of the culture of that institution and not simply focus on the culture of individuals.

A foundational idea behind interest convergence is that social justice programs will only be implemented by policy makers if they do not adversely affect the status quo, regardless of the potential benefits to minority groups. This theory is borne out in current school practices related to community consultation. Notions of social justice and increased equity are professed goals of EQ and QSA, and the potential benefits for Indigenous peoples are apparent. The experiences of the participants in this project suggest,

however, that teachers of *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies* are being required by multiple education organisations to engage in consultation but are provided with insufficient support to do so effectively. Bell's theory is supported in this instance since policies requiring consultation are implemented without inconvenience to the Education Department, which does not provide extra time for consultation or pay teachers any extra money to engage in this work. Similarly, there is no requirement for schools to adjust timetables or deadlines in order to accommodate consultative processes. Refusal to adapt school timetables consequently requires community members to engage in non-Indigenous meeting procedures, undermining Indigenous models of consultation.

Bell's theory clearly applies to the teachers interviewed for this study (myself included). There is undoubtedly a desire to engage in consultation for all the reasons described by Shannon, Mark, Kathy and Brian, as well as those outlined by EQ and the QSA. However, this commitment does not extend so far as to compel these organisation restructure the school day or by paying teachers for engaging in consultation as part of their work in order to increase the extent to which Indigenous community members can participate in school business. Interest convergence theory is borne out in the limited time and resources made available for teachers to engage with communities. As research into teachers' work asserts, institutional support by way of provision of practical measures such as designated time to complete particular tasks, greatly increases the likelihood of an initiative's success. Ultimately, by failing to provide teachers with sufficient time and resources to complete the work it requires of them, the Department of Education is failing to provide practical measures by which the goals of consultation can be achieved. According to Bell, the likely outcome of such a situation will be racial sacrifice – Indigenous communities continue to be effectively excluded from most schools, or their input will be included in a manner that is not too epistemologically or politically challenging to educative institutions.

Author Note

Jacinta Maxwell is a Pākehā New Zealander and non-Indigenous Australian. She is an Associate Lecturer in the Faculty of Education at the University of Southern Queensland in Giabal and Jarowair country, Toowoomba. Her teaching areas include teacher identity, philosophies of education, and the Australian history curriculum. She recently completed a Master's degree and is working towards a PhD for which she is investigating the intentions behind the cross curriculum priorities of the Australian Curriculum.

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SPECIAL ISSUE: Directions and Intersections

'Deep Cleavages that Divide': The Origins and Development of Ethnic Violence in Rwanda

Deborah Mayersen
University of Wollongong

While Hutu and Tutsi subgroups have existed since pre-colonial times in Rwanda, major interethnic violence is a much more recent phenomenon. During the 1950s, issues of race, power and privilege became highly politicised. As decolonisation loomed, the intersections between race and power became bitterly contested, leading to the 1959 Hutu Uprising. The Hutu Uprising was the first major outbreak of interethnic violence in Rwanda, however following this, such violence recurred repeatedly. This article explores key issues that contributed to and emerged from the Hutu Uprising, including the conflation of political and ethnic issues, perceptions of the Tutsi minority as a threat to the Hutu majority, and the politicisation of ethnicity for party political advantage. These factors came to dominate the political agenda in Rwanda at times of national stress, leaving it particularly vulnerable to escalating interethnic violence. Ultimately this led to the 1994 genocide.

Introduction

"The most advanced elements among the Bahutu are stirring, and beginning to make overt demands", reported the United Nations (UN) Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of Rwanda in 1957 (15).[1] Under the auspices of the UN Trusteeship Council, the triennial missions to this Belgian colony had both oversight and advisory functions. The previous mission, in 1954, had declared "There appeared to be very little development of general or even

[1] The UN Trust Territory was officially the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, but Rwanda and Burundi were administered separately. Statements utilised throughout this paper from Trust Territory documents and reports refer to Rwanda only. For consistency, modern spelling of Rwanda is utilised throughout, however original spelling is retained within direct quotes.

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local public opinion" (United Nations 1954: 2) in the country; by 1960, however, the subsequent mission reported on the first major interethnic violence there (United Nations 1960). In a remarkably short period, relations between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority had become highly politicised, polarised, bitter and violent.[2] Racially motivated violence plagued the country during the independence process. By July 1962, when the country declared independence, some 100,000 Tutsi had fled as refugees (Webster 1966: 84); just eighteen months later ethnic massacres would claim the lives of 10-14,000 Tutsi (Segal 1964: 15; Lemarchand 1970a: 225). This article will analyse the origins and development of ethnic violence in Rwanda. First, it will explore how, and why, issues surrounding ethnicity became critical during the decolonisation period. It proposes that between 1954 and 1959 – when the first major outbreak of ethnic violence erupted in Rwanda – three key factors combined to provoke extreme levels of ethnic polarisation. Second, it will investigate why ethnic violence became a recurring feature at times of national stress. Arguably, a particularly toxic combination of issues increased Rwanda's propensity for such violence. Together, these analyses contribute to a greater understanding of the ethnic cleavages that ultimately culminated in the 1994 genocide.

Background

Rwanda has a long history of ethnic diversity, with the majority Hutu comprising approximately 85 per cent of the population, and the minority Tutsi 15 per cent. A third group, the Twa, comprise less than 1 per cent. In at least some parts of the country, Hutu and Tutsi subgroups have existed since pre-colonial times. Tutsi were traditionally pastoralists, with a small Tutsi elite comprising the ruling class, while Hutu were traditionally agriculturalists, of generally lower status. The distinction between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority subgroups has been varyingly described as one of race, tribe, caste, class, domination and subjugation, ethnicity and political identity. Each descriptor appears to have more than a kernel of truth, but also elements of distortion and inaccuracy. Moreover, the nature of these identities is not a static one, as they have changed over time and in response to both internal and external influences. Whereas today these identities are commonly referred to as ethnic identities (and will be referred to as such within this paper, in line with common practice), for much of Rwanda's history they were considered racial.

The first explorers to reach Rwanda had been quick to notice and comment upon the three groups that comprised the population, and the distinction between them was immediately interpreted as racial, in accordance with anthropological theories of the time. Much study was conducted into the

[2] A note on the terminology used in this chapter. Kinyarwanda is a language that uses prefixes extensively, but in conformance with general practice in academic writing on Rwanda, the terms 'Hutu', 'Tutsi' and 'Twa' will be used without prefixes, to denote both singular and plural. In Kinyarwanda the prefix 'mu' denotes singular, and 'ba' plural. Where quotes include these prefixes, they have not been altered.

physical attributes of each race, and they were ranked hierarchically. The 'Hamitic hypothesis' was invoked to explain the perceived superiority of the Tutsi – an explanation conceived by nineteenth century anthropologists that posited that 'superior', ruling groups within Africa, such as the Tutsi, were migratory descendants of Noah's son Ham, and thus far superior to the 'negro' race (although as descendants of Noah's cursed son, still inherently inferior to Europeans) (Mamdani 2001: 80-87). Under the influence of this hypothesis, for most of the period of German (1894-1916) and Belgian (1916-1962) colonial rule, the Tutsi minority was regarded as racially superior. [3] As such, Belgian colonial authorities bequeathed the Tutsi with privileged access to education and indigenous positions of authority. Over time, this perception of Tutsi superiority was both institutionalised and internalised within Rwandan society. Even as late as 1959, Belgium's annual report to the UN on the Trust Territory helpfully included a photo of the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa 'racial types' (*type de race*) (Belgian Government 1959).

There was a very light German colonial presence in Rwanda, and with less than 100 Europeans in the country, officials "could not really modify Rwandese society in depth" (Prunier 1995: 25; Melvern 2000: 7). The German colonial authorities utilised a system of indirect rule, which effectively reinforced the pre-existing complex and highly organised Tutsi monarchical system (the *mwamiship*), and the power of the Tutsi aristocracy. When Belgium assumed control of Rwanda, it too implemented a system of indirect rule, utilising the indigenous Tutsi elite to implement a range of policies. Over time, however, the model of indirect rule was substantially modified to meet Belgian economic and developmental goals. In the first three decades of their rule, colonial authorities focussed on building a road and infrastructure network, measures to prevent famine, the introduction of cash crops, and the provision of basic education and medical care.

In the wake of World War Two, however, new challenges arose. The new United Nations mandate advocated rapid political development and preparation for independence in the colony. Triennial Visiting Missions insisted on the first steps towards the democratisation of the indigenous political system. At the same time, a new generation of Catholic missionaries and clergy brought anti-racial and egalitarian values to Rwanda after experiencing the Holocaust in Europe (Mamdani 2001; Linden 1977). Many Hutu children were now receiving a rudimentary education, there were increased opportunities for Hutu in the emerging monetary economy, and through further education in the seminaries. These factors led to the emergence of a Hutu consciousness in the mid-1950s, or what has been dubbed the 'Hutu awakening'. For the first time, race became a contested

[3] Germany was 'allocated' territory that included Rwanda at the Berlin Conference in 1885, but the first German to arrive in the country did not do so until 1894. Belgium occupied Rwanda in 1916 in the course of World War One, the legitimacy of the occupation was confirmed under a League of Nations mandate in 1923.

political issue. In just a few short years, Hutu-Tutsi divisions led to the first major outbreak of interethnic violence, the Hutu Uprising of November 1959.

Ethnic Polarisation

Arguably, three key factors combine to explain the very rapid and extreme polarisation of Hutu-Tutsi divisions, and the resulting interethnic violence. First, the critical nature of this issue to the nascent Hutu counter-elite cannot be underestimated. For this first generation of politically conscious Hutu, race was not one political problem amongst the many challenges that beset Rwanda, but *the* central issue, and the lens through which all other developmental issues were approached. In March 1957 this became apparent with the publication of the *Bahutu Manifesto*. Signed by nine members of the Hutu counter-elite, including future Rwandan president Grégoire Kayibanda, it has been described as "probably the most important document in modern Rwandan political development" (Wagoner 1968: 158). The *Bahutu Manifesto* challenged every facet of Rwandan society:

> Some people have asked whether this is a social or a racial conflict … In reality and in the minds of men it is both. It can, however, be narrowed down for it is primarily a question of a political monopoly held by one race, the Mututsi, and, in view of the social situation as a whole, it has become an economic and social monopoly. In view, also, of the *de facto* selection in education, this political, economic and social monopoly has also become a cultural monopoly (Niyonzima and others 1957: 3).

The *Bahutu Manifesto* identified a range of problems facing Rwanda and even proposed numerous solutions – all of them highlighting a fundamental racial component. Thus integral to Rwanda's economic development was reform of the land ownership system, based upon traditional Tutsi privilege; while integral to education development was equitable access to education and government-funded scholarships (Niyonzima et al 1957). Political development required "that Bahutu should in fact be promoted to public office", and that positions such as sub-chiefs and chiefs should be elected by taxpayers (Niyonzima et al 1957: 8). For the Hutu counter-elite, the fundamental problem was Tutsi racial privilege, and addressing this issue was crucial for all areas of Rwanda's political and economic development.

The *Bahutu Manifesto* was prepared to highlight the critical issue of race relations to the 1957 UN Visiting Mission. The Visiting Mission also received a starkly different account of race relations in Rwanda, however, in *Mise au Point*, the *Statement of Views*. Published by the Superior Council, comprising Rwanda's Tutsi political elite, the *Statement of Views* also viewed race relations as "the fundamental problem in our country now" (High Council of State 1957: Annex II). Yet astonishingly, this statement was not referring to the problems of Hutu-Tutsi race relations – which did not rate a mention in the entire document – but race relations between whites and non-whites in the country. This highlights the high degree of racial awareness and the hierarchical nature of Rwandan society, but also a strong desire to de-

emphasise the Hutu-Tutsi distinction and recast Rwanda as a homogenous nation in a bid for the elite to retain its power (Atterbury 1970). The primary focus of the *Statement of Views* was on preparing Rwanda for rapid independence, through proper training, recognition and utilisation of the current indigenous elite (Wagoner 1968). Self-government was an interim goal, and the Statement noted "It would be difficult at the present to specify when it will be possible to grant us self-government, but we are anxious that we should be trained for self-government now" (High Council of State 1957: Annex II). The Superior Council's desire for rapid self-government, and omission of the Hutu-Tutsi issue, reflected an awareness of the potential threat posed by the nascent Hutu political movement, and a response designed "so they, the Tutsi, could use the machinery of government to maintain their power" (Webster 1966: 40). Both the *Bahutu Manifesto* and the *Statement of Views* were key documents in that they "provided the ideological basis for much of the political action which followed" (Webster 1966: 40; Harroy 1984: 237).

The second factor that contributed to the rapid ethnic polarisation of Rwanda during this period is the lack of responsiveness of both the Belgian colonial authorities and the UN Visiting Missions to this critical issue. Despite the *Bahutu Manifesto* and the *Statement of Views*, arguably neither authority realised the importance or disintegrative potential of the race relations issue prior to late 1959. The 1954 Visiting Mission completely failed to mention the problem of sub-group identity, and it was left to the Belgians to point this out in criticising their report (United Nations 1955: 47). Yet the Belgian authorities themselves made no attempts to address the issue. In 1956, a proposal to include Hutu representation on the (colonial-led) General Council of Ruanda-Urundi was defeated, leading its only proponent to resign. In a parting shot, Mr. Maus bemoaned "the conflict of interests between the Tutsi and Hutu communities which is the most pressing social problem and the most poignant human drama in the Territory, will therefore continue to be officially ignored by our institutions" (United Nations 1960: 40).

The *Bahutu Manifesto* and *Statement of Views* ensured at least some level of official acknowledgement of the race relations issue in 1957, but led to little real action. The UN Visiting Mission welcomed "the increasing rate at which the traditional society in Ruanda-Urundi is adapting itself to modern democratic ideas and forms" (United Nations 1957: 9). Yet it also acknowledged, for the first time, that the acceleration of political development for which previous Missions had pressed so strenuously might be a cause of political turmoil (Rawson 1966):

> The inevitable disintegration of such a civilisation [traditional Rwandan society] on contact with the modern world and its replacement by new forms may give rise to serious difficulties in spite of all the Administering Authority's vigilance (United Nations 1957: 12).

While noting the "especially delicate stage" of Rwanda's political development, it had little to offer of value, with hazy statements such as "Without minimising the danger of haste, the Mission believes that over-cautiousness is no less dangerous" (United Nations 1957: 12). The only practical suggestion it proposed – with extraordinary optimism – was further education:

> Under the influence of secondary and university education and of contact with the outside world, traditional conceptions are giving way and the *elite* of the old regime are coming up against a new *elite*. It will not be long – and indeed there are already indications of this – before the traditional political structure and the respect for feudal institutions will be as irksome to the rising generation of young educated Batutsi as to the new Bahutu *elite* (United Nations 1957: 23).

As such, the 1957 Visiting Mission failed to meaningfully respond to the *Bahutu Manifesto* and *Statement of Views*. Predominantly focussed on the need for rapid decolonisation (reflecting the international political climate of the time), it appeared to seriously underestimate both the importance and severity of the issues surrounding race relations in Rwanda.

There is conflicting evidence as to how seriously the Belgian Administering Authorities regarded the Hutu-Tutsi problem. Certainly they recognised the "deep cleavages which divide the Batutsi, the Bahutu [and] the Batwa ... Those cleavages are obvious ... and they dominate the whole of social life" (United Nations 1955: 47). But the stratified nature of society in Rwanda had been uncontested for decades – and indeed utilised as the basis of indirect rule – and the new Hutu challenge to Tutsi domination appears not to have been perceived as a pressing issue prior to the Hutu Uprising in late 1959. Afterwards, this rapidly changed, and the report of the 1960 Visiting Mission claimed that "In his discussions with the 1957 Visiting Mission, the Governor described relations between the Tutsi and Hutu as the key problem of the Territory" (United Nations 1960: 42). But if that was the case, it was not clearly described as such in either the 1957 report, or Belgium's annual reports on the Trust Territory. Indeed, a careful reading of documents during this period suggests that Vice-Governor General Jean-Paul Harroy did not concede until December 1958 that "the Hutu-Tutsi question posed an undeniable problem" – some twenty-two months after the *Bahutu Manifesto's* publication (Lemarchand 1970a: 152).

To the extent that the problem was recognised, the Administering Authorities appeared unsure how to address it. The General Council of Ruanda-Urundi passed a motion to study the *Manifesto*, but repeatedly postponed discussion of the Hutu-Tutsi polarisation (United Nations 1960). Governor Harroy initially adopted a stance that aligned closely with the position of the Tutsi elite, suggesting that the Hutu-Tutsi problem was largely an economic (rather than racial) issue, and warning of 'misuse' of the terms Hutu and Tutsi (United Nations 1960). This aligned with the Administration's early position in favour of abolishing the terms Hutu and Tutsi – a position advocated by the Tutsi elite but strongly opposed in the *Bahutu Manifesto* for its potential to mask discrimination (Niyonzima and others 1957: 11). During this period,

however, the Administration largely failed to take a consistent or decisive stance on the Hutu-Tutsi issue, and the authorities appear to have been unsure as to the best way in which to proceed. Meanwhile, as the democratisation process gathered pace ahead of anticipated independence, it did so in an environment of increasing polarisation.

The third, critical factor that contributed to the extremity of the ethnic polarisation was the confluence of the race relations issue with the democratisation and independence process. The rapid pace of decolonisation precluded the use of longer term conciliatory and ameliorative policies that might have improved Hutu-Tutsi relations over time. Rather, each side perceived the issue as immediate rather than chronic, and one that must be resolved prior to independence. Increasingly, that resolution came to be visualised as through a 'victory' of one group at the expense of the other. By 1959 the disastrous potential of the convergence of the race relations issue and the independence process was clear. Observer M.A. Munyangaju summed up the atmosphere on 30 January:

> The situation is very tense between Bahutu and Batutsi. A small quarrel would be enough for starting off a ranged battle. The Batutsi realise that after this, everything is finished for them and are preparing for the last chance. The Bahutu also see that a trial of strength is in the making and do not wish to give up (Quoted in Bhattacharyya 1967: 218).

Race was *the* political issue when political parties were allowed to form. Thus the founding charter of *Union Nationale Rwandaise* (UNAR), the party of the Tutsi elite, declared in August 1959:

> Although the Ruandais society is composed of individuals of highly unequal value, and it is not equitable to accord the same value to the vulgar thoughts of the ordinary man as to the perspicacious judgment of the capable ... Although universal suffrage will infallibly end in the enslavement of the educated minority by an uncultivated majority ... It is nevertheless impossible to refuse universal suffrage to the Bahutu. An open opposition will provide one more argument to the colonists whose civilisation ... [and] loyalty is now known (UNAR Charter, in Nkundabagenzi 1961, translation utilised from Bhattacharyya 1967: 248).

The most popular Hutu party, *Mouvement Démocratique Rwandais / Parti du Mouvement et de l'Emancipation Hutu* (MDR-PARMEHUTU), announced its goal as "a true union of all the Rwandan people without any race dominating another as is the case today" (Manifeste-Programme du Parmehutu 1959, in Nkundabagenzi 1961: 113). The few, quiet proponents of moderation received little support. The bitterness of the debate is further illustrated by a September 1959 press release from the Hutu social party APROSOMA, which began "The plans of the Tutsi party in Ruanda – representing the Tutsi who are exploiters by nature, zenophobes [sic] by instinct and communists by necessity ..." (United Nations 1959:1). By November of 1959, these divisive, race-based politics contributed to the outbreak of the Hutu Uprising.

The Hutu Uprising

The Hutu Uprising, or Rwandan Revolution as it is alternatively known, is particularly significant as the first major outbreak of interethnic violence in Rwanda. Tensions were high throughout 1959. A Belgian working group had visited in April, with a view to developing a decolonisation plan for the colony. Intergroup friction escalated as Hutu and Tutsi leaders each sought to convince the working group of their proposals for the nation's future. Tension continued to simmer through a long delay before the release of the working group's findings; and as elections due for the end of the year approached without the form they would take being finalised (Atterbury 1970: 64). Additionally, the sudden death of the Rwandan monarch on 25 July and the appointment of his replacement in controversial circumstances contributed to an atmosphere akin to a "simmering cauldron" (Atterbury 1970: 64). By 1 November, it only took a spark to ignite the Rwandan revolution. An altercation in which a band of "young UNAR militants" attacked a PARMEHUTU leader led to a Hutu retaliation that escalated into revolution (Lemarchand 1970a: 162). Hutu-led violence and the burning of Tutsi huts rapidly spread. As the subsequent Visiting Mission report noted:

> The operations were generally carried out by a fairly similar process. Incendiaries would set off in bands of some tens of persons. Armed with matches and paraffin, which the indigenous inhabitants used in large quantities for their lamps, they pillaged the Tutsi houses they passed on their way and set fire to them. On their way they would enlist other incendiaries to follow in the procession while the first recruits, too exhausted to continue, would give up and return home. Thus day after day fires spread from hill to hill. Generally speaking the incendiaries, who were often unarmed, did not attack the inhabitants of the huts and were content with pillaging and setting fire to them (United Nations 1960: 73).

There were few fatalities associated with these attacks, however serious damage was done as thousands and thousands of huts were pillaged and burned, plantations plundered and livestock killed (Lemarchand 1970a: 167).

The Tutsi reaction was swift, organised and politically motivated (United Nations 1960: 75, 77; Lemarchand 1970b: 904; Lemarchand 1970a: 164). UNAR leaders, working in cooperation with the Rwandan monarch, quickly organised commando units, dispatching them to kill and arrest specific Hutu Leaders (United Nations 1960: 75, 77). According to the UN Visiting Mission report:

> Each commando party amounted to some hundreds of persons or more, and included a majority of Hutu, but the leaders were generally Tutsi or Twa. The group would set off on its mission with very definite instructions. In other cases, emissaries were sent out from Nyanza with verbal orders instructing them to bring back or kill certain persons … It seems to be an established fact, moreover, that in many cases a commando group set out with orders only to arrest a person, but in effect killed him, either because he resisted arrest or because some attackers had the instinct to kill (United Nations 1960: 77).

Well over a dozen prominent Hutu leaders were killed in this way. UNAR appeared to be trying to eliminate the Hutu leadership, and thus its opposition. The Belgian Administration took more than a week to bring the situation under control, and it was not until 14 November that quiet was fully restored. At least 200 people were dead, and several hundred more wounded (United Nations 1960: 82).

From the perspective of November 1959, it is difficult to see how the Hutu Uprising earned the moniker of the 'Rwandan Revolution'. The Uprising began almost spontaneously; it did not target Rwanda's political institutions or colonial authorities; and did not seek or manage to overthrow anything (Wagoner 1968: 190, 193). Perhaps what was most revolutionary, at first, was the emerging consciousness amongst the Hutu that they could agitate for change, and that the long past of Tutsi domination did not foreordain the future (Wagoner 1968: 193). Within just a few months, however, the Uprising resulted in truly revolutionary change. The Belgian Administration announced radical reforms in preparation for decolonisation. For the first time, it recognised the legitimate political rights and aspirations of the Hutu majority. In the course of the Uprising, hundreds of Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs had vacated their posts, and the Administration filled these vacant posts predominantly with Hutu. Thus, by 1 March 1960 the number of Hutu chiefs went from 0 to 22 (out of a total of 45 chiefdoms), and the number of Hutu subchiefs rose from 10 to 297 (out of a total of 531) (United Nations 1960: 85-86). Furthermore, in the wake of the violence, Belgium appointed Colonel Logiest as the 'Special Civilian Resident', to ensure the maintenance of peace and order and implement the planned policy changes. Colonel Logiest was known to be favourable to the Hutu cause, and expressed his position openly:

> What is our goal? It is to accelerate the politicization of Rwanda … Not only do we want elections but we want everybody to be aware of this. People must go to the polls in full freedom and in full political awareness. Thus we must undertake an action in favour of the Hutu, who live in a state of ignorance and under oppressive influences. By virtue of the situation we are obliged to take sides. We cannot stay neutral (quoted in Lemarchand 1970a: 175).

Commentators have varied in their analysis of the Belgian response to the Uprising, with some suggesting the Administration had little choice but to address the Hutu demands for political inclusion, and others portraying a more actively pro-Hutu choice (Rawson 1966: 234; Wagoner 1968: 198; Lemarchand 1970a: 175; Bhattacharyya 1967: 273; Tabara 1992: 179-185). What is clear, however, is that Belgium's response to the violence – granting Hutu more power within the four months after the Uprising than they had been able to access through years of peaceable campaigning – indirectly, at least, rewarded the use of violence over that of peaceful methods. The violence of the Uprising, whether intentionally or not, led to advantageous political outcomes for the Hutu counter-elite.

The 1959 Uprising was provoked by perceptions of the Tutsi as posing a threat to Hutu self-determination, and by the entwinement of political and ethnic issues. The Hutu counter-elite's fear of continued Tutsi domination after Rwandan independence was palpable. The *Bahutu Manifesto* spoke of "the great despair of the Bahutu, who see themselves condemned forever to the role of subordinate manual workers, and this, worse still, after achieving an independence which they will have unwittingly helped to obtain" (Niyonzima et al 1957: 3). This fear was largely realistic – the UNAR charter quoted earlier highlights the lack of commitment to democracy amongst the Tutsi elite. Yet at the same time, the inexorable approach of independence and the urgent need to influence the vote of the largely illiterate and apolitical Hutu population led to an "intense politicisation of the racial cleavages by PARMEHUTU" (Bhattacharyya 1967: 314). For vast swathes of the relatively isolated and almost entirely rural Hutu population, a vote for Hutu rule was truly revolutionary, despite a history of longstanding Tutsi oppression. PARMEHUTU had to challenge its potential constituency to think beyond the traditionally higher status of the Tutsi minority, the historical clientship relationship between Hutu and Tutsi and the widespread belief in the Rwandan monarch as sacred ruler of the nation. For the Hutu counter-elite, politicising ethnic divisions and highlighting Tutsi oppression offered a more realistic hope of galvanising the Hutu peasantry than the presentation of progressive notions of egalitarianism (Lemarchand 1966: 318). The conflation of ethnicity and politics, however, set a dangerous precedent.

As the process of decolonisation continued in the months and years immediately following the Uprising, both the Belgian Administration and the United Nations struggled to control repeated outbreaks of violence. Sporadic violence destabilised the nation throughout 1960, including the burning of Tutsi huts in many regions. There was a growing refugee problem, which the Administration struggled to address, particularly as UNAR campaigned to gain refugee support. Communal and then legislative elections proceeded despite substantial violence in the period preceding each. Ultimately, PARMEHUTU won the elections and assumed leadership of Rwanda. Meanwhile, groups of Tutsi refugees in the border zones of Uganda and the Congo – who came to be known as *inyenzi* (cockroaches) – instigated cross-border raids into a number of Rwandan communes. The considerable efforts of both the Belgian Administration and the United Nations failed to curb the violence or resolve the refugee problem prior to Rwandan independence. Both issues would continue to plague Rwanda following independence, as will be discussed further below.

Recurring Violence

The Hutu Uprising is especially notable as the first major outbreak of ethnically targeted violence in Rwanda. It was not the last. Following independence in 1962, ethnic violence recurred at times of national stress. Particularly notable is the violence associated with the Bugesera invasion in 1963, the unrest prior to the Habyarimana *coup d'etat* in 1973, massacres of

Tutsi following the Rwandan Patriotic Front invasion in 1990, and ultimately the 1994 genocide. Three key aspects of the 1959 violence, however, became common features of many of these subsequent outbreaks. First, the violence led to advantageous political outcomes for the Hutu leadership. Second, it was provoked by perceptions of the Tutsi as a threat to the Hutu. Finally, the violence was intimately related to the conflation of ethnic and political issues. These factors contributed to increasing Rwanda's propensity for recurring violence.

The Bugesera Invasion

Unfortunately, it was not long before the newly independent Rwanda faced its first serious crisis. Like the 1959 Hutu Uprising, the 1963 Bugesera invasion – and the violence it provoked – contained the three components of perceptions of Tutsi as a threat, the conflation of ethnic and political issues, and the ultimately advantageous political outcomes for Hutu leaders (now in government). The invaders were Tutsi refugees, coordinated by the UNAR leadership in exile (Lemarchand 1970a: 219-220). On the night of 20 December, a group of refugees entered Rwanda from Burundi, acquiring additional arms and supporters from within Rwanda on their march towards the capital. It was not until the group was within a few kilometres of Kigali, however, that they encountered a company of the Rwandan National Guard. A brief battle ensued, in which the invaders were easily repelled. Several hundred Tutsi were killed, while others were pursued back to the border (Wagoner 1968: 258). Over the following week, a series of additional raids were launched from the Congo and Uganda, however all were quickly repelled by the now mobilised army (Lemarchand 1970a: 222). The government, however, reacted with shock and panic – particularly when a document was found on the body of one of the invaders, outlining a plan for a new, Tutsi-led government (Wagoner 1968: 259). Government officials were sent to each region to organise 'civilian defence forces' to aid the army (Segal 1964: 14). In the atmosphere of fear and panic, however, with wild rumours circulating that Kigali had fallen, defence became attack (Segal 1964: 15). "We are expected to defend ourselves. The only way to go about it is to paralyse the Tutsi. How? They must be killed" proclaimed one government official in the prefecture of Gikongoro, launching a massacre that targeted Tutsi indiscriminately (Lemarchand 1970a: 223-224). Over the course of about two weeks, between 10,000 and 14,000 mostly Tutsi were killed as the massacres spread across the country (Segal 1964: 15; Lemarchand 1970a: 225). It was not until mid-January that the violence ceased.

There is little doubt that the massacres were driven by fear. European observers in the nation during December 1963 and January 1964 reported an atmosphere of "near panic throughout Rwanda" (Wagoner 1968: 264). The report of the United Nations Commission that investigated the massacres also concluded that they were a result of Hutu "fear and panic" following the Tutsi incursion (United Nations 1964). The divisive, racially driven election campaigns prior to independence just a few years earlier – depicting Tutsi as

cruel oppressors – most likely contributed to the extreme levels of fear. The conflation of ethnic and political divisions was particularly notable in the reporting of the massacres in the international press. '"Genocide" Charge in Rwanda' and 'Rwanda Policy of Genocide Alleged' blared *The Times* (1964a: 8; 1964b: 10). The Rwandan government sought to refute this highly politicised reporting, commenting "This despicable slander comes from the people that profit from it" (Rwanda, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1964: 18). Rwandan President Kayibanda issued multiple statements expressing his frustration at the "subversive activities" of "neo-colonialists" in trying to mislead opinion and provoke international intervention, the return of foreign forces and/or the downfall of the government (Rwanda, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1964: 22-25, 29-30). Yet ultimately, the events of December 1963 and January 1964 had some advantageous outcomes for the Kayibanda government. The massacres left the UNAR leadership heavily decimated, and the UN report into events described them as resulting "in the silencing of the opposition" (United Nations, Press Services Office of Public Information 1964). Rwanda's survival in the face of invasion became a source of national solidarity and pride for the Hutu majority. The crisis brought a sense of cohesion to the Kayibanda government that had not previously existed, and a resurgence of popular support (Lemarchand 1970a: 227).

The Habyarimana Coup d'Etat

In subsequent outbreaks of violence, the three factors of perceptions of Tutsi as a threat, conflation of ethnic and political issues, and ethnic violence leading to advantageous political outcomes appear not just as features, but also as drivers of the conflict. Most dangerously, political leaders actively attempted to manipulate these factors to their benefit. For example, this is clearly apparent during the unrest in 1972-73. By 1972, the Kayibanda government was struggling to maintain support in the face of severe economic challenges (Weinstein 1974: 351). When large-scale massacres of Hutu (by the mostly Tutsi army) broke out in neighbouring Burundi, the violence spilled over to provoke renewed ethnic hostility and unrest in Rwanda. Yet Kayibanda did not respond decisively (Mamdani 2001: 137). Several authors have suggested that he allowed the hostilities to continue, or even actively fermented them, in an attempt to deflect criticism of his government's performance in other areas (Prunier 1995: 60-61; Greenland 1976: 115; Melvern 2000: 20). When Major-General Habyarimana, commander of the National Guard, subsequently seized power in a bloodless *coup d'etat* in July 1973, he too used issues surrounding ethnicity as a political tool to justify both his seizure of power and the legitimacy of his rule. Thus in an interview given two weeks after the *coup*, he asserted:

> The former regime had spread division, on a political level, an ethnic and regional division; a division that was to give rise to massacres in Rwanda ... when I saw that this was to lead to a fratricidal war, I said no and toppled the former government (Habyarimana 1981: 147).

The more complex reality, including the failed assassination attempt against Habyarimana by members of the former cabinet just prior to the *coup*, was not mentioned. And while in this case Habyarimana promoted ethnic reconciliation for political advantage, later in his rule he would do the opposite.

The 1994 Genocide

It was in the early 1990s that the factors which provoked the extreme ethnic polarisation during the decolonisation period, and those that subsequently increased Rwanda's propensity for repeated ethnic violence, came together with devastating results. In October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a group of second generation Tutsi refugees based in Uganda, invaded Rwanda. Repeated incursions led to a civil war in the country's north. At the same time, the government faced an economic crisis and strong international pressure to introduce democratic reform. Habyarimana attempted to regain the support of his disaffected constituency through a renewed focus on ethnic divisions (Twagilimana 2003: 105). The RPF invasion recalled the frightening Bugesera invasion of 1963 in the minds of many Hutu, and led to renewed perceptions of the Tutsi as posing a threat to Hutu (Des Forges 1999: 65). These perceptions were augmented by the government, which exaggerated the RPF threat, and tolerated and participated in anti-Tutsi rhetoric and violence (Des Forges 1999: 65). In November 1992, for example, Hutu extremist Léon Mugesera claimed to be speaking for the president when he concluded a public speech with nothing short of a call for genocide:

> The fatal error we made in 1959 was to let them [the Tutsi] leave the country. Their home is Ethiopia, and we are going to find them a shortcut, namely the Nyabarongo River. I must insist on this point. We must act forcefully! Get rid of them! (Quoted in Twagilimana 2003: 106).

The situation deteriorated, with periodic massacres of Tutsi in 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993. The United Nations and the international community failed to decisively respond to the worsening violence. As in the late 1950s, the rapid growth of ethnic polarisation continued unimpeded.

At the same time as Rwanda was grappling with civil war and economic crisis, a democratisation process was also underway. Rwanda's heavy dependence on foreign aid meant it had little choice but to accede to Western demands for democratisation following the end of the Cold War (Prunier 1995: 89). As the civil war intensified and peace negotiations suffered repeated setbacks, however, issues surrounding ethnicity became entwined with the politics of democratisation. The dual threats of democratisation and the RPF increasingly challenged the power of Habyarimana and his ruling MRND party, and their response was a massive anti-Tutsi propaganda campaign. The RPF and Tutsi were pitted as foreign and feudal oppressors, seeking to 'return' Rwanda to a state of Tutsi dominance and Hutu oppression (Des Forges 1999: 73). Propaganda linked any opposition to the MRND with support for the RPF.

Thus a huge pro-democracy rally in Kigali in January 1992 was labelled as having been organised by the RPF; opposition parties were accused of having "plotted with the enemy" to undermine Rwanda (Hintjens 1999: 261; Prunier 1995: 171; Longman 1997: 298). When the Arusha Peace Accords were negotiated in 1993, issues surrounding ethnicity and democratisation effectively combined, as a Broad Based Transitional Government with positions for both MRND and RPF leaders was negotiated. By this stage, however, the politicisation of ethnicity for political advantage, the conflation of ethnic and political issues, and the resulting perceptions of Tutsi as posing a grave threat to Rwanda had taken the country to the brink of genocide. Before the Arusha Accords could be implemented, Hutu extremists sparked the most intense genocide in history.

On 6 April 1994, Hutu extremists shot down President Habyarimana's plane as it descended into Kigali airport, killing the President and all on board (Melvern 2012). Within an hour, the genocide commenced. Roadblocks were erected in Kigali, and members of the Presidential Guard dispatched to begin killing opposition figures. Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana was killed on 7 April, along with 10 Belgian UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) soldiers who were supposed to be protecting her. In response, Belgium withdrew its UNAMIR contingent and other countries quickly joined the desertion. The genocide spread throughout Rwanda with a shocking intensity: "Army and militia forces went street to street, block by block, and house to house, in Kigali and every major city save Butare in the south …Tutsi were dragged out of homes and hiding places and murdered, often after torture and rape" (Jones 2006: 238). Roadblocks were everywhere, and anyone carrying an identification card that labelled them Tutsi – or at times even if they simply 'looked' Tutsi, had married a Tutsi or even simply befriended one – was stopped and killed. As the month of April progressed, and it became clear international forces would not intervene to stop the killing, the genocide reached new peaks of intensity. In a period of 100 days, close to a million Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed (Melvern 2006: 252-253). Meanwhile, the Hutu extremist government, distracted by the work of genocide, had not been able to prevent the RPF from advancing into the country. Slowly, the RPF fought and gained control of Rwanda, and by 18 July it was all over. For the victims, however, the victory came too late.

Conclusion

Rwanda was a nation forged from a violent, divisive and racially-driven independence process. The long history of Tutsi domination in the country meant that there was always potential for conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi populations. The failure of the Belgian Administration and UN Trusteeship Council to address the emerging divisions in the late 1950s exacerbated the ethnic cleavages. The rapid decolonisation process, concurrently occurring, led to a toxic conflation of ethnic and political issues, which culminated in the first major outbreak of ethnic violence in 1959. Following Rwanda's independence, the politicisation of ethnic tension for political advantage and

the entwinement of political and ethnic issues became strategies utilised repeatedly at times of national stress. While they may have offered a temporary political advantage, they created a population that perceived its minority Tutsi as a potential threat, and that was willing to use violence to manage it. When Rwanda experienced the major crises of RPF invasion, economic crisis and political reform in the early 1990s, the Habyarimana government resorted to the dangerous tactics that had previously been so effective. In 1994, those tactics culminated in genocide. This highlights the extreme danger of the politicisation of ethnicity, and the manipulation of ethnic cleavages for political advantage. The repeated conflation of ethnic and political issues rendered Rwanda particularly vulnerable to the massive violence that ultimately occurred.

Author Note

Deborah Mayersen is Vice-Chancellor's Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Institute for Social Transformation Research at the University of Wollongong. Deborah's current research is in the field of genocide prevention. More broadly, her research interests and expertise are within the field of comparative genocide studies, including the Armenian and Rwandan genocides. Prior to commencing at the University of Wollongong, Deborah was Program Leader for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities at The Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, The University of Queensland.

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The Politics of Loyalty: Accountability, Transformation and Redress in South African Higher Education

Ingrid Tufvesson
North West University, South Africa

In South Africa, a notion that is often touted by "progressive" universities is that they were not supporters of the institutionalised system of racialisation called apartheid. Rather, they would lay the blame at the door of "Afrikaaner nationalists", and spurn the notion of whiteness as being nothing other than hate speech by the "previously oppressed" in an attempt to bring about "reverse apartheid" in South Africa today. This paper will address what it calls the politics of loyalty in an attempt to understand the paradoxes that are at play in this country, which is still a complex, intricate and largely defragmented jigsaw puzzle indicative of most societies in transition. The varied nature of contextual whiteness does not appear to have a unilinear trajectory, uniform expression, and/or a uniform approach to transformation. This paper is located in the South African Higher Education sector and will incorporate a comparative view on universities in two separate geographical areas; traditionally polarised by their historical positions, ideological foci, and so on but a shared location in the bedrock of privilege that necessitated transformation in South Africa in the first place. Questions focused on in the paper include: How are First Nation peoples' current realities understood? Which, if any, university programs of restitution exist in relation to South African First Nation peoples? How is resistance or pursuit of the achievement of transformational imperatives and the simultaneous protection of "diversity" identified?

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Introduction

This discussion is located in the ideals and directives found in the *Freedom Charter* adopted on 26 June 1955, in which the very first notions of transformation are encapsulated. At the time of its adoption, 56 years ago, change was still only a dream, with specific ideals relating to the rescue of Indigenous South Africans from the nightmares created by the heinousness of settler colonists. This paper draws its theoretical shaping from theorists in the fields of African studies, critical race, whiteness, Indigenous and post-colonial feminist thought.

Diversity is not dealt with as a separate concept in this paper, but rather is seen as integral to an understanding of what change in higher education is supposed to be, based on South Africa's Constitution. Explicitly, this Constitution declares it obligatory that universities entrenched in Western colonist structures, characters, and *modus operandi* diversify their white-based universality in terms of composition, curriculums, social agendas, and politics so that they are transformed to spaces of learning that do more than 'acknowledge' Indigenous knowledges, ways of learning, cultures, languages, and history.

Concepts like Indigenous Peoples, First Nations, settlers, and whiteness are strongly contested in the South African context. Given the complexity of the transitional history of the country, some might object to the term "First Nations" in the South African context, since they might wish to argue that there are not many known contextually relevant theoretical studies to draw from to explain the complexities of South Africa in terms of First Nationhood without being cornered into a discursive cul-de-sac. Alfred (2009: 6-7) recalls Thohahoken, a Mohawk scholar's references to indigenous and indigent, which both have Latin roots that roughly translate to "lives-in a place" and "wants-in place" respectively. Settlers and colonizers, in this reasoning are then *indigent* people without somewhere to live and so went to live in someone else's place. While 'Indigenous Peoples' is also a highly debated concept, it might provide a more logical base from which to commence the purpose of this paper, which is to understand the paradoxes that are at play in South Africa as it relates to what I call the politics of loyalty. First Nations, however, remains the most meaningful concept in this paper.

Having mentioned some of the debates around being Indigenous or settler, the question of whether the settler can ever become a Native (read First Nations person) is pertinent. Mamdani (1998) points out that there is no single answer to this question, because the settler can only become a Native depending on "whether your vantage point is the civic or the ethnic" (Mamdani 1998: 7), since determining civic citizenship is simply a matter of

time and is debated every time citizenship is debated. Mamdani states that "From the point of view of ethnic citizenship, however, the answer is: NEVER" because as "long as the distinction between settler and Native is written into the structure of the state, the settler can become a citizen, but *not* a Native (Mamdani 1998: 7). The settler might be a member of the civic space of South Africa, which is now (questionably) de-racialised, but cannot be a member of the customary space, which is still ethnicised. In South Africa this dilemma has been addressed to date by the implementation of a liberal human rights solution, on the basis of a partial reform, one which reinforces individual civic rights while eroding group ethnic rights, but without totally undercutting these, and thus without doing away with the distinction between the civil and the customary, institutionally underpinned by two different types of authorities, civic and ethnic (Mamdani 1998:8) The pitfalls with the scenario above are that the inviolability of individual rights could also propose a means by which settlers' rights can be strengthened and thereby provoke opposition from the Native majority. A logical observation, then, is that if the politics of loyalty protects and strengthens the rights of non-Black South Africans and hinders transformation at the same time, opposition is inevitable.

This paper will attempt to first explain the *"politics of loyalty"*; thereafter offering an historical and contemporary context of South African Higher Education, followed by examples and a discussion of the politics of loyalty in two historically different South African universities. Finally, the conclusion draws together the strands of the preceding discussion and proposes that unless the politics of loyalty desists, the poor, marginalised, ostracised and excluded, who remain predominantly racialised, will once again rise up to force change in South Africa.

The discussion that follows emerges from observations made from conversations, formal exchanges, and debates with colleagues who are or have been employed in various ways to further, evaluate, monitor, and/or spearhead "transformation" in South African higher education institutions in various parts of the country. It is also located in the experiences of students and staff as participants and observers in their institutions' transformational agendas. What has emerged, amongst others, are the various ways in which people impede or progress transformation.

Those who have understood transformation to be a process of completely disassociating post-1994 South Africa with pre-1994, and are tasked with institutionalised means and methods to do so, have a commonly shared frustration about the disjuncture between rhetoric and reality in relation to universities and their commitment to transformation. A factor that is of particular exasperation is the impeding loyalty displayed by university management to practices, processes and notions of the past despite their

flowery reports on transformation shared internally with staff and students, as well as externally with the world at large, and despite the continuation of the past in the present.

The Politics of Loyalty

The notion of a 'politics of loyalty', as used in this discussion, emerged firstly from twelve years of engagement with *transformation* in higher education in Sweden, Australia and South Africa. By 'transformation' I mean *the conscious process of contextually specifying the multiple areas that require change in order for there to be no equivalent of the past in the present, because the past has been commonly agreed to be unacceptable and has compelled the need for change in the first place.* In other words, transformation is not a universally applicable activity and process. Beyond Constitutional and legislative imperatives, the factor or factors that activate the need for change are not unilateral, and hence any remedial intervention cannot be 'one-size-fits-all'. The context that requires change never just materialises like an unannounced bolt of lightning but rather, as in the pre-lightening stage, there are warning bolts of thunder. So too the materialisation of transformation as an imperative was and is induced by contextualised manifestation/s. The specificities of this materialisation comprises purposefully directed systems, as well as processes and practices that have actively interacted in numerous ways over extended periods of time which collectively create the irrefutable compulsion for change to occur. Hence, transformation is locked into being a process of undoing that which has been *commonly identified* at a specific point in time and place as being unjust, unacceptable, undesirable, and detrimental, and requires contextually specific change intervention.

In the process of trying to understand why, despite internal and external rhetorical commitments to transformation by universities, their management, staff, and students can actually decide and behave as though there is no common agreement on either the need for change, or on the contextually specific factors that require change, *loyalty* seemed to be a fundamental factor of importance. The who, what, why and how of individual loyalties to historical dynamics and current realities of South Africa seem to play a decisive role in ridding the present and future of the oppressions of the past. Loyalty as a catalyst or anti-catalyst for sustainable and meaningful change has not and is not *directly* dealt with in studies and debates on transformation and diversity in the South African context. For purposes of understanding the role of loyalty in anti-transformative factors, I sought studies on loyalty for a considerable time and only found copious amounts on the subject in relation to areas such as brand loyalty or product loyalty. None of them provided what I was looking for. My understanding of loyalty as a matter of politics is therefore reliant on studies related to morality and

ethics, and is partly derived from the study of Royce (1908), who proposed that the phrase "philosophy of loyalty" speaks about "loyalty as an ethical principle" (Royce, 1908: 13), where his preliminary definition of loyalty is "The willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause" (Royce 1908: 16-17). I am less inclined towards his final definition after many pages of philosophising, which is that "Loyalty is the will to manifest, so far as is possible, the Eternal, that is, the conscious and superhuman unity of life, in the form of the acts of an individual Self" (Royce, 1908: 357). Or more plainly, he claims, "Loyalty is the Will to Believe in something eternal, and to express that belief in the practical life of a human being" (Royce, 1908: 357).

The debates that exist between political scientists and political theorists vex understandings of what politics is. Political scientists claim that political theory is not a science because "it does not belong in a discipline devoted to the systematic, scientific understanding of political phenomena" (Grant, 2002: 578). This article is also not aimed to prove any definitive acumen in relation to theorising or elucidating politics per se, particularly given the underlying refutation of the pre-immanence ascribed to westernised understandings of politics that are founded on the denunciation of First Nation Sovereignty. Alfred (2009) provides a moving explanation of this practice and its' impact on First Nations and/or Indigenous peoples today when he claims that

> It is the damage done to the national consciousness of our peoples, the wearing thin of our nations' cultural and political foundations, and the weakening of our collective sense of community that present the most significant threat to our continuing existence as new generations of our people emerge and grapple with new realities in the struggle to survive culturally, politically and spiritually (Alfred, 2009: 2).

The temptation to engage with the polemics of terms like indigenous, indigent, native, Bantu, and so on is hard to resist but must be put on the back-burner at this point given the practical ambits of this article. Instead, with a sense of resignation, the posit is proffered that the impacts of John Stuart Mill's social, political and political economic theories, as well as Adam Smith's 1776 notions of the 'invisible hand' have arguably been most paramount in shaping the intimate relationship between politics and economics, by which the subjugations and elevations of South Africans are determined. This intersectional relationship reverberates throughout the politics of western countries and western colonised spaces; the latter of which South Africa is one. Gumede (2012), while occupying himself mainly with berating the country's ruling party, the African National Congress, as well as national institutions, foregrounds the intersections of politics and economics in South Africa as a formidable threat to the young democracy.

Given the politics of liberal-democratic capitalist mainstream that is norm in South Africa today, politics in the ensuing discussion then has to do with the way people make collective decisions and exercise power to govern societal life in order to safeguard the interests of those who speak and are listened to. Those who speak and are listened to are invariably those with socio-economic power, historical colonialist and/or settler legacy power, and public discourse power. The socio-economic reality of South Africa post political transition remains racialised, where the position of disadvantage has been and is irrefutably held by the black populace[1]of the country.

Loyalty, in this article, is about the voluntary, systematic and practical commitment of an individual or a group to a certain cause. For this discussion, then, the politics of loyalty is the voluntary, systematic and practical commitment to a cause that will ensure the interests of those who speak and are listened to. In South African Higher Education, the power to speak and be listened to is owned by those in senior and middle management positions, as well as widely published and well-known academics. As such the role of academia in the move towards a transformed South Africa, or one that will rebel in the manner referred to by Mamdani above, is of significant import.

Higher Education South Africa in Context

In some ways, this paper connects with that of Serote (2007), when he held that the major policy shifts that have taken place in South Africa like the National Plan on Higher Education and the Higher Education Act (1997) are "not sufficient panacea for all the major social ills that bedevilled [sic] the higher education sector" (Serote 2007: 2) because "each wave of change was watered down by an attendant set of new limitations" (Serote 2007: 2). These limitations include global higher education trends that favour increased managerialism.

Unlike Serote, however, I am not of the mind that 1994 constituted a 'revolution', but rather an *evolution,* because those who had suffered and endured the heinousness of non-Black oppression had graciously opted for reconciliation rather than Nuremburg-style justice where the perpetrators were punished and victims, speaking of the Jewish people in particular, were given Israel (Mamdani 1997). Mamdani calls this an example of the collapse of the paradigm of justice and insists that this form of reconciliation is not sustainable. The reason for this is because:

[1] Black is used here generically to refer to African black, so-called Coloured, and Indian members of the populace. In recent years, Chinese citizens have also been ascribed "ethnic minority" status.

> while the argument to opt for truth-telling as opposed to criminal justice was underscored as a political necessity, the more truth is told the more it may fuel the demand it is supposed to displace, that for justice in the form of criminal justice! (Mamdani, 1997:21).

Added to Mamdani's posits, it is pertinent to note that of all the structural institutions that bolstered, educated and justified the institutionalised system of racialisation called apartheid, academia (South African Higher Education) was the only public sector left unexamined and/or held to account for the truth of their collusion and complicity in furthering, fortifying and sustaining the apartheid regime and agenda. Therefore, some have argued, universities (known for their production of knowledge and state-serving academics) emerged like ethereal beings in a haze of purity that belied their historical purposes and historical impact.

While racialised divisions were intrinsic to apartheid, the 1984 constitution entrenched apartheid divisions in education. The apartheid government extended the disenfranchisement of its African citizens by introducing, in 1984, a new constitution for the Republic of South Africa (RSA). This constitution divided the national parliament into three chambers (the 'tricameral' parliament): one house for the representatives of white voters (the House of Assembly), one for the representatives of coloured voters (the House of Representatives) and one for the representatives of Indian voters (the House of Delegates). No provision was made in the 1984 constitution for any representation of Africans in the RSA parliament, even though this group constituted at least 75% of the population living in the RSA, outside the TBVC[2] countries.

A key element in the creation of the three separate parliamentary houses in the RSA in 1984 was a distinction drawn between 'own affairs' and 'general affairs'. What were described as 'own affairs' were matters specific to the 'cultural and value frameworks' of the coloured or Indian or white communities. 'General affairs' were those which had an impact across all racial communities. Education was considered by the 1984 constitution to be an 'own affair' as far as whites, coloureds and Indians were concerned. This implied that all education for whites (primary, secondary and higher) was the responsibility of the House of Assembly, for coloureds that of the House of Representatives, and for Indians that of the House of Delegates. This constitution considered education for Africans in the RSA to be a 'general affair'. Responsibility for the education of Africans was therefore vested in a

[2] The national government divided South Africa into five entities in the 1980's: the Republics of Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda, Ciskei (TBVC), and the Republic of South Africa (RSA).

'general affairs' government department which was termed the 'Department of Education and Training' (DET) (Bunting, 2002: 60).

How could this happen, one might be tempted to ask with incredulity, given the extensive role played by universities designed to fill the needs of the apartheid state's apparatchiks? For example, pre-1994 universities were racially determined and bilingually embedded in the colonial settler languages of English and Afrikaans. The latter language being that of the right wing National Party through which apartheid took tangible shape after centuries of preparation. Therefore, Wilkins and Strydom (2012: 254) maintain that
Calls for national unity of all races in South Africa border on fantasy when viewed against the backdrop of deliberate barriers which have been consistently thrown up against common education.

After the Second Anglo-Boer war, hatred for what was considered an anglicisation of "their country", South Africa, Dutch leaders started teaching Afrikaans and the Calvinistic doctrines in private schools. In an October 1968 speech, Dr Andries Treurnicht, then Deputy Minister of Education and Training with responsibility for black education, and a key member of the *Afrikaner Broederbond*[3], declared:

> For too long...the Afrikaner had to suffer the insult of an alien cultural stamp being forced onto the education of his children in the persistent anglicisation process. It became the logical and compelling demand of his own nationalism that his education should be in his own language and should form the young lives for the Afrikaner community. And because the nation's origins and growth were so closely connected with the work, doctrine and activities of the church, it was obvious that the national life should be Christian in its education (Wilkins & Strydom, 2012: 254).

Hence, the roles of universities were to fulfil the institutional and public sector needs of the apartheid state. For example, student intake at traditionally white universities were allowed racial quotas, courses of study towards professional degrees were racialised, and Afrikaans universities were infested with Afrikaner Broederbond members, who were educated to become members of the National Party government and all its institutions, particularly the Afrikaans universities, including the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education (Wilkins & Strydom 2012), which is mentioned in this paper.

[3] The historical prominence and machinations of the Afrikaner Broederbond are dealt with in another paper which explores their possible metamorphosed practices, processes and strategies in South Africa today. So too, the role/s of non-Black English in historical and current developments in relation to First Nations realities also cannot be overlooked

A proposed answer for why the role/s of universities in the odious past still remains so absent in vigorous academic explications of persistent inequalities in South Africa today relates, amongst others, to Mamdani's discussion mentioned earlier about the possibility of the coloniser and/or settler being able to be a Native, namely:

> while the liberal initiative calls for a strong defense of the property rights of civic citizens, the main body of the right wing demands the Afrikaner volk no longer be considered settlers, but be recognized as natives, complete with a native homeland and presumably a Native Authority (Mamdani, 1998:12).

Simplistic deductions are problematic however, of course.

South Africa is rather unique in having been passed from one colonial settler regime to another (British to Dutch Calvinism) after a war between these two, and racism underpinned both colonialism and apartheid (van der Westhuizen, 2007: 53). Another distinctive factor is that those who governed were (and remain) a minority, and the oppressed the majority under both settler colonist regimes.

The directions undertaken by South Africa in 1994 brought into play the intersections of history and contextual reality, which further brought into motion the factors of accountability, transformation and redress in all spheres of society including Higher Education. The country chose to implement evolution rather than revolution, and eagerly set in motion a reconciliation process by way of the Truth and Reconciliation (TRC). Let it not remain unsaid that this choice was not made without significant pressure from the world powers like the United States of America, and Great Britain, amongst others. The first move towards this kind of self-reflection was initiated by the African National Congress (ANC), when the human rights violations brought about in the process of maintaining internal discipline at a time of war against apartheid were exposed (Boraine 2000; Verdoolaege 2008). In other words, these were not violations against external parties, but within the ranks of the ANC, where cadres were found to be double agents, and the like.

Furthermore, in 1992 at the University of the Western Cape (UWC)[4], Professor Kader Asmal comprehensively explained the shape and substance

[4] In 1959 ratified legislation saw UWC established at the University College of the Western Cape particularly aimed at providing higher education to the "Coloured" populace of the Western Cape. A year later, 166 students are said to have enrolled for studies but their training was shaped to be of service to the apartheid state. University status was awarded in 1970 making it possible for UWC to award degrees and diplomas. In 1975, following student protest action, the first Black Rector

of the ANC's proposed truth commission after the 1994 elections aimed at addressing human rights violations following the attainment of a political settlement (Verdoolaege 2008). What is important to note is that the idea for justice through truth-telling was not an initiative of the non-Black minority in power, but by the oppressed majority. Many hold fast today that the graciousness shown by the Black majority has yet to be even remotely matched by that of the non-Black minority.

The reconciliation process of South Africa premised itself upon a shared desire by all groups within the country for a transforming of history into a new democratic reality. All manner of atrocities enacted during the apartheid years were brought to the fore, and critics on either side of the political divide expressed their support or opposition to the TRC, its role, its origin, its focus, its efficacy, and the sustainability of its agenda, amongst others. Therefore, as mentioned previously, South Africa, did not have the equivalent of the Nuremburg Trials, where clear delineations between victims and perpetrators were drawn, and where relevant reparative measures were taken in relation to apportioning accountability and punishment.

As Mamdani (1998) points out, inasmuch as colonies of settlers do not come about by way of immigration or even migration, settlers are the products of conquest mostly brought about by juridical interventions that cause intergroup distinctions. First Nations and/or Indigenous Peoples are conquered in ways that "buttress the conquerors and isolate the conquered" (Mamdani 1998: 4). History or the obfuscation thereof cannot eliminate the distinctions caused by such conquering marauding because they become embodied in the institutional structures of the conquered space since the very first act that must take place is for the soon to be forcibly annexed space to be declared *terra nullius* (Moreton-Robinson 2002). In relation to the violent annexation of education and knowledge, Odora Hoppers (2008: 5) calls it "a convenient rationalization for colonization and ill treatment". Thereafter, settlers must use possessive discourse in relation to the conquered space in order to claim and maintain ownership, even to the point of relating stories of settler hardship in order to erase the depth of trauma experienced by the conquered (Moreton-Robinson 2002).

The most common ways of dispossessing the conquered of their claim to their land and its sovereignty was orchestrated with closely focused precision. Amongst the repertoire of dispossession tools was the recollection

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(Professor Richard E (Dick) van der Ross) was appointed at UWC. Formal rejection of the apartheid ideology on which UWC was founded was eventually rejected by the university in 1982 but it was not until Professor Jakes Gerwel became Rector in 1987 that UWC aligned itself unequivocally with the mass democratic movement and a "open" university admissions policy.

of a foreign text (the Bible), from which claims were made regarding the will of divine providence with notions of having been "called" to "lead" the conquered. The latter, mostly defined as "heathens" (Magubane 2007), were set aside in a camp of "non" with strict delineations drawn between natives and citizens (read 'civilised'), which further defined political, social and economic identity, reality, and possibility. These demarcations divided all who had settled and all who were conquered into settlers and natives, citizens and subjects, where the latter were excluded from civic rights (Mamdani 1998).

Universities played an important role in the explications of reality, and many so-called "progressive" academics, scientists and politicians, to name a few, aborted their human rights duties for expediency. For example, Stokes (1934), Davie (1963), and Davis Jnr (1972), while lauding universities like the University of Cape Town (UCT) for its liberalism and decrying universities like those in Potchefstroom[5] and Bloemfontein[6], did not take a stand against the decision to completely or partially exclude students or academic work on racialised grounds. Some discussion on these practices was mentioned earlier. In fact, they found ways to 'amend' the degree of atrocity or recommended ways in which the Bantu Education Act[7] could be "better implemented" rather than to reject it outright. Most disturbing are accounts, like those of Stokes (1934), who in impeccable English describes the then South African Native College at Fort Hare and Lovedale in terms that actually approved the Bantu Education Act.

Without taking a stand regarding "the right or the wrong" of the Bantu Education Act of 1953, Davie (1963) divides the 1963 non-Black populace of South Africa in universities into two European elements, namely, "those derived from Afrikaner stock and those descended from British" (Davie 1963:10), and he claims that these two European elements manifested themselves into the social, cultural, economic, and political structure of South Africa. Already, then, Davie argued that despite broad based denial, political differences were expressed in racial terms. How, one wonders, is inter-white friction determined in racial terms?

[5] Then the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education now only one of three campuses of the merged North-West University.
[6] The University of the Free State.
[7] The Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953 (later called the Black Education Act) was enacted, in essence, to segregate the education of Black South Africans from that of non-Blacks. It was authored by the Afrikaner Broederbonder, H. F. Verwoerd, who was Minister of Native Affairs at the time and Prime Minister later. He was assassinated by Dimitri Tsafendas in September 1966.

Inter-white friction is many hundred years old in South Africa, dating back as far as 1689 following the arrival and settlement of the Huguenots in the Cape (Davie 1963:1). Incorporated into this friction are the factors of legislation, administration and/or politics. Predominantly, differences arose in relation to varied interpretations and outlooks on policy between Afrikaans and English speaking groups within the white populace; this despite the irony of both groups claiming pre-eminence in relation to "South African" nationality (Davie 1963; Van Der Westhuizen 2010). Fundamental to this animosity is the Anglo-Boer War, where these two groups fought for ownership of the land they had colonized as though it were *terra nullius* upon their arrival. The ignominious irony that accompanies this reality is, of course, that the Indigenous populaces of the country were not reckoned as equal partners in the battle, but rather as chattels, possessions, objects of fear, and/or downright irritations, in some cases.

Davie (1963: 1) claims that "there was certainly a widespread effort on both sides to avoid conflict and to seek mutual understanding" after the Anglo-Boer War but not so in 1963, since at the time "there is all too little evidence of such conciliatory activities". The in-faction fighting of whites affected political and social policies and practices affecting the lives of all within South Africa. Apartheid, according to Davie (1963) is linked with the English versus Afrikaans tensions. At the time, Davie contends, the provision of university education for Blacks saw two groups of universities polarise into Afrikaans versus English universities, namely, "Pretoria, Stellenbosch, Bloemfontein, and Potchefstroom on one hand, and those of the Witwatersrand, Cape Town, Natal, and Rhodes on the other" (Davie, 1963: 2).

An overriding irony and still largely unpacked reality of settler colonisation history in relation to inter-white relations is, of course, that apartheid benefitted both these groups even though it was only verbalised in 1948. Rather, apartheid became both the substance of the cohesion that saw this racialised system solidify the systematic marginalisation and oppression of the Indigenous majority since 1652, when Jan van Riebeeck first arrived (van der Westhuizen 2010). In fact, a close reading of van der Westhuizen indicates collusion amongst the English and Afrikaans forces that saw First Nations people, especially the so-called Coloureds, being used as political and economic pawns in their striving for power. In this there is a clear politics of loyalty at play despite lingual, religious and 'ideological' differences as the cause was a common one, namely, the protection of non-Black interests.

Examples of the Politics of Loyalty

As mentioned, I have spent over a decade engaged with transformation in one way or another, and I have had the opportunity to experience the politics of loyalty at play, as have most of my colleagues at other universities. My

experiences relate to my time at UCT and currently at the North-West University (NWU).

UCT is popularly recognised for "diversity" (Salo 2010). So too Boraine (2008) has numerous references to the enlightened nature of UCT, its staging of seminars by anti-apartheid figures, as well as rallies addressing prominent issues of social concern like crime in the areas surrounding the leafy suburbs in which the university is located. When reading Boraine (2010), UCT was understood (and probably understands itself) to be the most progressive amongst South African universities and the most inclusive, which is possibly a reason why the university believes that it does not have to engage in serious change; this despite the fact that "Nothing is different but everything's changed" according to Hall (2010:355).

All is not as cut and dried as it would seem though, as Salo elucidates when she claims that the boldly published equity statistics, which held that of UCT's academic staff "as of April 2006, 71 percent of the staff was white, and 29 percent was black". The author insists that closer examination is required since

> The number of permanent African women academics remains disappointingly small, currently only 2 percent of the total faculty. Even if we count all permanent black women academic staff, including African, Coloured, and Indian women, they still only constitute 8 percent of the total. Including temporary academic staff improves the picture slightly, raising African women's representation to a total of 5 percent of all academic staff. But, again, closer examination indicates that most black women work in the lower ranks of the faculty, as senior lecturers, lecturers, and tutors, where they bear the bulk of the responsibility for teaching and student consultations, leaving little time for the writing, research, and publication that would be necessary to advance their careers (Salo 2010:301).

Then there is the cooperation with the apartheid state in relation to the brilliant and much maligned Professor Archie Mafeje, an Indigenous Social Anthropologist and academic activist, who had moved to UCT from the University of Fort Hare (UFH)[8] in 1956. Of Mafeje, Wilson wrote in a citation:

> This then is the man, armed with a Cambridge Ph.D and a classic published urban study, whose appointment as a Senior Lecturer was rescinded by the university council after pressure from the apartheid government in 1968. This is also the man for whom in the early 1990's we [& I include myself] at UCT all failed to provide the appropriate space to enable him to come home to teach and write as he so badly wanted to do (Wilson 2008:4).

[8] Previously the South African Native College at Fort Hare.

Not only did UCT withdraw its offer of employment to Mafeje under pressure from the apartheid government but years later, after the political transition from the apartheid regime to the new democratic South Africa, the university refused to accept his application for a professorship; insisting instead that Prof. Mafeje accept a lesser post despite his prolific publication record, international academic experience, and being highly respected by his peers. At this liberal English university well-known for its claim to being avidly anti-apartheid and all it stood for, a young Black female academic, well-versed in her field, came to my office to request for advice on what to do about the constant racist and sexist comments she was being subjected to in her department. Her fear of retribution caused her to delay coming forward until her doctorate had been awarded. Since she would be the only other Black female with a PhD in the faculty that we were in, I was keen to do all I could to retain her in the faculty. I followed protocol and procedure, as did she in the hope that the Dean of the faculty would take the necessary action. We were both dismayed when he interpreted the matter to be little more than a matter of opinion, trivialised her experience, told her to lay a formal charge (which she had done by going to see him, we thought), and made all manner of excuses for his inaction. Needless to say, she left the faculty and the university. The fact that he has a settler colonist background from abroad and decisively assisted in suppressing the exposure of suspected illegal financial corruption in the faculty[9] only served to aggravate the situation even more. Nonetheless, he remains at UCT, has focused on improving and sustaining the financial income from the faculty to the university, and is openly protected by its management, while continuing to enact some of the most flabbergasting labour relations travesties by employing the most creative notions of what is legal[10].

The image of not needing to do much to transform is heavily marketed in the media, despite the fact that from 2007 to 2010 there was no formal transformation agenda and no mentionable transformation plan at UCT. Although policies on employment equity, sexual and racial harassment exists, any existing transformation plan is still not accessible on UCT's website, which has also remained static since the current Vice Chancellor took over in 2007[11]. The unfortunate thing about this is that the exceptionally respected and appreciated efforts undertaken by the pro-active Deputy Vice Chancellor until 2007/8 lost their momentum, effect, and progress for Black staff and

[9] This matter is being assessed for submission to the South African courts at the time of writing this paper.

[10] *Maximising Human Resources in South Africa* by Johnston, Tufvesson & Johnston (2010) deals with this and related issues.

[11] There are some indications that this state of affairs has changed somewhat but by the time of submitting this paper nothing tangible could yet be accessed to corroborate this possibility.

students. Additionally, Institutional Climate Surveys undertaken between the late 1990's and 2010 show UCT to not have transformed much at all in contrast to its public image (Hall, Aiken and Mohamed 2010). Whiteness, racism, sexism, is intricately weaved into the fibre of what looks like utopia from the outside and to most of the privileged inside.

The historical background of NWU holds no claim to transformation fame as that of UCT. The dominance of Christian National Education (CNE) at its Potchefstroom Campus still exists "based upon the tenets of Calvinism and the ideology of a highly nationalistic mythology" (Davis Jnr 1972:6) clear about its racist agenda as can be seen in the Christian National Education manifesto of 1943, where it states:

> There is too much at stake for us to relax in the struggle. With the use of our language as the medium [of instruction] we have not yet achieved anything. On the contrary, we have attained very little. Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in a school atmosphere that is culturally foreign to our nation is like sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal. The true material of culture is not yet there. Our culture must be carried into the school and that cannot be done merely by having our language as a medium. More is needed. Our Afrikaans schools must not merely be mother-tongue schools; they must be places where our children will be imbued with the Christian and national spiritual and cultural material of our nation...We wish to have no mixing of races. We are winning the struggle over medium. The struggle for Christian and national schools lies before us (Davis Jnr 1972:7).

NWU in the North West Province is a product of a merger between the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, the University of the North-West (formerly the University of Bophuthatswana, a university located in a homeland created by the apartheid government), and the Sebokeng Campus of Vista University.

The first mentioned of these three merged higher education institutions was comfortably situated within the ideology of the CNE, which was the source from which Bantu Education was hatched, and from which apartheid statesmen, public servants, and judicial powers emerged. The significant majority of the non-Black staff on all levels at the three campuses of NWU come from a Calvinist Afrikaans apartheid supporting background. Many of these staff members have been at the Potchefstroom campus for thirty years or more with long and entrenched Afrikaner Broederbond roots that can be found in Wilkins & Strydom (2012). The latter mentioned institutions that were merged to form NWU emanated as results of the Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953.

Here, debates and dialogues about transformation are only really just starting to take place with the Deputy Chair of Council elected in 2012

indicating his concern that implementation of transformation focused activity remains lagging in *eish!,* the university's newsletter. Here too, the picture portrayed to the internal university community and the external South African community declares that "All is well!", awakening the same sense of "get real!" as held by many in the country in relation to UCT. The redeeming factor for NWU is that the staff and students, not in top and middle management, have a different view, and the majority are eager to have the truth told. This is what inspires the belief that one 'can *do* things here' (not discounting the challenge of convincing the powerful that this is necessary and desirable without also exacting the full might of possible ire).

NWU has gone through a challenging period in the process of formulating a transformation plan, identifying ten key performance areas, or transformation indicator goals (TIG's) by which it aims to "trace and track" its progress in relation to transformation. Remarkably, the performance plans of academic managers now also include weighting against their active participation in bringing about transformation. How and whether this will actually occur is still not immediately obvious.

All is not yet as it should be, since employment equity, demographic details of student intake and success rates, amongst others still require concerted attention. Significant and sustainable change appears to hinge on the "old guard" reaching retirement age or leaving the NWU by some other means. NWU has also undertaken institutional climate surveys like UCT and outshines the latter in relation to the openness and focused contribution of staff, as well as the number of participants in the survey.

Nonetheless, it remains difficult for change to take place, resistance is not easily locatable and policies to address issues of racism and sexism still need to be given serious attention. Student experiences along racial, sexual, (dis)ability, socio-economic and lingual lines also require comprehensive attention. The politics of loyalty is more easily exposable at NWU because of the continuing existence of known supporters of apartheid and the institutionalisation of whiteness (fortunately made immediately possible by Wilkins & Strydom (2012). Prof. Maake (2011) provides relevant contemporary information on dynamics at play at NWU.

What separates NWU from UCT, however, is that the latter exudes an undisguised arrogance of whiteness in the face of critique about its faltering transformation trajectory. It continues to protect those who were part and parcel of the exclusion of Blacks, through selective processes regardless of its proclaimed 'enlighted-ness'. Its history and the academics it housed pre- and during apartheid were quite comfortable to practice a politics of loyalty in favour of non-Black South Africa and UCT's equity statistics seem to confirm that things have not changed. Academics well over retirement age are still

employed at UCT – some in creatively fashioned posts, non-Black academics without Masters and/or doctorates continue to exclude aspirant Black academics who have doctorates, promotions of Black academics still happen rarely, and the university houses "a South African intelligentsia with a prejudice more than just skin-deep" (Mamdani 1998:15).

Conversations with transformative staff and students at UCT speak dejectedly about nothing changing and the inability to penetrate the shell of the loyalty that shields the "old guard". One Associate Professor in the faculty, mentioned earlier in the example, recently drew my attention to the fact that after almost five years of trying, the old guard have now again distributed a proposal to recruit and offer employment without going through the labour practices as entrenched in the law. It appears as though there is no concern regarding the possibility of a rebellion or mass action in the Western Cape Province, where UCT remains linked with socio-economic and racial privilege.

The former (i.e. NWU), however, cannot escape broad-based awareness of its role in the racialised history of South Africa, and is probably therefore more adamant about achieving meaningful transformation at least as reflected to the outside. Seeking to achieve public sentiment regarding particularly its Potchefstroom Campus having severed all ties with its tainted historical past, seem to include processes that require examination that can be found in Wilkins & Strydom (2012), like obtaining state or governmental stamps of approval confirming that change has and is indeed occurring. In the case of both these universities (UCT and NWU), as diverse in relation to ideologies and history as they might be, the politics of loyalty in action at both is evident in the continuation of the dominance of the past in the present.

Change is impeded through resistance to acknowledging the existence of the most common elements of what shaped apartheid, a shared characteristic at both universities. After all, no matter how either one might try to escape it, and no matter the liberalism of UCT, apartheid benefited them both, their offspring, and those they favoured with inclusion. What separates the two, are the varying degrees of openness to engaging with, understanding, and addressing resistance to change, as well as the substantial ways chosen to bring about and 'measure' change. At UCT, management is of the opinion that there is no likelihood of rebellion or unrest in the Western Cape[12], while at NWU, staff and students, Black and non-Black, speak about recognising tensions and occurrences reminiscent of the period before Umkhonto we Sizwe (Xhosa for "Spear of the Nation"), the military arm of the African

[12] This was expressed to me in no uncertain terms and with absolute confidence by an executive member of management in 2010.

National Congress (ANC) was established, the 1976 student riots, and the period just before the violent outbreaks of the 1980's, which did not hit the Western Cape Province at the same time but which reached there in spite of the English liberalism. The result is that staff and students at NWU are keen to explore ways to bring about meaningful and mutually respectful transformation for all within the region, and the majority wish to better understand and embrace the diversity of cultures, languages, and other important features of the area.

Concluding Discussion

In the aforegoing discussion an attempt has been made to present the importance of loyalty as an analytical tool to be utilised in discussions and examinations of transformation in what has been a gravely unequal higher education sector in South Africa. This public sector disadvantaged predominantly First Nations/Indigenous Peoples albeit that the new Constitution includes a number of other categories that have been marginalised historically and are not intended to be dismissed by the focus of this particular discussion.

An academic colleague said to me recently that a silent revolution is taking place internationally and it has to do with the sovereign rights and rule of First Nations. The loyalty of Indigenous Peoples to their heritages, ways of knowing, doing, and speaking is asserting itself as multiple methods of erasure threaten their total extinction. Loyalty is also repeatedly utilised as a discrediting argument in the media and popular political anthologies, books and commentaries, mainly against the new South African Government, the African National Congress, universities that have been placed under "administration", as well as those higher education institutions where the executive management of such institutions have shown an unapologetic stance towards fulfilling transformation imperatives.

The usefulness of applying *the politics of loyalty* to understand, expound and remedy asymmetries that continue to plague public higher education institutions in South Africa lies in that it provides a means by which to identify the continuance of the unacceptable past alive in the present and threatening the future. Identifying how the politics of loyalty is at play in the discourse of policies, the characteristics of practices, and the patterns of processes of higher education institutions can assist to expose historical ideological loyalties that might be interactively engaged in maintaining what has been judged as an ignominious status quo. Ignoring the value of identifying the politics of loyalty could, for example, see the re-emergence of a metamorphosed Afrikaner Broederbond occur in stealth, and/or new forms of collaborations taking place between traditionally opposed parties. Loyalty

to socio-economic power also has the possibility of furthering the racialisation and gendering of poverty, and thereby the chances of accessing higher education. In this latter example, unlikely partnerships could be formed where inter-group tensions between First Nations/Indigenous Peoples may arise and hence paradoxically conspire to protect colonist settler domination. The South African context is a complex one, shaped and informed by its history. The notion of transformation, first entrenched in the 1955 *Freedom Charter,* presented the basic elements of change that ought to be addressed if the country were to become the democratic state envisaged. Unlike the manner in which the Indigenous majority had been oppressed, marginalised, disenfranchised and had their land stolen, the *Freedom Charter*, encompassed a graciousness of spirit and protection of the rights of *all* within the borders of South Africa. By implementing the TRC, it was hoped that reconciliation would suffice for a mutual commitment towards change, where meaningful redress, in all spheres, would be brought about.

By excluding higher education from being held accountable for its role in furthering, propagating, sustaining and legally justifying over four hundred years of abuse, the possibility for supporters of apartheid - whether they were obvious, as in the case of Calvinist Afrikaner, or less obvious, as non-Black English speakers or others - to continue pursuing their own racialised agendas by means of loyalty to their own cause was protected. The same people, whom apartheid benefited, largely remain in power in higher education, and from climate survey studies, the elemental characteristics of that odious system remain evident in the submissions by university staff. The current realities of Indigenous people are still framed in the terms of those in power, both to the outside and internal community. The universities presented in the preceding paragraphs indicate that they have transformation plans in place, one also indicating the establishment of politically correct policies in this regard. Despite this, however, as we have seen from a more in-depth examination by Salo (2010) of the employment equity statistics of UCT, the possibility that the absence of marginalisation and exclusion of Indigenous academics, women in particular, is highly likely. The question this raises, of course, if the past benefactors of apartheid are still in power, what is the chance that their reports to the outside and internally will own up to the enactment of a policy of loyalty aimed to ensure the longevity of their own historical race and class cause?

Staff and students at the NWU are more sensitive to the manifestations of tensions so similar to those of the pre-1994 period. As a result, they are keen to address transformation and to resist supporting a politics of loyalty. This is probably understandable given the stance historically taken by Afrikaans speaking people in relation to South Africa. They have used possessive discourse to speak of the land as their own. Of course, this too is a discussion that needs to be unpacked and understood with regards to what

it means for the Indigenous peoples who were removed or dispossessed of their land.

The need for more concerted efforts towards making South African Higher Education relevant and recognisable to Indigenous peoples is an imperative. In *I Speak as a White,* the author writes:

> The position of the "white" in South Africa will become increasingly intolerable, psychologically, morally, and spiritually, unless processes of cultural accommodation and transformation, together with the necessary individual conversions are initiated to bring about sufficient therapeutic release (McGurk 1990:82)

It is the exclusive focus on all that makes economic sense, according to McGurk (1990), and the emersion of all things into *homo economicus* (economic being only) and where the same is imbued with a politics of loyalty entrenched in a racialised agenda of control (my own thoughts) that the past remains real and active in the present. Insodoing, "Money dominates the notion of justice" (McGurk 1990:85).

The aforementioned state of affairs was the predominant purpose for enslaving and colonising Africa in the first place and the reason why such concerted efforts to have power over the intellect and intellectual growth and development of Blacks in South Africa in the first place and universities played an integral role in the entire course of action. The world economy being in the state that it is will put additional pressures on maintaining loyalties. Also, issues such as racism are not matters of individual or group opinions, they are *crimes* enshrined in the South Africa Constitution and subsequent legislation. Is it then not essential that more serious attention be paid to elucidating the historical role of universities and their existing staff in any settler colony, even South Africa?

Author's Note

At the time of writing this article, Dr. Ingrid Tufvesson held the position of Executive Advisor: Transformation and Diversity Management to the Vice-Chancellor and Council of the North-West University. Her research and practice areas include transformation, women and gender, transitionary societies, African understandings of Indigenous and settler issues, whiteness, Black feminist theory, intersectionality, and the politics of loyalty, to name a few. In both her academic and academic management positions, she has remained unapologetic about the pursuit of justice and equality. She can be contacted for personal communication at **justis1st@gmail.com**

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Maggie Scott
Melbourne University

Chris Healy's book *Forgetting Aborigines*, contrary to its ominous title, is a text that seeks to examine contemporary dynamics between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians in relation to public 'Aboriginality' and rethink some convenient blind spots in the functioning of historical memory. In doing so, Healy locates and illustrates the flawed processes of memory and history-making that have been produced in response to actual violence and dispossession of the inhabitants of Australia. Healy draws upon a series of cultural examples from scholarly theory, television, art, heritage, museums and tourism to demonstrate how contemporary indigenous and non-indigenous people try to negotiate the spectre of a shared past.

From the outset, Healy's definitions of both Aboriginality and of memory are made clear: following from Marcia Langton's characterisation of the term, 'Aboriginality' as it appears within these pages does not purport to be an authentic expression of indigenous people; rather, it describes a public cultural sphere 'generated when Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people engage in actual dialogue...[in which] the individuals involved will test imagined models of the other...to find some satisfactory way of comprehending the other' (Langton, in Healy 2008: 202). In keeping with this prescribed realm of Aboriginality, Healy is primarily concerned with shared cultural memories, although he is careful to point out that he does not conceive of memory as a collective monument, but rather as an ever-shifting historical consciousness among varying groups, institutions and individuals. Nonetheless, his insights about remembering and forgetting are consistent throughout, premised as they are on the troubling paradox brought about by a colonial and postcolonial legacy of attempted genocide. Healy follows Philip Morrissey's argument, that despite the general success of the attempted 'erasure [of Aborigines] as subjectivities and intelligences from history and contemporary Australia...the embodied being of Aborigines - remains a troubling and disturbing fact for Australia' (p.10).

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The implications of this premise become clearer in the second chapter, establishing one of the text's recurring conceptual concerns. Healy pinpoints the form of forgetting operating in claims made by baby-boomer cultural critics that Aboriginality was invisible to them growing up - claims often accompanied by banal laments such as "Why weren't we told?" (about the Stolen Generations, for example). Proposing a more complex picture, Healy contrasts this landscape of non-indigenous confessions with the example of the award-winning and widely viewed 1962 ABC documentary program Alcheringa. Fashioned in an anthropological style that would initially be read as a 'bad representation' of stone-age primitives, *Alcheringa* nevertheless features an all-Aboriginal cast and is hosted by a Yorta Yorta man named Bill Onus who is at once 'ancient and modern' (Muecke in Healy 2008: 50). Assuming Onus must have had some authorial control over his role as host, Healy points out the paradox of a modern, thriving indigenous man simultaneously presenting a 'dying race' (although, in the context of Onus' commitment to his community, he might have seen his role as teaching people about traditional cultural practices). Healy deploys this example to illustrate that there was and always has been indigenous visibility in the public sphere prior to the collective confessions of unawareness from non-indigenous cultural critics. Such admissions constitute neither an 'enlightenment' or a new beginning, but in fact mark a period when people started acknowledging and trying to understand silent consent in non-Indigenous Australia (p.18).

The tendency to conveniently forget what was already known is enabled by what Healy describes as the white fantasy of indigenous disappearance. This is articulated in a study of objects and museums in chapter five, in which Healy notes that breastplates, those shameful objects which symbolise the shackles of colonial domination, have become both a benign object for sale in the auction houses and a symbol of reconciliation worthy of heritage status. As Healy notes, "these displacements enable one of those characteristically modern historiographic conceits: a separation of past from present that enables the here and now to be a place always so much better" (p.153). He is shocked when he realises that some indigenous observers view breastplates with pride as well as sorrow, seeing evidence of colonial failure. This insight prompts a closer study of the role of these objects as memorials to a 'dying race.'

Reading through each chapter, I wondered initially how these deceptive forms of remembering and forgetting - which seemed to flourish predominantly within the older generation of intellectual critics of Aboriginality - related to, rethought or were being answered by an incoming generation of indigenous and non-indigenous cultural engagement. Thankfully, Healy has carefully considered the cyclic nature of memory and has provided detailed examples of more current readings and responses to these issues. For example, the Warlpiri Media short film and SBS TV series *Bush Mechanics* (1998, 2001) is considered in relation to *Alcheringa* in that it parodies and engages with the stereotypes, styles and tropes of such earlier programmes. Like Bill Onus, *Bush Mechanics* director/actor Francis Jupurrula Kelly plays a figure that simultaneously slips between the ancient and the modern, at once a larrikin on a

mechanical misadventure and helping the other characters to fix their cars using age-old cultural skills.

In response to the dilemma of the white fantasy of indigenous disappearance, chapter five offers an analysis of the indigenous branches of the National Museum of Australia and the Melbourne Museum. These institutions have experienced considerable consultation, leadership and contribution by indigenous mentors and non-indigenous supporters. Rather than conveying an expectation of indigenous disappearance - such as through the display of categorised indigenous objects and information - these spaces are more like cultural community centres that provide physically living memories and links to previous generations in addition to a willingness to look forward to a vital indigenous future.

There is a sense that Healy worries that lapses into benign gestures and sentiments regarding an Australian past are often tantamount to forgetting. He therefore insists that he is not "proposing that if only non-indigenous Australians replaced their forgetting with remembering, then there would be real historical grounds for better settler-indigenous relationships today" (p. 4). Yet this book is certainly a project of reconciliation. Remembering will always be fraught with the spectres of violence, dispossession and cultural genocide executed in the Australian past and linger within contemporary indigenous and non-indigenous relationships. Despite such bitter truths, Healy implores us to remember that although colonialism was and is a destructive and genocidal force, it was also unsuccessful. Indigenous people never disappeared, nor will they, no matter how strong the "will to forget" is (p.204).

In the closing chapter, Healy links this "will to forget" to continuing indigenous existence with the racialised category 'Aborigine'. Straying from the book's central focus on cultural meanings and interactions, Healy offers a brief engagement with notions of race and how to eradicate racialised thinking. This departure may flag future research that considers the forgetting of 'Aborigines' and the dismantling of racialisation within the same framework, seeking the replacement of 'Aborigines' as a category with the imagining instead of "friends, neighbours and strangers who live near and far; citizens marked by difference and sameness...people, who like all of us, live with the possibilities and constraints of being in history" (p.220). Should such scholarship eventuate, I trust that like this book will prove an engaging and worthwhile read.