

MULTINNY

A PAPER OF ANARCHISTIC IDEAS & ACTIONS

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THE FINAL ISSUE...

Politics of asylum and
(post)coloniality in the
new Pacific Solution

Fighting to Win: SydSol
and the politics of
solidarity networks

Framework towards an
autistic radicalism

Beyond speaking out:
responding to rape



...ONLY A BEGINNING

WELCOME TO THE VERY LAST ISSUE OF MUTINY ZINE.

The end of this zine shouldn't be taken for an abandonment of revolutionary ideas. Rather we are now involved in a variety of other radical projects, and hope that others will continue the vital work of anarchist publishing in the 21st century.

One lesson that we learned through doing the zine is that it only takes a few committed people to pull this off. So if you want to see more publications like Mutiny, make them happen!

We want to thank all the collective members and writers, past and present and all the people who have performed countless hours of work over the last 8 years - writing, printing, distributing, giving feedback and more. And we want to thank *you* for reading.

So what does this final issue add to the long list of great articles we've been putting out all these years? There are pieces on Australian neo-colonialism in the Pacific, sexual violence and the left, a radical framework for autistic politics, solidarity networks and more.

Your editors signing off with love and solidarity, Syzygy, Finale and Jiminy Cricket.

Mutiny began as an anarchist anti-war collective in Sydney in the early 2000s. The zine started in 2006 as a way to explore different avenues of disobedience & resistance, & to encourage people to write about their ideas, actions & experiences.

Want more anarchy? Check out the publications listed on the back cover, or visit:

- Black Rose Library and Social Centre, 22 Enmore Rd, Newtown. blackrosenewtown.wordpress.com
- Jura Books, 440 Parramatta Road, Petersham. jura.org.au



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Politics of asylum and (post)coloniality in the new Pacific Solution

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Mandatory detention. Pixelated images of bodies behind barbed wire. Waves of self-harming incidents. Protests. Lips sewn together. Rabid border security rhetoric. Boats turned back at sea. Drownings.

It seems, overwhelmingly, that so little has changed since the election year of 2001, when the Liberal Prime Minister John Howard, facing a failing campaign for re-election, enacted a populist policy to turn away boats of asylum seekers before they reached Australian shores. The “Pacific Solution” was a response to the *Tampa* crisis, and followed just months later by the baseless accusations of Howard and his immigration minister Ruddock that asylum seekers had thrown their own children overboard in an attempt to frustrate Australian efforts to turn their boat around.

“I don’t want people like that in Australia” declared Howard back then, and in spite of an Australian Senate Select Committee confirming a year later what many already knew—that the allegations had been baseless, and Howard and his government had known this before the election—the exclusion of *people like that* was established as a tried and tested mode of electoral populism. Today, “stopping the boats” remains a catch-cry of both major political parties. The Pacific Solution has been followed by many other “Solutions”—the Malaysia Solution, the Timor Solution, and most recently the PNG Solution—and they all follow a horribly similar tune.

There is a sense, though, that the announcement of the PNG Solution in July last year marked a qualitative shift, in the move not only to off-shore processing but also off-shore



Painting by Alwy Fadhel - a refugee who has been detained for 4 years and 2 months. He paints with instant coffee powder that has been diluted in water and then put to the page. therefugeeartproject.com

resettlement. Actions by the Liberals since the September 2013 election—including the recently announced closure of four onshore detention centres, the launch of Operation Sovereign Borders and the turning around of boats at sea—confirms that the shift is a bilateral one. Kevin Rudd’s promise that any asylum seeker arriving by boat would have “no chance of being settled in Australia as a refugee” is one which Abbott seems determined to keep.

Beyond the intensification of the punitive treatment of asylum seekers themselves, and the intensification of xenophobic rhetoric that comes with the refusal to allow any boat-arriving asylum

seeker to step foot on Australian soil, this shift to offshore resettlement is also transforming regional geographies, with powerful implications for the neocolonial relationships between the Australian state and the states and populations of, particularly, Pacific Island countries. These (post)colonial geographies and imaginaries intersect, in turn, with the politics of indigeneity with which Australian asylum seeker policy has always been entwined.

Geographies of post-coloniality

Globally, source countries from which asylum seekers flee are overwhelmingly concentrated in the post-colonial world, and the conflicts, poverty and sufferings which force them to leave are often (in part at least) legacies of colonial encounters. It is in the postcolonial world, too, that the burden of hosting refugees, asylum seekers and other forced migrants is disproportionately concentrated. Nevertheless, notwithstanding that asylum seekers are also facing increasingly hostile reactions in many global South countries, it is the relatively small minority which reaches the countries of the (formerly colonising) global North which generates the most vocal expressions of panic. In Britain, France, America, Australia, and other countries of the North, this panic is articulated in remarkably similar terms: images of *floods* and *invasions*, of (brown, poor, culturally other) people *pouring* across borders, *swamping* local (white, western) societies. The regulatory responses they compel—brandings of illegality, detention, expulsion—similarly follow a common pattern, attempting to contain in place the populations of the postcolonial world, even as the places in which they are contained become ever more accessible to those seeking resources, cheap labour, sex and adventure tourism.

Within Australia, these global dynamics of (post)coloniality converge with the country's particular, unending histories of indigenous dispossession. Ghassan Hage (in *Against Paranoid Nationalism*, 2003) has argued convincingly that the asylum seeker policies developed during the Howard years (since continued by subsequent Labour governments and now again by the Abbott-led Liberal government) are indicative of a “paranoid nationalism” bound up in Australia's persistent failure to come to terms with the violent acts of indigenous dispossession upon which the nation-state was founded.

That a country founded by the arrival of colonising boat people displays such anxiety about boat arrivals speaks to a deeply-rooted unease about the constitution of the nation, its geographic location in the world, and the rigour of its claims to sovereignty. That boats carry a particular symbolic purchase is evidenced by the significance that is attached to asylum seekers' mode of arrival. The policies prescribed by Howard and then by the Gillard, Rudd and Abbott governments that followed—off-shore processing, and now off-shore resettlement with no chance of family reunion—apply only to those asylum seekers who arrive by boat. This is in spite of the fact that the number of asylum seekers arriving by boat is roughly comparable to those arriving by plane, and it is these latter arrivals, not “boat people”, who are much more likely to be found not to be “genuine refugees” (notwithstanding the obscurity of these categories and assessments). Still, the images that are lodged in the popular imagination and in the policy prescriptions of successive governments are not of planes, but of boats: wooden boats, sinking boats, boats that keep coming, boats crowded with “disorderly”

brown bodies, boats that must be stopped and turned away.

Those who arrive by boat today threaten the sovereignty claims of the nation-state in ways that are different from, but nevertheless entangled with, the challenges posed by indigenous Australians (those who, in 1788, did *not* arrive by boat). The sovereignty claims of Indigenous peoples “live”, as Irene Watson describes it, in spite of their “impossibility” in the face of the formal inviolability of Australian state sovereignty (‘Aboriginal sovereignties: past, present and future (im)possibilities’, in S. Perera, ed. *Our Patch: Enacting Australian Sovereignty Post-2001*, 2007). At the same time, the very existence of indigenous people, culture and lore renders impossible the sovereignty claim of the state which, for all its formal inviolability, nevertheless rests on the fiction of *terra nullius*. Those who arrive in Australia seeking asylum arrive, then, in a place within which sovereignty is already under challenge by the continuation of colonial relations which refuse to be contained within the “post” of the (post) colonial state.

Australia, however, is not only a former colony and a continuing settler-colonial state. It is also a former colonising power, having had formal administrative power over the Territory of Papua since 1906 (just five years after its own Federation), and over the Territory of New Guinea since 1919. It continued to administer the two after their administrative union in 1949, until their independence—as Papua New Guinea—in 1975. Unpacking the intersection of asylum and coloniality, then, the PNG Solution must be considered not only in terms of Australia’s own fraught engagements with asylum seekers and its own indigenous history, but also in terms of its relationship with its former colony, as


well as the neocolonial relationships it maintains with other Pacific Island states, including Nauru.

“You will be sent *there*”

For all the boldness of its sloganeering, the PNG Solution policy and the media campaign associated with it carried other messages, more subtly implied. What was being communicated to prospective asylum seekers, their friends and family already in Australia, and the domestic voting population at large, was not simply “you *won’t* be settled in Australia”, but also “you *will* be sent to Papua New Guinea”. The stated (if questionable) purpose of this message was not simply to stop boats arriving in Australia, but rather to stop people getting on boats in the first place. The effectiveness of the arrangement as a deterrent, however, rested on the assumption that the prospect of being sent to PNG would be enough to convince people that they would be better off staying where they were. And the implication here was that the prospect of life in PNG was a dismal one. Founded on a logic of deterrence, then, the “Solution” espoused by the Regional Resettlement Arrangement was not so much resettlement in PNG as the *promise* (threat) of resettlement in PNG, which was intended to be sufficient to make the resettlement unnecessary.

The deterrence logic of the policy functioned through the circulation of images and imageries capitalising on the widespread representation of Papua New Guinea as an impoverished, violent, crime-riddled place. Here, the Australian mainstream media was much less constrained by the exigencies of diplomatic relations. An article published in Brisbane’s Courier Mail newspaper in the days after the policy announcement, is illustrative. The piece was a feature about life in Hanuabada, a settlement in

**BURN THE
DETENTION
CENTRES.**



**DEPORT THE
GOVERNMENT.**



**WELCOME
THE REFUGEES.**



REFUGEE SUPPORT MILITIA
LET THEM IN YOU BASTARDS

PNG's capital Port Moresby, which had been identified as a potential resettlement site for refugees. Couched in quasi-humanitarian language—"Papua New Guinea villagers the new refugee victims" the headline ran—the article purported to tell the story of settlement residents who could be evicted to make room for asylum seekers. References, though, were to a "shanty town", "a bleak picture of law and order", "car jackings, rape, theft, and murder", and a "hellish place". Accompanying images were of rubbish and sewerage surrounding houses and children. "Filth" was the one-word caption accompanying one. Through these images, and through the pixelated distress of those who found themselves en route to this "hellish place", the promise of the PNG Solution circulated both within and without Australia, including in PNG itself. The experiences and opinions of these Papua New Guineans have been largely ignored in discussion of the forecast resettlement in PNG, as have the experiences and opinions of Nauruan people and others who find their lands and country annexed for Australia's punitive policies.

"And PNG becomes a dumpyard"

For Papua New Guineans, the policy announcement was met with vigorous debate, and a key arena in which this played out was the growing, and increasingly politically significant, blog and social media sphere. On Sharp Talk—A Facebook group that is PNG's largest online discussion forum, with over 13,000 members and generally in excess of one hundred posts a day—postings began within minutes of the announcement of the Rudd-O'Neill press conference, and continued at a high intensity for several weeks afterwards. Sharp Talk is not representative of the country as a whole: its users are, for the most part, urban-based with a high

degree of English literacy. Nonetheless, the forum's political and social prominence makes it indicative of at least some of the key contours of local opinion in PNG.

Considering the discursive responses to the PNG Solution from within PNG's civil society highlights the intertwining of the politics of asylum and (post) coloniality at a lived, local level, as well as revealing key disjunctions between civil society and the PNG state, who sought to portray the policy as an equalizing of the Australia-PNG relationship, a bilateral trade between "friends" (a dehumanizing exchange of asylum seekers for infrastructure funding).

While some people posting on the Sharp Talk site did speak in favour of the PNG Solution—citing Christian compassion and international obligation as reasons—the overwhelming response was one of opposition, with the policy widely interpreted as a humiliating confirmation of Australia's neo-colonial intent, and the PNG state's acquiescence to this. "This is not our problem...why should we succumb to this neo colonialistic attitude?" asked one poster. "Fed up of Australia and its bloody bullying tactics!!!" wrote another. Comments articulated a sense of Papua New Guinean sovereignty being compromised: "Which electorate in PNG does this joker [Australian immigration minister] Burke represent? Which portfolio in the PNG cabinet does he hold?"; "what makes a country a sovereign state ????? ... might as well make PNG another state of Australia". For many, this sense of neo-colonial interference by Australia was linked to Papua New Guinea's perceived economic dependence on its former colonial ruler. "PNG is politically independent but economically dependent", wrote one user, "so we continue to say yes sir to our colonial master".

Border politics

Six months after the announcement of the PNG Solution (and the accompanying plan to process and resettle asylum seekers in Nauru), the status of the policy is to some extent unclear. Abbott has reiterated his support for offshore resettlement, but to date no asylum claims have been processed in either place. People are simply being held, in limbo, a condition that is exacerbated by the effective banning of journalists from the detention centres and most recently by the scrapping of the immigration minister's (already woeful) weekly briefings (these will now be replaced with a prepared statement, with no capacity for journalists to ask questions). Still, it remains likely that resettlement will proceed, at least in PNG. With Abbott determined not to let boat-arriving asylum seekers step foot on Australian soil, at least some of those currently being held will need to be resettled somewhere, and PNG is the largest Pacific Island and the most obvious site.

Responses to the PNG Solution make clear that regional resettlement is being perceived by Papua New Guineans, acutely, as bound up in colonial histories and neocolonial presents. Containing the disorderly brown bodies of asylum seekers outside the national borders, the Australian state intensifies the (post)colonial divisions between the Global North and South, cementing the construction of itself as a white nation, in but not of the region. And this, in turn, can only be read as a further defensive assertion of white state sovereignty in the face of persistent Indigenous sovereignty claims.

Having had a strong connection to PNG through my work over the past seven years, what saddens and worries me most is that the intertwining of asylum

and postcolonial politics on the ground in PNG is engendering xenophobic and at times intensely hostile responses to asylum seekers from Papua New Guineans, sentiments reflective of much of the worst of conservative popular opinion in much of Australian and other global North countries: resentment over perceived differential access to services; associations of asylum seekers with terrorism, crime and illegality; and negative responses to real or perceived cultural difference. On the Sharp Talk site, many anticipated conflict with resettled refugees, and some called for it directly. Repeated references to Australia's use of Papua New Guinea as its "dumping ground" spilt over, by logical extension, into a categorisation of asylum seekers as "rubbish".

Others drew connections to other contemporary migrations, including of Asian and other migrant labour associated with the expansion of resource industries. Drawn further and further into a neoliberal, globalising world, one commenter predicted that in the next decade foreign nationals would "own all the business, get all the employment", while Papua New Guineans are left to "fight and die over cleaners and tea boy positions". Not dissimilarly to the ways in which anti-asylum seeker sentiment in Australia and elsewhere in the North has been fuelled by anxieties about a neoliberal world, asylum seekers in PNG are received as one, symbolically-laden articulation of the perceived porousness of borders and the insecurities of globality.

Knowing how to respond to all of this seems heart-crushingly difficult, but it seems important to recognize that the struggle for asylum seeker and refugee rights must also be a struggle for Indigenous sovereignty and a struggle against neocolonialism in the region.

FIGHTING TO WIN

SYDSOL AND THE POLITICS OF SOLIDARITY NETWORKS

Chris

Working in a call centre is hell. You call people you don't want to speak to, and who don't want to speak to you. All day long, you have the same conversations again and again and again. You get yelled at. Hung up on. Abused. But you can't leave, or even move from your desk – you just have to keep picking up the phone and starting again. For eight, nine, ten, eleven hours, it goes on and on, and before long all sorts of strange, crazed thoughts are rushing through your head. The bullying and pressure to meet sales targets is intense. It's so bad, in fact, that the *Sydney Morning Herald* is even moved to write a feature on the terrible conditions there.

What would be worse, though, would be if, after quitting after a month because you couldn't stand it any longer, you didn't even get paid for your efforts.

Which is exactly what happened to me. I took a second job at Contact Centres Australia, a call centre which handles outsourced work for charities, for a few weeks in 2013. But after I quit, the company decided that they weren't going to pay me for one of my all-day shifts. Nothing. Months and months went by, email after email was sent politely requesting an explanation, but no reply ever came. Total silence. And no pay.

So after four months of this I decided enough was enough. I got together 15 friends and, one Saturday, marched into CCA's offices and demanded to speak to management.

Eventually, one of the bosses came out, and I pushed a letter into his hands. 'It is your responsibility to ensure that your employee is paid in full for the wages he is legally owed,' the letter read. 'If this is not done within 14 days, we will take further protest action against Contact Centres Australia.'

'I used to work here, but I haven't been paid. You need to read this letter, and do what it says,' I snarled as the manager stared around at us all in surprise. Then, without waiting much longer, we marched out, clapping our hands in unison as we went, the noise booming and reverberating around the empty lobby.

And then, within ten days, the money miraculously appeared in my bank account. After months and months of totally ignoring me, CCA caved in without a fight. We had turned the entire world on its head. The bosses were paper tigers. It was almost too easy.

For me, there were a few things about these events that made them unusual and novel. Firstly, for possibly the first time ever, I was fighting about something that directly affected me in a real, tangible and everyday way, and that those that I took action with, and indeed a large portion of the population, could relate to.

And secondly, for undoubtedly the first time ever, we actually won. It may seem obvious, but amongst the ranks of the activist left, the experience of fighting for real, immediate goals that connect to our own lives, and of actually winning those goals, is unusual, if not almost

outright unheard of. And in the days that followed, news of this tiny action involving only a handful of people and producing a relatively small victory zipped around the internet. Dozens upon dozens of people shared it on Facebook, and the website where the news was displayed received thousands of hits. It's hard to know, but maybe other people felt like this too.

Winning just these kinds of victories is the aim of the newly-formed Sydney Solidarity Network, or 'SydSol' for short. SydSol had formed from a small core of people in June 2013, and the action against my old call centre was our first real test to see whether we could meet the goals we had set for ourselves: to win small, tangible victories using direct action against instances of employer and landlord abuse that directly affected us and others like us. But none of us had ever done this before and we faced seemingly endless uncertainties. What if we weren't able to mobilise enough people to make the demand delivery effective? Would people understand what we were trying to do? And what if we delivered our demands and they just ignored us? Did we have it in us to mount an ongoing campaign against a massive call-centre with 500 staff and overseas offices? Equally, what if we won? Would we be able to follow up and reach out to others beyond our own circles with similar problems?

Fortunately, what we were doing was nothing original. The practice of forming 'solidarity networks' to fight and win small battles against bosses and landlords is becoming increasingly popular across the US, UK and Canada, and our new group had plenty of examples to follow. To get some idea of what the Sydney Solidarity Network hopes to achieve, it's worth looking at what other, more established solidarity

networks have achieved overseas.

The longest running and most powerful solidarity network is SeaSol – the Seattle Solidarity Network. SeaSol was formed in late 2007 by a handful of members of the Industrial Workers of the World, a syndicalist union, and has since grown to encompass several hundred members and a highly active organising committee of 25 people. An average SeaSol action, whether a demand delivery, mass picket or some other form of direct action, can generally attract between 30 to 60 people.

Typically, SeaSol's fights with employers or landlords begin when a worker or tenant with a particular grievance contacts the organisation. SeaSol's main form of outreach involves sticking up posters calling on passers-by to contact them if they're experiencing certain problems – 'Unpaid wages? Denied repairs? Problems with your boss or landlord?' – which, despite organisers' initial scepticism, are successful in soliciting large numbers of calls. A number of organisers then meet with the affected tenant or worker, determine what the problem is, and describe how the solidarity network functions and how it can fight back to resolve the grievance.

Central to SeaSol's fights is the notion of 'winnability'. Any fight that the group takes on must be winnable, in that SeaSol's members must be able to exert enough pressure on the offending boss or landlord to be able to make them cave in to their demands. Thus, vague or imprecise demands, or ones so immense that they would require protracted campaigns with no certainty of victory, are not taken on. So, for instance, a fight to gain \$500 backpay for a week of unpaid 'trial' shifts at a café – a target highly vulnerable to actions like pickets – is

likely to be taken on, while a campaign to raise wages across the board at a large factory in an industrial area wouldn't be.

Equally important is the network's refusal to function as a social service or charity taking action 'on behalf' of people – any workers or tenants who wish to fight with SeaSol are told that they must be willing to take on a leading role in their own struggle, and then turn out in support of others in future fights. In this way, the organisation continually grows, spreads skills, and expands out from its initial core of activists. Furthermore, in promoting a culture of solidarity rather than charity, it empowers and politicises those who are drawn in to the network, turning them into organisers who must take control of their own struggle. Doing this also provides workers and tenants who contact SeaSol with a direct, practical education in class politics: dozens of others will turn out to support their fight, and they turn out to support others' struggles.

Finally, after voting whether to take a fight on, the network moves on to its third principle: direct action. A list of demands is typed up, printed out, then delivered *en masse* by upwards of 50 people to the offending boss or landlord, catching them completely by surprise in an immense physical display of the group's power. 14 days are given to meet these demands and then, should they not be met, SeaSol begins slowly escalating direct action, beginning with small-scale leafletting and postering and stepping up to pickets and mass phone-ins. In this way, those taking part directly experience their own power to defeat landlords and employers, rather than relying upon legal procedures, social workers, lawyers or representatives.

And it works: in the six years that it's been around, SeaSol has taken on 36 fights, and won 27. Tens of thousands of dollars in stolen wages have been repaid, repairs on rental properties swiftly granted, and evictions prevented. Meanwhile, solidarity networks have spread across much of the English speaking world, with dozens popping up in the US, UK and Canada to take on and win similar cases of smallscale employer and landlord abuse. SeaSol's strength is now such that it can compel employers and landlords to pay up by threats alone: their last victory, involving \$6,000 in backpay for a former supermarket worker who was paid below the minimum wage, was won after a demand delivery action alone. The employer paid up within two weeks without a fight.

Observing these developments from Sydney, many of us were inspired by what we saw and read, and determined to see if we could replicate similar success in Australia. And so, over the course of May and June last year, we began meeting and slowly working towards what would become SydSol.

The conditions that we face here in Australia, while not identical to US ones, point to the usefulness of solidarity network-style organisations for tackling problems in our lives. Housing, in particular, is an inescapable problem: seemingly no-one under 40 will ever be able to buy property and rents are spiralling out of control, with many tenants afraid to request even basic repairs for fear of being thrown out, and evictions in order to dramatically increase rents becoming common. Similarly, contract, labour hire and casual work, rife with superexploitation, wage-theft and illegal conditions, is close to becoming the new

workplace norm, and now comprises almost 50% of the jobs market.

More than this, SeaSol's emergence as a response to the seeming irrelevance of much of the activity of the far left also speaks strongly to Australian conditions. 'When I first became interested in anarchist politics,' one organiser wrote, 'there weren't many groups for me to get involved with. All of the collectives I joined seemed to form, fall apart, and reform - always the same people reshuffling into new groups, disbanding, and starting over again.' Another described joining SeaSol out of 'frustration with symbolic and ineffectual anti-war and anti-globalisation protests and anarchist propaganda groups that had limited relevance to most people's lives, including my own.' My own experiences amongst activist milieus are generally similar. Everything I took part in seemed to be symbolic, small, unconnected to my own life and, despite all the sacrifice, we never won anything – campaigns never finished after the enemy gave in or conceded something, but after we became exhausted.

But it doesn't have to be like this. The experience of SeaSol, which grew out of the efforts of a only a small handful of radicals, shows how large numbers of 'ordinary' people can be engaged and brought into fights around the basic experiences of working class life, and how anarchist ideas and tactics of confrontation, direct democracy, and direct action can actually be of immediate relevance to the lives of thousands of people. This harks back to the best traditions of anarchism's 'glorious period' in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when anarchist organisations numbering in the millions were part of the very social fabric of the communities and workplaces where they existed, intimately

connected to people's everyday problems and.

On a far smaller scale, we are already seeing this happen in Sydney. The relatively few posters that we've stuck up – which don't look at all like typical anarchist propaganda, but instead canvass for grievances like Unpaid wages? Unpaid trial shifts? – have drawn a surprisingly large response, and led to phone calls from significant numbers of people who've had their wages stolen, their pay cut, or their dignity at work repeatedly trampled. Similarly, the two victories that SydSol has had have drawn a uniformly sympathetic response from those friends and workmates outside activist circles who I've mentioned it to. The problems that we fight against are not at all uncommon, and the potential for engaging large numbers of people, ignored by both the far left and the mainstream trade unions, is enormous.

Solidarity networks are not perfect models of organisation and SydSol, within its brief six months of existence, has not been without its problems. Forming a new organisation with few resources and no local precedents to follow has been an immensely difficult task, full of confusion, backward steps and mistakes. But we are now far stronger than we were six months ago, and have expanded well beyond our initially tiny numbers. And, as we've discovered, the model pioneered in Seattle appears to work: people with job and landlord grievances see and respond to our outreach work and, when we take action against a target, we win. We are only in our early stages, but the solidarity network model provides a template for success that allows us to start building a larger movement and, as the network grows, new possibilities for radical struggle will present themselves to us.



PROBLEMS AT WORK?

**UNPAID WAGES?
UNPAID "TRIAL" SHIFTS?**



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INTERVIEW WITH TAKESHI

A JAPANESE INTERNATIONAL STUDENT LIVING IN SYDNEY

Can you tell us a bit about yourself? Why did you come to Australia? What interested you about this country? What was the main reason for your visit?

My name is Takeshi, from Japan. I studied Western philosophy in my university and after graduated in my uni, I worked in the bookstore and the factories.

The biggest reason for me to going abroad is that I wanted to live in other countries and to feel other cultures and customs. Of course, I wanted to study English as well. I heard from my agency in Japan that Australia is a safe country and there are a lot of beautiful places in the nature. I like sea, and once I watched the beautiful ocean in the TV, so I was excited to coming Australia and seeing the sea.

Can you tell us about your English school? What were the conditions like? Was it expensive?

I had gotten an international student visa and been to my English school for 10 months. My school was a private English school near Town hall. My school had about 200 students. Most of students were from South Korea, Japan, Colombia and Brazil. There were few European students. I studied general English there, it includes conversation, grammar, writing and listening.

Before coming Australia, I had to choose a school and to spend all payment for the school, because this is the condition to get a student visa. I spent about 2/3 of my saving for the school, it is not cheap.

When you were in Australia, did you have to work to support yourself? What sort of jobs did you take? How did you find out about them?

I had to get casual job, but my English skill was not so good, so I searched jobs in Japanese website. It introduced casual or part time jobs in Australia, but most of jobs were Japanese restaurant jobs. I got a kitchen hand job in Japanese restaurant, and had worked there about 7 months.

The minimum wage for a casual restaurant job is \$21.05 per hour. Did you receive this? Did the other staff? Did the restaurant owner provide you with information about what your workplace rights were?

I did not receive minimum wage in my workplace. The manager of my restaurant did not tell me about minimum wage in Australia. Nobody knew about minimum wage. I do not know payment of other staffs, but I am sure that they received less wage than minimum wage.

International students are only allowed to work 20 hours per week. Did your boss make staff work more than 20 hours? Were staff worried that they could be deported for doing this?

I heard that there were a lot of international students had worked more than 20 hours per a week. However, I think that most of them were not feared because they received their wage by cash, so there were no evidences to working illegally. They took their risk, and most of them did not think so seriously about working illegally because of their ignorance of the law. I do not know that my

manager forced his staff to work illegally, but at least there was no force to working long time for me. Generally, Japanese students are happy to working long time even though it is illegally, they just want much money.

Do you think the rates of pay and working conditions in your restaurant were typical for jobs that international students do?

I know only about Japanese restaurant industry. Generally, managers does not pay wage legally in this industry. When I was looking for job in Sydney, all of Japanese restaurants which I had an interview did not pay their wage legally. \$10, \$11 and \$12... so on. They must pay the wage by cash because they know that they do illegal thing and do not want to leave evidence.

Tell us about the places you lived in. Typically, how many people lived in each room? How much rent did you pay? What sort of condition were the places in?

The first one month in living Sydney, I had stayed with homestay family. Later, I left there and was looking for new house because homestay was too expensive for me. I found new share room near Ultimo. The landlords were from Philippines and I shared with 3 people in our room. There were beds for each residences and was a bathroom. The rent was \$130 per a week.

The room was not so bad. Sometimes a bed was broken, but our landlord repaired it. The bad point was that there was no privacy in the room share. Later I became not feeling comfortable, so I moved another apartments. New apartments have the rooms for each residences, there were a desk, a bed and a closet in each rooms. The rent was \$145 per a week. It was comfortable for me to have a private room, but I did not

like that the kitchen was too dirty. No one washed their dishes after using them. And the rooms did not have a window, so I did not know that now is morning or evening.

I heard that many room share near Town hall or Central are very bad. When I stay few days in room share near Central station, it was terrible. Each residences have their own space, but they are just separated by the curtain in the big room. I think it was worse than the place which people who lost their houses live after big earthquake in East Japan on March 2011.

Many international students are exploited by employers and landlords. Do you think this is easy for them to do this? Why?

Unfortunately, it is easy for employers and landlords to exploit international students because they do not know Australian laws so much. They do not doubt the custom of industry and do not think about their rights of workers.

These problems are serious. In the view of Japanese industry, Japanese managers exploit Japanese or Asian workers. For international students who are not good for English, it is difficult to get jobs to Australian local companies. That's why many students work in their same or similar ethnic groups even though they are exploited. Therefore it is difficult for Australian workers to know workers condition and the housing problems because of difference of languages.

There is no clear answer. One of the way to avoid these problems, the agency of study abroad should know about the problems and should tell for the international students them. The structure of exploitation will keep going as long as immature students coming in Australia. They should know about their rights.

Framework towards an AUTISTIC RADICALISM

James Pollard

I have yet to hear much discussion of autistic politics in any radical space. I'm generally surprised if people have tolerance for common autistic behaviours; it's unusual, in fact, for someone to have the slightest clue what autism is. Talking about autism on the left is usually taken as an invitation to bemoan the medicalisation of every aspect of life, attempts by well-meaning but poorly-informed post-somethingists to deconstruct one's condition, or rebukes that one is simply trying to engineer an excuse for moral failings (anything from outbursts of emotion to talking too much can fit this last category). Where autism receives any due at all, it is in the all-too-familiar and excruciatingly boring list of oppressions which radicals declare themselves against. Usually, it's the same people who refuse to admit the very existence of autism who also declare themselves the enemies of ableism. Thanks, comrades. Though it pains me to appear ungrateful, this essay will be partly comprised by naming some of the accepted practices of the left which work towards the exclusion of autistic people. This criticism is necessarily preceded by some explanation of the existing frameworks of autistic politics. Finally, while I believe these criticisms are a valid indictment of radical organising practices, they do not in themselves constitute a radical politics of autism. The final section of my essay will therefore outline a framework for autistic radicalism. It should be noted that this essay will NOT include any description of autism's basic symptoms and functioning; I'm loath to waste words to save some readers ten minutes on wikipedia. Without a basic understanding of autism, this essay probably won't make any sense.

The autistic movement must first be distinguished from movements speaking about autism. There are organisations which advocate for the support, treatment, or cure

of autistic people and their carers. Many are run by parents of autistic children, or therapists specialising in autism. An independent autistic politics only emerges with the rejection of the "cure" framework:

Autism is a way of being. "It is not possible to separate the person from the autism. Therefore, when parents say, 'I wish my child did not have autism,' what they're really saying is, 'I wish the autistic child I have did not exist, and I had a different (non-autistic) child instead'" (Sinclair 1993). This laid the basis for the elaboration of an autistic identity, one based on being "foreign," in Sinclair's words, in every culture and society one exists in. From this basis, and through the meetings of autistic people online and in meatspace, a concept of autistic culture has emerged with fundamentally different assumptions about how language and meaning work, what the rules and purposes of social interaction are, and what counts as politeness. It is also from this concept, that autism is a valid, but different, way of existing as a human being, that the idea of neurodiversity was first put forward. Neurodiversity proposes that conditions like autism be understood under a framework of difference, not deficit; that different neurotypes should be defined by their own criteria, not by their divergence from what constitutes a neurotypical.

Autistic people in radical spaces

Radical spaces are seldom more welcoming to autistic people than wider society is; in some cases, they can be less welcoming. Unlike a shopping mall or public library, there tends to be a strictly defined code for how participants in a space should behave. The supposedly obvious morality of this code often extends to policing the bodily movements, modes of speech, and styles of interactions of the participants. While respect and politeness are generally useful


concepts, many radical communities, out of caution or a conviction of moral righteousness, often extend these values to an implicit requirement for conformity. Whether this is desirable is up for debate, but it is something autistic people routinely fail at. Furthermore, when social codes are considered obvious and universal they are rarely made explicit; an outsider to the group may not even know when they are committing a violation. The same forces which keep the movement white and middle class tend to keep it neurotypical. The idea of self-facilitation is probably the best example of this: a proper radical is one who knows exactly when and how to speak, and exercises total control over their body and words. Similarly, the conflation of speaking out of turn or acting “disruptively” with dominance or violence leads to the exclusion of those with different neurotypes. With this silent policing, shaming, and exclusion, the appeal of autistic separatism is strong. When we talk to each other without neurotypicals, we can ramble, quote, or twitch

without fear of judgement. It's exhausting maintaining a pleasing and unthreatening mask, but it's the only way we are allowed to participate in radical activities.

Neurodiversity isn't enough- limitations of neurodiversity as a framework

If neurodiversity is to be incorporated into a leftist political framework, it forces one to ask some difficult questions. One needs to re-evaluate one's expectations for behaviour, as well as the means that are used to communicate and enforce those expectations. It is irresponsible to shun people who are seen as acting oddly. Furthermore, understanding that the structure of a person's brain has important meanings for who they are and how they function in the world calls into question the strict social constructivism found in certain strands of feminism which cannot propose a woman's liberation without her disembodiment. (Though the ways in which autistic and disabled politics sometimes fall prey

Support neurodiversity



to this disembodiment will be shortly examined.) Finally, autistic experiences of the world question the close identification of liberation with structurelessness. In all honesty, a punk's utopia is often an autistic's hell. Our struggles for liberation must accommodate people's different yearnings, rather than homogenise them. That being said, neurodiversity in and of itself is not a radical framework. While I believe that the embracing of autism as a way of being holds radical potential, neurodiversity's current incarnation has some serious limitations. I want to conclude by looking at two critiques of the neurodiversity movement, in the hope that the concepts it has raised can evolve.

First, there are the relevant critiques against any identitarian movement. A politics based only on a diagnosis fails to call into question the divisions within the movement based on race, class, and gender. While some of these questions are easier to answer with an appeal to neurodiversity, the belief that any theory or framework can answer all questions guarantees one some serious blind spots. Therefore we should not expect that the Autistic Self-Advocacy Network or the Autism Rights Movement will ever be capable of delivering a message of universal liberation. Moreover, partial liberation tends to lead to one of two conclusions. The first is separatism. This is a pleasant heuristic device, and even a useful tactic (autistic or other neurodiverse individuals constructing something on the model of a safe space) but as an ultimate political vision it is necessarily limited and utopian. Unless, of course, we exterminate the normies. But, as you know, Obama wants to restrict the second amendment rights of the mentally ill, so it seems they're onto us. Plan B is to demand a rightful place within society. This is the goal of most autistic organisations, and it completely compatible with the goals of capital. In fact, some firms have gladly taken on this task: Merrill-Lynch has a recruiting program aimed specifically at autistic people (as long as we don't have to do customer service, a lot of us are great with numbers and routines that others would find tedious); Specialisterne, a Danish labour contractor, focusses on recruiting autistic people and providing support to integrate them

into varying work environments where their strengths can better serve the interests of capital. It's tough to get too angry about this co-option, when so many autistic people suffer from chronic unemployment and all of its associated challenges, but it's also hard to get very excited, if one is a committed leftist.

The second critique is one that is made against disabled politics at large as they have been practiced since the 1980s. Much of disabled activism bases itself around the social model of disability, which sees the "disabling" part of disability coming primarily from society's understanding and treatment of disabled bodies, not those bodies themselves. While of course there is truth to this, it tends to invisibilise those for whom the body is itself a challenge: people with chronic pain, problems with eating or digestion, or those mental symptoms which impair one's ability to interpret the world (delusions, paranoia, hallucinations, etc) who want not just acceptance but relief from physical or mental pain. As one writer puts it,

Perhaps, Critical Disability Studies has unintentionally or unknowingly adopted – this culture's rules and values [that] distance us [both persons with and without disabilities] from the realities of our own bodies in all their glorious imperfection. In turn, the adoption of these values may explain the disavowal of the body as a source of inquiry within our nascent field. However, the effect has been that persons with disabilities have been rendered as "disembodied" entities when the irony is that any change in embodiment shifts one's subjectivity. This is quite telling considering that, from a material point of view, all I or anyone else has in this world is a body (Miceli 2010: 2).

In a way, the autistic movement was bound to make this error. Many organisations which advocate around autism from a curative perspective are loath to allow autistic people any voice. For them, any autistic person who can self-advocate isn't really autistic; the only real autistics are those who are so alienated by their surroundings that others can authoritatively speak on their behalf. Re-interpreting autism as a set of abilities to be tapped, rather than impairments, is a step in rejecting that one's only

legitimate demands can be for a more pleasant form of disempowerment. However, these tactics mean that neurodiversity often lacks the resources to explain serious mental and bodily pain which is not a result of discrimination or violence, let alone politicise it.

Imagining bodily utopias

The communist project must be the creation of real, embodied subjects, not abstract individuals. Taking that proposition seriously means abandoning the utopian dream of a universal law and language. We must acknowledge the ways in which our experiences of reality are fundamentally fragmented and uneven. The development of such a politics will require many inputs, and a lot of experimentation. Basic assumptions of what it means to be human, what it is to feel or care or communicate, what constitutes a good life, need to be questioned. These are obviously not new problems, but autistic perspectives and tools such as the theory of neurodiversity can offer new approaches and insights to them. The autistic experience requires a degree of cosmopolitanism. Our utopia could never consist of a single language. Our self-medicated gatherings are celebrations of idiosyncrasy; one comes expecting rudeness, obscure references, and stories that don't seem to go anywhere. It is expected that everyone will make a speech without obvious importance to everyone. Far from an isolating experience this is something truly communal. We communicate not the finished product but our process, we share our brains, listen simply because something is being said, speak simply because the words seem right. Comprehension has its uses, but the autistic experience forces one to confront the often difficult task of learning to love and respect the occasionally incomprehensible.

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BEYOND SPEAKING OUT -Responding to Rape

Tanya

Rape is often viewed as both apolitical and ahistorical when it is neither of those things. To put it another way, the question of how to respond politically to rape is not timeless or universal but needs to be answered in relation to particular social and political circumstances. In Australia, today, those circumstances are largely shaped by the uneven political effects of the second-wave feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s. In the aftermath of this movement, central feminist contentions around rape – such as that rape is about power rather than sexual desire, that rape is an expression of gender inequality, and that the historic silence around rape needs to be broken by speaking out – have moved from being politically marginal claims to widely accepted truisms. On the other hand, many fundamental realities of sexual violence remain unaltered. There is no evidence that the proportion of women, or men or children, who experience unwanted sex is significantly lessening. Large numbers of survivors continue to be disbelieved and silenced, and criminal justice and social responses demonstrate significant class and racial biases in relations to both perpetrators and survivors of sexual violence.

The fact that much remains the same can sometimes blind us to the fact that the social changes that have occurred are also significant, particularly in

terms of developing political responses. For instance, 'rape myths', widely held beliefs about rape that put the blame on victims rather than perpetrators, were first identified by feminists in the 1970s. In Australia today, these myths remain widespread but they manifest differently than they did in previous decades. Significantly, there is a recurring contradiction between the general beliefs about rape that people express and their responses to specific occurrences of sexual violence. Many people believe that false accusations are rare, that sexual violence is common and spread across the social spectrum. These same people will still mobilise myths around false accusations and untrustworthy victims when confronted with allegations against specific individuals they either know or respect, such as famous footballers. That this kind of double vision is not limited to conservatives is evidenced by both the recent SWP responses to allegations of rape within their organisation and the response of many on the left to the accusations against Julian Assange.

My main argument here, drawn from thinking about responses to both the SWP and Assange examples, is that the radical left has failed to develop a political response to rape that engages with these changing political and social conditions. In fact, left responses to rape are largely indistinguishable from those of liberals or conservatives. Sexual violence in our society is largely met with a political uniform response; a shared reliance on a politics of moral outrage about the general idea of sexual violence coupled with a disturbing willingness to excuse this violence in specific circumstances. It is the

particular circumstances in which rape is excused that is perhaps the greatest indicator of political differences rather than any essential difference in political understanding of sexual violence more broadly.

This political uniformity, I believe, derives from the hegemony of a specific set of second-wave feminist ideas and practices that can be broadly be grouped under the label 'speaking out'. The political logic that underlies these ideas is encapsulated in the slogan 'break the silence - end the violence'. This logic, as seen in the slogan, has two main elements. First, that rape is a topic of taboo and silence, and that this silence is a necessary enabling condition for the continuation of sexual violence. Secondly, that because of this, any act of speaking about or drawing attention to rape is politically beneficial. In practice, this results in a political strategy based around the production and dissemination of narratives of victimisation, exemplified in occasions like Reclaim the Night rallies.

The problem is not that this political logic, or the activism that it produces, is inherently wrong or reactionary. Rather, the problem is that a political strategy developed in response to a specific context has come to be seen as an unassailable truth and a moral good. At the time that it was developed this strategy was used to enable women's experiences of violence to become the basis for political and legal claims. And it has been extremely successful in achieving this. But the very success of the strategy has changed the political conditions that made the strategy useful in the first place. My argument here,

therefore, is that 'speaking out' is no longer an adequate response to sexual violence, even if it once was. In the remainder of this article I outline three key problems with continuing to base radical responses to rape on the political logic of 'speaking out'.

TELLING THE TRUTH

The first problem is that the politics of 'speaking out' can obscure the political contestations that shape rape as a social reality. As feminist authors Brenda Higgins and Lynn Silver put it, 'Who gets to tell the story and whose story counts as truth determine the definition of what rape is.'¹ Historically, truths about rape were established by powerful and repressive institutions such as the law. Second-wave feminists intervened in this process by insisting that women's experiences, historically treated as untrue, be recognised and validated. While this is an important advance, it still fails to acknowledge that perceptions of rape are a result of political struggles. A determination to believe the victim/survivor in sexual assault cases is a political stance, a decision to treat some stories as more significant than others.

In contrast, seeing rape as a matter that can be simply discovered through investigation of objective facts leaves all sexual assault cases open to debate, assessment and judgement, including by people far removed from the circumstances. It also mystifies the fact that these debates, assessments and judgements are themselves never innocent but always about accepting a particular version of the truth. These judgements draw on a history of distinguishing between what legal theorist Susan Estrich describes as 'real'

and 'simple' rapes.² The archetypal 'real' rape involves a bad man lurking in a dark alley with a weapon attacking women at random. 'Simple' rapes are assaults that are perpetrated by acquaintances and may not involve obvious physical force. Their reality is always seen to be suspect. Today, compared to the 1970s, 'real' rapes are responded to better, both legally and socially. There are also a greater number of sexual assaults that have a chance of being viewed as 'real'. Those rapes which aren't judged to be 'real', however, are still met with disbelief and denial. As the Assange and SWP cases demonstrate, even amongst progressive sections of the population this 'real'/simple distinction continues to be applied, enabled by a deliberately naïve view about the 'truth' of rape.

THE SPEAKER'S BENEFIT

The second problem is that the political logic of 'speaking out' mimics what Michel Foucault described as the 'repressive hypothesis' in his *History of Sexuality*.³ Foucault argues that twentieth-century Western understandings of sex were based on this repressive hypothesis, the conviction that it was repressed, and socially taboo. This was despite the fact that through discourses like psychiatry and medicine talking about sex had become a mechanism of disciplinary power, used to categorise and control individuals and populations. The repressive hypothesis thus disguises the ways in which both speech and silence can be complicit with power or contest it. Instead, it confers upon anyone speaking about sex what Foucault called the 'speaker's benefit'. If the repressive hypothesis is accepted, any act of speech becomes transgressive and courageous,

and the speaker is free from considering the actual effects of this speech.

There has been a similar insistence that rape in our society is only met with taboo and silence. This is despite the ubiquity of representations and discussions of rape in popular culture and the ways in which these representations are used to categorise women as victims and discipline them through limiting their engagement in the public sphere. Rape scenes are a standard trope in television, movies and fiction, used both to 'explain' female characters problems and allow heroic men to protect and nurture them. Stories of 'real' rape are also a topic of great fascination in the news media, as any casual newspaper reader would know.

We need a more sophisticated understanding of speech and silence around rape. Rather than asserting that talking about rape is always liberating, it is more useful to think about the kinds of speech that occurs around sexual violence and its political effects. For instance, feminist author Louise Armstrong has described a 'high-tech filter' that exists in popular culture, which allows for personal stories of suffering and victimisation but filters out political speech that attempts to address the structural conditions that enable sexual violence to occur or suggests that it can be resisted.⁴ We need to be wary of speech that insists that survivors of rape are eternally victimised, traumatised and damaged, and incapable of acting our own behalf. Recognising the horror of rape is important but we cannot allow such recognition to further cast survivors of violence, and women generally, as always-already victims.

There is a long history of raped women

being mobilised as symbols in political conflicts and political radicals need to be particularly careful of claiming the speaker's benefit on behalf of survivors of sexual violence. Writing of such processes in anti-colonial struggles in India, R. S. Rajan writes: 'The woman's newly recognized identity - which may be more properly described as her function in an economy of sexual propriety and property - becomes an emotional war-cry and the prelude to the virtual disappearance of the woman herself.'⁵ In other words, claiming a heroic role on behalf of raped women can be complicit in the erasure or sidelining of the woman herself.

BAD MEN AND MORAL CONTAMINATION

Finally, 'speaking out' relies on and reinforces moral expectations of clear distinctions between good and evil. This perpetuates the enduring, and comforting, myth that sexual violence is only committed by 'bad men' and not by people we know, or even like and respect. To return to the point I made above, when men are liked and respected, even radical people can refuse to validate women's experiences. If there is no 'bad man', in this logic, then there can be no rape. Sexual violence is an important political problem precisely because it is not simply an issue of bad men who do bad things but because we live in a society where unwanted sex is a frequent occurrence, even amongst communities of generally good and progressive people.

Moralistic responses to rape thus transform sexual violence from a political problem in our society and our lives into

a moral contamination introduced from outside. This externalisation of sexual violence occurs frequently through the scapegoating of racial others, such as Muslim or Indigenous men. But the same process can be seen in the recent case inside the SWP. The organisation's defence of their handling of the allegations made frequent reference to the claim that they were 'good' socialists and so couldn't possibly have treated survivors of rape badly. On the other hand, many outside the SWP were keen to label sexual violence as a particular problem of the 'trots' rather than seeing the SWP crisis as something that could and should have wider implications. The fantasy of drawing a line in the sand with ourselves on one side and the rapists or enablers of rape on the other is highly tempting, but, like many political fantasies, it's also dangerous. Labelling the problem of sexual violence as external to 'us' forecloses the chance of political engagement and change. This doesn't mean that it isn't right to denounce or exclude perpetrators or sexual violence and those who would excuse their actions. I believe that it is often essential that we do so. But such denunciations can't substitute for political strategies or become an assertion of our own moral purity.

CONCLUSIONS

A radical response to sexual violence needs to question and go beyond the legacies of second-wave feminism that I have outlined here. These responses are not intrinsically valueless but they fail today, I think, to offer a way forward in responding to rape. Instead, a radical response, at a minimum, means abandoning a focus on discovering

the truth of rape in favour of political contestations around gender and sexuality. It means refusing the easy fallacy of the speaker's benefit and the tempting fantasy of a world where political issues around gender and sexuality can be resolved purely through avoiding moral contamination.

We need to continue to react to sexual violence with outrage and abhorrence but use that anger to generate rather than foreclose political possibility. We need to ask what it takes to envision a world without rape and how do we incorporate that vision into our political responses in the here and now. These are questions that our current responses to sexual violence do not even consider, let alone answer.

Notes

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anarchist & radical publications directory

Jura.org.au/blog

Articles by members of the Jura Books Collective and guest contributors. Recent articles on the Sydney Anarchist Bookfair, 'How I Became an Anarchist' & the 'Revolutionary Art of Conversation.'

Anarchy.org.au

Your online source for Anarchy in Australia. Currently administered by the Melbourne Anarchist Club.

Disaccords.wordpress.com

An anarchist news blotter following events in Australia & Indonesia (& other nearby places). Email noisland@riseup.net with links & recommendations.

[With Sober Senses](http://WithSoberSenses)

withsobersenses.wordpress.com

Fault Lines of Capital Accumulation & Front Lines of Class Struggle. 'A new project in which I am trying to reorientate my research and writing towards mapping out the territory of capital accumulation within Australia... [which] may be useful for those trying to understand and change the society they live in and make up.'

[The Golden Barley School](http://TheGoldenBarleySchool)

goldenbarleyschool.wordpress.com

An anarchist, a communist and a feminist walk into a bar...A group blog, which, despite the tagline, is not run by three people with defined and separated political identities.

[Revolts Now](http://RevoltsNow)

revoltsnow.wordpress.com

'A multitude of possibilities.'

Slackbastard

slackbastard.anarchobase.com

Anarchy and apathy battle it out on @ndy's blog.

[Wayward Wobbly](http://WaywardWobbly)

waywardwobbly.wordpress.com

Wobbly explorations into class composition.

Avenue

unnamedavenue.org

Zine of Perth anarchist collective, three issues available. Contact avenue.perth@gmail.com

[The Wolves at the door](http://TheWolvesattheDoor)

<http://thewolvesatthedoor.noblogs.org/>

Irregular anarchist journal from Sydney. 2 issues available. Contact thewolvesatthedoor@riseup.net.

[Black Light](http://BlackLight)

http://anarchy.org.au/anarchist-texts/black_light_1/

Paper of the Melbourne Anarchist Club. Issue #1 'Anarchy and organisation' is now available. Contact blacklightzine@gmail.com.

Sedition

<http://anarchy.org.au/sedition/>

Sedition is a mutual collaboration between two geographically disparate Australian anarchist collectives: Melbourne Anarchist Club & the Jura collective from Sydney. Issue 2 has just been published. Articles on the wage system and its abolition and more.