

Joint Publication 3-53



Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations



5 September 2003



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication addresses military psychological operations planning and execution in support of joint, multinational, and interagency efforts across the range of military operations.

2. Purpose


This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



JAMES A. HAWKINS
Major General, USAF
Vice Director, Joint Staff

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-53 DATED 10 JULY 1996

- **Revises the categories of military psychological operations to strategic, operational, and tactical**
- **Discusses missions supported by psychological operations**
- **Covers the concept of psychological operations measures of effectiveness**
- **Explains in detail the integration of psychological operations with information operations**
- **Updates the duties and responsibilities of the organizations involved with psychological operations**
- **Clarifies the command relationships over psychological operations forces**
- **Discusses psychological operations planning in support of the joint campaign**
- **Provides guidance on the psychological operations approval process, to include approval of psychological operations objectives and themes and psychological operations products**
- **Expands the discussion of peacetime psychological operations to include theater security cooperation plans**
- **Discusses psychological operations support to joint force campaign phasing**
- **Includes a discussion of psychological operations during interagency operations and multinational operations**
- **Provides a sample of the psychological operations tab to the information operations appendix of an operation plan or order**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Provides an Overview of Psychological Operations**
 - **Discusses Organizational Responsibilities for Psychological Operations**
 - **Explains Command Relationships**
 - **Discusses Psychological Operations Planning in Support of the Joint Force Campaign**
 - **Highlights the Psychological Operations Approval Process**
 - **Discusses Psychological Operations Across the Range of Military Operations**
-

Overview

The purpose of psychological operations (PSYOP) is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.

Psychological operations (PSYOP) are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. **PSYOP are a vital part of the broad range of US diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities.** PSYOP characteristically are delivered as information for effect, used during peacetime and conflict, to inform and influence. When properly employed, PSYOP can save lives of friendly and/or adversary forces by reducing adversaries' will to fight. By lowering adversary morale and reducing their efficiency, PSYOP can also discourage aggressive actions and create dissidence and disaffection within their ranks, ultimately inducing surrender.

There are three categories of military PSYOP: strategic, operational, and tactical.

PSYOP are an integral part of military operations and, as such, are an inherent responsibility of all military commanders. There are three categories of military PSYOP, strategic, operational, and tactical, which are used to establish and reinforce foreign perceptions of US military, political, and economic power and resolve. **Strategic PSYOP** are international information activities conducted by US Government (USG) agencies to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor of US goals and objectives during peacetime and in times of conflict. These programs are conducted predominantly outside the military arena but can utilize Department of Defense (DOD) assets. **Operational**

PSYOP are conducted across the range of military operations, including during peacetime, in a defined operational area to promote the effectiveness of the joint force commander's (JFC's) campaigns and strategies. **Tactical PSYOP** are conducted in the area assigned a tactical commander across the range of military operations to support the tactical mission against opposing forces.

The President and Secretary of Defense issue national security policy through directives and statements.

During peacetime, the Secretary of Defense (or designated representative) translates national security policy into military policy. **Because the execution of policy routinely contains an informational element and desires behavior favorable to its intent, there is an inherent psychological dimension.** During war, policy flows directly from the President, as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the combatant commanders. The combatant commander is responsible for the centralized direction and conduct of PSYOP within the command's area of responsibility.

PSYOP supports joint force commander missions.

PSYOP units support the JFC and contribute to all aspects of joint operations by performing the following missions:

Advising the supported commander through the targeting process regarding targeting restrictions, psychological actions, and psychological enabling actions to be executed by the military force.

Influencing foreign populations by expressing information through selected conduits to influence attitudes and behavior and to obtain compliance or non-interference with friendly military operations.

Providing public information to foreign populations to support humanitarian activities, ease suffering, and restore or maintain civil order.

Serving as the supported commander's voice to foreign populations by conveying the JFC's intent.

Countering adversary propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, and opposing information to correctly portray friendly intent and actions, while denying others the ability to polarize public opinion and affect the political will of the United States and its multinational partners within an operational area.

Organizational Responsibilities for Psychological Operations

Organizational responsibilities for PSYOP involve many parts of the Department of Defense.

The **Secretary of Defense** participates in the establishment of national security policy and objectives and provides strategic PSYOP advice to USG agencies and allies.

The **Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD [P])** approves all PSYOP programs unless the authority is delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) (ASD[SO/LIC]), and delegates product approval and dissemination authority to the appropriate level for peace, contingency, or war.

The **ASD(SO/LIC)** acts as principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the USD (P) on PSYOP matters; coordinates PSYOP policy, plans, and programs with other USG departments and agencies; develops PSYOP policy for the Department of Defense; reviews and approves all PSYOP plans and programs delegated by the USD(P); and evaluates the effectiveness of DOD PSYOP plans and programs.

The **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** advises the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council on all matters regarding PSYOP forces, capabilities, programs, and missions.

Command Relationships

Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Commander, US Special Operations Command exercises combatant command (command authority) over all assigned military PSYOP forces.

When directed by the Secretary of Defense, **the Commander, US Special Operations Command transfers PSYOP forces by attachment to geographic combatant commanders.** When these forces are transferred, the command relationship of the gaining commander (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified; in most cases that will be operational control.

PSYOP forces, organized as a joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF), normally serve as a subordinate joint command of a joint force. **The JPOTF exercises command and control of those PSYOP assets assigned, attached, or in support from the Services components and, when applicable, from other nations.** Further, although tactical PSYOP units are usually assigned to maneuver commanders, the JPOTF normally has coordinating authority with tactical forces for developing, producing, and disseminating PSYOP products.

The scale of operations generally will dictate the organization of PSYOP forces.

As a crisis begins to develop, one of the first elements deployed to a supported commander is the **PSYOP assessment team (POAT)**. The POAT provides staff support to the operations directorate (J-3) of the joint force. The POAT assesses the situation, confers with the commander, develops the PSYOP objectives, and recommends an appropriate combination of personnel, equipment, and support provided by Service components to accomplish the mission. If the POAT assesses that significant PSYOP forces are required to support the JFC's objectives, the POAT recommends to the JFC that a JPOTF or PSYOP support element be established.

Psychological Operations Planning in Support of the Joint Campaign

Effective use of PSYOP increases the potential for operational success.

PSYOP are involved in all three types of planning processes for joint operations: campaign, deliberate, and crisis action. Experience has repeatedly demonstrated that **PSYOP planners must be involved throughout the planning process** and that bringing PSYOP in early to the process can significantly improve the PSYOP contribution to the overall operation.

The overall function of PSYOP is to cause selected foreign audiences to take actions favorable to the objectives of the United States and its allies or coalition partners. **PSYOP forces are the only DOD asset given the authority to influence foreign target audiences (TAs)** directly through the use of radio, print, and other media. PSYOP personnel specifically advise the supported commander on methods to capitalize on the psychological impacts of every aspect of force employment to achieve the overall campaign objectives. Their duties are wide-ranging but include, as a minimum, advising on the psychological impacts of planned operations, the identification of foreign TAs, and any psychological weaknesses.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's execute order (authorized by the Secretary of Defense) should designate who has authority for PSYOP product approval and PSYOP product dissemination.

The Secretary of Defense normally delegates PSYOP product approval to the supported combatant commander. This does not mean that the supported combatant commander also has been delegated approval for PSYOP product dissemination. **In some cases, PSYOP products may be politically sensitive and may require separate approval for dissemination.** The supported combatant commander may, in turn, delegate PSYOP product approval to a joint task force (JTF) commander but not lower without approval of the Secretary of Defense.

In all PSYOP activities, commanders must be aware of two levels of product approval. PSYOP objectives and themes frame the products

that reach foreign TAs and reflect national and theater policy and strategy. Approval of themes and messages is reserved by USG policy at Office of the Secretary of Defense-levels where the interagency process can address PSYOP products with a broad range of considerations. Commanders subordinate to JTF commanders can modify approved products, within the guidelines issued by higher headquarters, to better target local foreign TAs.

Psychological Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

PSYOP support joint and multinational operations and designated government agencies.

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) not involving the use or threat of force that can be supported by joint PSYOP include foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, foreign internal defense, consequence management, and DOD support to counterdrug operations. These military activities provide training and in-theater access to allow for the facilitation and use of PSYOP during the transition to war. Nonlethal activities such as PSYOP can be decisive in MOOTW involving the use or threat of force. **Joint PSYOP are capable of supporting operations conducted during MOOTW**, to include strikes and raids, combatting terrorism, foreign internal defense, enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept operations, peace operations (e.g., peace enforcement operations), noncombatant evacuation operations or flexible deterrent options as directed. **During war prehostilities**, PSYOP can provide powerful operational leverage in support of flexible deterrent options. Among their potential contributions, PSYOP can be employed to gather critical information, undermine a potential opponent's will or capacity to wage war, or enhance the capabilities of multinational forces. During war, PSYOP at the strategic, operational, and tactical level may enhance the success of operations at all echelons.

CONCLUSION

PSYOP are operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. To accomplish this goal, PSYOP must have a clearly defined mission, the ability to analyze and evaluate targets and their effects, a reliable media transmission, and a rapid ability to implement their activities. PSYOP depend on communications to ensure proper execution of the mission and objectives. This is accomplished by command and control, preplanning, and support from all levels of the chain of command.

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CHAPTER I

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: AN OVERVIEW

“In this war, which was total in every sense of the word, we have seen many great changes in military science. It seems to me that not the least of these was the development of psychological warfare as a specific and effective weapon.”

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower

1. General

a. The employment of any instrument of national power, particularly the military instrument, has always had a psychological dimension. Foreign perceptions of US military capabilities are fundamental to strategic deterrence. **The effectiveness of deterrence hinges on US ability to influence the perceptions of others.** Psychological operations (PSYOP) are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP are to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. PSYOP are a vital part of the broad range of US diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities. **PSYOP characteristically are delivered as information for effect, used during peacetime and conflict, to inform and influence.** When properly employed, PSYOP can save lives of friendly and/or adversary forces by reducing adversaries’ will to fight. By lowering adversary morale and reducing their efficiency, PSYOP can also discourage aggressive actions and create dissidence and disaffection within their ranks, ultimately inducing surrender.

b. The President and Secretary of Defense issue national security policy through directives and statements. During peacetime, the Secretary of Defense (or designated representative) translates national security policy into military policy. Because the execution of policy routinely contains an informational element and desires behavior favorable to its intent, there is an inherent psychological dimension. During war, policy flows directly from the President, as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the combatant commanders. The combatant commander is responsible for the centralized direction and conduct of PSYOP within the command’s area of responsibility (AOR). **Early and full PSYOP support to the supported commander is critical throughout the crisis action planning process.**

“[Members of the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) of the Joint Task Force (JTF) NOBLE ANVIL] . . . Psychological Operations (PSYOP) played a key role throughout Operation ALLIED FORCE. Your efforts at influencing diverse groups ranging from Serb military and police forces in Kosovo, to the civilian population in Belgrade and in small towns and villages throughout the remainder of Serbia, to Kosovar Albanian refugees in camps in Albania and Macedonia, were truly impressive. Although difficult to measure, I truly believe your efforts had a significant impact on the success of the operation.

During the 78-day air campaign, the JPOTF developed over 40 different leaflets. More than 104.5 million leaflets were dropped throughout Serbia over the course of the campaign.

The JPOTF also produced radio and television programming in Serbian and Albanian which was broadcast by EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft. The format for the program, modeled after National Public Radio's programming, set a high standard for honesty and objectivity and provided a valuable antidote to Serb propaganda. . . .

Your efforts, combined with other elements of the JTF, helped to save lives and to prevail in this conflict."

**J.O. Ellis, Admiral, United States Navy
Commander, Joint Task Force NOBLE ANVIL**

2. Statutes and Policy

Several Presidential Security Directives and Executive Orders apply to PSYOP. Additionally, regulatory guidance pertaining to the conduct of PSYOP is promulgated by the Department of Defense (DOD).

Specific Executive and departmental citations are listed in Appendix C, "References."

3. Treaties and Agreements

Bilateral defense treaties usually have agreements concerning the conduct of PSYOP by the signatories. Use of PSYOP also may be regulated under status-of-forces agreements. A current list of treaties and other international agreements in force is found in Department of State Publication 9434, *Treaties In Force*.

4. Military Psychological Operations

a. PSYOP are an integral part of military operations and, as such, are an inherent responsibility of all military commanders. They have been used throughout history to influence foreign groups and leaders. Modern PSYOP are enhanced by the expansion of mass communications capabilities. Nations may multiply the effects of their military capabilities by communicating directly to their intended targets promises or threats of force or retaliation, conditions of surrender, safe passage for deserters, invitations to sabotage, support to resistance groups, and other messages. The effectiveness of this communication depends on the perception of the communicator's credibility and capability to carry out promises or threatened actions. **It is important not to confuse psychological impact with PSYOP.** Actions such as shows of force or limited strikes may have a psychological impact, but they are not PSYOP unless the primary purpose is to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, decision making, or behavior of the foreign target audience (TA).

TRUTH IS THE BEST PROPAGANDA

“. . . While B-52s rain terror from the skies, an elaborate psychological operation is fighting for the hearts and minds of Afghans, trying to turn them against Osama bin Laden. American armies have used PSYOP [psychological operations] since the Revolutionary War (leaflets were passed out to British soldiers at the battle of Bunker Hill promising free land if they defected). It has a reputation as a black art, the stuff of Tokyo Rose and Nazi propaganda, but today’s psywarriors act more like Madison Avenue ad executives — except they wear combat fatigues and jump out of planes. Four PSYOP specialists, for example, parachuted in with Army Rangers who raided a Taliban compound and air base Oct. 19; they heralded the arrival of US forces by spreading leaflets with the picture of a New York firefighter raising an American flag. Psywarriors have found that ‘the truth is the best propaganda,’ says COL [Colonel] James Treadwell, the 4th [Psychological Operations] Group’s commander. Otherwise, ‘you lose credibility,’ he explains, and the audience tunes out. Leaflets have explained how to use relief food packets and warned civilians to stay away from combat zones. Commando Solo’s broadcasts mix world news stories with sales pitches. A recent show [broadcast], for example, reported on United Nations efforts to organize Taliban opposition groups and ended with the plea: ‘this must happen for there to finally be peace in Afghanistan.’ “

SOURCE: Douglas Waller, *TIME.com*, December 10, 2001

b. **Every activity of the force has psychological implications that may be leveraged in the battle to influence a foreign TA.** If communicated to the potential opponent, such things as the arrival of the force in the operational area, the multinational nature of the force, its combat power, technological sophistication, level of training, and preparation of US and multinational forces can break the adversary’s will to fight.

c. Categories of military PSYOP are shown in Figure I-1.

d. Military PSYOP constitute a systematic process of conveying messages to selected foreign groups to promote particular themes that result in desired foreign attitudes and behaviors. PSYOP are used to establish and reinforce foreign perceptions of US military, political, and economic power and resolve.

5. Policies and Strategies

a. PSYOP in support of **US national policies and strategies** to resolve conflicts, deter hostile action, and attain objectives in crises or open hostilities are designed to influence foreign groups and leaders so that their behaviors and actions will promote the attainment of US national goals.




Figure I-1. Categories of Military Psychological Operations

b. **Strategic-level US Government (USG) departments and agencies** conduct international information activities to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor of US goals and objectives. These activities predominantly take place outside the military arena but can use DOD assets and receive support from military PSYOP forces. **Strategic PSYOP play an important role in theater security cooperation (TSC) agreements** by supporting US country team initiatives such as counterdrug and mine awareness programs.

c. **Operational-level PSYOP** are designed to strengthen US and multinational capabilities to conduct military operations in the operational area and accomplish particular missions across the range of military operations. Along with other military operations, PSYOP may be used independently or as an integral part of other operations throughout the operational area. Operational-level PSYOP also play an important role in supporting military-to-military programs as part of TSC agreements. These initiatives have promoted military professionalization and human rights programs within host nation militaries, as well as many other programs designed to improve civil-military relations.

d. **Tactical-level PSYOP** outline how military force will be employed against opposing forces to attain tactical objectives. PSYOP are conducted as an integral part of multinational, joint, and single-Service operations.

For details concerning PSYOP support to multinational operations, refer to Chapter VI, "Psychological Operations Across the Range of Military Operations."

6. Missions

a. PSYOP units support the joint force commander (JFC) and contribute to all aspects of joint operations by performing the following missions:

(1) **Advising the supported commander** through the targeting process regarding targeting restrictions, psychological actions, and psychological enabling actions to be executed by the military force.

(2) **Influencing foreign populations** by expressing information through selected conduits to influence attitudes and behavior and to obtain compliance or non-interference with friendly military operations.

(3) **Providing public information** to foreign populations to support humanitarian activities, ease suffering, and restore or maintain civil order.

(4) **Serving as the supported commander's voice** to foreign populations by conveying the JFC's intent.

(5) **Countering adversary propaganda**, misinformation, disinformation, and opposing information to correctly portray friendly intent and actions, while denying others the ability to polarize public opinion and affect the political will of the United States and its multinational partners within an operational area.

b. The above missions highlight the fact that PSYOP are a force multiplier and one of the most effective nonlethal weapons available to a JFC.

7. Principles of Joint Psychological Operations

"If you are going to win any battle, you have to do one thing. You have to make the mind run the body. Never let the body tell the mind what to do . . . the body is never tired if the mind is not tired."

General George S. Patton, US Army

a. **PSYOP Methodology.** Although the complexity of the methodology varies with the foreign TAs, basic considerations for development of all PSYOP are the same. **The following are essential to successful PSYOP:**

(1) **PSYOP Core Task.** The PSYOP core task must be clearly defined in terms that correspond to the supported commander's vision of how the campaign or operation will proceed.

(2) **PSYOP Approval Process.** The PSYOP approval process must be clarified in the initial planning, and modified as required to facilitate the process. (See Chapter V, "Psychological Operations Approval Process.")

(3) **Early Planning.** Early planning and employment of PSYOP are critical in maximizing their impact upon the foreign TA.

(4) **PSYOP Themes, Activities, and Symbols.** PSYOP themes, activities, and symbols should be based on a thorough analysis of targets, including friendly and adversary PSYOP capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses.

(5) **Impact of Military Operations.** All military force presence and actions should be thoroughly evaluated for their psychological implications and, where necessary, supported by deliberate PSYOP to offset potentially negative effects and reinforce positive effects.

(6) **Media Selection.** The medium or media selected for transmission or dissemination should be relevant, reliable, and readily accessible by the intended foreign TAs. The potential for adverse environmental consequences should also be weighed as planners select the appropriate medium or media.

(7) **Timeliness.** Timely exploitation of PSYOP themes is critical. The PSYOP process is interactive, the dynamics of which force the executor to perform an action, assess a reaction, and implement an appropriate counteraction. The PSYOP approval process is rooted in DOD policy to ensure adequate oversight of this potential activity. A streamlined and responsive approval process will facilitate the flexibility a commander requires.

(8) **Continuous Assessment.** Where possible, the results of PSYOP should be continually evaluated for relevance to the mission and to national and military goals. As with initial planning actions, decisions to terminate or revise PSYOP programs must be linked to careful analysis of all-source intelligence.

(9) **Measure of Effectiveness.** A PSYOP measure of effectiveness (MOE) provides a systematic means of assessing and reporting the impact a PSYOP program (series of PSYOP products and actions) has on specific foreign TAs. PSYOP MOE, as all MOE, change from mission to mission, and encompass a wide range of factors that are fundamental to the overall effect of PSYOP. PSYOP impact indicators collectively provide an indication of the overall effectiveness of the PSYOP task. Development of MOE and their associated impact indicators (derived from measurable supporting PSYOP objectives) must be done during the planning process. By determining the measure in the



Soldiers erect the antenna of the Special Operations Media System-Broadcast (SOMS-B) capable of providing local radio and television support including editing of radio and audiovisual products.

planning process, PSYOP planners ensure that organic assets and PSYOP enablers, such as intelligence, are identified to assist in evaluating MOEs for the execution of PSYOP. Evaluating the effectiveness of PSYOP may take weeks or longer given the inherent difficulties and complexity of determining cause and effect relationships with respect to human behavior.

b. **Psychological Impact.** The psychological dimension affects those fighting the battle, their military leaders and staffs, the political leaders, and the civilian population. Within the battlespace, **US forces want to face an adversary that is both unsure about its cause and capabilities and sure about its impending defeat** — an adversary who, even if unwilling to surrender, has little will to engage in combat.

“To seduce the enemy’s soldiers from their allegiance and encourage them to surrender is of especial service, for an adversary is more hurt by desertion than by slaughter.”

**Flavius Vegetius Renatus,
The Military Institutions of the Romans, c. 378 AD**

c. **Support Requirements.** Support requirements for successful PSYOP are shown in Figure I-2 and discussed below.

(1) Intelligence Support

(a) **Intelligence.** Intelligence support for military PSYOP requires detailed information concerning the target identity, location, vulnerabilities, accessibility, and the political, economic, social, cultural, religious, and historic conditions within the operational area. Intelligence also supports the detection and analysis of adversary propaganda programs in support of PSYOP counterpropaganda activities. **Collection should be from all available sources and agencies and is based upon thorough mission and requirements planning.** Developing a well-planned collection management architecture ensures that the requisite intelligence is available to support the development of PSYOP.

For further details concerning intelligence support to PSYOP, refer to Chapter VII, “Psychological Operations Enablers.”

(b) **Counterintelligence.** Counterintelligence support for military PSYOP consists of identifying, exploiting, deterring, or neutralizing foreign intelligence service targeting of PSYOP plans, operations, personnel, and equipment, especially at the operational and tactical levels. Upon execution of PSYOP, counterintelligence and human intelligence (HUMINT) operations can provide feedback on its effect.

(2) **Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C4S).** Military C4S are vital to planning, mounting, and sustaining successful joint PSYOP. The Services must design C4S that provide interoperable, rapid, reliable, and secure exchange of information throughout the chain of command.




Figure I-2. Psychological Operations Support Requirements

For further details concerning C4S, refer to Chapter VII, “Psychological Operations Enablers.”

(3) **Logistic Support.** Support of joint PSYOP places unique additional demands on Service and theater logistic systems. **Although the majority of PSYOP sustainment requirements are satisfied by standard Service support systems, PSYOP-specific equipment is generally low-density items requiring careful management.** To ensure continuous sustainment and support of PSYOP, commanders, planners, and logisticians must plan for and coordinate the effective procurement and distribution of operating supplies, repair parts, and major end items for PSYOP-specific equipment. Distribution of these assets to PSYOP forces may pose problems that are dictated by the nature of the operation, the existing transportation infrastructure, and rates of consumption. **Before any PSYOP plan is executed, all aspects of logistic supportability must be considered and coordinated.** Emphasis also should be placed on locating and using equipment and supplies already available in theater; i.e., printing presses and radio and/or television (TV) broadcast transmitters.

For further details concerning logistic support to PSYOP, refer to Chapter VII, “Psychological Operations Enablers.”

8. Psychological Operations Relationships

a. PSYOP Relationship to Public Affairs (PA)

“One cannot wage war under present conditions without the support of public opinion, which is tremendously molded by the press and other forms of propaganda.”

General Douglas MacArthur, US Army

(1) PSYOP are used to influence the attitudes, opinions, and behaviors of foreign TAs in a manner favorable to US objectives.

(2) Military PA are the public information, command/internal information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal audience with interest in the Department of Defense. PA provide accurate and timely information without attempting to influence or sway the audience. As open sources to foreign countries and the United States, PA channels can be used to disseminate international information. **To maintain the credibility of military PA, care must be taken to protect against slanting or manipulating such PA channels.** PA channels can be used to provide facts that will counter foreign propaganda, including disinformation, directed at the United States.

(a) PA operations and activities shall not focus on directing or manipulating public actions or opinion.

(b) PA and PSYOP products should provide a timely flow of information to external and internal audience. **Based on policy, PA and PSYOP must be separate and distinct even though they reinforce each other and involve close cooperation and coordination.** Each function requires distinct efforts to plan, resource, and execute as part of the commander’s operation plan (OPLAN). It is critically important that PA and PSYOP coordinate with each other to maintain credibility with their respective audiences. Therefore, PSYOP representatives should coordinate with command PA offices supporting the joint information bureau and PA representatives present within joint planning organizations such as the joint planning group, operations planning group, or information operations (IO) working group to integrate operational activities while strictly maintaining autonomy.

(c) PA and PSYOP products must be coordinated and deconflicted early in the planning process and during execution. **Although PA and PSYOP generated information may be different, they must not contradict one another or their credibility will be lost.** Although each has specific audiences, information often will overlap between audiences. This overlap makes deconfliction crucial. Under no circumstances will personnel working in PA functions or activities engage in PSYOP activities. Commanders will establish separate agencies and facilities for PA and PSYOP activities, with PA being the commander’s primary contact with the media.

For further details concerning PA, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.

b. **PSYOP Relationship to Military Deception and Operations Security (OPSEC).** PSYOP convey information not only to intended PSYOP foreign TAs but also to foreign intelligence services and their customers. Therefore, PSYOP messages must be coordinated with counterintelligence planners and operators, with military deception planners, and with OPSEC planners to ensure that essential secrecy is realized, counterintelligence operations are not compromised, and messages reinforce the desired outcomes of counterintelligence and deception as well as PSYOP plans. Additionally, PSYOP can be executed to support deception actions or vice versa.

(1) **Military Deception Operations**

(a) **PSYOP normally are directed toward a TA whereas military deception operations normally target specific individuals, i.e., adversary decision makers.** An individual targeted by military deception also may be part of a target group. Groups that might be suitable for targeting by PSYOP in support of military deception include adversary command groups, planning staffs, specific factions within staffs, nonmilitary interest groups who can influence military policies and decisions, and intelligence systems analysts.

(b) PSYOP can magnify the effects of and reinforce military deception plans through the skillful use of associated truths. Dedicated PSYOP dissemination assets can discreetly convey intended information to selected foreign TAs through appropriate “key communicator” back channel networks. PSYOP convey information not only to the intended foreign TAs but also to foreign intelligence systems. This provides the opportunity for mutual support if military deception and PSYOP are carefully coordinated.

(c) PSYOP units plan and conduct counterpropaganda operations that can complement and enhance military deception operations. Counterpropaganda operations are those PSYOP activities that identify adversary propaganda, contribute to situational awareness, and serve to expose adversary attempts to influence friendly populations and military forces.

(2) **Operations Security**

(a) PSYOP integrate with OPSEC to assist in denying critical information about friendly forces to an adversary.

(b) Planning for, preparing for, and conducting PSYOP and psychological actions must be accomplished to maintain essential secrecy for the commander’s intent and to gain and maintain essential secrecy for OPSEC-sensitive PSYOP courses of action (COAs).

For further details concerning military deception and OPSEC, refer to JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, and JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security, respectively.

KEY TERM**INFORMATION OPERATIONS:**

Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called IO.

9. Psychological Operations Integration with Information Operations

a. General

(1) IO exploit the opportunities and vulnerabilities inherent in dependence on information supporting military activities. IO should be conducted in concert with operations conducted by general-purpose military forces to provide a fully integrated warfighting capability. In peacetime, IO support national objectives primarily by influencing foreign perceptions and decision making. In crisis and hostilities, IO can be used as a flexible deterrent option to communicate national interest and demonstrate resolve. In conflict, IO can be applied to achieve physical and psychological results in support of military objectives. IO contribute by taking advantage of information technology, exploiting the growing worldwide dependence upon automated information systems and near real time global dissemination of information, to affect adversary decision cycles with the goal of achieving information superiority.

(2) IO contribute by both defending military decision making from adversary attacks and degrading an adversary's decision-making capability, thereby producing a relative information advantage. IO also contribute by shaping adversary perceptions and behavior.

b. **Core Capabilities.** IO core capabilities are employed by DOD components to influence foreign decision makers or groups while protecting friendly decision making. **PSYOP, military deception, and OPSEC are three core capabilities associated with influencing foreign decision making.** Electronic warfare (EW) and computer network operations (CNO) are concerned with affecting or defending the electromagnetic spectrum, information systems, and information that support decision makers, weapon systems, command and control (C2) and automated responses. Integration of all of these core capabilities is critical to mission accomplishment.

c. Integration

(1) As one of the core capabilities of IO, PSYOP must be integrated with the other IO capabilities providing mutual benefits for both. **PSYOP are used to conduct counterpropaganda,**

induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior to friendly objectives, and discourage support for adversaries and their goals. As an integrated part of the IO plan PSYOP can:

(a) Integrate with IO capabilities by either providing or withholding information for adversary analysis.

(b) Be used to attack adversary legitimacy and credibility.

(c) Build and sustain support among selected foreign TAs.

(d) Shift loyalty of adversary forces.

(e) Help promote the cessation of hostilities.

(f) Undermine adversary confidence.

(g) Persuade isolated and bypassed adversary forces to surrender.

(2) PSYOP are an integrated part of IO through effective analysis of adversary propaganda and information efforts to:

(a) Counter and diminish adversary propaganda efforts.

(b) Discourage adversary offensive operations.

(c) Assist host/foreign nation in providing information and support to its civilian populace.

(d) Reduce or neutralize support of adversary operations.

(e) Reorient or educate the selected foreign TAs in liberated or occupied territory.

(f) Support command information programs.

d. Psychological Operations and the Information Operations Cell

(1) PSYOP is a critical core capability of IO. They are conducted to influence foreign TAs. PSYOP are also an important contributor when conducting interagency coordination for joint operations involving the influence of foreign TAs.

(2) **The coordination of IO elements is critical to successful execution of IO.**

(3) The JFC's staff, which includes the IO cell, develops and promulgates guidance/plans for IO that are passed to the components and supporting organizations and agencies for detailed mission planning and decentralized execution. **The IO cell integrates the broad range**

of potential IO actions and activities that help contribute to the JFC's desired end state in an operational area.

(4) The IO cell is comprised of representatives from each staff element, component, and supporting agency responsible for integrating IO capabilities and related activities.

(a) PSYOP representatives to the IO cell are integral members of the cell.

(b) The duties PSYOP representatives perform in the IO cell are in addition to the ones they perform, for example in a joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF).

(c) **In the IO cell, PSYOP representatives integrate, coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize the use of PSYOP with IO capabilities and related activities.** They also advise and/or recommend on multinational information activities within a JFC's operational area, that may support IO.

(d) It is important to note that these representatives integrate the PSYOP supporting plans with the overall IO strategy.

(e) A PSYOP representative must be prepared, at the direction of the JFC or Director of the Joint Staff, to assume duties as chief of the IO cell.

For further detail concerning IO, refer to JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) S3600.1, Information Operations (IO) (U), and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.01A (S), Joint Information Operations Policy (U).

e. Information Operations Support to a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force

(1) The IO cell supports the JFC's JPOTF by performing the following tasks:

(a) The cell **supports** improved PSYOP product development by obtaining critical personality profiling data and human factor analysis data for PSYOP use and obtains special information not usually available through DOD intelligence systems for PSYOP use upon request. It also can augment dissemination of PSYOP products and programs via non-standard dissemination assets or platforms, and provide responsive access and use of classified and compartmented information and programs for PSYOP forces as required.

(b) The cell **facilitates** PSYOP communications, distribution, and dissemination through joint restricted frequency list deconfliction, frequency spectrum analysis, media analysis, propagation analysis, and modeling, and helps in the facilitation of PSYOP contingency planning by coordinating resources to support the PSYOP scheme of maneuver. Additionally, it facilitates the PSYOP product approval process as part of an IO program and foreign TA polling, post-test analysis, and impact assessment of PSYOP programs, and establishes systems for adversary propaganda collection, reporting, and analysis to facilitate PSYOP counterpropaganda programs.

(c) The cell **coordinates and synchronizes** PSYOP with IO capabilities and related activities and other aspects of joint force operations and assists in the collection and analysis of impact indicators and MOE of PSYOP plans and programs. Furthermore, it assists in coordination and synchronization with strategic information operations, programs, or activities, and helps coordinate PSYOP requirements for support from other government agencies at the strategic level.

(d) The cell **ensures** the integration of PSYOP with military deception, EW, CNO, OPSEC, and related activities of PA and civil-military operations (CMO). The cell also ensures the joint targeting coordination board (JTCCB) supports the JFC PSYOP objectives.

(e) The cell **makes sure** that the JTCCB has the support of PSYOP subject matter experts.

(2) If military potential is to be maximized, PSYOP and IO cannot be conducted in a vacuum; rather, they must be woven into the strategies and operations across the range of military operations to include integrating them with joint, multinational, and interagency operations.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IMPACT

Millions of PSYOP [psychological operations] leaflets were dropped [during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM]; they called on the Iraqis not only to surrender, but also warned them to stay away from their equipment because it was the target of Coalition air strikes. Most leaflets were dropped by MC-130s. F-16s and other aircraft flew several missions a day carrying the MK 129 leaflet container, showering the Iraqi troops with messages and warnings. USMC [United States Marine Corps] A-6s dropped another version of the leaflet in Kuwait. UH-1Ns used loudspeakers and Arab linguists to convince Iraqi soldiers to surrender along the Kuwait border. One leaflet depicted a mosque and a schoolyard, in which Saddam Hussein had liberally interspersed tanks, AAA [antiaircraft artillery] guns, and other military equipment. The message to the Iraqi soldier was that Saddam Hussein was deliberately endangering their religion and families.

The detonation of several 15,000-pound bombs, which were dropped from MC-130 special operations planes, also seemed to have a psychological effect on Iraqi troops. Senior Iraqi officer EPWs [enemy prisoners of war] frequently commented that their troops also were terrified of B-52s, and could clearly see and hear their strikes, even when miles away.

SOURCE: Final Report to Congress
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992

CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

“For a strong adversary (corps) the opposition of twenty-four squadrons and twelve guns ought not to have appeared very serious, but in war the psychological factors are often decisive. An adversary who feels inferior is in reality so.”

Field Marshal Carl Gustav Baron von Mannerheim
The Memoirs of Field Marshal Mannerheim, 1953

1. Responsibilities

The following responsibilities are outlined in DODD S3321.1, *Overt Peacetime Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Contingencies Short of Declared War*:

a. The Secretary of Defense:

- (1) Participates in the establishment of national security policy and objectives.
- (2) Recommends to the President the mobilization of Reserve Components (RC) assets, as necessary, and provides strategic PSYOP advice to USG agencies and allies.

b. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]):

- (1) Approves all PSYOP programs not delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) (ASD [SO/LIC]).
- (2) Delegates product approval and dissemination authority to the appropriate level for peace, contingency, or war.

c. The ASD(SO/LIC):

- (1) Acts as principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and USD(P) on PSYOP matters.
- (2) Represents the Secretary of Defense in interagency forums and coordinates PSYOP policy, plans, and programs with other USG departments and agencies.
- (3) Provides guidance on the planning and conduct of PSYOP activities and their integration into USG activities during peacetime, and more specific guidance for the planning and conduct of these activities across the range of military operations.
- (4) Develops PSYOP policy for the Department of Defense.

(5) Reviews and approves all DOD PSYOP programs delegated by USD(P).

(6) Evaluates the effectiveness of DOD PSYOP programs.

d. **The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)** reviews all DOD PSYOP plans and programs and provides recommendations to the ASD(SO/LIC) on the development of specific PSYOP programs affecting the geographic combatant commanders.

e. **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs** review all DOD PSYOP plans and programs and provide recommendations to the ASD(SO/LIC) on the development of specific PSYOP programs affecting their responsible areas.

f. **The DOD General Counsel** conducts legal reviews of all proposed PSYOP programs.

g. **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:**

(1) Advises the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council on all matters regarding PSYOP forces, capabilities, programs, and tasks.

(2) Represents the Secretary of Defense on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization PSYOP Working Group and in other multinational military forums.

(3) Coordinates and directs the preparation of multinational PSYOP plans and US participation in multinational military PSYOP training programs.

(4) Provides PSYOP representation to the interagency organizations and their working groups.

(5) Provides the general policy and establishes production priorities for the PSYOP Studies Program.

(6) Provides the guidance for PSYOP conducted by the combatant commanders.

(7) Prepares strategic plans and issues policy for the use of military PSYOP across the range of military operations.

(8) Reviews the PSYOP plans and programs of the combatant commanders to ensure they are adequate, feasible, and consistent with USG and DOD policy.

(9) Provides PSYOP plans and programs to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for review and approval.

(10) Reviews the peacetime psychological operations plans and programs of the combatant commanders.

(11) Establishes in conjunction with the Commander, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) joint doctrine for PSYOP.

(12) Provides a joint, prioritized statement of military requirements for PSYOP capabilities to meet the needs of the Secretary of Defense, the Service Chiefs, combatant commanders, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(13) Provides an integrated statement of joint PSYOP training requirements and ensures that these requirements are appropriately addressed.

(14) Apportions PSYOP forces to the combatant commands through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

(15) Prepares integrated logistic and mobilization guidance for PSYOP capabilities.

(16) Provides a unified, prioritized list of PSYOP intelligence and counterintelligence requirements to meet the needs of the combatant commanders, Joint Staff, and Services.

(17) Ensures integration of PSYOP activities into the CJCS Exercise Program and Joint Experimentation Program.

(18) Incorporates PSYOP instruction into joint professional military education programs.

(19) Ensures integration of PSYOP activities into military planning for TSC activities, contingency operations, and war.

(20) Ensures integration of PSYOP activities into the preparation and review of joint OPLANs that conform to policy guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense.

h. Geographic combatant commanders have the following responsibilities in addition to those listed in Annex D, JSCP and those listed for all military commanders:

(1) Designate specific staff responsibility for maintaining a PSYOP planning element, coordinating PSYOP actions, and ensuring that regional plans, activities, and operations support national psychological objectives.

(2) Develop intelligence and counterintelligence requirements necessary to perform PSYOP analysis, planning, and execution.

(3) Plan, support, and conduct in peacetime and during conflict PSYOP activities in support of theater military missions and US national and regional objectives. Peacetime PSYOP must be coordinated with the chiefs of US Diplomatic Missions within the combatant commander's geographic AOR.

(4) Prepare PSYOP plans and, upon approval, conduct theater PSYOP to support the execution of operations.

(5) Foster cooperative PSYOP policies among multinational military forces and regional security organizations.

(6) Ensure advance contingency planning for use of non-DOD informational and related capabilities in DOD PSYOP.

(7) Establish a PSYOP reporting system to provide relevant information about PSYOP adversary activity, apparent impact of friendly PSYOP activities, and any anticipated changes to ongoing PSYOP activities.

(8) Integrates PSYOP activities into the preparation and review of joint OPLANs.

i. **Combatant Commanders (less Commander, USSOCOM)** have the following responsibilities in addition to those listed for all military commanders:

(1) Ensure that staffs and organizations within their commands have sufficient representation and working proficiency in the planning and conduct of joint PSYOP. This includes requesting liaison officers from other USG agencies when appropriate.

(2) Develop plans and programs, in coordination with the Joint Staff and the USSOCOM, to support PSYOP requirements identified by supported geographic combatant commanders, and develop and submit to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff additional PSYOP requirements necessary to support geographic combatant commanders.

(3) When directed by the Secretary of Defense, accept the attachment of PSYOP forces from the Commander, USSOCOM. Employ these forces as directed.

j. **Commander, USSOCOM.** The Commander, USSOCOM's responsibilities for the development of strategy, doctrine, and tactics for joint PSYOP are interrelated with those of the Service Chiefs. **The Commander, USSOCOM exercises combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of all active and reserve US Army PSYOP forces.** The Commander, USSOCOM has the following responsibilities in addition to those detailed in Annex D, JSCP:

(1) Prepares program and budget to fund approved PSYOP programs. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Commander, USSOCOM coordinates with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Chiefs, and the other combatant commanders to ensure that all PSYOP and support requirements are addressed.

(2) Provides trained and ready PSYOP forces to support the Secretary of Defense and the other combatant commanders with strategic, operational, and tactical PSYOP support.

(3) Acts as CJCS Executive Agent for the programming, training, and equipping of joint PSYOP forces.

(4) Prepares and provides assigned PSYOP forces to the other combatant commanders, when directed by the Secretary of Defense.

(5) Supports the other combatant commanders' PSYOP requirements.

(6) Provides the special operations (SO)-peculiar resources necessary to sustain the forces, capabilities, and support programs. This includes identification of PSYOP future concepts, technology development, and acquisition of PSYOP systems.

(7) Provides training to foreign military personnel, when directed.

(8) Recommends PSYOP policy guidance to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Chiefs, and US military commanders, as required.

(9) Validates and develops priorities for PSYOP training, intelligence, and military requirements and provides these to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support Service, combatant command, and Joint Staff responsibilities as they relate to PSYOP.

(10) Provides visibility of PSYOP issues, activities, tasks, and capabilities to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Chiefs, and commanders at other US military command levels.

(11) Coordinates with the Commander, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to integrate PSYOP activities into joint training and experimentation plans and programs.

(12) Acts as the lead agent for joint PSYOP doctrine development.

(13) Develops PSYOP concepts to support national security objectives, reviews Service PSYOP doctrine development for consistency with joint doctrine, and ensures that joint and Service PSYOP training supports national objectives.

(14) Participates with assigned PSYOP forces in CJCS and combatant command exercises to develop joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for PSYOP forces.

(15) Manages the PSYOP Studies Program and coordinates PSYOP input to the Defense Intelligence Production schedule.

(16) Ensures that PSYOP forces are trained to plan and conduct PSYOP in regions to which they are apportioned.

(17) Provides for employment of RC PSYOP forces in planning, developing concepts, and participating in joint training exercises and contingency operations.

(18) Coordinates with the Service Chiefs for planning and providing combat support, combat service support, and sustainment of PSYOP forces assigned to the other combatant commanders for conduct of PSYOP.

k. The Military Departments and Services:

(1) Provide civilian and military personnel with appropriate PSYOP training and planning skills.

(2) Provide capabilities organic to Service forces to execute PSYOP actions and dedicated PSYOP forces and equipment.

(3) Develop Service PSYOP doctrine relating to the primary functions assigned to the particular Service.

(4) Provide PSYOP forces or detachments (not assigned to the Commander, USSOCOM) to combatant commanders for service in foreign countries.

(5) Provide departmental intelligence and counterintelligence assets that are trained, equipped, and organized to support planning and conduct PSYOP.

(6) Incorporate PSYOP instruction into Service training and education programs.

For further detail concerning Service PSYOP capabilities, refer to Appendix A, “Department of Defense Psychological Operations Capabilities.”

l. The Chief of Staff, US Army, in addition to responsibilities delineated as Chief of a Service, trains foreign personnel in PSYOP, when required.

m. Joint task force (JTF) commanders have the following responsibilities in addition to those listed for all military commanders:

(1) Coordinate all JTF PSYOP efforts with appropriate US and multinational authorities in the joint operations area, and incorporate PSYOP in JTF plans.

(2) Maintain up-to-date PSYOP estimates for designated operational areas.

(3) Monitor and review component PSYOP plans, including coordination of the development of appropriate PSYOP force capability.

(4) When directed, accept the attachment of and employ PSYOP forces from the combatant commander.

n. **The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency:**

(1) Establishes and implements a plan to satisfy PSYOP intelligence and counterintelligence requirements.

(2) Assists in the preparation of PSYOP intelligence and counterintelligence estimates and appraisals of foreign groups designated by USD(P), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Chiefs, Commander, USSOCOM, and other combatant commanders.

(3) Provides PSYOP training for intelligence analysts to ensure a capability to respond to intelligence production requirements in support of PSYOP programs.

(4) Recommends PSYOP opportunities in support of US policy.

(5) Provides indications of potential vulnerability to hostile PSYOP or foreign intelligence services.

o. **The Director, Defense Information Systems Agency** provides computer systems support of the PSYOP automated system (POAS) and will support the communications and information systems requirements for the transmission of PSYOP products from the continental United States (CONUS) production facilities to overseas PSYOP forces.

p. **The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service**, provides intelligence information to satisfy intelligence collection requirements.

q. **All military commanders**, when appropriate:

(1) Include PSYOP planning in the preparation of plans for all military actions across the range of military operations.

(2) Consider the psychological effects and implications of all COAs during joint operation planning.

(3) Include PSYOP forces in the planning and conduct of all military exercises.

2. **United States Forces Commanders Serving in Multinational Commands**

a. Implement multinational PSYOP plans to the extent consistent with international law, including the law of armed conflict, and treaty obligations in relations with the government and civilian population of countries where US forces are assigned.

b. Request guidance from the Secretary of Defense on implementation of multinational policies and objectives, as appropriate.

c. Coordinate joint PSYOP planning with appropriate multinational commanders and national forces of host countries.

For further details concerning multinational operations, refer to Chapter VI, “Psychological Operations Across the Range of Military Operations.”

3. Other United States Government Agencies

a. During peacetime, the Department of State provides overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas. In peacetime operations or in conflict, the Department of State may restrict PSYOP messages and themes used within specific countries or areas.

b. The Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Department of Treasury, Department of Justice, and other agencies impacted by military PSYOP, including peacetime PSYOP activities, may review plans to ensure consistency of effort.



Reachback, support near real time video, audio, and data over the Ethernet from Ft. Bragg to a SOMS-B site at Bagram, Afghanistan provided through JITI and DVDS transmission.

CHAPTER III COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

“As the excited passions of hostile people are of themselves a powerful enemy, both the general and his government should use their best efforts to allay them.”

Lieutenant General Antoine-Henri Baron de Jomini
Summary of the Art of War, 1838

1. General

a. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Commander, USSOCOM exercises COCOM over all assigned military PSYOP forces. **When directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Commander, USSOCOM transfers PSYOP forces to geographic combatant commanders. When these forces are transferred, the command relationship of the gaining commander (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified; in most cases that will be operational control (OPCON).** Upon transfer of those forces, combatant commander responsibilities commence as described in Figure III-1.

b. Because of the strategic and operational importance of the PSYOP contribution to the combatant commander’s strategic concept, centralized planning of PSYOP should be focused at that level. Likewise, when the combatant commander activates a subordinate joint force, PSYOP planners should be on the subordinate JFC’s staff. The supported combatant commander may obtain, through the Secretary of Defense, required PSYOP forces in the same manner that other forces are obtained.




Figure III-1. Combatant Commander Responsibilities

c. PSYOP forces, organized as a joint PSYOP task force, normally serve as a subordinate joint command of a joint force. **The JPOTF exercises C2 of those PSYOP forces assigned, attached, or in support from the Services components and, when applicable, from other nations.** Further, although tactical PSYOP units are usually assigned to maneuver commanders, the JPOTF normally has coordinating authority with tactical forces for developing, producing, and disseminating PSYOP products. This procedure allows PSYOP forces to meet the maneuver commander's requirements more effectively, while ensuring continuity with the objectives and intent of the combatant commander, or JTF commander. The JPOTF works closely with the US country team, other USG officials, allies and coalition officials, and international organizations. Finally, it coordinates strategic-level PSYOP requirements with the combatant commander.

d. **The combatant commander may attach PSYOP forces to a subordinate joint force commander, normally a JPOTF or joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander.** This prevents the development of conflicting PSYOP programs and messages, and facilitates a more rapid approval process and product responsiveness. PSYOP planners will identify foreign TAs and PSYOP objectives, themes, symbols, activities, and products that support the JFC's campaign plan. PSYOP have significant impact on the JFC objectives as they involve the need to mobilize the civilian population, while simultaneously isolating the adversary, taking away its ability to muster popular support. Subordinate commanders will identify requirements for PSYOP forces to the JFC. Depending on mission requirements, PSYOP staff support may be provided to the commander of a subunified command, JTF, or component command to enhance planning and coordinating capability.

2. Organizing Psychological Operations Forces

a. **The scale of operations generally will dictate the organization of PSYOP forces.** This organization will vary with the nature of the mission, availability and operational requirements; and the supported commander's assessment of the PSYOP mission requirements.

b. As a crisis begins to develop, **one of the first elements deployed to a supported commander is the PSYOP assessment team (POAT).** The POAT provides staff support to the operations directorate (J-3) of the joint force. This small, tailored team (approximately 4-12 personnel) should consist of PSYOP distribution/dissemination and logistic planners, capable of assessing the needs and requirements for a JPOTF. It should deploy with organic communications and vehicles. The POAT assesses the situation, confers with the commander, develops the PSYOP objectives, and recommends an appropriate combination of personnel, equipment, and support provided by Service components to accomplish the mission. If the POAT can accomplish necessary planning and assist commanders in executing PSYOP activities, no further PSYOP forces are likely to be required. The POAT also coordinates with other USG agencies with related missions.

c. If the POAT assesses that significant PSYOP forces are required to support the JFC objectives, the POAT recommends to the JFC that a JPOTF or PSYOP support element (PSE) be established.

(1) The decision on whether or not to activate a JPOTF is determined by the following factors:

(a) Requirement for C2 of PSYOP product production elements in the operational area.

(b) Geographical size of the operational area requires dispersed operations.

(c) Number and types of supported units exceed the capability of a PSE to advise and assist.

(d) Number and types of PSYOP units and/or assets to be coordinated exceed the C2 capability of a PSE.

(2) **A PSE is a tailored element that can provide limited PSYOP.** PSEs do not contain organic C2 capability; therefore, command relationships must be clearly defined. The size, composition, and capability of the PSE are determined by the requirements of the supported commander. A PSE is not designed to provide full-spectrum PSYOP capability; reachback is critical for its mission success.

(3) The regional PSYOP battalion normally provides C2 assets and product development capability. The regionally oriented battalion is augmented by production assets (audio-visual studios, printing presses, and other related equipment), and dissemination assets (radio stations and radios, TV stations and TVs, tactical PSYOP teams [loudspeakers]), including RC, enemy prisoner of war (EPW)/civilian internee (CI)/dislocated civilian (DC), and tactical units, as required.

(4) Retention of OPCON of the JPOTF by the JFC and integration of its functions into the J-3 structure optimizes interaction with other operational activities and streamlines the approval and oversight process (see Figure III-2). Because all products used throughout the joint force must be consistent, they are developed in one product development cell. Retaining OPCON at the joint force headquarters allows the most effective use of scarce PSYOP-trained personnel and linguists while ensuring access of PSYOP products to all subordinate commands.

(5) Tactical dissemination assets, primarily tactical PSYOP teams and liaison teams, may be attached in CONUS to deploying units, attached in theater based on mission requirements, or deployed with the JPOTF and remain in support of the entire joint force. When attached to a maneuver unit, tactical PSYOP forces normally are placed under the OPCON of the maneuver unit commander.

(6) Factors that will affect the size and composition of the PSYOP force include, but are not limited to, the following:

(a) Scope and duration of the PSYOP objectives.




Figure III-2. Joint Force Organizational Options

(b) Requirements for liaison and coordination with other USG and host nation (HN) agencies.

(c) Requirements for sustaining and coordinating with supported units.

(d) Policy, funding, and foreign or HN sensitivities and their effect on other combatant command and supporting component objectives.

(e) Foreign intelligence and security service threats emanating from within the host country or from the target country.

d. **The senior PSYOP officer in the operational area, normally the JPOTF commander, also may serve as the de facto joint force PSYOP officer.** If the situation can be handled by augmenting the JFC's staff, the joint force PSYOP officer will ensure that component staffs are aware of the PSYOP products available. Working through the various component operations staffs, the joint force PSYOP officer will ensure continuity of psychological objectives, and themes to stress and avoid.



EC-130E COMMANDO SOLO from the 193rd Special Operations Wing, Pennsylvania Air National Guard, supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

e. When deployed in support of joint force operations, COMMANDO SOLO normally remains under the OPCON of the commander, JSOTF while the Navy's transportable amplitude modulation (AM) and frequency modulation (FM) radio broadcast system (TARBS) normally remains under the OPCON of the Navy component commander. Coordinating authority is granted between the COMMANDO SOLO element, the TARBS element, and the JPOTF to facilitate PSYOP dissemination.

“ . . . PSYOP [psychological operations] and COMMANDO SOLO. We have an EC-130 aircraft that is rigged out as a broadcasting studio. And it broadcasts — . . . we were broadcasting in Afghanti — in the various languages with Afghan music intermittently to put on a five-hour radio program covering all of Afghanistan in theater. We were running two five-hour broadcasts per day out of this aircraft, short wave and AM. The leaflet drops — . . . from 14 October to 21 October, the B-52s, which obviously dropped other things, dropped over 10 million leaflets across Afghanistan. And our MC-130s also were dropping leaflets there. The 4th PSYOP Group [Airborne] that you mentioned is down at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and it's a very unique operation of video, graphics arts, printed media, some very good professionals down there that work on the PSYOP themes that are approved here at national policy, at the State Department, et cetera.”

**Mr. Robert Andrews, Principal Duty Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict)
Defense LINK News Transcript, December 12, 2001**

f. During full mobilization, the entire US military PSYOP capability becomes available for employment by the supported combatant commander. PSYOP units apportioned for theater planning purposes and available for employment are identified in Annex D to the JSCP.

g. Operations may require use of RC PSYOP forces. **Early identification of PSYOP requirements is necessary to facilitate RC activation, processing, and training.** Required

RC PSYOP forces must be included in the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), along with Active Component (AC) PSYOP forces; otherwise, data essential for Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) will not be available and deployment of forces required for the operations may be delayed.

h. The high demand for PSYOP forces to support worldwide operations make reachback a critical component for PSYOP success. Reachback assets must be considered whenever planning is conducted to minimize transportation requirements and provide flexibility to support future operations. Improvements in technology will continue to increase the ability of PSYOP to support multiple geographic areas with limited assets.

For further details concerning JOPES, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures), and CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance).

CHAPTER IV

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLANNING IN SUPPORT OF THE JOINT FORCE CAMPAIGN

“The real target in war is the mind of the enemy command, not the bodies of his troops. If we operate against his troops it is fundamentally for the effect that action will produce on the mind and will of the commander; indeed, the trend of warfare and the development of new weapons — aircraft and tanks — promise to give us increased and more direct opportunities of striking at this psychological target.”

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart
Thoughts on War, 1944

1. Objectives of Joint Psychological Operations

a. **General.** The campaign planning process represents the art of linking major operations, battles, and engagements in an operational design to accomplish theater strategic objectives. Combatant commanders translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. These plans represent their strategic view of related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives. Campaign planning can begin before or during deliberate planning, but it is not completed until after crisis action planning, thus combining both planning processes. **PSYOP are involved in all three types of planning processes for joint operations: campaign, deliberate, and crisis action.** Experience has repeatedly demonstrated that PSYOP planners must be involved throughout the planning process and that bringing PSYOP in early to the process can significantly improve the PSYOP contribution to the overall operation.

b. The general objectives of joint PSYOP are shown in Figure IV-1.

2. Planning Skills

To plan for the effective employment of PSYOP, JFCs and their staffs must possess a thorough knowledge of national security policy and objectives, as well as national and theater military objectives. In addition, PSYOP planners must possess joint operation-planning skills, with knowledge of PSYOP doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and force structure; and a thorough understanding of the customs, mores, and values of the foreign TA. They must be able to develop three distinct types of documents: military plans and orders that synchronize the activities of military units; develop operations of persuasion that cause selected foreign TAs to behave in ways that support the commander’s objectives; and an external information plan or proposal to clarify information, synchronize military PSYOP with national information programs, and leverage national resources to facilitate the actions of the supported commander. They must be able to explain how other IO capabilities and related activities support PSYOP.



Figure IV-1. Joint Psychological Operations General Objectives

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

On 10 June 1999, NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] suspended the air campaign following confirmation that the full withdrawal of Yugoslavian security forces from Kosovo had begun. NATO had prevailed in its first protracted endeavor outside the shadows of the Cold War. Psychological operations [PSYOP] had proven to play a key role in setting the conditions for this victory.

During the 78-day bombing campaign, a total of 104.5 million leaflets were dropped over Belgrade, Kosovo and other major urban and rural areas throughout the country. The thousands of Yugoslav Federal Army (VJ) soldiers within Kosovo, as well as the civilian population throughout Serbia, were routinely targeted by PSYOP products. In addition to the millions of leaflets dropped, thousands of posters, handbills and newspapers were also produced by tactical PSYOP forces in Albania. From the refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia to the citizens of Belgrade and Kosovo, PSYOP products were widely disseminated to inform and influence the Serbian and Kosovar Albanian populations.

In addition to the printed products created to support Operation ALLIED FORCE, daily radio and television programs were broadcast from 1 April until the final broadcast on 27 June 1999. NATO's Allied Voice Radio and Television brought current world news and information about the situation in Kosovo to listeners throughout Yugoslavia. In areas where national media assets had been destroyed, and particularly in the face of heavily censored, state-run media, Allied Voice Radio and Television provided the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) with a powerful communications asset to reach the Yugoslav people.

Additionally, the production of the daily radio and television program was a significant accomplishment for the soldiers of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne). The success of the Reachback concept permitted the program to be written, translated, and recorded at Fort Bragg, then sent forward via secure communications to Germany where it was assembled into a 60-minute or 90-minute broadcast. Daily Allied Voice Radio and Television programs, which aired less than 24 hours after recording at Fort Bragg, validated the Reachback concept and demonstrated the responsiveness and advanced capabilities of PSYOP.

. . . the contributions of PSYOP during the war in Kosovo made one thing clear: PSYOP will continue to be a weapon of first choice as a combat and diplomatic multiplier and a combat reducer for future military operations.

**SOURCE: Psychological Operations Support
to Operation ALLIED FORCE**

3. Psychological Operations Concepts

"If we do go to war, psychological operations are going to be absolutely a critical, critical part of any campaign that we must get involved in."

**General H. Norman Schwarzkopf III
Commander in Chief, US Central Command, 1988 to 1991
Operation DESERT SHIELD**

Effective use of PSYOP increases the potential for operational success. As plans are developed the following concepts must be kept in mind:

a. **Persuasive Communications.** All communications that systemically convey information with the intent of affecting the perceptions and behaviors of the foreign TA are persuasive communications. These communications will interact with individual beliefs to change or reinforce attitudes and behaviors.

b. **Command Disruption.** Disruption of C4S not only directly interferes with the capabilities of an adversary to succeed in combat but also can have serious impact upon the morale, cohesion, discipline, and public support essential to efficient operations.

c. **Counterinformation.** Competing parties systematically can deny opponents information they require to formulate decisions. The DOD Information Security Program establishes procedures to protect classified information, and the OPSEC program establishes measures to deny unclassified but sensitive indicators of friendly activities, capabilities, and intentions.

d. **Intelligence Shaping.** It is possible to systematically convey or deny data to opposing intelligence systems with the objective of causing opposing analysts to derive desired judgments. These judgments interact with the perceptions of opposing planners and decision makers to influence estimates upon which capabilities, intentions, and actions are based.

4. Psychological Operations Functions

*“U.S. planes are dropping leaflets as well as bombs and humanitarian rations over Afghanistan in hopes of winning support inside the country for its anti-terrorist campaign, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said Monday. ‘We’re working to make clear to the Afghan people that we support them, and we’re working to free them from the Taliban and their foreign terrorist allies,’ Rumsfeld said. In addition, he said, the United States has begun broadcasting its message to people on the ground, he said, but said U.S. planes were not yet dropping radios to help them hear the message. ‘The partnership of nations is here to assist the people of Afghanistan,’ the leaflets said. They are accompanied by a photo of a Western soldier shaking hands with an Afghan civilian. Another leaflet lists the frequencies on which U.S. broadcasts can be heard and broadcast times.” [See Figure IV-2, The leaflets were not produced in English. The English examples are used in the figure for clarity and understanding by the users of JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*.]*

CNN.com, *War Against Terror*, 15 October 2001

a. **The overall function of PSYOP is to cause selected foreign audiences to take actions favorable to the objectives of the United States and its allies or coalition partners.** PSYOP forces are the only DOD asset given the authority to influence foreign TAs directly through the use of radio, print, and other media. PSYOP personnel specifically advise the supported commander on methods to capitalize on the psychological impacts of every aspect of force employment to achieve the overall campaign objectives. Their duties are wide-ranging but include, as a minimum, advising on the psychological impacts of planned operations, and the identification of foreign TAs and any psychological weaknesses. PSYOP staff officers assist in integrating and coordinating psychological activities to ensure unity of effort and thematic consistency within the operational area. **PSYOP officers often can provide input most effectively by participating in the targeting process through the JTCB of the supported combatant command or JTF.** At the JTCB, members discuss target priorities, recommend engagement methods and timings, discuss consequences and collateral damage issues, and recommend approval or disapproval for decision. Although the time frame is operationally dependent, the doctrinal tasks or functions of PSYOP units are enduring. PSYOP units have functions that must be considered, regardless of mission, level of conflict, range of military operations, or situation. The following paragraphs explain each function.




Figure IV-2. Examples of United States Psychological Operations Leaflets Produced and Disseminated in Afghanistan in Support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

b. **Provide Command and Control for Psychological Operations.** A PSYOP commander performs C2 functions by arranging personnel, equipment, communications, computers, facilities, and procedures when planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling PSYOP forces and operations. **PSYOP C2 always is austere and the commander uses the resources of the supported command to the maximum extent possible.** The intelligence function is inherent to C2 but unique in PSYOP. PSYOP forces possess limited capabilities to collect, process, integrate, analyze, evaluate, and interpret PSYOP-relevant intelligence information for PSYOP

forces and for use by supported geographic combatant commands, JTFs, component commands, other government agencies, and other intelligence organizations.

c. **Develop Psychological Operations Programs and Products.** PSYOP development includes the planning of a PSYOP program, the development of prototype information products, and the recommendation of PSYOP actions to be executed by other forces to communicate and ultimately influence the beliefs of foreign populations, thereby changing behavior. Programs primarily are developed at the PSYOP development center of the JPOTF, and at the tactical PSYOP development detachment of a tactical PSYOP company when deployed in support of a ground maneuver force. This function consists of detailed planning of informational activities, studying targeted foreign populations, constructing informational prototypes, and testing and evaluating of these informational prototypes before and after dissemination to measure and improve effectiveness.

d. **Produce Psychological Operations Media.** PSYOP production is the transformation of products into media that are compatible with the way foreign populations are accustomed to receiving information. Production is not just the technological transfer of script to media, but the study, refinement, and application of media technique, language, journalistic style, theater, art, music, visual cues, and media format. Most PSYOP production occurs at the media production center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the theater media production center deployed forward into the operational area, or forward with PSYOP units. Some production requirements may be



Leaflet rolls being packed at Fort Bragg, NC for loading on to PDU-5/B leaflet bombs that eventually will be dropped in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

contracted to private industry, while still other production requirements may be done by units attached to the PSYOP force. The production function includes the use of video, audio, and still photographic personnel to obtain visual and auditory material required for the prototypical products.

e. **Distribute Psychological Operations Information.** PSYOP distribution is the physical and electronic linkage of developers, producers, and disseminators, in order to facilitate the development, production, and dissemination of PSYOP informational products and programs. Telecommunications networks may be established using organic PSYOP equipment and forces, commercial assets, and other Service component resources to transfer large data files globally.

f. **Disseminate Psychological Operations Messages.** PSYOP dissemination involves transmitting PSYOP informational products directly to the foreign TA, via desired media. PSYOP messages may be disseminated via the organic resources of PSYOP forces, by other governmental agencies, by contracted sources of media, by multinational partners, or through airborne and seaborne platforms supporting PSYOP. PSYOP dissemination forces will attempt to leverage as many different media as possible to ensure access to the foreign TA.

g. **Employ Tactical Psychological Operations.** Tactical PSYOP forces with augmentation of product development and/or dissemination assets are capable of providing all functions of PSYOP, on a limited scale, to Service and functional component commands. This force provides face-to-face communications with foreign populations. Tactical forces serve as an ideal tool for the commander to resolve issues of armed resistance and local interference to military operations, while encouraging dialogue and cooperation with noncombatants. They also are trained to collect pertinent PSYOP-related intelligence information for use by the supported commander and PSYOP developers.

h. **Conduct EPW, CI, and DC Operations.** In virtually all situations of crisis proportion where military forces are used, the management of EPWs, CIs, and DCs will become an integral part of military operations. Military forces conducting these operations understand they usually are handling, and to a large extent controlling, the lives of people who are demoralized, desperate, apprehensive, and distrustful. These emotions can create a volatile atmosphere that is dangerous to the military force and those civilian noncombatants and EPWs being managed, handled, or interned. This function of PSYOP is used to dispel rumors, create dialogue, and pacify or indoctrinate EPWs, CIs, or DCs to minimize violence, facilitate efficient camp operations, and ensure safe and humanitarian conditions persist. PSYOP forces also may use this function to facilitate other PSYOP tasks. These tasks include testing informational PSYOP materials, assessing the culture of potential audiences, collecting intelligence, and recruiting key communicators, informants, and collaborators.

5. Planning Guidance

Specific joint PSYOP guidance and planning considerations are shown in Figure IV-3.

SPECIFIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GUIDANCE AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

- Convey to the target audience an awareness of US resolve to attain national security objectives
- Consider and plan for the early conduct of military psychological operations (PSYOP) and, if required, use of host-nation resources and non-PSYOP military assets for media production and dissemination; e.g., use of Navy ship printing facilities for production of PSYOP products
- Plan the movement of PSYOP specific equipment
- Integrate PSYOP measures into counter command and control plans
- Assist multinational military and/or civilian governmental organizations in developing coordinated PSYOP programs
- Use host-nation and US Country Teams to gain local support
- Deter and discourage would-be aggressors from threatening vital US interests
- Include the use of the Psychological Operations Automated System
- Maintain the capability to accomplish US-only objectives when PSYOP forces and capabilities are provided to multinational commands
- Consider the effects of terrain, weather, and a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment on forces, equipment, and the planned method for dissemination of PSYOP products
- Ensure comprehensive coordination of plans with emphasis on those staff elements or agencies that generate information, such as the public affairs officer, so all information activities are concordant
- Integrate tactical exploitation of national capabilities and assets before and during mission execution
- Establish a PSYOP reporting system to provide relevant information about:
 1. Adversary PSYOP activity
 2. The apparent impact of friendly PSYOP activities
 3. Any anticipated changes to ongoing activities
- Consider preparation of PSYOP to counter the effects of an adversary's psychological warfare effort before, during, and after US military combat operations

Figure IV-3. Specific Psychological Operations Guidance and Planning Considerations

6. Psychological Operations Support to Joint Force Campaign Phasing

a. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, states that phasing operations are a tool commonly used by commanders to organize operations. **Phasing assists commanders and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements**

in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in achieving major objectives that cannot be attained all at once, by planning manageable subordinate operations. Although the commander will determine the actual phases used during a campaign, use of the following phases provides a flexible model to arrange the full spectrum of operations. The notional example at Figure IV-4 reflects phases a combatant commander can use while planning and conducting a campaign in support of strategic and operational goals and objectives. As stated in Chapter I, “Psychological Operations: An Overview,” there are five missions in which PSYOP units contribute to all aspects of joint operations.

b. It is important that PSYOP planning is aggressively integrated early into commanders’ plans. This ensures force integration and synchronization of activities.

(1) To remain effective, commanders must continually adjust PSYOP as the battle damage assessment of programs is accomplished. Successful integration of planned PSYOP activities (e.g., TV/radio broadcasts, leaflet drops, and loudspeaker broadcasts) and diplomatic, informational, military, or economic activities enables commanders to shape the psychological environment of an operational area.

(2) PSYOP planners must be able to develop three distinct types of documents. First, they must be able to develop plans and orders that synchronize the activities of military units. Second, they must develop activities that persuade selected foreign TAs to behave in ways that support the commander’s objectives. Third, they must develop an external information plan or proposal to clarify information,




Figure IV-4. Phases — Joint Campaign

synchronize military PSYOP with national information programs, and employ national resources to facilitate the actions of commanders.

c. **Deter and Engage Phase.** This phase may be for deterring aggression or taking action against threats to national or multinational interests, possibly requiring mobilization and other predeployment activities. During this phase, the combatant commander expands partnerships, enhances relationships, and conducts actions to prepare for potential crises. **Flexible deterrent options may be initiated in this phase supported by PSYOP as part of pre-hostility activities.**

(1) PSYOP forces are key contributors to shaping the international security environment and reacting to events. PSYOP can be executed aggressively and offensively in support of all the instruments of national power.

(2) PSYOP are crafted to meet a unique set of circumstances with appropriate themes and messages.

(a) PSYOP planning and execution actions are applied to influence the behavior of foreign TAs.

(b) PSYOP planning, foreign TA analysis, product development and dissemination, and test and evaluation are conducted during this phase in the same manner for both MOOTW and war.

d. **Seize Initiative Phase.** JFCs seek to seize the initiative in all situations through the application of appropriate joint force capabilities. In combat operations this involves executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, defeating the adversary and setting the conditions for decisive operations. In noncombat operations, the JFC establishes conditions for stability by providing immediate assistance to relieve the conditions that precipitated the crisis.

(1) During the seize initiative phase, the objectives of PSYOP forces are:

(a) Deploy a PSYOP force tailored to mission requirements with the capability to dominate the information environment early.

(b) Advise the commander on supporting psychological actions throughout the operation.

(c) Create and exploit opportunities.

(d) Clearly communicate multinational and US intent.

(e) Develop the situation by forcing the adversary to react by seizing the initiative on the “information front.”

(f) Advise and contribute in the influence over factions in the operational area.

(g) Establish conditions conducive to political solutions by defusing/reducing factional tensions, recognizing and preempting inherent dangers, and disrupting illegal activities.

(2) Retaining the initiative requires planning beyond the initial operation and anticipating possible events. Follow-on forces are tailored to meet specific concerns of the long-term mission. Initiative requires delegating decision-making authority to the lowest practical level.

e. **Decisive Operations Phase.** The decisive operations phase continues with full spectrum employment of joint force capabilities and the appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area as quickly as possible. This phase focuses on defeating the adversary and achieving the objectives. The JFC seeks to dominate the situation with decisive operations designed to establish conditions for an early, favorable conclusion, setting the conditions for the transition phase.

(1) During the decisive operations phase, the objectives of PSYOP forces are as follows:

(a) Work to gather popular support for US and multinational operations.

(b) Establish the legitimacy and credibility of US and multinational systems and programs.

(c) Weaken the legitimacy and credibility of an adversary's systems and programs.

(d) Lessen external support for an adversary — political, military, fiscal, human, and informational.

(e) Weaken the loyalty of adversaries.

(f) Deter interference with US and multinational operations.

(g) Promote cessation of hostilities to reduce casualties, minimize collateral damage, and hasten a transition to post-conflict operations.

(2) PSYOP forces must evaluate their actions as they occur and continuously assess their results.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Planning for psychological operations [PSYOP] began immediately after the [Iraqi] invasion of Kuwait [Operation DESERT SHIELD]. A PSYOP planning group consisting of military and civilian personnel from CENTCOM [US Central Command], SOCOM [US Special Operations Command], and the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) was formed at CENTCOM Headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, FL, in early August of 1990. This group became the nucleus of the PSYOP command and control element that deployed to Saudi Arabia.

Leaflet, radio, and loudspeaker operations were combined and this combination was key to the success of PSYOP. Leaflets were the most commonly used method of conveying PSYOP messages. Twenty-nine million leaflets consisting of 33 different messages were disseminated in the Kuwait theater of operations. Delivery means consisted of MC-130, HC-130, A-6, F-16, B-52, and artillery.

A building block approach for leaflet operations was used, with the first leaflet themes being ones of peace and brotherhood. Increasing the intensity of the PSYOP message as events evolved, leaflet themes transitioned to emphasizing the United Nations imposed 15 January deadline. After the UN deadline passed and Operation DESERT STORM began, themes emphasizing abandonment of equipment and desertion were used. Exploiting the effects of specific munitions leaflets were also used to inform Iraqi units that they were going to be bombed. Feedback from interviews with enemy prisoners of war validated the success of leaflet operations.

“Voice of the Gulf” was the Coalition’s radio network that broadcast from ground based and airborne transmitters, 18 hours per day for 40 days. The radio script was prepared daily and provided news, countered Iraqi propaganda and disinformation, and encouraged Iraqi defection and surrender.

Loudspeaker teams were used effectively throughout the theater. Each tactical maneuver brigade had loudspeaker PSYOP teams attached. Many of the 66 teams came from the Army Reserve Components. Loudspeaker teams accompanied units into Iraq and Kuwait, broadcasting tapes of prepared surrender messages. Messages were transmitted in Arabic and were developed by cross-cultural teams. These messages were similar to those on the leaflets being dropped. Iraqi soldiers were encouraged to surrender, were warned of impending bombing attacks, and told they would be treated humanely and fairly. Many Enemy Prisoners of War mentioned hearing the loudspeaker broadcasts in their area and surrendered to the Coalition forces because they feared more bombing.

**SOURCE: Final Report to Congress
*Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992***

f. **Transition Phase.** The transition phase enables the JFC to focus on synchronizing joint force activities to bring operations to a successful conclusion, ideally characterized by self-sustaining peace and the establishment of the rule of law. During this phase, joint forces may conduct operations in support of other governmental, nongovernmental, and international organizations/agencies.

- (1) During the transition phase, the objectives of PSYOP forces are:
 - (a) Modify the behavior of selected foreign TAs toward US and multinational capabilities.

- (b) Support the peacetime elements of US policy.
- (c) Support the geographic combatant commander's TSC.
- (d) Support the US country team.

(2) As with the other joint campaign phases, PSYOP forces must be prepared to work with interagency organizations during transition.

7. Psychological Operations Plan Development

a. The following guidance is provided for the development of Tab D, (Psychological Operations) to Appendix 3, (Information Operations) to Annex C, (Operations) of plans and orders. Additional information on Tab D is provided in Appendix B, "Format for Tab D, (Psychological Operations) to Appendix 3, (Information Operations) to Annex C, (Operations)."

(1) **Research and Analysis.** Research must be conducted and requisite data must be collected to plan PSYOP. The data must be analyzed to determine competing and complementary US and other-party goals, and possible strategies and PSYOP supportability of COAs to achieve these goals. The planner also should make a **determination of key questions about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities** vitally needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment. **Such key questions are termed critical information.** Critical information is used to develop taskings for intelligence collection and analysis.

(2) **Development.** The perceptions, knowledge, and factors that influence particular targets must be evaluated. Both the sources upon which particular targets rely and the US ability to influence those sources must be determined. Target information-gathering interests and activities need to be identified. Information and indicators that should be conveyed and denied to targets to reinforce desired appreciations and preserve essential secrecy must be ascertained. Execution means and methods to convey or deny information and indicators have to be selected. A plan for a general phasing of those means has to be developed. Tasks to prepare and execute implementing actions and to supervise overall execution need to be identified. Themes and actions to be stressed or avoided must be developed to support the attainment of specific psychological objectives. **Success or failure of PSYOP can hinge on analysis of culturally sensitive themes or actions that may be viewed as offensive to the foreign TA.** Planners should identify the assets necessary to execute the plan and list them in OPLAN TPFDDs; otherwise, it may become difficult to obtain these assets in time to execute the plan. A dissemination or PSYOP activity timeline also must be developed and be listed in OPLANs submitted for approval.

b. **Production Requirements.** The forces, assets, and capabilities needed to produce PSYOP products must be analyzed to determine the correct task organization to support mission requirements. These factors must be compared to the forces assigned or available for planning. Tasks for available



Soldiers in CONUS use deployable video editing equipment to process raw video footage harvested by organic electronic news gathering kits in Afghanistan.

PSYOP resources, including specific requirements, also must be provided. Requirements for PSYOP resources in excess of those available to the combatant command will be forwarded to the Joint Staff.

c. **Dissemination Plan.** The dissemination plan must take into account the type of PSYOP product (e.g., leaflets, radio broadcasts, TV broadcasts, and internet-based products) and the means to deliver them. Coordination among the commands planning and executing PSYOP is necessary for effective use of capabilities. A joint communications plan should be prepared to ensure that communications systems are compatible and adequate. Regardless of the means used to disseminate PSYOP products, the messages and actions must be carefully evaluated for intent and impact. The effects of PSYOP actions on targets, deceptions in use or planned, OPSEC posture and vulnerabilities, and policy consistency demand close scrutiny and coordination among all planners. Planners must also ensure plans are consistent with existing environmental requirements.

8. Psychological Operations Studies Program

a. The Research and Analysis Division of the 4th POG(A), is the only source of finished PSYOP analytical intelligence products that are tailored to the needs of the entire PSYOP community, the geographic combatant commanders, and the intelligence community. **The PSYOP studies program includes the special PSYOP study (SPS), the special PSYOP assessment (SPA), and the Psychological Operations Appendix to the Military Capabilities Study (MCS).** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides general policy guidance and establishes production priorities for the program. Commander, USSOCOM, as the supporting combatant commander, manages the PSYOP Studies Production Program, issues taskings, and monitors production.

Products of the PSYOP studies program primarily are designed to support the operational requirements of the combatant commands and of US PSYOP forces worldwide, although they also are used by a variety of other organizations (e.g., Department of State). Studies provide combatant commanders with PSYOP perspectives on issues of direct significance to peacetime strategy, joint operation planning, and operational preparations. Studies on all topics of interest can be requested through a combatant command's PSYOP staff officer or supporting intelligence officer, who will enter them in the community on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers [COLISEUM] system for managing intelligence production requirements.

b. **Special PSYOP Study.** The SPS is a relatively narrow, focused study that may address any of a wide variety of different subjects; it has a flexible format to permit the most effective analytical approach to be taken. The SPS might identify looming problems in a country of current or potential significance to the United States or it might discuss a social institution, a region within a country, a particular target group, the PSYOP environment, or an important issue that affects the population in a given area — always with an eye toward how they might affect US interests or involvement. The SPS provides greater depth of analysis on a relatively narrower topic than any other type of PSYOP study.

c. **Special PSYOP Assessment.** The SPA is a time-sensitive intelligence memorandum that analyzes the PSYOP significance of such things as crisis situations, important events, or pressing issues and how they may affect US national interests or politico-military operations. SPAs normally are produced on short notice and are disseminated as electronic messages to an established distribution list in addition to being posted on INTELINK and INTELINK-S (collateral vision).

d. **Psychological Operations Appendix to the Military Capabilities Study.** The MCS distills the encyclopedic mass of PSYOP-relevant information (or intelligence) available on a given country into a brief, issue-oriented summary. Because of the conciseness of the format, detailed factual description and proof are avoided in favor of succinct summaries of PSYOP issues, target group or key audiences, and vulnerabilities. The challenge is to “boil down” complex realities into short statements without compromising accuracy.

e. Various products can be produced in response to requests for more narrowly focused PSYOP analyses. Included among them are **Assessments of the PSYOP Environment**, which summarize and assess the basic psychological conditions in a country or region of current interest; **PSYOP Audience Analyses**, which identify and analyze key groups that could be targeted in a PSYOP operation, suggesting the most effective methods of communications and the lines of approach that likely are to be most influential; and **PSYOP Issue Analyses**, which analyze attitudes toward a specific issue or set of issues that is of concern in a particular country or region. **PSYOP spot reports** are short, time-sensitive notices that analyze discrete events and issues of potentially immediate interest to PSYOP.

f. Most PSYOP studies are posted on the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) (Airborne) home page on INTELINK-S and on INTELINK. The INTELINK home page is resident on the

USSOCOM joint staff intelligence home page under “PSYOP Studies.” It should be noted that no special password is required to access these Web sites other than basic system access.

9. Coordination with other Government Agencies

a. Coordination of PSYOP with other USG agencies ensures that policies and plans supporting PSYOP objectives are articulated and in consonance with Secretary of Defense-approved themes and policies.

b. **Department of State.** The Office of International Information Programs (IIP) is the principal international strategic communications service for the foreign affairs community. IIP designs, develops, and implements a variety of information initiatives and strategic communications programs, including Internet and print publications, traveling and electronically transmitted speaker programs, and information resource services. These reach — and are created strictly for — key international audiences, such as the media, government officials, opinion leaders, and the general public in more than 140 countries. The office’s products and services are uniquely designed to support the State Department’s initiatives, as well as those of other US foreign policy organizations. It also manages Information Resource Centers overseas and offers reference specialists based in Washington, DC, to answer specialized information queries from abroad.

(1) The IIP was created from elements of the US Information Agency when it merged with the Department of State on October 1, 1999.

(2) The IIP, operating as a reinvention laboratory through its team-based management structure, comprises three offices:

(a) **The Office of Geographic Liaison** is the first point of contact within IIP for missions overseas and the audiences they serve. Its writer-editors, information resource officers, program officers, and translators provide regionally oriented products and services.

(b) **The Office of Thematic Programs** has multifunctional teams organized in one of two ways: along subject-matter lines, such as economic security, or along product lines, such as electronic media. The thematic teams work closely with the geographic teams in preparing products and services that support Secretary of State initiatives and mission requests.

(c) **The Office of Technology Services** is responsible for developing, interpreting, and applying government-wide technology policies and procedures in support of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Exchanges, and IIP.

c. In addition to the Department of State, PSYOP should be coordinated with other USG agencies, including, but not limited to, the Central Intelligence Agency; Broadcasting Board of Governors; Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, Transportation, Energy, and Justice; Drug Enforcement Administration; and the US Coast Guard.

CHAPTER V

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS APPROVAL PROCESS

“The approval chain for PSYOP [psychological operations] should be as short and streamlined as possible to facilitate timely review, approval, production and dissemination. Although coordination of PSYOP with other staff elements and organizations is absolutely critical in maximizing PSYOP effectiveness, the coordination process should not be so cumbersome as to adversely impact dissemination necessary to achieve the intended effect.”

**CJCSI 3110.05B, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement
to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 1998**

1. Operation Plan Approval

a. Combatant commanders submit their OPLANs, including Tab D, Psychological Operations, to the Joint Staff for review. The Joint Staff reviews the plans for adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and compliance with joint doctrine. The OPLANs are then forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for appropriate review and interagency coordination.

b. During deliberate and crisis action planning, the geographic combatant commanders submit their overall campaign plans, which include a PSYOP annex or appendix, to the Joint Staff for Secretary of Defense approval. Once the campaign plan is approved, the JFC is delegated PSYOP approval authority.

c. ASD(SO/LIC) normally will conduct the required Office of the Secretary of Defense review and interagency staffing for the PSYOP portions of the plans. Upon completion of Office of Secretary of Defense-level coordination, the Secretary of Defense approves the OPLAN.

2. Psychological Operations Product Approval

a. The Secretary of Defense normally delegates PSYOP product approval to the supported combatant commander. **This does not mean that the supported combatant commander also has been delegated approval for PSYOP product dissemination.** In some cases, PSYOP products may be politically sensitive and may require separate approval for dissemination. The CJCS execute order (authorized by the Secretary of Defense) should designate who has authority for PSYOP product approval and who has authority for PSYOP product dissemination. The supported combatant commander may, in turn, delegate PSYOP product approval to a JTF commander but not lower without approval of the Secretary of Defense (see Figure V-1).

b. In all PSYOP activities, commanders must be aware of two levels of product approval.

(1) **PSYOP Objectives and Themes.** Objectives and themes frame the products that reach foreign TAs and reflect national and theater policy and strategy. **Approval of themes and messages is reserved by USG policy at Office of the Secretary of Defense-levels where the interagency process can address PSYOP products with a broad range of considerations.**




Figure V-1. Psychological Operations Plan and Program Approval Authorities

(2) **Products.** Commanders subordinate to JTF commanders can modify approved products, within the guidelines issued by higher headquarters, to better target local foreign TAs.

c. The JPOTF will develop PSYOP products and recommended actions, based on the Secretary of Defense-approved objectives and themes included in the execute order, for approval by the combatant commander or JTF commander.

d. The JPOTF will review all requests for PSYOP support to include those submitted by components, the US country team, other USG agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and obtain combatant commander or JTF commander approval as appropriate. Upon approval, the JPOTF will produce and disseminate the product or notify the requesting component or organization that the product is approved for production and dissemination.

e. Without timely approval, the relevance of PSYOP messages to current operations may be reduced. The JFC with product approval authority can assist the JPOTF commander by the early

establishment of a streamlined internal approval process. The JFC should provide clear guidance to the participants in his/her staff review of the product, and specify coordinating and comment versus disapproval authority.

3. Approval Process in Multinational Operations

a. A multinational JPOTF may deploy to support multinational military operations as well as operations involving international and regional organizations such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. When US PSYOP forces remain under the OPCON of a US commander, the Secretary of Defense normally will delegate PSYOP product approval to the supported combatant commander in the execute order. The combatant commander may subdelegate PSYOP product approval authority to a US military officer who is serving as the commander of the multinational operation.

b. When US PSYOP forces are attached to a multinational command under the command of a non-US commander for the purposes of developing multinational products only (i.e., no US information products), PSYOP approval authority could remain with the combatant commander, be subdelegated to the senior US military officer or diplomatic official involved in the operation, or be subdelegated to the non-US commander with the Secretary of Defense approval.

4. Peacetime Psychological Operations Approval

a. The US ambassador/chief of mission, or his/her designee, normally exercises product approval for PSYOP forces deployed in support of the US country team under the auspices of peacetime PSYOP activities (see Figure V-2).

b. Annual peacetime PSYOP programs will be submitted to the Joint Staff for coordination and transmittal to USD(P) or designee, ASD(SO/LIC), for staffing and interagency coordination. Annual programs approved by the USD(P) or the ASD(SO/LIC) will be returned through the Joint Staff to the geographic combatant commanders for execution as part of their theater security cooperation program (see Figure V-3). Approval of an overall annual program is required before the conduct of specific operations. Previously approved annual programs may continue while the following year's proposed program is in the staffing and approval process.

For further details concerning peacetime PSYOP activities, refer to Chapter VI, "Psychological Operations Across the Range of Military Operations."




Figure V-2. Psychological Operations Program Approval Process

5. Summary

“Successful Psychological Operations [PSYOP] require: 1) the early development of an overall PSYOP strategy, 2) the early integration of PSYOP planners, 3) visibility at the CJTF [commander, joint task force] level for integrating PSYOP into current and future operations, 4) expedient approval of PSYOP products, and 5) the assets necessary for executing PSYOP.”

**Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY
 Joint After Action Report (JAAR)
 United States Atlantic Command**

Regardless of the particular situation and the delegation of approval authority, all PSYOP actions and messages must comply with, complement, and stay within the bounds of the approved PSYOP objectives and themes as stated in the execute order. Requests for changes to the original




Figure V-3. Psychological Operations Program and Product Approval

approved objectives and themes must be forwarded through the combatant commander to the Secretary of Defense for approval. PSYOP objectives and themes must support US policies concerning the operation as promulgated by the Secretary of Defense.

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CHAPTER VI

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

"It is your attitude, and the suspicion that you are maturing the boldest designs against him, that imposes on your enemy."

**Frederick the Great
Instructions to His Generals, 1747**

1. General

a. PSYOP support joint and multinational operations and designated government agencies. The role of PSYOP varies depending on the level of operational activity or environment. Although the following discussion of PSYOP applicability to the range of military operations describes each in discrete terms, in actual circumstance there may not be a precise boundary where a particular state ends and another begins. See the range of military operations model as outlined in JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, for further clarification.

b. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

*"MOOTW [military operations other than war] encompass a wide range of activities where the **military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than large-scale combat operations usually associated with war**. . . . MOOTW usually involve a combination of air, land, sea, space, and SO [special operations] forces as well as the efforts of governmental agencies and NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], in a complementary fashion."*

JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*

(1) **MOOTW Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force.** To be effective, peacetime military PSYOP are conducted in accordance with DODD S-3321.1, *Overt Peacetime Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War (U)*, and require interagency coordination and authorization at the national level. MOOTW not involving the use or threat of force that can be supported by joint PSYOP include **foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), nation assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), consequence management, and DOD support to counterdrug operations**. These military activities provide training and in-theater access to allow for the facilitation and use of PSYOP during the transition to war. The broad objectives of PSYOP in these circumstances are shown in Figure VI-1.

(2) **MOOTW Involving the Use or Threat of Force.** When other instruments of national power (e.g., diplomatic, informational, and economic) are unable to influence a deteriorating or potential hostile situation, military force or threat of its use may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability, support the other instruments of national power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms. Nonlethal activities such as PSYOP can be decisive in MOOTW involving the use or threat of force.




Figure VI-1. Joint Military Psychological Operations Objectives Across the Range of Military Operations

Joint PSYOP are capable of supporting operations conducted during MOOTW, to include strikes and raids, counterterrorism (CT), FID, enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept operations, peace operations (e.g., peace enforcement operations), noncombatant evacuation



A SOMS-B media broadcast site operating at Kandahar, Afghanistan.

operations or other flexible deterrent options as directed. Failure to consider the use of nonlethal activities during planning may prolong the operation at the cost of lives. In MOOTW involving the use or threat of force, PSYOP offer the Secretary of Defense options for engagement that potentially avoid the employment of additional combat forces, reduce the period of confrontation, and enhance the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. PSYOP are directed toward selected foreign TAs in support of MOOTW involving the use or threat of force to achieve the objectives shown in Figure VI-1.

c. **War.** Actions combatant commanders are able to take before the initiation of hostilities can assist in determining the shape and character of future operations. Most inclusive is preparing the operational area, which involves intelligence and counterintelligence operations to understand clearly the capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential opponents, as well as the geography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) of the operational area. During prehostilities, **PSYOP can provide powerful operational leverage in support of flexible deterrent options.** Among their potential contributions, PSYOP can be employed to **gather critical information, undermine a potential opponent's will or capacity to wage war, or enhance the capabilities of multinational forces.** During war, PSYOP at the strategic, operational, and tactical level may enhance the success of operations at all echelons. PSYOP objectives during war are shown in Figure VI-1.

2. Theater Security Cooperation and Peacetime Psychological Operations

a. **TSC plans are deliberate plans for all military activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime.** Based on guidance from the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders develop plans and employ forces and personnel in peacetime to protect and promote US interests and regional objectives. TSC is comprised of the combatant commander's strategic concept. The geographic combatant commanders and executive agents develop TSC plans; the functional combatant commanders, Services, and other Defense agencies develop supporting and/or coordinating plans.

For further details concerning TSC, refer to CJCSM 3113.01A, Theater Engagement Planning, and JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

b. Peacetime Psychological Operations

(1) PSYOP shall be employed routinely by combatant commanders to shape the operational environment during peacetime. PSYOP activities shall be based on Annex A to the Contingency Planning Guidance as well as thoroughly integrated and consistent with the combatant commanders TSC and any other direction provided by the Secretary of Defense. The peacetime PSYOP program, executed as part of the combatant commander's TSC, is coordinated and integrated with the country team in each country involved. Products developed in support of peacetime PSYOP program are reviewed and approved by the country team.

(2) Peacetime PSYOP plans shall be submitted to the Joint Staff for each fiscal year concurrent with the TSC and contain, as a minimum, theater objectives, priority countries, information themes encouraged to employ PSYOP in peacetime engagement activities including, but not limited to, conducting military-to-military PSYOP programs and support to CBT and counterproliferation activities.

(3) Peacetime PSYOP activities must be approved by the ASD(SO/LIC) before execution. As appropriate, PSYOP activities will be coordinated with interagency organizations to ensure coherency with other USG efforts.



The broad objectives of psychological operations are best served by modern, sophisticated systems such as deployable editing equipment being used in conjunction with the SOMS-B.

PEACETIME PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

The primary focus of the Peacetime Psychological Operations Program is the Regional Information Support Team (RIST) or the Military Information Support Team (MIST). The term “RIST” or “MIST” is used because it is more palatable than psychological operations (PSYOP) to the governments and public of Latin America. The number one mission of RIST Colombia is support to the Andean Ridge Initiative. The RIST is the United States Southern Command’s (USSOUTHCOM) number one priority in the drug war. In Bolivia, the 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) maintains permanent MISTs that coordinate their PSYOP programs with the RIST in Colombia. In addition, temporary MISTs deploy for shorter duration to Venezuela, Ecuador, Guatemala, EL Salvador, the Bahamas, and the Dominican Republic. The majority of peacetime PSYOP missions in USSOUTHCOM are funded with counterdrug (CD) money, but PSYOP also support a humanitarian demining mission each quarter.

The Fiscal Year 2001 Deployment Order authorizes up to 14 soldiers for RIST manning at the United States Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia. Currently, the United States Military Group (USMILGP) limits RIST personnel to four soldiers, plus augmentation of a civilian intelligence analyst as necessary. With prior coordination, the USMILGP authorizes the RIST to surge additional personnel as required to meet mission requirements.

Under peacetime PSYOP, the RIST integrates the national objectives of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Commander, USSOUTHCOM’s plan, and the United States Ambassador’s plan. RIST operations, to include PSYOP product development, are coordinated and synchronized with the Participating Nation’s (PN) military or government agencies, the country team, and the embassy’s public affairs officer. The Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) gives the final approval to all RIST-developed PSYOP products (print, audio or audiovisual). The RIST has limited production and dissemination capabilities; as a result, the production and dissemination of products are contracted to PN vendors.

The RIST uses the full gamut of PN media available in addition to other delivery systems necessary to reach intended target audiences. Throughout 2001, RIST Colombia produced as many products as the joint PSYOP task force (JPOTF) in Sarajevo, which has 43 personnel.

RIST Colombia’s support is to JTF-South [Joint Task Force-South], the main effort of USSOUTHCOM, the Country Team, and the Government of Colombia, with the focus on Human Rights. The supporting effort is eradication, interdiction, and institution building. The economy of force is demand reduction and alternative development.

[See examples of a poster, booklet, and handbill associated with this vignette on the following page.]

**SOURCE: Major Leo G. Pullar
4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne)**

3. Psychological Operations Support to the Targeting Process

a. PSYOP planning and targeting is performed concurrently with the development of the higher headquarters plans and orders. The PSYOP planner plans in concert with the higher headquarters operational staff.

b. As a JPOTF within a JTF or as a member of a battlestaff, the PSYOP planner contributes to each phase (or step) of the overall plan/order and gains needed information to make decisions while formulating and refining the PSYOP plan. If targeting is successfully integrated into the higher headquarters plan or order, the PSYOP targeting plan will likely answer the following questions:

(1) **Phase 1 — Commander’s Objectives, Guidance, and Intent.** What is the strategy translated to discrete tasks, each logically and directly related to the overall desired outcome? What are the developed MOEs to assess whether objectives have been attained?

(2) **Phase 2 — Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization.** What specific foreign TAs, nodes, or links must be attacked and what objectives must be achieved with specific PSYOP forces to support the commander’s intent and the concept of the operation?

(3) **Phase 3 — Capabilities Analysis.** What resources are necessary to determine the vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, and accessibility to reach the desired targets and audiences? How are the attitudes and impressions assessed, and how are products designed to overcome censorship, illiteracy, or interrupted communications?

(4) **Phase 4 — Commander’s Decision and Force Assignment.** How (what assets) and when will be the attack of these adversary targets?


(5) **Phase 5 — Mission Planning and Force Execution.** What is the detailed information on the targets, which supported by the analytical reasoning, linked the target with the desired effect (Phase 2). As the adversary responds and deviates from friendly force assumptions, what changes are needed in order to allow commanders to maintain the initiative through flexibility?

(6) **Phase 6 — Combat Assessment.** What defines success for the PSYOP objectives and how will the impact be assessed? Is there an effective method to establish a direct link between a message and a specific attitude?



Human Rights - Over 30,000 Human Rights Posters were produced and disseminated to the Colombian general population and military (JTF-South soldiers). Messages on the posters included the commitment of the Colombian military to the defense and protection of human rights in Colombia and emphasis on JTF-South respect for human rights and international law.

Eradication - Thousands of Eradication information booklets were produced and disseminated to the Colombian general population. The booklets provided information on Glyphosate, the herbicide that is used for aerial eradication in Colombia. The booklet's objective was to persuade Colombians that Glyphosate is not harmful to the environment.



Eradication - Eradication handbills were produced and disseminated to the Colombian general population. The PSYOP supported objectives of these series were to discourage the planting of illicit crops and to provide notice that Colombian Security Forces would continue to eradicate new illicit crops.

4. Psychological Operations Support to Special Operations and Interagency Operations

“PSYOP [psychological operations] are the most powerful weapon in the SOF [special operations forces] inventory.”

**General Carl Stiner, US Army
Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command, 1990 to 1993
Address at the Association of the US Army Symposium, April 1993**

a. **Special Operations.** SO are integral parts of a theater campaign . While SO can be conducted unilaterally in support of specific theater or national objectives, the majority of SO are designed and conducted to enhance the likelihood of success of the overall theater campaign. SO can be conducted in support of or separate from conventional military operations. SO must complement — not compete with — conventional forces. PSYOP may support the following SO core tasks (see Figure VI-2):

For further guidance concerning SO, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

(1) **Unconventional Warfare (UW).** A major component of UW is psychological preparation of the battlespace. Conventional PSYOP techniques may be applicable during UW operations, but because of the changing operational environment, different target groups exist. The four major UW targets of PSYOP are listed below.

(a) **The Uncommitted.** Members of the general populace who are neutral, but may doubt the potential success of a resistance organization or friendly government supported by the United States and its allies or coalition partners. PSYOP efforts focus on obtaining the support of these neutral citizens for a US-backed resistance movement or government.

(b) **Hostile Sympathizers.** Hostile sympathizers can be categorized as willing collaborators, persons under duress, or passive hostile sympathizers. PSYOP are used to halt or



Figure VI-2. Special Operations Supported by Psychological Operations

prevent the sympathizer's support by sowing doubt as the validity of the hostile power's actions and instilling fear for collaborating.

(c) **Hostile Military Forces.** Hostile military forces may be government forces, an occupying power, or other forces helping the hostile government. The hostile military forces' nationality may or may not be the same as the populace. PSYOP directed at this foreign TA seek to provoke feelings of isolation to the point of distrust of one another, and insecurity about the outcome of the struggle and the legitimacy of their cause.

(d) **Resistance Sympathizers.** Resistance sympathizers are in favor of the resistance movement's goals but are **not active members** of a resistance organization. PSYOP promote the foreign TA active support or passive cooperation.

(2) **Foreign Internal Defense.** In FID, PSYOP forces target particular groups with specific objectives.

(a) PSYOP support the achievement of national goals by targeting specific audiences. In FID, specific PSYOP goals exist for the following foreign TAs.

1. **Insurgents.** Create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within insurgent forces, as well as help discredit them.



Inside the video production and editing tent of the SOMS-B complex at Kandahar, Afghanistan during a broadcast in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

2. **Civilian populace.** Gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the HN government and its counterinsurgency programs.

3. **Military forces.** Strengthen military support, with emphasis on building and maintaining the morale of the HN forces.

4. **Neutral elements.** Gain the support of uncommitted groups inside and outside the HN.

5. **External hostile powers.** Convince hostile foreign TAs the insurgency will fail.

(b) PSYOP forces can assist a FID core task by:

1. Improving popular support for the HN government.

2. Discrediting the insurgent forces with neutral groups and the insurgents themselves.

3. Projecting a favorable image of the HN government and the United States.

4. Supporting defector programs.

5. Providing close and continuous support to CMO.

6. Supporting HN programs that protect the population from insurgent activities.

7. Strengthening HN support of programs that provide positive populace control and protection from insurgent activities.

8. Informing the international community of HN and US intent and goodwill.

9. Passing instructions to the HN populace.

10. Developing HN PSYOP capabilities.

For further guidance on FID, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

(3) **Direct Action (DA).** PSYOP in support the DA core task depend on the situation, mission, and type of forces involved. When PSYOP forces participate in DA, their presence needs to be closely coordinated and linked to US public diplomacy and command information programs. The following are common PSYOP objectives in DA operations:

(a) Explain the purpose of the operation to counter the adversary's reaction and ensure that friendly, neutral, and hostile audiences know what has occurred and why.

(b) Influence noncombatants, neutrals, and other groups in the operational area.

(c) Reduce interference in the DA operation by hostile forces and nations.

(d) Exploit foreign TAs that might not otherwise be accessible. Exploitation includes demoralizing potential adversaries with the results of the operation.

(e) Assess the psychological impact of the operation.

(f) Reduce the adverse effects of mission failure.

(g) Capitalize on DA mission success in strategic PSYOP.

(h) Support DA missions in contingency operations.

(4) **Special Reconnaissance (SR).** PSYOP support SR by assessing the psychological impact of the operation to include the impact on compromised operations, limiting or negating the effects of compromise, conducting deception operations, and providing personnel to help in area assessments.

(5) **Counterterrorism.** PSYOP must integrate with other security operations to target the elements employing terrorism. The aim is to place the terrorists on the psychological defensive. To do so, PSYOP forces analyze the terrorists' goals and use psychological programs to frustrate those goals. PSYOP support CT by the following means:

(a) Countering the adverse psychological effects of a terrorist act.

(b) Lessening popular support for the terrorist cause.

(c) Publicizing incentives to the local people to inform on the terrorist groups.

(d) Deterring terrorist acts by persuading potential terrorists of the futility of their actions or guarantee of defeat/death in the attempt.

(e) Promoting legitimacy of US and HN governments.

(6) **Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.** PSYOP support operations to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in numerous ways. Specifically, PSYOP perform the following:

(a) Discredit the adversary or nonstate actor with neutral groups and the adversarial group itself.

- (b) Project a favorable image of the USG.
- (c) Strengthen HN support of programs that provide positive populace control and protection from weapons of mass destruction.
- (d) Explain the purpose of the operation to counter the adversary action and ensure that friendly, neutral, and hostile audiences know what has occurred and why.
- (e) Inform the international community of US and HN intent and goodwill.
- (f) Assess the psychological impact of the operation.
- (g) Provide personnel to help in area assessments.

(7) **Civil-Affairs Operations (CAO).** PSYOP can provide key support and information for CAO. PSYOP can provide support in the following areas:

- (a) In addition to military intelligence PSYOP can develop information for CAO concerning the location, state of mind, and health of civilians and the physical characteristics of the operational area.
- (b) Disseminate information concerning the safety and welfare of the indigenous civilian population.
- (c) Influence a civilian population's attitude toward US policy and prepare it for CAO involvement across the range of military operations.
- (d) Maximize CAO efforts in the area of FHA by exploiting the goodwill created by US efforts in the area of medical and veterinary aid, construction, and public facilities activities.
- (e) During disaster-relief operations, foster international support for host governments and coordinate publicity for US and HN efforts.
- (f) Conduct assessments before and after the operation to determine the most effective application of effort and document the results.
- (g) Provide direct support to CAO conducting emergency relocation operations of DCs and for operation of the DCs camps.
- (h) As a corollary, when conducted within the framework of a viable civil-military concept, CAO activities can contribute significantly to the overall success of PSYOP activities.

For further details, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.

b. Interagency Operations

“The common thread throughout all major operations, whether in war or military operations other than war, is the broad range of agencies — many with indispensable practical competencies and major legal responsibilities — that interact with the Armed Forces of the United States.”

JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I

(1) Military operations must be synchronized with operations of other agencies of the USG as well as with foreign forces, NGOs, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. Success will depend to a large extent on the ability to blend and engage all instruments of national power. These actions must be mutually supporting and proceed in a logical sequence. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of that power and the economic, diplomatic, and informational entities of the USG as well as NGOs and international organizations. Successful interagency coordination enables these agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation.

(2) The impact of interagency operations on PSYOP planning is significant. PSYOP planners must understand not only the interagency environment but also the criticality of interagency coordination. As the use of information activities in support of US objectives increases, so does the role of military PSYOP in the interagency arena. **Presidential Decision Directive-68 directs the integration and synchronization of interagency PA, public diplomacy, and international military information, a euphemism for military PSYOP.** This integration is accomplished through high-level interagency coordination committees and working groups.

(3) The projection of information to targeted foreign audiences by the USG is an important element of US national power.

For further details concerning interagency operations, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.

5. Multinational Operations

“NATO [North Atlantic treaty Organization] planners established the need for a campaign targeted at the local population of B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina] and designed to shape attitudes and behavior in favor of IFOR [Implementation Force] (later SFOR [Stabilization Force]) troops and operations. To carry out this task, IFOR’s primary tool was its psychological operations [PSYOP] campaign, called the IFOR Information Campaign (IIC). Although an official NATO term, the term ‘psychological operations’ was not used. Some NAC [North Atlantic Council] members did not want to be associated with a ‘psychological operations campaign. ‘IFOR Information Campaign’ seemed to ease these fears. However, there is

little doubt that the 'information campaign' was a psychological operations campaign. It was conducted by PSYOP forces and according to NATO's draft peace support psychological activities doctrine.

The PSYOP Campaign was primarily conceived as a force protection tool. First, by making NATO's mandate and intentions clear to the local population and FWF [Former Warring Factions], the IIC sought to prevent misunderstanding leading to unnecessary violence. Second, the IIC objective was to ensure broad compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement and discourage the factions from interfering with IFOR/SFOR operations. The NAC themes and objectives, approved in December 1995, reflected the overwhelming importance attached to the force protection aspect of the mission. Indeed, a majority of themes emphasized that IFOR/SFOR had robust rules of engagement and the capability to enforce the peace agreement, and would respond in an even-handed manner to all violations of the peace agreement. Further themes sought to discourage the factions and local populations from hindering IFOR/SFOR operations and to encourage cooperation with NATO."

**Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations
NATO-Led Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina December 1995-1997
Pascale Combelles Siegel**

a. **PSYOP units should be integrated into all multinational operations.** The multinational force commander must ensure that all PSYOP activities, regardless of national origin, are coordinated. PSYOP must begin early, preferably before deployment, to prepare a population for the arrival of multinational forces and develop communication channels that can be used from day one of an operation. PSYOP provide the commander with a controlled mechanism to communicate with all elements of a population: civilians, military, or belligerent factions. PSYOP communicate policy, provide information, and can persuade groups to cooperate with multinational forces. A detailed analysis of a country's culture, religion, political climate, and military organization can help the multinational force commander to effectively apply PSYOP to communicate policy, provide information, and persuade groups to cooperate with friendly forces.

b. When the Armed Forces of the United States are integrated into a multinational command structure, peacetime PSYOP policies and wartime conduct should be coordinated and integrated to the maximum extent possible for the attainment of US and multinational security objectives. **However, US PSYOP normally will be approved in US channels regardless of the composition of the multinational force chain of command.**

For further details concerning multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.

CHAPTER VII

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ENABLERS

“The enemy bombards our front not only with a drumfire of artillery, but also with a drumfire of printed paper. Besides bombs which kill the body, his airmen also throw down leaflets which are intended to kill the soul.”

Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg
1847 - 1934

1. Intelligence

a. The use of PSYOP forces and assets is predicated on political, military, economic, cultural, religious, and psychological or social conditions. **PSYOP planners must possess a thorough and current knowledge of these conditions to develop PSYOP targeted at selected foreign groups to influence their objective and emotional reasoning.** This knowledge is obtained through the intelligence process producing actionable, timely, and relevant intelligence, and made available to PSYOP. The intelligence process, shown in Figure VII-1, has six integrated phases that include planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback.

b. Intelligence and counterintelligence requirements include current intelligence, background studies of foreign countries, and intelligence and counterintelligence estimates. Each command must evaluate its assigned missions and operational areas and identify specific PSYOP intelligence and counterintelligence needs. The thoroughness of this evaluation and identification will determine how well intelligence-gathering organizations and counterintelligence support organizations can gather essential information and produce relevant intelligence and counterintelligence products. **Development of PSYOP-related intelligence and counterintelligence should be predicated on a detailed collection plan** with specific collection requirements to exploit all available sources and techniques. It should include basic intelligence and country studies on foreign cultures and particular target groups as well as current intelligence on foreign group attitudes, behavior, and capabilities.

c. Intelligence should be provided continually about specified target groups to keep PSYOP estimates current and to provide feedback about group reactions to PSYOP messages. In addition, interrogations of EPWs and line crossers, CIs, current defector information, and other similar current data are needed to evaluate, plan, and execute real-time PSYOP and to ascertain the effectiveness of ongoing operations.

d. PSYOP planners should ensure that specific needs for finished intelligence products are communicated to the intelligence community so that the requests can be tasked, processed, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner. When appropriate, planners also should ensure that information gaps are identified as intelligence requirements to drive collection or as a HUMINT collection requirement, time-sensitive collection requirement, or ad hoc HUMINT requirement for tasking to the Defense HUMINT Service.




Figure VII-1. The Intelligence Process

e. **Any factor that presents a recurring and identifiable obstacle to achieving success of a military PSYOP program is deemed a threat.** The early identification and exploitation of threats increase the potential for successful fulfillment of PSYOP program goals and objectives. The collections manager, in coordination with the PSYOP planner, needs to develop a collection plan with specific information requirements pertinent to PSYOP. Intelligence and counterintelligence assets can then be tasked to collect the information for analysis. Generally, three environments are viewed as posing a threat to the effectiveness of military PSYOP.

(1) **Conflict environment threats** are those that can stem from governments, organizations, groups, and individuals using military and economic power to gain control of a region and influence or counter the strategic intent of the United States and its allies or coalition partners. Whatever the method used, the US PSYOP analyst should identify specific information requirements for which the intelligence collection manager can levy collection requirements,

assisting the PSYOP planner in recognizing the PSYOP effort to influence the behavior of individuals toward a desired goal.

(2) **Technological environment threats** are products of an expanding ability of governments, organizations, groups, and individuals worldwide to use easily accessed communications resources. Many of these entities possess electronic attack and electronic protection assets that can degrade US military PSYOP efforts. The PSYOP planner needs to submit specific information requirements so the intelligence collection manager can task collection assets to assist in determining the adversary's capabilities to jam PSYOP signals, counter US and multinational PSYOP messages, and conduct other technical operations.

(3) **Social and political environment threats** are created through upheavals in a country's economic, religious, cultural, and political structures. These changes may be sudden or anticipated, temporary or permanent, and may alter the perceptions held by the country's populace. This can pose a threat to the success of US military PSYOP if planners do not recognize the potential for these changes in perception. The PSYOP planner needs to submit specific information requirements so the collection manager can task collection assets to assist in determining changes to political, religious, economic, and cultural structures.

(4) PSYOP studies are unique in format; however, other military intelligence products can contain this type of intelligence. In general, they profile the salient features of a country or its people; provide an analysis of the influences that lead different social, occupational, and ethnic groups of that country to act as they do; discuss issues that elicit strong responses from the indigenous population; assess attitudes; identify vulnerabilities; and suggest ways and means to influence people.

For further detail concerning intelligence support to operations, refer to the JP 2-0 series.

2. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

a. Communications between commands that are planning and executing PSYOP actions are necessary for effective use of capabilities. A joint PSYOP communications plan should be prepared to ensure that communications systems are compatible and adequate. Theater communications architecture must include plans for integration of PSYOP support requirements into secure voice and data nets, satellite communications systems, and a capability to communicate with US national level agencies, multinational, and HN communications systems.

b. **Control should favor centralized planning and direction and decentralized execution.** Control is exercised from the lowest level that accomplishes the required coordination. PSYOP considerations may dictate that control be at high national levels. The flexibility needed necessitates that PSYOP forces have access to long- and short-haul communications.

c. The POAS, which originated as a joint computer system, has been absorbed into the United States Army Special Operations Command's REDNET system. POAS plays an important part in supporting PSYOP worldwide — for the combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and the interagency

community. Unique POAS capabilities facilitate the research and analysis that underlie foreign TA analysis, PSYOP product development, finished PSYOP intelligence production, special projects, and operational deployments by conventional as well as special operations forces. POAS users can draw on a number of different database collections:

(1) **DOD Message Traffic Collections.** These collections contain daily Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) and Defense Messaging System (DMS) messages from different government agencies and military sources, including the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and Foreign Broadcast Information Service. The system has the capability to do a full search and retrieval against AUTODIN/DMS message traffic with a continuous real-time message feed and indexing. The message archives are readily accessed and extensive, running from October 1989 to the present. This unique feature makes historical searches easy and allows immediate retrieval of material for discernment of long-range trends.

(2) **PSYOP Study Collection.** This collection holds all extant PSYOP studies and assessments produced by the Strategic Studies Detachments. The PSYOP collection is the most complete archive available for past PSYOP studies.

(3) **Radio/TV Collection.** This collection has statistics on radio and TV facilities in various countries. It includes such information as location, equipment range, and frequencies, and users can search the collection based on facility characteristics.

(4) The POAS electronically archives studies and also offers analysts access to various classified and unclassified databases. Commanders can obtain most of these studies through the 4th POG(Airborne)'s home page on the secret-level classified intelligence system, INTELINK-S. PSYOP intelligence products of all types are posted on this site as soon as they are completed, making dissemination far faster and easier than in the pre-electronic past. All of the PSYOP studies are posted on INTELINK (Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System) along with studies that are excluded from INTELINK-S because of dissemination restrictions or classification constraints. On INTELINK, they can be found on the home page of the USSOCOM, under intelligence products. Copies of PSYOP studies can be downloaded or printed from the computer system. In the unlikely event that an end user does not have access to INTELINK or INTELINK-S, the POAS staff can, by exception, forward a copy.

d. The Joint Center for Lessons Learned has reports and reviews regarding PSYOP at their SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network website.

3. Logistics

a. PSYOP forces normally will deploy with a 30-day basic load of PSYOP supplies. This is a baseline-planning figure and may not be sufficient to meet specific contingency mission requirements. Commanders and their staffs must ensure that PSYOP support requirements are taken into account when planning logistic support.

b. Although PSYOP rely heavily on state-of-the-art systems, planning must take into consideration the potential for having to integrate into less sophisticated equipment often found in remote areas of the world. **Host-nation support (HNS) may provide much of PSYOP-required supplies.** HN personnel and organizations can perform many of the support-related functions, thus reducing the strain on US logistic systems. CA can identify potential sources of HNS for PSYOP requirements. Early identification of PSYOP HNS requirements is critical to facilitate location and establishment of agreements or contracts to provide necessary PSYOP-related supplies, equipment, and facilities.

c. When US PSYOP forces support multinational operations, they normally will be supported by US logistic systems unless otherwise determined by agreements, directives, or approved OPLANs. HN forces involved in US-sponsored or US-supported PSYOP activities may provide the major portion of their logistic support requirements. When approved by the combatant commander, US PSYOP or logistic systems may furnish military supplies, services, PSYOP-specific equipment, and US medical support in accordance with directives and approved OPLANs.

d. JPOTFs must submit statements of requirements for additional material and equipment to support ongoing operations.

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APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES

“To capture the enemy’s entire army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a company, or a squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances by diplomacy. The next best is to attack his army. And the worst policy is to attack cities.”

Sun Tsu
The Art of War

1. General

Each Military Service has the inherent capability to support US national strategic objectives with organic assets for production and/or dissemination of PSYOP products. Aircraft, ships, and other military equipment can have psychological effects on a TA through presence, weapons employment, or delivery of goods/equipment. Planning guidance is contained in the JSCP, JOPEs, and Service doctrine. Plans should address the use of strategic, operational, and tactical PSYOP as aspects of the overall strategy for conducting operations.

2. US Army Psychological Operations Assets

“The role of psychological operations (PSYOP) in the information age is to assist military commanders in articulating their mission objectives, to help identify the decision makers who can promote or interfere with these objectives, and to recommend appropriate courses of action to properly influence them. In this regard, PSYOP are applicable across the operational continuum because command objectives may vary at any point in time and because key decision makers exist at every level of military endeavor. . . . By converting command objectives into the people who have the ability to act on them, and by recommending the use of available military and nonmilitary resources, PSYOP soldiers attempt to educate and motivate targeted decision makers to act, or refrain from acting, in ways that support the commander’s objectives.”

Colonel Robert M. Schoenhaus
7th PSYOP Group Commander, June 1999
FM 3-05.03, Psychological Operations

a. Army PSYOP capability consists of one AC PSYOP group and two RC PSYOP groups. The AC PSYOP group is capable of conducting limited strategic PSYOP. However, it primarily conducts operational and tactical PSYOP. The two RC PSYOP groups are tactical units. They have some regional capabilities due mainly to their assigned parts of the world, and some language competencies.

b. **Psychological Operations Group.** A POG plans, coordinates, and executes PSYOP activities at the operational and tactical levels. It also can provide limited support to strategic planning and operations. A POG is structured to support conventional and special operations forces deployed worldwide. It can support several JPOTFs at the combatant command and the JTF level. A POG may contain the following organizations:

(1) **Research and Analysis Division.** Department of the Army civilian analysts give the 4th POG (Airborne) a unique research and analysis capability and add a deeper dimension of socio-cultural expertise and institutional continuity to the array of operational skills possessed by the POG. No other operational unit in the US Army has a comparable pool of experts organic to it. The analysts have advanced degrees and many have had years of military experience. As a condition of employment, they must be able to read and understand the language of their primary country of specialization. Some speak with native fluency, while others are competent in several languages. Virtually all of the analysts have lived in their geographical area of focus, some for many years. Their knowledge of foreign cultures and their analytical capabilities undergird all of the efforts of the 4th POG (Airborne) — in planning and operational deployments as well as in research and analysis.

(2) **Regional PSYOP Battalion (POB).** Regional POBs provide cultural and linguistic expertise and is capable of providing simultaneous PSYOP support to two or more organizations within the combatant command.

(3) **Dissemination PSYOP Battalion.** Dissemination POBs provide audio, visual, and audiovisual materials production, signal support, and media broadcast capabilities to the POG, JPOTF, and tactical PSYOP units. The dissemination POBs are structured to support two separate operational areas at the combatant command level.

(4) **Tactical PSYOP Battalion (TPB).** TPBs provide tactical PSYOP support to corps-level units and below and select special operations and conventional task forces at Army-level equivalent-sized units. The TPB develops, produces, and disseminates tactical products within the guidance (themes, objectives, and foreign TAs) assigned by the JPOTF and authorized by the product approval authority (combatant commander or subordinate JFC). The TPB's capabilities include dissemination of PSYOP products by loudspeaker message, leaflet, handbill, and face-to-face communications.

(5) **EPW/CI/DC PSYOP Battalion.** This POB collects and evaluates PSYOP-relevant intelligence directly from EPW, CIs, and DCs through interrogations, face-to-face communications, and pre- and post-testing of PSYOP products and themes. Camp functions performed by the battalion dispel rumors, create dialogue, and pacify or indoctrinate EPWs/CIs/DCs to minimize violence, facilitate efficient camp operations, and ensure safe and humane conditions persist.



The soldiers of a tactical PSYOP team stand beside their loudspeaker-equipped HMMWV in Afghanistan before a mission in support of Operation ANACONDA.

3. US Navy Psychological Operations Assets

a. Capabilities to produce audiovisual products are available from Fleet Audiovisual Command, Pacific; Fleet Imagery Command, Atlantic; Fleet Combat Camera Groups; various film libraries; Naval Imaging Command; and limited assistance from ships and aircraft of the fleet. Naval Reserve USJFCOM PSYOP Audiovisual Unit 0286 provides audiovisual and training support to USJFCOM.

b. The Navy is developing the capability to produce documents, posters, articles, leaflets, handbills, and other material for PSYOP. Administrative capabilities ashore and afloat exist to prepare and produce various quantities of printed materials. The Navy is developing in large deck ships a high-speed leaflet and handbill production capability that can be used in conjunction with naval air assets to rapidly disseminate PSYOP products early in a crisis. Language capabilities exist in naval intelligence and among naval personnel for most Asian and European languages.

c. The Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC), located at the Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base, Norfolk, Virginia, has a limited ability to provide specialized training in planning and executing PSYOP, FHA, military support to civil authorities, and is available to assist fleet units. FIWC maintains a close relationship with the 4th POG (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for training, equipment employment, product dissemination, and tactics, techniques, and procedures development in the area of Navy support to PSYOP.

(1) TARBS is a prototype high-power radio station installed on selected ships with the primary mission of supporting PSYOP. TARBS provides the ability to conduct PSYOP broadcasts intended for the civilian and military population as part of naval IO in littoral areas. Secondary non-PSYOP using TARBS include providing radio broadcast capability in support of FHA and military support to civil authorities in the event of US domestic disasters.

(2) TARBS ideally will be installed onboard one ship in each amphibious ready group. When needed, TARBS will broadcast voice information as directed and authorized by the JFC. PSYOP broadcast information products will be produced for the JFC by the 4th POG (Airborne) or the JPOTF supporting the JFC, and forwarded to the TARBS operators for final dissemination. The products will be forwarded either electronically to the TARBS laptop computer or by other means as necessary (e.g., cassette and compact disc-read only memory). Once authorized by the JFC, the TARBS operators will conduct both AM and FM broadcasts of this product on designated frequencies.

(3) TARBS is designated as a portable system divided into three subsystems, mostly contained in a transportable shelter 173 inches long, 86 inches wide, and 84 inches high, with an approximate loaded weight of 9,600 pounds. TARBS is comprised of an audio transmitter and antenna subsystems capable of operations ashore or afloat.

(4) Most US Navy vessels have the ability to support PSYOP through an organic high frequency transmission capability.

d. Several US naval aircraft have the capability to support PSYOP. Naval F/A-18 aircraft can disperse leaflets by dropping SUU-76 (PDU-5) ROCKEYE leaflet bombs. Shipborne helicopters can provide leaflet drop, loudspeaker broadcast, and foreign humanitarian aid dissemination.

4. United States Air Force Contribution to Psychological Operations

“Air Force PSYOP [psychological operations] support national and military objectives by conveying specially tailored information to target audiences.”

AFDD 2-5.3, Psychological Operations

a. Air Force contributions to PSYOP leverage air and space power, and applicable technologies to achieve USG and theater commander objectives. Air Force PSYOP is focused on the employment of air and space as the Air Force’s primary means of preparing, shaping, and exploiting the psychological dimension of the battlespace.

b. Air Force PSYOP forces support JFC objectives through a variety of operations and activities that include development of psychologically informed targeting strategies. The US Air Force (USAF) information warfare flights have individuals located in either Air Force air and space operations center (AFAOC) or joint air operations center that assist commanders in many disciplines of IO, to include PSYOP. They coordinate/liaise between the AFAOC and the

JPOTF, and utilize all-source analysis of an adversary's sociological, cultural, and demographic information to recommend effective PSYOP.

c. A wide variety of USAF assets have the inherent capability to execute missions in support of JFC/JPOTF PSYOP objectives. Certain aircraft have PSYOP as their primary mission. The EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO aircraft are equipped for airborne broadcasts of PSYOP messages via radio and television signals. In addition to disseminating PSYOP messages electronically, a number of airdrop aircraft are capable of performing leaflet airdrop missions. Also, USAF fighter and bomber aircraft can dispense leaflets by dropping leaflet bombs.

5. US Marine Corps Psychological Operations Assets

Although the Marine Corps has no organizational PSYOP structure, it does have the capability to execute both audible and visible actions designed to convey specific impressions to an adversary. These actions can include broadcasts from either shore-based or airborne loudspeaker systems and leaflet dissemination by various aircraft. PSYOP expertise within the Marine Corps resides in the individual Marines who have received training from joint and Service schools. The civil affairs groups, when activated, normally will have formally trained personnel capable of advising the Marine air-ground task force commander on PSYOP.

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APPENDIX B
FORMAT FOR TAB D, (PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS) TO APPENDIX 3,
(INFORMATION OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C, (OPERATIONS)

1. Overview

The guidance in this appendix relates to the development of Tab D (Psychological Operations) to Appendix 3 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) for plans and orders.

a. Situation and Overview

- (1) What is the general psychological situation in the operational area?
- (2) What, if any, are the ongoing PSYOP programs?
- (3) What are the significant factors influencing PSYOP activities?
- (4) What are the competing PSYOP goals in the operational area?
- (5) What is the PSYOP task to be accomplished?

b. US (or US and Allied/Coalition) Perspective

- (1) How will the assigned PSYOP task be accomplished?
- (2) What resources will be used?
- (3) What will be the general phasing of current actions with future actions?

c. Neutral Perspective (if applicable)

(1) What are the projected actions of the neutral populations under various circumstances?

(2) What activities and resources are available to these neutral intentions?

(3) What actions and behavior by the neutral population(s) would favor mission accomplishment?

(4) Which apparent current COAs might affect mission accomplishment?

(5) What resources are available to execute alternative COAs?

(6) What objective and subjective factors could affect decisions and resource effectiveness?

(7) What are the staff factions and who are the particularly influential individuals?

(8) What are the characteristics of decision makers and their key advisors, major staff planners, staff factions (to include particularly influential individuals), and intelligence system analysts?

(9) What are the groups of related planner and decision maker critical information?

(10) What is the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful appreciations for each group?

d. Adversary Perspectives

(1) Decision Makers and Staffs

(a) What COAs might affect friendly task accomplishment?

(b) What resources are available to execute each COA?

(c) Who are the decision makers who can direct development or allocation of resources of COAs pertinent to the task assigned?

(d) What are the characteristics of adversary decision makers, their key advisors, and staff (particularly intelligence analysts)?

(2) Intelligence Systems

(a) What are the intelligence systems that support decision makers and their staffs?

(b) What are the intelligence systems' capabilities pertinent to the situation?

(c) What are the objective and subjective factors and the characteristics of collection planners and decision makers that affect their development and selection for use of information gathering resources?

(d) What are the groups of related planner and decision maker critical information?

(e) What is the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful appreciations for each group?

(3) Target Audiences

(a) What groups can influence plans, decisions, and operational effectiveness in task accomplishment?

- (b) How susceptible are these groups to PSYOP?
- (c) What group behavior is favorable or harmful to task accomplishment?
- (d) What are the apparent goals, motivations, and characteristics of each group?
- (e) Who are the leaders who can cause these groups to behave in various ways?
- (f) What are the groups of related foreign TA critical information?
- (g) What is the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful appreciations for each group?

(4) **Command Systems**

- (a) What communications systems and command centers will be used to plan COAs and control, coordinate, and supervise execution of the planned COA?
- (b) What is the purpose and what are the characteristics of each C2 communications net?
- (c) What are the PSYOP targets for jamming or attacking?
- (d) When should PSYOP to demoralize and disorganize opposing command be executed?
- (e) When should PSYOP to reduce opposing operational effectiveness be executed?
- (f) When should PSYOP to enhance the effectiveness of planned deceptions be executed?
- (g) When should PSYOP to support OPSEC to the maximum advantage be executed?

e. **Mission.** How will PSYOP support the maneuver commander's mission?

f. **Execution**

(1) **Concept of Operations**

(a) **Overview**

- 1. What is the commander's intent?

2. What is the overall concept for using PSYOP in support of task accomplishment?
3. Who will plan and conduct strategic PSYOP in peacetime and in support of preconflict deterrence options? Who are the supporting commanders?
4. Who will plan and conduct strategic and theater PSYOP in support of sustained hostilities? Who are the supporting commanders?
5. Who will plan and conduct joint tactical PSYOP in support of operational COAs? Who are the supporting commanders?

(b) General Guidance to Units and Forces

1. What are the valid PSYOP themes to be promoted to induce strategic and theater PSYOP objectives?
2. What are the valid or invalid PSYOP themes to be discouraged? Include indications of specific foreign TA sensitivities and harm that might occur if foreign TAs accept the themes.

(c) PSYOP Actions Suitable for Use

1. What is the guidance for the conduct of military operations, actions, and personnel behavior to promote valid PSYOP themes?
2. What is the guidance for avoiding military operations and actions and personnel behavior that would result in harmful foreign TA attitudes and behavior?
3. What are the cultural and psychological characteristics of foreign TAs, which will aid operational planners and personnel in selecting COAs and interacting with foreign TA members?

(d) Adversary PSYOP

1. What adversary PSYOP will be directed at US personnel and at foreign groups in the operational area?
2. What is the guidance for countering such adversary operations?

(e) Outline of Each Planned PSYOP

1. What is the foreign TA and set of PSYOP objectives, overall themes, subgroups to be targeted (to include their characteristics), and specific themes to be promoted for each subgroup?

2. What are the provisions for testing, producing, stocking, and disseminating PSYOP materials and for measuring PSYOP effectiveness?

3. What are the command and staff arrangements? Who are the supporting commanders?

4. What resources are required to plan and conduct PSYOP actions? Include civil capabilities; indigenous assets; exploitation of EPWs, internees, and detainees for PSYOP; and military PSYOP resources.

5. What are the logistic requirements? Include preparation, distribution, and stocking of PSYOP materials; transport of PSYOP material and personnel to operational areas and their basing and support while conducting PSYOP; provisions for the supply and maintenance of US and indigenous PSYOP material; and fiscal and personnel matters.

6. What are the requirements for implementing schedules and PSYOP control sheets?

7. What is the code word for OPSEC-sensitive PSYOP?

(f) What is the OPSEC planning guidance? Include planning for, preparing for, and conducting PSYOP and PSYOP actions to maintain essential secrecy for the commander's intent and to gain and maintain essential secrecy for OPSEC-sensitive PSYOP COAs.

(2) **Situation Monitoring**

(a) How will intelligence, multidiscipline counterintelligence, security monitoring, and operational feedback be provided?

(b) What is the requirement for running situation estimates; periodic estimates of target appreciations responsive to critical information, actions, and attitudes and behavior; and current reporting of intelligence and multidiscipline counterintelligence information, security monitoring results, and implementing actions?

(c) What resources are required? What is their availability?

(3) **Control**

(a) How will control be affected and implementation centrally coordinated?

(b) What are the coordinating instructions?

(c) How will implementation planning and supervision of the planned action be accomplished?

(d) What is the need for specific PSYOP?

(e) What coordination is required with adjacent commands and civilian agencies, to include US diplomatic missions and US Agency for International Development (USAID)?

(f) What coordination is required with military deception and OPSEC planners, electronic warfare planners, and planners in the fields of civic action; FHA; CMO; EPWs; detainees, command, control, and communications; legal; captured US personnel; and operations?

(4) **Tasks**

(a) What responsibilities must be assigned to implement the concept?

(b) Is designation of an executive agent to coordinate implementation among multiple organizations required?

(c) How will feedback to ensure effectiveness of tasks be provided?

g. **Administration and Logistics**

(1) **Logistics**

(a) What is the guidance on stocking of PSYOP and information materials and provisions to disseminating organizations?

(b) What are the provisions for the supply and maintenance of PSYOP-unique supplies and equipment?

(c) What are the provisions for control and maintenance of indigenous equipment and materials?

(d) What are the fiscal matters relating to special funds?

(e) What are the personnel matters relating to indigenous personnel?

(2) **Administration**

(a) What are the requirements for special reports?

(b) What are the requirements for planning and operations in support of education programs regarding EPWs and CIs?

(c) What will be the participation in interrogation of EPWs, CIs, and detainees to obtain information essential or peculiar to PSYOP?

h. Command and Control

(1) Refer to appropriate sections of Annex K (Command, Control, Communication, and Computer Systems) and provide pertinent extracts of information included in the basic plan or Annex K, to include the following.

- (2) What are the recognition and identification instructions?
- (3) What is the electronic policy?
- (4) What are the headquarters locations and movements?
- (5) What are the code words?
- (6) What is the frequency allocation?

2. Tab D Format

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND
APO AE 09128
8 February 1999

**TAB D TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USEURCOM OPLAN 4999-99 ()
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ()**

() References:

- a. JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*.
- b. Presidential Decision Directive-68, *International Public Information*.
- c. CJCSI 3110.05B, *Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 1998*.
- d. Memorandum in the Name of the Chairman-163-98, *Cooperation Agreement for Policy Coordination between the United States Information Agency and the Department of Defense (1997)*.
- e. List plans, estimates, basic PSYOP studies, special PSYOP studies, special PSYOP assessments, and other documents that have a significant bearing on the conduct of PSYOP.

1. () Situation. Summary of the psychological situation in the operational area, any ongoing PSYOP programs and any significant factors influencing PSYOP activities. (If parts of the situation description are long or complex, include as attachments.)

a. () Overview. Describe the general situation, competing goals, and the task(s) to be accomplished.

b. () US (or US and Allied) Perspective. Briefly outline intentions (how the assigned task(s) will be accomplished), capabilities (resources to be used), and activities (current actions and general phasing of future actions).

c. () Neutral Perspective (if applicable). Briefly outline estimated neutral intentions under various circumstances, the resources available to them, and their activities. State neutral actions and behavior that would favor mission accomplishment. Indicate apparent current COAs that might affect mission accomplishment and summarize resources available to execute alternative COAs. (Include the abilities to execute information operations strategies.) State objective and subjective factors that could affect decisions and resource effectiveness. Identify staff factions and particularly influential individuals. Describe the characteristics of decision makers, their key advisers, major staff planners, staff factions (particularly influential individuals), and intelligence system analysts. List groups of related planner and decision maker critical information, and for each group, list estimates of background knowledge and desired and harmful appreciations.

d. () Adversary Perspectives

(1) () Decision Maker and Staff. Identify the decision makers who can direct development or allocation of resources of COA execution pertinent to the task assigned. Outline feasible, alternative actions that would favor or harm friendly operational effectiveness. Indicate COAs that might affect friendly task accomplishment and summarize resources available to execute each COA. Describe the characteristics of adversary decision makers, their key advisers, and staff (particularly intelligence analysts).

(2) () Intelligence Systems. Identify intelligence systems that support decision makers and their staffs. Summarize intelligence systems' capabilities pertinent to the situation. Cite references for detail. Describe objective and subjective factors and the characteristics of collection planners and decision makers that affect their development and selection for use of information-gathering resources. List groups of related collection planner and decision maker critical information and for each group, list estimates of background knowledge and desired and harmful appreciation.

(3) () Target Audiences. Identify groups that can influence plans, decisions, and operational effectiveness in task accomplishment; identify their susceptibility to PSYOP. State group behavior favorable and harmful to task accomplishment. Briefly describe the apparent goals, motivations, and characteristics of each group and the leaders who can cause groups to

behave in various ways. List groups of related target audience critical information and, for each group, list estimates of background knowledge as well as desired and harmful appreciations.

(4) () Command Systems. Describe communication and computer systems and command centers used to plan COAs and control, coordinate, and supervise execution of the planned COA. Briefly identify the purpose of each C4S and its characteristics. State targets for jamming or attacking. Indicate when to execute operations to demoralize and disorganize opposing command, reduce opposing operational effectiveness, enhance the effectiveness of planned deceptions and PSYOP, and support OPSEC to the maximum advantage.

2. () Mission. Refer to the Basic Plan

3. () Execution

a. () Concept of Operations

(1) () Overview. State the commander's intent. Outline the overall concept for using PSYOP in support of task accomplishment. Sequentially address strategic PSYOP in peacetime and in support of preconflict deterrence options; strategic and theater PSYOP in support of sustained hostilities (conduct of war globally or in a region, and support for campaigns and operations); and joint tactical PSYOP in support of operational COAs. State who will plan and conduct each PSYOP and the supporting commanders.

(2) () Provide the following as general guidance to units and forces involved:

(a) () Valid PSYOP themes to be promoted to induce strategic and theater PSYOP objectives.

(b) () Valid or invalid PSYOP themes to be discouraged and indications of specific target audience sensitivities and harm that might occur if the themes are accepted by target audiences.

(c) () PSYOP actions suitable for use:

1. () Guidance for the conduct of military operations and actions, and personnel behavior, to promote valid PSYOP themes.

2. () Guidance for avoiding military operations and actions, and personnel behavior, that would result in harmful target audience attitudes and behavior.

3. () Description of the cultural and psychological characteristics of target audiences to aid operational planners and personnel in selecting COAs and interacting with target audience members.

(d) () Description of adversary PSYOP (including disinformation and propaganda) directed at US personnel and at foreign groups in the operational area and guidance for countering such adversary operations.

(3) () Provide an outline of each planned PSYOP operation. Indicate for each target audience and set of PSYOP objectives, overall themes, subgroups to be targeted, their characteristics, and specific themes to be promoted for each subgroup. As appropriate, refer to intelligence studies, basic PSYOP study, SPS, and SPA for detailed intelligence. State provisions for testing, producing, stocking, and disseminating PSYOP materials and for measuring PSYOP effectiveness. Describe command and staff arrangements for each campaign or operation and indicate supporting commanders. List resources required to plan and conduct PSYOP actions, including civil capabilities, indigenous assets, exploitation of EPWs, CIs, and detainees for PSYOP, and military PSYOP resources. State logistic requirements, including preparation, distribution, and stocking of PSYOP materials; transport of PSYOP material and personnel to operational areas and their basing and support while conducting PSYOP; provisions for the supply and maintenance of US and indigenous PSYOP material; and fiscal and personnel matters. Indicate requirements for implementing schedules and PSYOP operation control sheets. (Note: Treat plans for PSYOP conducted in support of UW operations by SO forces in support of military deceptions as OPSEC-sensitive. Assign each plan a code word and distribute it separately from the Basic Plan and Tab D.)

(4) () In the basic concept description and in each tab describing separate operations, provide OPSEC planning guidance. The guidance should address planning for, preparing for, and conducting PSYOP and PSYOP actions to maintain essential secrecy for the commander's intentions and to gain and maintain essential secrecy for OPSEC-sensitive PSYOP COAs.

b. () Situation Monitoring. Describe how intelligence, multidiscipline counterintelligence, security monitoring, and operational feedback will be provided. State requirement for running situation estimates; periodic estimates of target appreciations responsive to critical information, actions, and attitudes and behavior; and current reporting of intelligence and multidiscipline counterintelligence information, security monitoring results, and implementing actions. Identify resources required and their availability.

c. () Control. Outline how control will be affected and implementation centrally coordinated. State coordinating instructions. Describe accomplishment of implementation planning and supervision of the planned action. Identify the need for specific PSYOP. Address coordination with adjacent commands and civilian agencies, including US diplomatic missions and USAID. Address also coordination with military deception and OPSEC planners, EW planners, and planners in the fields of civic action, FHA, PA, CMO, EPW, civilian internees, detainees, command, control, communications, and computers, legal, captured US personnel, and operations.

d. () Tasks. Assign responsibilities to implement the concept. When multiple organizations are involved, designate an executive agent to coordinate implementation. Ensure that tasks clearly fix responsibilities and provide for feedback about effectiveness.

4. () Administration and Logistics. Provide a statement of the administrative and logistic arrangements applicable to PSYOP but not covered in the Basic Plan or another annex thereof. Include data on:

a. () Logistics

(1) () Stocking of propaganda and information materials and provisions to disseminating organizations.

(2) () Provisions for the supply and maintenance of PSYOP-unique supplies and equipment.

(3) () Provisions for control and maintenance of indigenous equipment and materials.

(4) () Fiscal matters relating to special funds.

(5) () Personnel matters relating to indigenous personnel.

b. () Administration

(1) () Requirements for special reports.

(2) () Requirements for planning and operations in support of education programs regarding EPWs and CIs.

(3) () Participation in interrogation of EPWs, CIs, and detainees to obtain information essential for or peculiar to PSYOP.

5. () Command and Control. Refer to appropriate sections of Annex K and provide pertinent extracts of information included in the Basic Plan or Annex K, including:

a. () Recognition and identification instructions.

b. () Electronic policy.

c. () Headquarters locations and movements.

d. () Code words.

e. () Frequency allocation.

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APPENDIX C REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-53 is based upon the following primary references.

1. US Public Laws

- a. National Security Act of 1947 (50 USC 413).
- b. DOD Reorganization Acts of 1958 and 1986.
- c. Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (Public Laws 99-591 and 99-661).
- d. 10 USC 167, *Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces*.

2. Executive Branch Documents

- a. Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*.
- b. National Security Directive 51, *US Government International Broadcasting*.
- c. National Security Decision Directive 130, *US International Information Policy*.
- d. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-68, *International Public Information (IPI)*.
- e. National Security Strategy of the United States (current year).
- f. National Drug Control Strategy (current year).
- g. “US Capabilities to Engage in Low-Intensity Conflict and Conduct Special Operations,” The President’s Report to Congress.
- h. National Security Decision Directive 77.

3. Department of State Publication

Department of State Publication 9434, *Treaties in Force*.

4. DOD Publications

- a. DODD S-3321.1, *Overt Peacetime Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Contingencies Short of Declared War*.
- b. DODD S-3600.1, *Information Operations (IO) (U)*.

- c. DODD 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components*.
- d. DODD 5132.3 w/ch1, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance*.
- e. DODD 5138.3, *Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict)*.
- f. DODD 5525.1 w/ch2, *Status-of-Forces Policies and Information*.
- g. DODD 5530.3 w/ch1, *International Agreements*.
- h. DODI 5240.10 w/ch1, *DOD Counterintelligence Support to Unified and Specified Commands*.
- i. DOD Handbook 0-2000.12-H w/ch1, ch2, *Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence*.

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions and Manuals

- a. CJCSI 3110.05B, *Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 1998*.
- b. CJCSI 3210.01A, *Joint Information Operations Policy (u)*.
- c. CJCSM 3113.01A, *Theater Engagement Planning*.
- d. CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures)*.
- e. CJCSM 3122.03A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)*.

6. Joint Publications

- a. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.
- b. JP 1-05, *Religion and Religious Support in Joint Operations*.
- c. JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.
- d. JP 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations*.
- e. JP 2-01.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence in Joint Operations*.

- f. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*.
- g. JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*.
- h. JP 3-05.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*.
- i. JP 3-05.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning*.
- j. JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*.
- k. JP 3.07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*.
- l. JP 3.07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism*.
- m. JP 3.07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*.
- n. JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*.
- o. JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*.
- p. JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*.
- q. JP 3-13.1, *Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)*.
- r. JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*.
- s. JP 3-51, *Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare*.
- t. JP 3-54, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Security*.
- u. JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*.
- v. JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*.
- w. JP 3-58, *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*.
- x. JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*.
- y. JP 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*.
- z. JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*.

- aa. JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*.
- bb. JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*.

7. Department of the Army Publications

- a. FM 3-0, *Operations*.
- b. FM 3-05, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations*.
- c. FM 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations*.
- d. FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*.
- e. FM 27-10, *Law of Land Warfare*.
- f. FM 31-20(C), *Special Forces Operations*.
- g. FM 33-1-1, *Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures*.
- h. FM 100-6, *Information Operations*.

8. Department of the Navy Publications

- a. OPNAVINST 3430.25, *Information Warfare and Command and Control Warfare*.
- b. OPNAVINST 3430.26, *Implementing Instruction for Information Warfare Command*.
- c. OPNAVINST 3434.1, *Psychological Operations*.
- d. SECNAVINST 3300.1A, *Law of Armed Conflict (Law of War) Program to Insure Compliance by the Naval Establishment*.
- e. Navy Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*.

9. Department of the Air Force Publications

- a. AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*.
- b. AFDD 2-5, *Information Operations*.
- c. AFDD 2-5.3, *Psychological Operations*.
- d. AFDD 2-7, *Special Operations*.

- e. AFDD 2-7.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*.
- f. AFPD 51-4, *Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict*.
- g. AFPD 51-7, *International Law*.
- h. AFI 51-401, *Training and Reporting to Ensure Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict*.
- i. AFI 51-701, *Negotiating, Concluding, Reporting, and Maintaining International Agreements*.

10. United States Marine Corps Publications

- a. MCWP 3-33.1, *MAGTF Civil-Military Operations*.
- b. MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*.
- c. MCWP 3-40.6, *Psychological Operations*.

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APPENDIX D
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Special Operations Command. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-53, 10 July 1996, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SOOP-JD//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//
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Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

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c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 15 November 1999, *Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands*.

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GLOSSARY
PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|-------------|--|
| AC | Active Component |
| AFAOC | Air Force air and space operations center |
| AM | amplitude modulation |
| AOR | area of responsibility |
| ASD(SO/LIC) | Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) |
| AUTODIN | Automatic Digital Network |
| C2 | command and control |
| C4S | command, control, communications, and computer systems |
| CAO | civil affairs operations |
| CI | civilian internee |
| CJCS | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| CJCSI | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction |
| CJCSM | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual |
| CMO | civil-military operations |
| CNO | computer network operations |
| COA | course of action |
| COCOM | combatant command (command authority) |
| COLISEUM | community on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers |
| CONUS | continental United States |
| CT | counterterrorism |
| DA | direct action |
| DC | dislocated civilian |
| DMS | defense message system |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| DODD | Department of Defense directive |
| EPW | enemy prisoner of war |
| EW | electronic warfare |
| FHA | foreign humanitarian assistance |
| FID | foreign internal defense |
| FIWC | fleet information warfare center |
| FM | frequency modulation |
| HN | host nation |
| HNS | host-nation support |
| HUMINT | human intelligence |

| | |
|-------|---|
| IIP | international information program |
| IO | information operations |
| J-3 | operations directorate of a joint staff |
| JFC | joint force commander |
| JOPEs | Joint Operation Planning and Execution System |
| JP | joint publication |
| JPOTF | joint psychological operations task force |
| JSCP | Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan |
| JSOTF | joint special operations task force |
| JTCB | joint targeting coordination board |
| JTF | joint task force |
| MCS | Military Capabilities Study |
| MOE | measure of effectiveness |
| MOOTW | military operations other than war |
| NGO | nongovernmental organization |
| OPCON | operational control |
| OPLAN | operation plan |
| OPSEC | operations security |
| PA | public affairs |
| POAS | PSYOP automated system |
| POAT | psychological operations assessment team |
| POB | psychological operations battalion |
| POG | psychological operations group |
| PSE | psychological operations support element |
| PSYOP | psychological operations |
| RC | Reserve Components |
| SO | special operations |
| SPA | special psychological operations (PSYOP) assessment |
| SPS | special psychological operations (PSYOP) study |
| SR | special reconnaissance |
| TA | target audience |
| TARBS | transportable amplitude modulation and frequency modulation radio broadcast system |
| TPB | tactical psychological operations battalion |
| TPFDD | time-phased force and deployment data |
| TSC | theater security cooperation |
| TV | television |

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| USAF | United States Air Force |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| USD(P) | Under Secretary of Defense for Policy |
| USG | United States Government |
| USJFCOM | United States Joint Forces Command |
| USSOCOM | United States Special Operations Command |
| UW | unconventional warfare |

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

basic psychological operations study. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

battle damage assessment. The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA. See also combat assessment; measures of effectiveness. (JP 1-02)

battlefield psychological activities. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs activities. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military

operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combat assessment. The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components: (a) battle damage assessment; (b) munitions effectiveness assessment; and (c) reattack recommendation. Also called CA. See also battle damage assessment; measures of effectiveness. (JP 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CBT. (JP 1-02)

consolidation psychological operations. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

counterpropaganda operations. Those psychological operations activities that identify adversary propaganda, contribute to situational awareness, and serve to expose adversary attempts to influence friendly populations and military forces. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

critical information. Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities vitally needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02)

direct action. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces or special operations-capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces or special operations-capable units may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; conduct independent sabotage; and conduct anti-ship operations. Also called DA. (JP 1-02)

dislocated civilian. A broad term that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an expellee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also called DC. (JP 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (JP 1-02)

joint psychological operations task force. A joint special operations task force composed of headquarters and operational assets. It assists the joint force commander in developing strategic, operational, and tactical psychological operation plans for a theater campaign or other operations. Mission requirements will determine its composition and assigned or attached units to support the joint task force commander. Also called JPOTF. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

measures of effectiveness. Tools used to measure results achieved in the overall mission and execution of assigned tasks. Measures of effectiveness are a prerequisite to the performance of combat assessment. Also called MOEs. (JP 1-02)

military deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are as follows. a. strategic

military deception — Military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator's strategic military objectives, policies, and operations. b. operational military deception — Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in a theater to support campaigns and major operations. c. tactical military deception — Military deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements. d. Service military deception — Military deception planned and executed by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems. e. military deception in support of operations security (OPSEC) — Military deception planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities. (JP 1-02)

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

perception management. Actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator's objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations. (JP 1-02)

propaganda. Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations assessment team. A small, tailored team (approximately 4-12 personnel) that consists of psychological operations planners and product distribution/dissemination and logistic

specialists. The team is deployed to theater at the request of the combatant commander to assess the situation, develop psychological operations objectives and recommend the appropriate level of support to accomplish the mission. Also called POAT. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

psychological operations impact indicators. An observable event or a discernible subjectively determined behavioral change that represents an effect of a psychological operations activity on the intended foreign target audience at a particular point in time. It is measured evidence, ascertained during the analytical phase of the psychological operations development process, to evaluate the degree to which the psychological operations objective is achieved. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

psychological operations support element. A tailored element that can provide limited psychological operations support. Psychological operations support elements do not contain organic command and control capability; therefore, command relationships must be clearly defined. The size, composition and capability of the psychological operations support element are determined by the requirements of the supported commander. A psychological operations support element is not designed to provide full-spectrum psychological operations capability; reachback is critical for its mission success. Also called PSE. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

psychological warfare. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02)

public diplomacy. Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

public information. Information of a military nature, the dissemination of which through public news media is not inconsistent with security, and the release of which is considered desirable or nonobjectionable to the responsible releasing agency. (JP 1-02)

receptivity. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance. Also called SR. (JP 1-02)

strategic psychological activities. Planned psychological activities in peace, crisis, and war, which pursue objectives to gain the support and cooperation of friendly and neutral countries and to reduce the will and the capacity of hostile or potentially hostile countries to wage war. (JP 1-02)


susceptibility. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

target audience. An individual or group selected for influence or attack by means of psychological operations. (JP 1-02)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW. (JP 1-02)

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-53** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

