

KARL MARX
FREDERICK ENGELS

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has for years taken the *Bon Sens* and the *Démocratie pacifique*; he solemnly conferred with Louis Blanc and Considérant, but found himself out of his depth, and returned home none the wiser. Now as before he loudly advocates free competition or, as the Swedes have it, freedom of *nourishment* or else *själfförsörjningsfrihet*, freedom of self-supply (which sounds even better than freedom to pursue a *trade*). Of course, they're still up to their necks in the guild nonsense and, in the parliaments, it's precisely the bourgeois who are the most rabid conservatives. Throughout the whole country there are only two proper towns, à 80,000 and 40,000 inhabitants respectively, the third, Norrköping, having only 12,000 and all the rest perhaps 1,000, 2,000, 3,000. At every post station there's one inhabitant. In Denmark things are scarcely better, since they have only one solitary city there, in which the guilds indulge in the most ludicrous proceedings, madder even than in Basle or Bremen, and where you aren't allowed on the promenade without an entrance ticket. The only thing these countries are good for is to show what the Germans would do if they had freedom of the press, viz., what the Danes have actually done, immediately found a 'society for the proper use of the free press', and print almanacs full of Christian good intentions. The Swedish *Aftonbladet* is as tame as the *Kölnier Zeitung*, but considers itself 'democratic in the true sense of the word'. On the other hand the Swedes have the novels of Fröken^a Bremer and the Danes of Councillor of State (Era traad) Oehlenschläger, Commander of the Order of the Dannebrog.¹³⁸ There's also a terrific number of Hegelians there and the language, every third word of which is filched from the German, is admirably suited to speculation.

A report was begun long ago and will follow within the next few days.¹³⁴ Write and tell me if you have Proudhon's book.^b

If you wish to make use of Proudhon's book, which is bad, for your own book,⁵ I will send you the very extensive excerpts I have made. It's not worth the 15 francs it costs.

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^a Miss - b P. J. Proudhon, *Système des contradictions économiques, ou Philosophie de la misère*.

36

MARX TO PAVEL VASILYEVICH ANNENKOV¹³⁵

IN PARIS

Brussels, 28 December [1846] Rue
d'Orléans, 42, Faubourg Namur

My dear Mr Annenkov,

You would long since have had a reply to your letter of 1 November had not my bookseller delayed sending me Mr Proudhon's book, *Philosophie de la misère*, until last week. I skimmed through it in two days so as to be able to give you my opinion straight away. Having read the book very cursorily, I cannot go into details but can only let you have the general impression it made on me. Should you so desire, I could go into it in greater detail in another letter.

To be frank, I must admit that I find the book on the whole poor, if not very poor. You yourself make fun in your letter of the 'little bit of German philosophy' paraded by Mr Proudhon in this amorphous and overweening work, but you assume that the economic argument has remained untainted by the philosophic poison. Therefore I am by no means inclined to ascribe the faults of the economic argument to Mr Proudhon's philosophy. Mr Proudhon does not provide a false critique of political economy because his philosophy is absurd—he produces an absurd philosophy because he has not understood present social conditions in their *engrènement*,^a to use a word which Mr Proudhon borrows from Fourier, like so much else.

Why does Mr Proudhon speak of God, of universal reason, of mankind's impersonal reason which is never mistaken, which has at all times been equal to itself and of which one only has to be correctly aware in order to arrive at truth? Why does he indulge in feeble Hegelianism in order to set himself up as an *esprit fort*^b?

He himself provides the key to this enigma. Mr Proudhon sees in history a definite series of social developments; he finds progress realised in history; finally, he finds that men, taken as individuals, did not know what they were about, were mistaken as to their own course, i. e. that their social development appears at first sight to be something distinct, separate and independent of their individual development. He is unable to explain these facts,

^a intermeshing - ^b Literally: strong intellect

and the hypothesis of universal reason made manifest is ready to hand. Nothing is easier than to invent mystical causes, i.e. phrases in which common sense is lacking.

But in admitting his total incomprehension of the historical development of mankind—and he admits as much in making use of high-flown expressions such as universal reason, God, etc.—does not Mr Proudhon admit, implicitly and of necessity, his inability to understand *economic development*?

What is society, irrespective of its form? The product of man's interaction upon man. Is man free to choose this or that form of society? By no means. If you assume a given state of development of man's productive faculties, you will have a corresponding form of commerce and consumption. If you assume given stages of development in production, commerce or consumption, you will have a corresponding form of social constitution, a corresponding organisation, whether of the family, of the estates or of the classes—in a word, a corresponding civil society. If you assume this or that civil society, you will have this or that political system, which is but the official expression of civil society. This is something Mr Proudhon will never understand, for he imagines he's doing something great when he appeals from the state to civil society, i. e. to official society from the official epitome of society.

Needless to say, man is not free to choose *his productive forces*—upon which his whole history is based—for every productive force is an acquired force, the product of previous activity. Thus the productive forces are the result of man's practical energy, but that energy is in turn circumscribed by the conditions in which man is placed by the productive forces already acquired, by the form of society which exists before him, which he does not create, which is the product of the preceding generation. The simple fact that every succeeding generation finds productive forces acquired by the preceding generation and which serve it as the raw material of further production, engenders a relatedness in the history of man, engenders a history of mankind, which is all the more a history of mankind as man's productive forces, and hence his social relations, have expanded. From this it can only be concluded that the social history of man is never anything else than the history of his individual development, whether he is conscious of this or not. His material relations form the basis of all his relations. These material relations are but the necessary forms in which his material and individual activity is realised.

Mr Proudhon confuses ideas and things. Man never renounces what he has gained, but this does not mean that he never

renounces the form of society in which he has acquired certain productive forces. On the contrary. If he is not to be deprived of the results obtained or to forfeit the fruits of civilisation, man is compelled to change all his traditional social forms as soon as the mode of commerce ceases to correspond to the productive forces acquired. Here I use the word *commerce* in its widest sense—as we would say *Verkehr* in German. For instance, privilege, the institution of guilds and corporations, the regulatory system of the Middle Ages, were the only social relations that corresponded to the acquired productive forces and to the pre-existing social conditions from which those institutions had emerged. Protected by the corporative and regulatory system, capital had accumulated, maritime trade had expanded, colonies had been founded—and man would have lost the very fruits of all this had he wished to preserve the forms under whose protection those fruits had ripened. And, indeed, two thunderclaps occurred, the revolutions of 1640 and of 1688. In England, all the earlier economic forms, the social relations corresponding to them, and the political system which was the official expression of the old civil society, were destroyed. Thus, the economic forms in which man produces, consumes and exchanges are *transitory and historical*. With the acquisition of new productive faculties man changes his mode of production and with the mode of production he changes all the economic relations which were but the necessary relations of that particular mode of production.

It is this that Mr Proudhon has failed to understand, let alone demonstrate. Unable to follow the real course of history, Mr Proudhon provides a phantasmagoria which he has the presumption to present as a dialectical phantasmagoria. He no longer feels any need to speak of the seventeenth, eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, for his history takes place in the nebulous realm of the imagination and soars high above time and place. In a word, it is Hegelian trash, it is not history; it is not profane history—history of mankind, but sacred history—history of ideas. As seen by him, man is but the instrument used by the idea or eternal reason in order to unfold itself. The *evolutions* of which Mr Proudhon speaks are presumed to be evolutions such as take place in the mystical bosom of the absolute idea. If the veil of this mystical language be rent, it will be found that what Mr Proudhon gives us is the order in which economic categories are arranged within his mind. It would require no great effort on my part to prove to you that this arrangement is the arrangement of a very disorderly mind.

Mr Proudhon opens his book with a dissertation on *value* which is his hobby-horse. For the time being I shall not embark upon an examination of that dissertation.

The series of eternal reason's economic evolutions begins with the *division of labour*. For Mr Proudhon, the division of labour is something exceedingly simple. But was not the caste system a specific division of labour? And was not the corporative system another division of labour? And is not the division of labour in the manufacturing system, which began in England in the middle of the seventeenth century and ended towards the end of the eighteenth century, likewise entirely distinct from the division of labour in big industry, in modern industry?

Mr Proudhon is so far from the truth that he neglects to do what even profane economists do. In discussing the division of labour, he feels no need to refer to the world *market*. Well! Must not the division of labour in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when there were as yet no colonies, when America was still non-existent for Europe, and when Eastern Asia existed only through the mediation of Constantinople, have been utterly different from the division of labour in the seventeenth century, when colonies were already developed?

And that is not all. Is the whole internal organisation of nations, are their international relations, anything but the expression of a given division of labour? And must they not change as the division of labour changes?

Mr Proudhon has so little understood the question of the division of labour that he does not even mention the separation of town and country which occurred in Germany, for instance, between the ninth and twelfth centuries. Thus, to Mr Proudhon, that separation must be an eternal law because he is unaware either of its origin or of its development. Throughout his book he speaks as though this creation of a given mode of production were to last till the end of time. All that Mr Proudhon says about the division of labour is but a résumé, and a very superficial and very incomplete résumé at that, of what Adam Smith and a thousand others said before him.

The second evolution is *machinery*. With Mr Proudhon, the relation between the division of labour and machinery is a wholly mystical one. Each one of the modes of the division of labour had its specific instruments of production. For instance, between the mid-seventeenth and mid-eighteenth century man did not make everything by hand. He had tools and very intricate ones, such as looms, ships, levers, etc., etc.

Thus nothing could be more absurd than to see machinery as deriving from the division of labour in general.

In passing I should also point out that, not having understood the historical origin of machinery, Mr. Proudhon has still less understood its development. Up till 1825—when the first general crisis occurred—it might be said that the requirements of consumption as a whole were growing more rapidly than production, and that the development of machinery was the necessary consequence of the needs of the market. Since 1825, the invention and use of machinery resulted solely from the war between masters and workmen. But this is true only of England. As for the European nations, they were compelled to use machinery by the competition they were encountering from the English, in their home markets as much as in the world market. Finally, where North America was concerned, the introduction of machinery was brought about both by competition with other nations and by scarcity of labour, i. e. by the disproportion between the population and the industrial requirements of North America. From this you will be able to see what wisdom Mr Proudhon evinces when he conjures up the spectre of competition as the third evolution, as the antithesis of machinery!

Finally, and generally speaking, it is truly absurd to make *machinery* an economic category alongside the division of labour, competition, credit, etc.

Machinery is no more an economic category than the ox who draws the plough. The present *use* of machinery is one of the relations of our present economic system, but the way in which machinery is exploited is quite distinct from the machinery itself. Powder is still powder, whether you use it to wound a man or to dress his wounds.

Mr Proudhon surpasses himself in causing to grow inside his own brain competition, monopoly, taxes or police, balance of trade, credit and property in the order I have given here. Nearly all the credit institutions had been developed in England by the beginning of the eighteenth century, before the invention of machinery. State credit was simply another method of increasing taxes and meeting the new requirements created by the rise to power of the bourgeois class. Finally, *property* constitutes the last category in Mr Proudhon's system. In the really existing world, on the other hand, the division of labour and all Mr Proudhon's other categories are social relations which together go to make up what is now known as *property*; outside these relations bourgeois property is nothing but a metaphysical or juridical illusion. The

property of another epoch, feudal property, developed in a wholly different set of social relations. In establishing property as an independent relation, Mr Proudhon is guilty of more than a methodological error: he clearly proves his failure to grasp the bond linking all forms of *bourgeois* production, or to understand the *historical* and *transitory* nature of the forms of production in any one epoch. Failing to see our social institutions as historical products and to understand either their origin or their development, Mr Proudhon can only subject them to a dogmatic critique.

Hence Mr Proudhon is compelled to resort to a *fiction* in order to explain development. He imagines that the division of labour, credit, machinery, etc., were all invented in the service of his *idée fixe*, the idea of equality. His explanation is sublimely naïve. These things were invented for the sake of equality, but unfortunately they have turned against equality. That is the whole of his argument. In other words, he makes a gratuitous assumption and, because actual development contradicts his fiction at every turn, he concludes that there is a contradiction. He conceals the fact that there is a contradiction only between his *idees fixes* and the real movement.

Thus Mr Proudhon, chiefly because he doesn't know history, fails to see that, in developing his productive faculties, i.e. in living, man develops certain inter-relations, and that the nature of these relations necessarily changes with the modification and the growth of the said productive faculties. He fails to see that *economic categories* are but *abstractions* of those real relations, that they are truths only in so far as those relations continue to exist. Thus he falls into the error of bourgeois economists who regard those economic categories as eternal laws and not as historical laws which are laws only for a given historical development, a specific development of the productive forces. Thus, instead of regarding politico-economic categories as abstractions of actual social relations that are transitory and historical, Mr Proudhon, by a mystical inversion, sees in the real relations only the embodiment of those abstractions. Those abstractions are themselves formulas which have been slumbering in the bosom of God the Father since the beginning of the world.

But here our good Mr Proudhon falls prey to severe intellectual convulsions. If all these economic categories are emanations of God's heart, if they are the hidden and eternal life of man, how is it, first, that there is any development and, secondly, that Mr Proudhon is not a conservative? He explains these evident contradictions in terms of a whole system of antagonisms.

In order to explain this system of antagonisms, let us take an example.

Monopoly is good because it is an economic category, hence an emanation of God. Competition is good because it, too, is an economic category. But what is not good is the reality of monopoly and the reality of competition. And what is even worse is that monopoly and competition mutually devour each other. What is to be done about it? Because these two eternal thoughts of God contradict each other, it seems clear to him that, in God's bosom, there is likewise a synthesis of these two thoughts in which the evils of monopoly are balanced by competition and vice versa. The result of the struggle between the two ideas will be that only the good aspects will be thrown into relief. This secret idea need only be wrested from God and put into practice and all will be for the best; the synthetic formula concealed in the night of mankind's impersonal reason must be revealed. Mr Proudhon does not hesitate for a moment to act as revealer.

But take a brief glance at real life. In present-day economic life you will find, not only competition and monopoly, but also their synthesis, which is not a *formula* but a *movement*. Monopoly produces competition, competition produces monopoly. That equation, however, far from alleviating the difficulties of the present situation, as bourgeois economists suppose, gives rise to a situation even more difficult and involved. Thus, by changing the basis upon which the present economic relations rest, by abolishing the present *mode* of production, you abolish not only competition, monopoly and their antagonism, but also their unity, their synthesis, the movement whereby a true balance is maintained between competition and monopoly.

Let me now give you an example of Mr Proudhon's dialectics. *Freedom* and *slavery* constitute an antagonism. There is no need for me to speak either of the good or of the bad aspects of freedom. As for slavery, there is no need for me to speak of its bad aspects. The only thing requiring explanation is the good side of slavery. I do not mean indirect slavery, the slavery of proletariat; I mean direct slavery, the slavery of the Blacks in Surinam, in Brazil, in the southern regions of North America.

Direct slavery is as much the pivot upon which our present-day industrialism turns as are machinery, credit, etc. Without slavery there would be no cotton, without cotton there would be no modern industry. It is slavery which has given value to the colonies, it is the colonies which have created world trade, and world trade is the necessary condition for large-scale machine

industry. Consequently, prior to the slave trade, the colonies sent very few products to the Old World, and did not noticeably change the face of the world. Slavery is therefore an economic category of paramount importance. Without slavery, North America, the most progressive nation, would be transformed into a patriarchal country. Only wipe North America off the map and you will get anarchy, the complete decay of trade and modern civilisation. But to do away with slavery would be to wipe America off the map. Being an economic category, slavery has existed in all nations since the beginning of the world. All that modern nations have achieved is to disguise slavery at home and import it openly into the New World. After these reflections on slavery, what will the good Mr Proudhon do? He will seek the synthesis of liberty and slavery, the true golden mean, in other words the balance between slavery and liberty.

Mr Proudhon understands perfectly well that men manufacture worsted, linsens and silks; and whatever credit is due for understanding such a trifle! What Mr Proudhon does not understand is that, according to their faculties, men also produce the *social relations* in which they produce worsted and linsens. Still less does Mr Proudhon understand that those who produce social relations in conformity with their material productivity also produce the *ideas, categories*, i.e. the ideal abstract expressions of those same social relations. Indeed, the categories are no more eternal than the relations they express. They are historical and transitory products. To Mr Proudhon, on the contrary, the prime cause consists in abstractions and categories. According to him it is these and not men which make history. *The abstraction, the category regarded as such*, i.e. as distinct from man and his material activity, is, of course, immortal, immutable, impassive. It is nothing but an entity of pure reason, which is only another way of saying that an abstraction, regarded as such, is abstract. An admirable *tautology!*

Hence, to Mr Proudhon, economic relations, seen in the form of categories, are eternal formulas without origin or progress.

To put it another way: Mr Proudhon does not directly assert that to him *bourgeois life* is an *eternal truth*: he says so indirectly, by deifying the categories which express bourgeois relations in the form of thought. He regards the products of bourgeois society as spontaneous entities, endowed with a life of their own, eternal, the moment these present themselves to him in the shape of categories, of thought. Thus he fails to rise above the bourgeois horizon. Because he operates with bourgeois thoughts and assumes them to be eternally true, he looks for the synthesis of

those thoughts, their balance, and fails to see that their present manner of maintaining a balance is the only possible one.

In fact he does what all good bourgeois do. They all maintain that competition, monopoly, etc., are, in principle—i.e. regarded as abstract thoughts—the only basis for existence, but leave a great deal to be desired in practice. What they all want is competition without the pernicious consequences of competition. They all want the impossible, i.e. the conditions of bourgeois existence without the necessary consequences of those conditions. They all fail to understand that the bourgeois form of production is an historical and transitory form, just as was the feudal form. This mistake is due to the fact that, to them, bourgeois man is the only possible basis for any society, and that they cannot envisage a state of society in which man will have ceased to be bourgeois.

Hence Mr Proudhon is necessarily *doctrinaire*. The historical movement by which the present world is convulsed resolves itself, so far as he is concerned, into the problem of discovering the right balance, the synthesis of two bourgeois thoughts. Thus, by subtlety, the clever fellow discovers God's secret thought, the unity of two isolated thoughts which are isolated thoughts only because Mr Proudhon has isolated them from practical life, from present-day production, which is the combination of the realities they express. In place of the great historical movement which is born of the conflict between the productive forces already acquired by man, and his social relations which no longer correspond to those productive forces, in the place of the terrible wars now imminent between the various classes of a nation and between the various nations, in place of practical and violent action on the part of the masses, which is alone capable of resolving those conflicts, in place of that movement—vast, prolonged and complex—Mr Proudhon puts the cackly-dauphin movement¹⁸⁶ of his own mind. Thus it is the savants, the men able to filch from God his inmost thoughts, who make history. All the lesser fry have to do is put their revelations into practice.

Now you will understand why Mr Proudhon is the avowed enemy of all political movements. For him, the solution of present-day problems does not consist in public action but in the dialectical rotations of his brain. Because to him the categories are the motive force, it is not necessary to change practical life in order to change the categories; on the contrary, it is necessary to change the categories, whereupon actual society will change as a result.

In his desire to reconcile contradictions Mr Proudhon does not

ask himself whether the very basis of those contradictions ought not to be subverted. He is exactly like the political doctrinaire who wants a king and a chamber of deputies and a chamber of peers as integral parts of social life, as eternal categories. Only he seeks a new formula with which to balance those powers (whose balance consists precisely in the actual movement in which one of those powers is now the conqueror now the slave of the other). In the eighteenth century, for instance, a whole lot of mediocre minds busied themselves with finding the true formula with which to maintain a balance between the social estates, the nobility, the king, the parliaments,¹⁸⁷ etc., and the next day there was neither king, nor parliament, nor nobility. The proper balance between the aforesaid antagonisms consisted in the convulsion of all the social relations which served as a basis for those feudal entities and for the antagonism between those feudal entities.

Because Mr Proudhon posits on the one hand eternal ideas, the categories of pure reason, and, on the other, man and his practical life which, according to him, is the practical application of these categories, you will find in him from the very outset a *dualism* between life and ideas, between soul and body—a dualism which recurs in many forms. So you now see that the said antagonism is nothing other than Mr Proudhon's inability to understand either the origin or the profane history of the categories he has defied.

My letter is already too long for me to mention the absurd case Mr Proudhon is conducting against communism. For the present you will concede that a man who has failed to understand either the present state of society must be even less able to understand either the movement which tends to overturn it or the literary expression of that revolutionary movement.

The *only point* upon which I am in complete agreement with Mr Proudhon is the disgust he feels for socialist sentimentalising. I anticipated him in provoking considerable hostility by the ridicule I directed at ovine, sentimental, utopian socialism. But is not Mr Proudhon subject to strange delusions when he opposes his petty-bourgeois sentimentality, by which I mean his homilies about home, conjugal love and suchlike banalities, to socialist sentimentality which—as for instance in Fourier's case—is infinitely more profound than the presumptuous platitudes of our worthy Proudhon? He himself is so well aware of the emptiness of his reasoning; of his complete inability to discuss such things, that he indulges in tantrums, exclamations and *vraie hominis prohi*,^a that he

^a the anger of an upright man

fumes, curses, denounces, cries pestilence and infamy, thumps his chest and glorifies himself before God and man as being innocent of socialist infamies! It is not as a critic that he derides socialist sentimentalities, or what he takes to be sentimentalities. It is as a saint, a pope, that he excommunicates the poor sinners and sings the praises of the petty bourgeois and of the miserable patriarchal amorous illusions of the domestic hearth. Nor is this in any way fortuitous. Mr Proudhon is, from top to toe, a philosopher, an economist of the petty bourgeoisie. In an advanced society and because of his situation, a *petty bourgeois* becomes a socialist on the one hand, and economist on the other, i.e. he is dazzled by the magnificence of the upper middle classes and feels compassion for the sufferings of the people. He is at one and the same time bourgeois and man of the people. In his heart of hearts he prides himself on his impartiality, on having found the correct balance, allegedly distinct from the happy medium. A petty bourgeois of this kind defies *contradiction*, for contradiction is the very basis of his being. He is nothing but social contradiction in action. He must justify by means of theory what he is in practice, and Mr Proudhon has the merit of being the scientific exponent of the French petty bourgeoisie, which is a real merit since the petty bourgeoisie will be an integral part of all the impending social revolutions.

With this letter I should have liked to send you my book on political economy,⁵ but up till now I have been unable to have printed either this work or the critique of German philosophers and socialists² which I mentioned to you in Brussels. You would never believe what difficulties a publication of this kind runs into in Germany, on the one hand from the police, on the other from the booksellers, who are themselves the interested representatives of all those tendencies I attack. And as for our own party, not only is it poor, but there is a large faction in the German communist party which bears me a grudge because I am opposed to its utopias and its declaiming.

Ever yours

Charles Marx

P.S. Perhaps you may wonder why I should be writing in bad French rather than in good German. It is because I am dealing with a French writer.

^a K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology*.

¹²⁷ Disturbances among workers took place in the Faubourg St. Antoine in Paris from 30 September to 2 October 1846. They were caused by the intended raising of the price of bread. The workers stormed bakers' shops and raised barricades, there were clashes with troops. Paris members of the League of the Just were suspected by police of participating in the disturbances.

Engels' letter to Gigot mentioned above has not been found.
Strubingens—see notes 86 and 116.—89

¹²⁸ Ewerbeck had left for Lyons at that time.—90

¹²⁹ A reference to the complications which arose in the relations of Marx and Engels with the leaders of the League of the Just in London (Karl Schapper, Joseph Moll, Heinrich Bauer). The latter maintained contacts with the Brussels Communist Correspondence Committee and together with Harney formed a correspondence committee in London (below Engels writes about Harney's particular). However, Schapper, Moll and Bauer, influenced by certain immature ideas of utopian 'working-class communism', including those of Weitling, were still very cautious at that time in regard to revolutionary theoreticians—'scholars'. They did not approve of Marx's and Engels' attacks on Kriege and other 'true socialists', sought ways of reconciling various trends and, with this aim in view, planned to convene a congress of participants in the communist movement early in May 1847. In this connection they issued an address to the League of the Just members in November 1846. Marx and Engels considered that to convene such a congress without thorough preparation and dissociation from the trends hostile to the proletariat would be premature. The effect of scientific communist ideas, however, proved stronger than sectarian and backward tendencies. At the beginning of 1847 the London leaders of the League of the Just themselves took a step to remove their differences and draw closer to Marx and Engels.—91

¹³⁰ The address of the German Workers' Educational Society in London to Johannes Ronge, leader of the bourgeois trend of German Catholics, was drawn up by Weitling in March 1845 and testified to the immature views of the leaders of the Society and the League of the Just. The document developed the idea that the Christian religion, 'purified' and reformed, could serve communism.

On the address of the Educational Society in London about Schleswig-Holstein, see Note 96.—91

¹³¹ At that time the Verlagbuchhandlung zu Belle-Vue was owned by Johann Marmor and August Schmid. It is impossible to establish which of the two Engels means. In December 1846 the firm moved to Constance.—93

¹³² As is seen from the publisher Löwenthal's letter to Engels of 11 March 1847 (included in *MEGA*₂, Abt. III, Bd. 2, S. 330), Engels intended to have his 'Die Gegenwart der blonden Race' printed by J. Rütten of Literarische Anstalt publishers. Judging by Engels' letter to Marx of 10 December 1851, Engels returned to this subject after the 1848-49 revolution, which had interrupted his studies (see this volume, p. 509). However, there is no information as to whether he realised his intention.—93, 509

¹³³ The *Order of the Dannebrog* (Order of the Danish State Banner)—an Order of Danish knights founded in 1671.—94

¹³⁴ Engels' report to the Brussels Communist Correspondence Committee has not been found.—94

¹³⁵ Marx wrote this letter in reply to the request of his Russian acquaintance Pavel Vasilyevich Annenkov for his opinion on Proudhon's *Système des contradictions économiques, ou Philosophie de la misère*. On 1 November 1846 Annenkov wrote to Marx, concerning Proudhon's book: 'I admit that the actual plan of the work seems to be a *jeu d'esprit*, designed to give a glimpse of German philosophy, rather than something grown naturally out of the subject and requirements of its logical development.'

Marx's profound and precise criticism of Proudhon's views, and his exposition of dialectical and materialist views to counterbalance them, produced a strong impression even on Annenkov, who was far from materialism and communism. He wrote to Marx on 6 January 1847: 'Your opinion of Proudhon's book produced a truly invigorating effect on me by its preciseness, its clarity, and above all its tendency to keep within the bounds of reality' (*MEGA*₂, Abt. III, Bd. 2, S. 321).

When in 1880 Annenkov published his reminiscences 'Remarkable Decade 1838-1848' in the *Vestnik Yevropy*, he included in them long extracts from Marx's letter. In 1883, the year when Marx died, these extracts, translated into German, were published in *Die Neue Zeit* and *New-Yorker Volkszeitung*.

The original has not been found. The first English translation of this letter was published in: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Correspondence. 1846-1895*, Martin Lawrence Ltd., London, 1934.—95

¹³⁶ Here Marx uses the word 'cacadauphin' by which during the French Revolution opponents of the absolutist regime derisively described the mustard-coloured cloth, recalling the colour of the Dauphin's napkins, made fashionable by Queen Marie Antoinette.—103

¹³⁷ *Parliaments*—judicial institutions which arose in France in the Middle Ages. They enjoyed the right to remonstrate government decrees. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries their members were officials of high birth called *noblesse de robe* (the nobility of the mantle). The parliaments, which finally became the bulwark of feudal opposition to absolutism and impeded the implementation of even moderate reforms, were abolished in 1790, during the French Revolution.—104

¹³⁸ The letter was dated 1845 by mistake. The correct date was established on the basis of the contents and the postmark: 'Paris 60, 15. Janv. 47.'

An extract from this letter was published in English for the first time in: K. Marx and F. Engels, *Literature and Art*, International Publishers, N. Y., p. 81, 1947.—107

¹³⁹ The reference here and below is to Marx's possible removal to Paris and the documents he needed for that move. The text below shows that Marx had the permission of the Belgian authorities to stay in Belgium. It was issued to him after his expulsion from France in February 1845 and signed on 22 March 1845 on condition that Marx would not publish anything concerning current politics. Besides, on 1 December 1845 Marx received a certificate of renunciation of his Prussian citizenship and perhaps permission to emigrate to America for which he had applied in order to deprive the Prussian authorities of any pretext for interfering in his future.

However, Marx was not able to go to Paris until after the February 1848 revolution.—107

- 140 An allusion to relations with Hess which deteriorated in February and March 1846 when Marx and Engels started a decisive struggle against 'true socialism' and Weitling's utopian egalitarian communism. In an effort to avoid an open break, Marx and Engels persuaded Hess to leave Brussels in March 1846.—108
- 141 The reference is to *The Poverty of Philosophy* by Marx. He worked on it from the end of December 1846 to the beginning of April 1847. It came out early in July 1847 in Brussels and Paris. In it Marx compared Proudhon's views and the theory of the British utopian communist John Bray. The latter advocated exchange of the products of labour without money as a method of transition to a society free from exploitation (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 138-44). Bray expounded his theory in his *Labour's Wrongs and Labour's Remedy*, Leeds, 1839. By 'our publication' Engels meant the manuscripts of *The German Ideology* intended for publication.—109
- 142 Here Engels refers to the second part of his and Marx's joint work *The German Ideology* devoted to the critique of 'true socialism' (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 453-539). Engels continued his work on this section up to April 1847 and its results have reached us in the form of an unfinished manuscript 'The True Socialists' supplementing *The German Ideology* (see present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 540-81).—109
- 143 As is seen from this letter Engels originally intended to work up the article; he had apparently written in the autumn of 1846 or early in 1847 on Grün's *Uher Goethe* for the second part of *The German Ideology*, devoted to the critique of 'true socialism'. Later this article served as a basis for the second essay in the series *German Socialism in Verse and Prose* (see present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 249-73). It is quite possible that Engels also used the manuscripts of *The German Ideology* for the first essay in that series. The essays on Grün were published in the *Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung*, Nos. 93-98 of 21, 25 and 28 November and 2, 5 and 9 December 1847.—110
- 144 Engels has in mind the time the young Goethe spent among the burghers of his native town Frankfurt am Main, and his service at the Duke of Weimar's court: from 1782 to 1786 Goethe held several high administrative posts, was a member of the Privy Council, Minister of Education, etc.—110
- 145 Marx's letter to Zulauff has not been found. Like the letter published here, it apparently concerned the tasks facing the Brussels Communist Correspondence Committee and the communist groups close to it when Marx and Engels joined the League of the Just as a result of their negotiations at the end of January and the beginning of February 1847 with Joseph Moll, a representative of the London leaders of the League who was sent to Brussels and Paris specially for this purpose. The negotiations showed that the League leaders were prepared to recognise the principles of scientific communism as a basis when drawing up its programme and carrying out its reorganisation. Marx and Engels, therefore, called on their followers grouped around the Brussels Communist Correspondence Committee not only to join the League of the Just but also to take an active part in its reorganisation.—111
- 146 See Note 86. Here the reference is to the members of the Paris communities of the League of the Just.—112
- 147 The reference is to Engels' as yet unbound satirical pamphlet about Lola Montez, a favourite of King Ludwig I of Bavaria. The scandalous influence of

- this Spanish dancer on the policy of the Bavarian Government caused in 1847-48 the appearance of numerous pamphlets, articles, cartoons, etc. Further on, the text (see p. 114) shows that Engels tried to have this pamphlet published by Vogler in Brussels and by the Belle-Vue publishers in Switzerland. A letter has survived which Vogler wrote on 3 April 1847 in reply to Engels' letter of 28 March which has not been found. Engels' proposal was rejected because of the censorship existing in the Great Duchy of Baden where the publishers had moved by that time.—112
- 148 The reference is to the rescripts by Frederick William IV of 3 February 1847 convening the United Diet—a united assembly of the eight provincial diets. The United Diet as well as the provincial diets consisted of representatives of the estates: the curia of high aristocracy and the curia of the other three estates (nobility, representatives of the towns and the peasantry). Its powers were limited to authorising new taxes and loans, to voice without vote during the discussion of Bills, and to the right to present petitions to the King. The *United Diet* opened on 11 April 1847, but it was dissolved as early as June because the majority refused to vote a new loan.—112
- 149 Engels intended to have this work published as a pamphlet by Vogler in Brussels who was printing Marx's *The Poverty of Philosophy*. However, when Marx received the manuscript, Vogler had been arrested in Aachen (see this volume, p. 117). The part of the pamphlet which has reached us was first published in Russian in the USSR in 1929.—114
- 150 *Communists matérialistes*—members of the secret society of materialist communists founded in the 1840s (see Note 90). The members of this society were tried in July 1847 and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.—114
- 151 The persecution of the Paris members of the League of the Just by the French police was reported in an item dated Paris, 2 April 1847, published in the *Berliner Zeitungs-Halle*, No. 81, 8 April 1847. It said of Engels: "Several police agents have also been to Fr. Engels, who lives here in great retirement and devotes himself only to economic and historical studies; naturally they could find nothing against him."—115
- 152 Marx's letter to Bakunin has not been found.—116
- 153 The reference is to a cartoon by Engels of Frederick William IV of Prussia delivering the speech from the throne at the opening of the United Diet in Berlin on 11 April 1847 (see present edition, Vol. 6, p. 67). This cartoon was published as a special supplement to the *Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung* of 6 May 1847.—117
- 154 The reference is to the congress of the League of the Just at which, as agreed between the League leaders in London (H. Bauer, J. Moll, K. Schapper) and Marx and Engels early in 1847, the League was to be reorganised. The congress was held between 2 and 9 June 1847. Engels represented the Paris communities, and Wilhelm Wolff, bribed by Marx, was a delegate of the Brussels communists. Engels' active participation in the work of the congress affected the course and the results of its proceedings. The League was renamed the Communist League, the old motto of the League of the Just 'All men are brothers' was replaced by a new, Marxist one: 'Working Men of All Countries, Unite!' The congress expelled the Weitlingians from the League. The last sitting on 9 June approved the draft programme and the draft Rules of the League, which had