

lexamen des enfants arriérés et psychopathes: S. Rabinovitch et Rossolino-Savitch. La notion de l'ordre des événements et le test des images en désordre: H. Kraft et Jean Piaget.

THE ECONOMIC RECORD. The Journal of the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand. Published twice yearly by the Melbourne University Press. 10/- per annum.

Vol. I. No. 1. Nov. 1925. Australian Population, its Nature and Growth: C. H. Wickens. Australian Banking and Exchange: D. B. Copland. The Australian Tariff and the Standard of Living: J. B. Brigden. The Measurement of Business Conditions in New Zealand: A. H. Tocker. Wages and Production: J. T. Sutcliffe. Group Settlement of Migrants in Western Australia: E. Shann. The Story of Australian Land Settlement: H. Heaton. Reviews and Notes.

THE MEDICAL JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA. Sydney. Published weekly. 1/-.

THE LEGAL JOURNAL. Sydney. Published monthly. 10/6 per annum.

NOTES AND NEWS.

The Fourth Annual Meeting of the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy was held at Melbourne, 20-21 May. In addition to the Presidential Address and Professor Morris Miller's The Psychologist in Service, papers on the following subjects were read and discussed: The Processes of Thought: Professor H. Tasman Lovell. Mental Defect: Dr. C. R. McRae. Aspects of Behaviourist Psychology: W. M. Ball. The Philosophical Interest in Relativity: Dr. Love. Doctrine of Substance in Descartes and Spinoza: R. Jackson.

Papers on the following subjects have been read and discussed at meetings of Local Branches of the Association:—*Sydney*: "Some Difficulties in the Social Sciences"—G. V. Portus. *Wellington, N.Z.*: "The Psychology of Propaganda"—Dr. Sutherland. At the inaugural meeting of the Wellington Branch, the President, Sir Robert Stout, made an appeal for greater general interest in philosophical studies. *Auckland*: "The Philosophical Aspect of Relativity—Theory"—E. V. Miller.

Mr. R. F. Fortune, M.A., Victorian University College, Wellington, has been awarded a post-graduate scholarship. He will continue his studies in England and Vienna. His article on "The Psychology of Dreams" appears in this number of the Journal.

An extensive programme has been arranged for the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy at Harvard University, Sept. 13-17, 1926. The Chairman of the Programme Committee is Professor R. B. Perry, Cambridge, Mass. Corresponding Secretary—Professor J. J. Coss, Columbia University, New York City.

IN MEMORIAM—BERNARD MUSCIO.

WE grieve to announce the death of Professor Bernard Muscio, one of the original founders of the Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy. He acted from the first as Chairman of the Central Executive, and much of the success of the Association and of this Journal has been due to his guidance and inspiration. Through his premature death at Sydney on the 27th May, the interests of philosophy in Australia and New Zealand have suffered a serious loss.

Professor Muscio was born in New South Wales, thirty-nine years ago. He had a very distinguished University career at Sydney before proceeding to Cambridge, where he received a research degree for a thesis on Idealism and the New Realism, and was awarded the Burney Prize, open to all graduates for an Essay on Determinism and Free Will. On the outbreak of the Great War, he volunteered for military service, but was rejected by the military authorities for reasons of ill-health. From 1914 to 1916 he acted as Demonstrator in Experimental Psychology at Cambridge University. From 1916 to 1919 he was engaged at Sydney University as Lecturer on Psychology and Philosophy, returning to Cambridge in the latter year at the invitation of the British Industrial Research Board, to act as Investigator and Lecturer. Some of the results of his work in this connection were published as Reports in the British Journal of Psychology. His Lectures on Industrial Psychology, delivered and published in Sydney in 1917, were published in a 2nd edition in London, 1920. He also contributed articles and reviews to the *Monist*, *Mind*, *International Journal of Ethics*, *Philo-*

subjective order of our perceptions of those events. The work of Sigwart, Broad, and especially Cassirer, has made the issue clearer. For the psychologist, time is essentially the inner sense of sequence and duration, while for the physicist it is the measurable time of the outer world of motion. There are thus two concepts of time, but neither is the sound and adequate metaphysical view. The metaphysician cannot rest content with merely mental or subjective time. On the other hand, while sharing with the physicist in objectivity the metaphysician refuses to accept the physical concept, because of its limitation to terms of measurement.

Bergson, however, refuses to recognise objective time, and thus he confuses Time merely with our awareness of it, an identification which is quite unwarranted, mischievous, and fallacious. No writer has more brilliantly brought out the psychological points involved in that awareness, but his psychology cannot be substituted for metaphysics. The objective sequence and duration of events constitutes time, but Bergson throws this aside as spatial. His subjective time, is a *durée* *perçu* *et* *vu*, "a personal mental time which cannot exist apart from consciousness (as a complex of memory, percept and conation). But the distinction between before and after, between the earlier and later phases of a mechanism can be made apart from all memory and expectation, in and through the concrete present of subjective time, and indeed apart from all consciousness, as an implication of the causal sequence of events in nature and the successive phases of a movement, and this constitutes objective time.

Neither Einstein nor Bergson has the clue to the nature of time. They are both "extremists," the one physical, mathematical, the other psychological. Bergson's book, however, is to be welcomed and studied, because in spite of its mischievously subjective view and its rejection of objective time, it serves to bring into clear relief the twin concepts of time which proceed from physics and psychology respectively. If regarded in this sense, it is a useful contribution to the metaphysical work required. If it be taken as a substitute for that work, the true metaphysical view of time will be imperilled and postponed.

—J. Alexander Gunn.

II.—MARX AND HEGEL. * By G. V. Portus, M.A., B.Litt. Lecturer on Economic History, University of Sydney.

Marx being human, his work was moulded by two sets of circumstances—the history of his time, and the intellectual influences under which he came. A man's originality lies first in his conscious choice of intellectual guides, and then in his reactions to their influences and to his material environment.

It is not surprising that the Father of the First International should have put himself to school with Englishmen and Frenchmen as well as Germans. Among his teachers is Adam Smith, Ricardo, and the early 19th

*"The Logical Influence of Hegel on Marx." By Rebecca Cooper. University of Washington Publications in the Social Sciences. Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 79-182.

Century socialists like Thomas Hodgkin and Robert Crow, were British; St. Simon and Fourier were French; while Hegel, and especially the group that called itself "the Young Hegelians of the Left" were of Marx's own country. In the main Marx got his Economics from the British, his philosophy from Hegel, and his sociology, by reaction from the French Utopians and Robert Owen.

The problem which Miss Cooper sets out to solve is the extent of the *logical* influence of Hegel upon the work of Marx. Note the careful delimitation here. She does not deny that Hegel enormously influenced Marx, and particularly as to his mode of expression. But she does deny that the work of Marx is logically derived from Hegelian tenets, or that Marxism would collapse if the Hegelian contributions were removed. In short she finds that "the connection between the Marxian and Hegelian systems is, for the most part, a purely external and verbal rather than an integral one."

Miss Cooper has not much difficulty in proving her point with regard to the Marxian Economics. It is true that Superficial Hegelianisms abound both in "Capital" and in "The Critique of Political Economy." But all the "polar opposites," the "negations of negations," and the tiresome Hegelian syllogisms are needless mystifications. Stripped of Marx's pedantic lucubrations, terms like "use value" and "exchange value" have the same essential meaning in "Capital" as in the works of Adam Smith and Ricardo. Marx has really done himself a great disservice. Not one in five hundred of the earnest folk—be they red Radicals, pink lecturers bent on social uplift, or true blue Tories—who sit down to the three stout volumes of "Capital" can wade through the flood of metaphysical verbiage and ponderous abstractions with which he surrounds his main propositions. In the preface to the only volume of "Capital" published during his life time, Marx admits that he "coquetted" with Hegel for the purpose (apparently) of giving Hegel a lift. And this is really all it amounts to. When the occasion demanded, Marx could set down the essentials of his Economics clearly and unambiguously, as witness his two pamphlets, "Values, Price, and Profit," and "Wage Labour and Capital," which were written for working class readers. Here there is no trace of Hegelian terminology and no resort to Hegelian principles—not even to give Hegel a lift. It is not, therefore, difficult to concede to Miss Cooper that the Hegelianism of Marx's economics in what the Anglican Prayer Book calls, a work of supererogation.

But can this be said of the Marxian Sociology as Miss Cooper maintains? Even if we admit that Marx and Engels discovered the class war as the real social dynamic from their reading of history rather than by deduction from Hegelian principles; there still remains their prophecy that, after the collapse of Capitalism and the end of the existing class struggle, Communism will emerge as the final and classless form of society. Miss Cooper maintains that the proof of this future communism as the final social form does not depend on any pure abstract logical deduction, apparently because Engels said it did not. Engels did say so, but he did not supply any evidence to show that this prophecy had been empirically discovered from observation of facts. On the other hand this confident pre-

dition finds a curious parallel in Hegel. He did prophesy that true spirit (Freedom) would at last realize its goal. He did put an end to the dialectic process. Apparently he could not contemplate a never ending series of negations of negations, of syntheses that became fresh theses, and developed through new antitheses into further syntheses. And apparently Marx and Engels were Hegelian enough (or human enough) to sympathize with this view and to wish to put an end to the eternal war of classes based upon different systems of production, distribution, and exchange. If this prophecy of Communism as the final form of Society does not derive from Hegel, then where did Marx and Engels get it? It cannot be *induced* from the facts of history. There is nothing in the human record that suggests that Communism will not create different social classes with different interests; and, if it does so, it cannot, on the Marxian hypothesis, be the final form of Society.

There is, of course, much evidence in history of a very widespread wish for a happy ending to human affairs. The Norse Valhalla, the Mahometan Paradise, and the Christian Heaven are cases in point. And the wish will always engender an appropriate eschatology. May it not be that both Hegel and Marx felt this widespread urge to postulate a happy ending, and to provide an appropriate eschatology? For the one it is to be the Final Victory of the Spirit as Absolute, for the other the emergence of the Final Society as Classless. If this be so, then neither of the solutions can be strictly said to rest on logic. But since Marx had been a disciple of Hegel, and the Hegelian dictum of a final synthesis was certainly familiar to him, it would seem fair to assume that there is a real connection between the final social synthesis of Marx and Engels and the final philosophical synthesis of Hegel. The onus of suggesting any other solution of the close parallelism between the eschatologies of these thinkers seems to rest on Miss Cooper.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF SOME GREAT THINKERS OF THE RENAISSANCE AND THE REFORMATION. A series of Lectures delivered at King's College, University of London. Edited by F. J. C. Hearnshaw, M.A., LL.D., Harrap & Co., Ltd., London. pp. 215, 7/6 net.

This book is the fifth of a series of volumes based on public lecture courses given in King's College, University of London. It is the third of a series under the same Editorship of which the two former are concerned with medieval thinkers. This present volume deals with thinkers of the great transition period of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and consists of an introduction and seven essays on representative men of the Renaissance and Reformation with special reference to their social and political teachings.

The introductory lecture by the Editor is an excellent sketch of background and rightly insists upon the importance of the nationalistic and

economic motives underlying the Reformation. Dr. E. F. Jacob writes entertainingly of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), scholar, bishop and cardinal, who lived during the Italian Renaissance when ecclesiastical reform seemed possible by peaceful and constitutional methods without rending the unity of Christendom. The "platform" of Nicholas was put forward in his "De Concordantia Catholica" at the Council of Basel in 1433 at which he took the anti-papal side. On this thesis was based the Conciliar Movement which, by claiming that the authority of the General Council is founded not in the Papacy but in the consent of all, attempted to apply to the most authoritative institution in the world, the constitutional principle that government must rest on the consent of the governed. Nicholas' claim that even the Pope may be deposed if he does not fulfil his administrative functions is a curious echo of Wycliffe's "Dominion founded on Grace" half a century earlier. The German, however, unlike his English forerunner, changed his allegiance. It is true that Nicholas became a papal legate, a cardinal, and finally a bishop. But the trite explanation of self-interest is unnecessary. He was no revolutionary, but a medieval liberal. Reform seemed more likely to come from the papal bureaucracy than from an inexperienced Council which was already stretching out to control delicate administrative machinery in whose operation it was utterly unversed. It was the same dilemma which confronted Stratford two hundred years later. Like the author of "Thorough," Nicholas lost his faith in the reformers without losing his burning desire for reform. And the position of a man who loses trust without losing love is always desperate. The times, too, were ripening into an age which demanded action more than thought, and men rather than measures. Nicholas' political thinking was done, but some of his best work in mathematics, philosophy and theology remained to be accomplished in the intervals of his busy administrative life. He proposed the reform of the Julian Calendar, and years before Copernicus was born, he defined the rotation of the earth round the sun. But these things are beyond the scope of Dr. Jacob's essay.

Miss Levett, discussing Sir John Fortescue, acutely places him as "a typical Englishman living at the time of the Renaissance rather than a typical thinker of the Renaissance." A typical Englishman he was in his pride of his country. His explanation of the number of thieves hanged early in England was that it was an evidence of the high spirit of the English, "so infinitely greater than that of the French of whom few indeed had spirit enough to steal and still less to be hanged for it!" Fortescue is on more solid ground in his insistence that economic and social facts must form the basis of legal systems and principles. "In this," says Miss Levett, "he would have delighted the hearts of Bodin, of Montesquieu, and of Burke." She might have added to these names, those of Marx and Engels. But Fortescue has not much political philosophy. His chief work, "The Governance of England," is an attempt to grapple with the problems of administration at a time when, in Stubbs' telling phrase, "constitutional progress had outrun administrative order." His views on Church matters are quite distinctly medieval, and though as