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
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ANARCHY 49



AUTOMATION

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Automation—anarchism —the future

COLIN JOHNSON

THE ATTITUDE OF NEAR DREAD, with which all sections of the community who have some secondary interest in our industrial set-up—regard automation both appals and puzzles me. Let me begin by stating that I believe in automation, and I believe that the sooner machines are working instead of men and women the better. Having said this, let me try to put the question of automation and its effects into the context of my beliefs as an anarchist, and our current social and economic arrangements. That I feel out of step with the majority of anarchists on this question depresses me, those who have pretensions towards improving the position and scope of workers in industry seem to be particularly unimaginative and ill-informed on this subject.

Political attitudes on this subject are interesting and predictable; the trade unions wish to safe-guard their jobs, while capitalist investors want higher dividends. On the political left automation is invariably equated with unemployment and social disaster, largely I believe a hangover from the between wars situation which many workers found themselves in. We should not underestimate this feeling, but it should be clearly recognised that this "automatic revolution" will probably be every bit as gradual as the industrial revolution itself. It seems to me, however, that the attitude prevailing, that everyone has an inalienable right to work 40 hours a week, grudgingly, and without enjoyment, in order to have the right to live, is one of our largest social ingrowing toe-nails. This is reinforced at a more academic level, as James Gillespie points out in ANARCHY 47 for "we are ceaselessly told that the major solution to our social and economic problems is more production to keep up employment which will keep up buying power which will keep up production". On the right automation is probably viewed as a means to increased profits, the primary interest in industry, via less wages and higher production. I wonder, incidentally, how much the extreme right dread it because of the implied release of the workers from the moral responsibility to work. It is not hard to imagine all the 17th-18th century reasoning being refurbished and used once more should the release of manpower by automating processes occur too quickly. These are probably the extremes and it should be noted that they could both be termed conservative. In between there appears to be a large amount of confusion, tempered with dread. Even James Gillespie has his share of it, perhaps a subconscious expression of a vested interest—I can't imagine "work in fellowship" being a welfare requirement for a bank of I.B.M.'s. He assures us however, that "only

about 50 per cent of our production plants are likely to be the subject of full automation". This may comfort him and many others who read it, but my immediate reaction is: why? Broadly, automation seems to be the stumbling block for thought of the future. That this applies to anarchist thinkers as much as "conventional" thinkers is perhaps a sign that as a movement we are even more entrenched in the industrial and moral attitudes of the beginning of the century than we might suspect.

Let us attempt to dispel some dread from a mildly technical point of view; the basic concept of manufacture depends upon the following things, that a raw material is subjected to the application of various forms of energy to change its physical, chemical, and dimensional properties. It is then combined with items, similarly processed, to form an end product. At the present time the most expensive form of energy applied in production is that of manpower. As this is progressively decreased it is replaced by fairly expensive machinery, and the more complex the human operation to be replaced the more costly the mechanism required to replace it. Obviously, then, there is an economic ceiling below which automatic processes do not pay. But given that a general increase in the material standard of living is inevitable once the manufacture of consumer goods has been started, there must eventually come a point within an economic group when the ceiling becomes irrelevant. This situation is in sight in America now, where wages are relatively high, and is causing a great deal of concern in the predominately puritan atmosphere. Basically it amounts to this; automation becomes realistic when a series of machines can produce a series of machines which will apply the energy required to a raw material to make the end product become economically feasible.

There are two considerations which should be noted, firstly it does not matter which economic system produces sufficient wealth to eliminate the ceiling, once the process of automating has begun money becomes increasingly irrelevant. To support this opinion I would instance Professor Colin Cherry, who recently completed a series of televised programmes on communications—the heart of automation—in his last programme he assuaged some fear by stating emphatically that automation was impossible while we maintained a money economy. It is also reported that Barry Goldwater's economic adviser proposed a negative tax for those whose income was below a certain level—mainly in anticipation of the problems of earning a wage in an era of automation. Secondly, in the short term, there is a danger that automatic processes will be devoted to the non-consumables we find it necessary to produce, armaments for instance. In fact a lot of development work has gone into remote control and automatic handling of radioactive materials already, to continue and contain this trend would, no doubt, save the administration no end of problems.

The scope of the first consideration bodes glorious ill for the ideological position of the two power blocs, unless that is, their mutual antagonism is too ingrained to be relieved by the removal of their economic differences. It also implies that perhaps a 'uranium standard' would be required instead of gold for international transactions. (I realise this is not factual—but the basic premise remains valid.) In the

resulting chaos let us hope we would be able to pass on some of our surpluses in increasing quantities to the under-privileged nations.

Apart from the initial economic capacity, given access to raw materials and reasonably unlimited supplies of electricity from nuclear power, is there any reason why we should not expect certain essential commodities to progressively become universally available so that eventually they cease to have a monetary value? Now this seems to me to be the area for genuine workers control, there should now be examinations of the industries involved in producing essentials with the object of programming their automation, for although within the existing capitalist set-up these industries will be fairly low on the automating list we should, if only for economic reasons, realise that they must be among the first to be released from the cash/demand situation. Politically this will imply a broadening of the meaning and scope of 'welfare' services, more of the essential products of natural wealth, as opposed to manufactured trivia, will have to come to be regarded as birth-rights rather than privileges to be laboured for. Paul Goodman and his brother Percival, have in their book *Communitas*, foreseen, although not in the context of automation, the likely outcome of this proposition in capitalist countries, namely a two level economy. This is to my mind the most obvious and viable solution.

The problem raised for anarchists though, who should control, initiate, and distribute the produce from our automated plant, is likely to be the most contentious part of the future. The obvious and dismal answer is the state; the most hopeful answer is one based on ideas currently being canvassed by Anthony Weaver and others, in the search for peace, that we must become more regionally conscious, and begin to base our activities on the assumption that the optimum economic unit is of 3 to 6 million people. Units, that is, of about the size of the Scandinavian countries, large enough to allow adequate usage of resources, and small enough to ensure a reasonable degree of peaceful coexistence parallel with the technical development of automation, political development of regionalism into smaller and smaller units seems feasible and desirable. If one can take what I would regard as a cybernetical view of the mechanics of social adjustment and reaction, then obviously the smaller the communities involved the better, both for the individual and the whole. So were these developments possible, and there are many favourable indications that some "influential" people, both technical and political, are inclined to these concepts, then the problems involved in the production and distribution of what in one sense may be regarded as anti-wealth, need not be inseparable from or incompatible with the promotion of the sort of future anarchists would like to see.

How will the proliferation of automatic processes effect the issues of social/industrial relationships? Eventually I hope the distinction between the two would disappear, and such industry that would be necessary would be come an integrated social function. Realistically, however, I must say that the ambiguity that James Gillespie points to in the individuals responsibilities will continue, and probably be welcome, if only through habit. In the present situation the notion that one has

any control over any aspect of environment, social or industrial, is tenacious and misleading. The essential difference in the future, which we should be recognising and working for now, will be that the decisions which we are now trying to make the prerogative of the worker involved in the process, must become the prerogative of the community for which the product is intended. For instance, whether a plant is used to produce, say, shoes or mink-lined beer can openers is a decision which would affect most people in a community, and the decision should be governed by their needs, both physical and spiritual.

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Beyond automation

GEORGE AND LOUISE CROWLEY

WE AGREE ESSENTIALLY WITH THE ANALYSIS of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Revolution, as stated in its memorandum to President Johnson. That memorandum holds explicitly that cybernation invalidates the traditional methods by which society's wealth is distributed. Implicit in the Committee's report is the thesis that our present economic and social system (read capitalism) is now facing breakdown through a deepening paradox: income, hence consumption, hinges on employment; while accelerating productivity with all its potential of abundance, hinges on the very opposite—elimination of human labour. This paradox cannot be resolved within capitalism's distributive framework of wage labour.

We submit, however, that the cybernation revolution poses an impasse for socialists also: it presents us with nothing less than the liquidation of the working class as a significant component of society. When human industrial labour is obsolescent, to project a worker's state becomes an anachronism. It has long been the essence of our philosophy as Marxists to believe that economic developments stimulate appropriate changes in the organisation of society. The Industrial Revolution triggered the rise of socialism; the cybernation revolution calls for something beyond it, which as yet has no accepted name.

It is not communism. The abundant society cybernation makes possible eliminates need for social constraint, including the constraint

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to produce according to one's abilities. It points instead to the freest conceivable exercise of individual option in production and consumption as in all human activities. It points away from private ownership of the means of production, but not toward their collective ownership; rather, it suggests that the fully automated productive complex, operating independently to supply whatever people may demand of it, needs no ownership nor management at all. Who owns the air?

If this be anarchy, it is anarchy of an altogether new type stripped of its own nostalgia for primitive communism. If it be utopian, it looks toward a hitherto unimaginable kind of utopia: a variform utopia of ultimate technology, in which men and women, freed from all compulsion to wrest their livelihood from a given environment, may live their lives as they desire in milieu of their own choosing.

We assume the beneficence of freedom from toil, and therefore assert that our efforts should be directed toward the speediest development and broadest application of automation. As the Ad Hoc Committee stated, it is the income-through-jobs link that acts as the main brake on the capacity of a cybernated productive system. This link must be broken. The traditional dictum (however modified) that he who does not work shall not eat is postulated on an economy of scarcity, in which the labour of all is needed to sustain the community. In the United States at least, current levels of productivity have invalidated it even in terms of the present system. The income-reducing aspects of capitalist automation cannot and should not be countered by finger-in-the-dyke attempts to hold on to existing jobs and to create others. Such efforts can only delay the advent of a desirable new state of society, while little alleviating the misery inherent in the old. It is not jobs that are needed for the transition, but income.

Capitalism can accept—indeed, has in significant measure already accepted—breaking the linkage of income to employment. To provide everyone with an adequate income as a matter of right would of itself deal no deathblow to the system. Intelligent proponents of capitalism could even find virtue in thus cushioning the shock of technological displacement for millions of quondam workers. Yet it would rupture a critical strand in the fetters that precariously restrain the genie of cybernation, who even now, with tied hands, has begun to lay the economic foundation of the new society.

Mark I, Univacs I through VI, and Eniac, those first ponderous monsters, solved the manifold logistic problems of the Second World War and performed the calculations for the atomic and hydrogen bomb projects. Experience with these cooled vacuum-tube computers demonstrated that their speed and accuracy, unhampered by the limitations of the human nervous system, made feasible the solution of problems too complex to have been investigated with mechanical calculating devices.

The second stage of cybernation began with the introduction of small, low-voltage vacuum tubes that required no special cooling system nor elaborate controlled-temperature housing. The more versatile machines that resulted automated the big basic industries—steel, textile, petroleum, and chemicals—and broke the paperwork bottleneck in

insurance, banking, and government. These accomplishments dispelled forever in the minds of those associated with production management the idea that automation was just another step in the slow rise of labour productivity. Early the lesson was learned: as automation progresses, it becomes imperative to get all of the people out of the way so that the machines may work at their own optimum speeds. The new Ford block plant at Cleveland has been so designed that much of its assembly line is inaccessible to people; it was the presence of a few workers that rendered its ten-year-old predecessor obsolete.

Application of transistors and block circuits introduced the current proliferation stage, which has unveiled the Frankenstein's monster. The new devices (they can hardly be called machines, for virtually all mechanical components have been eliminated) can be made in any size and complexity, from miniature systems for small shops and offices to the Bureau of Internal Revenue's Big Brother which does the work of half a million people at a cost of less than twenty-five cents per man-year. Componentised and standardised, they can be custom assembled to any specifications. Built-in detector systems permit self-maintenance. Their reliability has brought precise quality (and obsolescence) control into mass-production industries. Communicating by telephone, a Minneapolis-Honeywell computer is capable not only of receiving six million bits of information per second, but of transmitting, over a different frequency, another six million at the same time. Such high-speed communication enables the otherwise prohibitive cost of complex systems to be spread over many users. If the average cost of all systems can be said now to have reached parity with that of hiring and equipping a human labour force, henceforth the scales will tip in automation's favour. As systems reach out for optimum workloads, they as eagerly assume the tasks of the doctor, lawyer, merchant, and chief as they did those of the butcher, the baker, and the candlestick-maker.

At this stage of the production revolution, all attempts to reclaim some of the lost jobs by featherbedding, reducing hours, etc., only serve to unleash new rounds of automation, as the delicate cost-balance shifts. Once a single plant in an industry has automated, the whole industry must follow suit to remain competitive. As Big Business automates, the anguished screams of smaller capitalists impel the state to subsidise their automation.

Reaction to the much-touted tax cut was the greatest shock of all. Official doctrine was that the higher profit ratio would relieve the urgency of automating, and would trickle down through more readily absorbed wage increases to improve mass consumption. Instead, something like 70 per cent of the gain has gone into automation equipment. Since this equipment is itself made in automated plants, the expected trickle-down is simply bypassed.

So we stand, in the Ad Hoc Committee's words, "at a historic juncture which demands a fundamental re-examination of existing values and institutions." Not of existing values and institutions only, we add, but of all concepts postulated on a need for human labour—in short, re-examination of all hitherto conceived notions of society. Default or short-sightedness could mean congealment of the social order

with a powerful oligarchy still astride the means of production, decreeing through a new Dark Age the conditions under which the lumpenised mass of unwanted humanity may, or may not, be permitted to survive. This, while automation stands willing and potent to give all men the full fruit of mankind's age-long struggles, if only it be turned loose to do the job! Our imperative task is to formulate a realistic programme to provide those conditions in which the new society can come most readily to fruition.

To do this we must consider in at least equal depth the implications of the other two coalescing movements. Fear engendered by the total destructiveness of nuclear weapons has obscured the nature of what the Ad Hoc Committee calls the Weaponry Revolution; actually it is a power revolution manifesting itself in the field of weaponry. We see latent in the demand for human equality an urge toward freedom from all dependence—from dependence on society as well as dependence on nature. The confluence of the three revolutions, all sweeping toward the same social transformation, is the force that can realise this freedom.

In its memorandum, the Ad Hoc Committee touched but briefly, and we think with mistaken emphasis, on the new weaponry. That no nation can "win" a war fought with nuclear, chemical, and organic weapons is to us a truism; and the futility of war is but its corollary. Without minimising the need to get this point across to those who fail to see or to heed it, we submit that the multiplex body of scientific and technological progress, still largely contained within the military womb of the new weaponry, holds the momentous potential of freeing man's evolution from the limitations imposed by his earthly environment. Cybernation offers to remove only one portion of Adam's two-fold curse; the new science in toto holds forth the prospect of lifting it altogether. Our view should not be narrowed by the dreadful fact that important areas of the current scientific revolution are being researched and developed with warlike intent. Cognisant of the ultimate capacity of the new weapons, we nevertheless prefer to speak of a Power Revolution.

Let us look at the long history of social change.

With the Neolithic Revolution, agriculture transformed the economic base of primitive society, signalling the dawn of recorded history, the rise of commodity production brought about the profound social and political changes of the Urban Revolution. The formerly almost imperceptible progress of science and technology quickened, productivity growing apace, until toward the end of the Roman Republic the sophisticated culture that had developed stood ready to pass in the Industrial Revolution. Manufacturing and agriculture were producing at the saturation point for a slave society. In the Archimedean screw, the aeolipile, and the steam piston, means were at hand to utilise the understood power of water and steam. But only by emancipating the slaves to become free consumers could the Industrial Revolution have been consummated. This the skilled and powerful Roman ruling class was able to prevent. After an initial application of authoritarian control, it wrought the fixation of the individual's socio-economic position, blocking progress so effectively that Rome's own decay merely added to the

general stagnation. Western Europe, still basically neolithic when conquered by Rome, and with no strong traditions of stable community life, defined social position in terms of individual to individual—man to master, and master to lord. Despite trappings of urban civilisation, the self-sufficient feudal manor was essentially a neolithic village. Feudalism was thus a product not of revolution but of counter-revolution.

As Europe emerged slowly toward the threshold of its own belated urban revolution, the powerful Catholic Church (a most urbane institution) sought to control the movement and on the strength of a successful Holy War to establish temporal authority over a restabilised, more trade-centered Europe. The Crusades precipitated backward Europe into confrontation with a society in which the Industrial Revolution had long been overdue. Matters got out of hand. Returning crusaders brought back a pregnant ideology: the reintroduction of scientific inquiry and of applied technology, a cosmopolitan view of man and his institutions, and a taste for opulent living. Its fruit was the Protestant Reformation, the Renaissance, and the consummation in the form of mercantilism of Europe's suspended urbanisation. The momentum of the movement carried Europe (with the significant exception of the Iberian peninsula) into the Industrial Revolution.

We see operating here the same factors that brought socialism not to the mature industrial nations that seemed most ripe for it, but to only superficially capitalist societies.

Examining these factors, we are struck most forcibly with the strength and sophistication of a solidly grounded ruling class. Revolutionary theory is not the property of revolutionists alone; the ruling class has studied Marx far more profoundly than has the proletariat on which he based his hopes. By whatever maneuvers of force, concession, and guile, advanced capitalist states have countered every bid of the working class for power, while strengthening control over their own internal stresses. It is time to face up to the sobering realisation that an over-ripe social order is by no means as vulnerable as Marxists have traditionally believed.

Nevertheless, compelling forces have transformed society and will transform it again. The three-fold nature of the current revolution brings their dynamics into sharper focus.

Each major social revolution has tapped previously unavailable sources of power. The Neolithic Revolution harnessed the muscle power of beasts; by providing institutions able to cope with human gang labour, the Urban Revolution made feasible the use on a large scale of slavery. With the Industrial Revolution man converted into torque the energy stored in fossil fuels, and applied it to an already advanced system of mechanised hand manufacture. This yoking of superior power to a body of cumulate technology touched off an explosive proliferation. Innovations burst upon society with institution-shattering force, and a process of metamorphosis got under way.

This is precisely the state of affairs we now see imminent. The abundant power attainable through control of nuclear events can catalyse just such a violent technological acceleration. Granting that the present

cumbersome reactors work with true Rube Goldberg inefficiency to produce power by extremely uneconomical methods, we yet recall that ordinary aluminum, the most common metallic element in the earth's crust, was until 1886 the costliest of metals to produce. The breakthrough occurred when sufficient current became available to permit cheap electrolytic extraction. Development of the MHD generator, shielding itself with its own magnetic field, may point a way toward breakthrough in the economic utilisation of nuclear power.

Theoretically, nuclear power is incredibly cheap. Sources are literally infinite, and the nuclear generator consists potentially of only a relatively small conversion unit without moving parts, together with its appropriate switching gear. There will be no need for such massive paraphernalia, with attendant maintenance requirements, as is requisite to the generation and transmission of hydro-electric power.

We know little of what may already lie in abeyance, awaiting an abundance of cheap power to trigger innovations. The power-hunger of the laser beam, for example, has retarded even its obvious applications to industry and communications; but who can foretell the course of the laser's development, given ample power? And here is power in plenty—power to explore the universe, power to create the environments we desire. Here is the means to manipulate matter itself, even to establish balanced matter-energy cycles—the Philosopher's Stone, the Universal Solvent, and Perpetual Motion.

At just such a conjuncture of technology and potential power did the slaveholders of Rome relegate the aeolipile to parlour amusement and the steam piston to opening temple doors. For the nuclear generator our own rulers have prepared a far more ominous dustbin.

The impending union of cybernation with nuclear power threatens sudden and violent disruption to an economy already troubled by its decreasing ability to sell the goods it must produce. We see in the rise of the extreme Right a response to the threat. In the United States, reaction now strives to ride to power on the wave of the white backlash, but its underlying causes are deeper and more fundamental.

We do not believe, as a majority of the Ad Hoc Committee apparently does, that institutions geared to promoting the interests of the class in power will or can act for the greater good of all humanity. Certainly we do not expect them to manifest such altruism in a situation of conflicting interests and values. Governing bodies can but arrest the current revolution at an intermediate stage of its development and stabilise society in a new equilibrium (possibly minimising disorder thereby, with less than optimum social benefit) or be themselves overwhelmed as the revolution sweeps to its consummation.

The dangers of a limited revolution are frightful and too little understood. The Ad Hoc Committee may prate about "planning agencies under democratic control," but the very folkwisdom tells us by what forces our so-called democratic processes are dominated. We have no illusions about their plans; their plans will be those of the capitalist class. The present division in its ranks offers us not a lesser evil but a choice between equally abhorrent alternatives. Capitalism's "enlightened" wing, which sees advantage in social tranquility, may

adopt what appears to be a favourable course. It may alleviate poverty; it may end racial discrimination; it may thaw the Cold War and cool off the hot ones; it may considerably reform the economic structure. If it does, it will do so only to secure a more placid population, more conformable to its control. Such expedients will not long be needed (though social habit may preserve them), for better means will soon be at hand. With the decipherment of the genetic code, the most terrifying nightmare of science fiction becomes the all-too-imminent probability: mankind can be stopped dead in its tracks, or its development can be permanently diverted into any direction the planners see fit. Reform thus becomes the means whereby automation's surplus production is used to impose paralysis. This cannot be shrugged off. Man's very capacity to rebel can be forever extinguished, as dissatisfaction is biologically eliminated from his prefabricated psychology. Whatever his existence he would be content, for he could be nothing else. It is to this fate that the primrose path of reform would lead us.

If replacement of purblind instinct with reasoned confrontation of environment is the prime direction of human evolution, then with each progressive transformation of society we see accelerated the humanisation of *homo sapiens*. In transforming society he transforms himself, the more so as his responses grow more malleable to environmental conditioning, and as the relative importance of his social environment increases. To the pre-human who foraged and scavenged his meager subsistence in disadvantageous competition with saber-toothed cats, the natural environment must have loomed all-important. It is unlikely that he gave much thought to his relationships with his fellow-scroungers, or that those relationships became at all complex until tool-making and pyrotechny transformed his conditions of life. We venture to guess that it was in a consequent amplification of gregariousness that speech developed the range and flexibility to become a serviceable instrument of communication.

It is difficult for us to imagine the psychology of that pre-toolmaking ancestor of ours. But after this earliest known transformation, we see developing traditions of toolmaking, socially transmitted and diffused techniques; we can trace community acceptance of new and improved designs. We view in a much more human light the social beings who shaped their flints into conventional laurel-leaf patterns. These are folk akin to us; they have evolved in our direction.

The man who emerged from the misnamed Neolithic Revolution was more human still: as he had become a farmer, he was by that much less a predator. Diminished predaciousness and the easier conditions of neolithic life opened up a new dimension in his conscious dealings with his environment. Hunting parties occasionally encountered each other in the forests and plains but so seldom that they could afford to settle their territorial conflict afresh with each encounter. If well-matched, they might fight it out on the spot; otherwise the weaker party might flee. Hunting populations were small, encounters rare, and territorial attachments slight, so much expedients served well enough. But men living in settled villages in fixed proximity had reason to seek more stable solutions. Abraham and Lot could put an end to their recurring

conflicts by reasonably negotiating a mutually agreeable partition. Thus the neolithic milieu conduced to new concepts in people-to-people relationships, and provided the conditions to implement them. Agricultural work is cyclic, with periods of relative leisure between the time of sowing and the time of first cultivation, between the last cultivation and the harvest, and from harvest to the next year's sowing. Much of the new leisure must have been put to the exploration of interpersonal relations, for man had now come to conscious acceptance of his interdependence. In the climate of neolithic, social interaction—derived from this concept—wrought the domestication of the species. In short, the Neolithic Revolution transformed *homo sapiens faber* into *homo sapiens domesticus*.

The Urban Revolution translated interdependence to subservience. More or less consciously, domestic man traded personal freedom for greater security. With the slaves read out of the human race, the application of their versatile labour power to productive techniques furnished mankind with fecund conditions to speed its development. In the affluent cities, the slave may have sunk to subhumanity, but the man became a citizen and a scholar.

When the harnessing of power obviated society's need to prune its work force from the body politic, the slaves at last made good their chronic demand for re-admission to the human race. The vindication of self they brought with them unfitted re-unified mankind for integration into progressively more ordered anthills. With the Industrial Revolution, man asserted his right to re-examine the concessions he had made to society. In capitalism's ruthless but sometimes rewarding competitiveness he became an individual, with impelling aspirations apart from the dictates of the social order.

Each revolution thus performs the human transformation that is prerequisite to the next revolution.

We suggest that the American Negro's drive for equality, insofar as it goes no further, is in essence a mop-up operation of the Industrial Revolution. If it were no more, an advanced industrial society could accede to it with little difficulty. But in the developing ideology and tactics of the Negro struggle here and of colonial movements elsewhere, we read a forecast of the next step in man's humanisation. Its vanguard is the widespread and growing insistence upon peaceable solutions to human problems, and the emergence in significant force of people neither listless nor subservient who are capable of non-violent conduct in the face of clubs, cattleprods, and even bullets. That non-violent tactics may be suicidal in a violent society is here beside the point. These people prefigure those of the new society. If the current revolution is to be pushed beyond the possibility of containment, theirs are the demands that will push it.

We submit that herein lies the so-called "ripeness of the masses" for revolution. It occurs when the human transformation has progressed to a point of no return at which its needs so exceed those of a limited economic revolution as to carry that revolution beyond itself and into the next.

If this be true, any given society at the breaking point is always,

so to speak, one revolution behind the next impending revolution. Our examination of the revolutions, fulfilled and aborted, for which we have sufficient data, bears this out, and we are reminded of what we stated at the beginning: that in the United States the current revolution calls not for socialism but for something beyond it.

The coming change, as we see it, will bring man from a condition in which he can maintain society only through the coercive institutions of government and law to a state of humaneness wherein all such institutionalised constraints will become unnecessary and will vanish. The individual man has long found them irksome; his more or less reluctant acceptance of them derives from his recognition of the advantageousness of the social order, and conviction that constraint is indispensable to its functioning. We grant that it has been so but believe that this revolution, if it is fully consummated, will virtually remove the element of interest?conflict from man's environment. In freer interaction, the humanist ideal can be realised. We find it no less reasonable to postulate a functioning society without authority than to postulate an orderly universe without a god. Therefore the word "anarchy" is not for us freighted with connotations of disorder, chaos, or confusion. For humane men, living in non-competitive conditions of freedom from toil and of universal affluence, anarchy is simply the appropriate state of society.

To recapitulate: with productivity already straining the economic systems' capacity to cope with it, the impending advent of cheap nuclear power threatens an explosive expansion. These are prime preconditions for social disruption, but they do not ensure the terms on which society may be re-stabilised. Contending human forces will strive, according to their own diverse interests, to halt social and economic change or to control it to their advantage. Only those who have no stake in present institutions will wish it to run its course.

It follows that the working class, mortally concerned as it is to preserve the value of labour power, is not the class to bring about this revolution.

Those conscientious scholars, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, opened their 1848 exposition of the aims of the several social classes with the word "today" and *The Communist Manifesto* is a document that does not waste words. Now and here a new alignment of forces exists, radically different from that which they so accurately and concisely defined for their day.

We see today a capitalist class divided by the adherence of one segment to the principle of *laissez-faire* and the adoption by the other of the values of social planning. One wing would consign us to a jungle; the other, to an anthill. Both have access to far more potent media for influencing the opinion and attitudes of the people than were conceivable in Marx's time, and their ideologies permeate, in one or another degree, all other classes of society.

The reduction of the small manufacturers, shopkeepers, and independent artisans and farmers has proceeded to just about that point recognised most desirable for preserving the still-cherished illusion of free opportunity. Their relative significance has diminished, but their role

has not changed.

With the rise of institutional capitalism, a formerly negligible element has come to prominence—people having little or no share in ownership, but bound wholly to the class that buys their services and their loyalty. They constitute the career management of institutional capitalism and its professional retainers. Not oriented toward independent business or professional status, they have none of the outlook of the petty bourgeoisie. Their precariously privileged position in society is predicated upon their selling not their labour power only, but their whole selves; their role is to administer the means of production in the best interests of its owners. To do so, they identify their own welfare with that of the institution they serve so completely that their upper echelon is frequently confused with the bourgeoisie itself. Their philosophy is most succinctly embodied in Charles Wilson's conviction that what is good for General Motors is good for the country.

The working class itself has attained a degree of social privilege Marx did not believe possible under capitalism, though Engels, who outlived him, observed in England the beginnings of its perversion. Even more critically, it is now a rapidly declining class. Its most skilled adaptable members are recruited into the lower ranks of the lackeys above; mechanisation and automation ruthlessly slough off its lower levels to the lumpen-proletariat. That which remains is in the process of being divided into two distinct layers, according to the social value of their labour power—the favoured workers in automated and semi-automated industries, and those in unautomated industry and services. No longer subjected to homogeneous conditions of life, they no longer have the basis for a common philosophy; working-class solidarity has become a nostalgic legend. Each of its organisations not corrupted outright by the capitalist class serves mainly the narrow interests of the particular trade or craft that it represents, sometimes at the expense of other organised workers, often at the expense of the unorganised, and almost always at the expense of working women and Negroes. To be sure, the working class stands opposed to the bourgeoisie, which exploits it. But its very existence as a class depends upon the continuance of the value of human labour power, and its institutions will work to preserve that. Its aim will be to contain the revolution.

This is not to say that workers may not align themselves with the truly revolutionary class. The essence of their exploitation is that they are constrained to labour, and consummation of the revolution will release them from that constraint. Their stake in the present social order is therefore less than the promise the revolution holds out to them. They too may be brought to defend their future rather than their present interests.

The lumpenproletariat, the declassed scum of society, Marx characterised as a rotting mass, now and then to be swept into a revolutionary movement but on the whole better fitted to be informers, scabs, and goons in the service of the bourgeoisie. He was undoubtedly quite correct. He recognised their affinity to the proletariat in that they had no share in the ownership of the means of production, but the lumpens comprise the slough of all classes, and in Marx's day the classes discard-

ing slough were the decaying aristocracy, the peasantry, and the distressed petty bourgeoisie. The proletariat itself had little to discard: the industrial complex of a younger capitalism consumed it utterly. Marx detested these corrupt and fickle lumpens, and Marxists have scorned them ever since, without giving them a second look.

It is time to re-appraise them. The aristocracy is gone, and the rate of liquidation of the petty bourgeoisie is practically stabilised; now the overwhelming mass of lumpens comes from the working class. They are the hard-core unemployed and the young people who will never find jobs; they are the ex-miners of Appalachia and the ex-autoworkers of Detroit. A great many of them are Negro, many are Puerto Rican, Mexican-American, and Indian. It is absurd to call these people workers. They do not work; they do not expect to work again; as they adapt to their new conditions of life, they do not want to work. Living on relief or (statistically) on air, they are the most depressed element of modern society, proletarians in the Roman sense: people of no value to the social order. They are no longer even needed as strikebreakers; machines do it better. A government economist has dubbed them "no-people."

Yet they constitute today a true class, with a common relationship to the rest of society, with common attitudes and values unlike those of other classes, and with a common aspiration: to consume the fruits of humanity's conquest of nature without submitting to repressive social relations. The permissive lumpenculture scorns all precepts to thrift, industriousness, and self-denial—that is, to the factitious morality that upholds wage-enslavement and privation. Their slogan is "Now!"—freedom now, peace now, abundance now. The homogeneity of their experience produces concerted actions without need for elaborate theory or formal organisation. They, and they alone, can settle for nothing less than the transformation of society and the transformation of man. Their ranks are growing, and their vanguard is on the move.

Our re-examination now leads us to question whether the Left's usual methods of procedure are applicable to this new revolutionary situation. Reluctantly, for it is always comforting to walk in accustomed paths, we must conclude that they are not. The objective is no longer to replace one power structure with another, however benevolent; so our efforts must not serve to create institutions capable of assuming control. The old concepts of organisation therefore can lead only to counter-revolution. Moreover, that the already emergent transformation of man is so essential to the new society demands tactics that will further its development. This, neither political maneuvering nor traditional forms of insurrection can do—on the contrary, they can only hinder it, and thus in effect prove counter-revolutionary also.

In the activities of the lumpens themselves we see an approach more congruous with the aims of this revolution. Resisting the war in Korea, they eschewed all organised forms of protest and simply dodged the draft, gold-bricked, and deserted—without apparent organisation but none the less in mass. General Hershey testified bitterly to the volume and effect of their non-participation. Resisting wage-slavery, they simply adjust to living on welfare; and resisting welfare restrictions, they simply evade them. Though spontaneous, these are not merely scattered indi-

vidualistic acts of personal expediency, but coherent and predictable responses of the class. As such, they reflect a solidarity of outlook that grows naturally out of common frustrations and common needs. Mass action thus motivated is the means that can destroy institutions of power without replacing them, and the practice-ground where men can function together on the basis of mutual understanding, without constraint either of binding ideology or of physical force. The normal *modus operandi* of the lumpenproletariat is also the logical tactic of the anarchist revolution.

What remains is that this hitherto mainly defensive action be turned to positive ends; this we now see happening in sections of the Negro movement. But with all enthusiasm for the Negro's effort, we insist that it is folly for white radicals to tail his kite. To pin our hopes on moving the mass of whites through a struggle but peripheral to their needs is to abandon the bulk of the oppressed to the demagogy of the far Right (which knows well how to use them) and to abandon the Negroes themselves to the white backlash. Until it is achieved, equality must of course be the Negro's overriding demand. But the fact is that many of the Negro's white friends have unwittingly and with the most commendable intentions become millstones around his neck, retarding the development of his own tactics of struggle. Those able to identify with his tactics as well as his aspirations have a particular contribution to make in bringing them into the broader arena. Beyond equality, the Negro's needs are the same as those of his fellow-humans, and are not to be satisfied by a job soon lost to automation, a vote nullified by class bias of the electoral system, unsegregated indoctrination, and the replacement of moldering ghettos with jerry-built slums. The hearteningly dynamic drive for racial equality needs to be echoed by parallel (and equally direct) action for peace, personal liberty, and an equitable share of the goods and services our productive complex pours forth in such abundance, just beyond our reach.

It has been the habit of the Left to deplore insurgent action when it manifests itself in ways outside our approved (and by new institutionalised) forms. But the lumpen's approach is varied and flexible. He refuses by whatever device may be most expeditious to participate in the conduct of war; he does not cooperate with police and opposes enforcement of laws repressive of personal freedom in whatever manner may be feasible in any specific situation; he implements rupture of the job-income link by utilising social welfare agencies, consumer credit, and whatever means may be at hand to preserve his consumption power. To proponents of the status quo, such procedures either are criminal or ought to be; to the several orthodoxies of the Left, they are (horror of horrors!) anarchistic. So be it. To a rapidly growing class they are the usual and accepted ways of coping with the environment—a fact to which only sectarianism or our own relative well-being could blind us. Police may bluster and social workers may moan, but the lumpens' rebellion continues to mount. Despite its sometimes nihilistic aspect, we acknowledge its revolutionary potential. As the practicability of an anarchic society on a cybernated economic base is popularised, it will find its direction and its purpose.

Then will the three streams of revolution be joined and an irresistible flood sweep away the damming power structures of old society, to carry man into that future of unlimited freedom in which his infinite aspirations may be realised.

OBSERVATIONS ON ANARCHY 47: "TOWARDS FREEDOM IN WORK"

IN WELCOMING JAMES GILLESPIE'S ESSAY "Towards Freedom in Work", I hope to help counter the imbalance of reaction which will probably favour criticisms arising out of what the Editor, in his excellent "note", calls "the luxury of revolutionary rhetoric". I can find fault with the presentation (flights into verse and oriental mysticism do not clarify the case) and with some of the ideas but Mr. Gillespie offers us something more important—food for thought, tried theories and a wealth of experience. He opens up a hitherto closed discussion so that those of us who have concerned ourselves with workers' control can join in at the level of practical application rather than generalised slogans which have little meaning to anyone but ourselves. May we go on from here to evolve a comprehensive pattern of objectives and methods which will appeal to a wide public precisely because they offer a better alternative to accepted but nevertheless inadequate practices? As the inevitable problems of increased automation, dehumanisation, trades union emasculation and collaboration, etc., grow and have their effects both on industry and society, so will grow the will to listen. Is it too premature to suggest a national Commission on Workers' Control to take over where the Nottingham conference left off? Alternatively, should we join and expand existing efforts, e.g. Demintry?

To return to the substance of the article, what is particularly valuable in Mr. Gillespie's approach is that he deals with the organisation of participation, something which has not been truly faced by some of the enterprises which have fine-sounding constitutions or by the small concerns which do not have the problem of numbers or of minimal understanding amongst the majority of workers. It is not so easy as it sounds. Workers, when asked to participate, do not automatically seize the opportunity. They can be apathetic or often, quite rightly, look upon it with profound suspicion as another management dodge to get more out of them for ephemeral returns. Even when presented with ownership, the result can be the same for these reasons and others which are come complex. The ownership situation is going to remain rare until the labour movement makes this its objective and is prepared to fight. Meanwhile we are left dependent on the tiny number of owners who, for altruistic motives, are prepared to transfer their holdings without a struggle and on the fine efforts of small groups like the Factory for Peace which are sufficiently determined to start from scratch. The only other avenue which seems practical at this moment is the piecemeal process of encroaching control in nationalised industries and firms with

"progressive" or permissive managements who imagine they are going to get something out of workers' participation. The danger there is, and I am sure Mr. Gillespie will disagree with this, that the management will succeed, thus leaving the workers with nothing but the illusion of control.

Having reached the point of disagreement, I must go on to emphasise my own belief that real ownership and therefore real control is central rather than peripheral to the issue as Mr. Gillespie appears to be suggesting. How participation without a credible stake, as conveyed by the word 'ownership', can be an end in itself, is beyond my comprehension. Likewise, ownership without control doesn't add up to anything (apart from an invitation to control). The incentive, and I don't merely mean financial, in a bureaucratic, nationalised industry or in a profit-orientated capitalist concern is just not sufficient to maintain prolonged commitment on the part of the workers. And why should it be? Even if ownership is not initially a part of the stated demand, it should be included in the total strategy.

One last word on management. Management could and should be a pure function based on the ability to organise, subject to the pressures of popular consent, carrying with it a not disproportionate share of status, wealth or power. But, as has been pointed out, management is seen exclusively in terms of power, so much so that it is hard to drive a wedge between the two either in the minds of managers or their fellow workers. Basically libertarian individuals become managers and their concept of liberty evaporates, often unconsciously. It seem to be almost an immutable law of being that those with power in its many varied forms hang on to it. The only possible answer—and in attempting to provide one, I remain cynical—is, on the one hand to make sure that individuals understand themselves and their motives before entering the situation, and, on the other, to evolve a democratic formula which will strictly define the limits of power while balancing this against the need for efficient decision-taking.

TONY SMYTHE

WHILE THERE ARE STATEMENTS I AM IN SYMPATHY WITH in Gillespie's article, e.g. "dark wasteland of our materialist culture", and "individual growth towards personal maturity", I wish to criticise the article because he does little towards promoting the first's obliteration or the second's advancement. I am also in disagreement with the whole tenor of work morality.

Take his statement . . . "in free and meaningful work which calls for skill and decision making, there is at once a focussing of consciousness on the world of reality and a protection against the backward grasp of unconscious fantasy and infantilism." I think Gillespie will agree that nearly all work today is alienated work, or alienated labour, that is work which does not fulfil the individual's own needs and faculties. How alienated work, or alienated labour, that is work which does not fulfil the individual's own needs and faculties. How alienated work can ever in any sense become "free" is beyond my comprehension unless a

“double think” about the word work is involved.

Most work is of a dull, mechanical and routine nature. Those who eulogise “work” tend to dwell on the creative kind, or the artistic variety. But the hard fact remains that most work is born of necessity and not freedom or pleasure. It is upon this steady methodical work that civilisation depends. Work is synonymous with instinctual repression and it is this repression which creates the civilisation, the specific social organisation of labour imposed by the interest in domination—what Marcuse calls surplus repression.

I fail to see how decision making is going to alleviate the lot of a worker “who sits correctly in a chair designed to promote maximum output.” That is the crux of the matter which Gillespie hardly touches upon. While industry remains organised in the interests of production rather than consumption, the worker can in no wise be free, nor can his work be meaningful. More of this all important aspect in a moment. What is this “work instinct” that some orthodox and society conforming psychologists have conjured up? They have led Gillespie astray, up the garden path of neatly cut theoretical paving stones. Indeed! How patently wrong is this idea of Gillespie’s; “Men do not so much dislike work as they dislike their management-dependent status.” From a practical point of view I have worked for over a year on a kibbutz where there was ideal work discussion and work grouping. Some jobs were intensely disliked such as kitchen routine, others liked, such as night watch duty, or rather not liked but better tolerated. And in the groups who discussed the work, some few became dominant, others regarded the discussions as a bore, they wanted their free time for themselves. There was no question of management-dependent status here.

To get on to the psychological aspect, i.e. the aspect upon which Gillespie has built the edifice of Free Group Theory. It is no use at all quoting Freud side by side with Fromm. To quote Marcuse (*Eros and Civilisation* p. 81) “The instinctual syndrome ‘unhappiness and work’ recurs throughout Freud’s writings.” In a letter quoted by Ernest Jones (*The Life and Work of S. Freud* Vol 1) Freud speaks of the “moderate misery necessary for intensive work”. There are two sides to Freud, the doctor curing sick patients and advocating instinctual renunciation, but here is also a Freud who created a general theory of man. Some students of Freud have revised him and their writings form the basis of the present orthodox psychoanalytical school (notable exceptions being Norman O. Brown, Herbert Marcuse and S. Isaacs). Those who have revised Freud, e.g. Fromm, and redefined him in the interests of individual therapy and respectability have robbed Freud of his revolutionary elements, of his shocks, of his “hideous hypothesis”, of his implied critique of society.

From these revisionists has arisen the new man with a work instinct. They have flattened therapy into theory. Sociological factors are emphasised, biological factors minimised—especially the role of sexuality. They have shifted the emphasis from the unconscious to the conscious, from the Id to the Ego. As Marcuse suggests, therapy is a course in resignation. Gillespie has followed his psychological mentors

into (to quote him) “the dark wasteland of our materialist culture.” With the modern orthodox school of psychoanalysts (Fromm, Sullivan—of whom Jung was something of a father) Gillespie has come to terms with reality and has lost the utopian horizon; that essentiality (at present out of fashion) for affirming faith in the possibility of solving problems which seem for the moment insoluble.

No, I don’t see Gillespie as “an apologist for half measures”. I see in him one who has forsaken the cause of the pleasure principle, i.e. to be happy, and as one who has dived into the deep end of productivity.

It is no wonder that he has not dealt with the relationship between play and work. For Gillespie “infantilism” is an abhorred word. The reformer who fails to be revolutionary, i.e. to keep in touch with the unconscious of the mind, like the artist, has no shining, guiding light, and betrays his cause. Gillespie is forever tilting “against the backward grasp of unconscious fantasy and infantilism” and “no decision-making breeds infantilism” etc. Yet for Freud whom he quotes repeatedly, happiness was “the fulfillment of a prehistoric wish.”

I would give another word to his (Gillespie’s) *free work*. It is called *play*. It would have been better to pursue this track. Play is aimless, pregenital, with its roots in infancy. To escape from infantilism is to escape from all play, all eroticism except genital eroticism—an organisation (as Barbara Lantos points out) of the sexual instincts which has a parallel in the work organisation of the ego instincts. Play is aimless, self gratifying. Work on the other hand serves a purpose outside itself, i.e. the ends of self preservation. Thus it is the purpose not the content which marks an activity as work or play.

True enough, as Gillespie points out, work can give satisfaction. It might be the anticipation of a reward, or the satisfaction of being in the right place, well occupied and contributing one’s part to the functioning on an apparatus. As Marcuse points out, “It has nothing to do with primary instinctual gratification. . . . To say that the job must be done because it is a job, is truly the apex of alienation, the total loss of instinctual and intellectual freedom—repression which has become, not the second, but the first nature of man.”

When work, the necessity to work, becomes a neurotic symptom, (a crutch, an attempt to make oneself feel valuable even though there is no particular need for working; this is not, as Gillespie thinks, an escape to infantilism. It is very much a adult thing. Infancy which breeds dependence on the adult has also bred, don’t forget, a joyous memory of a blossoming of the pleasure principle. Man will forever be the neurotic animal if he cannot find what he is seeking (and knows it not). It is a return to play, with the activity of the whole body and mind. When reality loses its seriousness, when work becomes play, man will cease to be split between his unconscious desires and the world of reality.

Work remains in the realm of necessity. There are reasons and compulsions why productivity is a sacrosanct ideal of both capitalist and communist communities, and they are mostly to do with repression and man’s compulsion to produce the surplus—the origin of money.

Productivity becomes an end in itself. But where productivity and the happiness of man meet . . . is in the vast new fields that productivity opens up for the individual man.

This is where Gillespie and I fundamentally disagree again. A societal system organised to allow the individual time to develop. (To use Gillespie's own words) "Individual growth towards personal maturity. . . ." Such a societal system must be organised to allow the individual time and space *outside* the work world. That is, if labour is alienated anyway—and who can deny that most labour is—why enlarge the sphere of alienation by the enlargement of work activity, by the creation of work groups! Productivity gives man the ability to have free time for individual growth. Let him shrink his workworld to the minimum and with the aid that psychoanalysis gives us, increase his potentiality for happiness. Let him throw away his work crutch and use work as it should be used . . . strictly for the realm of necessity and self-preservation.

MAURICE GOLDMAN

JAMES GILLESPIE STATES THAT "unfortunately, when Standard Motors sold out to Leyland Motors the gang system in the form described by Melman came to an end." That is entirely wrong. It continued, and is still in full successful operation. At take-over Leyland chiefs put cards on the table and workers' spokesmen asked for a statement of policy. The firm was temporarily in a sticky position, the old management was being removed (300 of them!) and the workers were asked to help get the factory going as a larger and more efficient unit. No one would lose, but gains would only come when that was achieved. It was—handsomely. This was not seen as "capital and labour lying side by side" but as a working arrangement between professional managers and workers—*both employees*. The capitalist money swindle, shareholders' rake-off and speculation was not, and is not, thought about. That is a different world—irrelevant! (Leyland's world network sells every car and van that can be made. Production is organised for 10 year runs—more with luck. The world demand, actual and potential, calls for vast new production schemes, now being organised. The bogy of "over-production" is far ahead. There may be temporary setbacks but that is the general picture—not "capitalist bull" but hard facts of production engineering. The causes are human—people want personal transport, status symbols, a sense of power—and there is the snob-appeal of a "foreign" car.)

The workers' earnings have increased, conditions of work improved, hours of work decreased and shop floor control of work is more and more in their hands. A small attempt to impose a Manchester/Leyland authoritarian control of work was easily defeated, without a strike, by determined resistance. Authoritarians defeated on their own ground—worn down! All this is normal. The number of workers is increasing—even with automatic production. Recruitment is through trade unions alone—the state apparatus ignored. This also is normal. The unions were historically "labour exchanges" before civil servants thought of

the idea. The workers' grape-vine is also more accurate than press or radio—its efficiency covers the country, partly through car deliverers etc., the same day.

The above applies equally to the tractor factory (sold by Standard to Massey Ferguson)—conditions as good, gang system in full operation, factory and output expanding into a growing world market. Both firms are taking on men who have been building aircraft. Recently a tractor production line was changed over from an old to a new model in a weekend—but four years' planning had gone into it—and "planning" means *work* as well as brains. As in all such lines a skeleton crew of experienced men start it up, make all possible and "impossible" mistakes, and then week by week absorb men. The gang system continuously trains men into a natural collectivity. There is nothing consciously idealistic about this—just a job of work. Workers don't theorise or worry, but they *do at once* resist authoritarianism.

Wages in both factories are very much higher than average—this being, in a sense, profit-sharing, *every week by those who have done the work*. Gang work is smoother, easier, produces more and pays more. It is, in a word, better all round, even under capitalism. Certain "left-wing" shop stewards do still attempt to impose their special brand of ideology—nationalisation, state contrl, "fight the gaffers!" etc. but the workers refuse to panic and increasingly decide for themselves. The old fashioned revolutionary syndicalist strike idea just does not work today—hardly any conscious "revolutionaries" around. *But, touch them*, touch their job, their money, their sex life, etc., and reaction is instantaneous. Every manager knows this and keeps his fingers crossed. (To keep his job!) Naturally these workers are the most vigorous and adaptable. Tired and lethargic people work in other factories where "middle-class" ideas prevail—kindergarten-wise. Electricians and electronics tend that way and one finds men with B.Sc.'s etc. getting little more than labourers' pay.

As I write news is out that the huge Coventry aircraft factory is to close. No more bombers, no fighters, no more civil aircraft either. Sold out to USA. Anticipating something of this sort men have been moving away for years. The residue of older men will be prematurely scrapped. The Labour Party supposes the country will gain many much needed engineers. No so. Younger men are moving to car and tractor assembly—a complete waste of skill. Apprentices, highly educated and trained (many to university level) will be pushed around with no outlet for their highly specialised skills. Other men have built up sidelines—one chap has six kids (and loves 'em) and grows thousands of rose trees—another, expert on engine installation is now selling animal foods—men have shops, car and tele repair outfits, electrical services, and so on. Labour intellectuals may plan—but people decide, with improvisation and a wealth of ideas. The state machine and apparatus of propaganda will try in vain to make people do the planners' will. They don't! And won't! I am continuously diverted by the spectacle of the state desperately trying to catch up with what is already past. Technical progress (some of it quite domestic) is the result of thousands of daily creative acts, most of them quite good. State sponsored research on the

other hand has been largely wasted on armies, navies, air forces, rockets, atom bombs and poisonous propaganda. The Labour Party, thinking it can organise this better than the others has already provoked massive disillusion—still inarticulate, but there. Voting at elections is meaningless except as a register of temperature—how people feel at the moment. Temperatures vary, but life goes on. Life under the Coventry gang system combines the individual urge to earn as good a living as possible for self and family with the collective satisfaction and security of being in a team. The “perfectionist” social theorist may dismiss it as “just another example of capitalist piecework”, but men with experience of it are violently shocked should they leave the gang and have to work the primitive orthodox capitalistic scramble. We have proved that people can be taught better along these lines than by exhortation. (The Labour Party has yet to learn.) That lively anarchist Mat Kavanagh used to say “It seems a waste of time talking to them. They don’t hear—or want to hear.” My reply was “It’s the wireless—one doesn’t hear it unless one wants to.” TV is the same: “One gets used to it—ignores it—unconsciously.” But in the real world, the world of work, men are different—good ideas can be demonstrated, learned, and practised. The Labour intellectuals seem to ignore, even despise, the ordinary man, imagining they can organise everything—even capitalism. They pay lip service, soft soap, and go their own way. And the ordinary man increasingly does the same—finds *his* own way.

One of our pioneer production engineers always insisted “One cannot plan a job without the full co-operation and confidence of the man or men concerned. It starts on the shop floor with the *man*.” He, with his ideas, made Bill Morris (Lord Nuffield) a millionaire. This was not the intention—it was just an exercise in engineering and social engineering. But Bill Morris *owned* the outfit. My production engineer friend remained relatively poor—though *he* was happy. But he failed to achieve the obvious extension of his ideas into gang work. This was carried out elsewhere, including Standard Motors, who in their early days equalled Morris *without* automatic production. They relied on *men*. And as social theorists and practitioners we must do the same. *Men* matter. Never mind whether they are good men, bad men or any kind of men. (Trying to make men different is women’s work. They *all* try it!) They are as they are—and we must make it clear that working together is worth while.

The immense diversity of men is an asset. The complexity of life demands diversity. Everything is there—it only wants using—for good. We think we can visualise good. So does the Labour Party, but its ideas seem to be bounded by workhouse-masterish techniques—organisation of poverty, doles and pettifoggery. And this in a world that work has made to teem with every conceivable kind of real wealth, that grows from the creative efforts of all kinds of men and women daily. The capitalist, (and Labour Party problem is *selling* it. To us the answer is obvious. Get people together, stop trying to make them all good, or all the same. Demonstrate, prove that the money system is idiotic—that trying to measure skill (for example) in pennyworths is even worse. The

same with bus fares—collecting coppers is infantile. Get the idea around that public transport should be free. Extend that to other things, until it will ultimately be taken for granted that all things belong to everybody. Land should be free—ultimately. In the meantime, while people get used to the idea, it could be fixed at all one price. (Gang labour in Coventry is all one price: nearly anyhow.)

Extend people’s minds with such ideas in profusion. Small ideas, big ideas. In England a week’s work of three nightshifts only is being tried out. Not much, admittedly, but the men have much leisure. In the USA a 25 hour week for installation electricians. Machines, methods and gang work can solve all production problems. Political fantasies, belonging to the past, will go. Emerging races, for example, imagine that political control, having their own state, will give them everything. It won’t. They will learn that there is no good without work, neither in material things nor in people. Work is where men really cooperate, for themselves, for others, and as a basis for freedom. Away from work men will increasingly carry on with the same ideas and develop anarchistic freedom—and new freedoms will feed back into work.

REG WRIGHT

Sir Leon Bagrit’s Reith Lectures broadcast by the BBC last November have been published in book form as *The Age of Automation* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 15s.) In the first and most interesting lectures he sought to define automation (he prefers the word *cybernation*) for the layman, stressing its differences from mechanisation.

“I suppose that most people’s basic fear of automation is that it is going to turn them into semi-human or sub-human types, into something close to robots. This is because they confuse millions of people sub-anisation. Mechanisation has sometimes given millions of people sub-human work to do. Automation does the exact opposite. A mass-production line is essentially a timing machine, which moves goods from place to place in a given time. In that given time, a man has to be available to perform a given task. He is in fact in many ways a slave of the machine. It fixes his time and fixes his movements, and he has to produce a series of semi-intelligent mechanical motions to keep the machine fed and moving. This is what I mean by saying that mechanisation is his master. Automation, on the contrary, by being a self-adapting and a changing piece of mechanism, enables a man to work at whatever pace he wants to work, because the machine will react to him. Except in the simpler processes he is the master of the machine.”

His subsequent lectures discussed the range of applications for automation, education for the automation age, political, industrial and economic consequences, and he concluded by discussing new opportunities for social enrichment. This was however, the conventional wisdom of the automation pundits, and his assessment of the “new opportunities” was prosaic in the extreme—a discussion of “retirement resorts” for the aged, with only a hint of the real automative revolution: “Given the technical means now at our disposal, we must get rid of the out-of-date concept that only those who work have right to eat.”

The Challenor case

NICOLAS WALTER

THE CHALLENGOR CASE by Mary Grigg (Penguin 3s 6d)

IT'S DIFFICULT TO REVIEW THIS BOOK IN ANARCHY, because it is difficult to discuss the Challenor case in any anarchist paper. What can we say about police misconduct in general or about Challenor's misconduct in particular? We know too much about it all, both in principle and in practice. In principle, we aren't much more shocked when policemen do their jobs badly than we are when they do them well, and we aren't much more worried about punishing innocent people than we are about punishing guilty people. In practice, we have known about Challenor ever since the middle of August 1963, when FREEDOM published Donald Room's account of his own case, and everything that has come to light since then has only confirmed what we already knew or guessed.

I am generalising from experience, not prejudice. During Greek Week, the police framed many people I know, apart from Donald Room. Terry Chandler, Peter Moule and George Clark were wrongly accused and convicted of incitement (though George Clark won his appeal). Jane Buxton, a devoted pacifist, was wrongly accused and convicted of insulting words and behaviour. Trevor Hatton, another devoted pacifist, was wrongly accused and convicted of assault. Frank Adler, yet another devoted pacifist, was also wrongly accused and convicted of assault, and of incitement as well. During Greek Week, I myself was framed by a certain Police Constable—I was wrongly accused and convicted of obstruction, because I argued with him when he was stopping a girl selling *Peace News*.

Greek Week wasn't the only time the police have framed people I know. In fact, it has happened at one left-wing demonstration after another during the last ten years. On three occasions, my own evidence has helped to clear people who have been framed (it didn't work for me!). And when the police haven't actually framed innocent people, they have usually given false evidence to make sure of convicting guilty people. In every one of the dozen or so court cases I have been involved in, the police witnesses have perjured themselves. Most members and supporters of the Committee of 100 will have had the same sort of experience.

So it didn't come as much of a surprise when Donald Room told me, one evening in July 1963, that a policeman called Challenor had planted an offensive weapon on him in West End Central Police Station, or when George Clark told me, one afternoon in October 1963, that the same policeman had planted offensive weapons on several people who were then with him in Wormwood Scrubs. I expect my reaction was

more or less typical of most readers of ANARCHY, which means that this new Penguin Special on the whole Challenor case will probably have less impact on us than on anyone else. Even so, it is well worth buying and reading. One day there will be a full-scale book on the Challenor case, in the Notable British Trials series perhaps, but until then Mary Grigg's account will do very well.

It is a short book (only 50,000 words), divided into four sections. Part One briefly describes Challenor's personality and briefly lists his known cases; Part Two describes the 26 cases in more detail; Part Three describes the growth of the affair, from a tiny little doubt to a great big scandal; and Part Four discusses various aspects of the case. This arrangement can be confusing, because the sections tend to overlap and repeat themselves, but it is probably the best—after all, the events overlapped and repeated themselves, and by looking at them from four points of view in turn, it is at last possible to see the case whole and clear.

* * *

One of the most important things about the "Challenor case" is that it is not just the case of Detective Sergeant Harold Challenor, and one of the most impressive things about this book is that Mary Grigg is fair to him and refuses to make him a scapegoat. His story, she says, "is not the story of one man, because what became important was that the man was a police officer, and in this role he was always part of a scene, part of a process, part of a system. He did not stand alone, as a man, until he stood accused." And his story, of course, is not over—Challenor, who punished so many people unjustly, is now punished unjustly himself, detained without trial during Her Majesty's pleasure (what a way to get pleasure!). As she says, "justice has not been seen to be done." Nor is it likely to be.

She describes Challenor's strange career, first as a hero in the war against fascism (when he was given the Military Medal), and then in the war against crime (when he was praised by the press). She describes his strange concept of justice—"He decided that he would put certain people in custody, invent a charge, plant the evidence, and then take his prisoners to court." (She gives this too common police idea the good name of "instant justice".) It worked, until he was tripped up by Donald Room in August 1963. Even then it took another year to clear up the mess he had made, and even now it isn't certain that all the mess has been cleared up. After listing the 26 people he is known to have framed (two of whom have still not been cleared), she points out that "these cases cannot possibly give a full picture of Challenor's activities, and there has never been an inquiry to investigate how many people might have been sent to prison on framed charges." It has been estimated that during his time at Savile Row he may have made as many as 600 arrests.

The detailed description of his cases isn't very interesting in itself, because they have already been described as they came to light, but it is very useful, because it gives all the important facts about them in the space of 40 pages—after reading this, no one can have any doubt about what was going on in the West End between May 1962 and July 1963. It is important to remember that Challenor was getting away with it

again and again, and would have gone on getting away with it if he hadn't dropped his bricks. Even then, he really lost only one of the eight brick cases, and that was because of what Donald Room has called his "appalling rotten luck". It is still not generally realised that if only he hadn't said he took the brick from Donald's pocket, or else had actually put it in Donald's pocket, he would have won that case too, and might still be in West End Central Police Station instead of Netherne Hospital. As it was, he won the case against Apostolou, who had the same evidence as Donald Room. Altogether, it was a damned close run thing.

* * *

The description of the growth of the affair is more interesting, because more of it is new. Mary Grigg is the Assistant Secretary of the National Council for Civil Liberties, and she describes the affair from the viewpoint of the NCCL. In February 1963, it first received information that Riccardo Pedrini might be innocent of the charge of possessing an offensive weapon (an iron bar), for which he had been given seven years in December 1962; but it could give no real help without definite proof. In July 1963, the NCCL found that four people who were taking part in the Mayfair demonstration against the Greek Royal Visit had been planted with offensive weapons (pieces of brick); this time it was able to give enough legal and scientific help to clear them all, between August and October 1963.

In August 1963, it found that four people who were in Mayfair, but were not taking part in the demonstration, had also been planted with offensive weapons (more pieces of brick); one was cleared in September 1963, the others not until July 1964. In October 1963, after Challenor had been sued by Donald Room and had been moved from duty to hospital the NCCL began to connect the brick cases with the Pedrini case and began to hear about other cases of people who had been planted with offensive weapons which also involved Challenor, and the national press began to realise that something had gone wrong. By November 1963, it was quite clear that Challenor and other policemen had framed at least a dozen people in the West End during the previous two years.

At this point the authorities could have cleared up the whole business if they had taken the initiative, but they refused to do so and left it to their opponents. From November 1963 onwards, the whole thing became a farce, except for the unfortunate people who were still in prison or in financial difficulties. Month by month, more information was found by the NCCL, passed on to the MPs and the press, and communicated to the public; month by month, more pressure was put on the authorities; month by month, they resisted the pressure; month by month, they were forced to give way.

In November 1963, the Home Office began an internal police inquiry, but it was not until March 1964 that this brought Challenor and the three constables who had helped him plant the bricks into court. Even then it was only the bricks cases that were being followed up, and it was not until July 1964 that the Home Secretary at last

admitted that there had been several other miscarriages of justice. After this, there was another internal police inquiry (into allegations that Challenor had accepted bribes) and a public police inquiry (into the circumstances in which he had been on duty when he appeared to be mentally ill). The results of both the internal inquiries are Official Secrets, and the results of the public inquiry haven't been published yet. The affair is still far from over. Joseph Oliva, who was framed with Pedrini, given five years in December 1962, and cleared in July 1964, was sent back to prison the day before this book was published—he was given eighteen months for wounding a man, though they had both said the charge was framed. Challenor has gone, but it is still going on.

* * *

The discussion of various aspects of the case is very interesting. Mary Grigg examines the responsibility of the police, the relations between the police and the public, the relations between the police and the politicians, the responsibility of the magistrates, judges and juries, the responsibility of Henry Brooke, the responsibility of Parliament and the press, the effects of class distinction, and the question of Challenor's insanity.

She makes it quite clear that Challenor and the three constables who were sent to prison in June 1964 couldn't possibly be the only policemen responsible for framing the known victims, and that Challenor couldn't possibly have kept his activity from his colleagues and superiors. She remarks that "no one who actually worked with him on particular projects noticed, or said, that he was framing charges"—but the operative word is "said". On pages 112-113, she lists some of the other policemen involved in Challenor's various cases, though unfortunately she gives no names. But she doesn't just blame the police, and she refuses to make them a scapegoat either. She shows how they are pushed and pulled in opposite directions by the public. "Society neither wishes to harbour crime nor to tackle it in any logical manner." The Challenor case coincided with several other cases she mentions—Stephen Ward, Hal Wolfe, Laurence Bell, the Sheffield rhino whip, the Glasgow cell death, and so on—but in these cases, as in the Challenor case, the police went too far partly because the public wants them to go such a long way in the first place. She also shows how the police are pushed in one direction by the authorities above them. She describes how the Metropolitan Police were used as a political police force during Greek Week, to interfere with demonstrations which were an embarrassment to the Government rather than a nuisance to the public. She explains how the Metropolitan Police is run by the Home Secretary, who at that time had expressed his determination to crush crime rather than to cure it, and had expressed his personal hatred of the demonstrators the night before the bricks were planted.

She then shows how the theoretical presumption that a man in court is innocent until he is proved guilty doesn't work in practice. From the beginning of a case, the police make all the running, and a "gradual process of assuming guilt begins". She shows how this process is assisted by magistrates, judges and juries, all of whom are the kind of people who accept police evidence without hesitation in most cases and

with hesitation in doubtful cases. She also shows how most lawyers fail to resist this process. Pedrini spent £400 and King £600 on lawyers, both in vain—"The price of injustice appeared to be high". The price of justice was high too. Donald Room was refused his costs of £180; most of this was raised by his comrades, but he got official compensation only after he sued Challenor, and then nearly six months after it all began. As he put it, "British justice—the best that money can buy."

More significant, perhaps, she shows how the whole crazy system can suddenly change. People who had been convicted because they had been presumed guilty were in the end presumed innocent after all, and after trying to get justice for several months found themselves cleared and compensated within a few weeks. Once everything had worked against them; then everything worked for them. In 1963, expensive legal and scientific experts were necessary to make a magistrate admit that he doubted an obvious lie; in 1964, a few words from the Home Secretary were sufficient to make the Court of Criminal Appeal reverse valid verdicts from the Old Bailey. The facts hadn't changed. "Justice, as always, was impartial: it had simply become available." What caused this remarkable change in the legal system? "Nothing had changed, except that the whole affair had become a public scandal. So much for the independence of the courts. What about the integrity of the politicians?"

She shows how for eight months Henry Brooke, who had the power to clear the whole business up in a day, personally and persistently resisted the pressure to do something when it had become clear that something must be done. He refused to move until he was forced to do so by the multiple pressure of the NCCL, the press, Parliament, and even the judiciary, and even then he moved as little and as slowly as possible. He was, as she says, "a disastrous Home Secretary". This won't surprise anyone, but what may surprise some people is that Frank Soskice doesn't seem to be much better. Gold and Louciades have still not been cleared, there has still been no full inquiry into Challenor's activities, there has still been no action about all the other policemen involved, and there is still no reason to believe it couldn't happen again.

She turns to the people in Parliament and the press who should have been able to do something about the misbehaviour of the police, the courts, and the politicians. She recalls that Donald Room's case has been called "the scoop that got away," because the national press missed it when it was news in August 1963, failed to catch up until October 1963 and even then failed to say much until June 1964. Nearly all the papers were unable or unwilling to break through their fear of the laws of libel and contempt and their respect for the police and the politicians. Some MPs did what they could, within their rigid rules, but they did no more than they should, and the Government ignored what they did do until the conviction of Challenor's aides forced it to move. She comments that "the traditional pressures were, finally, effective," but adds that they would have been effective sooner if they had been applied with more vigour and persistence.

One of the most important parts of the book is the discussion of

the effects of class distinction, in a chapter called "People-who-don't-matter". She points out that one of the main reasons why Challenor got away with it for so long was that he picked little people who couldn't answer back and couldn't make themselves heard. They were ex-prisoners, foreigners, political demonstrators, and sometimes—by a horrible irony—even deaf-mutes. He was "working to a general rule," for "some people are more susceptible to injustice than others". As well as these groups, she mentions coloured people, homosexuals, and teenagers as susceptible victims. She shows that all these people are vulnerable partly because people in authority are isolated from them—Challenor's victims found it impossible to make anyone in authority listen to them until they got experts to help them. She points the moral in the unique success of Donald Room, who "was not the sort of person to be easily framed. He could talk and write fluently and persuasively. He knew too much and too many people . . . Challenor must have forgotten that in every group of people who don't matter, there can always be one or two who might." She could have added that even Donald Room needed experts to win, to say nothing of luck.

As for Challenor's insanity, she gives the three main views—that he was never mad, that he was always mad, and that he became mad sometime between September 1962 and October 1963. Her own view is that he "was driven mad by what was happening" and "suffered a complete breakdown when the brick cases came to light". But as she says, "insanity, in this case, became something of a smokescreen which may have blinded the authorities themselves." The contradictory medical evidence which placed the onset of Challenor's illness at various times between the arrest of Pedrini and his removal from duty is not surprising or important. What is important, though not surprising, is that the authorities refused to admit there was anything wrong with him until he was caught, and then they suddenly decided that there had been something wrong with him all the time. They were more worried that he could be mentally ill on duty than that he could be framing people on duty, and they were more concerned to use his illness to help themselves out of difficulty than to help his victims out of misery. It is after all a matter of statistical fact that there are more policemen who frame people than policemen who are insane, and that more people are framed by sane policemen than by insane policemen; it is also a matter of psychological fact that there isn't all that much difference between a sane and an insane policeman.

The authorities, understandably enough, have never followed up this line of thought. Mary Grigg refers to Erich Fromm's point that a person who is insane may seem sane if his insane behaviour follows an acceptable pattern—such as being a successful soldier or policeman. She could also have referred to Alex Comfort's important book on the subject—*Authority and Delinquency in the Modern State* (1950). The whole question of insanity and criminality in such groups as the police is highly relevant to this case, but it is a tricky one to answer.

She ends by showing that Challenor's plea of insanity was more readily accepted by the authorities than many much stronger ones—she

mentions Podola and Reginald, and she could have added Heath, Haig, Christie, and many others. And she mentions that Challenor himself denied he was insane—was this yet another delusion, or was it perhaps yet another fact which the authorities wished to conceal, along with all the facts their acceptance of his insanity helped to conceal? After Donald's trial and before his own, Challenor was reported to have threatened that he would take a lot of other people down with him. Are the authorities frightened that he might have done so—and might yet do so—if he hadn't been silenced in the second most efficient possible way?

Mary Grigg's conclusion to the book is short and sharp. She notes that 26 people were framed, of whom 20 were held in custody, 13 sent to prison, and five assaulted, and that tens of thousands of pounds was spent to clear 24 of them. She repeats that four individual policemen weren't responsible for all this, but that there has been no official attempt to find out who else was. She lists all the people who have been in some way responsible, because they all make an erroneous distinction between criminals and non-criminals and all suffer from an irrational fear of the criminals—"the rage of Caliban seeing his own face in a glass."

* * *

The Challenor Case is generally excellent. It is easy to read and understand. It will have a large sale and, I hope, a large effect. Those who know Mary Grigg as a rather shy and uncertain person will be surprised at her strong and forthright style. Those who have wondered when the whole Challenor case would be put before the public will be pleased that she has done this so successfully. But the book is not perfect. The interested reader needs an index to the many names, and the sources of the many quotations. More important, there are too many factual errors and significant omissions.

The errors are the result of carelessness, and are not serious. The bricks charge against the unnamed juvenile wasn't withdrawn; he was acquitted at the Chelsea Juvenile Court on September 11th, 1963. The Woolf story wasn't "leaked by *Private Eye* a year after the event"; *Private Eye* broke the story—a leak is information given to, not by, a paper—less than nine months after Woolf died. The Skelhorn report on the Woolf case was published in 1964, not 1963. The description of internal police inquiries, of police powers over arrested people, of the Judges' Rules, of the right to report court cases, and of the demonstrations against the Greek Royal Visit are all slightly inaccurate. Macmillan didn't give an "assurance" that demonstrations against the Greek Royal Visit wouldn't be interfered with; Mary Grigg shouldn't have followed this common misconception, since in the same paragraph she quotes his actual statement that "the ordinary rights of peaceful demonstration are, of course, part of our tradition here"—he took care not to give any assurance that the tradition would be upheld.

The omissions seem to be the result of self-censorship, and are more serious. Mary Grigg writes always as a member of the staff of the National Council for Civil Liberties, never as a former member of the Committee of 100 (active between 1961 and 1963), and she keeps her

account of the Challenor case respectable by omitting the part played in it by extreme left-wing organisations and periodicals. She mentions the demonstrations of Greek Week, but not that they were organised by the London Committee of 100. She mentions that Donald Rooum is a member of the NCCL, but not that he is also a pacifist and an individualist anarchist. She mentions the pusillanimous behaviour of the press after his trial on August 8th, 1963, but not that the anarchist and pacifist press did not let the scoop get away; what she says is that "minority weekly papers reported it at a later date", but what happened was that *Peace News* and *Freedom* described the case in detail, naming and accusing Challenor, in the next issues they printed (August 16th and 17th)—this was the beginning of the public campaign, and she should have said so. She mentions the beginning of the campaign in the national press in October 1963, but not that important contributions to it appeared in PEACE NEWS, FREEDOM, SANITY (the organ of CND), ACTION FOR PEACE (the bulletin of the London Committee of 100, now called RESISTANCE), and SOLIDARITY. She mentions the hard work of the NCCL to make the facts known, but not that the anarchist, pacifist and unilateralist movements were also doing all they could. All this seems a great pity, because it is an essential part of the story; but I suppose liberals don't like being seen in the company of such dangerous people as anarchists, pacifists and unilateralists.

There are some other odd errors and omissions. Mary Grigg mentions that Donald Rooum's case wasn't reported in the national dailies, but not that it was taken up by Tom Driberg in the *Sunday Citizen* (August 18th) and by Michael Frayn on the television programme "What the Papers Say" (August 22nd). She then says that, having missed the chance in August, the papers printed nothing about Challenor until October; but reports certainly appeared in the *Guardian*, *Observer* and *Spectator* before the end of September. Perhaps the NCCL press-cuttings file isn't quite as good as it should be.

There are some other general defects. I think the book would be more convincing if Mary Grigg hadn't assumed that all Challenor's victims were completely innocent. For example, half the people who were planted with bricks were completely innocent, but the other half were taking part in a demonstration that was—however unreasonably—illegal; and some of the people who were accused of using offensive weapons in protection rackets do seem to have been mixed up in such activity. These circumstances don't in any way excuse what the police did, but they do in some way explain it.

The book would also have been more convincing if Mary Grigg had shown the difficulty of the police, the courts, the politicians and the press behaving any differently from the way they did. This difficulty is the reason for the present campaign for an Ombudsman, which some reviewers of this book think is the answer to the Challenor case. She should perhaps have shown what an Ombudsman could and couldn't have done to clear up the mess—thus he could have done a lot after November 1963, but not much before then, and nothing at all if Challenor had taken a bit more care with Donald Rooum. She is per-

haps limited by the NCCL policy from giving her own answer to the Challenor case, but it would have been interesting to know what it is.

* * *

But what is our answer to the Challenor case? In his article in *ANARCHY* 36, Donald Rooum said:

A police force is something like a pair of crutches. If everyone would stand on his own feet they wouldn't exist. We anarchists are striving towards a situation where everyone can stand on his own feet; but at this present moment, supposing it were possible to kick the police force from under the people, it would do more harm than good. Getting rid of crutches is not a sudden cataclysmic occurrence but a continuous operation. Weaken them slightly and a little responsibility goes to the citizen's own feet; as the feet exercise and gain strength, the power of the crutches can be reduced further. Meanwhile we must watch that they don't aggravate the sickness they are meant to relieve. And we must make people aware of the danger.

I think this is true and important. We have on simple answer to the Challenor case. We can't just say "all coppers are bastards" or—more politely—"the police should be abolished". All we can do is use the Challenor case to repeat what we think and know about the police. A study of something when it is functioning abnormally often helps us understand it when it is functioning normally. A study of the Challenor case may help us understand the police, and an attempt to see why it happened like that may help us to see why the police are like that. From the police, we can move on to the rest of the structure of the State. Everything that goes wrong is an opportunity for us to say how it could go right.

We have a double answer to the Challenor case. Ultimately, we don't want any police, good or bad, to bring any charges, true or false, against anyone, guilty or innocent. But immediately, we want to make the police better—that is, weaker—than they are. So despite inevitable mutual difficulties, we must help the liberals—the NCCL, and the better papers and MPs, and all the sympathetic people we know—and, if necessary, lead them. During the Challenor case so far, this is in fact what we have done, following Donald Rooum's example, and we have been so skilful and successful that the liberals think they did it all by themselves. Never mind—now we must get on with the next job, which will begin with the publication of the James report on how Challenor stayed on duty so long, and in that job one of our best tools will be this book.

Nicolas Walter

Ready next month

MALATESTA: HIS LIFE AND IDEAS

Edited by Vernon Richards

Writers and social historians are unanimous in considering **ERRICO MALATESTA** (1853-1932) to be the outstanding anarchist agitator since Bakunin, but they almost all overlook the fact that he was also one of the most original and realistic of anarchist thinkers, and one who expressed his ideas with clarity and conciseness. Equally important, as one historian who realised his worth put it: "Malatesta . . . bridges 19th and 20th century European thought as few of his peers did." Yet apart from a few pamphlets all his writings were in the form of articles mainly for Italian anarchist journals, a number of which he himself founded and edited, including the daily anarchist newspaper *Umanita Nova*.

One of the reasons for the neglect he has suffered is that very few of his periodical writings have ever been published in English. This volume aims at filling the gap and at presenting as complete a picture as possible of Malatesta's ideas on the ends and means of anarchism, in his own words. In order to do this within the compass of some 200 pages the editor has not offered a selection of articles, but has instead extracted the principal arguments from several hundred articles and classified them under twenty-seven subject headings which, in his opinion, emerge from the writings as those which most engaged Malatesta's thoughts and activity.

The second part of the volume—Notes for a Biography—seeks to emphasise the aspects of Malatesta's long life which illumine his political thought, rather than offering a detailed chronological account of his activities.

In Part Three, the editor makes his assessment of the relevance of Malatesta for anarchists today.

The Appendices include the text of Malatesta's articles against the First World War, and his long article on Kropotkin, a document of historic importance as well as a good example of Malatesta's consummate skill as a writer.

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