

CONVERSATIONS
ABOUT
ANARCHISM

ANARCHY 85

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Conversations about anarchism

RICHARD BOSTON

Richard Boston went round with a tape-recorder interviewing anarchists, and reduced eight or nine hours of tape to a forty-minute radio programme, produced by Tony Gould for BBC Radio 3, and broadcast on January 10th and 30th. The voices heard, apart from that of Richard Boston, were those of Bill Christopher, Paul Goodman, George Melly, Jack Robinson, Donald and Irene Room, Peter Turner, Nicolas Walter and Colin Ward. The following is the text of the programme.

*

Announcer: Who are the anarchists? What do they believe? What sort of society do they want, and what actions do they take to realise it?

CW: I consider myself to be an anarchist-communist, in the Kropotkin tradition.

NW: I think that if I had to label myself very quickly I would say I was an anarchist-socialist, or libertarian socialist even, if the word anarchist gave rise to misunderstanding.

BC: I would describe myself as an anarcho-syndicalist, anarchism being my philosophy and syndicalism the method of struggle.

JR: I don't call myself an anarcho-syndicalist. I could be called an anarcho-pacifist-individualist with slight communist tendencies, which is a long title, but this is a way of defining a compass point.

PT: First of all I'm an anarchist because I don't believe in governments, and also I think that syndicalism is the anarchist application to organising industry.

DR: I describe myself as a Stirnerite, a conscious egoist.

JR: We even have a strange aberration known as Catholic anarchists, which seems to be a contradiction in terms, but nevertheless they seem to get along with it.

RB: There are so many sorts of anarchist that one sometimes wonders whether such a thing as a plain and simple anarchist even exists, but the differences are mainly differences of emphasis. Anarchists are agreed on

the basic principle: anarchy—the absence of rule, which is not the same thing as chaos, although the words anarchy and chaos are popularly confused. As the anarchist sees it, chaos is what we've got now. Anarchy is the alternative he offers. In the 11th edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Kropotkin defined anarchism as, "The name given to a principle or theory of life and conduct under which society is conceived without government, harmony in such a society being obtained not by submission to law or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements concluded between the various groups, territorial and professional, freely constituted for the sake of production and consumption." I think most anarchists today of whatever label would agree with this. Where do they differ then? Well, one important difference is between those who, like the anarchist-communists and anarcho-syndicalists, emphasise collective organisation and those like the Stirnerites whose chief concern is with the individual. But in fact an anarchist-communist like Colin Ward and an individualist anarchist like Donald Rooum still have a great deal in common.

CW: For me anarchism is a social philosophy based on the absence of authority. Anarchism can be an individual outlook or a social one. I'm concerned with anarchism as a social point of view—the idea that we could have a society and that it's desirable that we should have a society, in which the principle of authority is superseded by that of voluntary co-operation. You could say that anarchism is the ultimate decentralisation. I believe in a decentralised society. What I want to do is to change a mass society into a mass of societies.

DR: The anarchist thinks that society is there for the benefit of the individual. The individual doesn't owe anything to society at all. Society is the creation of individuals, it is there for their benefit. And from that the rest of it follows. Eventually, as the ultimate aim of anarchism, which may or may not be achieved, the idea is to have a society of sovereign individuals.

RB: But how do you set about achieving an anarchist society? Well, there are two traditional anarchist methods, propaganda of the deed—at one time this meant assassinating royalty and statesmen, but nowadays is almost invariably non-violent—and propaganda of the word. Propaganda of the word is partly the spoken word. In London, for example, Speakers' Corner, and the meeting every Sunday night at the Lamb and Flag in Covent Garden, where there are usually about fifty people, but mostly the word means the printed word, and, apart from the Syndicalist Workers' Federation's monthly paper *Direct Action*, this mostly centres round the publications of the Freedom Press.

CW: ANARCHY was started in 1961. It's an offshoot of the anarchist weekly FREEDOM which is the oldest newspaper of the Left in this country I think. It was founded by Kropotkin in 1886. In ANARCHY what I try to do is to find ways of relating a way-out ideology like anarchism to contemporary life and to find those positive applications which people are looking for. There are problems you see. If you have a revolutionary ideology in a non-revolutionary situation, what exactly do you do? If you've got a point of view which everybody

considers to be way out, do you act up to it, or do you lean over backwards to show how normal and practical your ideas are? What I would like anarchism to have is intellectual respectability.

RB: What sort of subjects are discussed in ANARCHY?

CW: There do seem to be recurring themes, principally because they are what people will write about. They are topics like education, like this question of a technology in which people would have a certain degree of personal freedom and personal choice in work, instead of none at all, as the vast majority of people have today. ANARCHY discusses topics like housing, ANARCHY tries to take the problems which face people in our society, the society we're living in, and to see if there are anarchist solutions.

RB: ANARCHY is a monthly. FREEDOM, on the other hand, as a weekly paper, is more concerned with commenting on day-to-day political events and reporting on anarchist activities. It is itself run on anarchist lines. Jack Robinson of the Freedom Group:

JR: The whole of FREEDOM is produced with voluntary labour. I myself have a slight grant of £3 a week, and thus we exploit labour. Lilian Wolfe, who is working with us, is now 91 years of age, which I think is a record in the exploitation of old people's labour, but nevertheless she still comes in cheerfully three days a week. There is a carpenter, a print-worker, a furniture remover, who do the editorial work, and there is a type-designer who actually does the layout for us. Every member of the editorial committee has the power of veto but we do try to argue things out until a unanimous decision is arrived at.

RB: Propaganda of the deed nowadays mostly means what anarchists call Direct Action, that is to say, doing something yourself about your own problems rather than waiting for someone else to come along and do it for you. Sometimes this may take the form of illegal action.

CW: It does seem to me amazing that in the last few years, for instance, there hasn't been mass squatting in office blocks, when you get the situation of local authorities having huge housing waiting lists while you can see dozens of new speculative office blocks with TO LET plastered all over them. The very interesting instance in the last few years, of course, was the King Hill Hostel affair. King Hill Hostel was a reception centre for homeless families in Kent where all sorts of restrictions were placed upon the homeless, the most striking of which, of course, was the separation of husbands from wives. People were treated in a punitive way as though their homelessness were somehow the result of their own moral turpitude. A handful of people adopted Direct Action methods to embarrass the authorities, and they embarrassed them so much that they achieved much more for improving the conditions of reception centres for the homeless than had ever been done by legislative action for years. Direct Action is an anarchist method because it is a method which expands. People are pushed on by success. They are given more confidence in their own ability to shape their own destiny by being successful in some small way. The person who takes Direct Action is a different kind of person from the person who just lets things happen to him.

RB: Colin Ward gives another example of Direct Action in the mass squatting campaign that took place after the war when the homeless seized derelict army camps.

CW: The Minister of Health at the time, the Labour Minister of Health who was in charge of housing, Aneurin Bevan, said that these people were somehow jumping their place in the housing queue, they were part of a Communist plot, and all sorts of rubbish of that kind. But local authorities were very soon empowered to take over army camps for themselves. People who went round noticed that the people who seized the places for themselves had done a great deal to make them habitable—the usual temporary, makeshift improvisations to make life, family life, possible in such places. Those who were installed there by local councils did nothing. They waited for things to happen to them. This is an example, it seems to me, of the social psychology of Direct Action. The direct-actionist is someone who shapes his own destiny while other people are the victims of circumstances, of the whims of authority: things happen to them.

RB: Direct Action has also been the anarchists' preferred method in their opposition to war and the state's preparations for war, and their most conspicuous contributions to the peace movement have been when the peace movement has turned to Direct Action. One anarchist who has been active in the peace movement is Nicolas Walter.

NW: As soon as the Committee of 100 was formed I knew that I agreed with what it was trying to do. So I joined. And I've been active in that sort of thing more or less ever since, and I did all the normal things, I went on sit-downs, I got arrested, got fined and so on. But, more than that, there are things which I have done in the general anti-war movement, which I suppose one could say are the sort of things which I've done as an anarchist. One thing was being involved in the Spies for Peace, which, I think, is a perfect example of anarchist activity although not all the people involved in it were anarchists, in that here was a situation in which the Government had done something, for the sake of the people officially, which the people didn't know about.

RB: What was this?

NW: Setting up a regional organisation to rule the country in the event of nuclear war demolishing the State apparatus, so that if for example, South-West England was cut off from the rest of England, there would be a ready-made government to take it over and rule it. And this was all set up, it was set up secretly behind the scenes. No one knew about it. And, just by chance, this information fell into the hands of people in the Committee of 100, of whom I was one. And we published it, secretly, we didn't want to get caught. Then another, in a sense much smaller, thing, though it had more effect on me, was going along to a church where the Prime Minister was going to read the lesson, before the Labour Party Conference, and interrupting to say that I thought this was hypocrisy. This isn't a very serious thing, it was just propaganda by deed. It was to try and say, at the time and place where a lot of people would take notice, what I thought about the sort of thing the Labour Government does. And this got us landed in prison, a

couple of us.

RB: For the anarchist, in Randolph Bourne's phrase, "War is the health of the State." This sounds like a paradox, but, as Jack Robinson says, "to speak of a healthy state is like talking about a healthy cancer". The anarchist doesn't want a healthy state, he wants a healthy society. For this reason alone, many anarchists are also pacifists, even if they don't always rule out violence altogether. Here is the American writer Paul Goodman.

PG: My background is psycho-analytic, and psycho-analytically, we feel that face-to-face violence, like a fist fight, is natural, and it does damage to try to repress it; that it's better to have the fight out. Therefore on that level I have no opposition to violence. Naturally I don't like to see people punching each other, but anger is a rather beautiful thing, and anger will lead to a blow, and there you are. When people are under a terrible oppression, as say Negroes in the United States or the Parisians, let's say, during Hitler's occupation of Paris, it seems inevitable that at a certain point they are going to blow up and fight back. And that seems to me like a force of nature. You can do nothing about that, and therefore I don't disapprove. That kind of warfare, guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, brutalises people, of course it does, but it's human and I would make no moral judgement.

As soon as warfare, violence, becomes organised, however, and you are told by somebody else, "Kill him", where it's not your own hatred and anger which are pouring out, but some abstract policy or party line or a complicated strategic campaign, then to exert violence turns you into a thing, because violence involves too much of you to be able to do it at somebody else's direction. Therefore I am entirely opposed to any kind of warfare, standing armies as opposed to guerrilla armies and so forth. Therefore all war is entirely unacceptable because it mechanises human beings and inevitably leads to more harm than good. Therefore I am a pacifist.

IR: I'm a pacifist. I call myself a pacifist anarchist and I think that is basic really. I disapprove of governments because they wage war. I don't want to die, I don't want my children to die, and I don't want to have to watch other people dying for government, and killing people they don't know and have never met and have got nothing to do with. *RB:* That was Irene Rooum. A frequent criticism of anarchists is that their ideas are utopian. How do they answer this?

CW: It's perfectly possible to say that anarchism is utopian, but of course so is socialism or any other political "ism". All the "isms" are what the sociologists call "ideal types" and you can make fun of the ideal type of an anarchist society, but you can also do it to that of a socialist society, which is very different from anything Harold Wilson has in mind. It seems to me that all societies are mixed societies, and while, if it cheers us up, we can dream about an anarchist society, the sort of society that we or our descendants are going to get is a society where these two principles of authority and voluntarism are struggling. But because no road leads to utopia it doesn't mean that no road leads anywhere.

NW: I want to work towards anarchy. I don't want to establish it overnight. So I would take the—almost a slogan—view that means are ends, that what happens now is an end. To say that you are working towards an end strikes me as meaningless. What you are working towards is what you are actually doing. If you overthrow a government overnight you could say that this is establishing anarchy. I would say that you are much more likely to establish an extreme dictatorship.

GM: There are in the world thousands of people who haven't enough to eat, there are wars going on, there are far too many people over the earth's surface, there are diseases as yet unchecked. There is an enormous amount of money being spent in flinging expensive toys up into outer space, when there are people rotting from disease and lack of food down here. And it seems to me that the argument against anarchism that it is an impractical, lovable ideal which could never be realised, is unproven in the face of the inefficiency of the forms of government that have existed and exist on the earth's surface.

PG: The important crisis at present has to do with authority and militarism. That's the real danger, and if we could get rid of the militarism and if we could get rid of this principle of authority by which people don't run their own lives, then society could become decent, and that's all you want of society. It is not up to governments or states to make anybody happy. They can't do it. What they can do is maintain a minimum level of decency and freedom.

NW: Yes, in general I want a government that governs less, but I want the lessening process to be continuous, so that government always governs less and less, and the people always look after themselves more and more until in the end there is a government that does not govern at all—is simply a clearing-house, a post box, a way for people to collect their health benefits.

BC: Probably now, more than any other time, ordinary people have got more than a slightly cynical approach to parliament and politicians. People are beginning to say that they're all alike and we're just not going to bother to vote at all. But going on from there and saying, "What are we going to do?", this is the crunch, this is the problem. We have had illustrations in recent by-elections of people abstaining. But I think we can get over the idea now that the parliamentary system is a big laugh, is a big giggle. Once you start getting people thinking in terms of really querying the parliamentary system and exposing it for what it's worth—a gasworks—then I think we're making progress.

CW: Well, anarchists in elections usually indulge in anti-election propaganda, that is to say, they say "Don't vote for anybody!" And they're very often criticised for this. This is pointed out to be somehow negative or irresponsible and so on. Obviously, being opposed to the principle of authority, anarchists don't see the point in deciding which group of authoritarians are going to rule us.

RB: Authoritarians, centralisation, coercion, capitalism, these are the sort of things anarchists are against. George Melly:

GM: With a thing like the motor car, which is one of the great killers of our time, you have a whole society geared to sell people motor cars,

to impress them with the idea that without one they are failures, it will give them sexual potency, and a thousand other ideas; entirely linked to an economic situation in which people have to make motor cars and people have to sell motor cars and therefore more motor cars have to be used. But why do they have to make them? Because if they didn't make them the whole economic machine would break down. But this machine is artificial in itself. There's no need for everybody to be employed all the time. The more unpleasant jobs are always produced as an excuse against anarchism. Who would sweep roads, who would mine coal? But a lot of these things would be solved so that nobody need do them at all. There could be automatic street washers and the use of atomic energy instead of coal, but we daren't use atomic energy instead of coal because this would shut the mines and this would create an economic crisis. Economics is an artificial deformation, or seems to me to be it, and if one scrapped it all and started from human needs, and if one scrapped the whole of the thousands of law books in every country and started from good sense and good will, one might be moving towards a freer society.

PG: You see it isn't industrialisation which makes for centralisation, it's an error to think that. It's the way we do the industrialisation. Now in Yugoslavia at present, they're trying to extend workers' management to considerable control over the actual designing and engineering process, and they have found, of course it's obvious, that in order to do that, they'll have to bring the university right into the factory. Now the worker can get technical training—great. So now Yugoslavia is the one country in the world, it seems to me, that at present is taking, is trying to tend towards anarcho-syndicalism. Now if you talk to Yugoslavs—and I have recently been talking to a lot of them—I like their attitude. They're extremely sceptical about the whole thing. It's extremely inefficient and there are all kinds of error, etc.—and they're fantastically proud of it, and I love that attitude. You see they don't try to sell you a bill of goods, but they know they're right—and that I like. Now they wouldn't call it anarchism, but I don't care about the word.

CW: I think it started merely as a political gimmick to differentiate Yugoslav socialism from Stalinist communism, but that it has been taken seriously. I'm quite sure that some of the Yugoslav communists are determined to develop a system of workers' control. As things stand, of course, it is workers' control within those limits set by the Party, just as these experiments here are workers' control within the limits set by a capitalist market economy.

RB: But how do anarchists see such principles of organisation working on a larger scale, nationally or even internationally?

CW: I think the most complex industrial organisation could be broken down on the federative principle, that is to say, a federation of autonomous groups. This is not so far-fetched, because you see it in operation today in different international organisations. You can post a letter from here to Valparaiso or Chungking and know it will get there because of the federal arrangements of a dozen different national

post offices. Now there is no world post office capital. There are no directives. There is an International Postal Union, which is not a mandatory body. It is all done by free arrangement between separate national post offices. Or you can buy a ticket in London from here to Osaka and you travel on the railway lines of a dozen different countries, communist, capitalist, state-owned and privately owned, and you get there with no bother. But there is no international railway authority.

RB: The anarchist's opposition to the state obviously involves opposition to the state's coercive institutions such as the police and prisons. One anarchist whose dealings with the police hit the headlines is Donald Room.

DR: I suppose that my arrest by Detective-Sergeant Challenor had nothing to do with my being an anarchist. As you know, three or four perfectly innocent boys who were coming back from a game of tennis were arrested too, but I think it had something to do with my being an anarchist that I was able to spot an error made by this policeman in planting his evidence and that the general suspicion of policemen which for instance prevented me from complaining against the behaviour of one policeman to another policeman, that suspicion made me keep quiet in the police station and hold my story and my evidence and my defence until we came to the magistrate's court. I think it takes either an anarchist or a lawyer to realise that this is a sensible thing to do. Before the Challenor case I mainly thought of the police as a repressive agency and something that one ought to fight against. Since then I've had it rammed down my throat through watching it, what the policeman's job was. It's a very difficult job and instead of saying now we ought to be rid of the police force I would rather say that the society which needs a police force is a sick society. It's not the same thing at all as saying that you could cure society by getting rid of the police force. The police force is rather like crutches. With all its faults I suppose at the present day it's necessary. And that's an opinion that I didn't have before I was arrested.

NW: The one emotion I have after being inside Brixton prison is that I'd like to see Brixton prison blown up. But apart from that it hasn't changed my conviction at all, which is that in order to try and prevent people from hurting other people, to put them into a room and lock them up is the worst thing one can do. I can't think of anybody who was in Brixton whom I met who should have been locked up. I can't think of anyone in Brixton who would be any danger if let out, any more than he is going to be as soon as he comes out anyway. I would say with Kropotkin (this is the sort of thing anarchists do: they quote other anarchists), I would say that prisons are universities of crime—nurseries of criminal education, I think were the actual words, and that the state and society ought to consider whether the enormous expense and effort put into keeping people in prison wouldn't be much better using in trying to help people in some other way.

RB: On the political scene anarchists don't seem to have made much visible impact, but they feel that their ideas have made headway in the

increasingly libertarian attitudes apparent in the social field, in attitudes to the mentally ill, for example, in education, in the whole permissive climate of modern society. Of course they don't take all the credit for it, though they have made a contribution and on the whole they welcome it.

CW: Years ago, shortly after the war, Alex Comfort gave a series of lectures to the London Anarchist Group and they were published by Freedom Press under the title *Barbarism and Sexual Freedom*. Comfort's ideas on sex have reached the stage of course of being published many years later as a Penguin book, and what appeared revolutionary to people or somehow *outré* in one way or another in 1948, is almost *passé* by 1966. The revolution in sexual attitudes has happened. Take anarchist ideas about education—you've only got to see how every child today looks like the progressive school children of twenty years ago.

IR: Of course I haven't married, and I've had my own children. This wasn't very important at the time, we didn't think it was very important, and I still don't think it's important. I like to think that society is in fact getting more and more towards anarchism because now there are more and more people in fact living together and having children without being married and without asking the State if they may or may not.

DR: We thought that agreement to have a home and a family was a matter for two people and that in a marriage you don't have two parties, whatever the pundits are always saying, you don't have two parties to a marriage, you have three parties, a man, a woman and the State.

RB: In this sort of area, in personal morality, in society's considerable advance towards permissiveness in the past few years, the anarchists are probably in substantial agreement with a great many people who wouldn't call themselves anarchists. What about what is called the underground, the hippies, the drop-outs, flower people and so on? Is this a form of anarchism?

CW: My kind of anarchism wants to change the structure of society and the anarchist hippies simply walk out on authoritarian society. But it does seem to me that the wildly individual anarchism of the young is a good thing. I think we should be wildly individualistic when we are eighteen and twenty. Personally I'm not interested in individualism because I'm twice that age.

GM: The thing about hippies is that they are over-excited by certain aspects of freedom, I think. They're over-excited by the idea of drugs because drugs are something which older people disapprove of. They're a useful form of revolt. It used to be sex, when I was eighteen or seventeen because older people apparently in those days disapproved more of sex, so one went round having as many people as possible, as noisily as possible and telling everyone about it. On the other hand, since the *Lady Chatterley* trial, sex has become respectable. Even bishops admit an orgasm is a marvellous thing to have and so on, nobody condemns masturbation, and so on, so that sex is out and drugs are in, and I think that the whole emphasis on drugs in the hippy thing is hysterical and not altogether sympathetic. But I think that the hippy

feeling for the idea of love instead of hate, of openness, of people doing what they want, of freedom, is on the contrary, very sympathetic, and the interview recently between Mick Jagger and various members of the establishment—bishops, the Editor of *The Times* and so on—seemed to me to indicate that although Jagger is rather naïve in certain of his ideas, he also is on a track which they were unable to answer.

NW: I don't mean it as a criticism, but I do feel that a lot of the modern bohemian anarchists, or whatever particular label they have for that year, are to some extent a commercial phenomenon, rather than a political one, that they are people who are either trying to drop out of a commercial life or are trying to make money out of pretending to drop out of commercial life. I wouldn't see them in fact as part of the anarchist movement, though they are certainly relevant to the anarchist movement.

RB: As the anarchists don't have any form of membership it's hard to say how many of them there are, or even with any certainty whether or not someone is an anarchist, but certainly there must be quite a few people who like George Melly would go along with them most of the way.

GM: I think to say to me that I am an anarchist is overstating it because I would call myself more an anarchist sympathiser in that I feel that to be an anarchist completely it's necessary to rid oneself of practically everything that one holds except one's own body and a few clothes. And as someone who has a house, a car, pays insurance, and so on, I wouldn't consider myself an anarchist but someone who would hope that society would move towards anarchism, and who is occasionally provoked by the monstrosities in this society to an act of anarchist revolt or at least to an anarchist statement. Anarchism for me equals freedom. I mean the two words are interchangeable. But freedom in the absolute sense, not freedom shouted by one politician against another, freedom of each individual to exist entirely within his desires.

RB: The anarchists have had an erratic and lively history and have been particularly strong in the Latin countries. There are still many Spanish anarchists in exile after the Civil War, particularly in France, and there are small anarchist groups in most countries throughout the world. But in this country about how many anarchists are there, and what sort of people they are?

CW: I think that social attitudes have changed. People no longer equate anarchism with bomb-throwing. Anarchism perhaps is becoming almost modish. I think that there is a certain anarchy in the air today, yes.

JR: One of our disreputable comrades said that the membership of the anarchist movement is between one and two million and this actually meant that it was between the figure one and the figure two million.

RB: The size of the readership of *FREEDOM* gives some indication of their numbers.

JR: Roughly our circulation is round about the 2,000 or 3,000 mark.

CW: Anarchists tend not to be industrial workers and I think that the reason for this is that they won't stick the discipline of factory life.

Anarchists tend to be self-employed people or people employed in some of the apparently useful or social service type activities. They tend to be people who have a large amount of freedom in their work, simply because, I suppose, they have opted for that sort of life, being the kind of people that they are.

RB: Though they are very much a minority group the anarchists do include some well-known names, Sir Herbert Read and Alex Comfort, for example, but as Jack Robinson says, there are anarchists who are prominent but there are no prominent anarchists.

JR: No, we have never had any leaders because one thing about anarchists is that, if people do set themselves up to be leaders, they have the unfortunate experience that nobody ever follows them, which is the best thing that could happen to any leader.

RB: We've heard a little about who the anarchists are in this country and what they think, what sort of society they want and what sort of action they take to work towards such a society. One thing we haven't heard is how they, or at least how some of them, became anarchists.

CW: Well I became an anarchist when I was a soldier in the army. I think that's enough to make anyone an anarchist. The anarchists then, just as I am now, were hanging out their little rags of propaganda and I was one of the people that nibbled.

JR: I always say that I became an anarchist when I was in Wormwood Scrubs, which is probably true because I had been on the verge of anarchism and during the war I was imprisoned as a conscientious objector and I was meditating on what actually the State did contribute and I discovered that really the only contribution of the State as distinct from society was the contribution of the army and the police and the prisons whose guest I was and the army I had declined to go into.

BC: First of all I was in the Labour Party. I came out of that over German rearmament and the hydrogen bomb, I went to the ILP and I felt that I didn't seem to fit in there either. The party machine, not so much in the ILP of course, but in the Labour Party. I felt a rejection, a complete rejection of the parliamentary system. To my mind the parliamentary system is completely outdated and useless and therefore I reject the whole parliamentary system.

NW: Well in a sense I was an anarchist before I was born in that I had an anarchist grandfather, but I was in fact brought up more or less as a Labour Party supporter—an extreme left-wing Labour Party supporter and it gradually occurred to me that in fact I was an anarchist as well as being a socialist.

DR: Actually I was on some kind of Government potato-picking scheme, in 1944 I think it was, and I bought a copy of *War Commentary*, as it was then, one of the forerunners of *FREEDOM*, at Marble Arch. I read it and I thought, "Well, this is the gen. I agree with it."

"My contention is that one has to weigh the special circumstances of each case, and cannot safely guide one's conduct by hard-and-fast rules which know nothing of the circumstances or character of the people concerned. Surely the duty of man is not to do what he can't, but to do the best he can; and I believe that, by adopting abstract rules never to do this or that, never to use force, or money, or support a Government, or go to war, and by encumbering our consciences with line upon line and precept upon precept, we become less likely to behave reasonably and rightly than if we attended more to those next steps, the wisdom of which can be tested in daily life . . ."

—AYLMER MAUDE, in criticism of Leo Tolstoy.

Meliorism

GEORGE MOLNAR

THIS TALK IS A PLEA for a revision of the received libertarian attitude to meliorism. By meliorism I understand attempts to remedy or reform specific grievances or defects in a democratic society. Some of what I have to say arose out of reflecting on a book of essays by Paul Goodman.¹ However this is not a paper on Goodman. I'll refer to his views at the outset and also make exemplary use of his work in some places. But my main interest is in possible libertarian reactions to him, and beyond that, in the standard libertarian attitude to meliorism.

Goodman calls himself a "utopian sociologist", meaning of course to be ironical. He is a self-confessed pragmatist, strongly interested in practical goals and in getting things done. Although at heart he is a social critic, his avowed intention is to combine destructive criticism with positive proposals whose acceptance would improve the object of criticism or even replace it altogether with something better.

"I seem to be able to write only practically, inventing expedients. . . . My way of writing a book of social theory has been to invent community plans. My psychology is a manual of therapeutic exercises. A literary study is a manual of practical criticism. A discussion of human nature is a program of pedagogical and political reforms. This present book is no exception. It is social criticism, but almost invariably (except in moments of indignation) I find that I know what I don't like only by contrast with some concrete proposal that makes more sense."

Goodman is not in the tradition of 18th and 19th century reformers who were obsessed with the idea of a Grand Plan to cure all ills of mankind at one stroke and forever. His thought is therefore not to be compared to classical anarchism, for he seems interested solely in piecemeal reforms and changes. In modern American society thinking men are faced with a moral dilemma:

"It is only by the usual technological and organisational procedures

¹Paul Goodman: *Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals*. Vintage Books, N.Y., 1964.

that anything can be accomplished. But with these procedures, and the motives and personalities that belong to them, fresh initiative is discouraged and fundamental change is prevented."

Goodman rejects the general validity of the premises from which this pessimistic conclusion is drawn. He believes that the shortcomings and defects of the society in which he lives are *in part* due not to the absence of better alternatives but to an unwillingness seriously to consider and accept certain policies—the policies to which he gives the friendly-ironic label "utopian". This unwillingness is itself not an altogether unchangeable, rock-hard social fact on Goodman's view. Resistance to novelty or to proposals which are or seem radical and disturbing, can itself be studied and understood, and sometimes overcome. Goodman, conscious that all is not for the best in the best of all possible worlds, believes that "something can be done about it". He thinks that there exist means which, without being self-defeating, are apt to further modest but consequential ends. He calls them "expedients", and reminds us of Goethe's objective: "just to live on a little". The contrast with Marxist-historicist beliefs in the impossibility of reform within capitalism could hardly be more complete.

How do libertarians react to all this? Differences of interest between Goodman and libertarians are obvious enough. He is much more catholic in his interests than we are. He is concerned with town and community planning, with the aesthetic quality of life and the surrounds of activities; he is interested in the technology and administration of education; in vocational guidance; in psychotherapy; in youth camps; and in many other things which to the libertarian-in-the-street are either so many unknowns or else hobbies to be pursued unofficially. Some of his preoccupations are then *ab initio* quite unlikely to arouse much enthusiasm in our quarters. Nevertheless we should not overstress the differences. For Goodman is among other things an anti-militarist, a critic of superstitious ideologies, an advocate of sexual freedom and of freedom of expression. We do have a lot in common with what animates the man. In any case if this were less true, libertarians, in view of their social theory, would still have to accept and meet the challenge of defining their attitude to a reformer of the Goodman mould. We can hardly ignore him just because his interests differ from ours on many points.

I envisage the standard libertarian response to Goodman as an application to a particular case of our general doctrine of anti-reformism. Thus I expect most libertarians would be critical of Goodman's style of thinking, his pragmatism. And I do not mean here criticism of his excesses, his occasional blunders and over-all superficiality. I mean a deep-seated aversion. The reasons for this aversion fall into three rough categories. (1) There is the thought that meliorism is ineffective: it regularly or characteristically fails of its

GEORGE MOLNAR's article was given as a paper to a symposium to the Libertarian Conference at Sydney University in December, 1966, as was the reply by Ross Poole which follows it.

intended effects, especially when the intended effects are genuinely liberal. (2) In addition to ineffectiveness and perhaps more important than it, meliorism regularly generates unintended and unwanted effects which blight the hope of reformers to have achieved a net improvement in the world by their efforts. (3) Finally, the result of meliorism will be confusion in the mind and behaviour of the reformer: his ends, being in conflict, will fall into disarray, and it is predictable that in such an eventuality he will let go of his liberal intentions before letting go of his practical strivings.

Let me consider these points in turn (and not just with special reference to Goodman). My general line will be to suggest that these criticisms are severally *overstated* and *exaggerated*, and that the anti-meliorism to which they add up is therefore *too indiscriminate*.

In considering the charge of ineffectiveness (utopianism in the unfriendly sense) we should distinguish the technical impossibility of proposed policies from their unsuitability to the audience. By technical impossibility I mean that there are, at the time and place in question, no physical, technological, or economic means to the ends envisaged, nor are there any means to the means. Defects under the second heading include the following:

There is no (effective) audience, e.g. Domain oratory.

It is the wrong (irrelevant, impotent) audience. Goodman himself provides the example: there is something distinctly odd about propaganda for civic and political proposals being disseminated in literary journals.

There are reasons to believe that the Policy is not acceptable to the (right) audience.

It would be patently absurd to argue that all proposals for reform are technically impossible. Most of them, at any rate most of those nowadays put forward by radicals, dissenters, liberals and democratic socialists in our times are not in this class. In any case there is no rational way of judging the matter *a priori*. The possibility or impossibility of proposals must be assessed as they came up, in the light of the situation to which they are meant to apply. Somewhat more guardedly the same can be said about the unacceptability of meliorist proposals. Whether a policy is or is not acceptable is sometimes a more or less open question which can be settled conclusively only by putting the policy forward and seeing the public reaction. (Goodman implies this when he calls his utopian proposals "hypotheses".) Pre-scinding from questions of uncertainty, there is a second point to be made here. Suppose a proposal passes all reasonable tests, other than acceptability to the appropriate audience. Is advocacy of such a policy unrealistic simply because it is not immediately acceptable to those concerned? The answer is not always yes. If the policy in question is not of the now-or-never type, if, that is, immediate acceptance and implementation is not of its essence, then even if it is now unacceptable there may be some point to advocating the policy despite opposition or indifference.

Through advocating the policy at a certain time, some analogy

to it, or some part of it, may become more probable than otherwise, especially at some subsequent time. We know that many piecemeal changes are the result of the cumulative impact of advocacy (and other things) spread over a period. Nor is it necessary that these effects of one's advocacy should be exactly calculable.

Inasmuch as the inacceptability of a policy is based on reasons, the advocacy may lower the initial inacceptability. The advocacy of policies may have an educational effect.

Advocating a policy in public may disclose more precisely the obstacles to it. Frequently the reformer or would-be reformer starts off with guesses about the acceptability of his schemes, and he may test his guesses with advocacy. The institutions and social forces of our environment are not always transparent in their workings, sometimes we can find out their responses only by stimulating them.

Finally, take a policy which is otherwise futile in the foreseeable future. Such a policy just by being "on the books" may serve as an ideal or standard by which to judge and evaluate actual or proposed alternatives. (This might be the residual truth in Oscar Wilde's maxim on Utopia.)

Enough has been said, I hope, to show that the slogan "Reform is always ineffective" will not serve as an adequate basis for a *general* condemnation of meliorism.

John Anderson claimed that

"... the well-intentioned reformer *always* produces results which he did not anticipate, helps on tendencies to which he is avowedly opposed."²

Perhaps this claim is true, but only in a sense too wide to be useful. All social action may have incalculable consequences but what we want to know, in the present context, is whether meliorist action is especially prone to have such side-effects. Protest, after all, can and some times does have unplanned and unwelcome outcomes, for instance the strengthening of repressive laws, but this fact cannot seriously be taken as a global objection to protesting. I don't think the position of reformers is essentially different from that of protesters, although there may be differences of degree. There is perhaps more risk in promoting reforms: it is more calculable that reforms will have incalculable effects than it is that protests will. The degree of risk will depend on the sort of plans advocated, the times and places and styles of advocacy, and other factors. A great deal of difference is made by these details. That is why the argument from unintended effects is not a knock-down argument against meliorism.

There are two specifically libertarian arguments to be looked at under the heading of unintended consequences. First, it will be said that the method of implementing plans of social reform is itself essentially "political", involving compromises, unsavoury alliances, and so on. Second, the reformer is obliged, as soon as he meets with the slightest resistance, to lean in an authoritarian direction; to become

²John Anderson: *Studies in Empirical Philosophy*, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1962, p. 332. Original emphasis.

a meddler who, out of ignorance or righteousness, is inclined to impose his conception of what is desirable.

That the method of effective plans is political, involving compromises and commitments to allies not quite *kosher*, is often the case, and foreseeably so. Whether it is always a sufficient reason for libertarians to reject the action which entails compromises is another question. To me the issue is much more a matter of degree than preserving the purity of an absolute principle. In some circumstances, for some ends, one may weigh the likely cost of compromising against other factors, and come down on the side of action. Two observations are relevant here. (1) Libertarianism is not a "single value" ethic as it has sometimes been made out to be. Freedom or anti-authoritarianism looms large in our thoughts but it is not the only consideration. (I think, for example, that the crucial objections to racial discrimination which libertarians share with others have little to do with liberty and much with justice.) Now conflict between various libertarian goods is, *pace* Anderson, possible: frequently reforms pose a challenge to evaluate conflicting ends. (2) Apart from this, even issues of freedom can lead to conflict of ends which require compromise and adjudication. To set one's face "on principle" against the very possibility of compromise is dogmatic. I suggest that these theoretical considerations are recognised, in a backhanded way, in libertarian practice, although they have no place in our explicit doctrine. It has long been our habit to pick and choose issues and situations on or in which to speak and act, and it frequently happens, more and more of late, that the whole movement lapses into long periods of inactivity for want of the right issue. I diagnose this intermittent existence as due in part to a fear of compromise which is obsessive, a horror of soiling one's political purity. The mistake, if it is a mistake, lies not in the world for being too unkind to us, but in us for being too inflexible and paying too much attention to generalities and too little to the particulars of actual situations.

The reformer is a meddler, tempted by authoritarian means and often succumbing to the temptation. This is also true very often. Again, it is not necessarily true of all meliorists. Hear, for example, Goodman on the grounds of his selection of the fields in which he proposes expedients:

"... characteristically, I choose subjects that are political, personal, or literary problems of practice. . . . And the problems are my problems. As a writer I am hampered by the present laws on pornography, and as a man and a father by the sexual climate of that law; so it is a problem for *me*. It is as a New Yorker that I propose to ban the cars from the streets and create a city of neighborhoods. As an intellectual man thwarted, I write on the inhibition of grief and anger and look for a therapy to unblock them. And it is because I am hungry for the beauty of a practical and scientific environment that I am dismayed by our 'applied science' and would like to explain it away."

"... the content of my own 'arbitrary' proposals is determined by my own justified concerns. I propose what I know to be my business.

These are definite and fairly modest aims; whether or not they are practicable remains to be seen."³

This does not sound like a meddler speaking. Yet it may be said that to the extent to which Goodman shows us a clean pair of hands, just to that extent he is ineffective and bound to remain so. For practical success requires that the reformer should work with and through institutions and seats of power (government, civic authorities, business, parties, trade unions, etc.). In accepting these institutions as part of his means the reformer is also accepting their characteristic ways of working which is authoritarian. In mitigation of this one can answer:

That some reformers (e.g. Goodman) show great awareness of the difficulties and are looking, more hopefully than successfully, for alternatives.

There is a big difference between the State and other institutions, as we have always emphasised.

There is finally no reason to assume that every political act which is channelled through the State must be authoritarian in its net effects. (I'll bring up some examples later.)

Now to the third objection to meliorism which was that the liberal impulse behind reform activities becomes corrupted in the very course of these activities. Means do not corrupt ends, or those whose ends they are, *automatically or mechanically*. Social and psychological causation is more subtle than that. If the attitude of those advocating some reform is a reasonable mean between two extremes, it is at least possible to embark on a course of action without being committed to seeing it through *no matter what*. The extremes are blindly optimistic faith in the power of Reason on the one hand, and a fetishistic pre-conception about inescapable corruption on the other. A more rational attitude may be located in between. If circumstances change so should designs, intentions and determinations. What looks desirable or feasible at one stage, say at the stage of contemplated action, may change at another, and become through new developments, less desirable, more messy. Then we may consider getting off the bus. Certainly a man who invests his hopes and enthusiasm in a project is less likely to keep a cool head when things become complicated. His sensitivity is liable to be blunted, his patience to become short, his restraint weak. These are psychological commonplaces. But they are not necessities, not invariant phenomena. To say that the liberal impulse of the reformer is likely to wither away is valuable as a warning against dangers which are often not easy to circumvent. And it is, perhaps, just as well to be finicky here. However what we are faced with is a danger, a risk, not the certainty of doom.

Where are we in our argument? The standard libertarian attitude to meliorism is a reaction to 18th and 19th century utopianism and to their aftermath: an exaggerated faith in the welfare state. It seems to me that while the positions to which we react are quite wrong

³Goodman: *loc. cit.* p. xv, p. 116. Original emphasis.

and their underlying assumptions mistaken, it is their contradictory not their contrary which is true. What we criticise in meliorism—the simple-mindedness, the optimism, the meddling, the authoritarian tendencies—are excesses or *abuses*, notwithstanding their frequency; they are overdoses of a medicine which can however be used in the proper quantities. There is a world of difference to my mind between someone like Shaw and, say, Goodman, and I should like to think that we can have a sufficiently sophisticated social theory to take *full* account of the difference. My own view is that we have overlooked the possibility of a “restrained meliorism”, which is selective and not committed to either silly beliefs or base actions. The problem as we see it is: What is wrong in general with meliorism? This formulation ought to be scrapped and with it all attempted answers. Instead of trying to convict meliorism *in general* on general grounds, we should try to look at each and every policy, proposal, action, actor, or institution, singly, judging them on their merits. That is, in the full light of the particular relevant historical circumstances, and with the sort of tentativeness or certainty which our knowledge of the particulars warrants. An important consequence of such a reorientation would be this: we could treat the question Protest or Reform? as to some extent “open”. We could recognise that there is not, from the libertarian or any other point of view, a single correct answer covering all situations and all exigencies. This is quite consistent with having a dissident, critical, or oppositionist outlook. We can be protesters or critics, other things being equal; indeed we can prefer this as a *modus operandi* to the committed practicalism exemplified by Goodman. But we should give ourselves more room to move in by allowing for the fact that other things are not always equal and deplorable consequences do not follow from meliorist actions with an iron necessity. Sometimes they don't follow at all. There are plenty of examples. To my mind it is clear that, other things being equal, it is better to have legal homosexuality than illegal, legal abortion than illegal, unrestricted availability of contraceptives rather than restricted, divorce by consent rather than by litigation, little censorship rather than much, multiform rather than uniform censorship, etc., etc. None of these, considered as objectives, is utopian in the context of contemporary Australia, though some are less likely than others. And policies designed to promote these ends and others like them *need* not have any debilitating or corrupting effects, though of course they *could* have them.

Now all this not to say that libertarians ought to adjourn henceforth to plunge into practical labours, to press for legislation, and so on, let alone that they should go all out to manufacture designs for gracious living. I'm not concerned so much with encouraging our activism, as with clarification of our attitudes. Whether we do something practical and meliorist is of little account, since obviously our actions depend not only on our convictions and the clarity, sincerity and seriousness with which we hold them, but also on the elan and energy we can muster in acting on those convictions. Political rejuvenation of a bunch of lazy bastards can hardly be expected from a mere symposium. Yet what we say and think about non-libertarian activists

could well be modified by accepting into our scheme of things what I have called restrained meliorism.

Meliorism—a reply

ROSS POOLE

By “meliorism” I understand a certain kind of social activity or behaviour—a kind of activity which is distinguished from other kinds of activity, not so much by any quality or style of the activity itself, but by its having certain ends or aims. Meliorist activity is that activity which has as its end, or is aimed at, some social improvement. This account of what meliorism is agrees, I think, substantially with that of Molnar's.

It might, however, be queried by some libertarians. They would argue that meliorist activity has a certain style—it involves a certain mode of behaviour, it has a certain intrinsic character. The adjectives “servile”, “conformist”, “devious”, etc., spring to mind as ways that libertarians have characterised what they take to be the intrinsic character of meliorism. However, to define meliorism as activity carried out in this manner would be to beg the question against those who claim that one can achieve worthwhile results in the social sphere without, as it were, sacrificing one's personal integrity in the process. And it does seem to be an empirical question which we should not pre-judge whether or not meliorism is always accompanied by a certain characteristic style of behaviour. It seems best, therefore, to adopt as a starting point a general characterisation of meliorism as that activity directed towards the end of social improvement.

Libertarians have in the past been averse to taking part in meliorist activity; they have usually, though not always, been content to air their grievances without trying to remedy them. Molnar has argued for a substantial modification of this attitude. He has based his position on an examination and criticism of certain arguments which he takes to be used as support for the libertarian attitude, and which he claims do not in fact support that attitude.

I agree with Molnar to this extent: *if* the libertarian opposition to meliorism is based on the arguments that he considers, then that opposition is not justified. To the extent that libertarians have defended their anti-meliorism by resorting to these considerations, then their defence has been an inadequate one. But, against this, I want to argue that the libertarian aversion to meliorism is based on considerations which Molnar ignores, and that these are crucial for an understanding of the libertarian attitude. I will further suggest that these considerations are basic to libertarianism—basic in the sense that if one were to reject them one would cease to be a libertarian. As a consequence of this, where Molnar suggests that libertarianism and meliorism—albeit of a restrained and selective kind—are compatible, I will argue that they are incompatible. Where Molnar asks that we reject the general

question "What is wrong with meliorism?", I think we should accept it, and try to answer it.

This will involve going over some pretty familiar material. Still, it seems worth going over if just to give it a certain emphasis which might be missed. It is also necessary because it seems that it is just this familiar material that Molnar has chosen to ignore.

Libertarians, as we know, are anarchists, though admittedly anarchists of a rather strange breed. Before we get onto those elements in libertarian thinking which distinguish them from other anarchists, it will be as well to stress at least one element in libertarian thinking which they share with classical anarchists. This is, of course, the enormous, perhaps inordinate, stress on freedom—freedom, that set of conditions in which human activity can be carried on unhindered, and in which individual and group interests can be expressed without barrier. Together with this is the correlative opposition to those forces and institutions which limit that freedom. Whereas other political creeds have, either explicitly or implicitly, settled for a limited freedom, anarchists and libertarians have held out in the name of complete freedom, and have maintained, or tried to maintain, an uncompromising attitude towards those forces that stand in the way of that freedom.

It is because libertarians try to maintain this position that they are anarchists; if they ceased to hold this position they would cease to be anarchists—they would be ratbags of a different kind. What I want to stress is that this attitude is basic to libertarianism, and because it is an *attitude* it is not, as such, subject to argument or proof. Libertarians just have this attitude: it is their starting point. It is not the conclusion of an argument, nor a terminus arrived at from the consideration of premises.

Given that libertarians qualify as anarchists because of this basic common ground, we can now point out how libertarians differ from most other anarchists, certainly from those in the classical tradition. Libertarians believe that the achievement of a society in which this ideal of freedom is realised is impossible; they believe that no amount of propaganda, education, or political struggle will bring about a society even remotely resembling the anarchist utopia. (I don't want to consider questions as to how this belief is justified. I think it is justified, though I think that the justification is not quite as straightforward a matter as libertarians have tended to believe. But this is by the way.) The point is that it is this belief that distinguishes libertarians from other anarchists, just as it is the uncompromising attitude towards freedom that distinguishes libertarians and anarchists from other political creeds.

Years ago, Molnar himself pointed out (*Libertarian* No. I (1957), p. 12) that the classical anarchists were not just utopian dreamers, but that there was another strand in their thought. On occasion, they stressed the reality of the present and actual engagement with authority, of the immediate struggle for emancipation, rather than the far distant, perhaps illusory, utopia, which they conceived to be the outcome of that struggle. It was in this mood that Bakunin wrote: "to think of the future is criminal". And it is this strain in anarchist thinking which

is attractive to libertarians. But with an important difference. The anarchists usually thought of their activity as a means to a certain end—the establishment of a free society. Libertarians, although they believe that that end is impossible, nevertheless continue with activity which is similar in kind to that of the anarchists *because they see that activity as an end in itself*.

Libertarians are concerned with the content of their activity, i.e., its quality as such, and are not concerned with the ends that it may or may not achieve. Libertarians see certain sorts of action as expressive of their belief in freedom; being free *is*, in a sense, acting in a certain way. They are concerned with the activity, not for what it is hoped that it will bring about, but because they think that it is worth doing for its own sake. This is, I believe, the content, or an important part of the content, of the notion of permanent protest.

Of course, this does not apply, nor is it meant to apply, to all activity undertaken by libertarians. It does not, for instance, apply to that activity which is concerned *just* with the mundane task of living, e.g., drinking, eating, etc. But it certainly does apply to activity in the socio-political sphere. There may well be difficulties in demarcating this area precisely, but perhaps it will be sufficient in this context to say that it is just that area in which we are being invited to participate in "restrained and selective" meliorism.

Given all this, we can immediately see the opposition or, perhaps better, the lack of contact between the meliorist and the libertarian. Meliorists and reformers are concerned with *ends*—their activity is calculated to achieve certain results. For the meliorist, the style of the activity, the manner in which it is carried out must, to some extent, be subordinate to the ends that he hopes to achieve by that activity. This is because meliorist activity is activity directed towards change or improvement, i.e., the end must govern to some, though perhaps only a limited extent, the means. If this is not the case, then the activity is wrongly described as being meliorist. Libertarians, on the other hand, are concerned with a certain kind of style of activity, and the consequences of this activity are a subordinate consideration. It may be that some activity undertaken by libertarians will have as a consequence some improvement of the social scene; it may also be the case that its consequence is some change that we would not regard as an improvement; much more likely, it will not have any important consequences at all. But all these considerations concerning the outcome of the activity will be subordinate to questions concerning the character of the activity as such. It is this difference of emphasis which sets the libertarian apart from the meliorist—even the "restrained and selective" meliorist.

Molnar, in the course of his paper, considered and rejected certain views which might be held to buttress an anti-meliorist stance. I have agreed that, as they stand, these considerations do not support a general opposition to meliorism. However, in the light of what I have said so far, some at least can be reformulated so as to appear much more plausible, not perhaps as arguments in their own right,

but as adjuncts to the basic position. For example, Molnar, in my view quite correctly, rejected the thesis that meliorism is ineffective. As a universal generalisation this appears to be plainly false. But what is more plausible, and what, perhaps, is meant by many who have made this claim, is the view that libertarian activity, if it is to be considered meliorist, will be seen as ineffective meliorism.

What I have in mind here is the libertarian reaction to the ill-informed criticism of libertarianism which runs: "What do you hope to achieve?" The short answer to this is, of course, "Nothing". Any achievement would be an unexpected bonus. It is just a mistake to judge libertarian activity by the same standards as meliorist activity; the latter is to be judged by its effectiveness, the former by other criteria entirely. The point here is that the libertarian has no need to make the claim that all meliorism is ineffective. All he wants to say is that libertarian activity is ineffective. And this is undoubtedly true, just because libertarian activity is not aimed at effects.

Another of Molnar's criticisms was directed at the view that, as a consequence of taking part in reformist activity, the initial liberal aims of the reformer are always corrupted, and are replaced by interest in authority, power, and manipulation. In short, he "sells out". Now, considered as an empirical thesis, this is most probably false. At the very least, it needs a lot more evidence than has thus far been adduced. But once again it is a thesis which libertarians have no need to defend, for, given the libertarian's overriding interest in a certain sort of activity for its own sake, and the reformer's interest in activity as a means to an end, then it follows that a libertarian cannot become a reformer without ceasing to be a libertarian. If ceasing to be a libertarian is taken to be a species of "selling out" (and I understand that it is taken this way in the best circles), then the thesis "he who takes up reform, sells out" is, when restricted to a certain class of people, viz. libertarians, not a generalisation backed by insufficient evidence, but an analytic truth.

The libertarian position is not, as I have outlined it, free from obscurities and difficulties. Questions which reserve discussion and clarification include the notion of "doing something for its own sake", as distinguished from "doing something as a means to an end". An account of this would have to be more complex than the rather *simplicite* discussion contained in this paper. It might, I think, allow that a certain activity, which is worth doing for its own sake and is in fact done for its own sake, might have ends, and intended ends, of a certain sort. For example, the work of a creative artist might have certain ends, e.g., earning a living, despite the fact that it is primarily worth doing for its own sake. Analogously, libertarian activity might also have certain ends, but these would be a subordinate consideration to that of the activity conceived as an end in itself.

Further problems concern the characterisation of the style of libertarian activity, and the range of activity covered by the tenets that I have outlined. These questions deserve, and perhaps will get, more attention than they have been given in this paper, or by libertarians

in the past.

But these are questions which I can only mention without further discussion. They arise out of a position which is, I think, central to libertarian thinking, and which Molnar has ignored. Because of this, his conclusion—that libertarians should change their attitude to meliorism—has been insufficiently argued for. I have been concerned to indicate what I take to be the basis of the libertarian opposition to meliorism; until that basis has been subjected to conclusive criticism, I see no reason to accept the thesis that the libertarian attitude stands in need of revision.

Utopian means they don't want to do it!

PAUL GOODMAN

PAUL GOODMAN was answering questions from Roger Barnard, Bob Overy and Colin Ward.

RB: Most people seem to conceive of you as an "utopian thinker", and indeed one of your books is called *Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals*. Yet from what I know, I think that you've referred to yourself more than once as a "pragmatist". Is this a contradiction, or don't you see it this way?

PG: Well, I'm not a utopian in any conventional sense of the term. Anyway, the people who use the word utopian generally use it as a curse word, don't they? Utopian means that they don't want to do it! You know, they're not fundamentally interested, they've got some other line. If by utopian we mean that somebody has some large preconceived notion of how the world in a big way would look, and he wants to impose that on other people as *their* scene, I think that's fascism. I'm not interested. That seems to me to be a complete burdening.

There are in fact very many things which could be done far better in the present situation, far cheaper, and much more simply. Generally that requires an act of will or political power. Now, how to get the political power to do even small things, like taking the money that is used for the New York public school system and dividing it up between a thousand little independent schools? Because that would be far better than what we've got right now. It wouldn't cost more, it wouldn't require more teachers, and so on. You see, there's nothing "utopian" about this kind of scheme, except that *they aren't going to do it!*

It's a power question. Of course, it's a question of political action too. Now, I happen to be terrible at politics. So instead, you say to the professional: Look, this is the way to do it, now go do it. Then he says: But that requires power. Of course it does. So go get the power!

There's something else that I do as well. It's a kind of trick. The Americans—and I'm pretty sure that it must be true in all high technologies—are absolutely *deluded* by the notion that the way things

are done today is inevitable, and that nothing can be done, because of the complexity of modern technology, the galloping urbanisation, the population explosion, the rising Third World, and so on. These are *delusions*. Therefore, in order just to loosen the Americans psychologically a little bit, I'm quite prepared to think up half a dozen crack-brained schemes on any issue. It's like saying: You think that's the only way to do this? Not so. You can do it this way, look, or you can do it that way, see. Now, I don't care about any of these schemes as such, you know, except politically: I like to make ones which are interesting. But psychologically, the point is to let them see, for instance, that this excessive centralisation is not necessary. It doesn't even measure up to its own claim, namely that it's efficient. So you make up little models out of your head. That doesn't mean that you're necessarily suggesting these models for application. What you're doing is saying: Look—think a little bit.

Of course, this sometimes has consequences. Take, for example, Students for a Democratic Society. Their founding manifesto, the Port Huron Statement, was almost entirely taken from a couple of books of mine. But then there come in as well some decentralist ideas. And they're not my ideas that they're thinking of. Their ideas are specific to the situation, as they have to be. If you want to know how to do social welfare in some small American town, you don't read theory and you don't think about it *a priori*. You look at the people. And you know, you look at what's needed. But the fact that you *can* do it decentrally, I apparently taught them. Now if you take many of my schemes literally, seriously, as something actually to do and make, then it would be "utopian". But I've got no interest in that. In fact, I think it would be wicked to try to spell them out, to *inflict* them on people. Is that clear?

RB: Yes. In fact, it's true then that you see yourself more as a kind of activating catalyst?

PG: That's right. But then there are many other things that are really terribly simple, and you just do them. For instance, take our Off-Broadway Theatre in New York. You know, for a time, when the Becks were there, that was the best damn theatre there was. But we made all that up out of our heads. You know, Julian and I got together and said: OK, we can't get a theatre, we'll use something else. Julian's very enterprising, and he found an old department store. OK, we'll convert it. So we all went down there, and we laid the bricks and worked at it ourselves, and it got to be the Living Theatre. What's "utopian" about that? Now, many people would have said: That's impossible, you know, because of all the commercial pressures on the Broadway stage, and so forth. But that's a lot of bullshit. It's not the least bit impossible. If you talk about it, it's Utopian. If you go and do it, it's certainly not Utopian.

RB: What do you think of the idea that this kind of do-it-yourself project is, in its own small way, one way of undermining power structures?

PG: Well, I think that if you use that as your purpose, it's wicked.

We should do everything for its own sake. Like Lawrence said: Make a revolution for fun, that's all. That is to say, I don't want to use the disadvantaged kids on the Lower East Side in order to undermine the system. I want to educate them, period. Now, *if* the process of educating them happens to undermine the system, so much the better. But I think any other way is a very spurious way of proceeding. That is, to sacrifice people's time and brains and talent and energies, and children and all that, for your own purposes, or indeed for any damn purpose other than that of the actual people, is wicked. However, let me say that it *is* the case that if you do *anything* sensible in America today, it's revolutionary. Anything! It had to be!

But there's another side to this. If you take something like the Vietnam war, for instance, where we're actually going out there, tormenting and dementing people, then you *have* to devote yourself to stopping it. Which is a bore, but nevertheless it has to be done. We can't just go on letting airmen drop bombs on some poor people's heads. There's absolutely nothing entertaining whatever about burning your draft card, or sitting in a jail, or getting your head busted on the picket line, or whatever. But you have no choice. You understand? These are different issues. That is, if you're doing some enterprise, you do it for its own sake, and if it's a good enterprise it will necessarily help lead to a better world. On the other hand, when something hellish is going on, like the Vietnam war, you've got to stop it. This is Malatesta's great point. If only they'd let us alone, then we're fine. But they won't let us alone! By the way, Malatesta saw clearly this very fine balance where violence is concerned: if they'd let us alone, we're not violent. But they won't get off our backs. They insist on using our taxes, etc., for bombs. But we don't want that. Therefore, don't pay the taxes. I'm a tax refuser, but there's not enough of us.

Power should always be very closely scaled to function. Where it gets very bad is when you have some abstract seat of power which then exercises itself in carrying on functions. The power should be very closely related to what is necessary to do the function. That is to say, if I want some space to carry on a theatre, activity, or a school meeting or something like that, I want as much power as allows me free access to that space when I'm using it, and no more. And when I'm not using it, then I shouldn't have the power over it at all. I don't think I can say it better than that.

cw: How about eroding the power of those who hold it?

PG: If they prevent natural function from going on, which in fact they do all the time, then you have to erode it. You have no choice. If they won't let life go on, you have to stop them. But of course, this does not mean that you replace their power. It means getting rid of their power so that everybody has as little power as possible.

RB: This is the same as making inroads into *their* power with your own freedom, is it not, and extending spheres of free action till, hopefully, they make up the most of social life?

PG: Yes, that's another way to look at it, but really I couldn't give a damn, as long as they aren't killing peasants.

Josiah Warren: the incomplete anarchist

HAROLD BARCLAY

JOSIAH WARREN HAS BEEN PRESENTED to the world by his various interpreters as an individualist anarchist and as the first American anarchist. His biographer, W. Bailie, entitled his work, *Josiah Warren: The First American Anarchist* (1906). Two recent anthologies of anarchist writings, I. L. Horowitz' *The Anarchists* (1964) and L. I. Krimerman and Lewis Perry's *Patterns of Anarchy* (1966), each have selections from Warren. George Woodcock in his survey of anarchism devotes several paragraphs to Warren and writes: "... he developed the theory of the sovereignty of the individual which has led to his being regarded, rightly, I think, as the first American anarchist" (1962, p. 456).

A recent reading of *True Civilization* (1863) and *Practical Details of Equitable Commerce* (1852) has led me to question how far one should classify Warren as an anarchist and to suspect that certainly as he grew older he assumed a position like that of Thoreau, or even Jefferson, which is more accurately described as decentralist democrat and, indeed, seems to form a significant link between various elements of the contemporary radical right (such as the Rampart College group at Larkspur, Colorado) and the anarchist left.

Josiah Warren (1798-1874) was born in New England and, after an early marriage, drifted westward eventually settling in Ohio. By profession an orchestra leader and music teacher, he pursued these enterprises sporadically throughout much of his life. Warren early gave indication of a practical and ingenious turn of mind with his invention of a lard fed lamp, much cheaper to operate than the usual oil type lamp. Later in his life he turned at different times to produce other inventions. His desire to propagate his social theories led to an interest in printing and the development of a cylinder press which, however, was not accepted by printers until reinvented by another individual a generation later. He, also, developed a notational system for music and a stereotyping process which brought him \$7,000, a sum he invested in his second experimental community of Utopia. All in all Warren appears to fit the stereotype of the ingenious Yankee tinkering among a variety of gadgets and producing the most practical technological inventions. But Warren was more than a creator of new gadgets.

His main claim to fame, of course, is as an innovator and experimenter with social systems. J. S. Mill called Warren a "remarkable American" and it is a sad commentary on the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and not on Josiah Warren that the encyclopaedia contains not a single reference to so creative and unique an individual.

Martin suggests that had it not been for his association with Owen, Warren might have devoted the rest of his life to business undertakings and "become one of the early men of wealth in the growing Midwest" (1957, p. 14). Between 1825 and 1827 Warren was associated with Owen at the New Harmony colony. He saw its major defects as excessive organization and centralization and left the community intent upon testing Owen's idea of economic exchange through promissory notes based upon labour time. Like Thoreau who embarked upon his Walden stay as an experiment, Warren, too, opened a "time store" in Cincinnati in 1827 to test the practicality of Owen's labour note theory. After three years of operation Warren closed his store convinced of its feasibility and invited others to join him in founding a community based on what he called the principle of equity, namely, that cost of an item was the labour time involved in bringing it to the consumer. Exchange was to be in the form of notes indicating a promise to give on demand so much labour time. In addition the community was to be "based on voluntary assent and lacking the formalities of majority rule" (Martin, 1957, p. 43). Thus, he founded Equity which lasted less than three years and was the shortest lived of his communities. Actually Equity was forced to close not because of the failure of the application of the social theories but because "Faulty judgment had resulted in locating the settlement on land in a low-lying area, which subjected the residents to a variety of illnesses. The principal one . . . was malaria" (Martin, 1957, p. 42). Following the Equity experiment Warren variously worked on a new printing press, ran a shortlived manual training school, edited a periodical, and operated for two years another time store. In 1847 he established his second community of Utopia and in 1851 still a third called Modern Times. Both were organized according to the same principles as those of Equity and eventually suffered from the ill-effects of the Civil War and the availability of cheap lands further west. Both, however, managed to continue on after Warren's death in 1874. Members gradually and quietly abandoned the principles of equity and the communities eventually withered away after a few decades. They had the merit of being the longest lived of any of the secular Utopian experiments of the nineteenth century. And this is a point worth bearing in mind, namely, that of all the secular experiments of this nature the two which survived the longest were the ones which were the most libertarian.

Warren's views may be broadly described as individualist, rationalist and pragmatic and his earlier writing, e.g., *Equitable Commerce*, as more specifically anarchist. There is a certain affinity between Warren and Paul Goodman: Warren could well have authored a *Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals*. The central theme of Warren's writings is the "sovereignty of the individual", by which he meant that the starting

place of any philosophy is with the individual who by implication is above all a rational being. The primitive condition of man requiring self-preservation produced clan organization which stressed the supremacy of the group over the individual, the dissolution of individuality in the group, and discouraged all individual responsibility. The clan idea has been perpetuated in modern times in the concept of nationhood, in the "Union of states" and in communism. True civilization is based on the sovereignty of the individual not of the group.

Before describing the doctrine of self-sovereignty further and its specific relationship to the idea of government—which is the main burden of this paper—it should be pointed out that Warren saw true civilization as a possibility only when individuality and self-sovereignty operated in concert with what he called the principle of equivalents and the principle of equitable money. The principle of equivalents holds that the price of an item is governed by its cost which in turn amounts to the labour of processing and delivering the item to the consumer. Cost should not be confused with value; to base price on value is an iniquity. One cannot determine value, but one can determine cost by labour exerted. Skill or talent which cost nothing are natural wealth and should be accessible to all without price. Warren, following Owen, advocates the equality of labour: the labour time of the physician is equal to that of the store clerk. This raises the question that if cost of an item varies according to labour time why doesn't the "cost" of the labour time vary according to the amount of energy and the investment of past training. In other words, should not past preparation and expenditure of energy make the surgeon's hour more costly than the shopkeepers?

With the principle of equivalents usury disappears and a borrower is charged, as Warren charged his borrowers, for the labour time it takes the lender to arrange for and ultimately collect the loan. The capitalist obtains, under Warren's scheme, only payment for the time invested in overseeing and other similar duties. Warren mentions two factors which will prepare the way for the establishment of this principle. First, stressing the rational nature of man, is the observation that men, capitalist and non-capitalist alike, will see that this approach is most reasonable. Those who do not will, by the operation of "equitable competition", eventually be forced to engage in "equitable commerce". Another essential ingredient of true civilization is equitable money where notes indicating a promise to provide a stated amount of labour time on demand are used for all commercial transactions. Such a system was applied by Warren in his time stores and in his communities where it apparently met with some success, suffering little from what one might consider its most obvious drawbacks, namely, an inability to redeem the notes and depreciation as a result of over-issue.

Warren uses the model of equitable commerce as the basis for his approach to education and all social relations. At one point in his work such economic emphasis is expressed in a naive economic determinism.

"Pecuniary affairs are the very basis of society. When we change

these we change all institutions, for all are built, directly or indirectly upon property considerations. . . . The great excuse for laws and government is, the protection of persons and property, but were it not for property, persons would not be in danger." (*Practical Details*, p. 71.)

When methods of acquiring property are so altered that each may share in an abundance "with less trouble than it will cost him to invade his neighbour", we shall be able to dispense with rules (*Practical Details*, p. 71). Warren makes, then, in this one instance what today would be considered a vulgar Marxist explanation, but both *Practical Details* and *True Civilization* are permeated with an intellectualistic causal theory intimating that the real dynamic force in society is the rational man who comes to realize his own self-interest.

While Warren continued throughout his life a faith in the principles of equitable commerce, he apparently modified his views concerning the principles of individuality and self-sovereignty as they relate to the role of government. Thus, Martin writes:

"Agitated by the violence and disruption which was becoming a part of the existence of many in all parts of the land, Warren published a curious tract, *Modern Government and Its True Mission, A Few Words for the American Crisis* which advocates expedients greatly at variance with principles which have unalterable status among anarchists. A study of the work reveals a regression to functional aspects long taught by Robert Owen" (Martin, p. 82).

Martin does not elaborate further, but when one explores *True Civilization*, written a year after (1863), his meaning becomes more apparent. Warren here has become the advocate of a form of limited government much in the tradition of Thomas Jefferson.

"The true function of government deals only with the offensive encroachments upon persons or property—an expedient choice of evils where there is nothing but evil to choose from—to prevent unnecessary destruction of life or property" (*True Civilization*, p. 28).

True civilization never uses violence "unnecessarily" according to Warren. At other places in *True Civilization* he states:

"The Modern Military, as a Government, will be necessary only in the transitional stage of society from confusion and wanton violence to true order and mature civilization" (p. 33).

And in the concluding pages of the same volume he is apparently not objecting to government so much as he is opposing "Aggressive Government".

"And whenever a Government governs an iota more than is absolutely necessary to restrain or repair unnecessary encroachments on aggression, it then becomes aggressive, and should *itself* be governed and restrained" (p. 179).

Some hints of this interpretation of the role of government appear in *Practical Details* which Warren published more than ten years before *True Civilization*. Thus,

"There are some circumstances *under* which organization and laws seem to be justifiable which ought to be a temporary expedient, has been created into a universal rule, to which even the objects aimed at have become subordinate!" (*Practical Details*, p. 54).

Warren holds this condition is wrong, since, again stressing his pragmatism, he believes each case must be examined on its own. Later in this short book, he discusses his experiences in operating a manual training school. He presents views on education which are a nineteenth century previsioning of the philosophy of A. S. Niell as well as a further application of his practical, libertarian and rationalistic approach. In brief, he believes children should be motivated to obey not by command, threats, or punishment, but by the principle of labour for labour, love for love, i.e., the mutualist ideal. Children "have their own sovereignty as much as adults and it should be exercised in the same limits at *their own cost*" (*Practical Details*, p. 64). On the other hand, and this point is relevant to his remarks on government, "I cannot allow my child to exercise his sovereign will in all things, until, in *all* things, he can take the consequences on himself" (p. 68). In other words, I would submit that even in *Practical Details* written by Warren in 1852 there are indications of a trend that finally culminated in *True Civilization* and apparently also in his essay *Modern Government and Its True Mission*.

It is interesting to look for a moment at the type of government Warren envisaged. If individuals are unable to settle their affairs by mutual and voluntary contract Warren advocates appeal to deliberative councils composed of members who volunteer their services and are, of course, recognized in their role by the various sovereign individuals. These councils are to act as mediators, but

"when an issue has already been raised and no one of these decisions is acceptable to both parties, the decision may be laid before the military (or government) to act at its discretion, selecting that course which promises the least violence" (*True Civilization*, p. 30).

Warren tends to identify government with the military establishment and, hence, in line with his thinking, it is necessary to create a military or "home guard" composed of sovereign individuals. Thus, he suggests that the idea of commanding or governing be replaced by the principle of guidance or direction. "Men may lead and men must execute but intelligence, principle, must regulate" (*True Civilization*, p. 22). An essential part of the training of the military is in instilling the idea of individual sovereignty and the protection of the person and property.

"Part of the drill for such a force would be to give orders to do some unnecessary harm on purpose to be disobeyed in order to accustom the subordinate to 'look before they leap' or strike!" (*True Civilization*, p. 27).

Such a home guard would be "within but not under discipline", or, in other words the Sabbath is made for man and not man for the Sabbath.

When the "counsellors" have referred an issue to this military

organization of sovereign individuals ". . . of course members of the military may themselves assert their inalienable right to decline to act!" (*True Civilization*, p. 23).

"The most intelligent people always make the best subordinates in a good cause, and in our *modern military*, it will require more true manhood to make a good subordinate than it will to be a leader: for the leader may very easily give orders, but they take the responsibility of that *only*, while the subordinate takes the responsibility of executing them, and it will require the greatest and highest degree of manhood, of self-government, presence of mind, and real heroism to *discriminate* on the instant and to stand up individually before all the corps and future criticism, and assume, alone, the responsibility of dissent or disobedience. His only support and strength would be in his consciousness of being more true to his professed mission than the order was, and in the assurance that he would be sustained by public opinion and sympathy as far as that mission was understood" (*True Civilization*, p. 23).

"When a high degree of intelligence, great manhood, self-government, close discriminating *real* heroism and gentle humanity are known to be necessary to membership in our military corps (or government), these qualities will come into fashion, and become the characteristics of the people; and to be thought destitute of them, and unworthy of membership in the military would cause the greatest mortification: while to be known as a member in good standing would be an object sought in the highest honour" (*True Civilization*, p. 24).

If this reasoning is correct Warren believes we have the clue to the "true mission and form of Government—to the most perfect, yet harmless subordination—the reconciliation of obedience with FREEDOM—to the cessation of all hostilities between parties and Nations—to universal co-operation for universal preservation and security of person and Property" (*True Civilization*, p. 24).

Warren's views about the transformation of the military into a body of sovereign and rational individuals appear almost fantastic, particularly in our day when we have been made so much more aware of the nature of military organization—as the epitome of autocracy and authoritarian structure. Indeed, such ideas appear more the desperate efforts of a man frantically searching for means to salvage his libertarian philosophy in the face of a hitherto harmonious world now shattered by the violence of the Civil War period.

In describing Warren's later views as only peripherally anarchistic, I do not wish thereby to imply some doctrinaire definition of anarchism. I conceive of anarchism essentially as being at one end of a pole opposite to absolute despotism, or, to put it differently, at one end of a continuum is a condition in which all power is equally diffused among all members of society and at the other end is a condition under which all power is vested in a single person. There are "ideal types" and it is hardly conceivable that either has ever existed or ever will exist, although certain systems approach one or the other poles and various

pressures produce in a social system a dialectic process pushing society in one direction or the other. Obviously, Warren's thoughts fit on the anarchistic side of continuum. If Warren was an anarchist in the first half of his life as is evidenced by the nature of his experimental communities, his critique of the Owenite experiments, and by the writings of this period, he had taken towards the close of his life a position which does not appear to fall within that minimal definition of anarchy as the absence of government. Certainly, the anarchist society is to be free of the coercive forces of governmental institutions even though numerous other coercive forces will inevitably persist. (And as some have pointed out these latter can become more of a threat to individual sovereignty than government.) By placing the military as the ultimate arbiter and permitting individuals within that body to refuse to act, Warren perpetuates authoritarian elements of the present social order and, in addition, enhances the possibilities of "civil war" between rival factions of the military. Warren, of course, neglected or at least totally underestimated the role of the irrational in man and the effect of cultural forces in moulding men.

Warren was not the only anarchist who did not consistently follow an anarchist position. Proudhon, who in so many ways is similar to Warren and made many keen insights into the nature of government, at various points in his life was elected to the Chamber of Deputies, saw Louis Napoleon as a vehicle for initiating the Revolution, and sought to legislate a society of free contract. Such difficulties or contradictions as presented by Warren and Proudhon—namely, their incisive critiques of government, their plea for freedom and the individual coupled with what is probably best described as a naivete about the essential nature of power, of government and of the military, especially—suggest the source of their problem. Neither, I suspect, had the analytic and theoretic turn of mind—more characteristic in a Marx—to dig down to the roots of these institutions and clearly perceive their full implications. Obviously, the Civil War disturbance caused Warren to reconsider and reformulate his earlier position. Yet had he more fully comprehended the nature of government and the military, as well as the limits of the rational in man, even in the new light of this crisis, it is difficult to see his reaching the ambiguous and naive conclusions expressed in *True Civilization*.

If anything Warren's and, one can include here as well, Proudhon's struggle to formulate a conception of the free society is only a review of the basic problem facing all libertarians: How can a free society recognize the use of violence as a legitimate technique for resolving issues? Certainly, if anarchists are to have an army in their society it would have to be the kind portrayed by Warren, but as I have suggested above, in light of what we know today of human psychology and of the nature of the military structure, the possibilities of such an army appear sheer fantasy. The problem in effect comes down to the question can anarchists hold that the threat or use of violence is in any case legitimate? Conversely can those who call themselves pacifists subscribe to the political theory of the legitimacy of the state?

Tenants take over

ANARCHY 83, which put the case for a tenant take-over of municipal housing estates, got quite a good reception. *New Society* conceded that "the idea has its merits", the *Architect's Journal* found it "very sensible and down-to-earth", and one reader thought it had "an absolute genius for marshalling relevant themes and information in an easily-digestible form". Another found that it had "all the basic facts and arguments for a well-informed propaganda campaign" (which was the intention) and yet another declared "I can't help feeling someone ought to sponsor the sending of a copy to every local councillor in the country". We agree, but more important is that it should be in the hands of every tenants' association in the country. This is a time when council tenants are being driven into attitudes of militancy over steep rent increases (thousands of tenants in Walsall and Sheffield have refused to pay them) and more and more local associations are being formed. Wally Gill, general secretary of the National Association of Tenants and Residents declares that "Tenants have a common interest which must make them range their combined strength against the Government, against the national and international finance and property-owning interests which are served by the Government. Not only this particular Government, but government as we have known it throughout living memory." We believe that when it comes to long-term aims, Tenants Take Over should be on the agenda of every tenants' association in the country. ANARCHY 83 is available at 2s. a copy (discount for quantities) from Freedom Press, 17a Maxwell Road, London, S.W.6.
