CHAPTER 1. SACRED VALUES AND EVIL ADVERSARIES: A MORAL FOUNDATIONS APPROACH

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At the age of 87, several years after he had stopped writing, Isaiah Berlin responded to an invitation from a Chinese professor to summarize his ideas for publication in China. He produced an extraordinary essay that defended moral pluralism and warned against its enemy, moral monism (or moral absolutism), which he defined as the thesis that "to all true questions there must be one true answer and one only, all the other answers being false." He then wrote:

> Most revolutionaries believe, covertly or overtly, that in order to create the ideal world eggs must be broken, otherwise one cannot obtain the omelette. Eggs are certainly broken—never more violently or ubiquitously than in our times—but the omelette is far to seek, it recedes into an infinite distance. That is one of the corollaries of unbridled monism, as I call it—some call it fanaticism, but monism is at the root of every extremism. (Berlin, 1998)

In this essay we build upon Berlin's idea[1] and argue that the elevation or "sacralization" of a moral principle or symbol is a major cause of evil. This idea has been developed quite ably by others in recent years (see Baumeister, 1997, this volume, on "idealistic evil"; Glover, 1999, on tribalism; and Skitka & Mullen, 2002, and Skitka, this volume, on the "dark side" of moral convictions). We hope to add to these analyses of morality and evil by offering a map of moral space which may be helpful in explaining why so many different principles and objects can become sacred, along with an account of how sacredness permits and motivates different patterns of evil behavior.

We begin by defining our key terms – sacredness and morality. We then introduce Moral Foundations Theory as a way of broadening and mapping the moral domain, and thereby identifying diverse kinds of sacred objects. In the third section we show how this moral foundations approach can also broaden our view of evil, and we offer a definition of evil based on group-level perceptions of threats to sacralized objects. In the fourth section we take a qualitative approach to sacredness, showing how two diametrically opposed moralities can both lead to idealistic violence. In the fifth section we introduce the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale, a simple instrument that can be used to measure the degree to which people sacralize each of the five foundations of morality. We conclude by considering unanswered questions about which foundational values are most likely to lead to idealistic violence.

Sacredness and Morality

Evidence for totemism, animal worship, and other proto-religious practices goes back tens of thousands of years; even Homo Neanderthalis may have treated some objects as sacred (Solecki, 1975). Human beings have been engaged in religious practices for so long, with such intensity, and so ubiquitously that many researchers now believe that religion is an evolutionary adaptation (e.g., Wilson, 2002), even if belief in gods may have originally emerged as a byproduct of other cognitive capacities (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Boyer, 2003; Kirkpatrick, 1999). But as we have argued elsewhere (Graham & Haidt, 2010), the social psychology of religion should not focus on belief in gods; it should focus on the group-binding and society-constituting effects of ritual practice and other religious behaviors. Whether one believes that God is a delusion, a reality, or an adaptation, it is hard to deny that human behavior now includes a rather strong tendency to invest objects, people, places, days, colors, words, and shapes with extraordinary importance that is in no way justified by practical or utilitarian considerations (Eliade, 1959). The psychology of sacredness may (or may not) have co-evolved with belief in gods, but it is now a very general aspect of human nature. We believe that sacredness is crucial for understanding morality, including fully secular moralities.

The academic study of sacredness is roughly a century old, and most of the major treatments of it have emphasized the radical discontinuity between sacredness and the concerns of ordinary life. Nisbet (1966/1993, p. 6) summarizes the sociological use of the word: "The sacred includes the mores, the non-rational, the religious and ritualistic ways of behavior that are valued beyond whatever utility they possess." The first major treatment of sacredness came from Emile Durkheim (1915/1965), who argued that the distinction between sacred and profane (i.e., ordinary, practical) is among the most fundamental and generative aspects of human cognition. It is generative because sacredness is always a collective representation serving collective functions. Shared emotions and practices related to sacred things bind people together into cults, churches, and communities. Sacredness does not require a God. Flags, national holidays, and other markers of collective solidarity are sacred in the same way— and serve the same group-binding function—as crosses and holy days.

A few years later, Rudolph Otto (1917/1958) wrote about *das Heilige* (from the Greek *heilos*, translated as "sacred" or "holy") as something that could in different instances be mysterious, awe-inspiring, or terrifying, but that above all was "wholly other," a category completely separate from ordinary life. Following Otto, Eliade (1959) explored the psychological and phenomenological aspects of sacredness, but he also followed Durkheim in emphasizing its social functions. People want to live in a sacralized cosmos, he said, and they work together to create dense webs of shared meanings which valorize their land, their traditions, and their place at the center of the cosmos. Eliade noted that Western modernity was a historical aberration in having created the first fully desacralized, profane world. But he also noted that sacredness cannot be entirely removed from people's lives. When deprived of shared sacred objects, people still invest certain dates, objects, and places with a kind of sacred importance – for example, things related to the first time one fell in love or traveled abroad:

Even for the most frankly nonreligious man, all these places still retain an exceptional, a unique quality; they are the 'holy places' of his private universe, as if it were in such spots that he had received the revelation of a reality *other* than that in which he participates through his ordinary daily life (Eliade, 1959, p. 24).

Psychologists have operationalized sacredness in ways that are consistent with these earlier approaches. Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, and Lerner (2000, p. 853) concentrated on the absolute separation from the profane, defining sacred values as "any value that a moral community explicitly or implicitly treats as possessing infinite or transcendental significance that precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular values." They found that when participants were asked to resolve dilemmas in which sacred values (i.e., human life) could be traded off for a profane value (i.e., money), they often felt tainted and immoral, and they sometimes refused to make tradeoffs at all. Ritov and Baron (1999) examined "protected" values – defined as "those that people think should not be traded off" (p. 79) – and found that when such values are activated people are more likely to show the omission bias, and become less utilitarian (see also Baron & Spranca, 1997).

We draw from these treatments of sacredness to offer this definition, tailored for use in moral psychology:

> *Sacredness refers to the human tendency to invest people, places, times, and ideas with importance far beyond the utility they possess. Tradeoffs or compromises involving what is sacralized are resisted or refused. In prototypical cases these investments tie individuals to larger groups with shared identities and ennobling projects, and so tradeoffs or compromises are felt to be acts of betrayal, even in non-prototypical cases in which no group is implicated.*

This definition of sacredness complements our definition of morality. Because we have emphasized the diversity of moral *content* across cultures, we have avoided definitions of the moral domain that list specific principles or virtues (e.g., Turiel's [1983] stipulation that morality involves matters of "justice, rights, and welfare" exclusively, and all else is social convention or personal preference). Rather, we have taken a social-functionalist approach (Keltner & Haidt, 1999) and defined moral systems by what they do:

> *Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make coordinated social life possible* (adapted from Haidt, 2008).

Considering these two definitions together, the relevance of sacredness for moral psychology should be apparent. The human ability to live peacefully and cooperatively in large groups of non-kin is one of the greatest puzzles in the social sciences, particularly for those who take an evolutionary perspective (Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Darwin, 1871/1998; Henrich & Henrich, 2007). The existence and resilience of human moral systems requires an explanation. If the

"evolved psychological mechanisms" that are part of moral systems include a psychology of sacredness, then the puzzle is much easier to solve[2] than if human beings are modeled as fully profane—i.e., as rational agents in pursuit of self-interest, broadly construed. In the next section we present our theory of morality (Haidt & Graham, 2007) as augmented by greater attention to questions of sacredness.

Morality is Constructed, on Five Foundations

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) was first proposed by two cultural psychologists who noticed convergences between anthropological descriptions of morality and evolutionary theories of human sociality. For example, anthropological accounts of reciprocal gift-giving as a means of forging relationships (Malinowski, 1922) bore obvious similarities to evolutionary discussions of "reciprocal altruism" (Trivers, 1971). Haidt and Joseph (2004) drew on several existing accounts of moral variation (especially that of Shweder et al., 1997) to propose that there are five innate psychological "foundations" upon which cultures construct widely divergent moral systems: Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity. Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) developed several ways to measure endorsement of these five foundations (e.g., the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, MFQ; Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, in press), and found a pattern that has now been replicated many times: Political liberals value Harm and Fairness more than conservatives, whereas conservatives value Ingroup, Authority, and Purity more than liberals. In addition, liberals show a greater preferencing of Harm and Fairness concerns over the other three kinds of moral concerns, whereas conservatives value all five foundations relatively equally. However, people's scores on all five foundations can vary independently, and variations among many different moral patterns can be modeled as instantiations of different settings on a kind of "moral equalizer" with five sliding controls.[3]

Perhaps because the equalizer metaphor is intuitively appealing, and perhaps because we have frequently presented simple graphs showing how groups differ on the five scores provided by the MFQ, many readers of our work have interpreted Moral Foundations Theory as a kind of multiple regression theory of morality. Like the "Big 5" theory of personality, all you need to know about a person is his or her static and stable scores on five traits or dimensions. However, from our earliest writings we have emphasized that foundations are just foundations. A morality must be constructed on top of those foundations, and the construction process is always done socially, as part of one's development within specific ecological settings and subcultures.

We have found Dan McAdams' work on narrative to be particularly helpful for understanding this construction process. McAdams (2001) has studied "life stories," which he describes as "psychosocial constructions, coauthored by the person himself or herself and the cultural context within which the person's life is embedded and given meaning" (p. 101). Life stories help individuals make sense of their past experiences, and guide them as they make choices about their futures. (See McAdams et al., 2008, for evidence that the life-stories of liberals and conservatives, coded for foundation-related content, show the same pattern we have found using quantitative methods; see also Walker et al., this volume, on the life stories of moral

heroes.) For our work in political psychology, however, we have found it most useful to move from "life stories" to "ideological narratives" (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2010).

In *The Political Brain*, Drew Westen (2007) argued that successful political movements must have a story that explains the origins of present problems and shows why the movement offers a solution. He pointed out that coherent stories usually have an initial state ("once upon a time..."), protagonists, a problem or obstacle, villains who stand in the way, a clash, and a dénouement. These ideological narratives, as we call them, are clearly like life stories in most ways. For example, they always incorporate a reconstructed past and an imagined future, often telling a story of progress or of decline. But they are different from life-stories in one key respect: Each person must be the first author of his or her own life story. More than a little bit of plagiarism would be shameful. But when people join together to pursue political projects—from the demand for civil rights to violent revolution to genocide—they must share a *common* story, one that they accept as true without having authored. Ideological narratives, then, by their very nature, are always stories about good and evil. They identify heroes and villains, they explain how the villains got the upper hand, and they lay out or justify the means by which—if we can just come together and fight hard enough—we can vanquish the villains and return the world to its balanced or proper state.

Ideological narratives provide a crucial link between a psychological analysis of moral foundations and the sorts of violent extremists described by Berlin. First, we simply observe that people love stories. All around the world, cultures rely upon stories to socialize their children, and narrative thinking has been called one of two basic forms of human cognition (along with logical reasoning; see Bruner, 1986). Second, we note that successful stories—the ones that get transmitted from person to person and decade to decade—are those that fit well with the human mind, particularly by eliciting strong emotions, as found in analyses of successful urban legends (Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001). We think moral foundations theory provides the most comprehensive account of the "hooks" in the moral mind to which a good ideological narrative can attach. Third, we note that intergroup competition, and particularly warfare, causes prevailing ideological narratives to become more extreme, often to the point of being cartoonish (e.g., the frequent charge that one's enemies enjoy killing or even eating children). Such extreme narratives seem to serve the purpose of mobilizing and inspiring one's team, and preparing the way for its members to "break eggs," as Berlin lamented. As Baumeister (1997, p. 190) pointed out, "One far-reaching difference between idealistic evil and other forms of evil is that idealistic evil is nearly always fostered by groups, as opposed to individuals...To put this more bluntly: It is apparently necessary to have someone else tell you that violent means are justified by high ends."

The Five Foundations of Evil

Scientific treatments of evil have tended to define it in terms of a single moral foundation: Harm/care. For instance, evil has been operationalized as "human actions that harm others" (Staub, 2003, p. 5; see also Staub, this volume), "intentional interpersonal harm" (Baumeister, 1997, p. 8; see also Baumeister, this volume), and "intentionally behaving – or causing others to act – in ways that demean, dehumanize, harm, destroy, or kill innocent people"

(Zimbardo, 2004, p. 23). We share the normative intuition of these authors that the prototypes of evil are acts of cruelty and violence, and would even agree that these are the most important kinds of evil to understand and prevent. However, as a descriptive account of the psychological underpinnings of positive and negative moral judgments, Moral Foundations Theory suggests that perceptions of evil may be based on concerns other than harm, cruelty, and violence.

If ideological narratives can draw on any combination of the five foundations, then there can be many kinds of heroes and many kinds of villains. Table 1 shows how each foundation may be used to support the sacralization and demonization of diverse objects. The first column gives sacred values related to each foundation. As described above, these are the values that are set apart from everyday profane concerns and protected from tradeoffs; they are moral concerns imbued with value far beyond practical utilities or self-interest. The second column gives the sacred objects—the people, things, and ideas that can become sacralized because they are linked to these sacred values. And just as something is seen as worthy of ultimate protection, there is a vision of what it must be protected from: This is a vision of evil. Note that these visions of evil aren't simply people or things that go against the foundational concerns, like vices. Evil is something more, something that threatens to hurt, oppress, betray, subvert, contaminate, or otherwise profane something that is held as sacred. Also important to note is that the sacred object prompting the vision of evil is not held by just one person (say, a favorite teddy bear), but a *group*, who explicitly or implicitly cohere in these twin visions of sacredness and evil. More than just a very morally bad thing, evil is something special that comes out of a shared narrative, and in fact could be said to play the starring role in that narrative. Evil is whatever stands in the way of sacredness.[4] The last column gives examples of idealistic violence (what Baumeister [1997] calls idealistic evil), and illustrates that the process of sacralizing objects according to sacred values (as well as the attendant process of developing a vision of evil in whatever threatens those objects) can lead to violent actions *even if those sacred values are radically opposed to violence*, like nurturance, care or peace.

Our goal in presenting Table 1 is not to argue that there are five discrete kinds of evil. Evil emerges as communities construct ideological narratives and converge on a shared understanding of what their problems are, who caused them, and how to fight back. These narratives can build on several foundations – perhaps even on all five. Our goal is rather to show the diversity of values and objects that can become sacralized, and to show that evil is as diverse as morality. But this is all rather abstract. In the next section we provide two case studies of extreme ideological narratives, based on very different sets of moral foundations, which motivated people to commit idealistic violence.

Qualitative Approach: Narratives Connect Sacred Principles to Action
Sacred Race: The Turner Diaries

Less than 30 miles from our offices in Virginia one can find the headquarters of National Vanguard, one of America's largest white supremacist groups. This is a splinter group off the older National Alliance, which was led by William Pierce (author of *The Turner Diaries*, published under the pen name Alexander Macdonald) until his death in 2002. Provided the reader

can stomach it, *The Turner Diaries* (Pierce, 1978) offers an in-depth look into the moral worldview of ultra-right-wing white supremacy and anti-Semitism, from *inside* that worldview, as its adherents want it to be seen. A narrator from an idealized, post-America Aryan future presents the diaries of Earl Turner, who led a resistance army against the diabolical "System." The System was dominated by Jewish human-rights advocates who outlawed guns and employed black men to confiscate those guns from whites. Whites were left defenseless as nonwhites raped and pillaged at will. Turner wistfully remembers his "once upon a time" when whites didn't have to live in fear, when their racial pride wasn't censored as hate speech and their second-amendment rights were upheld. As many have pointed out, *The Turner Diaries* is a compendium of right-wing fears and angers, augmented into a dystopian vision, and then finally a utopian dénouement as Turner deals the decisive blow to the System by flying a plane with a nuclear warhead into the Pentagon building.

Although one can find evidence of values related to Fairness (reciprocity, vengeance) and Authority (honor, social order), the book treats as sacred a tight constellation of values related to Ingroup and Purity above all: loyalty and self-sacrifice for Turner's underground rebellion are painted as moral ideals, as are the self-control, cleanliness, and purity of the white race (presented in stark contrast to the vile, animalistic, and self-indulgent behavior of other races). The white race (and its "pure" bloodline) is the sacralized object to be protected, and the reader is encouraged to root and hope for its survival into future generations. With this vision of sacredness, of course, comes a vision of evil, and Pierce offers an amplified and even fetishized vision of the all-consuming power and viciousness of the Jews and Blacks who threaten the survival of the white race. By giving these exemplars of evil such power in his fictional world, Pierce brings the impulse to protect the sacralized object from evil to a fever pitch, and the reader is asked to cheer for the violence that is necessary (eggs must be broken) to achieve this morally sacred end.

At one point, Turner and his comrades load up a delivery truck with explosives, and detonate it under a federal building:

> At 9:15 yesterday morning our bomb went off in the F.B.I.'s national headquarters building....the damage is immense. [W]e gaped with a mixture of horror and elation at the devastation....It is a heavy burden of responsibility for us to bear, since most of the victims of our bomb were only pawns who were no more committed to the sick philosophy of the racially destructive goals of the System than we are. But there is no way we can destroy the System without hurting many thousands of innocent people—no way. It is a cancer too deeply rooted in our flesh. And if we don't destroy the System before it destroys us—if we don't cut this cancer out of our living flesh—our whole race will die. (Pierce, 1978, p. 42).

This scene will sound familiar to American readers because something very similar was carried out by one of the book's biggest fans, Timothy McVeigh, in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. McVeigh was deeply committed to the book, selling it at gun shows and sending copies to his

friends. When McVeigh carried out his own idealistic violence, he had pages from the book in his car and had mailed others to his sister and to the FBI. This horrific act of violence, which killed 168 people and wounded nearly 500 others, would not have been possible without a shared moral vision of sacred values (white pride, self-sacrifice for one's race, purity), sacred objects (the white race), and a vision of evil (international cabal of nonwhites and Jews), all built upon the Ingroup and Purity foundations. It is also important to note that, for these white supremacists, the lives of individual white people are valuable but not sacred. *The Turner Diaries* is full of meditations and metaphors (e.g., treating cancer) that justify the killing of individual white people in order to save and protect what is truly sacred: the white race.

Sacred Victims: The Weather Underground

The Ingroup, Authority, and Purity foundations reinforce each other in many cases of tribal, ethnic, or nationalist fervor, and such causes tend to be supported by more conservative elements within a society. But the propensity for idealistic violence is not limited to the political right; any combination of foundations can be used to support an ideological narrative that motivates violence.

Splitting from the Students for a Democratic Society in the late 1960s, the Weather Underground was a militant left-wing group active throughout the 1970s. Like most student groups at the time, this group was passionately concerned about atrocities happening in Vietnam, and about the injustice of the war itself. But their primary area of sacralization was black victims in white America. Soaking up and producing reams of revolutionary and Communist literatures, the group – many of whom lived together in tightly knit quarters – quickly established an ideological narrative that split the moral world into black and white, and white was bad. Nonwhites, the poor, and other oppressed peoples around the world were innocent victims deserving of justice, and White dominance (seen both in resistance to civil rights progress in the U.S. and imperialist actions in other countries) was the ultimate evil, harming and humiliating the sacred victims. Activist rhetoric quickly morphed from SNCC-style nonviolence to calls for open and armed revolt. After a series of bombings, the group went into hiding from the FBI in 1970, and started delivering communiqués to the press:

> "It is our job to blast away the myths of the total superiority of the man. We did not choose to live in a time of war. We choose only to become guerillas and to urge our people to prepare for war rather than become accomplices in the genocide of our sisters and brothers. We learned from Amerikan [sic] history about policies of exterminating an entire people and their magnificent cultures –the Indians, the blacks, the Vietnamese... Don't be tricked by talk. Arm yourselves and shoot to live! We are building a culture and a society that can resist genocide." (Dohrn, Ayers, & Jones, 2006, p. 157)

The members of the Weather Underground were horrified by the suffering and oppression of victims in their own time, and they wove that suffering into a larger narrative stretching back to the founding of America via genocide of Native Americans and enslavement of Africans. Once

victims had been sacralized, the devil was clear: white capitalist America, which must be destroyed, by any means available. Even though their morality was based squarely on the Harm/care foundation, which generally makes people recoil from violence, the group found a way to justify and motivate violence. They perpetrated dozens of bombings, mostly of police stations and other buildings that could plausibly be said to be part of the "system." At one point they had planned to detonate a bomb at a Non-Commissioned Officers' dance at the Fort Dix U.S. Army base, but the bomb went off in the bomb-maker's Greenwich Village townhouse. After that episode, the group tried to avoid killing people and focused on destroying property; nevertheless, several members were involved in a botched 1981 robbery of a Brink's truck that resulted in the killing of two police officers and two security guards (Berger, 2006). The group's leader, Mark Rudd, said of the time, "I cherished my hate as a badge of moral superiority" (Green & Siegel, 2003).

Although the group members' Harm and Fairness values led them to idealistic violence, those values also contributed to much self-criticism in later years. Some came to denounce the violent tactics, some still support them, but most came to agree with Berlin's warning about the dangers of moral absolutism. "The Vietnam war made us crazy," said Brian Flanagan, years after his involvement with the group. "When you think you have right on your side, you can do some horrific things" (Green & Siegel, 2003). Similarly, Bill Ayers reflected that "One of the great mistakes of 1969 is that we thought we [alone] had it right. The main failures we had were those of smugness and certainty and arrogance" (Berger, 2006, p. 114). Finally, Naomi Jaffe reflected on some of the group's vacillations between extreme positions (whichever seemed more in line with the revolutionary narrative at the time): "It was reflected in the see-sawing from dismissing the white working class to glorifying the white working class. Obviously, both those positions are wrong. But they're wrong because what's right is pretty difficult and complicated" (Berger, 2006, p. 282). This vacillation illustrates two features of sacredness: It is all-or-nothing (the object in question is either sacred or profane), and it is constructed by tightly knit moral communities, not by individuals.

Quantitative Approach: The Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale

If moral sacredness is so important and powerful, can it be brought into the lab? We have found the most useful empirical operationalization of sacredness to be the one in Tetlock's work on taboo tradeoffs of sacred values (Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock et al., 2000), which demonstrated that people often refused to exchange sacred values for profane concerns and felt contaminated when they did. Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) followed Tetlock's method by presenting people with violations of the five moral foundations – for example, "Kick a dog in the head, hard" for Harm – and asking how much money they would require to do it (with an option to refuse the taboo tradeoff for any amount of money). A major advantage of this approach is that compared to other self-report measures of moral personality (e.g., the Defining Issues Test; Rest, 1979), the very experience of taking the survey triggers some gut-level intuitive reactions (Haidt, 2001), as well as some deliberative reasoning. We have since developed and revised these items into The Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale, which we present here (see Appendix) in hopes that other

researchers in moral psychology may use it to investigate the full range of moral concerns that people can hold sacred.

As the Appendix shows, the scale gives four items for each foundation, as well as an optional four-item subscale with personally unpleasant outcomes that are not relevant to moral concerns (e.g., having a severe headache for two weeks). This nonmoral subscale can be used as a statistical control, to remove individual differences in attitudes about money and about tradeoffs in general when sacredness is not involved. All items are presented to participants in randomized order, without foundation or item labels.

Many of the items were inspired by previous treatments of sacredness; for example, the item about flag-burning reflects the attention Durkheim (1915/1965, pp. 260-262) paid to the national flag as a sacred object, and the item about selling one's soul mirrors Haidt, Bjorklund, and Murphy's (2000) observation that participants (even those who didn't believe they *had* a soul) resisted this offer as a tainting tradeoff. In developing and selecting items for the scale, we tried to capture a wide range of content domains for each foundational concern; for instance, instead of maximizing alpha, which would have led us to retain only nation-related items for the Ingroup scale, we selected a final set of items that concerned loyalty to nation, family, and club or team. For this reason, internal consistencies are relatively low (average $\alpha = .64$ for the four-item subscales), but sufficient given the lack of redundant items, wide range of topics, and small number of items (for a related discussion, see Graham et al., 2010).

The items are responded to on an 8-point scale, beginning with "$0 (I'd do it for free)," then $10, and then increasing by factors of 10 to a million dollars, with a top option of "never for any amount of money." The scale is scored in two ways: One method is simply to average subscale items on the full 8-point scale, and the other is to calculate for each person how many behaviors (out of 4) he or she would "never [do] for any amount of money" for each subscale. (This latter method sacrifices a good deal of information, but it is closer to the definition of sacredness as a refusal to make tradeoffs.)

The top panel of Table 2 provides full scale means and standard deviations for a large heterogeneous (and international) sample of over 27,000 visitors to YourMorals.org, as well as separate means for gender and political identification groups. The bottom panel presents the same data scored by the stricter criterion of number of "never" answers for each subsample. As both panels show, women are more likely than men to sacralize values related to all five foundations, in terms of both requiring more money to violate them, and being more likely to refuse to violate them for *any* amount of money ($ts > 17$, $ps < .0001$). Table 2 also shows clear political patterns for Ingroup, Authority, and Purity, in that conservatives are the most likely group to sacralize these values, then moderates, then liberals. However, no such pattern emerges for Harm and Fairness, which MFT predicts should be more sacred to liberals than conservatives.

We found something similar with an early version of the scale (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009, Study 3), and speculated that there might be a general tendency for conservatives to be more likely to refuse monetary tradeoffs in general (perhaps seeing such tradeoffs as a form of prostitution). The addition of the nonmoral subscale supports this speculation, in that it correlates weakly but reliably with political conservatism ($r = .08$, $p < .001$). When we computed difference

scores by subtracting participants' nonmoral scores from their foundation scores (to partial out individual differences in amounts required and propensity to refuse doing things for money in general), political conservatism remains positively correlated with Ingroup ($r = .11$, $p < .0001$), Authority ($r = .17$, $p < .0001$), and Purity ($r = .27$, $p < .0001$), and is weakly *negatively* correlated with Harm ($r = -.12$, $p < .0001$) and Fairness ($r = -.05$, $p = .02$). Finally, the last column of the table shows us that libertarians are the most profane group of all, for every subscale. As this group becomes more vocal in U.S. and international politics, it will be more important to investigate the narrative they are weaving, which seems to sacralize the value of individual liberty linked to the sacred figures of the American founding fathers and the evils of European-style socialism (see Iyer et al., 2010, for further information on libertarian morality).[5]

What can data from this scale tell us about what kinds of sacralization are most likely to lead to violence? As a first pass, we examined whether the Sacredness subscales could predict attitudes toward war as measured by a scale that treated peace and war attitudes as separate constructs (van der Linden, Linden, Bizumic, Stubager, & Mellon, 2008). The Attitudes Toward War subscale included items expressing justification for war, such as "Under some conditions, war is necessary to maintain justice." In multiple regression analyses including political identification and gender as covariates, pro-war attitudes were negatively predicted by Harm ($\beta = -.13$, $p < .001$) and Fairness ($\beta = -.11$, $p < .01$), but *positively* predicted by sacralization of Ingroup concerns ($\beta = .15$, $p < .001$). Of course, indicating that wars can sometimes be justified is a far cry from perpetrating acts of idealistic violence; we hope that future research can more directly investigate the links between sacralization of specific foundational concerns and idealistic violence in support of those moral ends. More generally, we hope that moral psychologists will begin using the scale as a way to measure individual differences in the tendency to sacralize values and objects. We predict that the differences measured by the scale will interact with many of the manipulations currently used in moral psychology experiments, which frequently pit values against each other.

Conclusion: Many Sacred Paths to the Same Evil

Why do absolutist visions of an idealized future so often require, as Isaiah Berlin put it, breaking some eggs? How can moral ends justify violent means? In this chapter we argued that sacredness is one key to understanding this phenomenon, and we suggested a process whereby strongly held values, in the presence of intergroup conflict or competition, lead to the sacralization of specific people, places, or ideas. This sacralization brings with it an attendant vision of evil as whatever threatens or stands in the way of what's sacred. We have also argued that this process of constructing sacredness and evil is not done by individuals, but by groups, teams, and communities – the visions of sacredness are *shared* visions, part of ideological narratives in which the evil one or ones play a starring role. We gave two qualitative examples of such narratives, based on very different constellations of foundation-related values (one based primarily on Ingroup and Purity, the other on Harm and Fairness). Finally, we presented the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale as a way to measure sacralization of principles related to five different classes of moral concerns.

Future theoretical and empirical investigations will need to address the question of which foundational values most lend themselves to idealistic violence: Can *any* sacralized values encourage violence in pursuit of their ends, or do some values lead to violence more quickly than others? The example of the Weather Underground shows that Harm and Fairness concerns can, almost paradoxically, lead to violent actions when sacralized by a moral community with a clear vision of evil. However, their killings were by and large accidental, whereas Timothy McVeigh specifically sought to kill hundreds of innocent civilians to strike a blow at his particular vision of evil, the government. We hope that future work by moral psychologists will reveal how the processes of sacralization leading to violence differ depending on the kind of sacred values and, most importantly, whether interventions intended to stop or reverse this process are differentially effective depending on this as well (for a promising start, see the articles in section V of this volume). Different evils may lead to violent crusades to stop those evils in different ways. It is our hope that Moral Foundations Theory, as applied to sacredness and evil, can help us understand and prevent the perceived necessity of breaking so many eggs.

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Footnotes

1. We note that Berlin's use of the word "monism" did not refer to the elevation of a single moral principle but rather to the belief that there is a single correct truth, which might involve several moral principles. Nonetheless, as we will argue, when any moral principles are sacralized, the result may be the kind of certainty, self-righteousness, and even willingness to "break eggs" in pursuit of those moral principles that Berlin warned about.

2. Of course, this move just pushes the evolutionary puzzle back one step: How did human beings evolve a psychology of sacredness that made them fail to pursue their individual self-interest? We believe that this question is perfectly answered by theories of multi-level selection in which genes are passed on as individuals compete with individuals and as groups compete with groups (see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Wilson, 2002).

3. We are indebted to Will Wilkinson for this metaphor.

4. In Hebrew the word for devil, *ha-satan*, means "obstacle" or "adversary."

5. We have long said that there are more than five psychological foundations. We believe the five we have identified are the five best candidates, but we are now investigating the possibility that Liberty/constraint is the sixth.

Table 1.1. Sacredness and Evil in Relation to Moral Foundations

Foundation	Sacred values	Sacred objects	Evil	Examples of idealistic violence
Harm	Nurturance, care, peace	Innocent victims, nonviolent leaders (Gandhi, M. L. King)	Cruel and violent people	Killing of abortion doctors, Weather Underground bombings
Fairness	Justice, karma, reciprocity	The oppressed, the unavenged	Racists, oppressors, capitalists	Vengeance killings, reciprocal attacks, feuds
Ingroup	Loyalty, self-sacrifice for group	Homeland, nation, flag, ethnic group	Traitors, outgroup members and their culture	Ethnic grudges, genocides, violent punishment for betrayals
Authority	Respect, tradition, honor	Authorities, social hierarchy, traditions, institutions	Anarchists, revolutionaries, subversives	Right-wing death squads, military atrocities, Abu Ghraib
Purity	Chastity, piety, self-control	Body, soul, sanctity of life, holy sites	Atheists, hedonists, materialists	Religious crusades, genocides, killing abortion doctors

Table 1.2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Alphas for Sacredness Subscales

Foundation	Total (n=27,833)		Women (n=12,082)	Men (n=15,752)	Liberals (n=17,795)	Moderates (n=2,699)	Conservatives (n=3,073)	Libertarians (n=2,354)
	Mean	(SD)	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
Harm:	6.96	(1.24)	7.36	6.66	7.08	7.05	6.89	6.32
Fairness:	6.41	(1.32)	6.58	6.27	6.43	6.51	6.56	6.06
Ingroup:	5.63	(1.45)	5.90	5.42	5.47	6.00	6.51	5.32
Authority:	4.43	(1.64)	4.71	4.22	4.29	4.87	5.23	4.04
Purity:	5.58	(1.47)	5.98	5.28	5.41	6.03	6.40	5.19
Nonmoral:	6.01	(1.11)	6.32	5.78	6.01	6.11	6.18	5.67
	# Never	(SD)	# Never	# Never	# Never	# Never	# Never	# Never
Harm:	2.51	(1.44)	2.97	2.17	2.60	2.63	2.47	1.89
Fairness:	2.04	(1.29)	2.20	1.91	2.05	2.10	2.18	1.75
Ingroup:	1.30	(1.18)	1.51	1.13	1.21	1.47	1.86	1.03
Authority:	0.93	(1.05)	1.06	0.84	0.85	1.15	1.38	0.74
Purity:	1.53	(1.20)	1.86	1.28	1.39	1.87	2.22	1.20
Nonmoral:	0.96	(1.05)	1.21	0.77	0.95	1.04	1.08	0.65

Note. Range for all items and subscale means is 1-8 (see Appendix for response options). "# Never" is the average number of items (out of 4) the subsample indicated they would never do for any amount of money; it is a stricter criterion of sacredness than the overall mean, in that it considers only refusals to enter into the taboo tradeoff altogether.

Appendix: The Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale

Instructions: Try to imagine *actually doing* the following things, and indicate how much money someone would have to pay you, (anonymously and secretly) to be willing to do each thing. For each action, assume that nothing bad would happen to you afterwards. Also assume that you cannot use the money to make up for your action.

Scale: (1) $0 (I'd do it for free); (2) $10; (3) $100; (4) $1000; (5) $10,000; (6) $100,000;
(7) a million dollars; (8) never for any amount of money

Harm:
DOGKICK: Kick a dog in the head, hard
ENDANGERED: Shoot and kill an animal that is a member of an endangered species
OVERWEIGHT: Make cruel remarks to an overweight person about his or her appearance
PALM: Stick a pin into the palm of a child you don't know

Fairness:
CARDS: Cheat in a game of cards played for money with some people you don't know well
APARTMENT: Say no to a friend's request to help him move into a new apartment, after he helped you move the month before
BALLOTS: Throw out a box of ballots, during an election, to help your favored candidate win
RACEPLEDGE: Sign a secret-but-binding pledge to only hire people of your race in your company

Ingroup:
TALKRADIO: Say something bad about your nation (which you don't believe to be true) while calling in, anonymously, to a talk-radio show in a foreign nation
FAMILYSHUN: Break off all communications with your immediate and extended family for 1 year
FLAGBURN: Burn your country's flag, in private (nobody else sees you)
LEAVECLUB: Leave the social group, club, or team that you most value

Authority:
PARENTCURSE: Curse your parents, to their face. (You can apologize and explain one year later)
HANDGESTURE: Make a disrespectful hand gesture to your boss, teacher, or professor
ROTTENTOMATO: Throw a rotten tomato at a political leader you dislike. (remember, you will not get caught)
FATHERSLAP: Slap your father in the face (with his permission) as part of a comedy skit

Purity:
SOULSELL: Sign a piece of paper that says "I hereby sell my soul, after my death, to whoever has this piece of paper"
TAIL: Get plastic surgery that adds a 2 inch tail on to the end of your spine (you can remove it in three years)
MOLESTERBLOOD: Get a blood transfusion of 1 pint of disease-free, compatible blood from a convicted child molester
STAGEANIMAL: Attend a performance art piece in which all participants (including you) have to act like animals for 30 minutes, including crawling around naked and urinating on stage

Nonmoral (optional):
ICEBATH: Sit in a bathtub full of ice water for 10 minutes
IDIOTSIGN: Wear a sign on your back for one month that says, in large letters, "I am an idiot."
HEADACHE: Experience a severe headache for two weeks
LOSEHEARING: Lose your sense of hearing for one year