Showing posts with label neo-colonialism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label neo-colonialism. Show all posts

Saturday, April 29, 2017

Garbage Floats in with the Tide: For Autonomous Antifascism

bw-sea-tide-shipwreck

In his “Notes on Trump,” Bromma posits that the election of Trump and the accompanying rise of the far right are not simple accidents of history, nor the result of some single failure on our side or success on theirs, but are conjoined expressions of a deep phase-shift within the global capitalist economy. Whereas the fact that a wacky reality tv star was the one who ushered this in, and that it happened in 2016 and not 2015 or 2017, might be a matter of contingency or chance, a lurch to the populist xenophobic right was predictable, perhaps unavoidable. This is an important claim, one which, if true, has strategic consequences for those of us who seek to resist what is coming.

While it is important to not fall into the trap of viewing political and cultural phenomena (“superstructure”) as being automatically set in place by economic considerations (“base”), we can nonetheless see that the latter often determines the possible ways the former might develop.

In this light, certain characteristics of the far right today gleam with particular intensity. For instance, while the far right always had important gender politics, in the current moment gender is explicitly centered in new and unstable ways, as different tendencies vacillate between wildly different positions. Whereas a perverse “femonationalism” has taken hold over large sections of organized racists, especially in Western Europe, positing Islamophobia and outright white supremacy as justified on “feminist” grounds, the alt-right in the United States swings the other way, embracing misogyny and a series of masculinist tropes.

Similarly, the “unipolar” post-Soviet world has been one of porous, unreliable state sovereignty, for a variety of reasons including but not limited to what some have termed the “hollowing out” of the state. In this context, far rightists have explored fantasies as to how to use zones of chaos, statelessness, and warlordism, as opportunities to bootstrap their own “tribal” minarchies. The welcome so-called “anarcho-pluralists” and “national anarchists” have received from larger far right forces, not to mention the authoritarian path of American “Libertarianism,” seem less anachronistic, and more significant, when this fractious global reality is taken into account.

Bromma’s text therefore points to Trumpism, and the current prominence of the far right, as being noteworthy for the way in which they signal that the worm has indeed turned; even though they themselves may only be precursor phenomena for what could be a cascading series of jumps to the right, to authoritarianism, ultimately towards a new cycle of genocide and war.[1]

If the motor force behind the night and fog descending is structural and present on a world scale – then ultimately, this points to global structural change as being the best bet to jam history’s gears and set ourselves upon a better path. That’s the “big picture” solution, one we must keep in mind – but looking at the far right surge as a corollary to this capitalist shift also demands more practical decisions for the immediate future.

RADICAL

The word “radical” comes from the Latin word Radix – itself ironically the title of an important alt-right publication – a word that means “root.” To go to the structural root of the historical dynamic we are enmeshed in, is therefore to be radical – and a radical vision, both going to the root of things and imagining ways of completely uprooting them, is made more urgent with every tremor that cracks the historical terrain.

Developing a radical stance means not only deepening our opposition to the far right, but also disconnecting our analysis and our positions from the system the far right so often claims to oppose. As troubling as it is, this sets a treacherous path before us, where we must resist automatic “left” or “antifascist” unity, while continuing to intervene against far right offensives. A task made all the more difficult by the fact that much that the far right sets itself against is itself a surface expression of the same deep structure that we ourselves oppose.

It is worth making sure this is not misunderstood, because it resembles a theory being muttered in some quarters, that leads nowhere good. Neocolonialism creates contradictory cultural and political phenomena – secondary effects of neocolonialism’s integration of oppressed and oppressor within structures that work to maintain these oppressive dynamics. Some of these secondary effects seem to promote the interests of historically oppressed groups, some seem to work against their interests, but all within this larger system that relies on massive and even genocidal oppression around the world. (And keeps its finger always on the trigger ready to kill to defend this order.) In this sense, the “whitelash” and the alt-right are themselves secondary effects of neocolonialism, just as are various new forms of middle-class etiquette and campaigns to “decolonize” aspects of capitalism without eradicating capitalism itself. Sensing this, some argue that the latter have caused the former – one common formulation being that white reaction is a “response to identity politics.” Whereas in fact, both what is often being referred to as “identity politics” and white reaction itself are secondary effects of the deeper neocolonial order – each may exacerbate the other, but neither one will go away just because the other does. They are generated by something deeper, the global economic and political structure itself.[2]

If opposing the far right everywhere, while not necessarily lining up behind everything the far right attacks, seems like a paradox, it is one that will only be solved to the extent that we develop positive reference points for ourselves and others. This means figuring out our social base, those who we will prioritize relating to, and whose interests we will take as our concern. This also means putting forth our own alternatives, ones based on our own values. Both tasks raise questions – what social base? what values? It is in how we answer these questions that we will finally learn who we really are. And it is here that communism, anarchism, and other “unrealistic” (and certainly unpopular) dreams, may prove themselves to be more realistic and practical than what the reformists and liberals have on offer.[3]

CULTURE

We are witnessing an entire constellation of ways of thinking and acting and being, all associated with a particular historical era (and with it, a particular configuration of capitalism), being pushed aside. Certainly, the charade of liberal multiculturalism and the pro-capitalist version of state-sanctioned “feminism” even, were as much products of the neoliberal moment, as were the invasion of Iraq and the proliferation of mass incarceration. Today, we see other forces pushing their way through, coming in with the tide, with giddy plans to change all this. Just not for the better.

In lockstep almost, Trump’s trajectory in 2016 grew alongside the enthusiasm of millions of alienated and angry privileged white men fed up with one facet of neocolonial culture. With every homophobic, ableist, racist, or sexist statement, those grounded in the neoliberal consensus felt more certain that The Donald “could not win” – and yet with every such pronouncement his support increased. On a cultural level, this was indeed a “whitelash” – one full of personal hatred against Barack, Michelle, and Hillary, to be sure … but not just against them, nor even just against the neoliberal clique that had won every election since Reagan … no, theirs was an anger against the entire neocolonial order and how it chafed. As the alt-right Traditionalist Youth Movement noted, “Even if Trump had never stated a single policy position, his alpha male frat boy bullying of the media and the left is a revolutionary thing in itself.”[4] They are correct.

Trump is not unique in this regard. The demagogue who appears to the polite left as a buffoon but to the broader public as a “man of the people,” is a mainstay of the populist right, radical and not. Ask a Canadian about Rob Ford. Such figures are especially attractive in times of rapid change; they are easy for a certain demographic to project their own feelings onto, whatever those may be – and if such figures seem a bit “nuts,” or unpolished, doesn’t that make them all the more accessible, reassuring even? Along these lines, it is worth quoting at length from Franco “Bifo” Berardi, in his discussion of former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (a Trump prototype if ever there was one):

“Silvio Berlusconi’s behaviour is incomprehensible to the conservative Right and Left, whose political reason follows traditional models. They see it as indispensable to respect official language and cannot imagine a context for political action outside of adherence to legality. But the strength of Berlusconi’s media-populism lies precisely in the systematic violation of the taboos linked to political officialdom and legality. […] What seems most unbearable and provocative to the custodians of severity is the ridiculing of political rhetoric and its stagnant rituals slyly and systematically operated by Berlusconi. But there are reasons to believe that the large majority of people who constitute the ‘public’ of politics (the electorate) were amused by this ridiculing and provocative gesture and in many cases conquered by it: they identified with the slightly crazy Premier, the rascal Prime Minister who resembles them, as at other times they had identified with Mussolini and Craxi.

“The majority of the Italian electorate grew up as TV audiences at a time when television became the primary vehicle for informality, vulgar and coarse allusiveness, the language of ambiguity and aggressiveness. Thus they spontaneously found themselves on the same cultural wavelength as Berlusconi, with his language, words, and gestures, but also with the deprecation of rules in the name of a spontaneous energy that rules can no longer bridle. […]

“To the plebeian coarseness of Berlusconi and his perky banqueters in government, the Left responded with prissiness and consternation in the face of the violation of the language of political correctness. But calling out ‘Scandal!’ proved to be a losing argument against the policies of the centre right government. In fact, part of the secret of Berlusconi’s success in politics lies precisely in the use of excess.”[5]

Like the Italian left criticized here, many today feel it enough to describe (accurately) the sexism and racism of Trump and his far right supporters, and cry out “Scandal!” And of course, it is scandalous, horrific. However, here too, just saying so is a losing gambit: those neocolonial and neoliberal rules and norms are not something we can rely on or properly defend any more, even when we want to. They’re a ship sinking in a shallow harbour – can’t be rescued, even though sections may stay above water, maybe even indefinitely – the important thing from our point of view, is that as a vehicle to go somewhere, or an alternative to appeal to people with, it’s not going to work very well. We need a break with all that, one that goes to the root. Easier said than done, of course.

AUTONOMOUS

To be radical for us therefore requires a break, a separation. It requires autonomy from the same system and culture the far right also claims to attack. Autonomous, radical, antifascism strives to not go down with the ship.

Beyond the culture war, nurturing autonomous radical opposition to the far right also makes good tactical sense. Not long after Trump’s victory, as thousands took to the streets night after night to express their outrage, Democrats were already sheepdogging for the new administration that days earlier they had dismissed as simultaneously fascistic and impossible. In her first statement after the election, Hillary Clinton announced that people had to “accept this result,” that they owed the new administration “an open mind” and a “chance to lead.” In a more concrete vein, Bernie Sanders would later explain that “It’s one thing to kill the TPP … it’s another thing to develop a trade policy that finally works for American workers and not the CEOs of large multinational corporations, and if Mr. Trump is serious about moving in that direction I’d be delighted to work with him.” The “responsible opposition” postured as the “resistance,” all the while condemning the black bloc and antifascists. As the 1st of May Anarchist Alliance noted at the time, “Perhaps the most revealing aspect of this moment is that after spending months describing Trump as a grave threat to the lives of women, people of color, queer and trans people and the disabled, the entire Democratic Party has immediately capitulated to him. They have made clear that they always held preserving their broken system to be far more important than our lives.”[6]

In such situations, there is a direct relationship between how quickly we can act, how clearly we can see, how easily we can relate to the people in the streets, and how well we have kept ourselves away from those forces intent upon capitulation/integration. Again, we strive to not go down with their ship.

On a very practical level, autonomy is a safety measure. Cooperation with state actors, or with organizations that seek ties to sections of the state, will always leave more radical forces vulnerable to manipulation and repression. Or to simply being used as a commodity up for trade, in one of the predictable deals that such groups must always make. Indeed, on more than one occasion state-allied organizations purportedly working against the far right have turned their fire against our side. While the most infamous examples are probably the 1993 revelations about the Anti-Defamation League’s collaboration with (apartheid) South African agents to assemble intelligence and smear progressive and anti-Zionist organizations, and the Southern Poverty Law Centre’s attacks against radical environmentalists in the 2000s, these are just the visible edge of a much wider phenomenon, one that plays out in small, trivial, and dangerous ways every day.[7]

Autonomy from the state does not guarantee our success (or survival), but it does give us a chance to set our own goals, and to fight for space in what is becoming an increasingly claustrophobic situation. Avoiding integration by the state and keeping our own priorities clear are more necessary now than ever. We may never be a majority here – that should not come as a surprise in a society based on theft and murder around the world – but that does not mean we can’t get stuff done, or that we’re not better off with a smaller but surer number of allies. As J. Sakai remarked years ago, an “obsession with needing a social majority has nothing to do with being ‘practical’. What it has to do with is bourgeois and defeatist thinking. This is like the left thinking that could not build a practical anti-fascist movement in Weimar Republic Germany during the 1920s and 1930s, although millions hated Nazism and wanted to do something, because that German left was too preoccupied with fantasies of either seizing or getting elected into state power for itself.” Prescient words indeed.

That said, autonomy in any complex multisided fight is an ideal which cannot always be put into practice. We must expect that we will be showing up at the same demonstrations, even sharing the same podium, with groups and individuals we do not entirely trust. (Not necessarily anything new there.) These situations have to be navigated on a case by case basis, real life not offering any guarantees.

“Autonomy” begs the question: Autonomous from who? From what? As our goals are social and political, our autonomy contains within itself its opposite, as we must be constantly reaching out beyond ourselves, putting our identities and our separateness on the line. On the level of offense, we need to win over the undecided, to be there at the moment where something makes them think twice – as such, we need to be where people are, even if this means not being comfortable or at ease ourselves (but to be effective, we had best not cling to our discomfort). On the level of defense, on a tactical level, we need to be able to work with larger numbers of people, without being burned by state-supportive elements but also without burning people who are not yet down with our complete programme. In other words, in terms of both defense and offense, we need people. So our autonomy is outward-looking, standing against the self-referentiality of the sections of the left. At the same time, it navigates away from state, systemic, and pro-capitalist forces that would trap us within their orbits and agendas.

Perhaps the best we can do at this point is to remember that there is no way to make ourselves (or our allies) bulletproof to the consequences of such unavoidable circumstances. Tread with care, and keep your cards close to your chest.

METAPOLITICS

After World War II, the imperialist west entered a long period of growth and relative stability. There was not a single successful revolution, either from the left or the right, in a “core” metropole from this point on. Major challenges to the world economic system, for instance the end of formal colonialism, did throw the system into crisis, but in the end were handled without the violent overthrow of the ruling class in any of their “home” countries.[8]

That said, the challenge thrown up by the anticolonial revolutions was massive. That this “should have” provided an opening for revolution in the core countries simply indicates how great the barriers (parasitism, chauvinism, racism) always were to such a possibility. Still, the imperialist countries could not neutralize anticolonialism without themselves being changed, and not just superficially. What we are witness to today is just one massive aftershock to this (and the way this aftershock plays out may throw a very different light on the past half century, showing that what we thought was up was really down, that what we thought was over had really just begun). Painful though it may have been, this change was something the ruling class could do, had to do, and once they did it, the stability of the postwar imperialist states and their new neocolonial consensus seemed practically unassailable. (Until, of course, it started to stumble.)

This had major consequences for the far right, which became increasingly hostile to the neocolonial solutions that the former colonial powers pursued, as most clearly evidenced in North America by phenomena such as the nazified “Fifth Era” Klan, the Posse Commitatus, etc. At the same time, this new situation led some of the more insightful far rightists to reject the quick march to power as simply impractical. It was in this context, in France, that a school of thought known as the European New Right first emerged, intent on rehabilitating fascism and racism and making them appealing to future generations. Focusing on the ideas, cultural forms, and assumptions that undergird formal politics, the approach adopted was termed “metapolitical” by its partisans. The goal being to shift the entire discussion in their favour, with a focus on the “elite.” Explicitly, this was a “war of position,” and Gramsci (and Mao) were discussed with interest in the ENR’s highbrow journals and symposia in this light.

It is thanks to their metapolitical strategy, borrowed directly from the ENR, that the U.S. alt-right has been most successful. A particular kind of success that has caused the “mainstream” to be enthralled by the spectacle they provide, as they contest areas where the (neo-)liberal consensus reigned, and where leftists grew complacent. We may not have expected to enjoy hegemony there, but we certainly did not expect the far right to be contending for it, either. Maybe we expected them to be the main radical force in the rural midwest, in the hillbilly churches, the army, or the prisons – but not on the nightly news, where depending on the venue they may be presented less as a freakshow for pundits to make fun of, than as the voice of a “forgotten America” said pundits wish to reconnect with.[9] This caught us off guard – but not nearly as off guard as it caught the liberals, which partly explains the media fascination with the alt-right, especially just after the election, trying to decode its appeal and debate its meaning. A fascination that does nothing so much as it provides an opportunity for their next major advance – because, despite the liberal hype, the smartest fascists are not into normalizing or mainstreaming, they’re into pulling the “mainstream” onto their terrain.

While recognizing the strength of a metapolitical approach, and how strongly it can boost a group’s importance on the level of ideas, it is worth noting that it does not a complete fascist movement make. Specifically, metapolitics aim to eventually win by shifting the parameters of debate everywhere, but do not immediately translate into any capacity to make their supremacist dreams reality right now. This points to an important initial weakness of the alt-right, namely its lack of any effective street presence. Until well into 2017 it remained a conglomeration of elitists who meet at private conferences, and populist keyboard warriors who rarely leave their basements, all of whom seem to have experienced their lives before Trump as some kind of inner emigration from the hostile – supposedly anti-male and anti-white – world around them. While they punched above their weight in the realm of public opinion, as we saw, this didn’t protect them from real punches in real life. This lack of a street presence proved a crucial factor in how things played out in the first months of the year. Our opponents were clearly aware of this, and there were a number of attempts to overcome this limitation, for instance in the calls for an anti-Jewish march on Whitefish, Montana, and in Gavin McInnes’s Proud Boys Network.

Finalizing this paper in April, the events in Berkeley – in which members of the alt-right came together with Patriots, neonazis, Republicans, and independent Trump supporters – seem to indicate that our opponents have overcome this weakness, and that basing our long-term strategies on an assumption that they will always be the ones we send running is a dangerous mistake. It is unclear how easily they will replicate this success – as has been noted by others, Berkeley was the result of a national far right mobilization against a local antifascist countermobilization – however we can’t afford to assume this was just some freak event.

Again: It is important to appreciate that what has changed is just the latest big lurch, in what we can predict will be an ongoing cascade of jumps to the right, and away from the neoliberal consensus that too many of us had grown comfortable with.

SPECULATIONS #1: SPLITS

It did not take long for observers from all sides to start noting the likely splits to occur between the insurgent far right and the Trump administration. What is perhaps less easy to recognize, is that such splits, when they happen – and indeed, some of them have already happened – also present our side with a challenge.

The alt-right and Trump each benefited from throwing their hats in history’s ring at just the right time. While the lurch to the right may have been structurally determined, their particular good fortune was not: despite the obvious talents of all involved, there was more than a little (bad) luck at play, too.

As the paths that together make up their awkward dance fall in and out of sync, this latest far right iteration finds itself occasionally at odds with the “new” political establishment, and its ongoing need to mediate and manage ruling class interests. Whether as an authoritarian racist regime, or as a simple demagogic kleptocracy, whichever way Trump heads, it’s unlikely to satisfy all the forces now in motion. (While discussions such as this can seem whimsical in that they are almost guaranteed to fail at guessing the future, we benefit from thinking these possibilities through in this abstract way, if only so that we can later see where we went wrong.)

Let us assume – for no good reason, really – that the more “responsible” ruling class approach is adopted. At first some hopefully claimed that Trumpism in such a scenario might involve a strategic withdrawal from the Middle East; more recent events seem to indicate that it is more likely to involve a dramatic escalation there. Either way, though, the kinds of increased social bribery Trump promised his supporters can only be paid for by increased imperial plunder, which eventually brings with it all the same problems that bedeviled the globalizers. The hopeful claim made by some on the left, that Trump would be worse for people inside the United States, but Clinton worse for people around the world, was a lot more convincing when everybody knew Clinton would win.

In the months since i first started writing this text, cracks have already appeared. Much of this speculative section is now outdated. And more will be before it goes to print, or ends up in a reader’s hands. Suffice to say, that being aware of the differences between different players and factions, not just using the same most-inflammatory or polemical terms for them all, is necessary in order to understand what is going down, and how we orient ourselves.

Splits between the non-systemic far right and a far right administration will be irresistible for some on the left, who may feel compelled to seize the opportunity and enter the fray, on one side or another. Needless to say, past experience shows that doing so often ends badly. The ability of the state – even a Trumpist state – to integrate left-wing movements, stands in parallel with the ability of sections of the far right to forge “red-brown” alliances of their own. Without our holding the center of gravity, with the tide against us, such dalliances will always leave us weaker, less steady, less what we need to be.

Which seems obvious beforehand, but may be less so when we notice who else is protesting the first Trump war, or when we are faced with Breitbart calling for a crackdown on their erstwhile friends, or perhaps themselves are the target of said crackdown.

There will be no “easy bits” on the road we must walk.

SPECULATIONS #2: CRISIS OF THE STATE – POSSIBILITIES OF A COUP

There was for a while much chatter about coups. Such talk might be done with, or might come again. The possibility of some kind of disruptive course correction from the neoliberals within the u.s. state was certainly there at least in the first days of the administration, as was the possibility of preventive countermeasures, but even then it must be said it was always highly unlikely. Which is not to say that nothing can be gained by thinking about it, of course, or that such a possibility had no impact on moves our opponents made.

There are abstract realities that we can map out, however doing so has only a distant connection to what would be necessary were such an eventuality to come to pass. The relationship between the two is similar to that between knowing the rules and the betting odds of a sports championship, and knowing as a competent player on the field where and how to kick the ball (not to mention being able to do so).

What we do know, is that under such conditions – whether a coup for or against Trump – sections of both the far right and the far left would be repressed, while sections of the far right and of the “left” would be used by the state to help with the repressing. To the extent that we have failed to retain our autonomy, and that we have failed to develop a sympathetic social base, we will be mopped up before we can figure out how to respond.

Given that the spectre of such a clampdown appears on both sides of the ruling class mudwrestling match, broad unity or affiliation against one side (in the name of democracy or antifascism or whatever), will conversely make us vulnerable to instrumentalization/integration by the other (and quick neutralization if we balk too much).

Even in these surprising times, this a highly improbable scenario; there is so much to lose for the ruling class (and not only the u.s. ruling class) if the regular state system breaks down in the united states, that all factions have a strong incentive to swallow all kinds of bitter pills rather than allow that to happen. However, this is not to say that the possibility, even if never realized, is without consequence.

More than anything, the talk of a coup was itself a sign, a shrill echo, of the crisis of the state under Trump. This is a characteristic of imperialism in decline, and one that is unlikely to lessen without a new equilibrium being forged between increasingly fractious capitalist elements – not a probable scenario.[10]

THE YEARS AHEAD

2016 represented a lurch to the right, both within and opposed to the u.s. state. History, experienced “live,” can be dizzying, and even before his election, friends and comrades were claiming that Trump was a fascist. Certainly, there was smoke, and there are live embers, but the overall situation remains more complicated than those initial claims. It is through that complexity that we must now fight.

What is to come will require political principles, to distinguish us from our far right and state-allied rivals, and also to allow us to develop and deepen our own political and social bases, and put forth our own alternatives. Anti-racism and anti-sexism are vital, but these terms must be given real content; they become ghosts of themselves when confined to the symbolic field and without an orientation towards those suffering economic marginalization, intensified exploitation, ever-harsher poverty, i.e. the proletariat. Liberation from structures of domination, an embrace of people as they choose to be – and with the power to make that choice in a meaningful way – without exploiting or oppressing others. Perhaps the biggest challenge to those of us in the metropole, especially in the oppressor nations, is finding what our base can even be, in societies founded on and maintained by white supremacist parasitism. In this regard, neat and tidy formulas represent a bad habit we need to get over, fast.

While Trump and the alt-right benefited from an extraordinary confluence of factors – not least for each being the other – there were deep structural factors at play that made such a lurch inevitable, if not now then soon enough. This is not “fascism,” and the alt-right are different from the mass reactionary movements the United States and Europe have seen in the past. But the night is still young.

One thing is clear, revolutionary left politics in North America are more relevant today than they have been for decades.

 

ENDNOTES

[1] Before continuing, a note on tides, cycles, history: Bromma’s text, like this one, uses the metaphor of the tide, that global phenomenon of the oceans being pulled back and forth roughly twice  a day, something that has been going on ever since the moon was split from the earth. As regular and predictable as clockwork. Metaphors, however, should not be taken literally. Bromma also, more than myself, takes the old-school setup that ruled prior to the mid-20th century global shakeup as a reference to where things are heading in the current era of the right ascendant. This can give the impression that what we are experiencing is a return to the past, that globalization is over and will be replaced by the same kind of setup that existed beforehand. Some readers may even think it means that neocolonialism will revert to old-style colonialism – not a claim that Bromma makes, it should be noted.

History after all is not like a tide. While it goes through repeated cycles where new phenomena carry with them what superficially may look like returns to the past (“history repeats itself”), in actual fact it is more like a spiral moving both circularly and in a particular direction at the same time. Not only does a full cycle not bring one back to the same point as before, but there are also chokepoints, qualitative boundaries, which once surpassed cannot be undone or reversed.

I am unsure, simply because I don’t feel I have a proper grasp of the macro-economic mechanics, as to whether or not Bromma’s view is correct, that the wave of globalization has crested, and that that is the economic sea-change being expressed in the rise of the right. However, I do proceed with the firm sense that whether globalization has crested or not, that neocolonialism in the context of the decline of imperialism is itself sufficient to establish structural parameters that will foster far right racist politics on a mass popular level, often with anti-elitist and even anti-systemic characteristics, as nations built around privilege sense that this core aspect of their identity now needs to be aggressively reasserted and defended.

Furthermore, it should not be assumed that even if Bromma’s formulation is correct, if globalization has crested, that this means a return to the status quo ante. The exact lines of division and forms of oppression that were challenged and to some extent displaced in the 20th century may reassert themselves – or they may not. Structurally, what is important is stratification, exploitation, hierarchical division – these are the sources of social power and overall cohesion for capitalism – the precise lines and forms these take are to a real if limited extent up for grabs. (It is very much this “up for grabs” that motivates all kinds of political actors, including those organizing and leading the right-wing surge, but also many who may appear to be on our side.)

As indicated above, my gloomy thoughts are not contingent on even that much being true. What they do assume is that the neoliberal and globalized form of capitalism is in crisis and is shifting to something new (whether this superficially resembles the past or not), and that this coming world will be a more hostile terrain for us, one that in numerous ways will make things worse for oppressed people, encouraging even greater racism, sexism, and violence both towards and between oppressed groups.

[2] How many things in life are complicated! Deeper, or more central, phenomena, seem to always throw up these contradictory surface-level expressions of themselves, sometimes separate but more often than not still tied to each other, spinning around each other’s center of gravity like some wobbly unstable binary star. Or maybe electrons around a nucleus would be a better analogy – and think of the energy that is released when an atom gets split. But how to do it is the trick. We need to learn to see how phenomena contain contradictory characteristics, and we need to be patient with the fact that what helps us and what hurts us can’t always be separated just by announcing that that’s our intention. Whether we’re talking about antifascism, “identity politics,” decolonization, Marxism or feminism or anarchism – the expectation that these things will be simple, take it all or leave it all, the final word …  are likely to disappoint.

[3] In this regard, the recent interview with Kieran on KPFA Radio is highly recommended. It has been transcribed and is also available on the Three Way Fight blog.

[4] http://ift.tt/2qgnS7K

[5] After the Future, Franco Berardi Bifo, pp. 116-7. I am grateful to AK Press for publishing this book, and also for individuals from around AK for highlighting these specific passages for me.

[6] “No One is Coming to Save Us: An Anarchist Response to the Election of Donald Trump” First of May Anarchist Alliance, November 11, 2016. http://m1aa.org/?p=1268

[7] Those in canada may also be interested in the pathetic history of the Ligue Antifasciste Mondiale (World Antifascist League) in this regard: http://ift.tt/2l0oxEN

[8] While Turkey, Greece, Portugal, and Spain all experienced what might be termed “revolutions” during this period, these countries existed in a condition somewhere between the imperialist core and the colonized periphery. Furthermore, when abrupt “illegal” changes of government did occur, they came from within the state, shepherded by NATO and other bodies of international capitalist order.

[9] Not to mention direct impact. The “alt-lite” Breitbart website, for instance, somewhat predictably improved its Alexa ranking from 1000 in the summer of 2016 to the 600s just before the election, to the mid-200s immediately after the election, and has continued to improve more slowly since then. (By comparison, flagship media sites like cnn.com and nytimes.com maintain ratings in the 100s.) More hardcore racist websites associated with the alt-right – the Traditional Workers Party, National Policy Institute, The Right Stuff, etc. – all saw similar predictably dramatic improvement in their ratings in 2016, with major jumps in November, though most lost some of these gains in the early months of 2017 (and all of these sites remained in the 1,000s or 10,000s).

[10] In this regard, recent articles in The New Yorker and The Washington Post about the Mercer family and the impact of the Citizens United decision on the U.S. State are worth reading and thinking about seriously.



on the main Kersplebedeb website: http://ift.tt/2pgsWrs



Monday, February 18, 2013

Comments on a Divided World, from Don Hamerquist


In the text that follows, Don Hamerquist addresses the current salience of imperialism, territory, and revolutionary organizing in the First World. This essay is prompted by the review of Zak Cope's Divided World Divided Class by Matthijs Krul, which was reposted to Sketchy Thoughts a few weeks ago. Don explains that "For Krul citations I am using generated page numbers from a print out of the version of the review and its single page of introduction that was on Sketchy Thoughts. These provide a rough guide to the relative locations of the citations, but may not translate accurately to other posted versions of the review. I considered not providing page citations, but I cite the document a lot and expect this will raise questions about interpretation, so this seemed like a better approach."

Here are Don's comments:
          
It’s not usually wise to comment on a review of a book that one hasn’t read, and I haven’t read the Cope book, Divided World Divided Class, although I hope to shortly. On the other hand, the time I’ve spent functioning politically with, and at times within, variations of radical Third Worldist anti-imperialism provides some insight into Cope’s arguments and some measure of agreement with his political conclusions.  However, just so I can be corrected on any possible misunderstandings, I’ll begin by sketching out my understanding of that position as it relates to some points I’d like to make about Krul’s review.

When Arghiri Emmanuel’s book, Unequal Exchange, was distributed in English in the early 70s, it was received as both a supplement and a correction to Lenin’s theory of imperialism - a theory that was showing some wear as its political context, the crisis of the more or less organized left at the outbreak of WWI, receded further into the past. Lenin’s theory didn’t adequately foresee subsequent decades of perpetuation and expansion of inequalities within and between diverging national forms of capitalist ‘development’. It didn’t explain how distinctively different social and class relations in the capitalist center and the capitalist periphery would be reproduced for decades after the onset of the “general (read final) crisis” of the “highest (also read final) stage” of capitalism.    

Emmanuel provided an approach to national oppression resting on a conception of unequal international exchange that in turn was based on Marx’s theory of prices of production in Volume 3 of Capital. He argued that, under certain assumptions, the economic relationship between low wage countries and high wage countries resulted in a transfer of value from the former to the latter. This process worked largely through exchange, through ‘trade’, and, while not excluding the element of extra-economic imperial coercion that is central to Lenin’s conception, it was not dependent on it. From Krul’s review and some other things that I have read, I understand the Cope book to be an attempt to expand the base of empirical support for the position that Emmanuel and others outlined in more general theoretical form. If I’m wrong about that, I can only hope, it doesn’t make the rest of what I say completely without value.

Emmanuel’s theory clearly pointed towards an accelerated weakening of the potential for internationalism and revolution among a growing, objectively privileged, stratum of the working classes in the capitalist center. While not necessarily replacing the processes that Lenin described as a basis for a labor aristocracy, this argument went well beyond the - essentially temporary - “crumbs” of superprofits that Lenin stressed, and pointed towards a massive long-term enlargement of the base of common interest between workers and capitalists in the imperial center. Then as now, this argument was politically unpalatable to large sections of the metropolitan left and it was widely challenged on both theoretical and practical grounds. Emmanuel’s book ends with extensive appendices where he debates these issues with Charles Bettleheim, a preeminent Maoist theoretician at the time. (Parenthetically I would say that Bettleheim made virtually all of Charley Post’s arguments in the early 70s –in substantially greater detail, with more coherence, and without the benefit of knowing certain things that we all should have picked up from the four decades of subsequent history.)

Just as Emmanuel’s positions were anathema to the mainstream metropolitan left, they have a continuing popularity with various critiques of Eurocentric radicalism and with an array of approaches to revolution on the periphery, including versions of prolonged people’s war. They also play a role in many Global South vs. Global North, “Bandung Conference”, perspectives that promote a radical third world socialism; e.g. Amin, Gunder Frank, and Wallerstein. (I would argue that this last category is essentially either utopian or reformist – or both – although many disagree.)

As Kersplebedeb notes in the introduction to Krul’s review, one of the advantage of the theory and politics of unequal exchange is that: “it strikes many of us as ‘obvious’ on a gut level.” (Review, p. 1) It appears to explain what is undeniable: the growing inequalities between center and periphery; the secular trend towards social passivity in the global North and West; and the continuing turmoil and rebelliousness in the global South and East. And it does this by assuming that these phenomena are interconnected and interdependent – mutually reinforcing - a point which also seems to some of us to be “obvious”.  Whenever the other side of the debate doesn’t simply ignore and evade this reality, it generally asserts that these processes are essentially independent of each other and the residue of unexplained issues is poorly explained through an unpersuasive combination of productivism and workerism.

Before getting to Krul’s review of Cope, I want to consider some of Emmanuel’s theoretical assumptions and raise some possible impacts of the changes in the global context since the late sixties when he actually wrote his book. I hope this will indicate the need for an expanded and modified framework of explanation to support the political conclusions of Third Worldist analysis that should be supported.

Emmanuel assumes a tendency towards profit equalization over a territorial area with an unlimited mobility of capital, but with no mobility of labor. Beyond this, he implicitly, and the like-thinking early Samir Amin explicitly, assume the existence or the real potential for a socialist territorial alternative to the capitalist world market. This ‘socialist camp’ is central to the state-centric oppositional politics that both of them suggest.

There are problems with both of these assumptions. International labor flows, specifically including labor mobility between periphery and center, are a major feature of contemporary capitalism. Any perspective that disregards them or diminishes their importance will encounter major problems. Just as clearly, the disintegration of  actually existing socialism into the capitalist world market makes it improbable, if not impossible, that any hypothetical national liberation state, New Democracy, or similar territorially-based transitional stage to ‘socialism’ will exercise substantive self-determination over basic economic processes for a meaningful period of time. Both of these problems raise doubt about the continuing relevance of the territorial state-centric national liberation framework used by Emmanuel and most Third Worldist radicalism – probably including Cope, and certainly Krul, who speaks of the importance of; “…vast transfers of value from the developing countries (my emphasis) to the developed ones…”. (Review, p. 6)

However, whether or not the Third Worldist framework provides an adequate explanation for it, the “gut level” feeling about global inequalities still is grounded in a significant reality. Inequality within and between segments of the working classes and poor are issues of overriding significance for any viable revolutionary strategy. These inequalities provide much of the content of the competitions among the oppressed and exploited on which the minority power of capital rests, and they constitute a more important element of the rule of capital than the always challenged, “monopoly of legitimate force” enjoyed by its state formations. Confronting the entire gamut of inequality must be the substance of internationalism and emancipatory politics.

Since my opinion of Negri’s current politics and much of his theoretical position is quite low, I’m reluctant to raise his views as a positive alternative to the Third Worldist perspective, although he explicitly presents them that way (see Empire, p. 333, for an example). Nevertheless, I think Negri and Hardt’s Empire provides a superior framework for dealing with the issues of equality and oppression that are based in the current relationship between capitalist center and capitalist periphery. This framework doesn’t exclude unequal exchange, but it emphasizes other aspects of growing inequality and oppression, while pointing out significant areas of tension and stress where these can be better confronted on a class rather than a national basis. These brief excerpts from Empire will give some sense of this point and will hopefully provide a context in which some of the issues with Krul’s review can be clarified.


“… the spatial divisions of the three Worlds (First, Second, and Third) have been scrambled so that we continually find the First World in the Third, the Third in the First, and the Second almost nowhere at all.” (Empire, p. xiii)
“Workers who flee the Third World to go to the First for work or wealth contribute to undermining the boundaries between the two worlds. The Third World does not really disappear in the process of unification of the world market but enters into the First, establishes itself at the heart as ghetto, shantytown, favela, always again produced and reproduced. In turn the First World is transferred to the Third in the form of stock exchanges and banks, transnational corporations and icy skyscrapers of money and command. Economic geography and political geography both are destabilized in such a way that the boundaries among the various zones are themselves fluid and mobile.” (Empire, p. 253-254)
“Empire is characterized by the close proximity of extremely unequal populations which creates a situation of permanent social danger.” (Empire, p. 336-337).
“From India to Algeria and Cuba to Vietnam, the state is the poisoned gift of national liberation.” (Empire, p.134, Negri’s emphasis)

Let me raise two processes, one based in the periphery and one in the center, that illustrate how this framework has the potential to illuminate current social conditions that tend to elude the Third Worldist analysis:

Negri’s conception of the “First World” becoming established in the “Third World” points towards new types of distorted and unequal social relations in the capitalist periphery. These emerge in contradictory relationships between new and growing ruling groupings, that are closely tied to the capitalist global system, and rapidly urbanizing working masses that are losing their ties to land, common areas, and collective resources. These processes can be partially explained in terms of national oppression, but in such a framework important elements of the extension to the periphery of what Marx terms “real subsumption” will not get adequate attention.

After the products and resources of the periphery are forcibly integrated into unequal capitalist relations of global distribution, the most valuable resource of these societies, their productive working populations, are also forcibly integrated into capitalist labor forces. A simple emphasis on the transfer of value from periphery to center tends to treat labor on the periphery as an undifferentiated oppressed unity confined within national social formations. In actuality the element of differentiation, particularly in terms of gender, is of primary importance and the effects of this differentiation cut across territorial boundaries and political jurisdictions in the capitalist periphery.

These are complex processes of expanded and continuing primitive accumulation with consequences that go beyond the separation of those who work from the tools and resources necessary for their minimal self-sufficiency. They cause involuntary and disruptive population movements in general, but more specifically they contribute to gender defined labor forces on a transnational level where a rapidly increasing proportion of women workers are employed at wages that challenge the reproduction of their labor power, while an expanding segment of working age men are permanently marginalized from the ‘legal’ economy. These processes are expedited, and at times resisted, by an array of quasi-state and civil society formations that indirectly and directly enforce labor discipline and control insurgent potentials - in large part through perpetuating male supremacy by overt force, not infrequently, military force. The fact that this occurs in areas that are increasingly characterized by hollow or failed governmental structures gives the results a de facto legitimacy despite all noise about rights and humanitarian interventions.

When it comes to the treatment of the capitalist center, the Third Worldist perspective is prone to make outside of time characterizations of the labor aristocracy. The general argument is that an expanded transfer of surplus value to the center equates to an expanded basis for a social democratic class collaboration that, in turn, equates to greater political stability for capitalism. The capitalist aristocracy of labor enjoys economic and social privileges that may entail some short run deductions from capitalist profit, but these costs are strategically justified by its centrality to the social order needed to maintain and expand capitalist profits over the longer run. This leads Krul to an endorsement of what is apparently one of Cope’s political conclusions:
“…the Western working class currently is not revolutionary, and in fact cannot (Krul’s emphasis)be revolutionary without majorly violating the expectations of Marx and Engels’ theory of historical materialism.” (Review, p.6. I’ll return to this point often.)
One feature of any aristocracy worth the name is that it is essentially hereditary. A capitalist labor aristocracy will only serve its function for capital, if it is a relatively stable network of privileges passed down through generations. So it is certainly a relevant issue for Third Worldist perspectives if, on the balance, processes in the capitalist center are undermining and fracturing this historic base of political support for the hegemony of capital – or if they are not. Negri’s conception of the Third World invading the First World and establishing itself at its heart – an image with deep Third Worldist roots extending back to Martin Nicolaus’s debate with Ernest Mandel in the sixties, points towards “…a situation of permanent social danger”. This “danger” relates to possibilities for major disruptions of the equilibrium provided by the social democratic labor aristocracy. In my opinion, any political perspectives that assume a continuation of current levels of metropolitan stability conflicts with a lot of contradictory evidence – including some that is introduced in the concluding sections of Krul’s review.

Just to be clear, this doesn’t mean that relatively affluent, typically white male, metropolitan workers are on the cusp of becoming militant revolutionaries or that their narrow sectoral demands have a newly acquired radical significance. It does mean that they are increasingly disaffected from what many of them had previously thought was ‘their’ country, ‘their’ government, ‘their’ system – and that there is an increased likelihood that they will eventually begin to act out this disaffection. Unfortunately, without some major changes that don’t appear to be on the horizon, the bulk of any militance and radicalism is likely to be right wing in character, but, nevertheless, this does not bode well for the stability of metropolitan capitalism.

Beyond this there are many other destabilizing elements in the capitalist center that don’t depend exclusively on what this relatively privileged working class fraction does or does not do - including a number of situations marked by that “social danger” from the “close proximity of extremely unequal populations” that Negri mentions. However, at this time I am only arguing that unless the Third Worldists only intend to explain a past that is being superceded, they must either challenge the accuracy of this estimate of current trends toward destabilization and possibilities of social ruptures, or they must adjust their cannot be revolutionary” estimate of the political impact of unequal exchange value transfers on the Western working classes.

This brings me more directly to the Krul review of the Cope book. I’d like to approach it somewhat in reverse, beginning from some of its conclusions before looking more carefully at the content of the argumentation. I think that these conclusions, and specifically some of them with which I have considerable agreement, don’t fit the major themes of the argument, giving the complete product a certain schizoid character.

Krul presents his conclusions quite casually at the end of the review. Consider the following:
“In the current period, the capitalist classes of the First World seem inclined to go more and more against the historic compromise of social-democracy, and the social-democracy is therefore declining in historical vigour proportionally to the shift of capitalist production from the First to the Third World in search of lower wages and higher profits.” (Review, p. 9)
I agree that this is a partial description of the actual tendency of metropolitan capital, although I might quibble about whether it involves a ruling class ‘inclination’ rather than a circumstances imposed compulsion. However, Krul doesn’t seem to appreciate the implications of this passage for the political positions that earlier sections of his review have substantially endorsed.  He has advanced a conception of global capitalism in which value transfers from the periphery become, “an almost total compensation for the domestic exploitation of the First World working class” (Review, p. 6), providing the economic basis for a much broadened social democratic consensus that involves, “…a wider and wider section of the working class of the center.” (Review, p. 6). If that is the case, what are the new calculations and/or new pressures that are inclining the “capitalist classes of the First World” towards a course that will certainly disrupt a relatively functional element of capitalist stability in the center, the arrangement that has provided important support for its capacity to exercise power in the rest of the world – specifically, what Krul terms the “historic compromise of social-democracy”?

Perhaps Krul is pointing to some new and greater threat that demands additional resources; e.g.; the political emergence of the toilers of the East that the later Lenin named as the ultimate guarantee of the working class revolution everywhere. But if there was once a period when it was possible to believe that the movement for national liberation in the oppressed ‘countryside’ was successfully encircling the urbanized center of world capitalism, that period is decades over – and has left behind its own list of unanswered, but still very pressing, questions. 

The concluding sentences of Krul’s review raise the issue more starkly, but still without providing any clear direction:
“This world monopoly is now that of the ‘West’ so-called, and every day it is more broken while every day the Western working class fights to maintain it. What will we do?” (Review p. 10)
Who or what is breaking the, “world monopoly…of the West”, if it actually is becoming… “more broken” every day? Since according to Krul, the, “…Western working class fights to maintain it”, what has changed, if anything, with respect to who they will be fighting with, and who against? What social forces do these changes allies and opponents represent – and how will this “fight”  be conducted?

There is an entire line of analysis that attempts to deal with a portion of these issues on a global level. I’m thinking about Wallerstein and, more specifically, Giovanni Arrighi (The Long Twentieth Century). Their positions emphasize contradictions in global capitalist processes and, at least recently, have moved away from the focus on revolutionary processes in specific national social formations on the periphery that is associated with modern Maoism and its nationally specific notions of prolonged people’s war. I don’t see any necessary conflict between this ‘world system’s’ view and Negri’s conception of empire – at least not on the issues that are of concern here.

Arrighi maintains that successive cycles of global capitalist expansion have been associated with the emergence of a distinctive world hegemonic state, and that there is always some tension between the capitalist hegemon, that functions in part according to a “territorialist logic of power”, and capitalist production that functions according to a universal logic of accumulation. This leads to “…recurrent contradiction between an ‘endless’ accumulation of capital and a comparatively stable organization of political space”. (see Arrighi, p. 27-34 for the general argument)

According to Arrighi, writing in the last years of the twentieth century, this “recurrent contradiction” is currently exacerbated by the decline of the U.S. as world hegemon, with - after he discounts first Japan and then China - no viable successor in view. He sees the contemporary content of the contradiction as follows:
“The uncontainability of violence in the contemporary world is closely associated with the withering away of the modern system of territorial states as the primary locus of world power…Combined with the internationalization of world scale processes of production and exchange within the organizational domains of transnational corporations and with the resurgence of suprastatal world financial markets, these unprecedented restrictions and expectations have translated into strong pressure to relocate the authority of nation-states both upward and downward.” (Arrighi, p. 331)
I have some agreement with these views, but I’m not sure if Krul or others sympathetic to more traditional Third Worldist national liberation politics do as well. However, even if Krul’s conclusion does point to the disruptions and dislocations associated with the decline of the U.S. as the last in a series of Western world hegemonic states, it is still questionable to treat the U.S. as equivalent to the “West”. But the “world monopoly” that Krul describes as broken, but still defended by its working classes, has been presented as the hegemony of the “West”, and not that of the U.S.

In any case, I agree with Krul on two points. First; the working out of the contradictions between profit maximization and political stability in the core territories of the global capitalist system, does leave traditional social arrangements …“more broken every day”. Second; to the extent that the working class in the center confines its resistance to rearguard actions that defend increasingly eroded structures of relative privilege, the best outcome is to bind itself more tightly within its strategic subordination to capital, while the worst is to expand the social base for fascism.

However, I think that Krul goes substantially beyond these points when he appears to argue that the metropolitan working class’s acceptance of the role of junior partner in a failing enterprise is fixed in concrete and beyond effective political challenge from the left. This subordination is presented as a necessary political outcome from the overwhelming capacity of the, “…ruling classes of the center to buy off the exploited working class of the center with the proceeds of this imperialist rent” (an imperialist rent which through social democracy is then) “…shared with a wider and wider section of the working class of the center.” (Review, p. 4). This then expands the sectors of the metropolitan working class that, as Krul has said and as I will regularly repeat, cannot be revolutionary”.

I do like this conception of the way that social democracy has functioned to broaden and generalize the base of class collaboration, however at this time I’m concentrating on problems with this overall approach. First, in my experience politics that are grounded in conceptions of objective material privilege, as is the case with the Third Worldist analysis, generally tend towards overly deterministic conclusions about the linkage between these relative material advantages and the ideas and actions of those that objectively benefit from them. Krul hints at a criticism of one possible form of this reductionist mistake when noting that Cope; “does not wholly avoid the common notion among Third Worldist Marxist writers that the economic analysis as such necessarily generates a set of strategic political concerns…(and – d.h.)…one simply cannot make the leap from historical and political economic analysis to strategy…” (Review, p. 8).  However, it would seem appropriate to ask Krul whether it is not true that his statement, “…the Western working class… cannot be revolutionary”, is exactly such a leap from “analysis to strategy”?

While there certainly are problems if a particular analysis is applied in such a doctrinaire way that it submerges other significant elements of politics, the criticism that Krul implies only deals with a secondary aspect of a larger issue. More important problems emerge when the economic and political reality that is the object of the analysis is presented as the necessary and sufficient cause of the ideas and behaviors of specific social groups. This is a big problem even when the material analysis of conditions is essentially valid. It is a larger problem when this analysis is flawed. It is not possible to adequately explain social action as a mere effect of social circumstances. The essential premise for the possibility of revolution always rests on the potential for enlightened social action to modify and even transform circumstances. Forgive me for an illegitimate argument, but without such a dialectical potential, what graduate student, privileged by definition, might become a revolutionary – and we do see many of them around.

At various points, Krul implies that he – and not only Cope or other Third Worldist theorists that he is reviewing – regards an expanded base for social democracy as equivalent to an expanded social democracy and from this point concludes that the metropolitan working classes (or at least major parts of them) are necessarily non revolutionary. I’d like to respond to this view with a deeper consideration of the implications of two passages from Krul, beginning with a restatement of the full version of the one that I’ve been citing ad nauseum:
“…the Western working class currently is not revolutionary and in fact cannot (Krul’s emphasis) be revolutionary without majorly violating the expectations of Marx and Engels’ theory of historical materialism.” (Review, p. 6).
“This labor aristocracy, so formed, then no longer fulfills the one special role the working class has in Marx and Engels’ theory of historical materialism: namely, to be unable to emancipate itself without overthrowing the conditions it itself reproduces with its labour.” (Review, p. 4).
The first citation combines an accurate description of Western working classes in a first clause, with a second clause that is, at best, an eminently debatable assertion about Marxism. The low regard that Marx and Engel’s had for the English working class in the last half of the nineteenth century, particularly with respect to its attitudes towards Ireland, was based on their estimates of its response to relative privileges. In this case, and in similar ones, substantial “revolutionary…expectations” for a working class segment that is heavily privileged, knows that it is privileged, knows that its privileges are the consequence of the oppression of other workers, and is set on retaining its privileges, certainly are a matter of self-delusion. However, even for a completely determinist view, logic requires that, if privileges are being eroded rather than expanded, any identification with ‘their’ capitalism will be shaken and revolutionary possibilities can be expected to emerge. This is even more likely, if, as is typically the case, the erstwhile privileged sectors have no real understanding that their relative affluence is related in any way to other worker’s impoverishment, and instead have regarded their advantages, assuming that they even recognize them as advantages, as a deserved reward for past struggles and present productivity, rather than as ‘privileges’.

More important, this implied conception of the revolutionary process, at least insofar as such a process is both anti-capitalist and liberatory, leaves out a crucial element. Revolution involves a break with capitalist patterns of competitive consumption; it projects needs that capitalism cannot satisfy and demands that capital cannot completely co-opt. These necessary ruptures with capitalist normalcy are possible, “be their wages high or low”, as someone has said. The issues of material privilege certainly impact the essential struggle for real equality and are thus always relevant to revolution - but they are not all that is important to the process.

This leads to the second cited passage, and its treatment of the, “one special role the working class has in Marx and Engel’s theory of historical materialism.” Laying aside the ambiguity surrounding the theory of historical materialism and the massive debates about its ‘correct’ interpretation; and laying aside as well, the real possibility that Marx and Engel might not provide the final word on the issues that confront us a century and a quarter after the end of their productive collaboration, I’d question both the point being made here and the manner in which it is being made.

We can begin by agreeing that working class revolution must emancipate all social groups in the process of eliminating capitalist production relations and the classes that constitute these relations Then the first question being posed is: can the sections of the working class in the capitalist center that have gained ‘more’ under capitalism commit to anti-capitalism; while the second question, assuming that such relative advantages haven’t completely ruled out this possibility, under what conditions and through what processes will more advantaged sections of the working class commit to anti-capitalism.

I answer the first question in the affirmative. Some of what Krul says implies that he might disagree, but I’m inclined to doubt it. A literal application of that position would treat struggles for improvements in material conditions and expansions of formal democracy in the capitalist center as entirely negative for revolutionary prospects – at least to the degree that they achieve some partial successes. It’s one thing to argue against incremental reformist notions that see revolution as the pot of gold at the end of a rainbow path of sectoral improvements in working and living circumstances. It’s quite another to see the reform struggle as only an inevitable process of corruption of some initially pure revolutionary impulse.

This is an impossible position to translate into any effective practical revolutionary politics in the capitalist center. And for those Third Worldists that might be inclined to discount any revolutionary possibilities in the capitalist center, it’s important to recognize that the same type of critique would also apply to partial struggles in the capitalist periphery – although in a distinctive manner. In the center, the reformist distortion is more likely to take the form of limiting struggles because there is ‘too much to lose’ by challenging capitalism. In the periphery, the reformist distortion can take the form of limiting struggles because there is ‘too much left to win’ within capitalism.

Leaving any implications with respect to peripheral capitalism for examination in a different context, let’s assume that the possibility for some relatively privileged sectors in the center becoming revolutionary is not completely ruled out. Krul might recognize a relatively limited revolutionary possibility in the working classes of the center, although one that is commonly approached in a reformist and opportunistic fashion. Recognizing that the magnitude of this potential and the political approaches required to materialize it will still be potential differences, I could agree with such an estimate. However, some clarifications are still needed to move this past a formal level.

What ‘more’ do the social democratic segments of the working classes of the West have that is ‘too much more’? Can this ‘too much more’ be quantified - with a recognizable break point between where it is determinant and where it isn’t? Is the crucial characteristic primarily a matter of higher wages – real or nominal, and, if so, how much higher? Does the counter revolutionary side of ‘too much more’ relate to the length of the working day, or to the breadth of the franchise, or to the stability of the social security net? Do segments of the metropolitan working class that are not white and male, but that also do have relatively more, also have ‘too much more’?

When these matters are worked through, I very much doubt that Krul’s conclusions about the metropolitan working class – “…unable to emancipate itself without overthrowing the conditions it itself reproduces with its labour” – will mark out any significant distinction between the working classes of the center and those of the periphery. Both areas require a rupture with existing patterns of struggle and accommodation. Although the specific form and content of the rupture will certainly vary, the one essential element that will be involved in both areas is the frontal challenge to all of the forms of inequality that are embedded within oppression and exploitation.

I’d like to conclude this comment by briefly noting some other interesting points that Krul makes in his review. These may or may not be integral to the questions about the existence and the impact of the labor aristocracy in the West. I think that they are, others may not, but at the very least they are important matters in their own right. I’d mention three such topics that Krul’s review raises: the question of the ‘socialism’ of the ‘actually existing socialism’ variant; the conception of social democracy; and the conception of fascism.

In a larger statement on the continuing relative weakness of revolutionary movements in the West, Krul says; “…in being more serious about supporting the so-called ‘really existing socialisms’ elsewhere in the world, the Moscow line parties and ‘Eurocommunists” were arguably still more useful than the current leading groups.” (Review, p. 6). This seems to mean that “serious” support for the socialist camp so-called was, and presumably still is, good politics. This is a common theme among certain Maoist tendencies that are looking to separate what was positive from what was negative in our history. While it’s hard to disagree with the disparagement of, “…the current leading groups”, assuming I properly understand the reference, none of this ‘really existing socialism’ was socialism in the only meaningful sense of that term, as a transition to communism. This was a ‘socialist camp’ that made communism appear undesirable and confirmed prejudices that it was not possible. Its failures and crimes bear more responsibility for the mass rejection of revolutionary communism as an objective, than any of the actions or the ideologies of capitalism. There’s nothing good here and – although there are important things to be learned, that has nothing to do with sifting through the wreckage for some trinkets that might still work.

This is the first time that I have seen the combination of an endorsement of the Comintern 3rd Period conception of “social fascism” with an endorsement of the post-Dimitrov WWII popular front. In my view they fit together and gain an essential similarity as successive massive errors. I think that Krul’s position, insofar as I understand it from this review, involves a mistaken conception of both social democracy and fascism. I think that a radically different conception of each of these is a vital core for an adequate revolutionary strategy, and a more complete understanding of the relevant history wouldn’t hurt either. This is already embarrassingly long-winded for what it set out to be, so I’ll leave it there for the moment, but I am intrigued by the issues and prepared to follow them out in more depth. However, not to repeat some of the problems with this piece, I’d first want to read some of the additional material that Krul indicates he has written.


Don 2/17



Friday, January 18, 2013

Zig Zag on Idle No More: "In any liberation movement there are internal and external struggles"

We are living in exciting times, with large numbers of people clearly fed up and taking action, no longer content to wait for the right moment or the right ideas or the right leadership to tell them what to do. Whether we think of Occupy, the Arab Spring, or the current Idle No More upsurge, spontaneity and taking a stand seem to be the order of the day. For those of us have lived through less exuberant times, it is a welcome change. That said, this new environment that clearly comes with its own potential pitfalls and weaknesses.

In order to try and understand this better, i asked some questions of Zig Zag, also known as Gord Hill, who is of the Kwakwaka'wakw nation and a long-time participant in anti-colonial and anti-capitalist resistance movements in Canada.  Gord is the author and artist of The 500 Years of Indigenous Resistance Comic Book and The Anti-Capitalist Resistance Comic Book (published by Arsenal Pulp Press) and 500 Years of Indigenous Resistance (published by PM Press); he also maintains the website WarriorPublications.wordpress.com.

Here is what he had to say...




K: What are the living conditions of Indigenous people today within the borders of what is called "canada"?

ZZ: Indigenous people in Canada experience the highest levels of poverty, violent death, disease, imprisonment, and suicide.  Many live in substandard housing and do not have clean drinking water, while many territories are so contaminated that they can no longer access traditional means of sustenance.  In the area around the Tar Sands in northern Alberta, for example, not only are fish and animals being found with deformities but the people themselves are experiencing high rates of cancer.  This is genocide.


K: Dispossession has been a central feature of colonialism and genocide within canada. Can you give some examples of how people have resisted dispossession in the past?

ZZ: Well in the past Native peoples had some level of military capability to resist dispossession, which ended around 1890.  More recently there have been many examples including Oka 1990, Ipperwash 1995, Sutikalh 2000, Six Nations 2006, etc.  At Oka it was armed resistance that stopped the proposed expansion of a golf course and condo project.  At Ipperwash people re-occupied their reserve land that had been expropriated during WW2, and they still remain there to this day.  At Sutikalh, St'at'imc people built a re-occupation camp to stop a $530 million ski resort. They were successful and the camp remains to this day.  At Six Nations they re-occupied land and prevented the construction of a condo project.




K: The canadian state has an army, prisons, police forces, and the backing of millions of people - not to mention the fact that it is completely integrated into world capitalism, both as a major source of natural resources and as an imperialist junior partner, messing up peoples around the world. What kind of possibilities are there for Indigenous people to successfully break out of this system, and resist canadian colonialism? What is the strategic significance of Indigenous resistance?

ZZ: Indigenous peoples must make alliances with other social sectors that also organize against the system.  The strategic significance of Indigenous peoples is their greater potential fighting spirit, stronger community basis of organizing, their ability to significantly impact infrastructure (such as railways, highways, etc, that pass through or near reserve communities) and their examples of resistance that can inspire other social movements.


K: What are bills C-38 and C-45, and how do they fit into the current global economic and political context?

ZZ: Bills C-38 and C-45 are omnibus budget bills the government has passed in order to implement its budget.  They include significant revisions of various federal acts, including the Navigable Waters Protection Act, environmental assessments, and the Indian Act. These are generally seen as facilitating greater corporate access to resources, such as mining and oil and gas.  The amendments to the Indian Act affect the ability of band councils to lease reserve land.  The move to open up resources, by removing protection from many rivers and lakes and "streamlining" environmental assessments is clearly meant to bolster Canada as a source of natural resources and to overcome public opposition to major projects such as the proposed Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline and others.


K: Is this something new, or more of the same old same old from the canadian state?

ZZ: These bills are new in that they're designed, in part, to facilitate greater corporate access to resources, primarily in the changes to the environmental assessment and Navigable Waters Protection Act.  These are measures designed to re-position Canada as a major source of oil and gas for the global market, and particularly Asian markets, while diversifying Canadian exports of such resources away from a US focused one, as the US economy continues to decline.  At the same time they are indeed a continuation of policies adapted by the federal government for many years now, which include major projects such as the Alberta Tar Sands and proposed pipeline projects.  These policies are the result of the neo-liberal ideology that states have been following for the past few decades.


K: What is one to make of this Idle No More movement that has sprung up over the past six weeks?

ZZ: It's similar to Occupy in that it reveals a yearning for social change among grassroots Native peoples, but it is also reformist and lacks any anti-colonial or anti-capitalist perspective.  It is fixated primarily on legal-political reforms, specifically repealing Bill C-45 (which passed in mid-December).  Although it has mobilized thousands of Natives, this is only to create political pressure on the government.  The four women from Saskatchewan who founded the movement are lawyers, academics, and business managers, so it is no surprise that the entire trajectory of the movement has been focused on legal-political reforms.  Another prominent speaker on behalf of INM has been Pam Palmater, a lawyer and Chair in Indigenous Governance at Ryerson University.  Last summer, she campaigned against Shawn Atleo for the position of "grand chief" of the Assembly of First Nations (AFN).

As it isn't anti-colonial or anti-capitalist, it has been a safe platform for many Indian Act chiefs and members of the Aboriginal business elite to participate, and many have in fact helped orchestrate the national protests and blockades that have occurred.  In fact, INM allied itself early on with chiefs from Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario.  It was chiefs from these provinces that made the symbolic attempt to enter the House of Commons on Dec. 4, an event that in many ways really launched INM and built the December 10 day of action.

These chiefs oppose Atleo, support Palmater, and have been the driving force behind most of the major rallies and blockades that have occurred in their respective provinces (with notable exceptions, such as the Tyendinaga train blockades).  

The involvement of the band councils has helped stifle any real self-organization of grassroots people.  The reformist methods promoted by the original founders has included the imposing of pacifist methods and so has dampened the warrior spirit of the people overall. Another factor in the INM mobilizing has been the fast carried out by the Indian Act chief Theresa Spence in Ottawa.  This has motivated many Natives to participate in INM due to the emotional and pseudo-spiritual aspects of the fast (a "hunger strike" to the death).  Despite the praise given to Spence, she revealed her intentions in late December when she made a public call for the chiefs to "take control" of the grassroots.




K: What you are outlining seems to be a class analysis of the INM movement. Some people have suggested that class analysis is incompatible with anticolonial analysis, that it is divisive, or amounts to applying a european framework that is not relevant to Indigenous people. What do you make of this?

ZZ: Under colonization the capitalist division of classes is imposed on Indigenous peoples.  The band councils and Aboriginal business elite are proof of this.  Under capitalist class divisions, there are new political and economic elites that are established and who have more to gain from assimilation and collaboration, despite any movements for reform they may be involved in.  As separate political and economic elites, they have their own interests which are not the same as the most impoverished and oppressed, which comprises the bulk of Indigenous grassroots people.  Middle class elites are able to impose their own beliefs and methods on grassroots movements through their greater access to, and control of, resources (including money, communications, transport, etc.).

For a genuinely autonomous, decentralized and self-organized Indigenous grassroots movement to emerge, the question of middle-class elites, including the band councils, must be resolved.  I would also say that in any liberation movement there are internal and external struggles.  The internal one determines the overall methods and objectives of the movement, and therefore cannot be silenced or marginalized under the pretext of preserving some non-existent "unity."  In fact, only when internal struggles are clarified can there be any significant gains made in the external one, against the primary enemy (state and capital).




K: January 11 was the day that Harper was initially supposed to meet with Spence and other chiefs from across canada. But on the day of the meeting, due to Harper’s shenanigans, Spence and most other chiefs opted to boycott it, and Spence declared she would be continuing her hunger strike. How deep is this split, and does it signify that some chiefs are breaking with the neocolonial setup and developing a radical potential?

ZZ: There have always been divisions within the AFN and between regions.  As I mentioned, some Indian Act chiefs, especially in Saskatchewan, Ontario and Manitoba, have been spearheading many of the Idle No More rallies and breaking from the AFN's agenda.  This shouldn't be interpreted as proof that they are more radical, but rather that they have their own agenda.  "Grand chief" Nepinak of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, the AFN's provincial wing, has been very active in promoting INM rallies and blockades, etc.  But Nepinak's AMC also suffered massive funding cuts announced in early September.  His organization will see their annual funding cut from $2.6 million down to $500,000.  He is fighting for his political and economic career and has little to lose by agitating for more grassroots actions, but that doesn't mean he's now a "radical."  Rather, the band councils and chiefs must be understood as having their own agenda in regards to their power struggle with the state.  Many are easily fooled by militant rhetoric and symbolic blockades, but these are old tactics for the Indian Act chiefs.

Along with chiefs fighting for the maintenance of their provincial or regional organizations (such as the AMC or tribal councils), which is contributing to band council participation across the country in INM mobilizing, the chiefs in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario have a political struggle with Atleo and have their own vision for greater economic development.  It was the chiefs from these provinces that boycotted the meeting between the PM and Atleo, and who called for the January 16 national day of action.

Delegations of these chiefs have travelled to Asia, Venezuela, and Iran seeking corporate investors, especially in the oil and gas industry.  Chief Wallace Fox of the Onion Lake Cree Nation, one of those at the forefront of recent events and an outspoken opponent of Atleo, is the chief of the top oil producing Native band in the country (located in Alberta and Saskatchewan).  Fox and other chiefs have also attempted to gain access to OPEC, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, for partnerships with corporations.  Nepinak and other chiefs also met with Chinese officials in December, also looking for potential partnerships.

The rationale of these chiefs, Palmater and their allies in INM (the four "official founders") is that Atleo is collaborating with the assimilation strategy of the Harper regime.  Meanwhile, it is they who seek to take control of the AFN and impose their own version of Native capitalism, based in part on foreign investment in resource industries.  Ironically of course, many INM participants are rallying to defend Mother Earth, in many ways being used as pawns in a power struggle between factions of the Aboriginal business elite.  Many INM participants, I would say, are unaware of these internal dynamics.  Their mobilization under the slogans of "stop bill c-45," "defend land and water," etc., are positive aspects of INM, and show the great potential for grassroots movements.  But this is something that is in the early stages, and the movement will have to overcome the parasitical participation and control of the Indian Act chiefs as well as middle-class elites for it to advance.


K: There were hundreds of Idle No More actions on January 11. Here in Montreal, roughly three thousand people demonstrated, by far the largest protest related to Indigenous issues i have ever seen in this city. At the same time, the demonstration was overwhelmingly made up of non-Indigenous people, ranging from radical anticapitalists to members of Quebec nationalist and social democratic groups. This seems in line with the INM strategy of framing the movement as representing all canadians. How compatible is this with an anticolonial perspective, and what are the strengths and weaknesses of such diverse support?

ZZ: The first priority and main focus for an anti-colonial liberation movement must be its own people.  This is how it develops its own autonomous methods and practise, free from outside interference.  This helps to unify the movement and establish it as an independent social force.  Alliances are clearly necessary, and while the ultimate goal might be a multi-national resistance movement, colonialism and the unique history as well as socio-economic conditions of Native peoples means they must be able to organize autonomously from other social sectors.

I think in principle to frame Idle No More as one representing all Canadians is correct, but the way in which they are doing this waters down and minimizes the anti-colonial analysis that is necessary for radical social change.  By trying to appeal to the "Canadian citizen" it may broaden its appeal but to what end?  In the process it will have weakened the anti-colonial resistance.  Even now you can see the renewed calls for "peaceful" protests from INM'ers, as well as statements from the "official founders" that they don't support "illegal" actions such as blockades.  They're very sensitive to any loss of public support, claiming it is now an "educational" movement and that they don't want to inconvenience citizens.  The reformists might claim that in this manner we can build a bigger movement to defeat Bill C-45, but clearly such bills are just part of a much larger systemic problem we can identify as colonialism and capitalism.  Without addressing the root causes we'll just be doing the same thing next year against another set of bills. And of course, basing one's anti-colonial resistance on the opinion of the settler population will never lead to liberation.


K: We seem to have entered a period of spontaneous upsurges like INM internationally, be it the Arab Spring or Occupy or the recent anti-rape protests in India; in each of these cases masses of people are clearly fed up and willing to throw themselves into action, but for better or for worse they often bypass any of the organized anti-imperialist or anti-capitalist groups or traditions. Is this a sign of a failure on our part, that when circumstances finally give way to revolt we are not connected to those doing the revolting? Or is there something else going on?

ZZ: I would say a part of these mobilizations is the use of social media in spreading information and coordinating actions. Certainly in the Arab Spring, Occupy and now Idle No More, this has been a significant component of the mobilizing that has occurred.  It seems that there are more people who have been influenced by these ongoing social revolts and mobilizations, that then decide to take action of some kind, and the internet empowers them to organize rallies, etc.  They don't need the already existing radical groups to do this, and may not even know of their existence.

This leads to the situation where mobilizations are called, gain traction and then expand -- but they have a very shallow analysis of the system and lack experience in real resistance.  In both Occupy and INM we see inexperienced organizers who believe they have re-invented the wheel, who feel they know best how social movements should conduct themselves, etc.  At best, these mobilizations show that there is a yearning for social change among a growing number of people, but social media enables them to bypass more experienced and radical groups, and their naivete leads them to think that these groups fail because they're too radical. Therefore they appeal to the most basic and populist slogans, the least threatening forms of action, etc.

I don't know if I would characterize it as a failure on the part of radical groups that they are somewhat disconnected from these types of mobilizations.  They're not revolts, they're largely reformist rallies without a radical analysis dominated by liberals and pacifists, middle-class organizers, etc.  Until these movements are radicalized there is little possibility for radicals to be fully involved.  Another aspect of these types of mobilizations is their relatively short duration.  Occupy was largely over three or four months after it began, with some exceptions (such as Oakland).  How long will INM endure?


K: Although their leadership may be neo-colonial and middle-class, surely many of those in the grassroots who are attracted to surges like INM are not. How should established Indigenous anti-colonial groups relate to these mass mobilizations? Are there specific approaches that are more effective than others? And are there things to avoid?

ZZ: I would say Indigenous anti-colonial groups should engage such movements critically, and not simply take the role of cheerleaders. When large numbers of people are aroused and mobilized, it means they're thinking about, and discussing, concepts such as colonialism, tactics, strategies, methods, etc.  So it is an opportune time to contribute radical anti-colonial and anti-capitalist analysis, even though some participants in the movement think that such debate "divides" people. I would avoid denouncing such movements, or opposing them, of course, because there are both positive and negative aspects.  Promote the positive and try to illuminate the negative, the contradictions, etc.  As many participants are new and inexperienced, anti-colonial groups can contribute a lot to expanding and radicalizing the movement.