

# ‘A New Chapter of Engagement’: Obama and the Honduran Coup



President Obama (left) shakes hands with Honduran president Manuel Zelaya at the Summit of the Americas in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, on April 19.

By Alexander Main

PRESIDENT OBAMA'S PROFESSED NEW APPROACH to multilateral diplomacy made headlines in April, when press photographs appeared of him shaking hands and smiling broadly with various Latin American leaders, including Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, at the Summit of the Americas in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. Although stateside pundits seized upon the Chávez-Obama encounter as an opportunity to brand Obama either a liberal appeaser or a crypto-Communist, the president scored points with the hemisphere's heads of state. During his address, Obama told the assembled leaders he knew that "promises of partnership have gone unfulfilled in the past, and that trust has to be earned over time." But,

he declared, "I am here to launch a new chapter of engagement that will be sustained throughout my administration."<sup>1</sup>

Then, on June 28, a little more than two months into this new chapter of U.S. engagement, Honduran president Manuel Zelaya appeared on television, disheveled and dressed in a floppy white T-shirt, and announced that he was in San José, Costa Rica, after having been kidnapped at gunpoint by Honduran soldiers in the middle of the night. Zelaya blamed the coup on "an extremely vicious elite" and wondered out loud whether the U.S. government had played a role in it. "If the U.S. ambassador in Tegucigalpa has nothing to do with this coup," he said, "he should make this clear."<sup>2</sup>

*Alexander Main is a policy analyst and international outreach associate at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington.*

## REPORT: U.S. POLICY



De facto Honduran president Roberto Micheletti (right) at a rally in Tegucigalpa, two days after the June 28 military coup.

Although no evidence has yet emerged of direct U.S. involvement in the coup, the Obama administration's reaction to it has greatly disappointed Latin American leaders, all of whom have explicitly and consistently condemned the coup since it took place. Many of them have also, unlike the United States, refused to recognize the November 29 presidential election, which occurred in a context of political repression and far-reaching media censorship. Although conservative National Party candidate Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo was declared the victor, the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Paraguay, among others, declared they would not recognize elections organized by an illegitimate government.

Condemnations of the coup and the coup government of Roberto Micheletti came from every corner of the hemisphere, marking the gains made by progressive forces since the 1970s and 1980s, when military dictatorships were the prevailing form of regime throughout the region. Yet the Obama administration remained stuck in its default position as regional hegemon, adopting a position of complacency toward the coup government by failing to carry out any effective sanctions and by never clearly calling for Zelaya's reinstatement. This has caused a deep disenchantment with Obama not only in Honduras but in much of Latin America. Even President Luiz

Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, who rarely openly criticizes the U.S. administration, accused Obama of renegeing on his promises.<sup>3</sup>

Indeed, Obama seems to have antagonized the hemisphere faster than George W. Bush did during his first term in office. It was Bush's support for another coup in April 2002, when Chávez was briefly unseated, that first placed his administration at odds with the region. Obama, in turn, chose to mostly ignore the coup in Honduras. While Zelaya was welcomed with full honors by every head of state in each of the Latin American countries to which he traveled following the coup (including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela), Obama refused six opportunities to meet with Zelaya in Washington and remained largely uninvolved in diplomacy over the issue. Marco Aurelio García, an aide to Lula, told *The New York Times* that the United States' posture on the Honduran coup was isolating it from the region. "That is very bad for the United States and its relationship with Latin America," he said.<sup>4</sup>

Like the Obama administration's controversial decision to expand U.S. military presence in Colombia, the U.S. posture on Honduras appears to be operating within a framework of policy objectives that prevailed under prior

administrations. According to this doctrine, which has roots in the Cold War paradigm that has existed since the 1950s, U.S. military strategists view the wave of so-called radical populist governments in Latin America as the new threat in the region. These governments are perceived as systematically antagonistic to U.S. interests and as potential threats to national security because of their close relations to countries like China, Iran, and Russia.<sup>5</sup>

This view compliments the belief, firmly anchored in Washington policy circles, that the political changes that the region has undergone in recent years have produced two lefts: a “good left” that is moderate and politically liberal, comprising the governments of Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, among others, and a “bad left,” populist and authoritarian, made up of countries like Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Venezuela, and the other members of the ALBA group of countries.<sup>6</sup> The good left is viewed in Washington as a model of the acceptable social-democratic left, and the bad left is looked upon as toxic and highly infectious.

If we view the Obama administration’s decision-making on Latin America through this ideological framework, its handling of the Honduran political crisis seems in relative harmony with perceived U.S. interests in the region. Zelaya, after all, had rocked the political boat in his country in a manner all too reminiscent of a Chávez, a Rafael Correa, or an Evo Morales. A representative of the country’s landed elite elected in 2006, Zelaya progressively broke ranks with the country’s tiny but powerful economic oligarchy. He refused, for example, to bend to their demand to privatize the state telecommunications company, Hondutel, and the national power company, ENEE, and defiantly expanded the state funding of social programs. As his support within the elite-oriented leadership of the governing Liberal Party shrank, he turned increasingly to the country’s campesino, indigenous, and labor movements for support and opened a series of productive discussions with their representatives on long-term social and economic development plans.

When, in January 2009, Zelaya increased the country’s minimum wage (until then, the lowest in the region), despite the opposition of the business elite, the country’s ruling families and their powerful media organs began an intense campaign to discredit and vilify the president and his cabinet. They focused in particular on his friendship with Chávez and accused Zelaya of wanting to convert Honduras into “another Venezuela.” Despite the sinister portrait of Ven-

ezuela drawn by the Honduran elite’s media outlets, they in fact welcomed key aspects of the alliance that Zelaya forged with Venezuela. The National Congress approved the country’s entry into the Venezuela-led Petrocaribe group (2007) and the ALBA group of countries (2008). These agreements remain in place, although the member countries recognize and deal with only the exiled Zelaya government.

The coup became a foregone conclusion when, in late June, Zelaya decided to push ahead with plans to hold a nonbinding survey asking Hondurans whether or not they believed that there should be a future referendum that would allow voters to decide whether to hold a constituent assembly to rewrite the Honduran constitution. The dominant conservative faction of the governing Liberal Party—led by former president Carlos Flores Facussé and the president of the National Congress, Roberto Micheletti—tried and failed to block Zelaya’s plans through orders issued by judges under their political control. In the days before the coup, reports surfaced of meetings held between the future coup government leaders and the high command of the armed forces. They forged a pact during these meetings, and planned the coup for June 28, the day of the government poll.

Why did Zelaya’s adversaries go to such great lengths to prevent a nonbinding poll? The Honduran political elite knows very well that there is a strong popular demand to revise the country’s unpopular constitution, drafted by conservative sectors in 1981–82, in a context of rampant political violence. The establishment dreads the prospect of such a process escaping their control and undergoing the influence of the Honduran social movements, which openly call for a constitutional framework guaranteeing more participatory politics and socioeconomic justice. Recent opinion surveys, like one carried out by U.S. pollster Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research in October, show that a majority of Hondurans support the drafting of a new constitution.<sup>7</sup> But, by helping bring the project of a constituent assembly fully into the realm of the possible, Zelaya joined the hemisphere’s so-called bad left. Although it is unlikely that Washington considered his government to be a potent threat, it had little incentive to allow the Zelaya government to be restored once it had been overthrown.

**Why did Zelaya’s adversaries effect a coup to prevent a non-binding poll? They know there is a strong popular demand to rewrite the constitution.**

**T**HE CONTRAST BETWEEN HOW THE UNITED STATES AND the rest of the hemisphere viewed the coup was evident on the very day it took place. While many

## REPORT: U.S. POLICY

governments in the region—including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, and others—were quick to denounce the coup and call for Zelaya's immediate reinstatement, a statement issued by the White House went no further than to call on "all political and social actors in Honduras to respect democratic norms, the rule of law and the tenets of the Inter-American Democratic Charter."<sup>8</sup> Later, the State Department issued a statement that also failed to identify the ouster of Zelaya as a coup and call for his reinstatement.<sup>9</sup> In contrast, the United States joined the rest of the Organization of American States in quickly issuing a unanimous resolution on June 28 demanding the "immediate, secure and unconditional return" of Zelaya to the presidency.<sup>10</sup>

Thereafter, the U.S. administration appeared to take a tougher stand against the coup government. On June 30, *coup* entered the White House's lexicon on Honduras when Obama told the press that he believed "the coup was not legal." "It would be a terrible precedent," he said, "if we start moving backwards into the era in which we are seeing military coups as a means of political transition, rather than democratic elections."<sup>11</sup> The United States again voted with the OAS on July 4, approving a unanimous decision to suspend Honduras as a member of the body as a result of the *de facto* government's refusal to reinstate Zelaya.

But the administration balked at pursuing more vigorous action. Together with a small group of staunch allies at the OAS (Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Panama), the United States opposed leveling economic sanctions against Honduras, as suggested by some South American countries, and opposed Zelaya's announced plans to return to the country, ostensibly because of the danger that this could cause "instability."<sup>12</sup> Anonymous State Department officials expressed their annoyance to the media when, with words of support from Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela, and other countries, Zelaya attempted to fly back to his country on June 5. Although his plane was prevented from landing, the massive mobilization of his supporters at the international airport in Tegucigalpa rattled the coup government, whose troops opened fire on the gathering, killing Isis Murillo, an unarmed 19-year-old.<sup>13</sup>

The groundswell of popular support generated by Zelaya's attempted return appeared to alarm the U.S. administration. Two days later, Zelaya was invited to Washington for a meeting with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, his first meeting with a cabinet-level U.S. official since the coup. Shortly before the meeting, on July 7, the administration's chess pieces fell into place. Earlier that morning, the *de facto* president of Honduras, Roberto Micheletti, announced on the radio that the conservative president of Costa Rica, Óscar Arias,

had agreed to a U.S. proposal that he mediate negotiations between the coup authorities and Zelaya.

"We are open to dialogue," Micheletti said. "We want to be heard."<sup>14</sup> Zelaya, faced with this *fait accompli* and assurances from Clinton that the United States would do everything in its power to ensure that the negotiation process would bear fruit, agreed. By getting Zelaya to agree to the Arias mediation, the State Department succeeded in displacing the Honduras issue from the OAS, where not only the left-wing bloc of ALBA countries but also regional heavyweights like Argentina and Brazil were determined to push hard for Zelaya's unconditional and speedy return. Instead, negotiations would be held with the Honduran putschists in a safer and much more controllable venue: the presidential villa in Costa Rica.

Many Latin American leaders strongly opposed what U.S. officials quickly dubbed the "San José negotiation process." The negotiations, they argued, would represent a net gain for the coup government, since negotiations of any sort would mean making concessions to the coup leaders, a terrible precedent in a region that is still trying to hold coup supporters and human rights abusers of the 1970s and 1980s accountable for their crimes. Moreover, many Latin American governments saw Arias as one of the chief promoters of U.S. interests in the region (whereas he is looked upon as a quasi-saint in U.S. foreign policy circles for his role in paving the way for a Central American peace plan in the late 1980s). Many on the Latin American left resent Arias's key role in the drafting of the 1987 Esquipulas II Accord, which brought peace to Nicaragua but under U.S. terms, with a blanket amnesty of Contra war crimes and the political undermining of the left-wing Sandinista movement.

During the negotiations Arias drew up a seven-point plan stipulating not only that Zelaya be reinstated as president but also that a power-sharing government of "reconciliation" be created. He also called for a general amnesty for those who may have committed "political crimes," along with other concessions.<sup>15</sup> Zelaya agreed to the conditions and, at Clinton's behest, provided the State Department with a written commitment to sign the agreement once Micheletti also agreed to it. But, in a pattern that would repeat itself countless times in the following months, the coup government dragged its feet. It eventually presented a counter-proposal that didn't include Zelaya's reinstatement.

Two months went by as the coup authorities appeared to be trying to wait out the clock until the national elections, set for November 29. When it became clear that the negotiations were going nowhere, Zelaya renewed his at-



A protester in Tegucigalpa shows his support for the election boycott called by Zelaya's supporters, November 27.

tempts to return to Honduras, despite stern rebukes from the U.S. administration. The top U.S. diplomat at the OAS, Lewis Amselem, called Zelaya “foolish and irresponsible” for attempting to return before a political agreement had been reached.<sup>16</sup> His second attempt failed, but on September 21, he managed to sneak into the country and appear in the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa. In response to the massive demonstrations of support that Zelaya's return generated throughout the country, the coup government intensified its crackdown on the opposition, closing radio and television stations critical of the coup and issuing a decree suspending citizens' basic freedoms.

The U.S. administration failed to denounce the coup government's human rights abuses until November. Yet these abuses were visible from the first day of the coup, when anti-government protests were violently put down. The military closed and occupied the major media outlets favorable to Zelaya (Radio Globo and Canal 36), and victims of human rights violations were left without protection or judicial recourse. This pattern of repression and censorship continued unabated, as Honduran and international human rights organizations condemned the abuses and pointed out that, as a result, it was increasingly doubtful that the November election would be legitimate and fair.

Although the U.S. administration expressed frustration with the Micheletti government's dilatory tactics, its own behavior was similarly sluggish. It took an entire month for the State Department to cancel the diplomatic visas of four people linked to the coup, and it wasn't until mid-September that the visas of a larger group of coup officials and supporters were revoked. (Many key officials linked to the coup retained their visas, including the former ambassador to Washington, Roberto Flores Bermúdez, who returned frequently to the U.S. capital to lobby Congress and the State Department on behalf of the coup government.)

Similarly, the administration backed off from pressuring the coup government in meaningful ways. U.S. officials did use the term “coup d'état” when referring to Zelaya's removal, but the State Department refused to officially call it a “military coup,” a designation that would have forced the administration to immediately terminate its aid programs to Honduras (under the Foreign Assistance Act, no non-humanitarian U.S. aid can be given to countries whose elected heads of government are removed by military coups).

The administration also refused to impose economic sanctions on the coup government, cutting only a limited amount of the U.S. aid being channeled to Honduras. (The limited and delayed cuts in U.S. aid to Honduras contrast with the nearly immediate and total cuts in aid

REPORT: U.S. POLICY

to Madagascar and Mauritania, both of which recently underwent military coups.<sup>17</sup>) It also refused to consider freezing the U.S.-based assets of the coup government, a measure that Zelaya had asked for early on and that many thought would be both effective and have little or no adverse effect on the poor in Honduras.

By late September, the coup government and its U.S. supporters changed their focus from trying to convince Washington that no coup had taken place to ensuring that the November 29 election would gain them some international recognition and legitimacy. The task might have appeared daunting at first. Many governments of Latin America—including the 12-member Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)—had indicated early on that they wouldn’t accept the outcome of elections held under the de facto government, since this would legitimate the coup. Meanwhile, the State Department announced September 3 that it “would not be able to support the outcome of the scheduled elections,” adding: “A positive conclusion of the Arias process would provide a sound basis for legitimate elections to proceed.”<sup>18</sup>

But the U.S. representatives to the OAS appeared to be on a very different track. From at least mid-September they and their small “coalition of the willing” in the OAS systematically blocked all attempts to approve resolutions that rejected the legitimacy of elections held without the prior reinstatement of Zelaya, according to an OAS official who asked to remain anonymous because the council meetings in question were confidential.<sup>19</sup> In an October article in *Time* magazine, an anonymous senior U.S. official acknowledged that the United States would be prepared to recognize the elections under the coup government if need be. “The elections are going to take place either way, and the international community needs to come to terms with that fact,” the official said.<sup>20</sup>

Still, at the end of October, many in the region grew hopeful that a solution had been reached when three senior U.S. officials (Dan Restrepo of the National Security Council, and Thomas Shannon and Craig Kelly of the State Department) visited Honduras and finally persuaded Zelaya’s and Micheletti’s representatives to sign an agreement. Although the terms of the accord were vague, two points seemed to hold out the possibility that Zelaya would be quickly reinstated, albeit under conditions that would severely limit his authority. One held that the Honduran congress would have the opportunity to restore the executive power to its condition prior to June 28; the other fixed November 5 as the date for

the creation of a unity government. A celebratory statement from Clinton—heralding a historic “breakthrough” agreement that overcomes a rupture of “democratic and constitutional order” with “negotiation and dialogue”—compounded the feeling of optimism.<sup>21</sup> Within a few days, however, these hopes were abruptly dashed.

Three days after the accord was signed, Thomas Shannon, then assistant secretary of state for the Western Hemisphere, announced on the CNN en Español network that the administration was prepared to “accompany” the Honduran election, with or without Zelaya’s prior reinstatement.<sup>22</sup> This unambiguous position had the immediate effect of removing all effective pressure on the coup government to reinstate Zelaya. Two days later the Rio Group of nations, which includes more than two thirds of the hemisphere’s governments, issued a sternly worded statement that it would not recognize the elections held under the coup government.<sup>23</sup> But this had little impact in Honduras, a country that relies almost entirely on the United States for its economic survival. The Honduran pro-coup media celebrated Shannon’s announcement, while Zelaya, still holed up in the Brazilian embassy, accused the United States of having strengthened the Micheletti government.<sup>24</sup>

The administration, in its statements leading up to the Honduran elections, appeared genuinely convinced that the elections would help turn the page—or, as Obama put it in a letter to Lula, that they would allow Hondurans to “start from zero.”<sup>25</sup> For those who know Honduras and have observed developments there since the coup, the United States’ analysis appeared shortsighted and superficial. Indeed, though it hasn’t been reported in the mainstream media, the big news in Honduras, since June 28, has been the consolidation of a powerful people’s resistance movement that is historically unprecedented in terms of its size and diversity. In view of this development, it is very doubtful that elections and the newly elected government of Porfirio Lobo will result in a return to stability in Honduras.

**W**HY DID THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION ACT SO clumsily, squandering its opportunity to write a genuinely new chapter of engagement in the Americas? Many in the media and in U.S. policy circles suggested that the U.S. position on Honduras went from bad to worse as a result of an intense and well-financed right-wing offensive. They noted that shortly after the coup, Honduran business groups supportive of the de facto regime hired well-connected lobbyists like Lanny Davis, the

**Three days after Clinton’s “breakthrough” accord, the State Department removed all effective pressure on the coup government to reinstate Zelaya.**

former White House council under Bill Clinton, and Roger Noriega, a former top diplomat on Latin America during the George W. Bush administration. These lobbyists, together with an ideologically driven network of militant anti-Castro activists and Cold War hawks launched a broad anti-Zelaya campaign in the media and in Congress and, in no time, a contingent of dedicated Republican foot soldiers took form.

Many of these Republicans went down to Honduras and stood in solidarity with Micheletti; others directly pressured the administration from Congress. Such was the case of South Carolina Senator Jim Demint, who, thanks to an arcane Senate procedural rule, blocked two key administration appointments: those of Arturo Valenzuela and Thomas Shannon, the respective Obama nominees to the posts of assistant secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs in the State Department and the U.S. ambassador to Brazil. Demint's justification? Valenzuela had referred to a "classic military coup" in Honduras during his nomination hearing before the Senate; Shannon was also presumably too supportive of Zelaya's reinstatement.

More progressive figures asked the administration to take decisive measures to pressure the coup government. Several Democratic members of Congress wrote strongly worded letters, and human rights groups, progressive NGOs, and Latin Americanist academics issued statements calling on the administration to do more. At an August press conference, Obama responded to criticism from both domestic and Latin American figures:

"The same critics who say that the United States has not intervened enough in Honduras are the same people who say that we're always intervening and the Yankees need to get out of Latin America," Obama said. "You can't have it both ways . . . I think what that indicates is, is that maybe there's some hypocrisy involved in their approach to U.S.–Latin American relations that certainly is not going to guide my administration's policies."

For those familiar with the history of U.S. interventions in Central America—most typically characterized by direct military intervention or covert action in favor of right-wing military regimes—Obama's remarks could only be considered disingenuous or, at best, naive. In this case the administration, as the only outside actor with real influence in Honduras, was simply being asked to take basic measures in favor of the restoration of democracy and human rights. What was it that was preventing Obama and his secretary of state from taking the actions that the entire region was calling for? The prevailing view in Washington is that the Republicans' aggressive defense of the pro coup agenda—with limited push back from their Democratic colleagues—played a major role in shaping the administration's agenda.

The validity of this view appeared to be confirmed when, the day after Shannon's statement to CNN, Demint issued a statement congratulating the administration on taking the right stand and announcing the lifting of the hold on the Valenzuela and Shannon appointments.<sup>26</sup>

But it is highly unlikely that the administration would have allowed a handful of Republicans to define its position on the single most critical issue on the hemispheric agenda since the political crisis in Bolivia in September 2008. Moreover, the administration's ambivalent position on the coup was forged long before the Republican campaign in favor of the coup regime had gained any traction. From the beginning the U.S. administration consistently refused to commit to openly backing the reinstatement of Zelaya and preferred vague terms like "restoration of constitutional rule" and later "implementation of the San José agreement." This suggested that the administration was always prepared to accept a "solution" that didn't involve restoring Zelaya's constitutional mandate.

All of these actions make sense if one subscribes to the "two lefts" thesis. Zelaya was toxic—too close to Chávez and to other "radical populist" governments—and, therefore, the only safe course would be to either politically neuter him or ensure that he wouldn't return to power in the near future. To this end, the administration left its options open at every turn. Clinton consistently refused to state that the goal of negotiations was to reinstate Zelaya, and, unlike almost every other country in the region, the administration never committed to withholding recognition of the elections held under the coup government.

The root of the problem lies in Washington's deeply flawed analysis of the new regional dynamic, starting with the "two lefts" thesis. Latin American governments themselves generally reject this simplistic view. There is no simple dichotomy among the new left-leaning governments of Latin America, but rather a plurality of lefts in Latin America, all of which are based in profound aspirations for effective political, social and economic change. It is a renaissance of sorts of nationalist and socialist aspirations that were strong in the 1940s and then became victims of the counter-offensive of conservative elites and Cold War overt and covert action by the United States.

The new Latin American left is much more than a Chavez, a Morales, a Lugo, or a Zelaya. Beyond the personalities that dominate the airwaves and the headlines, people's movements throughout the hemisphere are redefining democracy and redefining the social and political agendas of their nations. If there is truly to be "a new chapter of engagement" in Obama's Latin America policy, the administration must recognize this fundamental fact. ■

**'A New Chapter of Engagement'**

1. "To Learn From History, Not Be Trapped by It," Obama speech transcript, April 18, 2009, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago.
2. "Manuel Zelaya: 'Aún estoy en ropa de dormir,'" *El País* (Madrid), June 28, 2009.
3. "Lula critica las políticas de Obama en relación a América Latina," Servicio Sudamericano de Noticias, November 7, 2009.
4. "U.S. Policy on Honduras Puts Latin Ties at Risk, Brazilian Says," Reuters, November 25, 2009, posted at nytimes.com.
5. See, for instance, "Radical Populism in Latin America," conference at the Hudson Institute, Washington, November 6, 2007, and Hal Brands, "Dealing With Political Ferment in Latin America: The Populist Revival, the Emergence of the Center, and Implications for U.S. Policy," Strategic Studies Institute, September 2009.
6. Jorge G. Castañeda, "Latin America's Left Turn," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2006).
7. "Honduras Frequency Questionnaire, October 9–13, 2009," October 2009, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research.
8. "Statement From President Obama on the Situation in Honduras," transcript, Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, June 28, 2009.
9. "Situation in Honduras," statement from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, transcript, Department of State, June 28, 2009.
10. "Situación actual en Honduras," OAS Permanent Council Resolution 953 (1700/09), June 28, 2009.
11. "Remarks by President Obama and President Uribe of Colombia in Joint Press Availability," press conference transcript, Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, June 29, 2009.
12. "Senior Administration Officials, Background Briefing on the Organization of American States Decision on Honduras, via Teleconference," transcript, the Department of State, July 5, 2009.
13. Laura Figueroa, "Honduran Teen's Slaying Propels Youth Movement," *The Miami Herald*, July 13, 2009.
14. "Honduran Interim Chief: Costa Rica's Arias Agrees to Be Mediator," Agence France-Presse, July 7, 2009.
15. "Propuesta del presidente de Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, para solución a crisis de Honduras," *El Heraldo* (Tegucigalpa), July 18, 2009.
16. "US Describes Zelaya's Actions 'Irresponsible and Foolish,'" MercoPress, September 28, 2009.
17. See Alexander Main and Jake Johnston, *The Millennium Challenge Corporation and Economic Sanctions: A Comparison of Honduras With Other Countries* (Washington: Center for Economic and Policy Research, August 2009).
18. "Termination of Assistance and Other Measures Affecting the De Facto Regime in Honduras," transcript of Ian Kelly, State Department spokesman, September 3, 2009.
19. Anonymous OAS source and "OEA no llega a consenso en torno a conflicto hondureño," Radio la Nueva República, September 28, 2009.
20. Tim Padgett, "Is U.S. Opposition to the Honduran Coup Lessening?" *Time*, October 16, 2009.
21. "Breakthrough in Honduras," Clinton, transcript, October 30, 2009 (Islamabad).
22. Interview of Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shannon by Juan Carlos López, *Panorama Mundial*, CNN en Español, November 3, 2009.
23. "XXVIII Reunión de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores del Mecanismo Permanente de Consulta y Concertación Política, Grupo de Río—Comunicado conjunto," November 6, 2009.
24. "El régimen de facto celebró este cambio y utilizaron estas declaraciones para sus objetivos, e inmediatamente terminaron por incumplir y violar el Acuerdo," letter from Zelaya to Obama, November 14, 2009.
25. Alexei Barrionuevo, "Obama Writes to Brazil's Leader About Iran," *The New York Times*, November 24, 2009.
26. "DeMint: Administration Commits to Recognize Honduran Elections," press release, Press Office of Senator Jim DeMint, November 5, 2009.

**Retreat to Colombia**

1. "Quito echa el cierre a la base de Manta en un triunfo de la soberanía nacional," *Gara.net*, September 19, 2009.
2. Consejo de Estado, Sala Plena, "Concepto Previo," Bogotá, October 13, 2009, pp. 11–23.
3. Ian James, "US Defends Use of Colombian Mil. Bases," the Associated Press, August 14, 2009.
4. "Ya estábamos en seis de las siete bases": afirma William Brownfield, embajador de E.U. en Colombia," *El Tiempo* (Bogotá), November 1, 2009.
5. Department of the Air Force, "Military Construction Program, FY 2010 Budget Estimates, Justification Data Submitted to Congress," May 2009, p. 217.
6. "DoD FY 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification Special Topics," pp. 2–30.
7. "White Paper, Air Mobility Command, Global En Route Strategy," preparatory document for Air Force Symposium 2009—AFRICOM, March 2009, p. 22.
8. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," November 28, 2005.
9. Obama speech on Latin America policy, Miami, May 23, 2008.
10. Senators Patrick Leahy and Christopher Dodd, letter to Secretary of State Clinton, July 28, 2009.
11. Air Force, "Military Construction Program," May 2009, p. 218.
12. On U.S. assistance in tracking the bombed FARC encampment in Ecuador: Sergio Gómez Maseri, "FBI tuvo 'chuzados' teléfonos de varios cabecillas de las Farc," *El Tiempo*, February 20, 2008; Gerardo Reyes, "Propinan golpe demoleedor a red logística de las FARC," *El Nuevo Herald* (Miami), March 2, 2008. On U.S. assistance in Operation Jaque: Jens Glüsing, "Months of Intelligence Work Led to Betancourt's Rescue," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), July 3, 2008.
13. "Supplemental Agreement for Cooperation and Technical Assistance in Defense and Security Between the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Colombia," Article 3, Section 1, October 30, 2009.
14. Fabio Valencia, letter to Colombian senators, July 28, 2009.
15. See "Quick Data, U.S. military and policy trainees by country," list at justf.org/training.
16. Department of the Air Force, "Military Construction Program Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget Estimates, Addendum," November 6, 2009.
17. Department of State, "Vetted Units of the Colombian Security Forces Eligible for Possible US Assistance and Training, 2008 and 2009," unpublished document.
18. Air Force, "Military Construction Program," May 2009, p. 217.
19. "DoD FY 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification Special Topics," pp. 2–30.
20. Carlo Muñoz, "DOD: U.S.-Colombia Counterdrug Pact Focuses on Three Locations," *Inside the Pentagon*, September 2, 2009.
21. Eduardo Tamayo G., "Colombia se niega a dar informes a Unasur sobre acuerdo militar con EU," Agencia Latinoamericana de Información (Quito), September 16, 2009.
22. "White Paper—Air Mobility Command."
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 31.
24. Abigail Poe, "El Salvador Extends Forward Operating Location Agreement With U.S.," Just the Facts (blog), April 6, 2009.
25. Julio Yao, "Discurso ante el Mausoleo de los Soldados de la Independencia," *Las Noticias de Panamá* (Panama City), November 2, 2009; Eduardo Mendoza, "Gobierno instalará cuatro bases navales," *Prensa.com* (Panama City).
26. Hernando Salazar, "Colombia y EE.UU. firman convenio militar," *BBC Mundo*, October 30, 2009.
27. Ministerio de Defensa, Colombia, "Satélite y aviones entre los proyectos tecnológicos," April 29, 2009; "La Gobernación de Cundinamarca invertirá 20.000 millones de pesos en seguridad," *El Tiempo* (Cundinamarca), August 28, 2009; Patricia Arias, *Seguridad privada en América Latina: el lucro y los dilemas de una regulación deficitaria* (Santiago, Chile: FLACSO, 2009), 47–49.
28. *Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Act of 2009*, HR 2134, 111th Cong., 1st Sess.