

STATE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

**CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
&
MASS AGITATION**

SUBMITTED TO

**UP ACADEMY OF
ADMINISTRATION & MANAGEMENT**

DRAFT



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Preface

This State Disaster Management Plan for Civil Disobedience and Mass Agitation has been developed on the basis of the secondary sources notably reports, recommendations of different commissions, notably, National Police Commission. The draft report is, thus, largely conceptual in tenor, content, and approach.

A DMP, more focused on specific activities during L0, L1, L2 and L3 situations with reference to Civil Disobedience & Mass Agitation is definitely possible. This would, however, call for inputs on state government policies and procedures on managing agitation / protest programmes, available resource base for this purpose, intelligence mechanisms for real-time alerts, and the strategies that are in place to prevent the occurrence of / control mob-violence.

We had assumed that the critical inputs on prevailing / controlling mob violence would be made available to us by the Home Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh. We contacted Sri Vikas Gothalwal, IAS, Special Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Uttar Pradesh, the designated Nodal Officer with a set of questions on the matter. He expressed his inability to share the information with us on the grounds of confidentiality and sensitivity. However, he directed us to meet Sri A.P. Maheshwari, IPS, Inspector General (Law & Order). He too expressed similar constraints in sharing the information and suggested that a brainstorming session should be organized officially at UPAAM with a group of police officers. We requested UPAAM to this effect, however, they expressed their inability to organise such a session.

It is against this backdrop, that the plan has been developed. We now present the Draft Disaster Management Plan on Civil Disobedience and Mass Agitation and hope that the document will be critically examined and commented upon by the experts. Their valuable suggestions shall enhance greatly the usefulness of the final document.

Executive Summary

The objectives of a DMP on Civil Disobedience and Mass Agitation would be: to maintain law and order., to provide information on time, to the people about the danger, to shift those at risk to safer places., to ensure arrangement for food, shelter, and medicines for the affected people, to protect vital installations and ensure smooth functioning of essential services, to provide protection to properties belonging to members of public as well as to the government, and to minimize effective response time so that relief and rescue operations are undertaken immediately.

However, details of these activities would form part of the *District* Riot Plans. At the State level the plan needs to be strategic – it should anticipate the resource requirements and logistic supports needed by the districts in their response actions. State Plan should also aim at *preventing* the such agitation programmes as may turn violent, and to this end should explore the reasons behind such disobedience / agitation movements and what can be done to counter the forces that give rise to them.

This Plan sets out a roadmap in line with statutory provisions of the Acts, guidelines and executive orders issued by MHA, GoI, and other instructions on the subject by GOI and GoUP. The Plan aims at five strategic goals: 1) Professionalising the disaster management process; 2) Making preparedness, risk reduction / mitigation parts of their normal processes by concerned departments / organizations; 3) Strengthening institutional mechanisms to achieve the highest degree of coordination; 4) Strengthening emergency response systems to ensure that responses are prompt and effective; and 5) Strengthening rehabilitation and recovery structure.

The Plan sets out the following intermediate objectives: Identification of risk reduction / mitigation activities; Classification of necessary activities for effective preparedness for different Departments / Organizations; Identifying emergency responses; Situation analysis to understand and identify factors encouraging civil disobedience and mass agitations and to set in place an institutional mechanisms for curbing such factors; Creating appropriate structure for seamlessly providing relief and humanitarian assistance; and Creating system and infrastructure for effective training and capacity building for risk mitigation, prevention and response.

Civil disobedience & Mass agitations: Disobedience, if civil – in the sense gracious, well mannered, courteous etc - can never give rise to disaster. If civil is used in the sense of “non-military”, civil disobedience becomes the *non-military equivalent of a coup* and may well lead to chaos and loss of order. Mass agitation will mean the same as civil disobedience if the masses are agitating against the government or against the order. Masses may agitate against a specific target, for example farmers agitating against a sugar mill. Such agitations, though not aimed against order, if sustained long enough, may lead to chaos and breakdown of social order. The causes of mass agitations often lie deep. There is much evidence to suggest that *economic and social factors* are major causes of civil unrest. Globally, most civil unrest examples are seen to be associated with political reforms.

Civil unrest has often been linked to inequality. Inequality, economic or otherwise, is understood to breed feeling of being deprived, which in turn gives rise to frustration-aggression syndrome leading to protests. However inequality may not always results in social disorder. Deprived sections take to agitations only when they see their situation worsening or when they see possibility of improvements in their situation. Even the relatively privileged may resort to agitation if they feel their *relative situation* is worsening. Some common factors giving rise to civil disobedience are:

- Changes in the established pattern of sharing of some natural resources
- Influx of migrant labour beyond the capacity of the host community to absorb

Even the ongoing economic liberalization of India has been cited by some as a cause for social unrest in some quarters. The causes can be complex, but their understanding gives means of forecasting the frequency of such agitations.

Measuring Potential for Social Unrest (PSU): Based on two factors, a) division(s) in the community; and b) at least one section feeling deprived, social scientists have developed two indices to measure the PSU: Polarization index (PI), and Total relative deprivation index (TRDI). Polarization is taken to arise when members of a group sense strong within-group identity *and simultaneously* between-groups alienation. If income is assumed to be the key factor, the intensity of the within-group identification can be measured by the number of individuals who share the same level of income (A). And, the feeling of alienation of one group towards another can be measured by the difference in mean incomes between the two groups (B). The product A*B, added for all groups gives a measure of polarization. “Relative Deprivation” is a measure of dismay the community

members may suffer from. Total Relative Deprivation of a community is obtained by summing up the “relative deprivation” of all individuals. To estimate TRD, first RD of each individual is estimated by multiplying the fraction of people earning more than the individual with their mean excess income and then adding it up for the community. TRD can serve as a proxy for the “aggregated degree of discontent” and could thus be used to measure potential for social unrest. Indices could serve as possible advance warnings of looming social unrest. Both PI and TRDI need to be estimated since it is seen that in some situations one becomes a superior predictor of PSU.

Hazard risk assessment and vulnerability mapping

HPC report defines risk as “the expected loss (casualties, damage to property, and disruption of economic activity or livelihood) caused by a particular phenomenon”. Risk, thus, is product of likely loss in case of the occurrence of the hazardous event and the probability of the occurrence of the event itself. While it is not possible to accurately estimate the losses arising from a potential social unrest at any place, a rough assessment of likely loss can be made with the following indicators: Density of population, Geographical and social isolation, Accessibility of a location, Existence of properties. Probability of occurrence of a violent disorderly situation can be linked to PSU – potential for social unrest. With this framework, it is possible to map hazard risk with income distribution statistics of different towns / cities.

Some Probable Causes: These are the *causative factors*, which either give rise to the iniquities or provide a medium for their violent expression breaching public order. Four major factors are: Agrarian problems, Group Conflicts, Extremist activities, and Industrial Disputes.

Crowd dynamics: Crowd does not act as one entity. Crowds are heterogeneous entities and crowd participants are often not unanimous in their motivations. Crowds are largely made up of small groups of people who are acquainted with one another and thus individual members do not normally get the benefit of anonymity that the crowds are supposed to offer. Finally, crowd participants seldom act in unison. Thus, a crowd may display markedly different behaviors at different stages (of the process). Crowds have a beginning, middle and an ending phase. This process is reflected in the chart:



Agencies controlling a crowd (police / para-military) focus on the end phase—dispersal. However, they must also consider how people assemble and interact during the course of the gathering. These aspects of a gathering are likely to affect how it disperses.

Crowds are assembled by prior activities by a few leading actors. Occasionally, crowds may even assemble impromptu, when the process develops mostly by word of mouth. In such cases participants are people, who are already close to the venue. On the other hand, *organized* mobilization efforts are centrally planned, organizers have lists of names, and they contact potential participants, and even at times arrange transportation for participants.

Dispersal of a crowd can occur in various ways. Routine dispersals are specified in advance, emergency dispersal occurs when people evacuate an area as the result of some unexpected crisis, such as a fire, explosion, etc. Dispersal may be coerced by crowd controllers by use of force to disperse gatherings. Quite often now crowds are dispersed through negotiation. For a negotiated management to be successful the demonstration leaders must be available and *willing to participate*.

Most demonstrations and protests do not result in riotous mobs, but protest can evolve into violence causing damage to lives and properties. There are no clear cut cues on the personality types of participants. *The social networks and organizations, to which they belonged, appear to be better predictors of participation than any socioeconomic or demographic characteristics.*

It is difficult to predict violence by crowds. Personal experience may be the best means of forecasting potential violence. Experienced police officers often *perceive* that a particular incident in a given area might result in community violence. They can sense the ebb and flow of events in a familiar community and pick up cues. They, of course, also receive intelligence, which they match to their perceptions. As a result, such officers can intuitively assess a situation. There is no substitute for this experience.

Guidelines for Crowd Control

Police is the PA for civil disobedience and mass agitation. In fighting criminals, police forces fight and eliminate / capture opponents, who are combatants. In a mass agitation, police deal with crowds that consist largely of non-combatants. The rights of non-combatants must be respected while maintaining public order. This calls for decisions regarding the degree of force to be used against a large group that is (mostly) unarmed. To guard against unnecessary use of excessive force and to ensure that mission is accomplished, it will be useful if the police follow a standardized decision-making procedure. (We understand, the police have such internal guidelines, but cannot be shared with public.) The standard decision making process on managing mass agitations should address four major points: Pre-incident Planning, Background Information and Intelligence, Encouraging Relationships and Ownership, and Acceptability.

Planning begins before the incident and is initiated at the strategic level. It includes strategic guidance on crowd control as well as addressing responsibilities, training, organization, operating procedures, and rules of engagement. The planning should be aimed at avoiding confrontation. Most agitations don't turn violent. The police may, therefore, *at times help the crowds accomplish their goals within the law* even consider conceding some violations for the sake of avoiding confrontation. This is a strategic level decision and there should be clear guidelines on it to help the operational staff engaged in crowd management. Even if it is decided to concede some violations of law, police must maintain a presence in adequate strength to restrain the demonstrators from going beyond a certain limit.

Further, planning needs to focus on – “what are we trying to accomplish?” Process can sometimes drive the mission. This can easily occur in organizations that are trained to fight and overcome opponents; unless they focus on what they are trying to accomplish they may lose the perspective. Police must seek to know as much as they can about the protesting groups well in advance of a demonstration / march etc. With better knowledge about the organizers one can anticipate their actions. Thus the questions that the police must ask are: Who are they? What are their goals? What are they capable of doing? What are their traditional behaviors? When and where will they assemble? Where will they go? What are the possible targets of violence? What is the worst case scenario? And when and where will they disperse?

Police must also guard against generalizing about a crowd based on the behaviour of a few. Such generalizations are usually incorrect and dangerous. Generally only a few individuals engage in destructive behavior. Police should identify the violent individuals

INDIVIDUAL-IN-CROWD BEHAVIOUR




and restrain them. Intelligence plays a key role here. With background information police will be able to target the key persons respond to their behavior, rather than the crowd as whole. There are five psychological factors for understanding and assessing individual behavior in a crowd: Motivation, Confidence, Stress,

Focus, and Emotions. Understanding of these factors permit the police to intervene at different levels for controlling the crowd behaviour.

With working relationships between police and leaders of the agitation programme in many cases it is possible to follow the negotiated management model. The relationships allow group leaders to share with the authorities what they want to accomplish and authorities to convey to the group leaders what they are prepared to do. Such communications if started well in advance of an event can do much to prevent violence. Communication also means persuasion to “win over” demonstration leaders by encouraging them to protest in an acceptable way. It must be noted that negotiations require expertise. Police may identify and maintain lists of skillful, persuasive negotiators.

Winning a pitched battle against a largely unarmed crowd may portray police as oppressors and give opportunities to agitators to claim martyrdom. Thus winning is about controlling a crowd and getting a favorable image. Police may invite media to accompany officers managing agitation situations. Such outreach gives the impression that the authorities have nothing to hide and it provides an opportunity to media men to see the police’s side of an event.

In crowd situations, the use of weapons is a crucial factor. This force should also appear to be “self-triggering.” This non-lethal weapons hierarchy might occur as shown in the picture. Finally, *containing a crowd is, at times, more important than dispersing a crowd*; as forced dispersal can result in a crowd breaking up into groups that would scatter over a vast area, posing even greater public order problems.



Alert mechanism: In most cases the alert should come from the intelligence wing, unless violence erupts up from spontaneous trigger. A major agitation programme is a planned activity; the planning

may take place over weeks and cannot come as a total surprise. Intelligence, coupled with the experience of the local officers can predict violence during a demonstration. At times indications of violence may be received from central or state intelligence sources. Thus the alert mechanism may entail information flow from State to district or from district to State.

Level definition: District will activate the warning phase of its DRP and keep SCR informed. If the situation is not diffused and violence erupts, the SCR will define the level of the disaster keeping in view the report of the intelligence wing and of the scale of violence eruption(s). If the violence and its ramifications can be brought under control by the district administration, it is an L1 situation. If the scale of violence is such as would warrant intervention from the State level, it would be and L2 situation and in L3 situations *At the early stages level assessment exercise will mostly be prospective in nature*. Reports of large scale violence will almost always be accompanied with requests from district administration for units of PAC. Such situations, as they require State level interventions should be considered as L2. Required measures will depend on the level of the situation. Whereas L1/L2/L3 situations require response measures, L0 situations require normal times activities to be taken up with greater vigil. This being an SDMP, *only State level activities/ measures are described in the following sections*.

L0 Activities


- **Monitoring situation:** This essentially relates to the district police. At State level, Directorate will ensure that the normal times activities are carried out and their outputs are constantly evaluated.
- **Intelligence:** State level intelligence agency will collect physical data from districts and analyse on aggregate level to look for significant fluctuations suggesting an imbalance in any particular area.
- **Manpower planning:** Realistic manpower planning in regular police, coupled with full activation of the old Chowkidari system with Chowkidars acting exclusively for police departments. Manpower planning also covers regular trainings, at times jointly with Army and / or para military forces to ensure better understanding of their respective roles.
- **Logistics planning:** It goes beyond anticipating and fulfilling the required weaponry and transport. It must also include personal protection and communication equipment; and ensuring proper rest and food for the operating forces in sustained operations. Logistics should also cover rescue equipment, particularly for the high rise buildings coming up in towns. At times policemen combating riot situations receive grievous injuries and may need to be shifted immediately to larger hospitals.
 - Department of Revenue (Scarcity) (in charge of Disaster Management) may consider acquiring helicopters earmarked for use during emergency operations.
 - Health Directorate will need to ensure that each district has at least two fully functional cardiac care ambulances and sufficient trained emergency medical technicians to accompany police forces engaged in managing violent crowds. Directorate may make necessary arrangements special care for the weak, aged, lactating mothers and pregnant ladies as also for treatment of shock and trauma.
 - Department of Food & Civil Supplies must have ready arrangements for supplying food and other essentials to the poor and weak affected by agitations. It may get into pre-purchase agreements for supply of food grains, tents, blankets, plastic sheets, and firewood etc with reputed suppliers for urgent purchases during riots
- **Contingency Planning & Drills:** PA may check the workability of riot plans by organising drills from time to time. These drills may also include units of PAC

and of Army. Drills should involve Home Guards unit too as using them for routine works like traffic control would free more policemen for operations. The drill may also incorporate establishment of the command structure for L2/L3 situations.

- Monitoring preparedness: The Plan gives a detailed (but by no means exhaustive) check list for monitoring preparedness measures by PA and SAs.

L2 Responses

At State level responses would be strategic, essentially monitoring the situation and making men and material available for operations. Immediately on declaration of L2 /L3 the SCR will be upgraded into EOC and SDMA will appoint an IC. If army or para military forces units are also deployed the incident command system may need to be expanded into a Unified Command (UC) structure with "Commanders" from all major organizations involved in operations for an effective response. Whether a unified



command is created or not, the essential command structure of EOC will remain the same, as depicted in the graphic.

IC/UC will have two types of staff - General Staff and Command Staff. General Staff Sections will be directly involved with containment of riot and restoration of order. Command Staff Sections will assist the IC/UC in other necessary functions. The General Staff Sections are: Operations Section, Planning Section, Logistics Section, and Finance and Administrative Section. The Command Staff is responsible for effective use of the information environment, health and safety of people affected and of those engaged in response operations, and liaison activities. Its sections are Liaison Section, Information

Section, and Safety Section. The Plan details major tasks of the Command, viz. containment of trouble, ensuring preventive measures at other vulnerable centres, ensuring firm decisive action, ensuring relief to citizens, exploring and initiating dialogues at State level and keeping the media apprised.


In its initial meeting the command will come to consensus on priorities, the tactical objectives, and an overall strategy to carry out the response. In L3 situation the command structure and response mechanism shall remain the same as in L2, except that the UC may have a representative from MHA. (L3 situations may have implications transcending state borders and many critical decisions may come from centre.)


The two Schematics depict the process flow s under two situations:

- a. Perception of threat to public order– either by district intelligence or by State level intelligence agencies
- b. Flaring up of violence

In both cases the processes are to fulfill three types of functions:

- a. Control functions
- b. Strategic support functions
- c. Support functions





Preparedness measures

These consist of Preparations for pre-determined responses and centre on ensuring the availability of required resources – both in manpower terms and in terms of other physical resource. PA may prepare the list of National and State resources that will be available during a riot situation. The resources may come from - government, private, and civil society: It is important to track the resources available from corporate sector during emergencies – these can range from vehicles, men trained in first aid, safe premises for sheltering vulnerable people from affected areas, hospital beds, pharmacies etc. The Plan envisages to constantly tamarack availability of the following from different sources:

- Tear gas
- Rubber bullets
- Water canons
- Snifter dogs
- Search and rescue teams
- Bomb diffusers
- Loud speakers
- Armed police force
- Communication equipment
- Videographic equipment
- Transport
- Tentage
- Civil supplies
- Drinking waters
- Ambulances
- Mobile hospitals
- Life saving drugs
- Blood - plasma/ platelets
- Doctors / paramedics

Civil Society Organisations, particularly Red Cross can augment available resources. The details of resources available from them can be obtained from the Department of Revenue (Scarcity) who are the Primary Agency for ESF Donations.

State must be prepared attending to the special needs of the weaker sections- aged, lactating mothers, pregnant ladies etc- during riot situations. This will call for sensitization programmes on the needs of the weaker sections for medial and para medical staff. While shifting populations from vulnerable areas to safer locations, these needs must be kept in consideration. In curfew bound areas, the system for passes for pregnant ladies going to hospitals must be made more sensitive.

Capacity building is a major preparedness activity. Capacity building has many aspects - Training the manpower, Acquisition of proper equipment, and Changing the legal / procedural environment to increases the capacity of the regulatory framework to deal with riot situations. The Plan covers training needs in Section 4.5, equipment in Section 5.4.4. and the need for strengthening the regulatory environment in Sections 4.3.6 and 4.3.7. This Plan envisages an ICS or UC structure for management of an L2 or

L3 situation. The LBSNAA Mussoorie has been designated as the nodal training institution. At state level, UPAAM has been organizing programmes related with disaster management. Senior officers from police and administration should be exposed to such programmes at UPAAM or at LBSNAA. Further the powerful reach of media needs to be used more imaginatively during normal times to foster nationalism and patriotic fervour. (The Plan also suggests some guidelines on information dissemination during armed operations and for media presence at operation sites. The objective is to make the best use of the information environment for managing emergencies.)

Partnership with Other Stakeholders

For making any DMP more effective, it is imperative that it should identify the areas where partnerships with other stakeholders can be strengthened. Apart from the communities – the largest stakeholders, the Plan suggests developing partnerships with **Academic institutions to commission** researches on crowd behaviour and with **Armed forces** to get most from their involvement in emergency management. Similarly the ties with voluntary organizations working in the field of promoting peace and national integration need to be strengthened during peace times as they usually have committed and well-intentioned volunteers and workers. Large commercial organisation, in public sector or in private sector, have transport, hospitals, doctors, trained staff and protected space which can be of great use during emergency operations. With their roles defined, the PSUs / PSOs may be asked to prepare their own standard procedures so as to minimise the response time.

Financial arrangements: Disaster Management Act defines “mitigation” as “measures aimed at reducing the risk, impact or effects of a disaster or threatening disaster situation”. Thus, resources from CRF are not available for mitigation activities. However, there is a provision that *10% of the annual inflows into the CRF can be used for the procurement of search and rescue (SAR) equipment and communication equipment.* This provision can be utilized to acquire rescue tenders for fire services, to begin with, at potential centres. Further, DMF is now a statutory requirement for all States even though there is no unanimity on what should constitute DMF. Planning Commission has suggested that 0.5% of the total plan allocation of each Ministry/ Department be earmarked for NDMF. State may consider the workability of Planning Commission’s suggestion.

Adoption, Review and Updation:

After the Plan is approved, PA and the SAs will need to ensure that they reach the desired level of preparedness. They must confirm the actions taken for this purpose or they may confirm that no particular actions are required and they are capable of discharging all responsibilities arising from this Plan.

DRS, being in charge of disaster management, may need to coordinate the approval / review process and ensure that concerned agencies determine whether the issues related to them are *adequately addressed on a continuing basis* by reviewing the relevant parts. They may also like consider the issues not addressed in the document, i.e. such issues which are noted as requiring structural measures.

Plan must provide proof the PA and the DRS have approved the document and should carry the dated signatures of designated officials *every second year or whenever the incumbency changes*. Similarly the review should be confirmed by PAC, Fire Services, and the Director of Health at periodicity stipulated in the Plan.

PA may consider holding riot drills at all centres considered vulnerable in view of existing factionalism in local level politics, intelligence reports, agrarian problems and industrial disputes. The drills will involve all agencies named in the Plan and the *Plan should be reviewed after each drill*

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List of Abbreviations

CBDM	Community Based Disaster Management
CRF	Calamity Relief Fund
D-F-A	Deprivation-Frustration-Aggression
DIPR	Directorate of Information & Public Relations
DMA	Disaster Management Act
DMC	Disaster Management Committee
DMF	Disaster Mitigation Fund
DMP	Disaster Management Plan
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRP	District Riot Plan
DRS	Department of Revenue (Scarcity)
EOC	Emergency Operation Centre
F&CS	Food & Civil Supplies
GoI	Government of India
GoUP	Government of Uttar Pradesh
HPC	High Power Committee (on Disaster Management)
IC	Incident Commander
ICS	Incident Command System
IDRN	India Disaster Resource Network
LBSNAA	Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
NDMA	National Disaster Management authority
NDMF	National Disaster Mitigation Fund
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PAC	Provincial Armed Constabulary
PAC	Primary Agency (Police in this Plan)
PI	Polarization Index
PM	Prime Minister
PSU	Potential for Social Unrest
RAF	Rapid Action Force
SA	Support Agency
SCR	State Control Room
SDMA	State Disaster Management authority
SIT	Special Investigation Team
TRDI	Total Relative Deprivation Index
TRDI	Total Relative Deprivation
UC	Unified Command
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UPAAM	UP Academy of Administration & Management
UPSDMA	UP State Disaster Management Act
USAID	United States Aid for International Development
WTO	World Trade Organisation

PART I: GENERAL

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Vision Statement

To create a Disaster Management Plan that will provide all information required to understand, prevent and mitigate the threats it covers while complying with the provisions of all Acts, executive orders, guidelines; and will be the most authentic and useful resource for ensuring the state of preparedness to meet those threats and for effectively managing any disaster situation arising from those threats.

1.2 Evolution of This Plan

This Plan has been prepared as a deliverable under UPAAM letter no. 261 dated the 23rd May 2009. The terms of reference require, *inter alia*, the plan to be in line with statutory provisions of the Central and UP State Disaster Management Acts, and also to incorporate the guidelines and executive orders issued by Ministry of Home Affairs GoI, and other instructions on the subject by GoI and GoUP. The mandate also gives specific details of some major issues to be covered under this Plan.

The Plan has evolved around the provisions, directives and objectives of related legislations, executive orders, and international development initiatives. The Plan incorporates the guidelines suggested by the two statutes – Disaster Management Act and Uttar Pradesh Disaster Management Act, Report of the High Powered Committee set up by GoI in 1999, and related observations of NDMA & UNDP.

While the objectives of a disaster management plan should remain the same whichever source it may originate from; the stance of a plan and its underlying thematic currents will tend to reflect the concerns of the originator; and the plans so drawn would acquire different hues reflecting the differences in those concerns. Such differences would not merely consist of variations in details but would go much deeper, in as much as they would espouse different approaches and would assign different importance to sub-goals.

For developing this Plan as correctly reflecting the current concerns, suggested plan contents and recommended guidelines by different sources were carefully examined. Any such plan is essentially in response to the prevailing needs of the community. It is based on the prevalent socio-economic-political situation in general and the availability of resources in particular. It would, thus, require modifications with changes in those needs or in the societal perspective or in the resource-availability situation. It is, therefore, considered appropriate to clearly articulate those needs and perspectives which form the backdrop of disaster management initiatives undertaken in the country so far. The next few paragraphs provide a brief summary of such initiatives and of the frameworks suggested by the aforesaid Acts / Authorities / Organisation to sketch the setting for this Plan.

In 1999 GoI set up an HPC under the Chairmanship of Shri J.C. Pant to formulate a comprehensive, systematic and holistic approach to disaster management. The HPC emphasized shifting the focus of disaster management from relief centric reactive

approach to a proactive approach based on the culture of preparedness, quick response, strategic thinking and prevention. It prepared comprehensive model plans for DM at the national level and provided detailed guidelines for drawing up such plans at state and district levels. It also emphasized vulnerability based planning and graded disasters at three levels: L1, L2 and L3, while denoting L0 as a “no-disaster situation”. It introduced the concept of “Trigger Mechanism” to spontaneously set in motion the process of disaster response.

The disaster management planning received a new orientation with the passage of the Disaster Management Act, 2005. This Act created NDMA and stipulated preparation of a National Plan on Disaster Management in consultation with the State Governments and expert bodies. *It also stipulated that every Ministry and Department of the Government of India should make provisions, in its annual plan budgets, for carrying out activities and programmes set out in the disaster management plans.* It appears that similar stipulation has not been made in the UPSDM Act, which entered the statute-book before the enactment of the Central Act. Further, S40 of the Act stipulates that the DMP of every department of State Government shall lay down, inter alia, “the roles and responsibilities of the department of the State in the event of any threatening disaster situation or disaster and *emergency support function* it is required to perform” as also the “present status of its preparedness to perform such roles or responsibilities or emergency support function”.

In 2006 the Planning Commission, while formulating the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-2012) examined the manner in which measures for disaster mitigation, preparedness and capacity building should be enhanced and integrated into the development plans of the Centre and the States; and how to ensure that appropriate financial provisions for disaster management are built into the cost estimates.

Meanwhile in 2002, a Disaster Risk Management Programme was taken up in 169 districts in 17 multi-hazard prone States with the assistance from UNDP, USAID and European Union. Under this project, the States were assisted to draw up State, District and Block level disaster risk management plans; village disaster risk management plans in conjunction with the Panchayati Raj Institutions. This programme also helped create disaster management teams at village levels onward, of volunteers trained in preparedness and response functions such as search & rescue, first aid, relief coordination, shelter management etc.

In addition to these, an all parties National Disaster Management Committee was constituted in 2001 with the PM as its chair in the aftermath of the Gujarat earthquake. The Committee invigorated the political will and various states, notably Orissa and Gujarat, created their SDMAs.

As may be seen, a lot of measures were being taken, suggested under different initiatives by different organizations..

The UNDP Project and NDMA's initiatives led to creation of India Disaster Resource Network (IDRN), a powerful tool for prompt response to disaster situations.

As mentioned earlier the HPC report classified situations based on non-existence or severity of disaster as L0, L1, L2, and L3. Situations may arise in a number of cases where a disaster of unknown severity may appear impending without actually taking place. Examples would be formation of a cyclone heading towards Indian shores, swarms of locusts flying across international boundaries, intelligence reports on simmering civil disorder or communal tension etc. Naturally such information would be quickly shared, at appropriate levels, with the communities likely to be affected giving rise to "alert" situations. Such cases, L0 with "alert", it was found, were so very different from L0 without "alert" that they merited a different category for themselves. (L0 with alert could be called "Warning Phase" of L1/L2 etc and the situation after occurrence of the disaster could be described as the "Impact Phase".) However, as we already have a plethora of nomenclature, without actually naming such situations separately, this Plan emphasizes the *changed* roles of everyone concerned with disaster management when an "alert" is received.

The Plan is focused on the specific deliverables in the work order of UPAAM.

1.3 Themes and Underlying Currents

There are three essential themes running through the Plan: preparedness, development and equity. Preparedness implies a proactive approach, which emphasizes prevention and mitigation rather than reactive responses to an event; development underscores the inverse correlation between human sufferings during disaster and development status of a community; and equity ensures that the weak and helpless sections, which usually suffer worst during any disaster situation, are never lost sight of.

The HPC report defined a disaster as “an occurrence of a severity and magnitude that normally results in deaths, injuries, and property damage, and *that cannot be managed through the routine procedures resources of government*. It usually develops suddenly and unexpectedly and requires immediate, coordinated and effective response by multiple government, voluntary and private sector organizations to meet human needs and speed recovery”. DMA (the Act), on the other hand defines disaster as “a catastrophe, mishap, calamity or grave occurrence in any area, arising from natural or man made causes, or by accident or negligence which results in substantial loss of life or human suffering or damage to, and destruction of, property, or damage to, or degradation of, environment, and is of such a nature or magnitude as to be *beyond the coping capacity of the community of the affected area*”. Clearly, a situation becomes a disaster if the community is unable to cope with it in the normal course. Thus, the same situation may be a disaster for one community (of less coping capability) and a *non-disaster situation* for another. Accordingly, this Plan is first aimed at improving the “coping capacity” of the community, which if inadequate may turn even a relatively tame occurrence into a disaster. Thus the measures to be adopted for prevention and mitigation of disasters, that would improve the coping capacity of the society, constitute the first major theme of the Plan

The second theme weaves around the manner in which mitigation measures are to be integrated with development plans and projects of State. It is driven by two concerns; firstly the well established link between higher development level and lesser damage to human lives in disasters; secondly to ensure availability of funds for disaster mitigation activities on a regular basis. The Act defines “mitigation” as “measures aimed at reducing the risk, impact or effects of a disaster or threatening disaster situation”. Obviously resources from Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) are not available for mitigation activities. Though there has been some thinking on Disaster Mitigation Fund (DMF) for sometime, and DMF is a statutory requirement for all States, still there seems to be no unanimity on what should constitute DMF.

One approach is that it may comprise all Plan schemes which qualify as ‘mitigation’ under the Act. Another is that it may consist of a fixed percentage of total plan allocation to be spent only on such mitigation activities that are not covered under any of the existing plan scheme. Planning Commission has suggested that 0.5% of the total plan allocation of each Ministry/ Department be earmarked for NDMF. The third approach, favoured most by cash strapped states is that DMF may only consist of a small token amount to be utilized for unforeseen mitigation measures. This Plan is driven by the

realism that *disaster management and development must move in tandem else decades of development gains may get lost in a few minutes of disaster*. This realization calls for total internalization of DM processes in the planning processes making it the second major theme underlying this Plan.

The third theme of this Plan, “equity”, is borne out of the repeated observations that weaker sections continue to remain more exposed to sufferings from disaster risks than others. The powerless need more support from the community to cope with the hazards of disaster. To ensure that the special needs of pregnant ladies, lactating mothers, other women, children, aged and disabled are not lost in the flurry of operations the Plan has consciously kept them always in focus. A more effective way of ensuring it is to affirmatively seek their participation during preparedness and mitigation processes as well. As it is not practicable to seek participation of pregnant ladies in mock drills etc the Plan envisages participation of such sections of the community who are more acutely alive to their needs – hospitals, maternity homes, sanitarium and asylum (where existing) staff etc.

Other basic issues underlying the Plan are those raised by NDMA, namely, emphasis on Community Based Disaster Management (CBDM), awareness generation, training needs analysis, knowledge management, development of a state Human Resources (HR) plan, and early warning and forecasting system. As stipulated in the Act, the Plan also sets down standards for relief, rehabilitation etc.

1.4 Objectives of the State Plan

The only plausible objectives for a Disaster Management Plan can be to ensure least human sufferings and least damage to properties from disastrous situations, and quickest recovery and reconstruction in post-disaster period. Viewed from this angle, the objectives of a DMP on Civil Disobedience & Mass Agitation would be:

1. To maintain law and order.
2. To provide information on time, to the people about the danger
3. To shift those at risk to safer places.
4. To ensure arrangement for food, shelter, and medicines for the affected people.
5. To protect vital installations and ensure smooth functioning of essential services.
6. To provide protection to properties belonging to members of public as well as to the government

7. To minimize effective response time so that relief and rescue operations are undertaken immediately.

However, details of these activities and their tactical ramifications would form part of the *District Plans*. At the State level the plan needs to be strategic – it should anticipate the resource requirements and logistic supports needed by the districts in their response actions. It should also aim at *preventing* civil disobedience and mass agitations, and to this end an SDMP should explore the reasons behind such incidences and what can be done to counter the socio-economic and political forces that give rise to such situations.

This Plan sets out a roadmap in line with statutory provisions of the Act, UPSDM Act, also with the guidelines and executive orders issued by MHA, GoI, and other instructions on the subject by GOI and GoUP to achieve the final objective by setting some strategic goals, and identifies intermediate objectives as major milestones. The Plan aims at the following five strategic goals:

1. Professionalising the disaster management process
2. Making preparedness, risk reduction / mitigation parts of their normal processes by concerned departments / organizations
3. Strengthening institutional mechanisms to achieve the highest degree of coordination
4. Strengthening emergency response systems to ensure that responses are prompt and effective
5. Strengthening rehabilitation and recovery structure

The Plan sets out the following intermediate objectives:

1. Identification of risk reduction / mitigation activities for civil disobedience and mass agitations
2. Classification of necessary activities for effective preparedness for different Departments / Organizations
3. Identifying emergency responses for different stages of civil disorder
4. Situation analysis to understand and identify factors encouraging social disorder / violence and to suggest an institutional mechanisms for curbing such factors
5. Creating appropriate structure for seamlessly providing relief and humanitarian assistance

6. Creating system and infrastructure for effective training and capacity building for risk mitigation, prevention and response
7. Creating heightened awareness among the community-members by education and communication activities

CHAPTER II


OVERVIEW OF THE STATE

Uttar Pradesh is the largest state of India in terms of population and the fifth largest in terms of area. The state is divided in four economic regions i.e., Western, Central, Bundelkhand and Eastern. Lying largely in the Gangetic plains (except the Bundelkhand region), the economy of the state is still largely based on agriculture. This location in the Himalayan foothills and dependency on agriculture give rise to their own potential calamities. A scanty rainy season can lead to near drought conditions with drinking water scarcity; and a heavy rainfall can cause a flurry of floods destroying cultivation, damaging property, disrupting road transportation, water supply, electricity supply systems etc.

2.1 Topography

Uttar Pradesh is bounded by Nepal and Uttaranchal on the North, Haryana and Rajasthan on the west, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh on the south and Bihar and Jharkhand on the east. Situated between 23° 52' N and 31° 28' N latitudes and 77° 3' and 84° 39' E longitudes, Uttar Pradesh can be divided into two distinct geographical regions:


- The Gangetic plain in the North, West, Centre and East.
- The Vindhyan hills and plateau in the south



The state has 71 districts, grouped in 17 divisions, again grouped in 4 regions, based on physiographic characteristics and varied social and economic conditions: the Eastern, Central, Western and Bundelkhand regions. The broad characteristics of these regions are;

- Eastern region: Wide alluvial plains with dense rural population (776 persons per sq km), higher proportion of cultivated land.
- Central region: Level riverine plane characterized by fertile alluvial soil, dense population (658 persons per sq km), lower rural density compared to Eastern region.
- Western region: Varies from riverine alluvial plain to generally uniform and level with slight undulations towards south, slopes from north to south or south to east with reference to alignment of major rivers, economically developed and has larger urban centres; population density of 765 persons per sq km.
- Bundelkhand region: Northern part is plain, southern part has gentle undulating surface, due to undulating and rugged surface, Bundelkhand plateau has lower population concentration (280 persons per sq km) compared to other regions.

A map of UP showing the districts in each region is presented below:



2.2 Area and administrative divisions

The state of Uttar Pradesh is spread over 240,928 sq. km. comprising 71 districts 300 tehsils, 809 CD Blocks and 107,452 villages (including forest villages). The number of towns in the state is 694 of which 638 are statutory towns and 66 census towns.

2.3 Physical regions

Uttar Pradesh forms a major area of the Northern fertile plain known as the Indo-Gangetic plain. As already mentioned the Eastern, Western and Central regions lie in fertile alluvial plains, and the Bundelkhand region lies in the Vindhyan plateau. Its vast area, big and small rivers, varieties of climatic conditions, and different kinds of soils have bestowed a diversity of flora and fauna, which is hard to find elsewhere.

2.4 Climate

The climate of Uttar Pradesh is tropical monsoon in character. The standard temperature varies in the plains from 3-4°C in January to 43-45°C in May and June. Uttar Pradesh mainly experiences three distinct seasons - winter from October to February, summer from March to Mid June and the rainy season from mid June to September. The Himalayan region gets about 100-200cm of rain fall. The rainfall in the plains is heaviest in the east and decreases as one proceeds towards the north-west. Floods are a chronic problem of the state, causing damage to crops, life and property. Flood water during the rainy season becomes a major hindrance for tourists traveling to Uttar Pradesh. There are occasional cloud-bursts adding to the misery of the people. The most severe floods were in 1971, when 51 of the then 54 districts of the state were affected across nearly 52 lakh hectares.

The eastern districts are the most susceptible to floods, the western districts somewhat less and the central region markedly less. The eastern district's proneness to floods is attributed, among other things, to heavy rainfall, low and flat topography, high subsoil water level and the silting of beds which causes river levels to rise. The problem in the western districts is mainly poor drainage caused by the obstruction of roads, railways, canals, new built-up areas etc. There is water logging over large areas. The major flood-prone rivers are the Ganga, Jamuna, Gomati, Ghaghra, Rapti, Sarada and Ramganga. The insufficient drainage capacity of the smaller western rivers Sirsa, Kali and the Aligarh drain is also a cause of floods.

2.5 Temperature and Rainfall

The seasons in Uttar Pradesh can be divided into Summer, Monsoon and Winter. The temperature varies with the change of seasons. Summer season, which is very hot and dry, continues from March to June. The temperatures during this season rise to 45°C, sometimes 47-48°C. There is low relative humidity of about (20%) and dust laden winds flow throughout the season. Monsoon season runs from June-September. The state

receives 85% of average annual rainfall of 990 mm. during the season. The temperature is around 35-42°C on during the season. Winter season starts from October-February. The minimum temperature is around 3-4°C and sometimes goes below -1°C. The maximum temperature remains around 15 °C to 25 °C.



2.6 River systems and Dams

The state has a large network of rivers consisting of Ganga, Yamuna, Ghaghra, Saryu, Ramganga, Sharda, Rapti, Gandak, Gomti etc. These constitute perennial sources of water for the state. However, these rivers also cause serious floods during the months of August and September in most of the districts in the state. The major dams in the state are listed below:

1. **Matatila Dam** is constructed on Betwa River in Lalitpur District
2. **Parichha Dam** is also built on the Betwa River near Parichha town, which is about 25 km from Jhansi. Its reservoir - a placid stretch of water that runs to Notghat Bridge, 34 km away from Jhansi - is ideal for water sports.
3. **Rihand Dam** is built on Rihand River, a tributary of River Sone, at Pipri in Sonbhadra District, near the border of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar

Pradesh. It also produces power with its 6 units, each of 50 M.W. Many other seasonal and perennial rivers join the Rihand reservoir such as River Kanchan, Mayar and Azir.

4. **Jamini Dam** is constructed on Jamini River in Lalitpur District.
5. **Rohini Dam** is constructed on Rohini River in Lalitpur District.
6. **Shahzad Dam** is located on the outskirts of Lalitpur. It is built across the Shahzad River, a tributary of the Jamini River. It is a major source for irrigation in Lalitpur District and a major tourist attraction in the region.
7. **Govind Sagar Dam** too is constructed on Shahzad River in Lalitpur District.
8. **Sajnam Dam**, is constructed across the River Sajnam, a tributary of the Jamini near Chandawali in Lalitpur District. It is a major irrigation source and also a tourist attraction.
9. **Sukma-Dukma Dam** is constructed on Betwa River near Jhansi District.
10. **Arjun Dam** is an earthen type dam on Arjun river at Charkhari, about 20 km from Mahoba.
11. **Lakheri Dam**, in Jhansi district, provides irrigation facilities to the villages in the region and is a major source of water in Garautha tehsil.
12. **Maudaha Dam**, situated in Rath tehsil of Hamirpur district, is constructed across the Birma River, a tributary of the Betwa River. Apart from irrigation, Maudaha Dam provides drinking water to the larger parts of the region.
13. **Obra Dam**, situated in the outskirts of Sonbhadra, across the Rihand River, supplies water to the Obra Thermal Power House. The dam also has hydel power generation capacity of 99 MW.
14. **Rajghat Dam**, constructed on the Betwa River at 22 kms from Lalitpur, is a joint venture of the Governments of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh.

2.6 Demography

2.6.1 Population

The total population of Uttar Pradesh, as per 2001 Census is 166,197,921 comprising of 87,565,369 males and 78,632,552 females. 79.21 percent resides in the rural areas. The total number of households comes to 25,757,640. The average size of households in the state is 6. The proportion of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe population to the total population in the state comes to 21.1 and 0.1 respectively. The density of the state stands at 690 persons per sq. kms. A map showing density by districts in the state is given below:

Population Density by Districts

2.6.2 Religious Communities

Major religious communities are Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh, Buddhist and Jain. As much as 80.61% are Hindus followed by 18.50% Muslims. The population of other religious communities is negligible. There are 24 districts with a higher population of Muslims than the state average. The top five such districts are: Rampur (49.14%), Moradabad (45.54%), Bijnor (41.71%), Jyotiba Phule Nagar (39.38%) and Saharanpur (39.11%). Other districts with more than state average of Muslim population are Muzaffarnagar, Balrampur, Bahraich, Bareilly, Meerut, Siddharthnagar, Shrawasti, Baghpat, Sant Kabir Nagar, Ghaziabad, Pilibhit, Barabanki, Budaun, Bulandshahr, Lucknow, Gonda, Sitapur, Kheri and Mau.


2.6.3 Sex Ratio

It is the number of females per 1000 males in a given area and is indicative of the condition of females in the society. The Indian Census also provides the sex ratio in the age group 0-6 so as to gauge the discrimination between the boy and the girl child. The sex ratio of the state is 898 while that in the age group 0-6 is 916. There is a difference of 18 points in the sex ratio of two age groups. It indicates that more care is taken in upbringing of male child than that of a female child. The four districts in UP with a female dominated sex ratio are Azamgarh (1020), Jaunpur (1014), Pratapgarh (1004) and Deoria (1002). The lowest sex ratios have been recorded in Shahjahanpur (842), Budaun (842), Gautam Buddha Nagar (841) and Mathura (840).

2.6.4 Literacy and Education


The literacy rate of the state is quite low at 56.3%. Uttar Pradesh ranks 17th in literacy rate among 19 major states. The state has an identical female literacy rank among the

major states with 42.20%. Among districts, Kanpur Nagar (74.37%), Auraiya (70.50%) and Ghaziabad (69.74%) have the highest overall literacy rate. The lowest ranked are Bahraich (35.16%), Balrampur (34.60%) and Shrawasti (33.82%). In female literacy, the top three districts are Kanpur Nagar (67.46%), Lucknow (60.47%) and Auraiya (59.13%), while the lowest three are Bahraich (22.78), Balrampur (21.79%) and Shrawasti (18.58%). A map showing female literacy is given below:



2.6.5 Educational Level

4.3% of all literates in the State are without any formal education level. These persons have not achieved any educational level but can read and write with understanding as per the 2001 Census. It means they have not attended any formal school. 25.4% of the literates are educated up to below primary and 24.7% up to primary levels. Thus, over half of the literates have not completed school education beyond primary level. Those achieving middle and Matric / Secondary level of education are 18.9 and 12.0%. It may be seen that 56.3% are literate and of those as many as 85.4 % have either achieved a level below matriculation or none at all. Thus only about 8% of the total population has received education beyond secondary level.



appear to be marginally better educated. The table given below presents full details.

Educational Level in the Two major Religious Communities in UP

Educational Level	All Religions			Hindus			Muslims		
	P	M	F	P	M	F	P	M	F
Literates to total population	56.3	68.8	42.2	58.0	71.2	43.1	47.8	57.3	37.4
Literate with no education	4.3	4.0	4.9	3.7	3.5	4.1	7.7	6.8	9.1
Below primary	25.4	23.1	29.6	24.2	21.9	28.5	32.5	30.2	36.5
Primary	24.7	23.2	27.3	24.1	22.4	27.3	28.1	28.3	27.9
Middle	18.9	20.1	16.8	19.8	20.8	17.8	14.6	16.2	11.8
Matric/Secondary	12.0	13.4	9.5	12.6	14.1	9.9	8.6	9.4	7.2
HS / Inter / Pre-U / SS	7.9	8.6	6.5	8.4	9.2	6.9	4.6	4.8	4.3
Others not equal to Degree	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.2
Graduate & above	6.6	7.3	5.1	7.0	7.9	5.4	3.6	4.0	3.0

2.6.6 Socio-economic profile

With population of 16.6 million in 2001, the State has 16.17% of the country's population living on 240,928 sq. kms, which is 7.3 % of the country's area. The population density as is 689 per sq. km while the national average is 324 per sq. km. Largest sector is agriculture, it employs 72 % of the labour force and accounts for 46 percent of the state income. Although predominantly an agriculture driven state and the largest producer of food grains, UP is the third poorest in terms of *per capita production* of food grains as well as in terms of growth rate in the production of food grains.


Uttar Pradesh ranks low on most of the social development indicator in spite of being the most populous state in the country. The state domestic product increased @ 3% during 1997-2002 against national average of 5.3% during same period. The state's contribution in National Income according to quick estimates for 2002-2003 was 8.3%, placing UP among poorest states in the country.

In 1973-74, the number of persons below the poverty line was 53.5 million, which were about 57 percent of the states' population. It was about 16.7 % of the total number of

persons living below poverty line in the entire country. The number of persons living below poverty line is 31.15 % in 1999-2000 compared to all India 26.10%. Out of this the poverty ratio in rural areas is 31.22 % and that is the urban areas 30.89 %. It is revealed that though there is a significant declining trend, yet the number of persons living below poverty line in the state remains above 50 millions within a span of 27 years. About 41 million population below poverty line lives in rural area.

2.7 Economic Activity

The work participation rate or WPR (work population rate is arrived at by dividing the number of workers with total population) in the state is 32.5 percent as per the results of 2001 Census. The male WPR is 46.8 percent while that for females is only 16.5. The economy in Uttar Pradesh is basically agricultural. Thus, the proportion of workers engaged in cultivation, whether as cultivators or agricultural labourers, is as high as 65.9%. The proportion of Household Industry workers is 5.6%. Rest 28.5 % is engaged in the category of other workers which includes the secondary and tertiary sectors. A map showing Work Participation Rate by district is presented below:



2.7.1

Agriculture

Uttar Pradesh economy is primarily agrarian in nature. Agriculture contributes about 40 percent to the state gross domestic production as against 25 percent at the national level. This sector engages over 70 percent of the population and 65 percent work force in the state. State has a geographical area 24.2 million hectares and out of this 16.8 million hectares area is actually cultivated. The un-irrigated area is 3.98 million hectare. The state is geographically located in the most fertile tract of indo-gangetic plains. The state has good soils and water availability through rainfall and river flow.

Uttar Pradesh is largest producer of wheat in the country contributing about 36 percent of the all India production whereas UP is second largest producer of rice, contributing about 15 percent to the national production. The area under these crops is predominantly less than the contribution in terms of production. UP is the second largest

pulses producing state in India, contributing to about 45 percent of national production; but its production falls short of what is needed to feed its population. Similarly, in oilseed crops, state is contributing about 18 percent production of rapeseed / mustard. State also contributes about 45 percent sugarcane production in the country. The state is largest producer of potato with about 40 percent of national production while its contribution of mango and guava are about 40 and 46 percent respectively. In all, the state produces about 10 million tonnes of fruits and 17 million tonnes of vegetables.

2.7.2 Industry

Uttar Pradesh ranks fifth in the country both in terms of number of factories and of invested capital. In 2003-04 it had 9,237 factories, comprising 7.2% of total 129,074 factories in India. Growth of industry in UP is not keeping pace with the national growth rate. During 2003-06 UP received only 5 approvals of total 213 industry parks approved in the country.

Uttar Pradesh has 65,538 SSI units i.e., 11.3% of all SSI units in India and ranks fourth in the country in number of SSIs. It has one operational special economic zone at Noida and three approved and under establishment SEZs, one for textiles at Moradabad, and two multi-product SEZs at Bhadohi and Kanpur.

The industrial growth of Uttar Pradesh has been primarily driven by four factors, namely, the traditional skills of local artisans (carpets, brassware, bangles etc), availability of agriculture produce as industrial inputs (sugar, alcohol, other downstream chemicals), its proximity to national capital and huge population and large tracts of agricultural land that offer a big market for many manufactured produce. The first three growth drivers have contributed to concentrated pockets of industrialization.

Terai region has a number of sugar mills and a few chemical units that use molasses as feed. Kanpur / Agra have well developed leather industry, Eastern UP has weaving – textiles and carpets, Moradabad has brassware, Shikohabad has bangles and Khurja has ceramic potteries. Ghaziabad, a district adjoining the national capital has a large number of manufacturing units and newly developed NOIDA has forged ahead in services sector. UP State Industrial Development Corporation (UPIDC) has created a number of industrial states, which have attracted many prestigious industries. UP also has Hindalco, one of the major aluminium manufacturers of the country at Renukoot and an atomic power plant at Narora.

Manufacturing however is the last in contribution to the State Gross Domestic Product. In 2004-05 secondary sector (manufacturing) accounted for 24% of SGDP, primary sector (mostly agriculture) contributed 33% and, tertiary sector comprising transportation, communication, banking, real estate and other services, contributed maximum at 43%. The growth rate of the States SGDP, in line with the trend in national income, had risen from a 1% in 2000-01 to 5.8% in 2002-03. It stood at 4.8% during the year 2004-05. Over the five-year period (2000-05), tertiary sector posted a compounded annual growth rate of 5.5%; secondary sector at 4.4%, and primary sector grew at just 1.8%. Per Capita Income of the state, at 2004-2005 prices, stands at Rs.11477.

2.7.3 Mines

Uttar Pradesh has limestone in Mirzapur and Sonbhadra districts; dolomite in Mirzapur, Sonbhadra and Banda districts, glass-sand in Allahabad Banda and Mau districts; marble in Mirzapur and Sonbhadra districts; bauxite in Banda; non-plastic fireclay in Mirzapur; and Uranium in Lalitpur district. Besides, Barytes and Edalusite are found in the districts of Mirzapur and Sonbhadra. Southern parts of Sonbhadra district also have sizeable coal deposits mined by Northern Coalfields Limited, a public sector company with headquarters in Chhattisgarh. Sand-stone, pebbles, reh, salt punter, morang, sand and other minor minerals are also found in the State. Mirzapur – Sonbhadra area can be considered as the most significant mining belt of the state.

2.8 Health Infrastructure

Health infrastructure in the State is far from adequate, as would be evident from this table:

Particulars	Required	In place	Shortfall
Sub-Centres (SCs)	26344	20521	5823
Primary Health Centres (PHCs)	4390	3660	730
Community Health Centres (CHCs)	1097	386	711
MPW (Female)/ANM at SCs & PHCs	24181	21900	2281
Health Worker (Male) MPW(M) at SCs	20521	5732	14789
Health Assistant (Female)/LHV at PHCs	3660	2128	1532
Health Assistant (Male) at PHCs	3660	4061	-
Doctor at PHCs	3660	NA	NA
Obstetricians & Gynaecologists at CHCs	386	123	263
Physicians at CHCs	386	123	263
Paediatricians at CHCs	386	13	373

Total specialists at CHCs	1544	413	1131
Radiographers	386	NA	NA


2.9 Transport and communication

2.9.1 Roads

The state has the largest road network in the country after Maharashtra. There are 31 National Highways (NH), with a total length of 4,942 km (8.5% of total NH length in India). Total road length in the state is 248,481 km (2002), of which 67% (166,659 km) is surfaced and has the largest surfaced urban road network in the country i.e. 50,721 km, as on 2002. Besides total road length of PWD in the state is 118946 km. This includes 3869 km of national highways, 9097 km of state highways, 105980 of other district roads and 72,931 km of rural roads.

2.9.2 Railway

The state has the largest railway network in India with a total length of 8546 kms. Almost all the major as well as small cities in Uttar Pradesh are linked through railways. Cargo carried within the northern and north-eastern zone of the railways is approximately 133 million tonnes. Lucknow is the main junction of the northern network. Other important railway junctions are Agra, Kanpur, Allahabad, Mughalsarai, Jhansi, Moradabad, Varanasi, Tundla, Gorakhpur, Gonda, Faizabad, Bareilly and Sitapur.



2.9.3

Airports

Uttar Pradesh is well connected to Delhi and other cities in India. Uttar Pradesh has various

medium and small sized airports that have the facility to operate and host flights. Some of the major cities that are connected through Air-service are Lucknow, Kanpur, Varanasi, Jhansi, Allahabad, Agra, Bareilly, Hindon (Ghaziabad), Gorakhpur, Sarsawa

(Saharanpur) and Fursatganj (Raebareli). All these cities have airports, some (notably Lucknow, Varanasi, Agra, Jhansi) host flights from major cities in India. Varanasi and Lucknow have International Airports. Among the domestic airports, Lucknow is the best in terms of connection and infrastructure. The city is well connected to almost all the major destinations in India such as Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Agra, Jaipur, Varanasi and Patna among others.

2.10 Disaster Vulnerability of Uttar Pradesh

The physiographic profile of the state, described in details in this Chapter, bring to fore the following issues regarding its disaster vulnerability and challenges it may face in managing a disaster:

Natural disasters: Among the natural disasters, many are caused by weather factors – floods, storms, tsunami, hurricanes etc. UP, not being a coastal state is not exposed to tsunamis or seasonal hurricanes that form over seas. State is however exposed to the following natural disasters:

- Lying in close proximity to the Himalayan Range exposes UP to earthquake risks
- Dependence on rain fed agriculture over vast areas exposes the state to droughts
- Its riparian system exposes it to floods
- Western agricultural districts of the state are also exposed to locusts

Man made disasters: Population mix, concentration of industries, international borders, dams over rivers – all aggravate the potential threats from man made disasters.

- The population mix of the state gives rise to occasional communal clashes
- Long and porous international border makes it an easy target for anti national elements
- An atomic power plant in the state keeps the risks of a Chernobyl type disaster looming over the horizon
- The number of large and medium sized dams / reservoirs expose UP to the disasters arising from dam-bursts
- Concentration of industries in certain areas (and consequent mobility of population) may assist and promote simmering dissatisfaction among large number of peoples and lead to civil disturbance

The socio economic features of the state – low literacy level in certain districts and huge gaps in health infrastructure pose challenges in managing a disaster situation. It is not

improbable that in certain villages of Eastern districts there might not be any person capable of understanding leaflets containing instructions on dealing with a disaster situation. Moreover, low education levels make a population more susceptible to machinations of anti national elements.


Inadequacies in health care system – both of trained persons and infrastructure – make it necessary to move casualties over large distances for proper treatment. This can be a big challenge during floods when roads may get submerged and large tracts get cut off. Concentration of industries and changes in the level of industrialization across the state have impacted the dynamics of labour migration with consequent effects on the social fabric that need to be kept in view while formulating any disaster management plans.

Against this background, three major causes of potential disasters in the state are described briefly.

2.10.1 Earthquakes

An earthquake is a series of vibrations on the earth’s surface. It occurs without warning. It can cause grave damage to life and wreck the economy with long lasting adverse effects. Thus years of development gains may be lost in just a few seconds of a high intensity earthquake.

Earthquakes are caused due to the moving plates below the surface of the earth. Major earthquakes often occur around the edges of the moving plates and at other weak places



in the crust called *faults*. Based on these faults the whole country is divided into Seismic Zones; Zone V being the highest risk zone. UP

does not have any area falling under Zone V. The districts falling under Zones II, III and IV are noted below. The entire Himalayan Region is considered to be vulnerable to high intensity earthquakes

Zone IV : Entire districts of Saharanpur, Muzaffarnagar, Bagpat, Bijnor, Meerut, Ghaziabad, Gautambuddh Nagar, JP Nagar, Rampur, Moradabad, Bulandshar, Shravasti, Balrampur, Siddharthnagar, Maharajganj, Kushinagar, and parts Of Pilibhit, Shajahanpur, Kheri, Baharaich, Gonda, Mathura, Aligarh, Budaun, Bareilly, Basti, Sant Kabir Nagar, Deoria and Ballia.

Zone III: Entire districts of Sonbhadra, Chandauli, Ghazipur, Varanasi, Jaunpur, Azamgarh, Gorakhpur, Sultanpur, Raebareli, Faizabad, Unnao, Lucknow, Barabanki, Sitapur, Hardoi, Kannauj, Mainpuri, Firozabad, Etah, Mahamayanagar, Farukkabad, and parts of Mirzapur, Pratapgarh, Kanpurnagar, Auraiya, Etawah, Agra, Mathura, Aligarh, Badaun, Bareilly, Pilibhit, Kheri, Baharaich, Gonda, Basti, Sant Kabir Nagar, Deoria and Ballia.


Zone II : Entire districts of Lalitpur, Jbansi, Mahoba, Jalaun, Banda, Kausambi, Allahabad and parts of Agra, Etawah, Auraiya, Kanpur Nagar, Fatehpur, Pratapgarh and Mirzapur.

(The overlapping zones showed in the map above indicate that the whole district does not fall into a single zone.)

2.10.2 Flood Prone Areas

Floods are a chronic problem of the state, causing damage to crops, life and property. Flood waters during the rainy season often disrupt transport systems. The most severe floods were in 1971, when 51 of the 54 districts of the state were affected.

The eastern districts are the most susceptible to floods, the western districts somewhat less and the central region markedly less. The eastern district's proneness to floods is attributed, among other things, to heavy rainfall, low and flat topography, high subsoil water level and the silting of beds which causes river levels to rise. The problem in the western districts is mainly poor drainage caused by the obstruction of roads, railways, canals, new built-up areas etc. There is water logging in the large areas. The major flood-prone rivers are the Ganga, Jamuna, Gomati, Ghaghra, Rapti, Sarda, Gandak and Ramganga. (Source: NDMA Guidelines)



The Ganga River basin of U.P. experiences normal rainfall in the region from 60 cm to 190 cm of which more than 80% occur during the southwest monsoon. The rainfall increases from west to east and from south to north. Similar is the pattern of floods, the problem increases from west to east and south to north. Out of the 240.93 lakh hectares geographical area of the State about 73.06 lakh hectares is flood prone. As per the Irrigation Department's estimate, only 58.72 lakh can actually be protected. Up to March 2004, only 16.01 lakh hectares has been protected. The eastern districts as well as those situated in the Terai region bordering Nepal are the most affected. Due to floods, an average of 26.89 lakh hectares is affected annually, and the estimated loss to crops, houses and livestock is to the tune of Rs.432 crore annually. Apart from these, loss of human life also occurs.

2.10.3 Drought Prone Areas

Drought is generally considered to be occurring when the principal monsoons fail or are deficient or scanty. Monsoon failure results in crop failure, shortage of drinking water as well as undue hardship to the rural and urban community. Drought is declared for each state or part(s) of a state by the State Government under the Relief Manuals or similar documents of the State Government. Declaration of drought is primarily based on the quantum of rainfall, damage to kharif crops and lesser availability of drinking water and less moisture in the soil. It may be mentioned that there is no universally accepted definition of drought.

The identified drought prone districts of UP are Allahabad, Banda, Hamirpur, Jalaun, Mirzapur and Varanasi, Hathras, Mainpuri, Bareilly, Hardoi, Unnao, Rae Bareli, Farrukhabad, Kannauj, Kanpur Dehat, Fatehpur, Sultanpur, Basti, Sant Kabir Nagar, Kushinagar, Deoria, Mau, Ballia, Jaunpur and Ghazipur.

PART II: DISASTER SPECIFIC

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

&

MASS AGITATION

Chapter 3

Vulnerability Assessment and Risk Analysis

3.1 Civil Disobedience, Mass Agitation and Social Disorder

Civil disobedience was the non-violent weapon used by Mahatma Gandhi to fight for the ouster of the colonial rule in India. Can civil disobedience result in a disaster? If the connotation of civil is gracious, well mannered, courteous etc then a civil disobedience can never give rise to disaster. Another possible connotation of civil is “non-military”. Used in this sense, civil disobedience becomes the non-military equivalent of a coup. It may well lead to chaos and loss of order in the society, with all the attendant hardships on the citizens. Mass agitation will mean the same as civil disobedience if the masses are agitating against the government or against *order*. Quite often masses agitate against a specific target, for example farmers may agitate against a sugar mill, recalcitrant in paying the cane dues. Even if the agitation is not aimed against order, if sustained long enough, at some time, *most* mass agitations lead to chaos and breakdown of social order.

As with most social phenomena, the causes of mass agitations often lie deeper than what appear on surface. A large number of agitations do precipitate with occurrence of some event perceived negatively by a segment of the society, but it may be misleading to claim that those events were *true causes* of the agitations they apparently spawned. There is much evidence to suggest that *economic and social factors* are major causes of civil unrest. Globally, most civil unrest examples are seen to be associated with political reforms.

3.2 Why do mass agitations occur?

Civil unrest has often been linked to inequality. Inequality, economic or otherwise, is understood to breed feeling of being deprived, which in turn gives rise to frustration and aggression is known as a means to reduce frustration – leading to protests, marches and agitations. (This hypothesis is often called D-F-A Hypothesis and some (mostly American) research findings of 1960s-1970s do not seem to support it.) However, it does not mean that inequality always results in social disorder. Communities can remain peaceful for generations, accepting the inequalities. Deprived sections take to agitations only when they see their situation worsening or when they see possibility of improvements in their situation. Even the relatively privileged may resort to agitation if they feel their relative situation is worsening. In a major economic disaster, when the community finds no work, no money and no food, mass agitations almost always take place. Food riots are not uncommon features in poor countries.

Changes in the established pattern of sharing of some natural resources – water from a river for example are known to have given rise to mass agitations at many places. (A

ready example is the long running agitation in Tamil Nadu – Karnataka belt for sharing of water of River Krishna. Similarly influx of migrant labour, beyond the capacity of a community to absorb them often gives rise to mass agitation resulting in civil disorder. This is often used a political plank by local politicians. An example can be seen in frequent agitations in Mumbai on the “North Indians” robbing Mumbaikars of their job opportunities. Mumbaikars, prodded by local politicians react by thrashing North Indians and often the situation gets out of hand

Similarly, Bangladeshis settling all over India, looking for livelihoods has created a powerful time bomb. Demography suggests that this may eventually acquire communal overtones.

Though labour migrations, whether international or intra-national, have given rise to social disorder, it needs to be appreciated that not all labour migrations give rise to disorder. Labor migrations are of two types - seasonal and permanent; only the second type is considered as a threat by the host community. The need of seasonal migrant labour has been part of many local economies for generations but the permanent movements of labour produce ‘non-viable’ migrants that may have no means of surviving in the host community *except by underbidding the wage rate*. Such migrants often find employment in the informal sector and are subjected to oppressive employment practices. Initially willing to the cruel working conditions (and even happy to have survived the bleak prospects of their own community), the migrants eventually revolt or the members of the host community take to agitation when they see the migrants competing with them for better opportunities or even for state welfare measures – subsidized rations for example.

The ongoing economic liberalization of India has been cited by some as a cause for social unrest in some quarters. Liberalization led to closure of many manufacturing industries, rendering thousands of workers jobless. The new employment opportunities created, often with higher wage rates, require different skill-set causing major upheavals in the relative wellbeing of workers. This has been identified as one of the reasons for rise in agitations in recent years in some quarters.

The causes can be complex and at times beyond the control of the enforcement agencies, but their understanding gives means of forecasting the frequency of such agitations and to that extent preparing the State to manage the contingencies.

3.3 Measuring Potential for Social Unrest (PSU)

There can be a great many reasons why a civil society might descend into disorder. While more social unrest has been seen in poorer nations, it may be noted that riots had erupted in November 2005 and again in November 2007 in the poorer neighborhoods of Paris. It is safe to conclude that *no community is immune to social unrest, though some have higher potential for it than others.*

Researches suggest that two causative factors for social unrest are a) division(s) in the community; and b) at least one section feeling deprived. Based on these two factors, social scientists have developed two indices to measure the PSU:

- Polarization index, and
- Total relative deprivation index

Income of individuals is commonly considered as the criteria for formation of groups (it is by no means the only possible criterion – there could be others wealth, religion, social standing etc.). With income as the relevant criterion, one index is found to be more effective in certain situations and the other in some different situations. If income be the criterion of group formation, the potential of social unrest will change with redistribution of incomes. Research findings suggest:

PI is better predictor of PSU	IF	Number of distinct Groups falls	AND	There is strong sense of Group identity
TRDI is better	IF	Within Group identity is weak		

3.3.1 Polarization Index: Polarization Index (PI) has been designed to identify likely emergence of tension between heterogeneous groups. Polarization can take place in a community only if there exist several groups. But mere existence of groups does not rupture the social structure; rather it adds variety and enriches it. Polarization is taken to arise when members of a group sense strong within-group identity *and simultaneously* between-group alienation. If it is assumed that income is the key factor (it need not always be) the intensity of the within-group identification then depends on the number of individuals who share the same level of income. And, the feeling of alienation of one group towards another can be measured by the *difference in mean incomes between the two*

groups. To estimate PI one needs to know the income distribution in a community. With income distribution, PI can be estimated as follows:

1. First calculate the sum of a group's income differences from all other income groups to get the alienation component of the measure
2. Multiply the sum obtained in (1) by the number of individuals in the group -within-group identification (the identification component of the measure).
3. Summing up over all income groups yields the polarization number which can be suitably indexed.

Based on 2000 data of household incomes for India (in PPP US dollars) the national polarization measure has been estimated in the table below:

	No of Households			
Group	(Identification measure)	Mean Income	Alienation measure	A*B/1,00,00,000
	(A)		(B)	
A	9593204	500	24500	23503
B	86338840	1500	19500	168361
C	44128740	2500	16500	72812
D	12471166	3500	15500	19330
E	9593204	4500	16500	15829
F	8633884	5500	19500	16836
G	21105050	10000	42000	88641
Total	191864088	Polarization measure: 405313		

(This table is created from the data available at http://pdf.wri.org/hammond_india_profiles.xls.pdf)

It can be seen that PI will increase with a rise in the income inequality between the groups.

3.3.2 Total Relative Deprivation Index (TRDI): It is believed that disruptions emerge from dismay felt by community members. “Relative Deprivation” is a measure of this dismay. Total Relative Deprivation of a community of a community is obtained by summing up the “relative deprivation” of all individuals. To estimate TRDI too one needs to know the income distribution in a community. It can be estimated as follows:

1. First RD of each individual is estimated with the following formula:
(Fraction of people earning more than the individual) x (their mean excess income)
2. This added up for the community to get the TRD of the community, which can be suitably indexed to get TRDI

TRDI can serve as a proxy for the “aggregated degree of discontent” and could thus be used to measure potential for social unrest.

Based on 2000 data of household incomes for India (in PPP US dollars) the national TRD measure has been estimated in the table below:

Group	No of Households	Average income	% of people earning more	Their mean excess income	Relative deprivation
	(A)		(B)	(C)	(A*B*C)/1cr
A	9593204	500	95%	2711	2470
B	86338840	1500	50%	3250	14030
C	44128740	2500	27%	4167	4964
D	12471166	3500	20%	4171	1066
E	9593204	4500	16%	4194	624
F	8633884	5500	11%	4500	427
G	21105050	10000	0%	0	0
Total	191864088				TRD measure: 23582

(This table is created from the data available at http://pdf.wri.org/hammond_india_profiles.xls.pdf)

For any individual, an increase in the income of any higher income earner results in greater relative deprivation (even when the individual’s rank in the hierarchy of incomes remains unchanged), and for any individual, a decline in the number of earners of lower incomes results in more relative deprivation (even when the number of higher income earners and their incomes remain unchanged).

3.3.3 Uses of Indices: Indices could serve as possible advance warnings of looming social unrest. Both PI and TRDI need to be estimated since it is seen that in some situations one becomes a superior predictor of PSU. (It is emphasized that PSU is merely *potential for social unrest* it is not actual social unrest.) Clearly both PI and TRDI will change whenever income gets redistributed in the community. It has been suggested that:

- If the alienation component (differences in mean incomes) and the identification component (number of individuals in one group) of PI rise or fall simultaneously, use of either of the two indices will give the same result.
- If income redistribution results in *fewer distinct income groups* PI appears to be better tool for predicting PSU.
- When the *alienation component and the identification component of PI move in opposite directions*, TRDI becomes a better yardstick.

3.4 Hazard risk assessment and vulnerability mapping

HPC report defines hazard as “a rare event that threatens to adversely affect human life property of activity to the extent of causing disaster’ and risk as “the expected loss (casualties, damage to property, and disruption of economic activity or livelihood) caused by a particular phenomenon”. Risk, thus, is product of likely loss in case of the occurrence of the hazardous event and the probability of the occurrence of the event itself. The two aspects – extent of likely loss and the probability of the occurrence of risk events are considered separately.

3.4.1 Extent of likely loss: Mass agitations may cause loss of human lives and destruction of properties and thus, take away the gains of several decades of development and put the community back. While it is not possible to accurately estimate the losses arising from a potential social unrest at any place, a rough assessment of likely loss can be made with the following indicators:

- a. Loss of human lives will usually vary with the density of people living in the locality. More crowded areas are likely to suffer higher loss of human lives. An attack by a riotous mob on cinema halls, places of worship during festivals, railway stations, educational institutions etc may take very high tolls of human lives.
- b. Isolated, unprotected dwellings are easier to be broken into by rioters. Existence of such isolated dwellings – isolation could be geographical (with no houses nearby) or social - a house belonging to a member of target group surrounded by houses belonging to the members of the hostile group, increase the hazard risk.
- c. Finally, loss of human lives can be significantly higher in an area which becomes inaccessible due to any reason or in an area with inadequate medical facilities.
- d. Extent of loss of properties will first depend on existence of properties. This increases the hazard risk of cities compared to that of smaller towns and so on.

3.4.2 Probability of occurrence of a violent disorderly situation: This can be linked to PSU – potential for social unrest. For want of income distribution statistics of different towns / cities we have not been able to work out the PSUs for different districts / towns of the State. This can be done rather easily with an Excel spreadsheet. However, it must be noted that *PI and TRDI merely indicate potential of social unrest; they do not indicate the intensity of violence if unrest breaks out.*

3.5 Some Probable Causes

As mentioned earlier, often the underlying cause of mass agitation is existence of economic and social inequities, leading to a sense of deprivation. To a large extent its existence can be measured from sample distributions of income in a community. Occurrence of social unrest has also been analyzed from the angle of *causative factors*, i.e. the underlying factors, which either give rise to these inequities or provide a medium for their violent expression breaching public order. Four such factors are discussed briefly here:

3.5.1 Agrarian problems: Agrarian problems have often challenged maintenance of public order. The origin of the problem, it is believed, lies in persistent social and economic inequities in the rural areas. Several political parties too have shown interest in agrarian agitations for extending their areas of influence. Though agrarian protests have been witnessed in India since the days of Mughal Empire, two major chains of protests in post independence India have been the Telangana movement of Andhra Pradesh and the violent movement organised by Naxalites in West Bengal. In many states, extremists are active in fomenting agrarian unrest and organizing agitations. No major incident has been reported in UP.

The basic causes it seems are very deep rooted and perhaps beyond the scope of a disaster management plan. The causes may relate to socially depressed position of share croppers, denial of their basic rights, and uncertainty over continuance of tenancy or in their share in the produce or even in payment of fair wages. Government has launched many programmes to improve the situation but there have been few concrete changes due to ineffective implementation of the schemes

Agrarian agitations have on occasions turned very violent. Large-scale riots, accompanied by arson, violence and murders have been witnessed in certain States. Violent agrarian protests can be effectively dealt with only if the enforcement agency has full intelligence support. This aspect has been covered later in Section 4.3.2

3.5.2 Group Conflicts: Agitation has become an integral part of the political process. Political activities are aimed at winning elections, which means securing votes by appealing to *groups of voters* on some ground or the other. The appeals centre on issues that are *relevant to the formation of such groups*. Such repeated appeals reinforce the differences among the groups, making them more exclusive. Inter-group conflicts will, therefore, continue to be a feature on the election scene. Group conflicts often lead to

breach of peace. This process is fueled if there is a preponderance of younger people and the economic prospects are depressing.

Threat to public order usually comes from a smaller group trying to gain ascendancy, or a smaller leadership trying to acquire a bigger constituency – something which does not arise from the number of his / her followers. Agitations in West Bengal against Tata's Nano project provide a recent example of near disastrous situation created by group conflict.

3.5.3 Extremist activities: There are some extremist groups in the country which are committed to the ideology of violence as a means to subvert the existing system. Often such extremist groups have covert supports of foreign powers. Punjab lost more than a decade of growth and development in a stark reminder of what such groups can achieve. Border States face more of this threat. International relations and the situation on the country's frontier make the Border States sensitive and vulnerable to law and order problems of a serious nature. The present situation in the North East and Jammu & Kashmir is a pointer in this regard. The traditional and conventional policing procedures may not be adequate to meet the situation developing in such sensitive areas.

Though after bifurcation of Uttarakhand, UP does not have any district bordering with China, it still has a long (and porous) international border. Volatile situation in neighboring Nepal can have strong repercussions in border districts.

3.5.4 Industrial Disputes: Industrial growth is often accompanied with increasing number of conflict situations - between the management and the labour, and even between two groups of labours. In such conflicts each party, at times, tends to take a rigid stand to promote their own interests to the exclusion of the other. Although the Industrial Disputes Act provides several agencies to resolve industrial disputes, the labour often views the proceedings before such agencies as time consuming and management-friendly as the management can hire legal experts and can also afford a prolonged legal battle. This makes the labour at times feel that they better secure their objectives quickly by and pressure tactics in the form of strikes or other demonstrations and agitations. The multiplicity of trade unions also induces minority groups to adopt militant postures to secure bargaining powers which may not be available to them on the strength of their membership numbers. Industrial disputes, thus, often become focal points for trial of strength between the labour and management or between rival unions.

Such dispute, when cross the limits of democratic and accepted legal forms, pose a serious threat to public order and the police are required to respond to the situation for effective maintenance of law and order.


3.6 Crowd dynamics

Conventional view has been that a crowd acts as an entity, with a common motivation and individual participants, based on their own predilections make use of the anonymity offered by a crowd. Modern researches, on the other hand, have found that:

- Crowds are not homogeneous entities and crowd participants are not unanimous in their motivation.
- Crowds are largely made up of small groups of people who are acquainted with one another and thus individual members do not get the assumed anonymity
- Crowd participants seldom act in unison.

These findings have serious implications for the police / para-military engaged in controlling crowds. A standard step in the current approach to crowd control is to determine the *crowd type*. It is now felt that a crowd needs to be understood as a process and not an entity; thus, a crowd may display markedly different behaviors at different stages (of the process).

Crowds largely consist of small groups. The groups are usually comprised of friends, family members, or acquaintances. Individuals are known to companions in their groups, and to others in the gathering that have come from the same neighborhood or community. Such gatherings have a beginning, a middle and an ending phase. This process is reflected in the chart:



Agencies controlling a crowd (police/para-military) focus on the end phase—dispersal. However, they must also consider how people assemble and interact during the course of the gathering. These aspects of a gathering are likely to affect how it disperses.

3.6.1 The Assembling Process: This refers to the movement of people from different locations to a common location. Such collective phenomena seldom emerge randomly or spontaneously. They are caused by prior activities by leading actors with proper planning and organization. Crowds may assemble impromptu, when the process develops informally, mostly by word of mouth. In such cases participants are people, who are already close to the venue. On the other hand, a crowd may be *organized*. The organized mobilization efforts emanate from one common source, that provides justifications, something on the lines of “we have to stand up for such & such rights which are under attack”. The process is centrally planned, organizers have lists of names, and they contact potential participants, and even at times arrange transportation for participants. These are the common factors in the mobilization processes for political protests. Ready examples are rallies held for creation of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand, pre-election rallies etc.

Studies have also shown that people do not surrender their ability to reason to the crowd or its leaders. If they engage in collective behavior, it is because *they choose to do so*. How they decide to engage in collective behavior varies:

- They may independently engage in collective actions based, based on some cues – e.g. clap when a speech ends
- They may interdependently decide, for example, two or more companions may consult each other on a course of action
- They may adopt the goal of a third party – people choosing to follow the order of police to disperse

3.6.2 The Dispersing Process: This (last) phase of a temporary gathering involves the movement of people from a common location to one or more alternate locations, bringing the temporary gathering to an end, or at least it begins the gathering’s decline. Dispersal can occur on a *routine*, *emergency* and *coerced* basis. Routine dispersal may be specified in advance, may even be part of the assembling instructions. Emergency dispersal occurs when people evacuate an area as the result of some unexpected crisis, such as a fire, explosion, etc. Dispersal may also occur as the result of coercion. Crowd controllers often use *escalating force* to disperse gatherings. Escalating use of force, assumes that crowd members are non-compliant. At many places now police realize the benefits of contacting and negotiating with demonstration organizers and such negotiated management of crowds seems to have become the preferred method of getting protest

organizers to *police themselves*. For a negotiated management to be successful demonstration leaders must be available and willing to participate.

Finally it must be noted that most demonstrations and protests do not result in riotous mobs, but *protest can evolve into violence* causing damage to lives and properties.

3.6.3 Participants: There are no clear cut cues on the personality types of participants. Though many people believe that mass agitations are borne out of D-F-A i.e. deprivation, frustration and aggression, there is no clear correlation between intensities of riotous behaviours and DFA. It will be incorrect to say that most violent agitations are caused by those who feel they are most deprived – socially or economically. It means the individuals that are politically and/or economically deprived are not more likely to aggress to reduce their frustration resulting from their deprivation. *The social networks and organizations, to which they belonged, appear to be better predictors of participation than were any socioeconomic or demographic characteristics.*

3.6.4 Predicting violence by crowds: Often it is seen that some “spark” sets off violence. It is also called the “precipitating incident” or the “flashpoint.” However, such incidents are become known as the “triggering event” only *after the fact*. The intensity of a crowd’s behaviour may go up and down and during the course of an agitation many incidents occur that potentially can precipitate violence. When an incident is followed by violence, it became easy to say that it was the “spark” after the fact.

Personal experience may be the best means of forecasting potential violence. **Experienced police officers often *perceive* that a particular incident in a given area might result in community violence.** The richness of their experience enables the officers to make such assessments. They can sense the ebb and flow of events in a familiar community and pick up cues. They, of course, also receive intelligence, which they match to their perceptions. As a result, such officers can intuitively assess a situation and very likely they will be correct. **There is no substitute for this experience.**

Unfortunately, we cannot, yet, reduce our understanding of crowd behavior to a checklist that shows what will and will not be effective in understanding and acting in crowd situations.

Chapter 4

Preventive Measures

4.1 General

Maintenance of law and order is perhaps the first duty, if not the *raison d'être*, of State. Mob violence is a law and order situation but is far more insidious than a breach of public order by an individual or a small group. They are potentially more damaging too; and therefore deserve more efforts aimed at prevention. Often the very first signs of violent mass agitation may require the most stringent action to be taken because adopting lukewarm measures at the early stages may not deter the offenders and may push the situation beyond a point of no return. Preventing mob violence is far more important than containing it, because if violence is allowed to erupt it is difficult to suppress without counter-violence and without the attendant threat to lives and properties of law abiding citizens.

Analyses of past riots give us enough clues on what to expect and some suggestions on how to thwart mob violence. Existing laws of the land are mostly capable of dealing with such situations. The standard procedures already in place are adequate for the administration to anticipate such trouble in almost all cases for taking required measures.

Mass agitations, as mentioned in Section 3.5, usually arise from agrarian problems, industrial disputes, group conflicts, and extremist activities. Agitations also erupt in response to announcement of some major event that is perceived by people to be aimed at furthering some inequities. (In this class will fall agitations that have shadowed the WTO conferences all across the world, including New Delhi.) The roots of all these causes may lie well beyond the area of operations of the police, the primary agency for managing mass agitations. Nevertheless, the standard policing procedures, if followed meticulously, prepare the police with forewarnings in the form of workable intelligence. Intelligence, coupled with riot schemes, prepared by district police, (though focussed on communal riots) provide the necessary background material required for adequate preparations for managing an agitation programme.

A riot scheme or riot plan forms an important link in such procedures. Senior functionaries in Home Department and Police Directorate have confirmed that all the

districts in the State prepare District Riot Plans (DRP). DRP being a sensitive document can be shared only on *need to know* basis. Officials have confirmed that DRPs are comprehensive documents covering preparedness activities and response measures. DRPs, reportedly, contain full particulars of demography, existing disputes between communities, list of anti-social elements, opinion leaders, list of vulnerable locations, and also list of safe places where a population group, felt at risk, can be shifted temporarily. DRPs also have details of hospitals / other providers of medical facilities where wounded can be taken immediately. It is not known if DRPs provide for *riot rehearsals* i.e. mock drills or whether such drills are being carried out.

However, resources are understood to be woefully inadequate. Institutional mechanisms for transfer, posting of officers and for training of police and magistracy seem to have fallen into disuse (abuse). Thus, in spite of the procedural environment the culture of preparedness perhaps falls short of what is needed for effectively managing a potentially violent mass agitation.

This being a *State* Disaster Management Plan, it should mainly concern with the strategic steps required from State headquarters for anticipating and countering violent mass agitation programmes. An essential step entails reviewing what is done at the district level. That necessitates describing the district level procedures in some detail. The next few sections deal with the district level procedures, drawn to some extent from the reports of the National Police Commission. These are followed with the structural measures needed for effectively countering violent agitation.

4.2 Agencies involved in managing a civil disobedience / mass agitation: Police is the primary agency for such situations. District administration, magistracy in particular, also has a key role in managing response operations. Other agencies that have major role in planning and execution of response operations are intelligence agencies, armed police (PAC) and army. For this Plan, *all agencies other than police (i.e. even the magistracy) are support agencies*. There are other support agencies viz. Department of Health, Department of Food & Civil Supplies, Directorate of Information & Public Relations (DIPR), and Department of Revenue (Scarcity), PHED and Fire Service.

Primary Agency's (PA's) role encompasses anticipation, preparedness, preventions, response and finally assistance in recovery. Support agency's roles are varied. Intelligence plays a key role in anticipation, district administration (with police) in prevention, PAC

and Army in response, Fire Service in rescue, Health in providing medical care to victims and responders and F&CS, PHED and Revenue (Scarcity) in relief and DIRP in managing the information environment.

4.3 Prevention

Prevention is better than cure. Prevention is least costly and most painless if it is achieved at the earliest stage. Many untoward developments can be detected merely by observing standard precautionary measures, many more by effective use of the intelligence gathering machineries. Precautionary measures and intelligence can prevent most of the proximate causes of riots. But in many cases the proximate cause can be spontaneous, only later to be identified as the “flashpoint”. Such flashpoints are reached during the course of an agitation programme, i.e. participants are already assembled at one location; thus occurrence of a trigger event does not give much of a lead time before violence erupts. The best way to prevent mob violence is anticipation and full preparedness.

4.3.1 Precautionary measures

4.3.1.a Regulation: Precautionary measures essentially consist of regulation and restraint. Regulation measures are normal times procedures. The routine procedures of normal times such as a well dispersed police-presence in crowds, beat patrols, normal traffic control etc, create a climate that helps in maintaining normalcy. “Normalcy always acts as an antidote to tension” and prevents the situation from growing beyond breaking point. Thus the strategy should be to *strengthen police presence judiciously to inspire confidence in those who are afraid, and fear in those daring to challenge the law.*

4.3.1.b Riot Scheme

A riot scheme details the course of action of the police in a riot situation. It is prepared during normal times. It contains various data relating to the area covered by it also deployment strategies to deal with a riot. Several riot schemes, reportedly, have been prepared in a routine manner without visualizing the different conditions that may emerge in a crisis. Many (most) schemes are said to be impracticable. Some of the reasons are:

- a. They are designed for isolated areas, not taking into accounts the surroundings. Riots tend to spread quickly. Unless this factor is recognised a riot scheme may fail in its purpose.
- b. **Contemplated manpower is not worked out on a realistic basis.**

While it may not be possible to conceive of a model riot scheme to cover all possible situations, the scheme should incorporate at least the following features:

- a. Complete background information of the area covered by it
- b. List of bad characters with their addresses and *with the names of policemen who will be able to identify them*
- c. Maximum and minimum scheme of static deployment of the police.
- d. Placement of reserves and the maximum and minimum reserves requirements
- e. Information on hospitals, fire brigades, and availability of other civic services

The scheme should be carefully and constantly updated. *Item (b) would require particular attention in this regard.*

4.3.1.c Regulating agitation venues

DRP's contain, rather start with, profiles of districts. Each town has some locations historically used for mass agitations – a large park, open space around collectorate etc. The Riot Plan must identify such locations, and explore how the existing features of the locations can be best used for managing a violent crowd. Each police station should systematically maintain the list of such locations in its jurisdiction and plans on how to deploy forces there.

4.3.1.d Preventive arrests: Other precautionary measure is restraining such elements as may be likely to create panic and confusion. This can be brought about by arresting those who are likely to indulge in acts against public order. But if applied indiscriminately, *this measure can prove counterproductive.* Furthermore, all citizens have a right to protest. A preventive arrest of any person must be supported by sound evidence that the person had planned / conspired to create panic / violence.

4.3.1.e Countering rumours and monitoring media: Once violence breaks out, rumours are set afloat by interested parties. The administration should, therefore, disseminate correct and proper information to the public through all available means. Frequent broadcasts of correct and frank reports of the incidents occurring and of the steps taken by the administration boost the morale of the people and allay feelings of fear and insecurity in the population. Unless rumours are checked promptly and effectively the administration may lose the public's trust and forfeit its cooperation. *The emphasis should be on concrete steps taken for correcting the situation and not on authoritative demands on the*

people for cooperation. The administration must establish its credibility, if it is to get public cooperation in tackling the situation

4.3.2 Intelligence

Clearly, intelligence plays the most crucial role in prevention / peaceful management of mass agitations. Intelligence agencies operate both at State and district levels. There is a well established system of plainclothesmen gathering intelligence. Perhaps, more stress is required on intelligence gathering / data analysis by uniformed personnel. “Many of the failures in the recent riots were largely due to the negligence of the uniformed staff to monitor intelligence” – from report of the National Police Commission.

At present the intelligence advices received from State level are often reported to be too general in nature to be of much practical use. Here too, it is seen that the old system has fallen in disuse. Police & administration have for long maintained records of various physical data. If updated regularly, a critical scrutiny of these records, particularly of the fluctuations therein, can reveal a number of pointers. Such records should be properly maintained by the police officers in-charge of the districts and police stations. Intelligence agencies at the district and the State level should look for significant data indicating an imbalance in any particular area. The district level agency should constantly feed the State level agency updated data relating to its district. The State level agency should interpret this data on an aggregate basis for the whole State. With such analysis, the advice of the State intelligence agencies to the district units would be more precise and useful and would enable the district administration and police to develop well chalked out plans in advance.

4.3.2.a Intelligence - Industrial disputes: To anticipate threats to public order from mass agitations by labours, district police must collect on a continual bases a variety of basic data relating to all industrial establishments in their jurisdictions. These data should include:

- The total number of industrial establishments,
- The layout of the establishments and the location of vital and sensitive installations,
- Number of workers in each establishment,
- Number of unions with their membership, the political and social affiliation of the unions, the identity of union leaders,

- Historical account of past strikes and other forms of agitations in the industrial establishment,
- Current account of agreements entered into or the awards enforced in these establishments, and
- An account of the important court proceedings initiated by the labour and management, etc.

Besides such information relating to the personnel, it would also be necessary to compile information about the nature of products manufactured by the industrial establishments, the normal channels of their transport and the end point of their release for use by consumers or some other industry or for export, the sensitive nature of the products from the point of view of the security needs of the country, etc. *The police should have all this information on an on-going basis so that in the event of an industrial dispute they would have a full picture of what they are expected to protect and whom they are expected to deal with.*

Responsibility for compiling these basic data and information should be taken on by a special cell of the Intelligence wing at the district level. **A similar cell in the Intelligence at State headquarters should cover major industrial establishments which may give rise to industrial disputes having ramifications over more than one district.** The public sector, both Central and State, should also be covered by these cells. The most important point in the working of these cells would be the *constant updating of the information collected from time to time* and their dissemination to the various operative units at the sub-division, circle and police station level at regular intervals.

Besides collecting the basic data and information as detailed above, these cells should also collect intelligence about matters that arise in the day-to-day working of the establishments which generate friction between the labour and management. *Timely knowledge of such matters would help the police to anticipate crisis situations and be adequately prepared to deal with them.* **It is, however, important to note that collection of intelligence on such matters is not meant to secure police intervention in these disputes unless there is a distinct public order angle.**

These cells may need to be strengthened when any specific labour dispute arises and tension begins to build up. Special teams at the local level may have to be deployed for collecting intelligence in depth about the likely *agitationist plans of the organisers*. Intelligence

so collected would be of great help when the need arises for actual police intervention at some point of time in the course of a dispute.

4.3.2.b Intelligence – Agrarian Problems: Gathering intelligence on local agrarian problems is more difficult than collecting intelligence related industrial disputes, because the spread of the police in the rural areas is disproportionately thin; more so in the context of the progressively increasing attention that the rural areas are being given in the scheme of overall development of the country. The growing awareness of the people in the countryside of the scope for their development and their legitimate share of the output of the country's economy is bound to increase tensions and conflicts in the rural areas. The rising aspirations and expectations of the weaker sections of the community, particularly in the rural areas, are also likely to generate situations of confrontation and conflict. *Political battles will be more intensely fought in the rural set up, with the rural electorate progressively realising the importance and strength of its numbers.*

Against this backdrop, it is clear that the task of policing the rural areas will have to be given much more attention than is being given now. The first essential step would be to *increase the spread of the regular police in the rural areas and reduce the gap in the density of police presence in the urban area and the rural area as compared to each other.*

Agrarian problems are known to give rise to large scale mass agitations, even organised raids and killings. While the causes of some such incidents are strictly local, large scale agitations also arise from well organised movements transcending districts and even at times States. However, facilities for quick transmission of information, mobility, awareness of the mode of working of the police and access to supervisory levels which are available to the urban public do not, and cannot possibly, exist in the same measure in the rural areas. In their absence the regular police will require considerable assistance in rural areas to get a good grip over a prevailing situation and deal with it satisfactorily. Irrespective of the density of police presence in the rural area, the regular police will require some special arrangement at the village level to secure information relevant to police tasks.

The village chowkidari system was originally rendering some assistance to the regular police in this regard, but it has now ceased to be as effective as it was earlier. Chowkidars have traditionally served the regular district police as a source of information and a point of contact that enabled them to remain in touch with the ground situation in the village.

The Chowkidari system needs to be strengthened. Without effective Chowkidari, ground level intelligence collection from rural areas is not easy.

4.3.2.c Intelligence – Extremist Activities: Extremist activities are covered by several intelligence agencies – both at State and Centre level. It is not known how efficiently the intelligence gathered by different agencies is collated and analysed at any central information clearing house or how effectively such analyses reports are shared with those who may need them. Uttar Pradesh, so far, has not faced this menace to the same degree as faced by some other states. This, however, cannot be a reason for not expecting such activities in future and for not being fully prepared.

Preparations will call for thorough sharing of intelligence findings with agencies of neighbouring states and corroborating those findings with the ground level developments in the State.

4.3.3 Control Room

A control room is an on-going facility available to the public for communicating with police authorities. Often the members of public are diffident about contacting the control room because they feel they would be subjected to annoying interrogation. *A control room can have value in a riot situation only if it functions effectively during normal times.* If control rooms inspire confidence in the public mind during normal times then they would receive a vast mass of valuable information during crisis situations. In addition to equipment, the persons in charge should be polite and competent enough to assess the information received. Control room should have an adequate team of well briefed police officers who can be expeditiously despatched to a scene of trouble and who can be expected to deal with it effectively. Briefing of these teams by senior officers in the control room is an extremely important exercise which should not be neglected.

4.4 Structural measures

4.4.1 Mock Drill: Riot schemes should be rehearsed from time to time so that those, including the para military forces and the Army, who have to implement them would know their roles during a crisis. National Police Commission has recommended the use of "sand model" exercises, which provide a clear view of the effect the concentration of force in one area may have upon the adjacent pockets. These exercises would give an idea of the pattern of mobilisation of forces, which would leave no gaps, and which

would leave no community unprotected. They would also reveal the need of drawing alternative routes and placing reserves at easily accessible points that can be incorporated into the riot scheme. Such a scheme, properly exercised and updated, could be of great value during a real crisis situation. Rehearsing the riot schemes needs to be a compulsory annual activity. This will of course demand time and financial resources but over all balance lies squarely in favour of the drills that would bring to fore the impracticalities and shortcomings, if any, in the schemes and would also institutionalize periodic updating of the scheme.

4.4.2 Transfer and Posting

The efficiency of Administration in handling riot situation cannot be separated from the general health of the administration. Reportedly officers are transferred and posted on political pressures. This shakes the faith of the law abiding people in the Administration and the police. This also emboldens the daring people enjoying support of the same political forces. Loss of credibility in the government has serious repercussions. As without active public cooperation, it is just not possible to effectively control riots. Therefore, only specially selected experienced officers with an image of impartiality should be posted to the districts. *They should not normally be transferred before the completion of their tenure.* Field postings should be given to only such officers who have *displayed ability to read public behaviour correctly and who possess mature judgment.*

4.4.3 Investigations of offences reported during mass agitations

Burning of public properties – buses of state transport corporations, railway coaches or station buildings etc are very common; as are breaking open and looting private shops. The record of successful prosecutions of the offenders is low and this encourages the anti social elements to indulge in such excesses during any agitation programme that turns violent. Investigations of crimes cannot perhaps be undertaken during riots. Immediately after peace is restored Special investigation teams (SIT) should be set up to investigate crimes committed in the course of riots. Such teams should be set up under a State agency, and should consist of officers of high ability functioning under the supervision of a fairly senior officer.

Once a riot comes under control, several forces try to interfere in the registration and investigation of crimes. Many influential people try to prevent initiation of action against offenders. Non-initiation of action against such offenders emboldens them to act with

more audacity in future. Investigations should be conducted competently, quickly and impartially.

4.5 Training needs & Knowledge management

4.5.1 Training through case studies: Effective decision-making in crowd control depends on educating and training mid to senior level officers *that may be tasked with crowd control responsibilities*. This education and training should be based on case studies demonstrating prevention planning and crisis decision-making. Use of case studies will contribute to training, and will also provide feedback on tactics, techniques, and procedures. The case study is perhaps the best means of training in crowd control because sufficient information does not exist to develop models with validated crowd behaviors and motivations. *Additionally, artificial scenarios do not have any real meaning to operators*. The case studies could also be accompanied by and evaluated within the framework of the decision-making guideline proposed in Chapter 5.

The trainings must cover:

- Crisis response
- Art of negotiations
- Skill training
- Human rights aspects of crowd control

4.5.2 Knowledge Management—Lessons Learned: Knowledge management is aimed at strengthening an organization's ability to capture lessons-learned, and best and worst practices. A sound knowledge management system will generate case studies needed for education and training. To institutionalize sharing of knowledge of crowd control, lessons learned, or after-action reports, are needed to be filed. These reports should focus on the actions (or lack thereof) and reactions rather than on how effectively a situation was handled. The reports should contain the pre-incident plan and the outcomes of the response. Successive readers may form their views and recommend future actions. The tendency in many organizations is to scrutinize failure, but not look too closely at successes. These reports must address failures as well as successes.

A knowledge management system can have other benefits in addition to contributing to the development of case studies. It can help the organization act faster and more appropriately. It can provide a source of information that organizational members can

quickly draw on in crises, so they do not always have to “reinvent the wheel.” Additionally, a knowledge management system can provide feedback on crowd control tactics, techniques, and procedures. It can help an organization reject, validate, or improve these practices. Ultimately, a knowledge management system can enable an organization to more effectively respond to the demands of crowd control.

4.5.3 Training durations: Training Programs should be of sufficient duration else they will tend to become disjointed / hurried and fail to serve the purpose. Perhaps, a training subcommittee can be established with an officer of senior rank who can establish training goals. The training program should be of sufficient length and depth, and should include a progressive approach to building skill and competency over time. This will call for regular refreshers.

4.5.4: Training Needs: Some other training needs, for different level of functionaries are as under:

- Station level police officers
 - Preparation of riot schemes
 - Intelligence gathering
 - Motivational programmes
 - Human rights
- Sub-division and District level police officers
 - Preparation of riot schemes
 - Intelligence analysis
 - Negotiation
- Police Directorate Level
 - Intelligence analysis
 - Leadership
 - Crisis management
- Junior Officers of other civil departments
 - Legal provisions, powers and duties of a magistrate
- PAC
 - Annual training *for an entire company in one programme.*
 - Search & rescue in collapsed structures
- Doctors / para-medics with Police / PAC
 - Emergency health management

Chapter 5

Decision Making Guidelines for Control of Agitation Programmes

5.1 General

Police, the PA for civil disobedience and mass agitation, should emphasize prevention rather than confrontation. Managing a mass agitation requires its own thought process. In fighting criminals, police forces fight and eliminate / capture opponents, who are combatants. In a mass agitation, police deal with crowds that consist largely of non-combatants. The rights of non-combatants must be respected while maintaining public order. This is a vexing issue, and calls for decisions regarding the degree of force to be used against a large group that is (mostly) unarmed. To guard against unnecessary use of excessive force and at the same time to ensure that mission is accomplished, it will be useful if the agencies dealing with crowds follow a standardized decision-making procedure. And this calls for detailed guideline for operating staff. We understand, the police have such internal guidelines, but cannot be shared with public. This chapter discusses the precepts and key questions which are generally believed to be basic to crowd control, which should form the basis for such guidelines. The standard decision making process on managing mass agitations should address four major points:

- Pre-incident Planning
- Background Information and Intelligence
- Encouraging Relationships and Ownership
- Acceptability—Redefining What it Means to Win

5.2 Pre-incident Planning

Planning necessarily begins well before the incident and is initiated at the strategic level. It includes strategic guidance on crowd control (this makes, issuing such a guideline itself part of the planning process) as well as addressing responsibilities, training, organization, operating procedures, and rules of engagement. Some basic precepts of planning follow.

1. The planning should be aimed at avoiding confrontation to the extent possible. Crowd situations are highly unpredictable. However, crowd members are, just like police, purposeful individuals and they tend to resist opposition to the realization of their purposes. Planning should key on the prevention of bad outcomes. Most agitations don't turn violent. It may, therefore, be desirable at times to help the crowds accomplish their goals within the law. *Police may even consider conceding some violations for the sake of avoiding confrontation.* This is a strategic

level decision and there should be clear guidelines on it to help the operational staff engaged in crowd management.

2. Even if it is decided to concede some violations of law, police must maintain a presence in adequate strength to restrain the demonstrators from going beyond a certain limit. What would be this limit? That's another strategic decision that needs to be taken by the Police Directorate and conveyed to the crowd managers. This limit signifies when and where the police would draw the line.
3. Planning needs to focus on – “what are we trying to accomplish?” It is the most fundamental question to be answered, but often it is easier said than done. Process can sometimes drive the mission. This can easily occur in organizations that are trained to fight and overcome opponents; unless they focus on what they are trying to accomplish they may lose the perspective.

5.3 Background Information and Intelligence

Police must seek to know as much as they can about the protesting groups well in advance of a demonstration / march etc. It not only provides warning, but insights as well. With better knowledge about the organizers one can read the situation through “their eyes” and anticipate what they are going to do. Police must continually assess their objectives against what the protesters are trying to accomplish. Some basic questions that needs to answered:

- Who are they? What is the overarching identity of the crowd? Are they strikers, caste / community factions, or social protestors?

Understanding who they are will indicate what they may do. Do they identify themselves as strikers, ethnic groups, religious factions, or oppressed protestors against some social injustice? In large programmes it may be possible to determine identities and goals from advance assembling instructions, leaflets distributed to bystanders, placards and banners being carried, as well as, slogans and songs being expressed.

- What are their goals?

What the group wants to accomplish by assembling could determine the extent to which they can be accommodated once they have assembled. They may seek only recognition for their cause. This usually means being seen and heard. If so, this goal is usually easy to accommodate. In some cases groups may have more demanding goals that cannot be accommodated by the officers at site, making confrontation likely.

- What is the composition of the crowd and are there any known factions?

As previously indicated, crowds and demonstrations are frequently more heterogeneous than homogeneous.

- What are they capable of doing?

Protest groups often claim that they will assemble large numbers of people to produce some disruptive action. Organizers exaggerate for two reasons. First, they want to boost their own people's morale, and second they want the media to report that they have strength in numbers. Studying a group's past activities may provide an indicator of what they are capable of doing in the future.

- What are their traditional behaviors?

Different people do different things during protests. It varies with the group. For example, social protest organizations and striking unions will carry placards and banners. It is common to see in rural areas crowds sitting and blocking traffic to protest against some accident. Understanding the traditional behaviour of the protestors can be helpful in deciding how to respond to their behaviors.

- When and where will they assemble?

Every protest organizer has a time and place for assembling and perhaps a destination for the crowd to move. If the organizer attempts to mobilize large numbers of participants, the time and place(s) for assembling and dispersing must be made known in the instructions. This information may be stated in mobilization instructions, or disseminated by word of mouth.

- Where will they go?

Many crowds have destinations. Organizations may march a specified distance to ensure that their cause gets sufficient attention. If so, tactical commanders should know the route and minimize disruptions to the rest of society. They may also decide about providing security along the route.

- What are the possible targets of violence?

Rioters in particular may focus on target facilities.

- What is the worst case scenario?

The worst case scenario must be recognized for the sake of avoidance. For many on-site managers, the worst case scenario often is the situation of a peaceful crowd degenerating into a violent riot.

- When and where will they disperse?

Upon reaching its destination, the protest marchers may disperse. Even a well organized march, once disbanded and unsupervised, may become wayward. It may be important at times to transport the marchers back to the origin of the march.

During the course of an agitation programme, police officials may have to stop actions that threaten property, personal safety and public order. If such behavior is not stopped, it may generate a sense of empowerment among the protesters / rioters and encourage more destructive behavior. **It is easy to see a few violent individuals in crowds and generalize this behavior to the entire crowd. Such generalizations are usually incorrect and dangerous.** Generally only a few individuals engage in destructive behavior. The danger occurs when police respond collectively to the entire gathering and provoke individuals who were not involved in the violence. It is of utmost importance to identify the violent individuals and restrain them. Intelligence plays a key role here. With background information on key persons, police will find it more effective to target them and to respond to that behavior, rather than the crowd as whole. Such intervention

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requires an understanding of how this behavior might be altered. There are five psychological factors for understanding and assessing individual behavior in a crowd.

The factors closer to the top have the more immediate influence on performance. Each psychological factor represents a possible point of intervention:

- **Motivation** – It is an individual’s ability to be committed to the crowd’s cause despite fear, fatigue, opposition, and personal needs. Individuals’ motivations vary, depending on their zeal, fear, self-protection, obedience, or selfish needs. The motivations relate to their personal goals. Crowd managers may satisfy motivations through resolution. They also may reduce them through fatigue, fear, and pain.
- **Confidence** – It is an individual’s belief in his ability to accomplish goals. Confidence is crucial to the use of that ability, and the most important aspect of

individual behavior. Confidence enables motivation, the ability to handle stress, focus on a goal, and the ability to experience positive emotions. Preparation, resources, and *initial success contribute to confidence*. Conversely, the denial of these can reduce confidence.

- **Stress** – It is the physical, mental, or emotional reactions to internal or external demands. This is largely how individuals perceive and respond to stimuli. Some see difficulty and shrink from it. Others see challenge and respond to it. Stress may be caused by just the mere presence of force, or by creating a greater demand than someone has resources to meet. Also, individual needs—food, sleep, etc, can cause stress. Such stress can negatively affect an individual’s motivation to pursue their goals.
- **Focus** – It is the ability to concentrate on issues leading to a goal. This includes picking up cues that indicate actions needed for goal accomplishment. This factor more immediately influences behavior than previous ones. It can be altered by ineffective focus—focusing on those things that interfere with, or are irrelevant to goal accomplishment. Causing individuals to focus on personal needs for example may do this. Increased stress can also diminish focus.
- **Emotions** – They ultimately dictate individual behavior. They guide decisions, influence reactions to situations, and determine how individuals feel. Emotions vary among individuals in a crowd and change rapidly with the situation. Physical or ego threats can negatively influence emotions. A physical threat might be the size and resources of the police forces present at the site. An ego threat might be a goal that seems too difficult to accomplish. These threats can cause frustration, anger, or despair.

5.4 Encouraging relationships and ownership

Working relationships between police officials managing the agitation and group leaders organizing the agitation programme are increasingly seen as the best means of preventing bad outcomes in crowd situations. This is called the *negotiated management model* of crowd control. Such relationships provide an opportunity to communicate. They allow group leaders to tell authorities what they want to accomplish. Additionally, it allows authorities to tell group leaders what they are prepared to do, and how they might respond to certain crowd behaviors. Such communications can do much to resolve issues and prevent violence.

In some cases, police officials at the site may not be able to talk to all leaders before a crowd assembles. Some groups do not have recognized leaders and are basically ad hoc organizations. Other groups may have several leaders, but only some of those leaders will negotiate. In such cases, meetings with some leaders may tell one who the other leaders are and provide other critical information. Negotiations also may encourage more moderate leaders to do things that will support the authorities.

Police may initiate communication with group leaders, make contact with them and work out issues well in advance of an event. They need to make a concerted effort to maintain a working relationship with the leaders of groups, such as labor and trade associations that hold demonstrations and protest marches.

Communication also means persuasion. Police may even make a concerted effort to “win over” demonstration leaders. They can encourage demonstrators to protest in an acceptable way and offer favors to get them to do just that.

Several rules apply in negotiations. Credibility is key. Only communicate necessary information and those actions which authorities and tactical commanders intend to do. Negotiations should also be made from a position of strength. Through negotiation an agreement might be reached. However, contingencies should be developed in the event the agreement is violated.

A basic premise of negotiated management is to get the protesters to police themselves. Rank-and-file protesters are more likely to listen to their own leaders, as opposed to listening to the police. Protest organizers are likely to buy into a cooperative effort and agree to ground rules set during pre-protest negotiations. Many seek to stay on the right side of the law.

Finally, it must be noted that negotiations require expertise. Police may identify and maintain lists of skillful, persuasive negotiators.

5.5 Acceptability—redefining what it means to win


Winning a pitched battle against a crowd which is usually armed with brick bats and broken bottles may be easy for the police. But they also risk being portrayed as oppressors and they may effectively lose by appearing to win. Groups that perceive them to be oppressed will readily seek victimhood (martyrdom?) in an effort to gain the

support of public opinion. Winning in this environment is about *seizing and holding the moral high ground*. Police must maintain the authority and legitimacy of what they are doing.

Projecting a favorable image will require outreach to local leaders and citizens. Police may invite local leaders to observe briefings on upcoming public order operations in their community. This will also require developing relationships with the media. Police may even invite the media to accompany officers managing the agitation situations. Such outreach gives the impression that the authorities have nothing to hide. Additionally, it provides an opportunity for opinion builders (media men) to see the police's side of an event.

In crowd situations, the use of weapons and particularly non-lethal ones is a crucial factor. This is not merely a technical issue; it is loaded with political overtones. The same weapon that may be publicly acceptable in one situation may be unacceptable in another. Weapons acceptability depends on whom they are being used against, also on appropriate and proportionate responses. Crowd managing units should follow a non-lethal weapons hierarchy. This means that they should initially use non-lethal measures for passive defense, to hold crowds at a distance. If violent behavior occurs, they may increasingly resort to more active and greater levels of non-lethal force.

This force should also appear to be "self-triggering." In other words, the individuals who are the opponent should appear to be initiating their own consequences. This will be especially important in following the non-lethal weapons hierarchy. As the level of force increases, so will the likelihood of injuries and negative public reactions. This non-lethal weapons hierarchy might occur as follows:




Finally, containing a crowd is, perhaps, more important than disbursing a crowd; as forced dispersal can result in a crowd breaking up into a multitude of groups that would scatter over a vast area. This could pose even greater public order problems. A crowd is likely to be better controlled by means of containment—confining its activities to a given area.

Chapter 6

Response

6.1 Alert mechanism

In most cases the alert should come from the intelligence wing, unless violence erupts up from spontaneous trigger. Such spontaneous acts lead to violence only if the demonstrators / agitators had some preparations; otherwise it merely affords an opportunity to petty criminals. As mentioned in Section 3.6.4, *personal experience may be the best means of forecasting potential violence*. A major agitation programme is a planned activity; the planning may take place over weeks. Thus it cannot come as a total surprise. District police should be well aware of the organisers, the different factions in the organising entities, the leaders of those factions and their personal motivations. This intelligence, coupled with the experience of the local officers is usually a good predictor of violence during a demonstration. At times information of violence may be gathered from different intelligence sources – State or Central.



Immediately the information must be passed on to the District administration, who in turn would inform the State Control Room in Lucknow. Thus the alert mechanism may entail information flow from State to district or from district to State. District will activate the warning phase of its DRP and keep SCR informed. If the situation is not diffused and violence erupts, the SCR will define the level of the disaster keeping in view the report of the intelligence wing and of the scale of violence eruption(s). The chart depicts the flow of information and activities. In case of L1, SCR will merely monitor the situation. In case of L2/L3 the SDMP will be activated.

6.2 Criteria for level definition

If the violence and its ramifications can be brought under control by the district administration, it is an L1 situation. If the scale of violence is such as would warrant intervention from the State level, it would be an L2 situation and in L3 situations Central government's intervention becomes necessary. On threat perception, SCR will

evaluate the situation based on inputs from the intelligence agencies and the district and apprise the SDMA. *At the early stages level assessment exercise is necessarily prospective in nature.*

In case the threat to public order is caused by a stray spontaneous incidence the administration must be able to diffuse the situation by firm decisive action even while being alive to the sensibilities of the crowd. In other case, where threat is discerned from intelligence reports and *some signs of tension are seen* in one or more districts but no response is required from the State level it is still recommended that the situation be considered as the *warning phase of L2 if more than one district report threat* and of L1 if reported by only one district.

Reports of large scale violence will almost always be accompanied with requests from district administration for units of PAC. Such situations, as they require State level interventions should be considered as L2.

6.3 Recommended measures

Required measures will depend on the level of the situation and have been described under different situations. Whereas L1/L2/L3 situations require response measures, L0 situations require normal times activities to be taken up with greater vigil. This being an SDMP, *only State level activities/ measures are described in the following sections.*

6.4 L0 Activities

6.4.1 Monitoring situation: as mentioned earlier the major causes of mass agitation are: agrarian problems, group conflict, industrial disputes and extremist activities. The last often has cross border implications and UP being a border State is more vulnerable than many other states. (It is clarified here that terrorist activities are NOT covered under this Plan.) Full details of the ground level operations required during normal times for effective corrective measures during situations when threats get materialised are described in Sections 3.5.1 to 3.5.4, covering all the four causes. Those actions, to be sure, relate to the district police. At State level, Directorate will ensure that those normal times activities are carried out and their outputs are constantly evaluated.

6.4.2 Intelligence: The old practice of data collection at police station (and even village) level, which has fallen into disuse should be revived and the State level intelligence agencies would collect details of physical data every month from all the districts. State

level intelligence agency should interpret the data on aggregate basis for the whole State. They would look for significant fluctuations which would indicate an imbalance in any particular area. This way, the State intelligence agencies' advices to the districts regarding the possibilities of tension in their respective areas would be more precise and workable.

6.4.3 Manpower planning: many studies have indicated that India is under-policed. Even with that constraint, the presence of police in rural areas is disproportionately low. To be sure, rural areas do not need the degree of policing required in populous cities – for instance no manpower would normally be required for managing traffic in rural areas. Nevertheless, police presence, even if indirect, is a must in all villages to keep a heck on information that may be useful for police actions. Posting regular police force may perhaps be prohibitively expensive in the present scenario. What is needed is full activation of the old Chowkidari system with Chowkidars acting exclusively for police departments and never being used for menial duties in the police stations to which they are attached.

PA:

- All vacancies in police stations / districts in sensitive areas, where agrarian problems may be simmering, must be filled at all times
- Chowkidari system is toned up
- Police forces- district police, district reserve police and PAC units- should be sent for regular trainings. Training programmes must include sessions on motivation, negotiation, and human rights.
- Joint training programmes of State police forces may be explored with Army and / or para military forces to ensure better understanding of their respective roles and stronger coordination during operations.

SA: Health Directorate

- Medical relief teams should be constituted in such a manner that, as far as possible, members of various communities are represented in it.

6.4.4 Logistic planning

Logistics planning would largely consist of anticipating and fulfilling the required number and quality of weapon and adequacy of transport facilities, personal protection equipment, communication equipment and also rest and food for the operating forces. The terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2009 revealed acute shortage of personal protective equipment. Demonstrators are known for stray firing and all policemen attending on

unruly crowds must be issued full personal protection gear including bullet proof jackets.

Operating units need:

- Personal protective equipment including bullet proof jackets, shin guards, torso and shoulder protection, gloves, helmet and face shield
- Each unit should have respiratory protection - air-purifying respirators
- Communications Equipment Voice amplifiers, battery supply
- Rain clothes
- Clear identifiers for police functionaries

It is also the part of logistic planning to ensure that the personnel engaged in crowd management receive breaks, food, or water in a timely manner. Lack of rest or food can cause sever stress affecting their efficiency. Commanders must plan for relief staff and for sustained operations.

Each unit must have support of emergency medical technicians. There is an acute shortage of such staff. PA and Directorate of Health need to consider the issue jointly for expeditious recruitment.

In all sustained operations, there should be separate logistics subcommittee headed by a senior officer to ensure that the operating forces get all support in a timely manner.

PA:

- Increased use of firearms and bomb threats have been a recent trend in agitation programmes. Police headquarter should regularly review the weaponry of the sensitive police stations and districts to see if they match those expected from the miscreants.
- Wireless equipped vehicles are widely in use for patrolling duties. The number of such vehicles should keep pace with requirements – particularly for police stations in outskirts whose jurisdiction may not be fully covered with cellular phone network.
- Fire engines are critical equipment during riot management as riots are always marked with widespread arson. All district centres have fire brigades. Many high rise buildings are coming up in districts which challenge existing fire fighting capability. In light of this development the fire fighting ability needs to be augmented

- All police functionaries managing riots / violent mob situations or potentially violent mass agitations should be issued full personal protection equipment as described above.

SA-Department of Revenue (Scarcity)

- Many a time policemen combating riot situations receive grievous injuries and may need to be shifted to larger hospitals at divisional headquarters or at Lucknow. Department of Revenue (Scarcity) which is also looking after Disaster Management may look into feasibility of acquiring helicopters earmarked for use during disaster management operations. (the financial aspects of this acquisition have not been considered in this Plan)

SA-Health Directorate

- A large number of ambulances are not properly equipped. A riot situation may often demand cardiac care ambulances. Directorate to ensure that each district has at least two fully functional cardiac care ambulances. Directorate may even tie up with local private hospitals that may have better maintained ambulances for immediate availability during riots and such emergencies. If needed, this may be made one of the pre-conditions for grant of the license.
- Blood transfusion is most frequently required in riot situations. Directorate may enter into agreement with all the local blood banks for ensuring availability of blood during riot management – both for victims and for those engaged in managing riots.
- Police units managing riots / potentially violent agitation programmes must always be accompanied with emergency medical technicians. The strength of such technicians need to be decided in consultation with Police Directorate and they should be appointed and regularly trained by Health Directorate.
- Special care may be required for the weak, aged, lactating mothers and pregnant ladies as also for treatment of shock and trauma. Directorate may make necessary arrangements based on the scenarios created in DRPs.

SA-Food & Civil Supplies

- People may need to be shifted from vulnerable sites during a riot situation till the conditions calm down. In agrarian problems at times large numbers of people leave their homesteads and take shelter elsewhere. These displaced persons may be daily wage workers who would have no store of food. Food and other

essentials will need to be supplied to them till normalcy returns and they can get back to their homes. Department of Food & Civil Supplies may get into pre-purchase agreements for supply of food grains, tents, blankets, plastic sheets, and firewood etc with reputed suppliers for urgent purchases during riots.

SA-PHED

- DRPs will have sites earmarked for relocating people from vulnerable areas. Such sites may not have adequate sanitation facilities. Further, concentration of population will give rise to huge waste which will need proper disposal. It may well be beyond the capacities of the municipal authorities to arrange for sanitation and waste disposal. As the sites will be known beforehand from the DRPs, Department may make arrangements for such facilities, including water for drinking and sanitation purposes to be available when needed.

6.4.5 Contingency Planning & Drills:

PA

- PA may check the workability of riot plans by organising drills from time to time. Since policemen are over-worked it is unlikely that drills will be taken up by districts unless closely followed up by PA. PA may send personnel from headquarters to ensure that the drills are taken in earnest and not merely for namesake. These drills must also include units of PAC and of Army so that all agencies get fully aware of their roles during a crisis. PA may maintain a record of the drills at different centres.
- Home Guard units may be deployed for many of the routine policing functions during riots so that more policemen are available for managing riots. This will require more frequent trainings of Home Guards in sensitive districts – which will in turn require resources. PA may consider getting approval at appropriate level for such trainings.
- In L2/L3 situation an initial meeting of the incident commanders and their staffs takes place immediately on establishment of the command structure. The purpose of this meeting is to seek consensus on priorities, tactical objectives, and an overall strategy to riot management. This meeting must be pre-planned as part of contingency planning for different degrees of riotous behaviour in different centres. Planning would entail strategic locations in each city that must be protected, (recovered from the mob), locations from where population must be

shifted, typical requirement of striking forces to free the city from rioting mobs – different scenarios etc.

6.4.6 Monitoring developments and preparedness: An illustrative checklist for monitoring preparedness measures:

PA

- Intelligence gathering at district levels
 - Is the Chowkidari system in all villages working as envisaged?
 - Are all districts reporting the data on agrarian problems, industrial disputes, group conflicts and extremist activities in their areas?
 - Does the district police maintain a working relationship (that can facilitate communication during tensions) with all major group leaders?
- District Riot Plan (DRP)
 - Are the lists of anti-social elements being updated regularly?
 - Does the DRP incorporate the names of the policemen who can identify these elements when required?
 - Does the DRP take into account the impact of situation in neighbouring districts?
 - Is the DRP based on the area wise riot schemes of different police stations of the district?
 - Is the man-power assessed realistically?
 - Are all positions in sensitive districts / police stations fulfilled with no vacant slot?
- Logistics
 - Is the control room at the district adequately equipped?
 - Do the sensitive police stations have videography equipment with trained personnel?
 - Does the district have adequate number of fire-tenders with trained firemen?
 - Has the requirement of RAF / specialized battalions for managing riots been worked out?
 - Have the requirements of personal protection equipment, emergency medical technicians worked out?
- Armed police (PAC)
 - Are the PAC personnel regularly undergoing their annual training programmes with an entire company together?


- Do the PAC units have adequate (and in working condition) tentage and other equipment?
- Do the PAC units have their own transport?
- Preparing lists of suitable officers
 - The Cell in consultation with the Home Department, maintain a list of such officers who have proven record of lawfully handling complex situations while in charge of districts. The list will contain officers from both administration and police wings. These officers should be known for firm decisive actions, and impartial conduct. In case of need State may decide to depute such officers to assist / guide / replace those in charge of the district.
 - The Cell will also identify, in consultation with Home Department, senior officers who are capable of taking the position of Incident Commander in L2 / L3 situations.

6.5 L2 Responses

At State level responses would be strategic. It will essentially be monitoring the situation and making men and material available for operations.

6.5.1 Up-gradation of SCR to EOC and Command Structure

Immediately on declaration of L2 /L3 the State Control Room will be upgraded into Emergency Operation Centre and SDMA will appoint an Incident Commander. An L2/L3 level situation may often call for deployment of central government resources –



army or para military forces units and this may require the incident command system to be expanded into a Unified Command (UC) structure as a UC brings together the "Incident Commanders" of all major organizations involved in managing the incident in order to coordinate an effective response.

Expansion of ICS into UC will depend on the extent of deployment of central resources. If 3 or more companies of Army are deployed it may be more efficient to go for a UC structure.

Whether a unified command is created or not, the essential command structure of EOC will remain the same, as depicted in the graphic.

6.5.2 Different Sections of the Command

IC/UC will have two types of staff, to borrow military phraseology, General Staff and Command Staff. General Staff Sections will be directly involved with containment of riot and restoration of order. Command Staff Sections will assist the IC/UC in other necessary functions. The General Staff Sections are:

- Operations Section: It is responsible for all operations directly applicable to the primary mission of containing the riot and restoring order. It will be headed by a tactical expert with in depth knowledge of the affected area who will direct the operations, once the action plan is approved by the IC/UC.
- Planning Section: It will be headed by a representative of State intelligence agency. This section is responsible for collecting, evaluating, and disseminating the tactical information related to the riot and subsequent developments. It will also prepare and document Action Plans for approval by IC/UC and after approval execution by the Operations Section.
- Logistics Section: It is responsible for providing facilities, services, and materials for the operations as envisaged in the action plan.
- Finance and Administrative Section: It is responsible for all financial, administrative, and cost analysis aspects of the management operation. It will be headed by a representative of the Revenue (Scarcity) Department, which also looks after disaster management in the State.

The Command Staff is responsible for most effective use of the information environment, health and safety of people affected and of those engaged in response operations, and liaison activities. The sections are:

- Liaison Section: Liaison activities are of two types: first within command structure, among the various agencies involved this will be undertaken by a representative of the Revenue (Scarcity) Department. Other equally important liaison activity is establishing contacts with the opinion leaders of the two communities at State level. This is a highly skilled job and needs persons with credibility and contacts. Home Department will suggest the names of such interlocutor(s).
- Information Section: It will consist of representatives of the Directorate of Information and Public Relations. It will develop and release information about the riot management operations, indeed about everything related with the riots, to the news media as also to those engaged in operations. It will also arrange for media's interface with incident commander or other senior decision makers in operations. It will also media visits if considered desirable. It will also monitor what media is reporting and wherever needed put forward the correct picture.
- Safety Section: It will be headed by a representative of the Directorate of Health and will have representatives of PHED, Food & Civil Supplies, Electricity and other such departments that may be of use in providing safety, security and relief to affected population. It will also recommend measures to the IC/UC for assuring personnel health and safety and to assess and/or anticipate hazardous and unsafe situations.

6.5.3 Major tasks of the Command

- Containment of trouble to the centres where it has already erupted
- Ensuring preventive measures at other vulnerable centres – particularly to those nearby centres that have close economic / social ties with the affected centre, intelligence agencies would give their assessment of threat potential at other centres
- Ensuring firm decisive action with overwhelming force to bring the situation under control as soon as possible
- Ensuring as much relief to citizens of affected area as is possible under the trying situation
- Initiating dialogues with influential opinion leaders of both communities at State level
- Keeping the media apprised of the development

- Galvanizing rescue and relief operations commensurate with the size of calamity and extent / degree of human sufferings

6.5.4 Initial command meeting

The establishment of a command structure should immediately be followed by an initial meeting of the incident commanders and their staffs. During this meeting the incident commanders must come to consensus on priorities, a collective set of tactical objectives, and an overall strategy to carry out the response. This meeting may take too long unless it is pre-planned. *The responsibilities discussed above should be pre-planned to the greatest extent possible.* In this meeting the members may (must) share openly and honestly their priorities, considerations, and concerns. However, once they leave this meeting, they must speak with one voice.

6.5.4.1 Setting Priorities and Objectives

Different agencies will have different objectives to fulfill in riot management operations. However, some objectives would be common to all, in addition to their own set objectives. The common objectives are:

- Preserve the safety of human life;
- Stabilize the situation to prevent the event from worsening;
- Use all necessary containment tactics in a coordinated manner to ensure a timely, effective response; and
- Address all three of these priorities concurrently.

Each Section will certainly have other significant priorities requiring consideration. Understanding all the issues is important because consensus must be reached for response to be effective.

6.5.4.2 Developing a collective set of tactical objectives

At the onset of the initial meeting, UC members have an obligation to raise and discuss honestly what each response organization can provide in terms of authorities, equipment, skills, and experience, including their response capabilities. All incident commanders (police, armed police, para-military forces and army) must be free to speak openly about their constraints or limitations, whether practical or political in nature, because these constraints may have an impact on how the objectives can best be achieved.

Each agency will bring its own set of objectives and considerations to the response, the UC must decide upon a collective set of objectives — to identify what needs to be

accomplished — before an overall response strategy can be developed. To be effective, these objectives should be *specific, measurable, assignable, reasonable, and time-related*. The UC must come to consensus on a set of general objectives that can then provide focus for the response planning.

6.5.4.3 Adopting overall strategy

Strategy is the development of policies and plans to achieve the objectives. If the UC knows exactly how to accomplish an objective, it should specify the strategy. Because there are frequently multiple possible strategies that would accomplish the same objective, the Planning Section will recommend strategies for UC approval. This allows for better input and discussion from the responders, and also reduces meeting time for the incident commanders. The overall strategy will cover deployment of forces – both striking force and policing arms, tactical objectives and the time schedule for achieving those objectives, responders’ and affected population’s health and safety; and media management.

6.6 L3 Responses

In L3 situation the command structure and response mechanism shall remain the same as in L2, except that the UC may have a representative from MHA. L3 situations may have implications transcending state borders and many critical decisions may come from centre.

6.7 Schematic of the process flow


The process flow has been depicted under two situations:

- c. Perception of threat to public order— either by district intelligence or by State level intelligence agencies
- d. Flaring up of violence

6.7.1 Threat perceived by state level intelligence or by district level intelligence

1. Inform State Control Room
 - a. Decide about briefing DIPR to be ready to respond to if any news stories that may appear in media at this stage
 - b. Decide about initiating talks with the group leaders
2. Inform district(s) concerned
 - a. Closer regulation of areas prone to riots, closer vigil on vulnerable population
 - b. Locate the policemen who can identify the anti-social elements for preventive arrest on short notice

c. Monitor the movements of known anti-social elements




6.7.2 Violence flares up & riots reported

District administration advises State Control Room. SCR evaluates the situation in light of intelligence reports and reports from neighbouring districts and based on advices from SCR the SDMA takes a view on the level of the threat and declares L2. Immediately on declaration of L2:

Control Functions:

- SCR gets elevated to EOC;
- Headed by pre-identified (alerted) Incident Commander;
- Other commanders from Army / PAC join in and command structure is created;
- Command assesses the situation;
- Decides on priorities;
- Identifies objectives;
- Adopts a strategy to achieve objectives;
- Assesses the operational resources for the strategy; and
- Mobilises resources



Strategic support functions:

Monitoring rumours and information dissemination – DIPR

Involving the community leaders – SDMA level initiative

Support functions:

Search & rescue – Fire services

Medical aid – Health, Voluntary agencies

Temporary shelter – Revenue (Scarcity), Food & Civil Supplies, PHED

Feeding the displaced persons – Revenue (Scarcity), Voluntary agencies

Essential service: Power, Telecommunication

Chapter 7

Preparedness measures

7.1 Preparations for pre-determined responses

As mentioned earlier State level responses are strategic – deploying suitable commanders, enough men and adequate hardware. Performance of the deployed forces will be constantly monitored and tactical experts will be deputed to assist / guide or even replace the local commanders. The necessary normal time preparations for se have been detailed in Section 6.4 of the previous chapter.

7.1.1 Resource availability

PA may prepare the list of National and State resources that will be available during a riot situation. The resources may come from - government, private, and civil society: It is important to track the resources available from corporate sector during emergencies – these can range from vehicles, men trained in first aid, safe premises for sheltering vulnerable people from affected areas, hospital beds, pharmacies etc.

Inventory of human and material resources should be included in IDRN/SDRN and a system of *quarterly stock taking* and updating the database may be put in place. In particular the availability of the following at different centres;

- Tear gas
- Rubber bullets
- Water canons
- Snifter dogs
- Search and rescue teams
- Bomb diffusers
- Loud speakers
- Armed police force
- Communication equipment
- Videographic equipment
- Transport
- Tentage
- Civil supplies
- Drinking waters
- Ambulances
- Mobile hospitals
- Life saving drugs including intra venous drips
- Blood - plasma/ platelets
- Doctors / paramedics available with police / PAC units
- Doctors / paramedics available at Government hospitals in sensitive districts

Civil Society Organisations, particularly Red Cross can augment available resources. The details of resources available from them can be obtained from the Department of Revenue (Scarcity) who are the Primary Agency for ESF Donations.

7.1.2 Preparedness for attending to the special needs of the weaker sections- aged, lactating mothers, pregnant ladies etc- during riot situations

Sensitization programmes on the special needs of the weaker sections- aged, lactating mothers, pregnant ladies should be held for medial and para medical staff. While shifting populations from vulnerable areas to safer locations, these needs must be kept in consideration. In curfew bound areas, the system for passes for pregnant ladies going to hospitals must be streamlined.

7.2 Capacity building

Capacity building has many aspects:

- Training the manpower increases their fighting capacity and morale;
- Acquisition of proper equipment increases the capacity of the State to cope with different situations; and
- Changes in legal environment increases the capacity of the regulatory framework to deal with riot situations.

Training has been covered in Section 4.5. Equipment too has been covered in Section 5.4.4. The need for strengthening the regulatory environment particularly for post riot investigation into offences reported during the course of riots and prosecution of offenders have been referred to in Sections 4.3.6 and 4.3.7. Many offences committed during riots are not registered. Many of those registered are poorly investigated and not brought up for prosecution and finally prosecution takes years because of delays in courts. This emboldens anti social elements and also petty criminals in indulging in arson and looting during riots.

Any improvement in this area will go a long way in discouraging miscreants and will at least reduce the intensity of violence in riots if not eliminate the threat of riots.

Further, the institutional mechanisms for investigation and prosecution must be strengthened. Often SITs are constituted to investigate into reported crimes, and many a time special courts are established for expeditious disposal of prosecutions. The results have been far short of expectations. SITs themselves have been accused, at times, of partisan behaviour and even special courts take too long to dispose cases. A more serious issue is withdrawal of many charge sheets later under pressure from people wielding influence. Institutional mechanism to make the rioters pay for the damages caused by them needs to be put in place and effectively implemented.

7.2.1 Incident Command System

This Plan envisages an ICS or UC structure for management of an L2 or L3 situation. Incident Command System is being used increasingly all over the world in order to professionalize emergency response management. This system provides for specialist incident command teams with an Incident Commander or a Unified Command with officers trained in different aspects of incident management – logistics, operations, planning, safety, media management etc. The LBSNAA Mussoorie has been designated as the nodal training institution. At state level, UPAAM has been organizing programmes related with disaster management. Senior officers from police and administration should be exposed to such programmes at UPAAM or at LBSNAA.

7.2.2 Strengthening of Fire Services

Fire services play a major role in rescue operations in collapsed structures. Widespread arson is a common phenomenon during riots. Fire services' capacity needs to be strengthened. They should be developed into *multi hazard response units*. Each fire station in sensitive areas should be provided with *rescue tenders* in addition to fire tenders. At larger centres such as Kanpur and Lucknow fire services should be provided with hazmat vans. There is a need for recruitment of more firemen as and intensive training should be given to them so that they can function as multi hazard response units.

7.3 Use of media

Powerful reach of media needs to be used more imaginatively during normal times to foster nationalism and patriotic fervour. There is a role for the Directorate of Information and Public Relations here. DIPR should prepare write ups on inspiring instances from the State's rich history and lives of great leaders of the past, who had followers from both communities and who are still held in reverence by both the communities. Such write ups should be regularly published through print media and programmes based on their lives may be aired by television channels. Instead of inserting such write ups / programmes as paid adverts, DIPR can encourage writers / producers of repute and produce imaginative programmes with mass appeal that the established commercial media would be willing to participate in this endeavour.

7.3.1 Suggested Guidelines on Information Dissemination during Armed Operations

The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

- a. Specific information on troop strength, equipment, weapons, including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by support units or available on hand with combat units. Unit size to be described in general terms such as "*company-size, multi-battalion*" Number and amount of equipment and supplies to be described in general terms such as "large, small, or many."
- b. Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations or strikes, *including postponed or cancelled operations.*
- c. Information, photography and imagery that would reveal the specific location of forces or show the level of security at camp sites. Locations may be described as "this report is coming from *Babraich / Bulandshabar* District, close to the site of action".
- d. Any instruction issued to the fighting forces – "such as capture *so and so* dead or alive or seal the roads going to south".
- e. Information on intelligence collection activities, *including targets*, methods and results.
- f. During an operation, specific information on types of troops deployed – PAC / NSG commandos / STF including unit designations, names or operations and *size of forces* until released by the Incident Commander.
- g. Identification of landing sites for airborne forces.
- h. Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of targets' tactics, camouflage, cover, deception, intelligence collection or security measures.
- i. Specific identification information on missing while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.
- j. Specific operating methods and tactics, if pressed by media only general terms such as "low" or "fast" to be used.
- k. Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against State forces, such as details of major damage or major personnel losses, *until that information is released by IC.*
- l. Damage and casualties (can be described as *light, moderate or heavy.*)

It is realised that these guidelines may lead to *information vacuum*. Such a vacuum , at worst would give a spurt to the number of rumours floating around; and though the rumours may tell upon the morale of the forces and of the public, it is *a lesser evil compared to the likely damage to operations if such details were made available.*

How the information environment can work detrimental to State interests was starkly demonstrated during the Mumbai terror attack of 2008. The handlers of the terrorists, sitting outside the country, were able to pass on vital information to their men merely by watching the Indian television channels.

7.3.2 Suggested Guidelines on Media Presence at Operation Sites

- a. Unless precluded by the exigencies of operations, media personnel would be allowed to visit and cover emergency management operations. The exigencies that may preclude their presence include lack of space at the site and security considerations (of medial personnel).
- b. If the operation is being carried out at a remote location, State may organize visit by media personnel pool. Such a pool shall be disbanded as soon as it is back from the remote location and the visit is over.
- c. Journalists will not be allowed within the area of operations unless specifically accredited for entering such area and will be required to abide by instructions issued to protect themselves and those engaged in operations. Accreditation would be liable to be suspended / cancelled if these instructions are violated.
- d. DIPR functionaries will act as liaisons for media personnel but will not interfere, in any way, with the reporting process.

Chapter 8

Partnership with Other Stakeholders

8.1 Communities

Partnering with communities entails not only maintaining contacts with the influential opinion leaders but institutionalising an arrangement whereby an ordinary community member – a man on the street - feels comfortable in coming up to authorities with his / her difficulties. Senior officers at district levels must find time to attend functions held by different civil society organisations.

8.2 Academic institutions

No substitute exists for research. More research is needed to address the unknowns of crowd behavior. Academic institutes often conduct research / studies in riots. Just as peace studies scholars began studying war in order to understand how to avoid it in the future, researches in riots may help us better understand their causes in order to devise ways of avoiding them in future. Such research should be designed to compare and

contrast conflicting theories of why crowds turn violent. PA should enter into agreements with reputed academic / research organisations to commission researches to answer the following questions:

- Why people assemble?
- What social organizational structures exist within a gathering?
- What determines the intensity or “energy” of a gathering?
- How do crowds in other cultures behave?
- What psychological and social factors contribute to the emergence of violent behavior in crowds?
- What situational and cultural factors contribute to the emergence of violent behavior in crowds?
- What military or law enforcement actions lead to violent behavior in crowds?
- What crowd-control techniques are most effective in preventing and stopping violent behavior?

Another important field of research is quantitative study in occurrence of riots – seeking the relationship between the known causative factors of riots and the probability of its occurrence at any centre. Such studies have been done assuming a linear relationship between the causative factors (they are assigned numerical values – based on their intensities) and occurrence of a riot. Linear regression models, so arrived, have *some* predictive ability. Primary Agency may consider commissioning such research with reputed institutes working in the field of public administration and/ or social behaviour.

8.3 Armed forces

Armed forces play a crucial role in all disasters by providing or augmenting the rescue and relief operations. In riots and civil disorder situations they often play important roles in managing the situation. Partnering with armed forces does not require any special initiatives as they are state organs. But closer ties are required to get most from their involvement in riot management. Riot scheme rehearsals are the best way of achieving such ties. The drills will document how best the tactical objectives and the command structure can be shared between police, armed police and armed forces.

8.4 NGOs

There are many voluntary organisations working in the field of promoting peace and national integration. Such organisations usually have committed and well-intentioned

volunteers and workers. The district administration should maintain comprehensive data base on such organisations, and should mobilize support of, and encourage, such organisations, in their efforts to maintain communal harmony, and diffusing tension if a communal situation arises.

8.5 Public sector units and Private sector organizations

Large commercial organisation, whether in public sector or in private sector, have transport, hospitals, doctors, trained staff and protected space. On different occasions district administrations do seek their cooperation in managing situations. The resources available with all such units in a district / sub-division should be recorded. Relative strengths of the different units, where there are more than one, should be discussed in a joint meeting in order to decide which unit will be expected to give what type of support to riot management operations. With their roles defined, the PSUs / PSOs may be asked to prepare their own standard procedures so as to minimise the response time.

Chapter 9

Financial arrangements

Disaster Management Act defines “mitigation” as “measures aimed at reducing the risk, impact or effects of a disaster or threatening disaster situation”. Obviously resources from Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) are not available for mitigation activities. It has, however, been provided that *10% of the annual inflows into the CRF can be used for the procurement of search and rescue (SAR) equipment and communication equipment*. This provision can be utilized to acquire rescue tenders for fire services, to begin with, at sensitive centres.

HPC had recommended that at least 10 per cent of plan funds at the national, state and district levels be earmarked and apportioned for schemes which specifically address areas such as prevention, reduction, preparedness and mitigation of disasters. The Eleventh Finance Commission has paid detailed attention to the issue of disaster management and Disaster Mitigation Fund (DMF) is now a statutory requirement for all States. However there is no unanimity on what should constitute DMF. One approach is that it may comprise all Plan schemes which qualify as ‘mitigation’ under the Act. Another is that it may consist of a fixed percentage of total plan allocation to be spent only on such mitigation activities that are not covered under any of the existing plan scheme.

Planning Commission has suggested that 0.5% of the total plan allocation of each Ministry/ Department be earmarked for NDMF.

At present all capital expenditure on mitigation, except when covered under SAR equipment, will have to be met from plan funds. Primary agency should implement standard procedure of estimating riot mitigation expenditure in plan budgets.

PART III: CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

Chapter 10

Review and Updation

10.1 Action Taken Reports and Review of this Plan

Once the Plan is approved, PA and the SAs will need to take some actions to ensure that they have reached the desired level of preparedness, or they may like to confirm that no particular actions are required and they are capable of discharging all responsibilities arising from this Plan.

The purpose a review is to determine at regular intervals whether the planning documents continue to be adequate. The need for review arises from changes in the environment for which the document is prepared. A structured arrangement for review expedites the plan review process. This Section contains the procedure for ensuring that the agencies named herein are prepared and for expediting the review process.

The Department of Revenue (Scarcity) (DRS) is in charge of disaster management. Therefore it may need to coordinate the approval / review process. DRS may like to ensure that concerned agencies determine whether the issues related to them are *adequately addressed on a continuing basis* by reviewing the relevant parts (related to them).

DRS may also like use the issues that are not addressed in the document, i.e. such issues which are noted as requiring structural measures, as institutional goals to be achieved. Once they are achieved, the resultant measures are incorporated in this document in future.

10.1.1 Approval & Review Process

Once approved, the Plan must provide proof that the Head of DRS or the officer in charge of disaster management, has approved the document with a dated signature page, *every second year or whenever the incumbency changes*.

- Head of the PA or an officer made in charge of managing this disaster must put his signature in proof of the approval of the document *every two years or whenever the incumbency changes*.

- Head of Home Department or any officer made in charge of this disaster, must confirm that officers for taking over as Incident Commander and tactical experts are being identified and groomed on a continuous basis with the location where the current list of such officers is maintained, *every two years or whenever the incumbency changes.*
- The Head of PAC or an officer delegated by him for this purpose must *confirm every year* that the annual training programmes (of one company at full strength at one time) are being conducted regularly.
- The Head of Fire Services or an officer delegated for this purpose must *confirm every two year* on the as multi-hazard rescue training of firemen.
- Health Director or an officer delegated for this purpose must confirm that the list of hospitals, available doctors, paramedics , life saving medicines etc are updated for every sensitive centre *every year.*

10.2 Schedule of drill

PA may consider holding riot drills at all centres considered vulnerable in view of existing factionalism in local level politics, intelligence reports, agrarian problems and industrial disputes. The following agencies shall participate in the drill:

- District police
- PAC
- Army
- Fire service
- Intelligence agencies
- Health
- Civil supplies
- Power
- Telecommunication
- Red cross
- PSUs & Private Sector Organisations
- NGOs active in communal harmony

The drills will take place after creating a detailed scenario, which would not be fully disclosed at the beginning. The scenario will be disclosed to participants in a phased manner, mimicking the way a real civil disorder / mass agitation situation unfolds. Objectives of the drill would be to assess:

- At command level:
 - Time taken for activation of SDMP
 - Time taken for creation of a the command structure
 - Time taken for agreeing on the common tactical objectives
 - Time taken for finalising the strategy to achieve the tactical objectives
- At field level
 - Immediate availability of forces with the district police
 - Immediate availability of physical resources for operations – tear gas, water canons, rubber bullets, arms & ammunitions,
 - Characteristics of force deployment by district police
 - Time taken for arrival of reinforcements from PAC and / or Army
 - Characteristics of force deployment under UC
 - Availability of doctors, paramedics, life saving drugs, secured places where vulnerable population can be shifted,
 - Availability of volunteers from NGOs and time taken for their reporting

PA may consider undertaking three / four drills every year in different parts of the State. It is well understood that the State is under-policed and the police personnel are hard pressed for time. Such exercises may not be undertaken unless there is inveterst from the very top. Exercises are important from two reasons. First they go a long way in improving the capability of the PA to manage a situation. Second, they send a clear message to the subversive forces of the State's determination and capability of handling civil disorder and thus discourage them from taking to streets.

To ensure that the special needs of pregnant ladies, lactating mothers, and other women, children, aged and disabled are not lost in the flurry of operations it is desirable to ensure participation of these weaker sections in preparedness and mitigation processes. As it is not practicable to seek participation of pregnant ladies in mock drills etc, while organising the drills, participation of such sections of the community must be ensured who are more acutely alive to the special needs of these weaker sections – hospitals, maternity homes, sanitarium and asylum (where existing) staff etc.

The Plan should be reviewed after each drill