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Reason

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF SOCIAL AND
GENERAL PHILOSOPHY.

“FOR TRUTH AND RIGHT.”

No. 1. MELBOURNE, JANUARY 21, 1896.

3D.

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RICHMOND :

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4 RULE STREET.

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OUR INTENTIONS.

The purpose of this Magazine is to bring the light of Reason to bear where it is most needed — and, in consequence, principally upon the structure of human society, as it is and as it might be. Whilst not failing to take cognizance of those other aspects of life and thought which are not usually grouped under the title of “the Social Question,” it is to this latter that we shall devote most attention. We shall handle the subject in a way little customary; for we shall adopt no class standpoint, and in saying this we certainly do not mean that we shall attempt the impossible task of *recognising, and maintaining a balanced attitude between, all the existing classes.* There are false principles in society as it exists, which produce results bad for all. The cure can only be effected by eliminating them. Two wrongs do not make a right, nor two absurdities sense; and too many of the expedients proposed or adopted, no less for social preservation than for social reformation, are merely attempts, on the principle so dear to schoolboy arithmeticians, to correct one mistake by making another. Our intention is to try and bring about, by plain straightforward reasoning, a better understanding among all friends of progress — no matter what their immediate interests under existing conditions may be — as to the principles to be adhered to and those to be rejected in developing their ideals and aspirations; and we shall criticise in the same spirit the various projects put forward, whether by way of reforming present or of preventing future ills.

We are for a better state of things, and it is indifferent to us whether it be realised by, or in spite of, the efforts of the “working classes,” the “business classes,” the “leisured classes,” or any combination from among them, so long as the result is accomplished. The only classes we

recognise are : the people who honestly want to make the world better for those who are in it, and those who don't ; or if we admit any other distinction, it is one which, practically, differs from the foregoing in little but the terms—on the one hand people who have the will and the power to reason ; on the other . . . rogues who fraudulently reject reason, and fools who do not possess it. For the destinies of these latter sections we have no solicitude, except that in the interests of the rest of the world we are desirous of seeing them consigned to the museums of antiquities.

For the remainder of our programme, we shall keep in view the general questions which propound themselves to social humanity ; and shall from time to time devote attention to such special subjects in science and philosophy as may seem to have a particular interest or importance. We shall be glad to receive suggestions in this regard.

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REASON AND THE SOCIAL QUESTION.

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We should be more original in profession than in practice if we did not treat reason as necessary to the solution of the Social Problem. But we are not content with affirming reason to be the means for discovering a solution ; we are convinced, further, that reason is *itself* the solution.

To put the case briefly : if there are any social results which are absurd in their nature, that must proceed from a departure from reason in their causes.

Now, there is only one way of departing from reason as a social principle, and that is to establish any other principle of a less—there cannot be any of a more—adaptive character. It is a truism that every rule has its exceptions ; make a rule for the exceptions, and you require another to provide for exceptions yet again upon that. On the whole, if the object of a rule is to save the trouble of bringing reason to bear upon the particular instances, it seems like the proverbial "lazy man's short cut," as more effort has generally to be expended in finding out precisely what rules apply to the combination of points on which a decision is wanted, than would be needed for forming an original and independent judgment. Then again, while reason *may* fail from want of knowledge on which to proceed, rule *must* go wrong from the very fact that, being unable to provide for all the exceptions, it has to content itself with deciding upon some of them as if they were not what they really are—as if they really were what they are not. And while people may fail to use reason correctly, they are certainly no less liable to misconstrue rules than to misconstrue facts—so that one fails to see where the advantage of rule over free reason in any matter at all comes in.

We can understand a common agreement about some point which a number of people will accommodate each other to observe ; that rests on reason. But the extent to which an understanding arrived at is to be

acted upon, is also a matter for reason to determine. If Henry promises John, "I will be at such a place at 9:30," and a fierce shower of rain occurs, the question is whether the appointment is of such importance that the parties expect each other to get wet for its sake. It is for Henry to decide whether John is likely to be waiting for him, and if so whether it is more serious for him to get wet or for John to be disappointed ; whether John is likely to prefer (and to prefer *him*) to keep dry, or to keep the appointment. If you make the keeping of appointments compulsory, however, say under penalty of a month in gaol, you open up a brilliant prospect before a new industry—that of speculating in appointments with a view to making the other fellow buy their cancellation.

Of course, if there were several persons liable to be disappointed together by Henry's not turning up, he might need much stronger grounds of excuse than where it was only an affair between him and John (on the other hand their number might make his presence less important) ; but if a million people agree together that they will keep their appointments, they cannot succeed in making an appointment between Henry and all of them out of a simple personal appointment between Henry and John—so that, unless indeed *you* would deem it *your* duty for *you* to seize Henry by force and drag him violently through the streets to keep an appointment at which you had no business, when he thought he had sufficient excuse for not going, you cannot profess that any other outsider ought to do so, and therefore certainly you cannot profess that all outsiders collectively ought to do it, or anything equivalent to it.

All this apart from the fact that a rule is very often *not* an agreement at all, but either a simple habit foolishly treated as obligatory simply on account of being habitual, or a mere command.

The principle, here exposed, of making *universal*, observances whose desirability or appropriateness is only *general*, or even less, and justifying this by the fallacious assumption that the public have an actual joint and uniform concern in the cases, where they have really only a common liability to separate and variable concern in other possible single cases of the kind, appears to be the starting point of all evils which are radical in the present system of society, and the great cause which imposes spasmodic revolutions to remedy abuses and errors which would otherwise have had already a gradual and easy rectification in the course of social development, which would have outpaced and not lagged behind their own. It is the primary departure from the working of reason into practice. And it is the principle from which the socialists of to-day expect everything!

A correction in this point would be a development of individualism in the true sense, for it is only through an individualistic medium that reason—since the ends it has to serve and circumstances which it has to deal with are the matters of the people individually—can freely and really transform itself into action. And Individualism, if it means anything but isolation, jealousy, and mutual hostility—if it means **INDIVIDUALISM**—means the condition in which all individual satisfaction is rendered most fully and harmoniously possible by the emancipation of individual action. While such a correction would not be socialistic *as socialism goes*, it would

certainly reform out of existence all the real evils against which socialism is protesting, and at the same time reform in the opposite direction—by enlarging and vivifying them—the imagined evils in destroying which socialism would make itself a curse to humanity.

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GENIUS AND DEGENERACY.

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A REPLY TO LOMBROSO.

Lombroso maintains that genius is a form of epileptoid insanity. He supports this view with a mass of evidence which indicates that it is the general thing for men of genius to have some symptoms of this form of disorder, and he infers that the ability and inspiration are simply characteristics of a specialised form of the disease—in short, the complementary symptoms of the degeneracy with which they are so commonly associated.

Lombroso is, I am convinced, absolutely correct in saying that the operation of genius has epileptoid analogies; but to infer from this that genius is a degenerative psychosis, a form of epilepsy, appears somewhat faddish on the part of a medical expert familiar, necessarily, with the fact that every perturbation of disease has its analogue in some act or function of health. For instance, Lombroso mentions venereal excitation as an accompaniment of epilepsy, and the venereal faculty has frequent relations and striking analogies with both genius and epilepsy. And if not all people who have exercised this faculty have manifested obvious tokens of degeneracy, at least there is none who has never exhibited anything ever capable of being an epileptoid symptom. Is the sex-activity, then, to be classed as an epileptoid degeneracy?

With all that is said about atavism, is it utterly impossible to recognise any variations in the other direction—any “throwings forward” instead of “throwings back”—any accumulations of hereditary or accidental influences which are not degenerative but neo-generative? Surely if the race is in a state of progressive evolution, these types of variation must be more frequent than the reverse, and whatever the accidents of genius may be, it is logical to conclude that genius itself depends on progressive rather than retrogressive modifications. The Binomial Law of phenomena, to which Lombroso refers, is just as capable of affording the explanation that the man of genius is habitually subjected to what are, for him, specially degenerative external influences, as that he is the product of a special class of internal degenerations.

And I think that, so far from genius being a disease, the disease is simply a special liability to which the man of genius is subjected, partly as the muscularly active man is specially liable to certain accidents and induced disorders, and still more from the particular unsuitability of his social environment.

The possession of a large amount of muscular vigor and activity may be, neither the complementary irregularity of a low degree of mentality, nor part of a destructive disproportion in the lower physical system, but the result of a large amount of vital force harmoniously composed in a well-balanced organism. Similarly with genius, which indeed Lombroso observes to flourish particularly in the regions favorable to high vitality. Whilst it is true that the *phenomena* of genius may be produced by physiological irregularities, it seems to me that the more rational view to take of most instances where genius is accompanied by such irregularities is that when, under the influence of physical or social surroundings, the conditions fail for the maintenance of this general high vitality, then as a matter of course a lowering of tone occurs; and in the endeavour to keep the effectiveness of faculties up to the standard in the respects which appeal most powerfully to the sufferer at the time, specialised irregularities are then set up. They are thus not the physical synonym of genius, but merely the price paid for the conservation of some of the effects of genius under unfavorable conditions.

In Lombroso's opinion, genius is a destructive working of the cerebral machinery, and produced by a prior something amiss, as the natural working would not be of destructive intensity. But there are machines capable (under appropriate conditions) of working *safely* at a far higher intensity than others could be run at even destructively; and it is the same with brains. Nor does it seem necessary to conclude that great ability must be owing to any greater excitation of the cortical matter of the brain than is experienced by the average individual in normal health. There are two electrometers; one will respond to the most delicate influences with a precision, and to ordinary with an energy of manifestation, which the other instrument will only show when it is out of order in some peculiarly fortunate way, that produces “on a degenerative basis” an adventitious sensibility and energy which in the better machine are normal and occasioned by its greater nicety of construction.

Now, there is another point to be noticed. A man may have his faculties or functions “disproportionate” to each other as compared with what is the ratio observed in other persons, while at the same time his functions of system harmonise perfectly with the requirements of these other functions and faculties in the proportions in which they actually exist. This man will be certain to exhibit irregularities and fluctuations as compared with other men, because of his reactions being different and the adjustments therefore different also. But still, since the system is perfectly capable of enduring the reactions and effecting the adjustments, the man is perfectly healthy; otherwise it would have to be affirmed that an eagle is essentially diseased in comparison with an apteryx, and that a female is constitutionally unsound in comparison with a male of *equal* adaptation to the conditions of his sex. A person is healthy or unhealthy, normal or abnormal, sane or insane, not according to what other people are, but according to what he is; not as he conforms in structure and in method of function to their standard, or varies from it, but as his structure and method of function form a *self-consistent whole* or the reverse. If, then, genius functions by an exceptional excitement of the cortex, it is

still quite possible that this excitement, although abnormal to other individuals, is not more intense than is strictly provided for by the constitution of the man of genius; and therefore its mere presence is not sufficient evidence that any particular instance of genius is a morbid manifestation. Neither will the mere co-presence of unmistakable degeneracy warrant the attribution of the genius-function to the influence of this misfortune—it is not even certain that in a given instance the presence of genius has in any way subserved the production of the degeneracy. And Lombroso has certainly proved too much in reminding us, the better to establish the frequent co-existence of genius and epilepsy, that “many cases of headache (hemierania) or simple loss of memory” are now recognised as variations of epilepsy. This gives so wide a field to the disorder that if every man of genius were shown to be epileptic, a more intimate connection would scarcely be suggested between genius and the disease, than between genius and a cut finger.

Indeed, under the influence of present social conditions, which disturb nearly all the natural psychological reactions and physiological harmonies, it is so rare to find anyone at all who is not a degenerate, that one should think it rather a proof of some curious congenital abnormality which would appear as a derangement if under natural conditions, if the man of genius did not manifest some physical and psychic aberrations.

Side by side with disordered men of genius, there are other persons who exhibit the same degenerations, who have even the same faculties and the same tendencies abnormally excited and abnormally inhibited, and who nevertheless display no genius whatever (matroids or “cranks”). Where does the difference arise? In the subtleties of the disease? or in the individual capacities irrespective of the disorder? If the latter, then is the exercise of one's faculties all a matter of disease? The convolutions of the brain are like any other organs—they must be exercised in the proportion of their co-ordinate development and developmental capacity, or they will make the system suffer.

My observations lead me to conclude:—

- 1.—Genius has for its basis a local or general superiority in the brain.
- 2.—It depends further to some extent upon the way in which acquired impressions are determined by environment.
- 3.—It depends also to a very great extent upon a special stimulus being supplied to the superior brain mechanism, and this may be—
 - (a) The natural stimulus of a constitutional superior intensity of vital energy;
 - (b) A result of the perversion of energy by extraneous stimulations or inhibitions, including those which operate psychologically as well as those which have a specific physiological influence;
 - (c) A result of a perversion of energy arising from congenital or from acquired defects, disproportions, lesions, neuroses, etc.
- 4.—Talent is of two kinds; a superior, arising like genius from real cerebral superiority, but lacking the special stimulus; and an inferior which depends upon the mere cultivation and training of ordinary

faculties, coupled with the special stimulus, which is here of degenerative origin. Both classes depend more largely than genius, and the latter of them more than the former, upon the determining influence of environment with regard to acquired impressions. There is also Ability proper, being a lower constitutional degree of cerebral structural efficiency, with a strictly proportionate natural special stimulus, than constitute sound genius.

The provision to which I have alluded, in the constitution of the man of genius, for taking up the strains and reactions proper to his quality, I believe is ordinarily congenital; and, if better social conditions prevailed, not only in point of politico-economic relations, of course, but in the general field of social culture and organisation, it would be seen that in many of the cases where this provision appears now not to exist, it has simply been destroyed or rendered ineffective by the lack of appropriateness between the individuality and the (chiefly artificial) environment.

This is how genius comes to be so frequently associated with marked degeneracy, and how, perhaps, in spite of all improvements, very great genius, far in advance of the general development, must always continue to be so associated.



EXTRACT FROM AN OLD MEMORANDUM BOOK.

Those delights, hopes and comforts which religion afforded I have known, and when I came to see that they were the outcome of that which is false, I at once rejected them; it is better to know one's ignorance than to revel in false hopes and anticipations that will never be realized.

Yet if any should not be able to endure without flinching the idea of relinquishing their hopes of a better life to come, to them I would say, we know not what may be—there will be probably more and higher enjoyment in future ages than now, and you may console yourselves with the reflection that either your own vitality will remain unchanged and recognize pleasure in a new form as it has been doing all through your life, for the whole body has changed several times, or what is far more probable, that all the theories ever put forward are mere inventions, and you may as well resign yourself to whatever fate Nature will bring upon you.

For my part I am content to know that *there is happiness*, and it matters not whether “I” am there to participate in it or not. For “I” am merely the iron; the magnetism is life and the capability of happiness. The magnetism and the iron on which that force acts make the magnet; but the force is the real principle, not the iron, which is merely the matter upon and by which it acts. Its magnetism can be transferred elsewhere, or converted into other forces, and even so of life. Does not the life

Certainly not. The man who is a subject of any power, be it personified in one form of government or in another, is a SUBJECT, and being a subject, he is not a *franc man*. Freedom begins at home—with the individual citizen. When you know that your actions do not depend upon the permission of any authority whatever, but upon your own will and the tolerance of your fellow-citizens, who are under no obligation to any boss clique or fetish to let you act against their welfare; and when both you and they appreciate that condition of things, and take pride in making the best of it—then you can say you are free.

Do you think it was the desire to do away with a few pounds' taxation that went to the support of a royal family, which actuated the pioneers of America to draw up their Declaration of Rights? Do you think that all the blood that was shed in their War of Independence was shed for the privilege of enabling an American Gillies or Patterson to have plenty of flog? Do you think that the men who wrote "*All men are born free and equal*," merely meant to convey that an American citizen ought to be bossed by a clique of American sharpers instead of by a titled English pensioner?

We have had our EUREKA STOCKADE, and the flag of the Australian Republic has floated, though for the time in vain, beneath a Victorian sky. Do you think that the men who fought there fought for nothing but a name? Do you think they fought for nothing but the price of a digging licence?

I will tell you what the men of EUREKA fought for. The Government came down and levied a big fee for permission to seek for gold, and when a man had not his licence in his pocket he was carried off to the Commissioners' Camp and chained like a dog. And the men of EUREKA said, "We who are the people of the country have the natural right to avail ourselves of the resources of the country, which the Government did not create, but simply stepped in to prevent us from using unless we paid what it demanded." And they said also, "We are not slaves, we are not ignorant gaping yokels who pray God to

*Bless the Squire and his relations,
And keep us in our proper stations!*

We are men of intelligence, education and culture, who have been accustomed to regard ourselves as men, not as things; and we refuse to acknowledge the position that we have no rights but what some authority may be pleased to confer upon us. We have the inalienable right to shape our own lives as we please, with no other limit than the consideration we owe to each other. And we want this country to be independent, in order that we may establish social institutions which shall represent, not privileged authority and subjection, but the free and voluntary negotiations of free men who are *under* no power but their own individual wills—that is, *under* no power—and *liable* to no power besides but the like wills of their fellow-men, in equal full freedom, and actuated by the consideration and respect which truly free individuals should have for each other."

That was what they meant by the *Australian Republic*. That was what was meant by the American Republic. Well, that is what I mean also;

but then the institutions which the Americans relied on to work out this end, and which our own forefathers, in turn, would have relied on, were not as good as the intention behind them. A lot of institutions are that way. Law is a good-intentioned arrangement, but you would hardly think so on the principle of judging a tree by its fruits. Law existed before the State. It existed before any Government—except the sort of government that is plain undisguised brutality, and it was intended as a remedy for that. When people first came to recognise that they could do better in peace and harmony than by mutual rapine, then as their moral and ethical notions were vague, they fixed up their peace on a working basis by a kind of understanding that none of them would do certain particular things to each other, under penalty of being treated as the common enemy. That was *law*. But you see, a certain particular thing has not always the same bearings. The circumstances that lead up to it, those that it has to act on, and those that arise out of it, may put quite a different complexion on it in one case from what it wears in another. So that the respect inculcated for the outer form of the social treaty, might often be abused to back up and enforce violations of its spirit.

You see, what we want is not a code of particular things that must be done, or that may be done, or that must be left undone, nor a list of certain particular conditions under which they must, may, or must not be done; but a strengthening of the moral sentiment of treating others-in-general in the way we should, as self-respecting men and women, like to be treated; and also the intellectual training whereby to see clearly how this or that does really stand. Then, we want, no code tying us down, but *free scope* to determine our own conduct and our precise attitude with regard to anyone else's conduct—the same free scope for ourselves as we expect, that we need as 'a' people.

Law was an endeavour to arrive at a condition of things in which every one should have the fullest satisfaction of his own needs and purposes—which is, after all, what we live for—by mutual respect and harmony. But involved in it, lurked, as we see, a false principle. *Freedom* was destroyed, and what was intended to afford a standard for social harmony, became as the inevitable consequence the means of furnishing a code to tyranny, or, at best, of obstructing social progress.

It was the same with Property, which is only one form of law. You can understand that the original intention of Property was simply this. I have placed myself in access to certain resources; I have expended certain labor. Why? In order to meet my needs; in order to work out my purposes. Assuming that my operations are not inimical to you, you admit that my intentions should be respected. You say, "We won't meddle with the things a man is relying on for what he wants." That is fair play, and the right thing. But in a shortsighted way, people have said, "Certain things shall be held absolutely sacred to certain persons." That constituted Property. That opened the door to fraud. That enabled and tempted people to hold things, not for any need they had of them, but for the need the other fellow had of them, in order to compel him to pay for the opportunity of satisfying his needs. The idea *underlying* Property is honesty, honour, and decency. Property *itself*, defeats its purpose. It

is the means by which men are robbed and swindled and driven to become robbers and swindlers.

Then, if we have any respect for the good purposes which underlie Law and Property, we must kill Law and Property for the sake of saving their purpose alive. Not, to destroy Law, in order to attain chaos of every man's hand against every man; but since Law is a parent of that horrible condition, we should destroy it to provide something better than Law, and which will really subserve social harmony. Not, to destroy Property in order to place a man's possessions and resources at the mercy of the covetous; but since Property does precisely this, in a way even worse than promiscuous larceny, where at least every able-bodied man would have a chance to equalise matters, we should destroy Property for the purpose of putting something better in its place—something that will really tend to ensure the security of all that a man enjoys, but that will not give him the privilege and social means of preying upon other men.

But what is the Something Better than Law and Property that you can put in their place?

It is YOURSELVES!

A free and enlightened people, imbued with the love of liberty, with self-reliance, moral courage, the consciousness of personal responsibility to their own higher selves and to their few fellow-men, and with the great spirit of Solidarity, are a better safeguard to each others' freedom and welfare against all dangers from within or without, than all the institutions that were ever devised.

(To be continued.)

FOOLS.

Fools there are, as fools there have been; but the greatest fool is still
 He who hopes to gain for goodness by a compromise with ill.
 He who dreams of aiding Truth by lending aid to lesser lies,
 He who holds as helps to Union racial hate and party cries,
 He who justly claiming all, feels his heart with triumph throbb
 Ratifying, for a pittance, tyrants' privilege to rob,
 He who, seeking Freedom, urges forms of homage, modes of rule—
 He is, as he ever has been, Evil's faithful friend, THE FOOL.

Qui ne craint point la mort, ne craint point les menaces;

J'ai le cœur au dessus des plus fières disgrâces;

Et l'on peut me réduire à vivre sans bonheur,

Mais non pas me résoudre à vivre sans l'honneur.

—LE CID (Cornille).

PRISON SOCIOLOGY.

By J. A. ANDREWS.

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During 1894-5 I had considerable opportunities for studying this subject "from within." On the pretext that my address as printer appeared in fewer places than directed by King George The Fourth, my authorship and publication of "A Handbook of Anarchy" were avenged upon me by the N.S.W. Government by three months' imprisonment in Biloela Gaol. Not three months after my release, I was arrested on an elaborate charge of seditious libel in connection with the shearing troubles, and was subjected to two months' penal discipline for the crime of awaiting trial, followed by five months' imprisonment under sentence. Those seven months I passed in Darlinghurst Gaol, Sydney. I shall begin by describing the two prisons, which presented many points of difference.

Biloela Gaol is on Cockatoo Island, at the head of Sydney Harbour. The old men, imbeciles, etc., were separated from the other men imprisoned, but apart from this there was no other division between us. We mingled together during the day, and at night were locked up in large dormitories containing from two dozen to three dozen prisoners each. These dormitories were illuminated during the whole night. The prison at Darlinghurst is divided into a number of yards into which the prisoners are sorted according to the length and character of their sentences; and they sleep, some by themselves and others three in a cell, without lights. In Darlinghurst there were a great many prisoners who, being not more than 25 years old, and having sentences of not more than twelve months, had to undergo "separate treatment," that is solitary confinement for the whole term of their sentences, with only an hour daily passed outside their cells, and that in walking round in a circle, holding to a chain, at intervals of five yards, and keeping strict silence.

Besides these junior prisoners, everyone has to undergo nine months' separate treatment who receives a sentence of three years or upwards. There were many in both gaols who had at some time or other suffered this solitary confinement, and it is the unanimous opinion of prisoners that whoever undergoes it for any length of time is to some extent insane—violent, eccentric, intemperate, or afflicted with nervous disorders—for the remainder of his life.

The almost total deprivation of new impressions for the brain—such as the ordinary man receives from moment to moment of his existence—and the extreme monotony of the few external impressions which are conveyed, cause the brain to structurally degenerate. A man whose mind is well stored with recollections and accustomed to conscious meditation, may be less seriously affected than others; one who has not the control of his thoughts will pass from reverie to mind-wandering or delusion; and one

less well-equipped, unless indeed he is normally a mere human mollusc, becomes like an infant. The brain, the whole nervous system, may pass into a condition of sluggish degeneration from inertia; at least, the balance of the faculties is destroyed; and the subsequent condition will be one either of insensibility, or of extreme irritability, in the parts primarily or secondarily affected—perhaps the two forms of derangement will alternate or be combined in the same individual.

What is true of solitary confinement is true in as absolute a manner of the prison system generally, only that the degenerating causes are here less intense in their operation, than in a condition of entire personal seclusion for months together in a bare whitewashed cell. The comparatively social arrangements at Biloela would give scope for this degeneracy much more slowly than the cellular system at Darlinghurst. It has to be remembered that the prisoners are from 13½ to 14 hours out of the 24 confined to the cell or dormitory, which they quit at 6.30 or 6.45 a.m., according to the season, and return to at 4.45 or 5 p.m.; that they are all leading the same routine life, in the same routine way, among the same surroundings, and have no cognisance of what is going on in the outer world. Take three people, even those who move about freely in the streets and are in touch with the world; lock them up together, with nothing to occupy themselves with, from 5 in the evening till 6 or 7 in the morning, regularly every night—the same three—and, even if they happen to be mutually congenial, it will not be long before the nights become dreary and vacant. For prisoners, there is nothing to talk of except what was already in their minds before they were incarcerated, unless indeed they have the power of adding to their impressions by abstract discussion, and in the dormitory there is some scope for exchange of impressions; in the cell the practicalities are speedily exhausted, and prisoners who have spent much time in gaol simply go to sleep, or lie passive till sleep comes to them.

The mental depression produced by the monotonous continuance of this state of things is the surest means of rendering a prisoner incompetent to be anything else but a prisoner. If the process of forced degeneration is of moderate duration, he is excited and bewildered by little things when he comes out—is incapable of making his way collectively amidst the whirl of life about him. If the duration is longer, he comes out a mere log, deprived not only of the power of assimilating impressions, but also of the power to receive them.

This is what my experience has taught me. I have an unusually acute consciousness of my organic and functional condition, and its variations, and generally know even without trying to perceive it, how I compare at a given time with what I am normally and with what I have been under any other special influences. I observed that in Biloela Gaol I needed several times as long to read a book as would have sufficed outside, and it was more difficult to fix my attention upon it. Towards the end of my sentence such news from the outer world as was obtainable from new prisoners, or by contraband, ceased to be attractive. The items might as well have been fiction. A world in which I had no part might as well never have existed outside my informant's imagination. If a believing

Christian had some interest in the affairs of Heaven because he relied on getting there eventually, he would find it very difficult to listen to a person whom he recognised for a seer, when this one could tell him nothing but the doings of meaningless names and the befallings of mere words. Someone unknown did or suffered something unknown; and, in connection with unknown beings, amid unknown surroundings, under unknown influences, something unknown happened in an unknown way, with unknown bearings—"without form and void." "The long fellow is going to turn up the Publican," was an item of interest in certain circles in Darlinghurst, but to you, reader, what is it? Does it interest you to learn that Claude Lander has scored a great victory over Sam Train for the presidency of the Wombat Club, and expects to carry his amendment of the Refreshment Clause? Where do you or I come in to it?

In the course of my wanderings and adventures, when I was incidentally cut off from the newspapers and other accustomed means of extended communication, my curiosity as to the events of the interval was reserved, not extinguished, and my appetite for similar information remained unchanged. But on leaving Biloela, although I knew that many matters of personal as well as general interest were to be found in the back issues of numerous papers, my curiosity was not lively enough to cause me to go to much trouble in looking them up, and the mere labor of reading them was disgustingly wearisome. Still more marked were the effects at my release from Darlinghurst after seven months' incarceration. Of course, we have here the influence, not only of the starving down of perceptive and assimilative faculties, but also of the direct weakening, by restraint, of will-power and independent purpose—as to which, I shall have something to say further on.

It is not so much even the social severance as the absence of new physical impressions which operates in this way. Variety of physical externals is raw material for the mind. A solitary person, taken through changing scenery not so rapidly as to prevent impressions from being formed and collated, would be better off than one imprisoned in a close space with a few companions. And the most persistent recollections of my two terms of imprisonment are of the craving for some variety to feed the physical perceptions on—the eagerness with which, at Biloela, I took every opportunity of posting myself on an elevation for a small outlook upon the harbour and its shores; the relish with which, after familiarising myself almost with the individual peculiarities of every grain of sand in the face of the sandstone wall, I observed on one occasion the existence of a moth's egg in one of the tool-marks; the magnified contrast of colors which I strained my eyes to discover in the stones of Darlinghurst, dull and uniform-tinted to casual view; the critical scanning of a cell I had not been in before, for a different distribution of the bug-marks, a different scaling down of the whitewash, a different brightening of the bolt and edges of the inner door by friction; the delight afforded by the discovery of a red feather which the wind had carried over the wall; the intense interest with which I watched the behaviour of a sparrow's feather caught in an eddy, and the train of reflections to which it gave rise on the subject of aerial navigation; the individual identification of every sparrow that

came to feel in our yard, and the naming of them after the warlers according to their boilly peculiarities; the execrating agony of interest with which the first turning on of the electric light in the gaol was watched; the strange sensations produced by a political meeting, and the playing of a band near the gaol; then the growing indifference to these things, as to any other impressions which did not subserve the imposed routine; the tendency to "brown stury" and passive vacuity—just as when, being without food for four days, as happened several times to me in the past, I would pass from the eager-picking up of individual crumbs of the size of a pin's head, to a loss of appetite and loathing of food, and, when I got the means to buy some, could not bring myself to eat it except by resorting to stimulants.

This indifference to everything, this ultimate lack of zest for impressions, pursued me out of Darlinghurst, and I found also that after my release, the things which I noticed the most (without feeling any particular desire to notice anything or to respond to what I did notice) were not such as I used to notice automatically before my incarceration, but precisely the things which corresponded most nearly with the sole possibilities for varied notice when I was in gaol—the minutiae of a wall or stone, the grain of a wooden table, the movements of a piece of waste paper, the odor of a brewery or of a shoeing forge coming on the wind.

(To be continued.)

||

L'expérience démontre avec toute l'évidence possible, cette opinion qui peut paraître paradoxale au premier abord : que c'est la Société qui prépare le crime, et que le coupable n'est que l'instrument qui l'exécute.—
Quéselot.

Experience demonstrates with all possible evidence this opinion, which may appear paradoxical at first, that it is Society which prepares the crime, and that the criminal is only the instrument that carries it into execution.

x

Legislators, fools as blind as those they pretend to conduct, have virtually extinguished all the motives of affection which necessarily should be the binding tie to the forces of humanity. They have prevented all unanimity of foresight, all co-operation for succour, and spread blind care among the separated members of this great body. Their foolish constitutions have exposed mankind to serious risk of losing all. Is it then astonishing that to repel these dangers passions should be excited even to fury?

DIDEROT.

x

Our freedom is the name of our self-will triumphing in our might.

THE PHYSIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR AUTHORITY REFUTED.

— + —

L'AUTONOMIE SELON LA SCIENCE.* AUTONOMY ACCORDING TO SCIENCE.*

Dans les animaux et les végétaux pluricellulaires inférieurs, toutes les cellules sont à peu près indépendantes les unes des autres et exercent à la fois toutes les fonctions; elles se nourrissent à l'aide d'aliments puisés directement dans le milieu ambiant; elles respirent en prenant l'oxygène par ce moyen; elles sont elles-mêmes susceptibles en se divisant ou en bourgeonnant, de reproduire un animal nouveau, etc. Dans les végétaux et animaux supérieurs, au contraire, chaque cellule jouit d'une fonction particulière; les globules du sang, par exemple, sont chargés de transporter l'oxygène dans toutes les parties du corps et d'en rapporter l'acide carbonique; les cellules musculaires ont pour fonction de produire les mouvements des membres et le déplacement du corps; certaines cellules nerveuses reçoivent les impressions du dehors, tandis que d'autres transmettent aux cellules musculaires les excitations qui les font contracter, et que d'autres encore sont le siège des phénomènes auxquels on a donné les noms de volonté, de mémoire, de conscience, etc. Chez ces organismes, certaines cellules et certains organes sont indispensables à l'entretien de la vie, tandis que d'autres n'ont qu'une importance relativement minime. On peut, notamment, enlever à un chien ses quatre membres, toute la face, une grande partie de son cerveau sans le tuer, tandis que la moindre lésion de la

In the lower pluricellular animals and vegetables, all the cells are nearly independent of each other, and at the same time exercise all functions. They are nourished by the aid of aliments drawn directly from the surrounding medium; they breathe by taking in oxygen by this means; they are themselves capable, by fission or gemmation, of reproducing a new animal, etc. In the superior vegetables and animals, on the contrary, each cell plays a particular part; the globules of the blood for example, are charged with transporting oxygen to all parts of the body, and bringing back from them the carbonic acid; the muscular cells have for their function to produce the movements of the members, and the displacement of the body; certain nervous cells receive impressions from outside, whilst others transmit to the muscular cells the excitations which make them contract, and others again are the seat of the phenomena to which the names of will, memory, knowledge, etc. have been given. Amongst these organisms, certain cells and certain organs are indispensable to the maintenance of life, whilst others have only a relatively small importance. It is possible, notably, to deprive a dog of his four limbs, the whole face, and a great part of the brain, without killing him; whilst the least injury to the region of the fourth

* Le Transformisme par J.-L. de Lussan. Paris.

* Extract (translated) from work on Evolution, by J.-L. de Lussan.

Région du 4^{me}. ventricule, qui a reçu le nom de nœud vital, suffit pour déterminer instantanément la mort.

En s'appuyant sur ces faits, les biologistes ont l'habitude de comparer les cellules des organismes pluricellulaires aux citoyens d'un Etat. "Je considère, dit M. Hæckel, tout organisme supérieur, comme un Etat, dont les citoyens sont les cellules individuelles. Dans tout Etat civilisé, les citoyens sont bien, jusqu'à un certain degré, indépendants en tant qu'individus, mais ils dépendent pourtant les uns des autres en vertu de la division du travail et ne laissent pas d'être soumis aux lois communes; de même, dans le corps de tout animal ou végétal supérieur, les cellules microscopiques, en nombre innombrable, jouissent bien jusqu'à un certain point de leur indépendance individuelle, mais elles diffèrent aussi les unes des autres en vertu de la division du travail, elles sont dans un rapport de dépendance réciproque, et subissent, plus ou moins, les lois du pouvoir central de la communauté."

M. Hæckel ajoute: "Cette comparaison excellente et souvent employée, empruntée aux constitutions politiques, n'est pas une vague et lointaine analogie; elle répond bien à la réalité. Les cellules sont de véritables citoyens d'un Etat. La comparaison peut être encore poussée plus loin; nous pouvons considérer le corps de l'animal, avec sa forte centralisation, comme une monarchie cellulaire; l'organisme végétal, plus faiblement centralisé, comme une république cellulaire. De même que la science politique comparée nous présente, dans les différentes formes d'organisation politique de l'humanité, existant encore aujourd'hui, une longue série de perfectionnements progressifs, depuis les hordes grossières des sauvages

ventricule, which has received the name of the "vital knot," suffices to determine death instantaneously.

On the strength of these facts, biologists are in the habit of comparing the cells of the pluricellular organisms to the citizens of a State. "I consider," says Hæckel, "every superior organism as an organised social unity, as a State whose citizens are the individual cells. In every civilized State the citizens are, indeed, to a certain degree, independent as individuals; but they depend, however, upon each other by virtue of the division of labour, and lack not of being subjected to the general laws. In the same way, in the body of every superior animal or vegetable, the microscopic cells, in number innumerable, enjoy indeed to a certain point their individual independence; but they also differ one from another by virtue of the division of labor, they are in a relation of reciprocal dependence, and are more or less under the laws of the central power of the community."

Hæckel adds: "This excellent and oft-employed comparison, borrowed from the political constitutions, is not a vague and far-fetched analogy; it answers well to the reality. The cells are true citizens of a State. The comparison can be again pushed further; we can consider the body of the animal, with its strong centralisation, as a cellular monarchy; the vegetable organism, more feebly centralised, as a cellular republic. Just as comparative political science presents to us, in the different forms of political organisation of humanity, it still existing to-day, a long series of progressive improvements, from the rude hordes of the savages to the most civilised

jusqu'aux Etats les plus civilisés, l'anatomie comparée des plantes et des animaux nous montre également une longue suite de perfectionnements progressifs dans les Etats cellulaires.

"Au bas de l'échelle, au dernier degré d'association et de communauté cellulaire, on rencontre les Algues et les Champignons, les Eponges et les Coraux qui, à considérer la nature rudimentaire de la division du travail et de la centralisation, ne s'élèvent point au-dessus des grossières hordes sauvages. Nous trouvons, au contraire, au sommet de l'évolution, la puissante république de l'arbre, l'admirable monarchie du vertébré, dans lesquels la nature complexe de l'élaboration et de la division du travail des cellules constitutives, donne lieu à l'apparition des organes les plus divers, et où la coordination et la subordination des états sociaux, l'action commune pour le bien général, la centralisation du gouvernement, en un mot l'organisation, ont atteint une étonnante hauteur."

J'ai tenu à reproduire en entier ce passage, parce qu'il contient, à mon avis, une erreur capitale, très répandue parmi les biologistes, et que n'ont pas manqué d'exploiter les partisans de la forme autoritaire des gouvernements.

Si ce que dit M. Hæckel de la "centralisation" des organismes pluricellulaires supérieurs était exacte; si, surtout, l'analogie qu'il établit entre les organismes pluricellulaires et les diverses formes de gouvernements était l'expression d'un fait réel, on devrait conclure que la monarchie la plus centralisée et la plus aristocratique serait la forme d'organisation sociale la plus parfaite, celle vers la constitution de laquelle devraient tendre tous les efforts des sociologistes et des hommes politiques. Il

"States, the comparative anatomy of plants and animals shows us, equally, a long sequence of progressive improvements in the cellular State.

"At the bottom of the scale, with the lowest degree of association and cellular community, we meet with the Algae and the Mushrooms, the Sponges and the Corals, which, considering the rudimentary nature of their division of labor, and centralisation, do not rise above the rudest savage hordes. We find, on the contrary, at the summit of evolution, the mighty republic of the tree, the admirable monarchy of the vertebrate, in which the complex nature of the elaboration and division of labor of the constituent cells gives scope for the appearance of the most diverse organs, and where the co-ordination and subordination of the social states, the action in common for the general good, the centralisation of government—in a word, the organisation—have attained an astonishing height."

I have thought fit to quote this passage at length, because it contains in my opinion an error of the first magnitude, widely disseminated among biologists, and which the partisans of the authoritarian form of governments have not failed to take advantage of.

If what Hæckel says of the "centralisation" of the higher pluricellular organisms were exact; if, above all, the analogy which he sets up between the pluricellular organisms and the diverse forms of governments were the expression of a real fact, we should have to conclude from it that the most centralised and aristocratic monarchy would be the most perfect form of social organisation, that towards the constitution of which all the efforts of sociologists and men of

n'en est heureusement pas ainsi ; l'analogie qu'on a cherchée à établir entre un animal ou un végétal pluricellulaire et une société animale ou humaine est beaucoup plus apparente que réelle. Je pense n'avoir pas de peine à le démontrer, et à prouver que le corps d'un vertébré, d'un homme par exemple, n'est nullement une " monarchie cellulaire," ainsi que le prétendent M. Haeckel, M. Virchow et un grand nombre d'autres biologistes, mais bien une république véritable, dans laquelle une part d'action sur les autres membres de la société revient à chacune des cellules constituantes.

Dans une monarchie absolue, autocratique, toute la puissance est concentrée entre les mains d'un seul individu qui dispose à son gré de la vie, de la propriété, du travail de tous les autres, sans que ces derniers puissent exercer la moindre action sur l'individu qui les gouverne. Dans une monarchie aristocratique, le monarche partage, dans une certaine mesure, son autorité avec un certain nombre d'autres individus ; ceux-ci en dehors de l'indépendance relative qui leur est accordée, mettent leurs forces à la disposition du monarque et contribuent à lui soumettre tout le reste de la société. Dans une monarchie parlementaire ou une république autoritaire, comme la nôtre, le nombre des individus qui commandent aux autres augmente encore considérablement ; il peut même être supérieur à la moitié des citoyens plus un, mais il existe toujours un certain nombre d'individus constituant ce que l'on nomme la minorité, qui ne prennent aucune part à la direction des affaires, ne confectionnent pas les lois, qui, en un mot, n'ont d'autres rôles que d'obéir à la volonté des autres, sans pouvoir réagir contre cette volonté. Celle-ci, en effet, a pour elle

polities ought to tend. Happily, it is not so; the analogy sought to be established between a pluricellular animal or vegetable, and a human or animal society, is much more apparent than real. I think I shall not have much trouble to demonstrate, and to prove that the body of a vertebrate—of a man, for example—is in no wise a "cellular monarchy" as Haeckel, Virchow and a great number of other biologists put forward, but indeed a true commonwealth, in which its part of action upon the other members of the society comes back to each of the constituent cells.

In an absolute, autocratic monarchy, all the power is concentrated in the hands of a single individual, who disposes, at his pleasure, of the life, the property, the labor of all the others, without these latter being able to exercise the least action upon the individual who governs them. In an aristocratic monarchy, the monarch shares, in a certain measure, his authority with a certain number of other individuals; these, outside of the relative independence which is accorded to them, place their forces at the disposal of the monarch, and contribute to make all the rest of society subject to him. In a parliamentary monarchy, or authoritarian republic, like ours, the number of the individuals who command the others is increased again considerably; it may be even greater than the half of the citizens plus one, but there exists always a certain number of individuals constituting what is called the minority, who take no part in the direction of affairs, do not have a finger in the pie of the laws, who, in a word, have no other part than to obey the will of the others, without being able to react against this will, which, in fact, has on its side, not only numbers, but also the public

non-seulement le nombre, mais encore toutes les forces publiques. En résumé, quel que soit le nom que porte un gouvernement centralisé et autoritaire, il existe toujours une fraction plus ou moins considérable des citoyens qui n'ont aucune action sur les autres, qui n'exercent aucune fraction de l'autorité de l'Etat, qui ne peuvent agir d'aucune manière sur les individus dominateurs, et n'ont d'autre rôle que celui d'obéir.

Est-ce une organisation de cette nature que nous présentent les êtres vivants pluricellulaires ? Leurs cellules sont-elles divisées en cellules dominatrices et cellules obéissantes, en maîtres et en sujets ? Tous les faits que nous connaissons répondent négativement avec la plus grande netteté.

Je n'insisterai pas sur l'autonomie réelle dont jouit manifestement chacune des cellules de tout organisme pluricellulaire ; ni M. Haeckel ni personne n'a, en effet, nié cette autonomie, mais il est important de bien mettre en relief la nature des limites dans lesquelles elle s'exerce. Nous verrons aussi qu'elle est beaucoup plus considérable qu'on ne l'admet généralement, et que s'il est vrai que toutes les cellules dépendent les unes des autres, et que les organismes pluricellulaires, même les plus élevés, ne sont, en aucune façon, comparables ni à une monarchie, ni à tout autre forme de gouvernement autoritaire et centralisé.

forces. To sum up, whatever may be the name borne by a centralised and authoritarian government, there exists always a more or less considerable fraction of the citizens who have no action upon the others, who exercise no fraction of the State authority, who cannot act in any manner upon the dominating individuals, and have no other rôle than that of obeying.

Is it an organization of this nature that the pluricellular living beings present to us ? Are their cells divided into dominating cells and obeying cells, into masters and subjects ? All the facts that we know reply negatively with the greatest definiteness.

I shall not insist upon the real autonomy which each of the cells of every pluricellular organism manifestly enjoys; neither Haeckel nor any one has, in fact, denied this autonomy, but it is important to bring into relief the nature of the limits within which it is exercised. We shall see, therefore, that it is much more considerable than is generally admitted, and whether it is true that all the cells depend upon each other, and that the pluricellular organisms, even the highest, are not in any fashion comparable either to a monarchy, or to any other form of authoritarian and centralised government.

(To be continued.)

(à suivre.)

Freedom is the right to be ourselves, in the largest sense, without other limit than the influence of the fact that others are equally themselves. He who obeys authority is not himself, but a part of his ruler.

La liberté, c'est le droit d'être nous-mêmes, dans le sens le plus étendu, sans autre limite que l'influence du fait que les autres sont également eux-mêmes. Celui qui obéit à l'autorité n'est pas lui-même, mais une partie de son gouvernant.

Der Mensch ist ein Naturproduct, seinem körperlichen wie seinem geistigen Wesen nach. Daher lernt nicht bloß das, was er ist, sondern auch das, was er thut, will, empfindet und denkt, auf eben solchen Naturnotwendigkeiten, wie der ganze Bau der Welt. Nur eine oberflächliche und kenntnislose Betrachtung des menschlichen Daseins kommt zu der Ansicht kommen, als sei das Thun der Völker und der Einzelnen der Aufluss eines vollkommen freien und selbstbewussten Willens. Eine tiefere Einsicht dagegen lehrt uns, dass der Zusammenhang des Natürlichen und der Naturnotwendigkeit mit dem Einzelwesen ein so inniger und unabweisbarer ist, dass hier überall von Willkür und freier Entscheidung nur in einem sehr beschränkten Masse die Rede sein kann; sie lehrt uns bestimmte Gesetze in allen Erscheinungen kennen, welche man bisher für Produkte des Zufalls, des freien Willens hielt. "Die menschliche Freiheit, deren Allen sich rühmen," sagt Spinoza, besteht allein darin, dass die Menschen sich ihres Wollens bewusst und der Ursachen, von denen sie bestimmt werden, unbewusst sind."

Wenn dem Menschen nicht immer etwas theurer ist als das Leben, so ist uns Leben nicht viel werth.

Ein leere Spott ist aller Ruhm, geht in todtm Stein,
Wenn uns'ren Helden edelm Geist
das Herz ist nicht ein Schrein,
Vergessen mög' der Name sein, ihr
Staub dem Wind ein Spiel,
Sofern ihr Geist die Menschheit
führt zu einem hehren Ziel.

(Freiheit.)

Man is a product of Nature, alike in his bodily and in his mental constitution. Whence, not only what he is, but also what he does, wills, feels, and thinks, depend on exactly such natural necessities, as the wlied structure of the world. Only a superficial and ignorant contemplation of human existence can reach the view that the doings of nations and individuals are the outcome of a perfectly free and self-conscious will. A deeper study teaches us that the interdependence of the natural, and of natural necessity, with the individual constitution, is so inherent and not to be got away from, that here above all, the application of the terms "arbitrary choice" and "free determination" can only be in a very limited sense; it teaches us to recognize fixed laws in all phenomena which have hitherto been regarded as products of chance or of free-will. "Human free-will, of which all "boast themselves," says Spinoza, "consists only in this; that men are "conscious of their wills, but unconscious of the causes by which the latter are determined."—Büchner.

If to man there is not always something dearer than life, then is life not worth much. — Seneca.

An empty mock the glory is, he who
for the tombstone lies,
If of our heroes' noble soul our heart
is not a shrine,
Forgotten rather be their name, their
dust let breezes roll,
So but their spirit lends mankind on
to a nobler goal.

(Freiheit)

ODE TO TYRANNY.

By J. A. Andrews (reprinted).

Spirit of ill, beneath whose frown
The light of life in gloom fades out,
Hope sinks a hundred fathoms down,
And all men quake in doubt;
Before whose bidding shrink and flee
Worth, honour, love, fraternity —
Even while the hell-fire lights thy
crown,
I worship thee!

I hate—I worship! For thou art
Of Truth the angry messenger,
Though, drunken, thou deny thy part;
And I would follow her.
Thou art the stream that points the
spring
Of want and woe and suffering;
Therefore tie while it wells, my heart
Thy praise shall sing!

While men, from Freedom's fulness
turn,
To bind their will and blight their
weal,
Deeming their fetters, strength, nor
learn.

To trace the pains they feel,
There shalt thou hasten to abide,
As curs oppress the lion tied,
Till in their bonds their eyes discern
Thy sovereign pride.

Till they shall know that not thy
might,
But theirs, wherewith they clasp
their chains,
Gave thee to conquer—that their
Right
Is palsy in thy veins —
Whose will his choice douies, that he
Hath to the spoiling summoned thee,
Thee whom no chains bind—bound
most tight

When they are free —

Till they grow free in will—till deed
Be free from every Error's chain,
So long they are but slaves, though
"freed,"

So long may'st thou remain
Pointing the wrong through agony!
So long, adoring Liberty,
While for thy death I fain would,
bleed,

I worship thee!

CURRENT NOTES.

When I was imprisoned for "seditious libel" in Sydney the presiding judge very distinctly refused to order the confiscation of my printing plant, pamphlets, MSS., etc., and after my release he wrote that he had certainly not made any such confiscatory order. Nevertheless, the authorities absolutely refused to give up anything—unless I took legal proceedings for the recovery, which they knew quite well I had no means of doing, even if there had been any possibility of getting a straightforward trial.

In this way I lost a great number of manuscripts, including those of a purely literary nature which were the absolutely irreplaceable condensation of the best labor of years; manuscripts hoarded with care that only the rarest moments of inspiration might be embodied in them, and but to worthily complete and publish which, I would, before Anarchy became a purpose to me, most literally have willingly laid down my life. This blow would not have fallen upon a rich man, even had there been a legal confiscation, which there was not; for the simple reason that he would not have had his personal effects crowded up with those of a risky printing press in one room,

shared by another man. Probably, indeed, he would not have kept a printing plant at all, but would have got his printing done by one of the big firms that tender for Government contracts, in which case it is safe to say no seizure would even have been suggested.

Of course, this did not surprise me. I remembered what Jean Grave said in *La Révolte*, that it is nonsense to trouble ourselves about legality, for there will be no legality for us when the rulers seriously try to silence our propaganda. Moreover, I was in New South Wales, the Prison Colony, where an amount of political and official despotism over the individual prevails, that is almost inconceivable to Victorians, whose rulers, with the notorious exception of a few mere adventurers, have been men who have imbibed from a healthier social atmosphere a moral sentiment of public liberty and equality, which the corrupting influences of power have rarely been able to utterly eradicate from their instincts.

I was, however, certainly surprised to be told by a something or other high up in the detective office (who tried to get rid of me by the deliberate lie that the things had been forfeited and destroyed, whereas they were in the custody of his subordinates on the off chance of my having support to take effective legal steps to compel restitution) that he was a BRITISHER, he was; to which he contemptuously added, he supposed I was Australian. From this it appears that beneath its political constitution, New South Wales is really a foreign possession, over whose inhabitants a few snobs from a damp European island are to lord it as they do over the Hindoos. I came back to Victoria for the reason, as much as any, that even our Govern-

ments have had enough of a certain spirit of local independence as to get at times into strained diplomatic relations with the Octopus Empire.

The incident above mentioned seems to pretty well sum up the Boer difficulties in South Africa. "I'm a Britisher, I am," stands for everything. There has been a gold boom, and, related to it, a land boom, and in consequence a lot of British subjects have swarmed into the Boer territories, bringing with them different manners and different social traditions. They want to upset the Boer institutions, in order to introduce laws and usages which will facilitate their quest for gold, whether in the ground or in other people's pockets, and enable them to swamp and shark the country.

Hence they are clamoring loudly for Political Rights, with a brazen effrontery that is simply paralyzing when one remembers how beautifully ready the Britisher is to give political rights to aliens coming within his territory, or even to acknowledge any political rights on the part of his fellow-Britishers who quit his company and build up a community of their own. What political rights has the Britisher given free welcome with to the Frenchman, the German, the Chinaman, the Hindoo? What would a single colony have done *within itself* but for the revolt of America, and but for the ominous storms that were visibly brewing in Australia's early history? "I'm a Britisher—a boss Britisher—and I have naturally all the rights I like to claim. Everybody else has naturally all the rights I like to leave him!"

And with what measureless hypocrisy a pretext is made that the Boers have been ill-treating the

blacks! as if a company of British sharks had not, only the other day, exterminated in one vast machine-gun massacre a whole nation of the blacks, and had not, before the blood had had time to clot, pegged out land boom subdivisions over the still writhing bodies!

The difficulty however is an apt illustration of the illogical and arbitrary nature of "political rights." Were there nothing of the kind to be in question on either side, if the British chose to immigrate into Dutch territory, the individuals would speedily find a *modus vivendi*, a way of living after their respective fashions without intolerably clashing; until by mutual contact and natural selection their customs would have become assimilated. On the actual basis of things, however, we get a dilemma.

If the Boers, having political rights, deny them to the immigrants, these hold the inferior position of Chinamen in Australia or Australians in China, and the modifying influence of their contact with Boers can take not even a local effect on politically guaranteed views and institutions, unless and until the majority of the Boers *everywhere* can be so persuaded.

By granting the political rights, on the other hand, the Boers would, in view of the rapid immigration, be condemning themselves to the same subordinate position, in their own country, and conferring on strangers with different acquired habits of looking at things, thinking, feeling and acting, the privilege of riding roughshod over them.

Some time back I wrote to the *Beacon* replying to its advocacy of Interest. In its current issue I find the following:—

Argument.....too technical for reproduction in the Beacon. Moreover, it loses in value through several erroneous assumptions. You say, for instance, that "before a single piece of money could be put in circulation someone must have given credit." This surely is wrong. A miner takes gold to the mint, gets it coined into money, and orders a pair of boots, on the completion of which he hands over a sovereign to the bootmaker. Surely that coin is in circulation, has been circulated, and no credit has as yet been given or accepted.

Money is not wealth, but a title to some not yet obtained. How can a TITLE to what one has not, be given by a completed exchange? The gold is not accepted as a barterable commodity in itself, but as representing a Bill of Exchange drawn on and endorsed by Society—to the vast majority of people a sovereign has not even a remotely contingent utility as metal, the quantity in circulation is immeasurably in excess of all demand for gold as metal (otherwise it could not keep on circulating), and the immediate competitive value of a sovereign in the metal market were gold everywhere totally demonetised, would be less than a penny. The bootmaker supplied the boots on credit, only he did not trust the miner, he trusted Society, which paid (at its own expense, the gold being no real equivalent) as he spent the money. If he had accepted the sovereign to make a gold ring of, there would have been "no credit as yet given or accepted," but as it would have been a case of mere barter the gold would not have been functioning as money.

J. A. A.

"Professor" Davis the cancer specialist, now awaiting trial on the charge of manslaughter, for the

reason that he did hasten the death of a cancer patient by the unskilful use of certain drugs, was not a legally qualified member of the medical fraternity.

An advertisement now appearing in the Melbourne papers, to the effect that a medical company in the U S America, are prepared—providing the afflicted persons journey thither—to undertake the cure of “secondary” blood poisoning, caused by the use of drugs such as Iodide of Potassium, mercury, etc; drugs which are a prominent item in the *caduc mecum* of the legally qualified medical practitioner; and which usually cause more trouble than the “primary” blood poisoning sought to be eradicated! leads one to infer that had the “Professor” been duly qualified, there probably would have been no question as to whether the unskilful use of the drugs or the disease itself was the cause of death.

On the subject of healing by faith or magic, which has become a popular form of credulity in this all round disengaged age, the Argus, in a recent article, sums up the question thus: “We must surely conclude that the human race is rich in credulity; and in good nature. But is just about bankrupt in common sense.”

Credulity here may prove more of a blessing than otherwise, providing they cultivate corresponding amount of incredulity in regard to the beneficial effects of the drugs generally administered by either the legal or illegal brethren of the art of medicine.

According to the “Morgue statistics” the number of suicides in the City of Melbourne during 1895 was 284; Not above the average, remarked the City Coroner. As usual, the larger number are said to be caused by

“drink.” Were the average individual possessed of a little of that commodity which—the Argus says—they have gone bankrupt in, the compilation of statistics on such subjects would probably be placed before us in a more instructive manner; but since the average individual has got it down his neck that the general cause of suicide is drink or insanity, it is hardly to be expected that the teachers of modern “societary ethics, who have themselves, only sufficient life-force to keep them from premature putrefaction, would have the moral courage to inform them that their accepted traditions were exploded; also to inform the said average individual that probably the “drink” was experimented in as a temporary palliative, but being a commercial article, and subject to commercial treatment, in the interest of vendors’ profits and State revenue, it proved to be more of a devilish draught of misery, than a cheering gift of the Gods; thus the afflicted party concludes to protest in the most effective manner possible to him, by ceasing to be a member of society.

It is evident that life even in these days is considered more of a martyrdom than a blessing. And since modern political economy accepts the Malthusian doctrine, which states, “a man coming into the world unprovided for, and Society not requiring his labor, he is really one too many on the earth, and that he had better “take himself out of it,” why practise the hypocrisy of holding a person guilty of a misdemeanour, in accepting the decree of Society and effecting to take himself away? instead of giving every facility by painless methods, to those inclined that way?

RIVULET.

Existing Society is based on law

VARIETIES.

In the Advance of Civilization Do Races Die Out?

How did man, at first so poorly armed, win the earth over animals with huge claws, sharp teeth, and ever-ready weapons? How did he vanquish the felines, better clad and more supple than himself? We are ignorant of this conquest; but we only know that man was more intelligent than the other beasts of prey. And how is it that the human race has not annihilated itself since in warfare, slaughtering for the sake of slaughter? How many times the charnel house of death has been filled; and how many times more will it be filled; yet in spite of arrow, pike and lance, in spite of shot and shell, in spite of pestilence, and fever, and debauchery, in spite of himself, man is more vigorous to-day than ever before, he is overspreading the entire globe. Not the whole race, but certain of its families, especially the whites of Europe, on whose banner is written: “Take, kill, and eat.” The Europeans and their American descendants are driving the small peoples to the slambies, or to the hospital. Every day sees a tribe, a myth, an Idea, obliterated. Thus we colonise, thus we civilise. But though the Idea, the myth, the dialect of a people be blotted out, the death of a people itself is only in appearance. A race never becomes wholly extinct, and it is very seldom that even the pettiest tribe is completely effaced. Its language is swept away, its names are replaced by those of foreigners, its altars are overturned, its laws forgotten, but the soul of the tribe survives with the blood of its most powerful families. If the soldier, the hunter, the adventurer, law and

poverty, leave never so little of vigor to a few of the vanquished, these penetrate in their turn into the victorious race, sometimes by lawful marriage, but more often by chance unions. The half-castes springing from these alliances cling tenaciously to the native soil, they grow up more robust than the children of the conquerors, and, at length, the nation which was thought to be extirpated has its roots ineradicably fixed in the mother land. Among the Anglo-Saxons, who of all the exterminating nations are least inclined to ally themselves with their savage victims, not a single race has in fact perished. The Indians live in numberless white homes in the United States, and the day when it shall be said that the last redskin has expired, that day the blood of the Six Nations, and of scores of other apparently lifeless tribes, will be coursing in the veins of thousands of families who boast of their English ancestry. Even the Tasmanians, scrupulously banished to the last individual, have left half-breed descendants dispersed throughout Australia.

It sometimes happens in America, in Africa, Asia, Australia, even in Europe, that there suddenly appears in a family supposed to be of pure blood, a child of singular visage, the offshoot of some seemingly dead nation. By his birth, this child protests against centuries of injustice. The superior nation had forgotten betrayed hospitalities, violated oaths, blazing forests, men drowned, women massacred, children trained against the walls, and history was mute. “But,” we read in holy writ, “if these hold their peace, the very stones will cry out.” This sure though hidden survival of races rid the world’s history of some of its bitterness.

Onésime Redus, in
A Birds-Eye View of the World.

Such is the feebleness of the human mind that the best causes are oftentimes gained only by bad arguments.—Renan.

In a discussion on the New Zealand estimates, some of the members thought it wrong that the inspector of asylums should receive a larger salary than the Premier. One member put the matter plainly. "If the inspector of asylums," said he, "gets so much for looking after a few lunatics, the Premier should get a great deal more for looking after this House."

PROBLEMS IN LOGIC.

Our Readers are invited to send in logical solutions, which should be expressed as tersely as possible.

1. By induction from the facts of individual existence it is established that well-being requires each individual to be free to live according to his own initiative. By a like induction, giving regard to the interdependence of individuals, it is inferred that each individual has the right, in his own interest, of modifying the lives of the rest. What is really indicated?

2. It is proved that every person has, independently of anyone else, a natural right (propriety of freedom) to avail himself of any natural resources whatever. Also, it is proved that the resources capable of being used by different individuals—other things being equal—differ in favorableness. Does this establish a specific collective ownership of natural resources by the community against the individual, or not?

OLD FRIENDS.

Jean Grave, of La Révolte, having shared in the amnesty of French political prisoners, is back at 140 Rue Mouffétard, Paris, where there is now issued a new weekly entitled *Les Temps Nouveaux* (see our back page). London *Freedom*, he writes, has been resuscitated; but we have not yet the address. The persecution of opinions, he says, has ceased in Europe, with the exception of Italy.

Since the above was set up in type we find from *Les Temps Nouveaux* that the address of *Freedom* is now No. 7 Lamb's Conduit St., London, W. C., England. Several other libertarian papers are announced, some being old friends re-established and quite a number new children of the world's thought.

NOTICES.

In consequence of an accident and other difficulties incidental to a first number, this issue of REASON appears at the wrong end of the month. To avoid future anomaly, the issue to appear a month hence will be called the March number.

The subscription to REASON is 2/6 for twelve months, in advance. Single copies, 3d. Liberal commission to Vendors, and Societies, etc., taking a quantity. Prompt payment is absolutely necessary.

Correspondence should be addressed to THE EDITORS of REASON, 4 Rule Street, Richmond, Victoria. Communications intended for publication should arrive by the middle of the month.

J. A. Andrews, printer and publisher,
4 Rule-st., Richmond, Victoria.

Reason

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF SOCIAL AND
GENERAL PHILOSOPHY.

The following BOOKS, PERIODICALS, etc., may be ordered through this office at the prices (which include all postage) respectively indicated, which must accompany orders for transmission abroad :

Le Transformisme, by De Lanessan (see our page 17) 10/-

La Lutte pour l'Existence et l'Association
pour la Lutte, same author, 2/6.

Les Temps Nouveaux, libertarian weekly, similar in its
general purpose to REASON, and contributed to by Kropotkin,
Jean Grave, Elie Reclus, Elisée Reclus, Octave Mirbeau, &c.,
quarterly 4/-, half-yearly 7/-, yearly 12/-

London Freedom, monthly, 2/- per year.

All works reviewed or noticed in REASON we can procure for our readers at published prices with necessary postage, etc., added.

The Criminal (Havelock Ellis), Primitive Folk (Elie Reclus), The Man of Genius (Lombroso), 3/6 each, with postage added where necessary.

On hand, a few remaining copies of Temple Mystic and Other Poems, by J. A. Andrews, slightly soiled, post free 1/-

Printed and published by J. A. Andrews, 4 Rule St., Richmond, Victoria.

Reason

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF SOCIAL AND
GENERAL PHILOSOPHY.

PUBLICATIONS.

From Portland, Oregon, N. Pacific Slope, U.S.A., we have received a libertarian paper "The Firebrand," for the burning away of the cobwebs of ignorance and superstition." It is published weekly at fifty cents (2/1) per year, which would be about 5/- here including money exchange and postage. Can be ordered through us, or direct from P.O. Box 477, Portland, Oregon, U.S.A. Its perusal would benefit Australians.

Les Temps Nouveaux, libertarian weekly, similar in its general purpose to Reason, and contributed to by Kropotkin, Jean Grave, Elie Reclus, Elisée Reclus, Octave Mirbeau, &c. quarterly 4/-, half-yearly 7/-, yearly 12/-, through us, covering all expenses, or direct from 140, Rue Mouffétard, Paris, on receipt of P.O. for eight francs net for one year.

London Freedom, monthly, 2/- per year, from 7 Lamb's Conduit Street, London, W.C., England; or through us, 2/6.

If we get a few subscribers to the above we can reduce the local cost to published rates of subscription for transmission to outside the country where published. That depends on having regular arrangements.

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On hand, a few remaining copies of Temple Mystic and Other Poems, by J. A. Andrews, slightly soiled, post free 1/-

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"The Social Question Not A Class Question" has been stereotyped, and friends wishing to have copies for distribution, in the form of a four page leaflet, can be supplied at cost, 1/- per hundred, 7/6 per thousand.

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